

**PART II**

**COMMENTARY ON THE CITIZEN MILITARY FORCES**

**1929 – 1939**

A report in detail on the annual progress in organisation, efficiency and strength of the Citizen Military Forces through the years 1929-1939.

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### **COMMENTARY ON THE CITIZEN MILITARY FORCES 1929 – 1939**

#### **(I) THE POSTION IN 1929**

##### **(A) The Suspension of Universal Training**

In November, 1929, the Federal Government decided to suspend Universal Training. Contrary to the previous organisational changes in 1884 and 1911, there were no preparatory discussions in Parliament or preliminary warnings given to District Commandants and Formation Commanders.

A telegram in November, 1929 to the effect that Universal Training was suspended at once and a system of voluntary militia instituted, was the first notice received by Commanders in Districts.

##### **(B) The Future Organisation of the Forces**

###### **1. Government Policy**

On 5<sup>th</sup> November, 1929, at a conference attended by the Prime Minister, the Minister for Defence, the Secretary for Defence, the Secretary for Chief of the General Staff, it was decided that (1) "the Defence Committee was to submit a scheme for an alternative to compulsory training, showing the minimum strength and the organisation essential for a defence just as adequate, or if necessary, more adequate, than that furnished under the existing system. No discharges of permanent personnel were to be made by reason of the change, surplus personnel being absorbed by replacement of wastage or in such manner as may be decided."

###### **2. The Militia**

The Council for Defence then agree on a scheme for maintaining a nucleus organization with a strength of 35,000 Citizen Forces (2) – henceforth to be know as the militia – and 7,000 Senior Cadets.

**NOTE:** (1) Report by the Inspector-General dated 15<sup>th</sup> April, 1930 – Part 1 para II.

Some of the conditions of service (1) were:-

**Enlistment**

Age of enlistment – 18 to 40 years  
First period of enlistment – 3 years  
Subsequent periods of enlistment – 1 year

**Pay**

The then existing rates of pay and allowances, commencing at 4/- per day, were to be retained.

**Training**

The training was to consist of 16 days annually, made up of 8 days home training and 8 days continuous training in camp, supplemented by courses, schools and from the training establishments, the organization and distribution of the Forces which and existed under Universal Training was to be maintained.

3. **Cadets**

These were to consist of Voluntary Regimental Detachments attached to each Militia Unit, plus a cadets corps associated with colleges, schools and institutions.

As previously maintained, the approved strength was 7000. The strength of the Regimental Detachment of the unit.

Ages for enrolment were:-

Regimental – not under 16 years  
Schools – not under 14 years

**NOTE:** See A.A.O. 542 of 19 November 1929 for full details

4. **Recruiting**

The line of immediate action to be taken by Commanders and Staffs was to be as follows:-

- “(a) For the present, the main efforts are to be directed to the encouragement of existing members to continue serving voluntarily.
- (b) As soon as the actual numbers of these volunteers are known, action can be taken if necessary, to complete establishments by recruiting.” (1)

Enlistment for both the militia and Cadets was to commence on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1930. By April 1930, the total strength had reached 24,033 all ranks and 5311 cadets.

The quarterly results of recruiting up to September, 1931, and the sudden drop in numbers in all formations during the quarter ending September, 1931, are shown on M.S. Circular 552/1931, the details by Arms being shown in M.E. Circular 572/1931.

Paragraph 6 of the first named circular shows the serious view then taken by Army Headquarters which instructed that all other action by Commanders and Staff was to be subordinated to bringing units to strength and maintaining numbers.

This policy existed for several years, so that till approximately 1935, the important records of activities for war of the Military Forces are few, and consist mostly of routine matters for maintenance of interest and numbers.

(II) **DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE YEARS 1930 – 1932**

(A) **The Birth and Development of the New Volunteer Militia during 1930 and 1931**

1. **The Absence of Detailed Policy**

Universal Training had been suspended in November 1929 and it was not until January 1930 that recruiting for the militia commenced. This meant that for two months the Australian Citizen

**NOTE:** (1) A.A.O. 542/1949 para 3.

Army consisted only of the Citizen Force Officers, and the Permanent Forces, and the Australian Light Horse, who were always voluntarily serving.

Sir Harry Chauvel's last report (covering only the first four months of 1930) refers briefly to those members of the Citizen Forces who continued to serve on as voluntary militia, and is also of value as showing the conditions of the various arms and services in April, 1930.

The suddenness of the instructing to change from compulsory to voluntary service left the Army Headquarters and Formation Commanders with no instructions as to administration, procedure terms of service, pay, etc, until A.A.O. 542/1929 was issued under the heading "Constitution of the Existing Forces on a voluntary basis".

This continued an outline of the conditions of service, but many of the problems that affected individual militia men personally were not catered for, and were only overcome through the ensuing years by the issue of instructions and orders (See Part III of this Report).

2. **The Prevailing Financial Position**

Funds were very limited and unit voluntary activities beyond those prescribed by Regulations had to be financed by donations, subscriptions, or personal expenditure of the officers, N.C.O's and members concerned.

In 1929 also, the financial depression was approaching a most critical stage with wholesale unemployment, particularly among the clerical or non-manual workers.

No worse time to inaugurate a voluntary force could have been selected, as members though keen, had not the money to spare for voluntary contributions, tram fares and other minor personal expenditure incidental to citizen soldiering.

3. **Recruiting Difficulties**

No funds were made available for publicity or propaganda for recruiting this new force, each District and Formation Commander having to develop his own publicity and recruiting methods.

The scope for recruiting was also not from amongst a new field of citizens who were anxious to enrol and obtain experience of military service. All eligible men within the age required, had (or should have) rendered their compulsory service when they were between the ages of 16 and 21 years, so that citizen soldiering was no novelty to the men who had to be enticed to enlist in the Voluntary Militia.

As a result only a proportion of those compulsorily serving in November, 1929, desired to continue serving as volunteers in their units, and the additional numbers had to be obtained from those older citizens who could be induced to serve again.

It speaks well for the relationship that must have existed between officers and trainees during the compulsory training years prior to 1929 that by the end of 1930, 25437 out of an establishment of 32,204 had re-enrolled.

4. **The Age Level of Militiamen and its Bearing on Efficiency**

Many ex-members of the A.I.F. and of the British Army, who have migrated to Australia, also joined up and one immediate result was that the average age of the service increased from 19 years to 23/24 years.

This also had an important bearing on general discipline, and the status of N.C.O.'s and junior officers.

Previously, on reaching the age of 21 years and having fulfilled the compulsory obligations of Universal Training, many keen junior officers and N.C.O.'s., who desired to continue their service beyond that age, were often discouraged by their employers and not granted leave to attend training courses and camps, with the result that they obtained their discharges.

As a consequence, the majority of the N.C.O.'s in 1929 were under 21 years of age having had very rapid promotion in 3 years of service with little experience of the responsibilities and duties of their ranks.

5. **Competitive Promotion of N.C.O.'s**

On the setting up of the voluntary system all N.C.O.'s ranks were made temporary. Instructional classes were held in units, after which competitive examinations were held, at which ex-Regular ex-A.I.F., ex-Militia or Senior Cadet N.C.O.'s competed and seniority was given to the most efficient competitor.

An older and more proficient class of N.C.O.'s was the outcome, with a consequent improvement in deportment, bearing and discipline.

Being more mature, they were in many cases content with the fellowship of men of their own age and military experience and less anxious for promotion to commissioned rank. This had a stabilising effect on the units and tended to increase the N.C.O.'s efficiency still further.

Older men, who did not favour the immature "Non Coms" of Universal Training were thus included to rejoin the forces as Privates.

6. **The Effect on Junior Officers of Increased N.C.O. Efficiency**

In many units there existed a small coterie of junior officers who had hitherto taken little interest in training their platoons, being content to leave the real work to Instructors and Sergeant Majors.

The increase in age and efficiency of N.C.O.'s gave these officers the choice of improving or getting out, as keen volunteers would not attend parades at which their officers could not carry out their duties in a proper manner and maintain interest by progressive instruction.

Quite a number of young officers relinquished their commissions, thus leaving vacancies to which keen and able N.C.O.'s could be appointed by competition from the ranks later on. This accounts largely for the drop in the number of officers in the years 1930-33 (see table of annual strengths Part IV sheet 6) as replacements naturally took some time to train for examination.

The disbanding of certain Battalions and the transference of the officers to the Unattached List of Reserve of Officers also reduced the number of officers serving on the Active List.

It was not till 1934 that the influx of new officers began to exceed the efflux.

7. **The Growth and Efficiency of the New Citizen Force – Various Constitutive Factors (1930)**

(a) **A.I.F. Unit Associations**

The re-enlistment of many ex-members of the A.I.F. led to the A.I.F. Unit Associations taking a keen interest in the recruiting and welfare of the Militia Battalions in their localities, and assisting in the personal civil welfare of the more unfortunate members.

(b) **Drill Halls and Social Activities**

The policy of making local Drill Halls the centres for social and community interests had the effect of arousing the interest of City Councils and citizens committee in unit affairs.

As many trained artisans were unemployed during the depression, it followed that if the tools and materials could be made available, the voluntary labor of members of the units would soon provide the means for altering and improving Mess Rooms and Men's Clubs at Drill Halls.

Material from disused hutted camps of the A.I.F. was used for this purpose and as a consequence bare inside walls of drill sheds were changed into neat Mess Rooms, Lecturer Rooms, Club Rooms, Supper and Buffet Rooms. The women folk of the members attended on parade nights and provided tea, coffee, etc., and also carried out many philanthropic community services for the more unfortunate members of the units and their wives and families.

In this way, much necessary military accommodation and many amenities that would have cost thousands of pounds were provided at little cost. These proved of great value when utilized to the utmost in the opening period of the war when units were first called up for continuous training.

(c) **Rifle Ranges**

On Rifle Ranges, shelter sheds and locker rooms that had been long hoped for were erected at little expense by working bees of members.

Interest in rifle shooting and machine gun training also increased, as many unemployed men.

This resulted in increased membership of Unit rifle clubs.

The military result was an increased efficiency in weapon training and tactical handling of weapons, which later led to very keen competition when annual grants were made available for this purpose.

(d) **Physical Training**

The Physical Training instructional Staff attached to Districts did splendid service during the winter of 1930. The interiors of drill halls were greatly preferred to the cold streets and nightly classes, athletics and organized games were arranged and controlled by these officers, till the drill hall did actually become a community centre of some considerable importance and popularity.

8. **The Growth and Efficiency of the New Citizen Force – Various Adverse Factors (1930)**

(a) **Unemployment and the “Paper Army”**

One difficulty of maintaining the full strength of units was the fact that as unemployment increased in the cities and industrial suburbs, so it became necessary for the job-seeker to go further afield. As the majority of country towns had no militia units, it was impossible for these men to continue their training and many had to be discharged.

Others wandered round the country with no definite period of employment or residence and did not notify changes of address. These could only be marked as A.W.L., often for long periods, until clothing and equipment could be collected and their names struck off the rolls.

Because of this, many units had large numbers of absentees on their books and could not enlist men in their places. Thus, for some years the figures shown in strength returns contained many members who existed on paper only.

This also had an adverse effect on senior cadets, who, on becoming 18 years of age, could not be brought on the paid strength of the unit or allowed to go to camp until members AWL were struck off to provide vacancies.

Many such single men, on their return dispirited to the city, were forced to seek refuge in unemployment camps and had to be discharged.

(b) **The Staff Corps and A.I.C. – Leave without Pay**

Requiring the permanent staff of units to go on compulsory leave for two months without pay whilst recruiting was being carried out had a very adverse effect on the potential recruit and on the efficiency and administration of the units.

The financial effect of compulsory leave without pay was very severe on senior Staff Corps officers such as commandants, who could not transfer responsibility for decisions to juniors.

They were obliged to continue to carry out their duties and in order to secure public co-operation in recruiting, had to attend an increased number of recruiting meetings, public gatherings, and unit encouragement committee with consequent additional personnel expenditure on reduced incomes.

(c) **Loss of Stores and Accounting Difficulties**

At a time when the drill halls were nightly filled with Universal Training members returning clothing and equipment and desiring clearance and discharges, voluntary recruits undergoing training and receiving clothing and equipment, intending recruits and visitors inspired mainly by curiosity, the staff was working long hours to safely store the clothing and equipment received and to make the necessary entries in ledgers and stocktaking accounts of articles issued.

During the compulsory leave of Staff W.O's the handling of these valuable stores and the necessary accounting had to be left to inexperienced Militia N.C.O's and voluntary helpers.

The consequence was that on the return of the Permanent Store Holder from leave, it was often impossible to reconcile stores with stock sheets and many valuable articles such as revolvers, binoculars and compasses disappeared without trace, and without any possibility of fixing responsibility on individuals for the loss.

Voluntary working parties of unemployed around drill halls and store rooms were often tempted to steal clothing and boots.

Stocktaking and ordnance audits continued to pile up list of losses, without any change of adjustment, and for many years afterwards the officers of Divisional Headquarters became inundated with reports of Courts of Inquiries on deficiencies.

(d) **Physical Training Instructors – Compulsory Leave and Termination of Services**

For the purposes of compulsory leave for two months without pay, The Physical Training Instruction Staff were treated as members of the Permanent Forces, but in the interests of the members of their teams and classes and rather than allow a break to occur, the majority continued to work during the period of so-called leave.

(e) **Shortage of Permanent Adjutants**

Control and administration of several Militia units was also rendered very difficult by the fact that no permanent Adjutants were available for allotment to them. The Government policy that no members of the Permanent Forces were to be discharged was not sufficient to warrant the increase of those forces by current graduates from the R.M.C., who were disposed of by either –

- (i) transfer to the Commonwealth Public Service;
- (ii) Commissions in the British Army;
- (iii) commissions in the Indian Army; or
- (iv) release from bond to return to civil life. (See A.A.O. 2/32)

In many units it was not possible to find a suitable Militia officer with time at his disposal for carrying out the duties of a full-time Adjutant, and unit administration and interior economy suffered as a consequence.

In 1931, Junior Cadet training ceased and the services of the Physical Training Instructors were dispensed with.

This was particularly unfortunate for the Militia Forces as interest in voluntary activities relaxed in many units in the absence of enthusiastic leaders and capable organisers. It is worthy of record that, despite the fact that no compensation or gratuity was granted to these Instructors, the majority of those still resident in the metropolitan area carried on their activities in a voluntary civilian capacity for a very long time after discharge.

9. **Falling Unit Strength in 1931 and 1932**

The loss of the full-time services of the Physical Training Instructors may be looked upon as one reason for the drop in recruiting figures throughout the Commonwealth during the quarter following their retrenchment (July-Sept 1931).

That Army Headquarters took a serious view of this Universal drop in numbers is shown by the order issued (M.B. Circular 552/1931 para 6) at that time, to the effect that all other action was to be subordinated to bringing units to strength and maintaining that strength.

In 1932, the depression was at its worst, maintenance of numbers was an almost impossible task and impositions were being practised by a small percentage who enlisted in several units under assumed names for the purpose of obtaining clothing, overcoats and boots.

In June, 1932, by order of the Minister for Defence, conferences of Commanding Officers of Formations and Units were held in each Military District in order to obtain the view of C.O.'s on conditions of their units, and on recommendations for improvements in strength and efficiency.

The records of these conferences have been referred to previously in connection with General Blamey's remarks concerning the necessity of assisting the Militia officer and N.C.O. nucleus, and are well worthy of reference in any period of revival of Volunteer Citizen Forces. (AAC 72/1932)

The reports of these conferences and the action taken by Army Headquarters are contained in M.B. Agenda 42/193 and correspondence 929/1/122 and 929/1/127.

10. **The Difficulties of the Permanent Forces**

(a) **Clothing**

As a result of the stoppages of pay of the P.M.F. for varying periods of compulsory leave without pay, the clothing of these members (which had to be provided at their own expense) became shabby and threadbare in contrast to the new uniforms which they issued to members of the Citizen Force units, of which they formed the staff.

As the members of the P.M.F. had never been given the advantage of rises in pay as the cost of living rose, as was the case with members of the Commonwealth Public Service, approval was given for all ranks up to Warrant Officer to be credited with a uniform maintenance allowance of 6d. per day.

(b) **Reduction of Officers at Staff College**

The decision to reduce attendance at Camberley and Quetta to one officer only, resulted in an accumulation of Staff Corps officers who had qualified for entry but for whom vacancies could not be found and whose chance of attending before they became too old were thus reduced.

All qualified officers were subsequently placed on a Staff College Qualified List from which a selection was made each year by the Military Board.

This restriction had a very adverse effect on training.

11. **Re-organisation of Rifle Clubs**

In 1930 the civilian rifle clubs which since 1923 had been entirely independent of military control, were again placed under the control and administration of the Adjutant-General.

In order to give Clubs a definite status in the Defence Force those clubs that so volunteered were allotted as reserve clubs to infantry units.

Approval was also granted for a limited number of members to attend camps of continuous training with their allied units.

**(B) THE EVENTS AND INFLUENCES DURING 1932**

**1. Factors adversely affecting the Militia**

**(a) Reduced Funds following a Change of Government**

In January, 1932, the Lyons Government took office. Military estimates for the years 1932/1933 totalled £955, 400 a reduction of £95,535 on the previous financial year

**(b) The Disarmament Conference and Proposed Disbandment of Units**

In order to maintain even a skeleton force on the funds allotted, the Military Board was forced to plan for the future disbandment of several units and the reduction in strength of others.

An actual reduction was made in the Militia Staffs and certain units were named for disbandment, pending the result of a disarmament conference. This threat of impending reduction or disbandment hung over the Military Forces during 1932 and 1933 (see Minister's statement in Estimates 1932/33, page 6 and Estimates 1933/34, page 7).

Although the Disarmament conference was inconclusive and no actual disbandment of units eventuated, the effect of the declared Government policy of disbandment of further units was sufficient to kill all incentive for joining the Militia and recruiting practically ceased.

The existing Citizen Force Commanders and officers carried on, however, receiving only a small issue of the promised better fitting uniforms, and with funds insufficient to pay for the domestic services of home training, such as train fares, cleaning and lighting drill halls, etc.

**(c) Lack of Equipment and Clothing**

The general shortage of equipment and clothing as a result of the financial stringency was aggravated by the ruling given by a magistrate that possessions on the day of the order had to be proved.

This rendered impotent the already cumbersome machinery for the recovery of these articles, as signatures or receipts obtained previously were not accepted as evidence.

Delay in recovery was thus increased until finally Section 79 of the Defence Act was amended.

(d) **Reduction of Reimbursement of Tram Fares**

In 1932 tram fares, which had been limited in 1929 to distances of over three miles from the drill hall, were reduced to two miles.

Prior to 1930, funds allotted for this purpose had been barely enough to cover the minimum attendance of the nearest drill hall under Universal Training.

Volunteers, however, had to be allowed to select the unit or arm of the service which they wished to join, irrespective of the distance to the drill hall, and the disallowance of refunds for fares already expended by individuals was a source of grave discontent to volunteers for many years until extra funds were allotted for the purposes.

(e) **Lack of Senior Cadets**

When Universal Training was in vogue all compulsory cadets were trained as infantry at the nearest drill hall, and selected for service in the appropriate technical arm on reaching the age of 18.

Under the Militia system, however, Senior Cadet Units were formed in connection with all branches of the Services and Senior Cadet volunteers enlisted irrespective of the distance of their homes from the unit drill hall.

Senior Cadets on enlistment were very keen, and they usually commenced by attending regularly; but as they received no pay, the restriction on tram fares inflicted an additional financial drain on their funds, with the consequence that later attendance gradually fell off.

The difficulty of progressively instructing small numbers of Senior Cadets in the technical duties of specialist units gradually caused Cadet recruiting for such units to be concentrated on squads at certain periods of the year. As the annual turnover of specialist personnel was not as great as in the Infantry the paper strength of technical units was soon reached with the result that the number of Senior Cadets who could be enlisted on becoming 18 years of age had to be restricted.

Senior Cadets were allowed to attend courses and classes which were held sometimes at the same time and place as the unit camp, and

advantage was often taken to include them in the ranks for some particular training exercise. This was particularly galling to the senior cadet who had rendered over twelve months service, was now over the age of 18 years, but was not yet taken on the adult Militia strength for pay purposes.

(f) **Militia Pay Anomalies**

The fact that pay was only made available at the end of each financial year caused hardship to some members, and a return to half-yearly pay periods was eventually secured.

The further bone of contention was created among some new members who conscientiously attended every parade during the years training, but received no pay for attendances in excess of the prescribed number.

This was also overcome eventually when approval was given for payment in the second half-year up to the maximum attendances allowed for the year. (See M.B.I. A91 of 1936).

(g) **Reduced Camp Attendances**

Camp attendances were adversely affected by the following:-

- (i) The "dead heads" carried in records as A.W.L.;
- (ii) the rates of pay;
- (iii) the difference of members (in temporary employment or employment of doubtful continuity) in requesting leave from their employers;
- (iv) the fear that Militia pay would render them ineligible for charitable relief or dole;
- (v) Senior Cadets could not be taken into the ranks or paid in place of absentees and thus they could not be allowed to attend.

2. **The Credit Side 1932**

(a) **Public Interest in Ceremonials**

During the year 1932 (and 1933) the interest of certain sections of the general public in military ceremonials, such as trooping the colours, was most marked.

These parades were held in the locality in which the units were raised, and the dates were generally selected to coincide with the anniversaries of Great War episodes, connected with the battalions concerned.

Attendances usually included ex-members of the A.I.F. battalions and of the pre-1914 Militia battalions from which the A.I.F. battalions had been formed.

Army approval for certain military stores and facilities to be used for tattoos and gymkhanas meant an improvement in the display items provided by the Citizen Forces and a greater interest in the training by the participants, their friends and the general public.

This assisted greatly to maintain the interest and to foster the attendance of the militia man at parades (M.B.I. G21/32).

(b) **Regimental Colours**

Whilst Kings Colours had been issued to Regiments, the purchase of Regimental Colours was a unit responsibility. As a consequence of this increased public interest, sufficient funds were soon subscribed to enable all units to purchase Colours.

(c) **Annual Grants for Military and Athletic Competitions**

A further boon to Commanding Officers was the issue of an annual grant of funds for District Military and Athletic competitions.

Unlike tattoos and gymkhanas, competitions could never be looked upon as money-making propositions and there was always the possibility of members of the committee being called upon to make good any outstanding accounts if receipts did not balance expenditure.

The provision of a small grant did not cover all expenses, but did enable activities to be staged on a better scale, and enabled teams from country units to attend what had previously been a metropolitan activity only.

3. **Lack of Remounts**

Voluntary attendance at week-end tactical classes and courses caused a severe strain on the small numbers of horses in the Remount Sections and made it necessary for training programmes and proportionate allotment of remounts to be made out well in advance.

The continued series of camps of continuous training, in which the units and personnel [sic] but the same horses had to be used, began to have its effect on the older horses, many of whom could not stand up to the strain and had to be cast.

As funds for replacement were practically nil, younger horses could only be purchased gradually by utilizing savings in the maintenance vote.

4. **Encroachment on Defence Areas – Additional Powers for Commandments**

With the general public belief that the possibility of war had ceased to exist, encroachment on Defence areas by business firms and influential associations increased and it became necessary for additional powers to be granted to District Commandants to prevent buildings, etc., being erected without authority.

This applied particularly to oil tanks on beaches and in the neighborhood of Defence works.

These additional powers and a list of proclaimed areas in M.B.I. 33 of 1932.

5. **Re-organisation during 1930/1932 (Table)**

As there had been disbandment and linking of several citizen force units and the closing of many country training localities during the years 1930/1932, a table of organization and distribution of existing forces was issued as A.A.O. 231/1932.

**Note:** This fills in the gap as a record between the Australian army list of 1928 and the next issued in 1934

(III) **THE YEAR 1933**

**TRAINING** - Details of training programme, etc, are contained in the Annual Training Report.

In January the old wooden drill hall at Albert Park, Melbourne, was completely gutted by fire, and the whole of the harness, equipment and guns of the 4<sup>th</sup> Divisional Artillery damaged or destroyed.

For home training this serious loss of fighting equipment and accommodation was temporarily overcome by superimposing the personnel of Batteries of 4 Div, Artillery on Batteries of 2 Cav. Div. and 3 Div. at Windsor, South Melbourne, and the Engineers Depot until new Artillery quarters were built at Batman Avenue in 1935.

The guns which were badly damaged by heat and flame were eventually repaired by the Munitions Department who deserve credit for accomplishing such a task without precedent or experience to guide, as funds were never made available for replacement by purchase.

**Clothing Problems**

The financial depression and the wide spread prevalence of unemployment among members of the Militia, made recovery of military property, particularly clothing and boots, from absentees of the Citizen Force a different problem. Even when offenders had been awarded a fine by a magistrate, confinement to prison of an unemployed impecunious man for non-payment of the fine not unnaturally caused an unfavorable reaction of public opinion against the services. Under these circumstances it was decided that committal should be sought for non-payment of fines only after a full investigation of the man's financial position had been made and submitted to the formation Commander.

The impecuniosity of many members was such that the wear and tear on civilian clothing during recruit training became a serious consideration where working dress was in short supply. This was overcome by permitting units to retain part-worn service jackets for use as working dress.

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**Notes:** See MBI A6/1933.  
See MBI Q86/1933.

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It was also found that many men in unit camps had no change of clothing and permission was granted for Service Dress jackets (A.I.F. pattern) to be retained as a second garment when Militia uniforms were issued. This contributed considerably to the improved appearance of the individual soldier and unit and lengthened the life of the new garments.

### **Melbourne Centenary**

The services of Brigadier-General C.H. Jess, the Commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> Division, and Temporary District Commandant, 3 Military District, were made available to the State Government of Victoria, from 18/5/33 to 30/11/34, as organizer of Victoria and Melbourne Centenary.

This enabled other senior officers to obtain experience in command and administration. Col E.M. Williams was appointed to administer the 3 District Base and Brig. A. Luxton to administer the 4<sup>th</sup> Division until Brig. McColl was appointed on 1/7/33.

### **Exchange Officer**

During this period, for the first time, an Australian Officer was appointed on exchange to a 2<sup>nd</sup> Grade Staff appointment in the United Kingdom for a period of two years. The posting was GSO, 2<sup>nd</sup> Grade 44<sup>th</sup> (Home Counties) Division of the British Army and the officer selected for the task was Major J. Northcott, Staff Corps (later Lieutenant-General J. Northcott, Chief of the General Staff.

### **Armoured Regiment**

The 19<sup>th</sup> Aust Light Horse Regiment (Wimmera), which was disbanded in 1929 as a Cavalry regiment, was reformed as an Armoured Car Regiment and temporarily equipped with hired motor vehicles. This was the first mechanised unit raised other than the Tank Cadre in N.S.W.

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**NOTES:** See A.A.O. 193/1933.

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### **Darwin Command**

A garrison, consisting of the 9<sup>th</sup> Heavy Battery, Royal Australian Artillery, previously stationed at Thursday Island, and a detachment of Royal Australian Engineers, was established at Darwin on 14<sup>th</sup> October 1933, under Major (later Lieut-General) C.A. Clowes. Administration continued to be the responsibility of the Commandant, 1<sup>st</sup> District Base.

The Darwin Construction Party, which had been employed since September, 1932, on the construction of quarters and emplacement of the guns transferred from Thursday Island, completed its task about the same time. The party consisted of members from all branches of the Permanent Forces under Lt-Col T.R. Williams, Staff Corps. (1)

The experience gained in erecting the fortifications and installing the guns was a great value in the later emplacing of the 9.2 inch guns at Sydney and elsewhere.

### **PERMANENT FORCE ESTABLISHMENTS**

The annual establishment of the Permanent Forces for this year shows a little improvement to make up for normal wastage.

## THE RECORD OF 1934

### TRAINING

Full details of the training programme and progress made during this period are available from the Annual Training Report. (2)

The period of 6 days home training and 6 days continuous training in camp was retained for the year 1934/35. Field Artillery Brigades were again required to arrange their camps as practice or training camps in alternate years, as it was found that this gave the best results for training, manoeuvre, gunnery and economy of ammunition.

The increasing use of M.T. Vehicles by the Aust. Army Service Corps made it very necessary for the Permanent Officers and members to receive advanced training in such matters, and to meet this requirement an Army Service Corps Training School was established at Victoria Barracks. (3)

### Changes in the Military Board

The death of the Quartermaster-General, Brig F.B. Heritage in July, 1934, his succession by Brig-Gen O.F. Phillips, the retirement of Brig-Gen T.H. Dodds and his succession by Brig-Gen C.H. Jess in December 1934 as Adjutant-General, marked a complete change in the administrative section of the Military Board within a period of a few months.

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- (1) See A.A.O. 232/1933.  
(2) See M.B.I. G27/'34.  
(3) See A.A.O. 53/1934.
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### Pay and Allowances

A continual source of irritation to some members of the staff corps was the system of Command & Staff pay, by virtue of which certain staff appointments were graded & allotted appropriate allowances.

A regarding of these appointments was made in 1934, (2), in an endeavour to preserve equity amongst individuals, to comply with the arbitrary numbers allotted to each grade and to keep within the financial provision of the estimates.

This did not, however, remove the causes of dissatisfaction and it might be mentioned here that these allowances were discontinued on the outbreak of the 1939/45 war. (Should be made of the departmental papers on the subject which indicate the inequities of the system.)

Another cause of resentment was the inadequacy of travelling allowances available to Commanding Officers particularly of Light Horse Regiment and Infantry Battalions, with widespread detachments in country areas. Such officers were severely handicapped in exercising the essential personal supervision.

## **Darwin Command**

Throughout the year it became apparent that the setting up of the Command at Darwin created problems that could only be settled by Army Headquarters, and the circumlocution through 1<sup>st</sup> Dist. Base only led to delay and needless friction. Accordingly, for all purposes would be controlled and administered directly by Army Headquarters. (1)

## **Command and Staff Allowance**

Command and Staff Day [sic] which had always been a source of heartburning in the Staff Corps, again made a regarding of appointments necessary to preserve equity among individuals and to comply with the arbitrary numbers allotted to each grade and to keep within the financial provision of the estimates. (2)

It might be mentioned, here, that Command and Staff Pay, was discontinued on the outbreak of the 1939/45 war and if any reintroduction is later suggested reference to correspondence concerning the inequity of those allowances should be considered.

## **Travelling Allowance for CO's when visiting country Detachments**

Commanding officers of L.H. Regiments and Infantry Battalions with scattered country detachments were severely handicapped in exercising the necessary personal supervision and providing encouragement. Not only did such officers have to absent themselves from their private business while visiting country detachments but from Corps contingent allowances, these were already insufficient to provide for all the other requirements of the unit.

As a result the Commanding Officer had personally to bear the expenditure for other items such as bed, board, porter age etc whilst absent on military duty.

## **Annual allowance for Senior Cadets at Educational Establishments**

The expenses for individual senior cadets at educational establishments had continued to be borne by the parents till an annual allowance of 10/- per head for each efficient senior cadet was granted to cover:-

- (a) Provision and maintenance of uniform.
- (b) Payment for loss or damage of equipment, and towards expenses of an annual camp.  
(Senior cadets attached to C.M.F. units received free rations, clothing and equipment, transport)

- (1) See A.A.O. 242/1934
- (2) See A.A.O. 43/1934
- (3) See M.B.I. 054/1934

(5) **THE ROYAL TOUR OF H.R.H., THE DUKE OF GLOUCESTER**

The Royal tour of H.R.H. the Duke of Gloucester provided a much needed stimulus to the Military Forces.

The itinerary included most towns where there was a militia infantry or L.H. unit of any size, all of which performed additional preliminary voluntary training for inclusion in guards of honour or escorts to H.R.H. in the capital cities, the ceremonies of the Royal landing, reception and state progress included public functions and displays in which the Services played a prominent public part. The increased public interest in the Militia Forces undoubtedly induced a large number of members of the Citizen Forces, who had completed their term of 3 years' service, to re-enlist for a further period.

(6) **CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES**

(a) **The effect of future mobilization on the utilization of civilian resources**

The complexity of future mobilization of resources for modern warfare was becoming more apparent, as a study of the utilization of civilian resources revealed the necessity for co-ordination of Army and Civilian authorities controlling production, distribution and transport.

The functions and lists of personnel comprising Departmental and Army Headquarters Committee illustrate that vision was shown by Military and Departmental heads even if non provision of funds postponed or nullified immediate results, which were later obtained and credited on the numerous Committees formed after the war broke out and into which money was poured without stint.

(b) **The effect of the expansion of Army Wireless sending Equipment**

The extension and improvement of the wireless sending equipment in the Signal Services of the Army made it necessary for co-ordination of wavelengths, etc., between the civil broadcasting stations and military stations at practice and training.

The first co-ordination instructions were therefore issued and formed the basis of all later codes and instructions.

## **(C) THE RECORD OF 1935**

### **(1) TRAINING DURING 1935**

#### **(a) Overseas training policy to keep Permanent Staff Officers abreast in Military Trends**

In order to ensure that the handicap of limited funds restricting active training of the Citizen Forces should not cause the military knowledge and experience of the Permanent Staff Officers to fall behind Military thought and training in other parts of the Empire, opportunity was taken to send as many officers for training abroad or other Dominion officers in their place.

- (1) These are set out in A.A.O. 196/1934
- (2) See M.B.I. G58/1934
- (3) The necessity and value of such training abroad is referred to in Sir Harry Chauvel's report for 1930, page 10, paras. 30-32.

The number of officers abroad for these years, shown in Part III of the table, is a very satisfactory result to have attained under such limited financial conditions. The four officers selected for exchange on staffs of British and Indian Divisions – Northcott, Rowell, Vasey and Boase – have come into prominence since the outbreak of war.

#### **(B) Importance of Voluntary weapon handling and firing**

The result of the encouragement of voluntary weapon handling and firing by means of unit rifle clubs, rifle matches, and district competition is shown by the excellent returns obtained by the best shooting units during the small arms courses for the year 1935.

It is hardly likely that these results have ever been equalled by Citizen Forces and they illustrate that though preceding pages may appear to indicate that most attention had been paid to ceremonial and dress in the endeavor to keep the forces up to strength, the reason for an Army's existence- namely proficiency in the use of its weapons – had not been overlooked, but on the other hand a high standard had been obtained.

### **(2) CHANGE IN APPOINTMENT**

#### **(a) Military Board Appointments**

With the retirement of Major General J.H. Bruce in April, 1935, following that of General Dodds in late 1934, all the personnel of the Military Board and the

D.G.M.S. had changed since July, 1934. These changes marked the last of the officers of the Permanent Forces who had held commissions in the State Forces prior to the formation of the Commonwealth and who had war service prior to the Great War of 1914-19. The senior rank held by any of the members of the Military Board was that of Brig. General, whilst that of the new C.G.S. was Brevet Colonel.

(b) **District Commandant Appointments**

With the exception of Western Australia, the Commandants of all the States changed during 1935. This will later be seen to mark the beginning of the rise in numbers and proficiency of the Citizen Forces, with improved armament of coastal fortresses, and in mechanisation of units of first line component.

(1) See A.A.O./237

(3) **BESTOWAL OF THE TITLE "ROYAL" BY H.M. – THE KING**

For the honour of receiving the title "Royal" bestowed by H.M. The King, the 1<sup>st</sup> Light Horse Regiment (N.S.W. Lancers) and the 6<sup>th</sup> Bn (Melbourne Regt) were selected as the two senior Regiments having the longest unbroken periods of existence since first being raised as volunteers in their respective Australian Colonies.

(4) **MILITARY REVIEWS IN HONOUR OF THE JUBILEE OF H.M THE KING: THE MORALE EFFECT**

At the reviews held in each capital city in honour of the Jubilee of His Majesty the King, two results were achieved:-

- (a) The members of units who had previously only seen their own unit on parade or at camp training were able to see that they were part of a very large organization in their state.
- (b) The general public were able to see that an organized force well dressed, disciplined, and capable of manoeuvre had been produced since 1930 and was worthy of support.
- (c) The public interest aroused in Sydney was displayed by the fact that despite the continuous rain from 12 noon till the conclusion of the parade at 2.45 there was no apparent diminution of the large public attendance.

(IV) **THE DEVELOPMENT OVER THE YEARS 1936 - 1939**

(A) **INVASION OF THE RHINELAND TOWNS BY GERMAN FORCES AND THE EFFECT ON AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE POLICY IN 1936**

1. **INVASION OF RHINELAND TOWNS**

In March, 1936, Hitler invaded Cologne and other Rhineland towns. In August, Hitler issued decree increasing Military Service of all German males from 1 to 2 years, thus doubling the strength of the German army.

The effect of this apparent threat of future war was shown in the increased interest in military affairs by the general public and improvement in the type of recruit offering for Militia Service.

2. **THE STEP-UP IN TRAINING**

(a) **Tactical Course and Administrative Conference for District Commandants**

The District Commandants had all been appointed within the last 2 years, and to enable the new C.G.S. to communicate his ideas on many defence problems, a tactical course for Senior Officers of the Staff Corps was held in February under the C.G.S. at Sydney and Newcastle. This was the first such conference held since 1928.

(1) Full details of the course are given in A.A.O. 47/36

(2) Advantage was taken of this assembly to hold an administrative conference under the A.G. at the end of the Course, when recruiting and administrative systems of Citizen Force units, and preparation of mobilization plans were discussed and directions issued.

(b) **The effect of absenteeism on progressive training and the introduction of CO's parade as a remedy.**

(i) **The causes of absenteeism**

(a) In accordance with Military Board Instructions that maintenance of members was to be the main Objective, numerous weekly unit parades were held to suit the convenience of members. The consequence was that the average attendance at many night and half day parades

was so small that advanced training could not be carried out, to the discouragement of the keen soldier and good attender, who was irked at the endless repetition of elementary details.

- (b) As any parade counted towards pay, it was possible for a member to remain absent for weeks at a time and then make up his parades for pay by attending in a concentrated period.
- (c) Whilst it was provided that an absentee could be persecuted in a civil court for evasion of personnel service, even under compulsory military service only extreme cases were brought before the magistrates, who either dismissed the case perhaps with a caution, or committed the soldier to the custody of the area officer for extra parades.
- (d) Under the Militia system, authority existed for the Commanding Officer to inflict fines for absence without leave, but as Commanding Officers had not previously exercised such powers, it was found they were diffident to use their powers to fine a man, who was unemployed, from his small pay of 4/- per diem

(ii) **The introduction of CO's parades**

With , however, the increases of pay to 8/- per diem, such consideration did not exist, and in order to ensure reasonable attendance at parades, it was ordered that specific parades were Commanding Officers' parades, from which leave could be obtained only by application, and absence without leave from which involved fines which could be deducted by stoppages from any pay due to the soldier at the end of the half year.

(iii) **The result of CO's parades**

As a result, Commanding Officers became more cognizant of discretionary exercising of their powers and responsibilities whilst attendances at C.O.'s parades increased to satisfactory numbers for progressive training

(c) **Tactical exercises in coastal areas**

Continuous training for the year included the holding of tactical exercises in coastal areas for officers of all arms, with special relation to the role which formations would be likely to perform in the event of enemy attack or raid.

Camps of units wherever possible were held in those areas so that officers and men could familiarise themselves with the country surrounding their war stations.

It was intended that locations of camps were to be changed each year, and that bivouacs were always to be laid out under service conditions with due regard wherever possible, for concealment from air observation.

(d) **Use of Radio telephones**

The issue of radio telephones was also increased and Commanding Officers and staffs were required to familiarise themselves with their use and procedure.

(e) **Review of officers and NCO's**

As a further advance towards proficiency each Commanding Officer was required to review the capacity and capability of his officers, N.C.O.'s and specialists in regard to their ability to train their respective units and sub-units when brought up to full strength after mobilization. The progress made in study and preparation of their respective duties in war.

(f) **Week-end courses**

The interest in unit week-end courses for officers and N.C.O's continued, and whilst funds provided only permitted only a certain number to be paid from unit funds, many others were held at the voluntary expense of the individuals.

(g) **Introduction of Church parades at week-end Parades**

The attendances at week-end parades in some cases became so marked that for a time there was concern on the part of some churches as to the Commonwealth Authorities instigating activities in disregard of the Sabbath.

A compromise was reached whereby Senior Chaplains would be provided with programme of army courses so that church parades could be instituted where ever warranted.

- (h) In connection with the encouragement of Citizen Forces to participate in tattoos, competitions and displays, a keen rivalry between units in metropolitan areas led to many displays of a thrilling but dangerous nature being undertaken by members participating.

It therefore became very necessary to regulate and control such competitions to prevent members being injured whilst not eligible for medical attendance or compensation. It was necessary to insist that all participation must be voluntary.

- (i) A list of authorised games and sports of which displays could be given was according issued. (1) Instructions for Training Serial 21 and notified in A.A.O. 200 dated 31 Aug 36.

- (j) **Attendance of V.A.D. male members at Camps**

Voluntary Aid Detachments registered as Reserve to A.A.M.C. were allowed to increase the experience of their interested and keen members by permission being granted for male members, not exceeding 12 at any one camp, to attend and be attached for duty to a field ambulance. (2) See M.B.I. A92/36

They would be provided with fares, rations and tentage, but no pay or allowances.

- (k) **Consolidation of Training and Administrative Instructions for Senior Cadets Establishments**

Since 1929 Senior Cadets at educational establishments had been established and administered on the briefest printed instructions, which had been added to or amended by further instructions, memos and orders.

In July, 1936, instructions and conditions applying to administration and training of such detachments were consolidated into a precise form. (3) see M.B.I. G51/36

(l) **Variations to pay and proficiency allowances to attract members to training**

The aim of training of the Militia Forces was to ensure as many as possible attending the annual minimum (4) see M.B.I. A91/36 Instructions governing pay and proficiency were:-

- (a) All parades (not classes and courses) would count for pay and efficiency.
- (b) In the first half-year payment would be made for parades attended up to a total of half the year's requirements.
- (c) In the second-half year, payment would be made up to the maximum number of parades required for efficiency during the year (less any stoppages etc. for A.W.L.).

(1) By this means it was possible for recruits enlisted during the second half-year to attend extra parades and thus enabled to pass out of the recruit stage as soon as possible.

(m) **Training Review**

The progress made in the past year is reviewed fully in Annual Training Report (1) Instructions for training for the ensuing 12 months are very full.

(3) **INTENSIFICATION OF THE RECRUITING CAMPAIGN**

(a) **Increase in Citizen Forces**

Following the Cabinet decision to increase the Citizen Forces to 35,000 provision was made for the first time on record for a recruiting propaganda campaign on up-to-date publicity lines to be direct by AHQ.

(b) **Appointment of a Recruiting Publicity Officer**

Limited funds were made available and approval given for an officer at Army Headquarters to be appointed Recruiting Publicity Officer in the Department of the A.G. to co-ordinate recruiting activities with advertising mediums and agencies for formation staffs.

(c) **The Publicity Plan**

The outline on which the publicity plan was to be formed is contained in:

(a) An appreciation of the Recruiting Instructions by the Adjutant General (Copy attached hereto) Part III;

and

(b) Military Board Instruction A52 and A91 as to machinery and improved conditions of service.

(d) **Improvements in conditions of service to attract recruits**

(i) **Previous conditions of service**

In M.B.I. A52, the Minister summarises the conditions under which the Citizen Force had been serving, in the following words:

“The voluntary system was inaugurated, and efforts for its sound establishment have been carried out under rather adverse conditions.

Owing to the exigencies of the Depression, the Defence Vote fell to almost less than half its earlier figure, and trainees were asked to continue at the low rate (4/- per diem) paid under Universal Training”.

(1) See M.B.I. G50/1936

(ii) **New conditions of Service**

The improvements in pay and conditions approved were:

(a) Pay, Private 5/- per day and 3/- per day efficiency allowances

(b) Home training pay to be paid half yearly instead of annually.

(c) Efficiency pay for camp to be paid in camp.

(d) Increased Corps contingent allowance for keeping drill halls in better condition.

(e) Increased funds for Week-end bivouacs for all ranks (previously limited to officers and N.C.O's)

- (f) Train and tram fares to be paid beyond a reasonable walking distance of drill halls.
  - (g) Ceremonial parades and annual reviews to be held.
  - (h) Inter-unit competitions to be held and fares paid.
  - (i) Uniforms to be further improved in neatness and fit. Peaked cap to be issued to all ranks of all arms.
  - (j) Opportunity and assistance for militia N.C.O.'s to join A.I.C.
  - (k) Officer to be appointed in each unit for recruiting.
  - (l) Welfare committees to be revived. Recruiting officers to be liaison officers with such.
  - (m) Funds for publicity to be allotted to Formation Commanders, who may sub-allocate.
  - (n) Attractive pamphlets, posters and postcards to be issued from A.H.Q. for recruiting.
  - (o) Unit betterment allowance paid to C.O.s.
- Para 9 stated. The greatest use may be made of the contents of the foregoing for publicity purposes.
- (iii) This M.B.I. A52 and A91 of 11, 36 and file is worthy of reference in any other recruiting campaign, as it was again the basis of the successful recruiting drive to increase the Militia to 70,000 in 1939.

(e) **Recruiting Poster Competition**

The recruiting poster completion notified in A.A.O. 293.1936 confined to members of the Citizen Forces was reported to be creating a great deal of local interest in military affairs.

As a poster could be submitted by any officer or soldier not necessarily his own work, a great deal of discussion and suggestion took place with civilians regarding details of military service which could be used as a motif to attract recruits.

From the many designs submitted, two suitable posters, copies of which are in records, were selected and utilized.

(f) **Increase in age limit for entry to RAC**

In view of the paucity of the number of candidates for entry to R.M.C. and to widen the field of election for applicants for the Citizen Forces, the upper age of normal entry to the R.M.C. was increased to 20 years. Details contained in A.A.O. 73/1936.

(4) **THE DEARTH OF OFFICERS FOR NEW COUNTRY BATTALIONS**

(a) **The Shortage of Citizen Forces Officers to act as CO's and the remedy**

(i) **The Difficulty**

In country areas when new detachments had been formed into battalions, difficulty was experienced in obtaining Citizen Force officers with sufficient rank, experience and time to fill the post of Commanding Officer.

Whilst officers of the Staff Corps were always appointed adjutants to such new battalions to carry on, it was found that without the prestige and powers of the appointment of C.O., good results could not be obtained.

(ii) **The remedy and its value**

The precedent was therefore adopted of appointing the Staff Corps Officer as Acting C.O. to administer the unit, in addition to his duties as adjutant.

In every unit where such an appointment was made, it was welcomed by the Citizen Force Officers who received benefit of direction and instruction. It also enabled the Staff Corps officer to obtain experience in command.

It is brought forward for consideration that future policy concerning the training of Staff Corps officers should include for selected officers, a short period in command of a Citizen Force unit.

Due to the shortage of Staff Corps officers it became necessary to employ more Citizen Force Officers as Militia adjutants.

(b) **The Shortage of junior Staff Corps Officers to act as Militia Adjutants and the effect on the A.I.C.**

(i) **The appointment of Citizen Force Officers as Adjutants**

Because of the shortage of Staff Corps officers it became necessary to employ more Citizen Force Officers as Militia Adjutants. During the year, 25 militia officers were appointed Temporary Militia Adjutant and Quartermaster, and 22 who were not being able to carry on effectively, relinquished their appointments. This made 47 changes in units during the year. The absence of trained Staff Corps Adjutants from these units was a serious handicap to efficient administration and training.

(ii) **The effect on the AIC**

In many units, officers were not available with knowledge, experience and time at their disposal to accept the appointment, and accordingly, extra responsibility and duties for which they were untrained, were thrown on the senior members of the A.I.C., who could not be relieved of their ordinary duties and responsibilities whilst so acting.

Authority was therefore obtained to increase the numbers of WO's of the A.I.C., and to pass selected candidates through schools of instruction before appointment to Militia units. It was however often many months before fresh postings of instructors could be made to units.

The A.I.C. was further increased in strength during 1936/1937 by the arrangement for 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> Special A.I.C. Schools at Randwick.

(5) **EFFECT OF RE-ENLISTMENT OF EX-NCO'S ON APPLICATIONS FOR COMMISSION EXAMINATIONS FROM THE RANKS**

(a) **The effect of the re-enlistment**

(i) **On the service**

One of the immediate results of the introduction of the voluntary military system in 1930 has been the re-enlistment of ex-N.C.O's which raised the age of N.C.O.'s and increased the proficiency and discipline of N.C.O's generally.

(ii) **On promotion of other N.C.O's**

These N.C.O's remained with their units during the succeeding years and as the majority did not desire promotion to commissioned rank, very slow promotion for aspiring corporals took place as few vacancies for sergeants occurred.

(iii) **On candidates for commission**

It was then realized that this was affecting adversely the number of applications from the ranks for competitive examination for commissioned rank, as the lowest rank for eligibility was sergeant.

(b) **Change in eligibility for commission**

As it was necessary that the rank of Sergeant be retained as a minimum to ensure that candidate had reasonable experience, instructions were amended A.A.O. 245/1936 to permit.

(6) **NECESSITY TO HIRE PRIVATE M.T. FOR MECHANISED UNITS AND SUBSEQUENT COMPENSATION CLAIMS**

(a)

(i) **Reason for the hire of private M.T.**

As it was not practicable to obtain and maintain sufficient departmentally owned vehicles for the training of mechanised units, a system of hiring private vehicles was introduced to permit the transport organization of units to be filled to the greatest extent on parades by a combination of departmental and privately owned vehicles.

(ii) **Types and terms of hire**

The types that could be hired were laid down, and full instructions issued as to conditions of hire, payment for damages, repairs, lubricants, etc.

(b) **Subsequent compensation claims**

As the vehicles in combatant units such as Armoured Car and Machine Gun Regiments were required for cross country work with speed at least equivalent to that of Cavalry, it followed that owners who used their vehicles only on roads began to submit numerous claims for damage due to unfair wear and tear. These claims became very difficult to settle. The point of difference being the tactical necessity for rough usage of the vehicle across country by the soldier drivers as against the care that would be given by a civilian driver using the vehicle for normal transportation on roads.

Until the above details of the employment of the vehicle had been investigated and an agreement setting out the conditions of engagement drawn up and explained to the owner of the vehicle, such disputed claims were bound to occur, but with the above as a basis and minor adjustment being made from time to time as drivers gained more experience the number of such claims became less. It must be remembered that the type of 30 cwt. Truck of 1936 was being subjected to trials then which would now be easy going for the modern jeep.

(7) **VIST BY DETACHMENTS FROM VICTORIA AND WESTERN AUSTRALIA TO S.A FOR THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CENTENARY**

In order to give an incentive or reward to serving members of the Citizen Forces, approval was given for a detachment from the Permanent Forces and Citizen Forces of Victoria and Western Australia to travel to South Australia for one week to take part in parades and displays in connection with the South Australian Centenary.

Rail fares and maintenance in South Australia were paid by the South Australian Government.

The contingent was formed by the selection of members from every unit, and as the visit was during the Christmas holidays, keen competition was created amongst those men anxious to be included.

Great public interest was taken in the troops in Adelaide, and the intention was that similar visits by troops of other States would be arranged in the future when similar conditions could be applied.

(8) **VISIT TO LONDON BY A CONTINGENT FROM AUSTRALIA FOR THE CORONATION OF H.M. THE KING**

For the Coronation of His Majesty the King in 1937 parliament approved of the dispatch to London of a contingent from Australia, consisting of 23 RAN, 100 AMF and 25 RAAF. The contingent was to be composed of half serving members of the forces, and half ex-members of the A.I.F. The ex-A.I.F. members were selected by personnel the State Council of the R.S.S.I.L.A.

Competition for inclusion from members of the Forces was very keen, and as primary selections were made in each local detachment of militia the interest was carried throughout the Commonwealth.

General Sir Harry Chauvel was selected to lead the contingent, the military portion being under the command of LT-Col F. Lind, D.S.C., and the Citizen Forces.

The Military contingent was uniformly clothed in Khaki, with red facing on shoulder straps and cuffs, as mounted troops with emu plumes, bandoliers etc. and organised and drilled as a four section battery of Field Artillery. Each member wore the colour patches on each arm, of the unit in which he had served, prior to selection.

The composition of the contingent and report on the tour are referred to in the records of 1937. See M.B.I. A97/1936.

(9) **STRENGTHS OF MILITIA FORCES FOR THE YEAR ENDING 30<sup>TH</sup> JUNE 1936**

The strength of the Militia Forces for the year ending June 30<sup>th</sup>, 1936 was for other ranks 26,637. This represented a rise of 2,202 from the preceding year. In addition regimental detachments of senior cadet other ranks, cost 3,173 a rise of 293.

It should be noted that the approval to raise the force to 35,000 and the recruiting campaign referred to in these notes did not elevate on till after 1<sup>st</sup> July, 1936, and figures above are the basis from which the strength was increased to that shown in return of strength for 30<sup>th</sup> June, 1937.

(10) **ADDITIONAL PROVISION MADE IN THE 1936/1937 ESTIMATES FOR DEFENCE PURPOSES**

In the estimates for 1936/37 the statement of the Minister for Defence indicated the extra provision being made and the items full details in chronological table attached for 1936, items 49 to 59 for which increased were being provided. The most important of these items being:-

- (i) The completion of the first three year programme.
- (ii) Provision for first year of further programme.
- (iii) R.M.C. to be retransferred to Duntroon.
- (iv) Increase in strength and improvements in pay and conditions of militia service.
- (v) Continuance of mechanization of A.A.S.C. Cavalry Artillery and Medium Artillery.
- (vi) Research for local pattern armoured car.

(11) **INCREASE IN PERMANENT FORCES COASTAL DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT**

A further slight increase was approved in the establishment of the Permanent Forces, for Citizen Force Staff and R.A.A. and R.A.E for recognized Coast Defences. As all selected candidates required training, and in the case of new W.O.'s of the A.I.C. more advanced instruction, it was many months before these new men were available for effective duty in the various ranks as trained soldiers.

(12) **GRANTING OF THE TITLE "ROYAL" TO ARTILLERY AND ENGINEER UNITS**

As Artillery and Engineer Units of Citizen Forces do not carry colours on which to display Battle honours, it was recommended by the Military Board that as a reward for War Service H.M. The King be approached to award the title "Royal" as in the case of the British Territorial and the Canadian Units of the same arm. Royal approval was granted and promulgated.