

History of Intelligence Activities in Queensland from September 1939 to September 1945

PART IV SECURITY

GENERAL

As stated in Part I, up to March, 1941 the responsibility of General Staff (Intelligence) in relation to security matters was divided into two parts, viz:-

- (a) Internal security
- (b) Military security

The responsibilities under (a) are summarised as follows:

(i) Investigation and action, e.g. surveillance, prosecution, restriction or internment, to control hostile, alien, subversive and pacifist individuals, classes of individuals, or organisations,

(ii) Investigation and action in connection with sabotage,

(iii) Administration of -

National Security (Aliens Control) Regulations,

National Security (General) Regulations,

National Security (Change of Name) Regulations.

National Security (Firearms and Explosives) Regulations,

National Security (Subversive Associations) Regulations.

(iv) Passport Control

(v) Checking the character and bona fides of all persons engaged in Government establishments, and in industries vital to the war effort, whether under Government or private control.

(vi) Checking all persons in positions having access to information of a secret nature, or with the opportunity of conveying messages for information to the enemy, e.g. wireless, broadcasting, etc.

(vii) Security measures regarding admission to factories or establishments engaged in war production, including direction as to any system of passes, and requests for the provision of adequate guards.

(viii) Security of all wharves and ships alongside (from the shore side only), and checking all applications for permits and licences to enter wharves and shipping.

(ix) Scrutiny, and any action necessary in connection with persons within or in the vicinity of Prohibited and Protected places and vulnerable points.

- (x) Investigation and actions in connection with leakage of information of value to the enemy.
- (xi) Investigation of undesirable rumours, and any action necessary to check them.
- (xii) Security aspect of immigration.
- (xiii) Scrutiny and (in conjunction with RAN) any action necessary in connection with seamen who signed on in Australia, or if signed on outside Australia, were discharged on arrival of the ship in Australia.
- (xiv) Security aspect of applications for naturalisation.

The responsibilities under (b) related to security of information, operations, personnel and material.

As stated in Part I, in June 1942, the responsibilities set out above were taken over by Commonwealth Security Service, except in those cases where military personnel were concerned, and in such instances General Staff (Intelligence) co-operated with Security Service in the investigation. The general principle was that when enquiries in connection with what may have begun as an investigation affecting military security led to the investigations amongst the civilian population, the matter was referred to Security Service for further action, or the collaboration of the latter obtained in pursuing enquiries by means of military personnel.

The only part of Queensland where the Army retained responsibility for internal security was that part of the State, and the islands adjacent thereto lying North of latitude 12 degrees South, which was declared by the Minister to be an area to which National Security (Emergency Control) Regulations should apply. Throughout the relevant period this area was administered by First Aust Army and the General Staff (Intelligence) had, therefore no responsibility for either internal security or military security from the date of such declaration - viz. 6th April 1942. (It will be noted that this was prior to the transfer of responsibilities to Security Service).

Search of Premises

Prior to the outbreak of war General Staff (Intelligence), with its limited resources, had compiled dossiers and files so far as was practicable relating to persons and organisations suspected of subversive tendencies, and this work was rapidly expanded in the early days of the war. Arrangements were made with the Commonwealth Investigation Branch and the Commissioner of Police to obtain all available information relating to these matters and Field Security Police were utilised in making investigations. Reports were also obtained from Military Reporting Officers (see Pt 8) on these subjects. The GOC held a delegation under National Security (General) Regulation 79 to issue a warrant for the search of any premises where he had reasonable ground for suspecting that a war offence had been committed. Warrants issued by the GOC under this authority were executed by an Intelligence Officer accompanied by members of the Field Security Police, except in isolated localities where the warrant was delivered to the Commissioner of Police and executed under arrangements made by him. The premises of all suspected enemy organisations were searched under this provision, and in addition a number of private homes occupied by persons suspected of having enemy sympathies were also searched. By these means in many instances evidence was obtained upon which action was taken to intern or restrict the individual concerned. It is suggested that if it should again become necessary for General Staff (Intelligence) to undertake searches of premises of suspected persons or organisations, only in very exceptional cases should civilian police be used unless accompanied by Intelligence Officers. Past experience has shown that, unless carefully directed, civilian police usually do not know what constitutes material of interest to Military Intelligence.

Arrest for Internment

In the case of enemy aliens, when sufficient evidence had been obtained to justify a recommendation for action, a complete dossier was prepared containing all statements, statutory declarations and other evidence, e.g. Nazi or Fascist emblems, correspondence or other documents found in the possession of the individual, and such dossier was submitted to the Chief Legal Officer for opinion. After March, 1941, the recommendation of Security Service was also obtained. The completed file was then submitted to the GOC with a recommendation for internment or restriction of the individual, according to the nature of the evidence available. If the GOC was satisfied, an appropriate order was made which was then executed by an IO accompanied by members of the Field Security Police, who arrested the individual and at the same time conducted a search of the premises. The individual was conveyed by the Intelligence Officer to the Internment Camp located at Gaythorne, where I(b) interviewed him and prepared all administrative documents including the personal dossier of the internee. In the cases of persons other than enemy aliens a similar procedure was followed, except that as the GOC had no executive powers a recommendation was prepared by General Staff (Intelligence) to be forwarded to Army Headquarters for consideration by the Minister. When the Minister made an order, the subsequent procedure above was carried out.

Sabotage

Any suspected cases of sabotage were investigated by I(b) in collaboration with the Commonwealth Investigation Branch, the Civil Police, and, subsequent to March, 1941, Security Service. Although many such reports were enquired into, no direct evidence was obtained that sabotage had in fact occurred, the incidents being mainly due to carelessness or negligence of a minor degree.

Passport Examination

An officer of I(b) carried out the duties of Passport Officer during the period when this was the responsibility of General Staff (Intelligence) and he met all ships making Brisbane the first and last port of call in Australia. The Passport Officer maintained close contact with Naval Control who advised when vessels were due to arrive, and then, accompanied by an officer of the Commonwealth Investigation Branch, he boarded the vessel at a point approximately 2 hours steaming time from its berth. The Passport Officer obtained the passenger and crew list, and checked visas on all passports. The officer of the Commonwealth Investigation Branch checked the passengers and crew with the Black List held by him, and, in any case of doubt, arrangements were made by the Intelligence Officer with the Captain to have the individual kept on board until the question had been further investigated. In the case of vessels leaving Brisbane as a last port of call the Passport Officer boarded the vessel one hour before sailing time and made a similar check of passports, and also checked the crew list. In order to carry out his duties efficiently, it was necessary for the Passport Officer to maintain close co-operation with the Customs Department, all Consuls, Shipping Agents, and the Navigation and Lighthouse Service.

Security Checks on Civilians

In connection with the Security measures referred to in sub-paras (v) and (vi) above, reports were obtained from the Commonwealth Investigation Branch and the Police Department, and where necessary further enquiries were made by personnel of the Field Security Police. In any cases where the result of the investigation warranted such course, the Department or organisation concerned was informed that for Security reasons it was undesirable for the particular individual to be employed, or to be continued in that employment.

Security of War Industries or Vulnerable Points

In connection with the security of factories or establishments engaged in war production, or essential undertakings, e.g. Electric Light, Gas and Water Supply, General Staff (Intelligence) made a survey of all such premises and undertakings and subsequently made recommendations to General Staff for the provision of adequate guards which were supplied by the Garrison Brigade. Similar recommendations were made with regard to the provision of guards at Prohibited and Protected Places, and vulnerable points, e.g. the Indooroopilly Railway Bridge. It was the duty of I(b) to visit all such guards from time to time to ensure that their duties were being properly performed, and to decide whether any of such guards should be increased or reduced to the nature of the circumstances.

Security of Wharves and Shipping

Prior to 1942 no overseas embarkation of troops had taken place in Queensland, and the control of wharves and shipping was carried out by the Deputy Director of Lighthouses and Navigation under National Security Regulation 7A. This officer issued all permits, but in pursuance of the Regulation he authorised two named officers of General Staff (Intelligence) together with the Intelligence Officers at Townsville and Cairns to issue permits in respect of military personnel.

In the early stages guards were provided at the wharves in Brisbane when vessels were unloading cargoes of military importance and, in conjunction with the Commonwealth Investigation Branch, all applications for entry to the wharves were scrutinised by General Staff (Intelligence). When the New Guinea campaign commenced, the security of wharves and shipping became a major question of military security. Whenever embarkation or disembarkation of troops was being effected, control of the wharf was taken over by the Army, existing permits held by civilian personnel were suspended for the period and only permits issued by General Staff (Intelligence) were recognised. On many occasions embarkations were effected at short notice, making it impossible for permits to be issued to civilians having business to attend to at the ship, and, in order to prevent dislocation, an officer of I(b) was stationed at the wharf to allow permit holders to enter the wharf if, in his opinion, the nature of their duties required them to be present. I(b) kept in close contact with Movement Control to ascertain when the vessels were due to depart or arrive. A request was then made to General Staff for provision of adequate guards for the wharf concerned, and I(b) gave the guards the necessary instructions as to their duties. If the vessel was carrying Allied as well as Australian Troops, the Intelligence Officer on the Allied forces was requested to furnish a guard to work in conjunction with the guard provided by our own forces. Personnel of the Field Security Section were also allocated for controls. Arrangements were also made by I(b) with the Police Department to control civilians and civilian traffic in the vicinity of the wharf and to remove all hawkers and itinerant vendors, who were mainly of alien origin. It was also arranged with the Water Police for a boat patrol to be maintained on the river alongside the ship. The only other ports used in Queensland were Townsville and Cairns and similar arrangements were made and supervised by the Intelligence Officers in such areas. It was found from experience that this system was effective and caused the least inconvenience to the civilian community.

Naturalisation and Land Transfer

Applications for naturalisation of aliens and applications under the National Security (Change of Name) Regulations, and also applications by persons of alien origin, for the acquisition or transfer of land located in the vicinity of defence area were referred to General Staff (Intelligence) for consideration from the security or defence angle. All of such applications were investigated and the department concerned informed as to whether or not there was any objection.

Security Check of Volunteers for A.I.F.

Prior to 1942 the military security problem was of a minor nature owing to the small number of troops in the area. Enlistments in the A.I.F. were scrutinised by General Staff (Intelligence) before the personnel were called up. Security posters and material for lectures were distributed through Unit Security Officers and a list of the latter was maintained by I(b). In the absence of trained FS personnel there was little organised security instruction for troops, and military establishments were not kept under continuous supervision.

Raising of Field Security Sections

In 1942 authority was received for the raising of three Field Security Sections on the Order of Battle, and such sections were raised and trained by the GSO 3 (Ib) for duty in this area. When these sections had completed their training, it was decided to employ them on an area basis along the Line of Communication from South Queensland to Cairns. One section was stationed in Brisbane with a detachment at Maryborough and Toowoomba; one section was stationed at Rockhampton with a detachment at Gladstone; and the other section was stationed at Townsville with a detachment at Cairns. Later another section was placed under command and was stationed at Cairns, with a detachment at Mareeba and Innisfail respectively. The arrival of these sections enabled the full duties of military security to be performed as will appear later in the Part.

Safe Hand Despatch

Up to 1944 Safe Hand Despatches were handled on behalf of this Headquarters by I(b), and during the relevant period all secret documents to and from GHQ, South-West Pacific Area, Adv LHQ, First Aust Army, and New Guinea Force were dealt with. This work required close cooperation with the civil airways, both internal and external, the RAAF and the USAAF. Documents for onward transmission had to be collected and handed to the pilot of the aircraft and a code signal despatched to the addressee advising the despatch of the document. In the case of aircraft leaving for New Guinea the documents were handled by the Intelligence Officers at Townsville and Cairns respectively. Whilst the Headquarters of senior formations were in this area such work was most arduous, but by the end of 1943, GHQ had established its own courier service which relieved General Staff (Intelligence) of the bulk of the work. Early in 1944 this Headquarters established a Message Centre which took over these duties. It is considered that the handling of Safe Hand despatches should be the function of a GSO (SD) and not form part of the functions of General Staff (Intelligence).

Cipher Section

Up to the end of 1941 a small cipher section was attached to General Staff (Intelligence), but it was under the operational control of the Chief Signal Officer. The duties of this section were as follows:-

- (a) Enciphering and deciphering all secret messages,
- (b) Custody of all codes and ciphers on charge, and documents in connection therewith,
- (c) Under Instructions from AHQ, issuing codes and ciphers to Formations, Censorship and Staffs, and all amendments thereto,
- (d) Issue of key words,
- (e) Issue of Unit code names.

Control of Pigeons

The Cipher Section controlled the issue of permits under National Security (General) Regulation 12 for the keeping, breeding and racing of homing pigeons and the holding of pigeon races. This work was carried out in conjunction with the Carrier Pigeon Section of Aust Corps of Signals. Early in 1942 the whole of the cipher personnel were transferred to Aust Corps of Signals and the duties relating to the control of pigeons was taken over by I(b). With the assistance of FS personnel, civil police and Military Reporting Officers (see Pt 8), a general survey was made of the whole area and a register compiled of all owners of pigeons. At a later date this responsibility was also transferred to Security Service, to whom all records were delivered.

Military Security Conferences

When Adv LHQ and First Aust Army, together with a number of Allied Formation Headquarters arrived in this Area in 1942, it was considered desirable to co-ordinate the work of military security. For this purpose the GSO 1 (Int) convened a standing conference which was attended by an Intelligence Officer of RAN, RAAF, Adv LHQ, First Aust Army, 1 Aust Corps, USAFFE, 8 US Army, Base Section 3, USA, and any other Formations from time to time in the area. The conference was held each month at which all security questions were discussed and the necessary action co-ordinated. In cases where action was required to be taken by any particular Formation, the conference made a recommendation which was then submitted to the Formation by its representative. This conference proved to be of considerable value as it enabled effective steps to be taken promptly. It also enabled all Formations represented to be clearly informed of their respective responsibilities, and resulted in the saving of time and correspondence. After the first meeting Security Service was represented at the conference. The direction of the conference was eventually taken over by Adv LHQ, but it remained in existence until the majority of the Formations moved out of the area. It is understood that as a result of the work performed by this conference, a similar system was adopted by New Guinea Force in that area. Towards the end of 1942 a similar arrangement was made at Townsville and Cairns respectively where this Headquarters was represented by the local Intelligence Officer.

In addition to the above, the GSO 1 (Int) also arranged a conference which was held weekly, and was attended by the Intelligence officers of RAN, RAAF, and Base Section 3, USA. This conference discussed all questions of local security affecting the services mentioned. By this means the responsibility for action could be decided without delay and the necessary action taken forthwith. This arrangement continued until GHQ, SWPA, moved out of the area. It is believed that this system could be employed with advantage in any situation where a similar set of circumstances might arise.

Allocation of Naturalised Subjects in Army

One aspect of military security which required special precautions related to naturalised British subjects of enemy origin who were liable to be called up under the Defence Act by reason of their British nationality. By arrangement with "A" Branch the following safeguards were adopted with regard to these persons:-

- (a) No undue proportion of such personnel be allotted to any unit, or sub-unit,
- (b) Such personnel were not to be employed on any Headquarters,
- (c) All such personnel to be kept under discreet surveillance through Unit Security Officers.

Area Officers in localities where it was known that a large number of this class of persons resided were instructed to maintain contact with units in their area in order to ensure that sub-para (a) was not put into effect. Subsequent to the entry of Japan into the war General Staff (Intelligence) arranged through "A" Branch to have all Australia-born personnel who were the sons of unnaturalised Italians, and who were serving in Infantry Battalions in North Queensland, re-allotted to an Employment Company which was allocated for duty in South Queensland, and which Company was not to be employed in an operational area. The Company was kept under surveillance by Field Security personnel and the security risk was thus diminished.

ALIENS

Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities the National Security Act was proclaimed and Regulations and Orders were made under that Act for the control of Aliens. The relevant legislation was as follows:-

- National Security (Aliens Control) Regulations,
- National Security (Aliens Service) Regulations,
- Aliens Landing Order,
- Aliens Embarking Order,
- Aliens Restriction (Fishing Vessels and other small craft) Order,
- Aliens Movement Order,
- Aliens Control (Prohibited Possessions) Order,
- Aliens (Queensland Curfew) Order, (Note: Queensland only),
- National Security (Change of Name) Regulations,
- National Security (Land Transfer) Regulations,
- Enemy Aliens' Communications Order.

Up to March, 1941, Military Intelligence was responsible for any security work required under the above legislation.

Registration of Aliens

Under the Aliens Control Regulations every alien (as defined in the Regulations) resident in Australia was required to register as an Alien, and every Alien who entered Australia, either as a passenger or a member of a the crew of an overseas vessel or aircraft was required to register himself at the first port of call or aerodrome in Australia. At the outset it was intended that the registration of aliens was to be a function of General Staff (Intelligence), but as the resources of the latter were deemed to be insufficient for the purpose, it was arranged through the Department of the Army with the Commissioner of Police for all officers in charge of Police Stations to become Aliens Registration Officers. An Aliens Registration Central Bureau was installed at the Roma Street Police Station and was manned by personnel of the Police Department, the cost being debited to the Department of the Army under the above arrangement. The Water Police were appointed Aliens Registration Officers in respect of incoming vessels, and they handled all aliens arriving in Australia.

This system not only relieved General Staff (Intelligence) of considerable administrative work, but it enable a complete survey of aliens throughout the State to be made by Police Officers who were well acquainted with the situation in their particular districts. It is believed that this system, which was common throughout Australia, was the best available to meet the situation, and no change is recommended.

All administrative work was performed by the Aliens Registration Officers thus enabling General Staff (Intelligence) to concentrate upon the task of investigating and supervising the subversive activities of enemy aliens. I(b) maintained close liaison with the Officer-in-Charge of the Aliens Registration Central Bureau, and any reported breaches of the Regulation were brought to the notice of the latter. The Alien Registration Central Bureau furnished periodical statistical returns showing the number of aliens by nationalities, and was in a position to keep I(b) informed on all questions relating to activities by any aliens.

GOC's Advisory Committee on Aliens

In the early stages the GOC appointed an Advisory Committee, on which General Staff (Intelligence) was represented, to deal with any doubtful questions arising in connection with any internment or restriction order made in respect of an alien, and to act as a Committee of Review in relation to objections or appeals made by the alien. The Committee also classified aliens according to their security rating, with particular reference to "Stateless" and "Refugee" aliens who raised objections to being dealt with as enemy aliens. When the regulations were amended, setting up Aliens Tribunals and giving the right of appeal against any internment or restriction order, the Committee was abolished.

Preparation of Dossiers

Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities, I(b) concentrated on the task of preparing dossiers in respect of Germans which contained all available information obtained from the Commonwealth Investigation Branch, Police Department, reports by FSP and MROs (see Pt 8), Special Agents, and individual members of the community. In connection with the latter, the individuals were interviewed, and wherever possible, Statutory Declarations were obtained in support of the allegation. When sufficient evidence became available to justify such course, a recommendation was made to the GOC for the issue of a warrant to search the premises of the alien. Arrangements were also made with the District Censor for the mail of the suspected person and any known associates to be kept under special scrutiny for a specific period, and any information obtained from this source was added to the dossier.

Legal Officer attached to GS (Int)

In order to assist General Staff (Intelligence) with the work of restriction and internment of aliens, arrangements were made with "A" Branch for an officer of the Australian Army Legal Department (later designated Australian Army Legal Corps) to be called up for part-time duty. This officer not only perused all files relating to aliens and discussed doubtful cases with the Chief Legal Officer, but he also represented the Army at appeals heard by Aliens Tribunals against any order made by the GOC or the Minister. The majority of such appeals were heard in Sydney or Adelaide, where the internees were being held, and on such occasions this officer and I(b) were sent to such places, taking with them all files and other documents relating to the appeal. It is considered that should General Staff (Intelligence) at any time in the future become responsible for the internment or restriction of aliens, a similar arrangement would be of considerable value.

Preventive Internment

Up to the end of 1941, the policy laid down by AHQ was that no action was to be taken in respect of any aliens unless definite evidence of subversive action, to an extent which would enable the Tribunal to dis-allow any objections or appeal against the order. Early in 1942, because of the large number of Italians resident in North Queensland and the possibility of an invasion by the Japanese, this policy was altered and a policy of what was described as "Preventive Internment" adopted. The general effect of this decision was that all aliens with a former anti-British history were to be interned forthwith, and that instead of individual recommendations for internment of naturalised British subjects and others, classified lists of names with the information available were to be forwarded to AHQ, and that signed detention orders would be held by this Command in respect of persons in this class, but that these orders would not be executed until the situation appeared to warrant such course.

When this policy was adopted, General Staff (Intelligence) perused all records held in respect of enemy aliens, and obtained reports from the police, Security Service, and local Intelligence Officers regarding the conduct and potential danger of enemy alien communities in the coastal areas extending from Mackay to Cooktown. It was eventually decided by the GOC upon the recommendation of General Staff (Intelligence) to intern all enemy aliens of military age residing in that particular area. The warrants were executed by the police in conjunction with the local Intelligence Officer, and the internees were brought to Gaythorne Internment Camp by special trains. Altogether up to the time when this responsibility was handed over to the Security Service, a total of 3,409 persons were interned in Queensland, and there is little doubt that the implementation of the above policy considerably allayed public alarm at the possibility that the activities of such persons would adversely affect the national war effort. It is of interest to note that the majority of aliens interned under this policy publicly proclaimed their sympathies with the enemy cause, and very few of them were successful in appeals against the orders for detention.

Aliens (Queensland Curfew) Order

As an additional security measure, the Aliens (Queensland Curfew) Order was issued, which directed that no enemy alien resident in this State should be outside his place of residence between the hours of 8 o'clock in the evening and 5 o'clock in the morning unless granted an exemption from such restriction by the GOC or the Deputy Director of Security, or by any person authorised in writing by either of such persons.

The provisions of this Order were administered by the Commissioner of Police through the Aliens Registration Officers, who were also responsible for issuing certificates of exemption in approved cases. The order applied principally in North Queensland, where the local Intelligence Officers maintained close liaison with the police. During 1942 and early 1943, which was the critical period, the order had a salutary effect on the enemy alien community, and any definite breach of such order was made a ground for other restrictive action against the offenders.

Internment of Japanese

In June, 1940, instructions were received from AHQ to prepare dossiers in respect of all Japanese with a view to immediate internment in the event of hostilities being commenced by Japan against the Allies. This included the personnel of all Japanese vessels engaged in the pearling industry on the Northern and North-Eastern coastline, and it was mainly for this reason that an Intelligence Officer was appointed at Thursday Island. It was considered that, owing to the Japanese mentality, even aged persons were liable to be dangerous, and it was therefore decided that all males over the age of 16 years were to be liable for detention as a precautionary measure. General Staff (Intelligence) prepared the necessary dossiers in respect of all such Japanese, and in addition also listed all persons associated with Japanese or persons having Japanese blood to any marked degree. An officer of I(b) was responsible for maintaining these dossiers and keeping an up-to date list showing the location of every Japanese in the State. Shortly before the entry of Japan into the war this policy was amended to provide that all persons in Queensland, irrespective of sex, of Japanese race or birth between the ages of 16 and 65 years were to be interned. As the result of the precautions taken by General Staff (Intelligence) within 24 hours of declaration of war, all Japanese had been arrested and interned. A total of 585 Japanese were interned immediately, and subsequently individuals who were partly of Japanese race were similarly dealt with.

The value of having available all information regarding aliens of any nationality was clearly demonstrated at various stages during the war, and it is believed to be essential that some organisation should be responsible for collecting and collating such information in the future so that prompt and efficient action can be instituted should a state of emergency arise. It is considered that General Staff (Intelligence) can be of considerable assistance in relation to this work.

SECURITY CHECKS

Check of Individuals

Prior to formation of Security Service in 1941, security checks in respect of all individuals, whether civilians or members of the AMF, who were employed in any confidential capacity or on work of a secret nature, were carried out by I(b). Reports were obtained from the Commonwealth Investigation Branch and the Police Department, and enquiries were made by Field Security Police to ascertain the background of the individual, his reliability, habits and associates. Where necessary, reports were also obtained from Military Reporting Officers (see Pt 8) and from General Staff (Intelligence) in other Commands. This procedure applied particularly in the case of persons employed in Headquarters, Censorship (see Pt 5), military camps and areas, and civilians having access to such establishments, e.g. members of Concert Parties, etc. As already stated, Field Security Police personnel were employed mainly on this work, and, because of the nature of their duties, there was no organised security checks of camps and other military establishments, to any extent, until 1942 when three Field Security Sections were allotted for duty in this area.

In 1942, the arrival in this area of senior Headquarters, Formations and Field Units, and other military establishments, together with the large numbers of Allied forces, required a considerable increase in the security controls and other measures for the maintenance of military security. In addition, the raising of special Intelligence units and other organisations engaged on duties of a secret nature caused a considerable increase in the number of individual security checks of personnel employed in such units and organisations. This work was done on an organised basis and a standard form was prepared and circulated to all concerned. This form of application was subsequently revised and adopted by LHQ, and published in Field Security Bulletin for the information of all Field Security personnel. If the enquiry proved satisfactory, the applicant was informed that the soldier's military record was satisfactory; that nothing adverse was known regarding his discretion and integrity; and that nothing adverse was known by General Staff (Intelligence) or Security Service as to his security status. In making such checks, thoroughness rather than celerity was aimed at. In cases where a check was urgently required, or where the application was made by signal, an interim report was furnished to the effect that the soldier was not adversely recorded, but that a further report would follow. The results of all such checks were retained in the Intelligence Registry, and a card index was maintained in respect of the individuals.

Security Checks of Units and Establishments

When Field Security Sections became available for duty, security checks of units and establishments were carried out on an organised basis throughout the area. Standard instructions were issued to all Field Security personnel under command, and to detached Intelligence Officers as to the manner in which such checks were to be made so that uniform reports could be obtained. The objective was to make a check of each individual unit at least once every three months in order that a review could be made of the manner in which each unit maintained security controls and instructions. A register in book form was kept by I(b) which contained the name of the unit, its location, the names of Field Security personnel making the check, date of check, and the general tenor of the report. This was a continuous record, and a reference to such register at any time enabled General Staff (Intelligence) to make a report on any particular unit. It was also of considerable assistance in enabling I(b) to control the working of Field Security Sections by directing attention to any units which had not been reported upon for an undue length of time.

Priority was given to Staging Camps (of which there were a number in this command) and training areas, but important units were checked several times, and all units at least once. When the LHQ School of Military Intelligence was established in this area, by arrangement with the Chief Instructor the personnel of Field Security Wing at the School were allotted the task of checking units in the vicinity of Brisbane as part of their instruction, and a copy of their reports, which were made by the students in the standard form, were submitted to I(b) for record purposes. An identical arrangement was made with the Chief Instructor of the Field Security Reinforcement Depot. This method prevented overlapping, and was of considerable assistance to General Staff (Intelligence). In addition to this work, at the request of General Staff (Intelligence) First Aust Army, I(b) arranged to have security checks made of units under command of First Aust Army which were stationed in isolated localities, or which could not be covered by the Field Security personnel of First Aust Army.

Unit Security Officers

In order to assist this work, a Routine Order was issued by this Headquarters requiring all units under command to appoint a Unit Security Officer, and to notify the name of the officer so appointed. General Staff (Intelligence) also prepared Notes on Military Security for the guidance of Unit Security Officers which were circulated by the General Staff to all Branches and Services of this Headquarters, and to all units under command, with a covering memo stressing the necessity of security measures and directing the issue of security Standing Orders. The procedure when making a check was for the Field Security personnel to contact the Unit Security Officer and discuss with him the various aspects of unit security, e.g. guards, control of visitors, protection of stores and equipment, identity of unit, signal security, office security, etc., and to indicate to such officer of weaknesses in the system maintained by the

unit, pointing out the appropriate methods by which any such weaknesses could be eliminated. Whenever possible Field Security personnel also delivered a lecture on security and censorship to personnel of the unit being checked. During any subsequent check, special attention was paid to weaknesses which had been noted on the previous occasion and the action taken to ensure that these were corrected.

USE OF FIELD SECURITY PERSONNEL

As stated earlier, up to 1942 members of the Field Security Police were employed mainly in connection with investigation of reported civilian and alien suspects, surveillance of political and subversive associations, and the performance of clerical duties for I(b) and detached Intelligence Officers. They also made individual security checks on members of the AMF and investigated any reported breaches of the National Security Regulations in relation to internal security. They conducted searches of the premises of suspected persons, and assisted in the arrest and internment of individuals against whom detention orders had been made. The personnel were under command of a Captain who worked directly under I(b). A small number of interpreters was included, their duties being to assist in the interrogation of aliens and to translate correspondence, papers and documents seized during any search and report generally on the contents of such documents from the subversive viewpoint.

Field Security personnel who were employed on investigation of subversive associations carried out their duties in plain clothes so that their identity and association with General Staff (Intelligence) would not be revealed. For similar reasons, members of the Field Security Police worked from an office building in Brisbane, and personnel employed on special duties did not visit the Headquarters of the Command. This also enabled the personnel to maintain contact with special agents and informants who could not take the risk of being seen associating with Army personnel.

Members of the Field Security Police were specially recruited for their knowledge of the tasks required to be performed, and they rendered good service. From time to time Warrant Officers and senior non-commissioned officers of Field Security Police acted as Intelligence Officers in detached centres during the absence on leave or duty of regular Intelligence Officers. It is also of interest to record that altogether 18 members of the Field Intelligence Police ultimately received their commissions either in General Staff (Intelligence) or Field Security and Censorship (Pt 5).

Distribution of Field Security Sections

In 1942 when the three Field Security Sections previously mentioned had been raised and trained it was decided to employ such personnel on an "area" basis, instead of a "formation" basis, the former being considered the most suitable method. For Intelligence purposes the Command had been divided into six areas, an Intelligence Officer being stationed in each of the five Northern areas and I(a) acted as Intelligence Officer for Southern Queensland. Each of these Intelligence Officers maintained direct contact with the Military Reporting Officers (see Pt 8) in his particular area. Accordingly one Field Security Section, controlled by I(b) was stationed at Headquarters with a detachment at Maryborough and Toowoomba respectively; one section controlled by the Intelligence Officer, Rockhampton, was stationed in that city with detachments at Gladstone, and later also at Mackay, and the other section, controlled by the Intelligence Officer, Townsville was stationed in that city with a detachment at Cairns. Later a fourth section came under command, and it was stationed at Cairns, under the control of the Intelligence Officer there, with a detachment at Mareeba and Innisfail respectively.

Administration of Field Security Sections

All administrative work in connection with these Field Security Sections was performed by I(x), and general operational direction and control was exercised by I(b), who thus enabled to co-ordinate all security work throughout the Command. During the period of greatest activity, by arrangement with the AQMG, blank rail warrant forms were obtained and held by I(x) and the Intelligence Officers controlling Field Security Sections, so that immediate movement by rail could be arranged to any part of the area. Field Security or other Intelligence personnel required at short notice for escort duty, or to make investigations, could be moved in accordance with the circumstances, thus avoiding any delay occasioned by applying to Q (Movts) in the normal manner. Close co-ordination was maintained with Movement Control, and the system also helped to preserve the secrecy of movement of Intelligence personnel. It is considered that should a state of emergency arise in the future, a similar method relating to movement by rail could be employed to advantage.

Tasks of Field Security Personnel

Until such time as LHQ Intelligence Instruction No. 31 was issued in early 1943, which co-ordinated the general functions of the Field Security Wing, and which was based on experience gained by Field Security Sections and Lines of Communication Areas, Field Security personnel were generally employed on the following duties:-

- i. Military Security:
 - (a) Information - Reporting instances of leakage of military information and taking steps to trace the source and prevent repetition;
 - (b) Personnel - Advising on all attempts to suborn, or spread disaffection amongst military personnel, and making individual security checks as required;
 - (c) Material - Checking the effectiveness of safeguards on military installations for the prevention of sabotage;
 - (d) Operations and Training - Instituting and controlling safeguards to prevent access by strangers or unauthorised persons to troops during movement and training;
 - (e) HQ, Camps and Military establishments - Checking the effectiveness of guards, the security of documents and marked maps, and precautions for destruction of documents;
 - (f) Censorship - Checking co-operation of troops, reporting and investigating instances of attempts to evade censorship, and the observance of regulations and instructions relating to this subject;
 - (g) Security of travel and movement by land, sea; or air;
 - (h) Security of safe hand despatches - Providing escorts for officers carrying such despatches, escorting any such despatches not accompanied by an officer, and delivery as required of any such despatches to addressees.
- ii. Morale:
 - (a) Internal - Checking and reporting on the morale of troops and the manner in which it may be influenced by equipment, training, leave, general conditions, enemy propaganda, etc;
 - (b) External - Relations with other troops, allied troops and civilians.
- iii. Educational:

Giving lectures and talks to improve security and morale, and instructing all personnel on security and censorship matters.
- iv. Suspects:

- (a) Suspects reported - Checking on suspects in contact with troops near military areas;
 - (b) Contact with troops - Checking on persons who were in a position to come in contact with troops by reason of their occupation or activities, and, where required, making a survey of any area likely to be occupied by troops for training or other purposes.
- v. Topographical:
Carrying out special road, or other reconnaissance as required by General Staff (Intelligence).

In carrying out the majority of these tasks it was essential that co-operation be maintained with Security Service through General Staff (Intelligence). In the metropolitan area close liaison was maintained with I(b) and the Military Liaison Officer, Security Service, and in the country areas similar liaison was maintained between detached Intelligence Officers and District Security Officers. Owing to constant changes in personnel of Field Security Sections it was found undesirable to have direct contact between a Field Security Section and Security Service. As a matter of policy it was directed that all questions in which Security Service was, or might be, involved must be referred in the first instance to General Staff (Intelligence). In addition, General Staff (Intelligence) was able to obtain reports from Military Reporting Officers (see Pt 8) and special agents when required to assist any investigation.

For a considerable time, in addition to the Field Security Sections under command, there was a number of other Field Security Sections in the area. The Headquarters concerned were Adv LHQ, First Aust Army, Corps, four Divisions, an Armoured Formation, 1 Aust Base Sub-Area, and Townsville Fortress. These Field Security Sections were responsible for security of units in each of their respective formations, but as command of individual units changed from time to time according to the circumstances, a great deal of overlapping and confusion occurred until some working arrangement was arrived at to suit local conditions. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the Field Security Wing was controlled by General Staff Intelligence (b) Adv LHQ, and Field Security Sections had direct communication with that Headquarters. The experience gained by General Staff (Intelligence) indicated that the most satisfactory method would have been to place all Field Security Sections under command of this Headquarters on arrival in the area so that their activities and general policy could be co-ordinated, but that they should be free to carry out such tasks as might be required by the formation Commander, and that a section should revert to its formation on the latter leaving the area. A recommendation was made to such effect but it was not approved by the Commanders concerned. However, the matter is again brought to notice, and it is suggested that some policy be considered for the future. One of the main lessons learned was that the essential liaison between General Staff (Intelligence) and the civil authorities could most properly be exercised through this Headquarters.

Security of Rail Movement

Owing to the large numbers of troops moving through the area and embarking for service in the Islands, security of movement was of particular importance. Close contact was maintained with Movement Control, and General Staff (Intelligence) received an advance copy of all movement orders issued. When troops were being moved by rail from Southern Queensland to the North, the procedure was for Field Security personnel to cover the move from the Staging Camp or Unit concentration area to the point of entrainment. Unit Security Officers were contacted prior to the move and all security controls to prevent leakage of information was checked. When the troops had moved out, the camp area was searched in order to ascertain whether any documents or other evidence of unit identification had been left behind. On arrival at the railhead Field Security personnel checked posting of guards and other measures to prevent contact between the troops and civilians. Arrangements were made with the civil police to remove all hawkers and other itinerant vendors (who were mainly aliens) from the area. Field Security personnel accompanied the train, and were relieved at Maryborough by members of the detachment there. At Rockhampton members of the Field

Security Section stationed there took over duty and travelled to Townsville where they handed over to the Section stationed at that point. If the troops were detrained at Townsville, the move to the camp area was covered, but if they were moving on to Cairns, Field Security personnel went with the train and handed over to the Section stationed at that point, and the latter covered the move to camp. Similar arrangements were made regarding moves in the opposite direction, and the location of Field Security personnel enabled these duties to be performed without difficulty and without interference to the other work required to be done.

Security of Embarkation

In connection with overseas moves the normal procedure was for Field Security personnel of First Aust Army to be responsible for security of movement from the concentration area to the Staging Camp, and Field Security personnel of this Headquarters were responsible from that point to the ships. The procedure followed in order to obtain security of the wharves and shipping is set out in Part I. In addition arrangements were made through AQMG for a mobile canteen to be stationed at the wharf during the period of embarkation so that troops could obtain necessary supplies without having to leave the area, and a mail box was placed at the head of the gangway for the convenience of troops. The mail posted in this box was then delivered to Censorship for treatment. Field Security personnel checked the surreptitious posting of mail, or attempts to hand telegrams to civilians employed on, or in the vicinity of the wharf.

Security of Air Movements

In regard to movement by air, so far as resources permitted Field Security personnel checked the arrival and departure of AMF personnel. Owing to the number of aerodromes in use, the considerable volume of air traffic into and out of the Command, and the difficulty in obtaining early information concerning the movement of aircraft, it was not possible to carry out an effective check. Useful work was performed in locating troops carrying uncensored mail, enemy equipment, and other contraband articles, but it is known that there was a good deal of unauthorised movement by air. It is considered that the only satisfactory arrangement would be to have Field Security personnel stationed at every principal aerodrome in use, and that no military personnel be allowed to leave until they were checked. This would require close co-operation by RAAF and Allied Air Commands, which was not always the case during the period under review. Despite definite orders and directions to the contrary, there were many instances of unauthorised travel by service aircraft.

Reconnaissance by Field Security Sections

Other important tasks undertaken were to make road and other reconnaissances as required by General Staff (Intelligence). All of the main and alternative roads used or likely to be used for military purposes were covered, and, in addition, reports were made regarding branch routes. Reports were also made on possible camp areas, and other topographical information was obtained for I(a). It was believed by General Staff (Intelligence) that a plan would eventually be adopted whereby Formations earmarked for operations in the Islands would be concentrated in some convenient locality for further training, and to enable the Formations already serving abroad to be re-organised and re-fitted when relieved. It was considered that the most suitable area would be the Atherton Tableland, mainly because of its climate, suitability for training, (including amphibious training), proximity to ports of embarkation, etc. The Field Security Section stationed at Cairns, was directed to make a comprehensive survey of this area and to report on all phases, including port facilities, communications, both road and rail, water supply, Headquarters, Camp, and training areas, supplies and all other relevant details. A full report with accompanying sketch and marked Strat maps was made and within a few days of its receipt an urgent request was received from Adv LHQ for all available information in regard to this area to be forwarded for submission to the Commander-in-Chief. The report and maps were handed over to the Director of Military Intelligence, and it was found that the details supplied were sufficient to enable a Staff reconnaissance to be carried out, and an immediate decision made to occupy the area. This was one of the most successful examples of the use of Field Security personnel on reconnaissance and it was valuable training for members of the Section.

CONTROL OF PHOTOGRAPHY

Under the provision of National Security (General) Regulation 19, a Control of Photography Order was issued by the Minister for Defence prohibiting persons from making any photograph, etc., except under the authority of a written permit granted in pursuance of such Regulation, of any things or occurrences specified under the Regulation.

The GOC issued an authority in writing to the GSO 2 (Int) and I(x) to grant permits under the Order, and those officers retained such authority throughout the period under review. These were the only authorised in existence. Up to the time when Security Service took over certain responsibilities, all applications for permits were investigated and approved by General Staff (Intelligence) but after such date permits for civilians were issued by General Staff (Intelligence) upon the recommendation of Security Service. Up to June, 1942, General Staff (Intelligence) was also responsible for recommending the prosecution of civilians who contravened the Order. After that date any observed breaches by civilians were brought to the notice of Security Service who took appropriate action.

Civilians were required to observe the terms of the Order in detail, but in the case of AMF personnel it was for General Staff (Intelligence) to decide, upon examination whether the photographs revealed anything which would be of value to the enemy. For the purpose of uniformity throughout the Command, it was directed that such breaches would include any photograph which:-

- (a) associated a definite type of equipment with a specific unit, e.g. at tank bearing a serial number, or a weapon in possession of a soldier wearing a colour patch or other distinguishing mark;
- (b) associated a unit with a definite locality;
- (c) associated a unit with any specific form of training;
- (d) associated a unit with movement, entrainment, embarkation, or emplaning;
- (e) depicted a military installation, a vulnerable point, or strategic area (Note: The whole of the coastline was considered a strategic area);
- (f) depicted any weapon or equipment on the Secret List.

The only exception was that AMF personnel were permitted to photograph any particular subject of which photographs had appeared in the Press, after release by Publicity Censorship or the Department of Public Relations.

Approved Photographers

Certain photographers were approved by General Staff (Intelligence) for the purpose of processing photographs for military personnel other than those taken for official purposes, and all such firms and individuals were forwarded a memorandum setting out the requirements of the Control of Photography Order and their responsibilities there under. A list of such approved photographers was published in Routine Orders from time to time.

Official Photographs

With regard to all films and photographs taken by formations, units, or other establishments for official purposes, a direction was issued that all such photographs were to be forwarded to General Staff (Intelligence) accompanied by a certificate that same were official and setting out the purpose for which they were required. General Staff (Intelligence) arranged for same to be processed and returned to the formation, etc, after making all the necessary arrangements for payment. As New Guinea Force was included, it will be realised that a considerable amount of work was involved. In May, 1944, it was directed by GRO, G18/44 that all such files and photographs would be forwarded to the Directorate of Staff Duties (Military History Section) LHQ for processing.

Prosecution of Offenders

In the early stages it was comparatively easy to exercise control as there was little photography being done, and any doubtful photographs were brought to notice of General Staff (Intelligence) by the processors. Subsequently Field Security personnel made regular visits to the processors and took possession of any photographs which were considered to require scrutiny by General Staff (Intelligence). In addition various photographs were received through censorship. In the case of civilians, if the breach was of a minor nature, the films were confiscated and destroyed, and the offender warned against repetition. If the breach was serious, and it could be established that the person concerned in fact took the photograph, the matter was referred to the Chief Legal Officer of advice as to whether on the evidence available a prosecution was warranted. If the answer was in the affirmative, the file was passed to "A" Branch, who arranged with the Commonwealth Crown Solicitor for the offender to be prosecuted in the Civil Court.

Where AMF personnel were involved, the photographs and relevant particulars of the soldier were forwarded to "A" Branch or the formation concerned as the case might be, for information, together with a recommendation for disciplinary action in serious cases.

Liaison with other Services

Each of the Services, and the Allied Services, was responsible for its own method of censorship (see Pt 5) of photographs, and the system adopted was determined by the Service concerned as being most suitable for its needs. For this reason any photograph which appeared to involve a member of the RAN, RAAF, or an Allied Service, was forwarded to the Intelligence Officer of that Service for information and any action deemed necessary.

Close liaison was maintained with Security Service, State Publicity Censor, Public Relations Officers, and Intelligence Officers of other Services and Allied Services in order to cover all aspects of this phase of security. In practice the system adopted was found to be satisfactory and caused little inconvenience or delay. It is considered that no change in such system is required.

CONFISCATION OF ARTICLES

Under National Security (General) Regulations articles could be seized under two powers, viz:-

- (a) Articles for which there were reasonable grounds for belief that they were evidence of the commission of a war offence as defined by the Regulations,
- (b) Derelict or looted articles.

With regard to (a) the power was derived from Regulation 79 under which the GOC was authorised to issue a warrant to search any specified premises and every person found therein, and to seize any article found in the premises or on any person which the officer executing the warrant had reasonable grounds for believing constituted evidence of the commission of a war offence.

It was under this Regulation that the premises of subversive associations and individuals were searched by an Intelligence Officer accompanied by Field Security Police, and also in some cases by civil police. The Intelligence Officer took possession of any articles which were of a prohibited nature, and also any articles or documents which appeared to be evidence of subversive activity. Any such articles were retained by General Staff (Intelligence) for examination and further enquiry, which, in cases where another party was involved, often took some time to complete.

Retention of Articles

Regulation 84 provided that any such articles coming into the possession of the authority, whether in consequence of the seizure of the article under the regulations or otherwise, might be retained for one month, such article, until the determination of those proceedings. Otherwise, an application had to be made to a Court of Summary Jurisdiction for an order authorising the further retention of any such article. It will thus be noted that the action of General Staff (Intelligence) in retaining any such article beyond the prescribed period was not strictly regular, although these remarks do not necessarily apply to some prohibited possessions found in the possession of enemy aliens. It was considered to be in the interests of the service to retain various articles which might have evidentiary value in regard to other suspects, and the practice grew up of retaining such articles and leaving it to the suspect to take any action he might have seen fit to regain possession. In fact, no such action was ever taken.

Many attempts were made to obtain an amendment to Regulation 84, but without success. It is considered that such Regulation was not primarily intended to cover the cases of subversive persons, and in any event it is believed to be desirable in the interests of security that Regulation based on the lines of Regulation 69AA (referred to later) would be more suitable. The latter Regulation enabled the authority to order the confiscation of any article, and placed on the person concerned the onus of proving that he is entitled to it.

Disposal of Articles

With regard to articles seized during the arrest of an internee, these were handed to the Commandant of the Internment Camp and a receipt obtained, or in the case of any article held for further examination, same was handed to "A" Branch for despatch to the Internment Camp where the internee was finally held.

For the reasons set out in Part I, supervision in relation to seized articles was not always fully exercised during the periods of greatest activity in 1940/1, and in some cases, confusion arose. It is considered essential that General Staff (Intelligence) should not be the custodian of any seized articles, but that firm arrangements should be made through staff channels whereby such articles should be handed over immediately to "A" Branch (Personal Services), which would be responsible for same, and that, where required, such articles could be examined by General Staff (Intelligence) whilst in the custody of "A" Branch.

Looted and Derelict Articles

With regard to the seizure of derelict or looted articles, the power was derived from Regulation 69AA under which any Censorship (see Pt 5) Authority, officer of Customs, or, in the case of any article contained in any baggage or a member of the Military Forces, any officer of the AMF, who in the course of his duty intercepted any article which was reasonably suspected of being a derelict or looted article as defined in the Regulations, was required to send such article to the GOC for further action. The GOC then had to make a decision as to whether:-

- (a) to call upon the addressee to apply in writing for the release of the article otherwise same would be forfeited; or,
- (b) return the article to the Authority or Officer from whom it was received for delivery to the addressee or return to the person from whom it was taken.

If action was taken under (a) and a request was received for release of the article, the GOC then had to decide whether the article was to be delivered to the applicant or forfeited to the King for the use of the Commonwealth. Notice of such decision was given to the applicant, and if he was dissatisfied, he could apply to a Court of Summary Jurisdiction to determine the matter.

The majority of articles recovered under this Regulation were received from Censorship and Customs, although some articles were found in the baggage of AMF personnel held in Aust Kit Stores. The procedure adopted in regard to all such articles was as follows:-

- (a) Articles found by Censorship (see Pt 5) or Customs were collected by Field Security personnel and delivered to General Staff (Intelligence) for examination.
- (b) If, in the opinion of General Staff (Intelligence) the article was a derelict or looted article as defined by the Regulation, a schedule was prepared setting out all necessary details and submitted by General Staff (Intelligence) to the GOC with a recommendation that the article specified be forfeited.
- (c) Notices were prepared by "A" Branch and forwarded to the persons concerned as prescribed.
- (d) The forfeited articles were retained by General Staff (Intelligence) until the time in which the person concerned had to take action expired, and the articles were then disposed of as follows:-
 - (i) Items of enemy equipment were delivered to the Enemy Equipment Depot at Enoggera.
 - (ii) Items of AMF or Allied equipment to the Returned Stores Depot.

Articles found in baggage held by Aust Kit Stores were delivered by the Kit Store to "Q" Branch which took similar action to that set out above.

In order to maintain efficient supervision, I(c) arranged to have a special store room fitted with pigeon holes arranged alphabetically in which the articles could be stored. This room was manned by personnel of 1 Aust Field Censorship Company who listed the contents of any package received, and kept a card index of every package, on which was recorded particulars of the persons concerned, a list of the articles, details of the action taken with relevant dates, and the ultimate disposal of the article. Receipts were obtained for all articles disposed of.

In practice the GOC decided to forfeit all article of equipment found, it being obvious that the persons involved could not acquire any title to such articles. In no case was the GOC's decision challenged. The method of handling such articles proved to be satisfactory, and no alteration is suggested.

PASSES AND PERMITS

During the period under review, General Staff (Intelligence) was the authority for the issue of all Passes and Permits on behalf of this Headquarters which were as follows:-

- (a) Special and Ordinary Passes for admission to Military Works and Establishments, issued under AMR&O 1362;
- (b) Passes to Press Correspondents to enter Military Establishments in connection with their vocation;
- (c) Identification Passes for personnel of General Staff (Intelligence);
- (d) Permits to enter wharves and ships issued under National Security (General) Regulation 7A;
- (e) Permits to enter the Northern Territory;
- (f) Permits to enter Torres Strait area;
- (g) Permits issued to specially selected Military Reporting Officers (see Pt 8), and to persons engaged on Special Duty.

Passes to Military Establishments

Special and Ordinary Passes under AMR&O 1362 were issued to all AMF and civilian personnel employed at Headquarters, and normally current for a period of 12 months. In addition, such passes were issued to civilians employed by essential services, e.g. water, gas, electricity and similar undertakings, whose duties required them to visit military establishments to carry out maintenance and repair work. All applications for such passes were examined by I(b), and where it could be shown that the pass was essential and there was no security objection to the applicant, the passed was issued over the signature of the GSO 1 (Int) or the GSO 2 (Int), these being the only officers having the authority to sign same.

Press Correspondent Passes

Until February, 1942, passes were issued to journalists who were regularly employed on a recognised newspaper to enter military camps and establishments for the purposes of their vocation, and the applications were reviewed by I(c). For the purpose of building up good will with the Press, and in order to obtain favourable publicity for the Army, it was the practice to issue a permit in all cases unless there was a definite security objection to the applicant. When the Department of Public Relations was organised, this system ceased to function and all journalists had to be accredited as a War Correspondent by the Director-General of Public Relations.

Intelligence Passes

For the purpose of identification, passes were issued to all officers of General Staff (Intelligence), and in a few cases to other ranks engaged on special duty. Such passes were issued for the purpose of avoiding delay, and were found to be of value so far as freedom of movement was concerned. The passes were in the following formats:-

Q'LAND L. OF C. AREA

No:

Rank:.....

Name:.....

Signature:.....

(Photograph)

The above named is a member of the INTELLIGENCE SECTION, Q'LAND L. OF C. AREA - and is hereby authorised to obtain information on behalf of General Staff, Intelligence, H.Q. Q'land L. of C. Area.

Dated at Brisbane this..... day of.....19.....

GENERAL STAFF

HQ Q'LAND L. OF C. AREA

These passes carried a photograph of the holder in the margin and were issued by the GSO 1.

Passes for Selected MROs

Early in 1942 when it was considered that there was a possibility of enemy air activity in this area, it was decided to issue a special form of pass to selected MROs (see Pt 8), and certain personnel engaged on duties of a special nature so that they would be able to move around in any areas which were attacked. This pass was in the following form:-

No:

THE
BEARER:.....
is engaged on essential Services and has permission to proceed to any place other than a proclaimed Prohibited Place at any hour. He is exempt from impressment of such goods and/or equipment as may be legally possessed by an accredited member of any Auxiliary Defence Force.

Such pass carried the signature and photograph of the holder and was signed on behalf of the GOC and also by the Commissioner of Police. A limited number were issued, and it is believed that if the emergency had arisen the possession of such passes would have allowed the persons concerned freedom of movement, without restriction under ARP or police requirements.

Wharf and Ship Passes

As stated previously, permits to enter wharves and to board ships were issued to members of the AMF by General Staff (Intelligence) under an authority from the Deputy Director of Navigation and Lighthouses pursuant to National Security (General) Regulation 7A. At Headquarters this authority was held by the GSO2 (Int) and I(x), it being considered that one of such officers would always be available to sign same. A similar authority was given to the Intelligence Officers at Townsville and Cairns respectively. These permits were of two classes, viz, permanent and temporary, and were issued in the form prescribed by the Deputy Director. In the case of Staff Officers and other personnel whose duties required them to visit wharves and shipping frequently a permit was issued which remained current for 12 months. In all other cases a temporary permit was issued which was current for the specific visit only. The colour of these permits was changed each year and all permits expired on 31st May when the new forms were taken into use. Supplies of these forms were obtained from the Deputy Director and a record of all permits issued was maintained by General Staff (Intelligence).

In October, 1945, the provisions of Regulation 7A were suspended, and it was no longer necessary for persons to obtain permits to enter wharves or board ships. As there was still considerable movement of troops and military cargoes to and from the Islands, it was directed by the GOC that the Army should control the wharves during the arrival or departure of vessels in the manner stated earlier. General Staff (Intelligence) arranged to have printed a number of permits in a form similar to that mentioned above, except that such permits specified that they were issued by the Army authority. Any persons, whether civilians or members of the AMF, had to be in possession of such permit before being allowed to enter a wharf or ship which was being operated by the Army. In Brisbane the permits referred to were signed by the GSO 1 (Int) or the GSO 2 (Int), they being the only officers authorised to issue such permits. In Townsville and Cairns the permits were issued by the Intelligence Officers stationed in those localities.

Permits for Northern Territory

In February, 1942, the Army Minister declared that National Security (Emergency Control) Regulations should apply to the area of Northern Australia under the control of Northern Territory Force, and an order was issued directing that no person, other than a member of the Services or of an Allied Services acting in the course of his duty, would be permitted to enter the area specified without a permit signed by, or on behalf of:-

- (a) Commander, Northern Territory Force,
- (b) The Commander of any Lines of Communication area,
- (c) The Quarter-Master General.

It was considered necessary to watch closely the increase in civil population in the Northern Territory owing to factors of security, accommodation, water supply, availability of civilian goods, etc.

The procedure adopted was to have a security check made of all applicants, and if same proved satisfactory to refer the application to Northern Territory Force by letter or signal for approval. If the application was approved, a permit was issued signed by the GSO 1 (Int) on behalf of the GOC. In the majority of cases, applications were received from Commonwealth officials, employees of the Allied Works Council, and employees of civil airways, and such applications were approved without referent to Northern Territory Force. The other applications were mainly former permanent residents or members of the commercial community, and in the case of these applicants their applications had to receive the approval of Northern Territory Force. The issue of permits ceased on 28 Feb 46, when the Minister's declaration was revoked.

Permits for Torres Strait Area

In April, 1942, a similar declaration was made by the Minister in respect of the area under control of Torres Strait Force, and the Commander of that area issued an order in terms specified above. Permits for civilians to enter the declared area were issued by General Staff (Intelligence) in the same manner as that applicable to entry into the Northern Territory Force area. In 1945 the control of such area reverted to this Headquarters and all applications were referred by General Staff (Intelligence) to the Brigadier-in-Charge of Administration for approval before permits were issued.

Throughout the period under review the above system relating to the issue of passes and permits proved to be satisfactory and caused the minimum of inconvenience to all concerned. No alteration in relation to any of these passes and permits is suggested.

POLITICAL AND SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENTS

As stated earlier in this part, immediately after the outbreak of war with Germany all organisations known or suspected to have been of Nazi origin were investigated, and, where sufficient information was available, the premises of any such organisation were searched in order to obtain additional evidence. Members of Field Security and Special Agents were employed to keep any such organisation under surveillance. When the international situation indicated that Italy might become involved in the war on the side of Germany, all Fascist organisations were placed under surveillance, and upon the declaration of war by Italy similar action was taken in regard to these organisations.

Associations suspected of carrying out activities of a subversive nature, e.g. the Communist Party of Australia and its satellites, and the organisation known as Jehovah's Witnesses, were kept under discrete surveillance by means of Special Agents, and all information received was collated and forwarded to AHQ for information. I(b) kept a map upon which was indicated the localities containing branches or groups of people reported to be members of or

sympathetic towards any of these or similar organisations, and the names and other particulars of any persons in this category were card-indexed by I(b). A record was kept of all members of the AMF believed to be associated with any such organisation, and wherever necessary arrangements were made with Unit Security Officers to keep such personnel under observation. It was also arranged with "A" Branch that an undue proportion of such personnel should not be allocated to any specific unit and that they should not be employed on any Headquarters.

Information was received by General Staff (Intelligence) from Censorship (see Pt 5), Field Security Police, Military Reporting Officers, Special Agents, informants, and Intelligence Officers of other services. This was evaluated, and, when sufficient evidence had been obtained to warrant such course, a recommendation was made to AHQ that the organisation concerned be declared to be an unlawful association under the provisions of National Security (Subversive Associations) Regulations. A number of these organisations was declared to be unlawful associations under the above Regulations, and, immediately any such declaration was made, the premises of the organisation and also the premises of its known leaders were searched by an Intelligence Officer accompanied by Field Security Police, and any property seized was dealt with as prescribed by the Regulations.

The experience gained by General Staff (Intelligence) indicated that it is essential for the activities of such associations to be kept under discrete surveillance at all times, and it is suggested that some method be devised whereby this can be effected. The resources of General Staff (Intelligence) could be utilised to this end.

The principal weakness revealed was that, apart from bringing to notice of the Branch or Service concerned of the subversive tendencies or activities of any Military personnel, General Staff (Intelligence) could not take any effective action. It was left to the Branch or Service to decide whether the officer or soldier reported on should continue to be employed on the duty he was then performing or be allocated on other employment which would mitigate the security risk. In many cases it is known that no action was taken. An effort was made to rectify this position by the issue of LHQ Intelligence Instruction No. 29 (SM222981 of 25 November, 1942) which directed that particulars of any doubtful member of the AMF be forwarded to LHQ where a register would be compiled known as the "Blue List". In the interests of security it is considered to be desirable that in any instance where General Staff (Intelligence) has investigated the security status of any member of the AMF and submitted an adverse report on the person concerned, together with a recommendation for his future employment, that such recommendation should be acted upon, and that arrangements be made with the Adjutant-General for a direction to be issued to all officers holding the appointment of Assistant Adjutant-General in any Command or Formation to such effect.

MILITARY LIAISON OFFICER TO SECURITY SERVICE

Upon the formation of Security Service in 1941, an officer of General Staff (Intelligence) was appointed as Officer-in-Charge of that Service in Queensland. This officer had been formerly in command of the Field Security Police and had wide experience on General Staff (Intelligence) duties. From the date of his appointment he co-operated with General Staff (Intelligence) and maintained daily liaison with the GSO 1 (Int). Direct telephone communication was established between I(x) and this officer, and any matters of mutual interest were brought immediately to notice. For these reasons it was not deemed necessary to appoint a Military Liaison Officer.

Subsequent to June, 1942, on which date Security Service took over certain responsibilities as stated previously, the GOC appointed a former officer of General Staff (Intelligence) who had been transferred to the staff of Security Service as Military Liaison Officer to the Deputy Director of Security for Queensland. It was agreed between the Director General of Security and the GOC that in order to carry out his duties satisfactorily the Military Liaison Officer should operate generally in the following terms:-

- (a) He should have full and complete access to all Security Service records and be permitted to take such notes as he required from such records for the information of Army authorities. Security Service should bring under his notice all files on matters of policy and all dossiers of military interest to the Commonwealth;
- (b) His advice should be available to Security Service on any of the major problems which arose, and he must be prepared and willing to assist in every possible way, and to make his knowledge and experience available at all time to Security Service;
- (c) He should have direct access to all branches of this Headquarters so that urgent matters could receive immediate attention.

The Military Liaison Officer was provided with office accommodation and a clerk-typist by Security Service and he had direct telephone communication with I(x).

The Military Liaison Officer brought to the notice of General Staff (Intelligence) all matters of security interest which affected the AMF, and in addition he had direct access to all branches and services at this Headquarters in relation to any matters affecting Security Service. On all matters of policy the Military Liaison Officer dealt direct with the GSO 1 (Int) who in turn submitted to this Headquarters for decision any questions of policy so raised, and subsequently conveyed the reply to the Military Liaison Officer. At Mackay, Townsville and Cairns liaison was maintained through the Intelligence Officers in those centres, and the local District Security Officers.

This system was found to work satisfactorily, the only weakness being that the Military Liaison Officer was on the staff of the Deputy Director of Security and was not a member of General Staff (Intelligence). This was due to the fact that the War Establishment made provision for only sufficient officers required for Intelligence duties, and an officer could not be spared to take up such appointment. It is considered that the Military Liaison Officer should be an officer of the General Staff (Intelligence), and, should a similar emergency arise in the future, it is recommended that the War Establishment should make provision for the Military Liaison Officer, Security Service to be carried on the strength of General Staff (Intelligence).