

**SERVING VITAL INTERESTS:  
AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGIC PLANNING IN PEACE AND WAR**

**JOINT STRATEGIC PLANNING: AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

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Assuming that history can provide adequate guideposts for those negotiating the byways of the 'real world', what might we include in a historical casebook, course syllabus, or reading list on joint/ combined strategic planning?<sup>1</sup>

Some obvious items from the ancient and mediaeval worlds were once well known to school children, from Homer's depictions of Bronze Age war councils, and Herodotus' description of the Persians generating schemes whilst drunk and reviewing them hung over, to Themistocles' analyses of Athenian strategy, and Cato's relentless thunderings against Carthage in the Senate. Those would, of course, have to be placed in perspective with the work of modern historians,<sup>2</sup> as would such cases as the Crusades; Lepanto; the Spanish Armada;<sup>3</sup> the Seven Years' War, including Wolfe's journal;<sup>4</sup> the American Revolution; and the Napoleonic Wars.<sup>5</sup> American Civil War strategy is well known,<sup>6</sup> far more than that of the War of 1812, the Mexican War,<sup>7</sup> and Latin America's international wars of the last two centuries as well as the Wars of Liberation.

Other likely candidates for inclusion are inter-allied dynamics in the Crimean War<sup>8</sup> and the Boxer Expedition, and war plans and planning structures before and during the World Wars.<sup>9</sup> Gallipoli remains a salient case, although its having become the iconic bad example of amphibious tactics has tended to overshadow its sophisticated planning and preparations. An extract from the Gallipoli Committee report might serve as an antidote to that.<sup>10</sup> Something on the combatants' high commands<sup>11</sup> and Supreme War Council might also be presented, as well as glimpses, at least, of Franco-Spanish planning of the Alhucemas operation,<sup>12</sup> the structure and workings of the British Committee of Imperial Defence,<sup>13</sup> American Joint Board,<sup>14</sup> the *Reichswehr's Truppenamt*, the French,<sup>15</sup> Japanese<sup>16</sup> and Soviet<sup>17</sup> High Commands, OKW,<sup>18</sup> British Combined Operations,<sup>19</sup> the American Joint Chiefs<sup>20</sup> and British Chiefs of Staff,<sup>21</sup> and that most forlorn of hopes, ABDACOM.

More recent instances include NATO,<sup>22</sup> the USSR and Warsaw Pact,<sup>23</sup> SEATO, CENTO, MACV and the United Nations; inclusion would also be warranted of Suez,<sup>24</sup> Korea, Vietnam,<sup>25</sup> the Falklands War,<sup>26</sup> the Gulf War,<sup>27</sup> modern programme budgeting and strategic planning,<sup>28</sup> and the evolving of various nations' Cold War strategic planning systems<sup>29</sup> and strategies, conventional<sup>30</sup> and nuclear.<sup>31</sup>

Beyond those are linked aspects of 'jointness' and 'combinedness', including command and staff processes,<sup>32</sup> 'coalition warfare',<sup>33</sup> 'strategy',<sup>34</sup> and 'grand strategy',<sup>35</sup> as well as 'jointness',<sup>36</sup> and 'combinedness' themselves,<sup>37</sup> which have been dealt with in official circles in various nations, from terse definitions in armed forces' lexicons, to abstruse discussions of elements of strategy relevant to 'jointness' and 'combinedness' like theory,<sup>38</sup> and style.<sup>39</sup> A survey of contemporary military professionals on any of those would very likely produce a wide diversity of approximations, a good many of them based on the official definitions, and others more idiosyncratic or custom built, derived from personal experiences with jointness.

While 'jointness' and 'combinedness' are not synonymous, they have often been closely linked, especially in military operations in the twentieth century, as forces have been increasingly 'packaged' both within individual nations' armed forces, and within alliances to deal with various contingencies. Beyond that, both of those topics are subsets of the broad realm of organisational fusion, in the military branches of which logistics, command-and-control, intelligence, strategy, operational art and tactics blend, each with its own subset of complexities and idiosyncrasies, including specific terms and ways of doing things. Some of that reflects functional and structural differentiation, and some of it conveys a chronic deep-

seated parochialism. Arguably, 'combinedness' is more convoluted than 'jointness', since it often includes the latter, but also encompasses both the blending of differing cultures, sub-cultures, languages, and the 'tribalism' of cooperating armed forces, in an overlap of diplomacy, anthropology and public relations—and that vast and tangled domain of national interest.

However helpful examining any of those military phenomena may or may not be in framing specific doctrines, methods or firm definitions, it does provide a perspective on the complexities of 'jointness' and 'combinedness', and their frequent overlapping, and the many paradoxes and quandaries that flow from them. In both 'jointness' and 'combinedness', for example, boundaries between allies and comrades have often been much higher and thicker in peace than in war, reflecting both military insularity and nationalism in a larger sense.<sup>40</sup> Extremes in the range of that tide can be seen in the massive support for the use of United Nations armed force by the American public in World War II, Korea, and the early Cold War, and for multinational command in various regions, and finally the Gulf War, in contrast with the hostility to such policies in the 1930s and 1990s.<sup>41</sup>

Somewhat more theoretically, both 'jointness' and 'combinedness' demonstrate the physicists' 'law of location' and a chaos-complexity theory precept: you cannot understand a system unless you get outside it. Gaining such detachment, of course, is very difficult, as is using history to find out just how things actually got done in a particular planning process. That is always an elaborate aggregate of human interactions, with a substantial informal dimension that goes unrecorded. Only the stark anatomy of planning is visible in official documents, and little of the metaphorical physiology—or perhaps the microbiology of command and staff. While the details of that process also tend to be out of view or focus in militarily-related social science studies and history,<sup>42</sup> the relative sparsity and impressionism of depictions of 'jointness' and 'combinedness' do provide enough to swamp the perceptual capacity of historians and military professionals alike. A casual glance at ancient and classical history reveals many examples of the collaboration of land and sea forces, including port-to-port, port-to-beach, and beach-to-port transporting of ground troops, equipment, supplies, horses and slaves. While Herodotus and Thucydides provided tracings of the complex alliances and faint glimpses of both Greek and Persian 'jointness' and 'combinedness', the descriptions of 'jointness' are somewhat sharper. Cases of combat at sea involving land forces engaged aboard ships can be found from Salamis and the Roman *corvus* to the ordeal of Major Harvey at Jutland. Although a host of sieges, opposed and unopposed landings, raids, occupations, and the sustaining and defence of outposts and colonies are described, with many references to naval-maritime fusion in ancient/classical warfare, few specific details, specifications and graphics of ship designs, or of how operations were actually planned, have survived—but that is also true of many modern military and naval operations.

Again, clear glimpses of planning, joint or combined, are rare since that dynamic encompasses individual thought, impulse, vision, inspiration, and the other 'fuzzy sets' that make up a 'commander's intention'. In any particular case, the crucial shaping forces in planning may be a creative chief of staff, an energetic staff, political pressures, or what Dickens called a bit of undigested mustard. Some bits of the 'human factor' are visible in memoirs and diaries, like those of Generals Henry Arnold, Sir Ian Hamilton, Sir Leslie Hollis, Sir John Kennedy, Sir Frederick Morgan, and Raymond Lee, Admiral Lewis Strauss, and in Stephen Roskill's biography of Lord Hankey. Those have sometimes been visible, as they were during World War II, in the vodka-drinking contests with the Russians, and Churchill's chronic imbibing, and a number of personality clashes<sup>43</sup> and friendships.<sup>44</sup> Far more, however, lay—and lie—out of view. Who, for example, would try to describe or read the full details of the 'field of the cloth of gold' meeting on Sicily in 1943, when dozens of junior Allied flag-rank officers gathered to work out the intricate working of the plans that preceded Operation HUSKY? Such a depiction could only be an impressionistic, selective summary, along the lines of official accounts of the major World War II superconferences, or the Supreme War Council's workings in 1917-18.

Perhaps much of what happened in respect to 'jointness' and 'combinedness' has not found its way into history books, like Walt Whitman's 'real war,' or lies closer to the realm of Tolstoy or Herman Wouk than 'serious' history. In any case, most military professionals lack the time and opportunity to immerse themselves in archival materials or secondary sources, and gain a sense of what even the paper trail of such intricate processes looks like. Perhaps administrative versions of 'staff rides' might be structured, using archivists, historians and veteran staff officers to provide a clearer sense of planning and bureaucratic processes, and throw light on problems presented by security classification, obviously or apparently missing documents, jargon, anecdotes, allusions, and what's behind those little scribbles in the margins of source documents that may or may not get into 'finished' history. Indeed, the dictum that 'planning is vital, but plans are irrelevant' presents a very deep difficulty, since most evidence of strategic planning is the plans themselves, and linked well-vetted documents. Those are only mountain tops above the mist; or to risk a more bucolic metaphor, administrative equivalents of ruminants' cud as heavily-edited bureaucratic memoranda, minutes of meetings, and substantive summaries routed to all participants to reflect consensus and sweet harmony.<sup>45</sup> the raw material that lies beneath the shaping of narrative history, however exhaustive and carefully crafted it may be.<sup>46</sup> Of course, other forces may squeeze the life and colour out of what was in fact dramatic and fascinating, including self-censorship and final editing by interested parties.

There are many other forces at work in that vortex. Keeping diaries has often been forbidden in wartime for security reasons. Roosevelt allowed no shorthand notes taken in the meetings where he was present, and MacArthur and his lieutenants worked energetically at sanitising and aligning documents. Despite that, some vitality and flavour shine through in Harry Butcher's *My Three Years With Eisenhower* (which made Eisenhower furious). Lord Alanbrooke's diary, albeit well-edited by Sir Arthur Bryant, and Elliott Roosevelt's very controversial *As He Saw It*. We do, nevertheless, seem to know quite a bit, or rather, lots of little bits, about 'jointness' and 'combinedness'. In the realm of 'jointness', we have such ancient and classical cases as the invasion of Egypt by the nine-bow barbarians, or sea peoples; the heyday of Crete; the Persians' amphibious landing at Marathon; and slightly sharper tracings of the many battles and expeditions that marked the history of the sea empires of the Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans and Carthaginians. Further from sight in the West, at least, are the naval histories of China, India and Arabia, and the peoples of southeast Asia, but that is also true of the very complex histories of Byzantium, the Ottoman Turks, the mediaeval military orders, the Italian maritime powers, especially Venice and Genoa, and the Barbary states. Naturally, Americans and British Commonwealth members have a slightly clearer sense of Portugal, Spain and the Dutch as great maritime and naval empires, but also in very broad terms.

Some general patterns of 'jointness' and 'combinedness' are visible across that rich tapestry, including arraying, phasing, articulation, orchestration, and decision sequence in the matrix of distance, context and resources, including:

- whether to try, at the strategic level;
- if so, where and when, within a date range, then a specific time and place;
- decisions re deceptions/ feints;
- 'go/no go' decision, during approach, on arrival, or if an enemy naval force is encountered;
- and, after commitment of the first echelon, whether to stay and hold, try to advance, withdraw slightly or wholly, commit; or
- to withhold reserve, to commit reserves elsewhere, or abandon committed elements.

'Jointness', as we think of it today, existed long before it was worked, in stages, into what looks like a 'modern' rationalised form during the early modern era. Thomas Molyneux's treatise *Conjunct Expeditions* still offers interesting insights, and an enviable coherence,<sup>47</sup> but applying systematic thought to warfare and 'jointness' long predated the Renaissance, as did 'combinedness'. Although Sir John Dill's statue stands in Arlington National Cemetery, Washington, and Franklin Roosevelt's in Grosvenor Square, London, even in that most ardent of alliances, between Britain and the United States during World War II, hearts rarely beat in

waltz-time. The Crusaders regularly fell out, Marlborough bickered with the Dutch Electors, and Rhode Islanders attacked French Navy Jesuit chaplains on the street in 1779. American relations with a vast nexus of allies oscillated, and sometimes wildly, throughout the Cold War, and the flames of Anglo-French 'combinedness' flickered as low on Carlton Terrace in the summer of 1944 as they had during the Suez Crisis of 1956 and before the meeting at Doullens in 1918.

Some similar patterns can be seen in both the domains of 'jointness' and 'combinedness', despite the unevenness of evidence, and strong emotional loading. First, the history of both 'jointness' and 'combinedness' abound with accounts of military and naval institutions and leaders struggling tenaciously to maintain personal control and organisational boundaries, sometimes at the expense of effectiveness, mission and national security. Strong motives are always involved, if not easily visible. A special paradox is the pervasiveness of indiscipline, despite stereotypes of military institutions being tightly controlled, and emphasis on rigid compliance in rites-of-passage, military and naval law, and traditions. Forms of dissent range from passive non-compliance and avoidance, to incivility and insubordination, and can be found up, down, and across the chain-of-command in military and naval history, often working against the latter and the spirit of 'jointness' and 'combinedness', and sometimes crudely. The density and intensity of personality clashes in democratic armed forces' command hierarchies seem all the more bewildering in view of the fading away of many authoritarian aspects in society in general, although that may represent a social variant of Newton's Third Law. Such pervasive and often much-admired feistiness has, of course, often been roughly balanced by cooperation, accord and the tact that Clausewitz saw as a major antidote to friction in war.

Despite many attempts to trace their workings, it is often not clear in histories of 'jointness' and 'combinedness' just how friction or rapport really worked in specific cases. Although military professionals, historians and analysts often steer past the deep and massive forces, including emotions and motives, which are at work in military organisations in war and peace, or treat them as a given, like background noise, those aspects are especially important in 'jointness' and 'combinedness'. The impulse to draw boundaries and defend them is raised to a pitch in war and, like a gigantic power surge, is very hard to measure, fine-tune or vector. In that sense, structuring both 'jointness' and 'combinedness' resembles artful antenna design, but are very old problems. Until the early nineteenth century, friction was virtually institutionalised in joint and combined operations by the Council-of-War system, under which the commanders of land and sea forces who were sent together on expeditions—men assumed to be mature gentlemen, and who sometimes were—were expected to agree on whether, and if so, when, where and how 'conjunct operations' should be carried out. That practice left the 'higher direction of war' in 'conjunct operations' and allied efforts formally at the mercy of the quality of interpersonal relations. That was dramatised sharply in the mid-eighteenth century by the contrast between the lack of effective rapport between British land and sea commanders at Rochefort in 1757, and the close bond between them in the Quebec campaign of 1759.

Historians have often portrayed personal relationships as vital, both collectively, as in the cases of Nelson's captains and Napoleon's marshals, and at the individual level, as with Wolfe and Craufurd at Quebec, Scott and Conner at Vera Cruz in 1847, Hamilton and de Robeck at Gallipoli in 1915, and Turner and Smith in the Central and North Pacific between 1943 and 1945. Nevertheless, the purity of such alloys was sometimes strained. At a time when many saw Grant and Foote as getting along very well during the riverine war in the West in 1862-63, Foote was advising his superiors that he gave the Army the minimum required, and protected Navy interests. Hostility was far more blatant in British Army and Royal Navy attempts to smother the RAF in its cradle in the 1920s, in the 'Battle of the Smiths' on Saipan in World War II, and in the American interservice rivalry that peaked in open clashes in the late 1940s. Just as Chester Wilmot's *The Struggle for Europe* opened up historiographical skirmishing on inter-Allied friction in World War II, several studies have probed what was really going on in the higher echelons during DESERT STORM.<sup>48</sup> Putative causes of the frictions visible there include the range of endemic interservice frictions, personalities, structure, doctrine, and personnel policies of the kind that produced a dearth of effective jointness in the United States' armed forces from World War II until it was curtailed if not wholly brought under control by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

Despite the myriad internecine boundaries and profound differences between situations, military historians and professionals alike have tended to view warfare as broadly generic as they sought to draw analogies, and 'lessons'. While the differentiation in modes of combat seems to have increased sharply over the last two centuries, that was visible also in ancient warfare. Students of Caesar will remember the Roman legion's *triplex acies*—triple battle-lines—*auxilii* of Cretan dart-throwers, Balearic island slingers, Numidian archers, and Gallic cavalry. Nevertheless, since the mid-1700s, the mechanisation of war has generated increases in the scale and diversity of functions, equipment, and format, and a resultant blurring of interservice, international and intercultural boundaries. If Victor Thompson's argument that hierarchy in organisation is mythical and task specialisation is functional reality, then service parochialism can be seen as a kind of blood clot or tourniquet in the anatomy of military organisation.

Despite denigration of the World War II and Gulf War frictions, and other negative cases,<sup>49</sup> it is not wholly clear that the oft-cited functional differences between armed services in themselves explain operational failure in all cases, or that service parochialism is a universal evil. 'Tribal' and psychosocial aspects aside, much of the distinction between services and nations has stemmed from functional differences arising from adaptations to specific environments and milieux. In both 'jointness' and 'combinedness', the lines of particularity have been increasingly brought into tension with broader and very powerful trends, including the evolution of weaponry, communications technology, and air power, all of which forced armies and navies increasingly to disperse and disguise themselves from the eighteenth century onward. At the same time, individual services and nations have been operating less and less autonomously, even on the high seas. Very few wars since 1914 have seen 'pure' clashes of fleets or armies, or nations. While on the surface of it the Falklands campaign looked somewhat atavistic in respect to 'combinedness', it was not a 'pure' model, considering the support each side received from other nations. Recent funding declines have highlighted the difficulties of armed forces' leaders trying to sort out the duplication of some capacities and absence of others,<sup>50</sup> and balance those against the persistent dilemma of redundancies which are unique in war.<sup>51</sup> The latter dilemma is linked to seemingly ephemeral but often crucial differences arising from insight and motivation. Both negative and positive examples of these can be presented. What, for example, if the Royal Navy and British Army's attempts to dismantle the RAF in the 1920s had been successful? Would the traditional services' air arms have been able—or inclined—to deploy forces even roughly equivalent to Fighter Command to defend Britain against the Luftwaffe's onslaught in 1940?<sup>52</sup> Partisans of each service could array instances from history here.

The picture becomes murkier here, when considered in light of PMS Blackett's assertion that the outcomes of modern military operations are usually the aggregate of the results of many dispersed, unlinked individual combats. That pattern is not a modern one. A general pattern of dispersion was visible in the Mediterranean during the Greek-Persian and Punic wars, and throughout the history of privateering at sea, and of guerrilla war on land. Although, as suggested earlier, 'jointness' and 'combinedness' are essentially individual human interactions at all levels of the chain-of-command, it is hardest to trace such patterns at the lowest echelons, other than in the form of anecdotes. A rough index of the intricacy of 'joint' and 'combined' operations is provided by the distribution list of the OVERLORD operations order, which included some 50 nonmilitary or paramilitary intelligence and bureaucratic entities. In another, at one point in mid-1943, an American subchaser carried indigenous Fijian and Solomon Island scouts, Chinese nationals, Australian and New Zealand Army and naval officers, and Coastwatchers while engaging in a range of special missions.<sup>53</sup>

Such examples underline how major historical 'movements', 'events', 'cases' and 'incidents' are gross sums of vast numbers of people doing all kinds of things with and to other people. Considering the 'micro' and informal aspects of both 'jointness' and 'combinedness' opens up a wide fan of nuances and uncertainties. Since perceiving and describing such complexity exceeds individual human beings' coping capacity, neither commanders and staffs, nor historians or journalists can monitor all the cross-threads of 'jointness' and 'combinedness'. That intricacy and ambiguity led Isaiah Berlin to see history as lying very close to metaphysics. When 'jointness' and 'combinedness' are placed on that plane, they can be

envisioned as rare, unstable transitory alloys, heated in the fires of necessity and pounded out on the anvil of war, or as drifting gases that concentrate and disperse as a function of temperature, pressure or friction. Like tactical skills, and diplomatic alliances, both usually degrade quickly during lulls in wartime, or in peacetime.

What would be more useful to military professionals or analysts? A casebook of famous 'joint operations' and structures,<sup>54</sup> or *A History of Anti-Jointness*, in keeping with Liddell Hart's views on the relative influence of negative examples?<sup>55</sup> Sources for the latter could be the personal correspondence and diaries of many who were involved in joint activities that went awry, official records, media accounts, hearings before representative bodies, and trials reflecting friction from the report of the Dardanelles Commission through the Riom trials in France in 1942 to the so-called 'Battle of the Potomac' in the late 1940s.<sup>56</sup> Of course, analysing the history of 'jointness' and 'combinedness' encounters the inadequacies of all media in depicting complex human activities, including military operations and politics. Neither film, drama, novels nor memoirs, official accounts, nor the most carefully crafted history can present absolutely true depictions of the workings of staffs and military bureaucratic process, nor of the grisly horrors, unique tensions and boredom of war, although many have felt that fiction and poetry have tended to come closer to capturing its essence than operational narratives and 'serious' history. In any case, it is impossible to capture mood exactly, or such ephemeral dimensions of war as the sense of frustration and urgency, especially during the early phases of war, akin to the feeling of walking in deep mud or molasses. That was very visible and powerful in the months following America's entry into the Second World War, and labelled 'too little, too late'. Before Pearl Harbor, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark, had warned Congress that, if war came, dollars would not be able to buy time. Awareness of the growing threat and money did not allow Americans more than a marginal chance to become familiar with the cultural complexities of their imminent allies, or their politics and military practices, or the very expensive and complex steps required for US forces to get ready, let alone 'groove in' operationally in combat.

While historical ignorance is common enough in public affairs, it also often has 'real world' effects, and highlights a special paradox in respect to 'jointness' and 'combinedness', since military planners have often been unaware of models and precedents, even those of very recent vintage. In both 'jointness' and 'combinedness', identifying and passing on 'lessons learned' has often been, in Gershwinian terms, a 'sometime thing'. Part of that can be attributed to a strong impulse on the part of commanders and staffs in battle to orient to their front and to their hierarchy, and, under stress, to fixate on certain things at the expense of others. Armies, navies and air forces, and all their sub-elements, after all, are 'top down' organisations, with a highly developed sense of rivalry. Their basic reflex is not to share information and resources but to hoard them. Not only does that work against the lateral transfer of data, but functional secrecy has tended to suppress or delay information transfer, and has often been harnessed to personal or parochial defensiveness. Some 'lessons' have been rejected because they were seen as trivial, or irrelevant, or because they conflicted with desires, expectations or norms. Such insularity offers some perspective on the unevenness of exchanges between the Allied theatres of operations during World War II. US Marine Corps Major General Julian Smith's claim that the vital 'lessons' of Tarawa could only have been learned in the crucible of war probably reflected things as he saw them, but most items he listed had appeared in after-action reports of US Navy-Marine Corps (and sometimes Army) amphibious FLEXes—fleet exercises—in the 1920s and 1930s, several of them repeatedly, and some in the Dardanelles Commission's report in 1917.

The relatively tangible dimensions of armed services' rivalry, like doctrine and competing for resources, tend to obscure other forces, sometimes amorphous but also sometimes significant, that bear on 'joint' and 'combined' command and staff processes, such as personality, 'national characteristics', 'tribalism' and rivalry within and between services, vendor and political pressures, and what the Russians call *shtabnava kultura*—staff culture. All that constitutes a perplexingly intricate Venn diagram in which politics, large and small 'p', overlap with economics, sociology, history, anthropology—and even medicine and psychiatry, of which more later. That complexity is compounded by the ambiguities and intricacy arising from planning methods and procedures, and the turbulence of operations, again, the sum totals of individuals' actions. And again, such bewildering swirls cannot be depicted in their full

detail, but only impressionistically. Many historians recognise the limits of evidence and that their accounts of the past are imperfect, although most proceed under the assumption that rational thoughts and decisions shape the course of events. That is a dubious enough assumption in economics and politics, but even more so in the province of war, where powerful emotions and forces, including reflex, impulse and intuition play major roles amid the overloading of senses in combat. 'Mindset' is also at work in 'jointness' and 'combinedness', as it is in all other aspects of military operations. That included cultural values and attitudes, as Ken Booth suggested in *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, and led JFC Fuller to point out that the symbol of war in the Occident is a sword, but a bow and arrow in the Orient. Although Westerners have shown skill at guile and deviousness in statecraft, war and espionage, the traditional Western warrior ethic was visible in the Romans' *miles gloriosus*, the Viking berserkers, Shakespeare's soldier, 'bearded like the [leo]pard and swearing strange oaths', and Cyrano—all bent on personal combat one on one with a valiant foe. Just as Eskimos have dozens of words for slight variations in the states of ice and snow, there are many perjorative slighting terms in American military semantics for passive, devious and subtle behaviour,<sup>57</sup> as well as for cerebration.<sup>58</sup> Many of those are identified with feminine behaviour, a special problem in a subculture where gender distinctions are the source of identity and major anxieties, especially in *corps d'élite*, but also in inter-service relations.<sup>59</sup>

As primitive and trivial as such attitudes may seem to the causal observer, they have often had a profound effect on cohesion in both 'jointness' and 'combinedness'. Military and naval history show a persistent pattern of deeply engrained internecine suspicions and hostilities, and a strong correlation between defeat and frustration on the one hand and victory and cooperation in wartime on the other. It remains to be seen whether the Goldwater-Nichols Act or British reforms since the 1980s will, at long last, remedy that millenia-old tradition.<sup>60</sup> The odds seem against it, although not every attempt to force new concepts and formats on reluctant soldiers, sailors and airmen has failed. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was promulgated as the Reagan defence boom crested in 1986—the peak of the heaviest flow of resources into the armed forces in peacetime in American history. Some perspective may be gained from looking further back, and considering the fate of some defence related concepts that were popular in the United States from halfway through World War II to the Korean War—the Armed Forces of the United States (AFUS) unification scheme, Universal Military Training, and standing United Nations armed forces, of which the US planned to provide the air component. The first two are dormant if not dead, and the latter faltering following a brief, vague resurgence in the Gulf War. While growing interservice tension may arise from the decade-long decline in defence funding, and consequent increases in interservice competition for scarce resources, the growing chasm is reflected in the contrast between the roseate view of the state of 'jointness' in official pronouncements and *Joint Forces Quarterly*, versus recent issues of the *US. Naval Institute Proceedings*.

However understandable it may be when people long for 'the good old days', and seek to hold on to or return to old ways, the risks of trying to do so in the military realm are very high. Taking a broader view, trends toward the interweaving and overlapping of systems and methods have been blurring and collapsing service boundaries in peace and war, generation after generation since the Renaissance. Those turbulent collisions of complex systems were—and are—driven by rolling waves of technical innovation that repeatedly confounded expectations. One general result of that was the erosion of the role of senior leaders as the immediate overseers of battle, because of the shunting of control in combat to lower echelon leaders as mechanisation and electrification of war increased the premium on high reaction speed, adaptability and agility. It also had a major reshaping effect on the nature of technique, both of staff work and the exercise of command. Nevertheless, many old forms have remained with us, and frictions are visible throughout the range of histories and memoirs relevant to 'jointness' and 'combinedness', including chauvinism, cultural antipathy, parochialism and primitive interpersonal hostility, all variants of what Elting Morison more elegantly labelled 'limited parochial identification'. Continuing emphasis on linearity and control in military and naval elites' training and socialisation has long served to offset that, as have mimicry and conformity in systems in which suitability for promotion is judged only by immediate superiors. Beyond that are the proverbial but not actually universal conservatism of military professionals, the mystique of operational experience, and a tendency to institutionalise obsolescence, especially among victors in war. Those forces and the sense of

warfare being generic obscure the dilemma that there is no way to know if one case is really relevant to another. That can render strategic planning a process closely akin to faith, and a tenaciously held faith at that. Not only is judging effectiveness in hindsight impressionistic at best, but there are no precise indices or coefficients of performance in organisations, military or otherwise, apart from crude bottom lines, and victory-and-defeat. Up to this point, the Prussians' 'Law of the Situation' stands firm.

Throughout the modern era, military officers have found themselves pulled between the roles of warrior and administrator, while specialisation and bureaucratisation increased organisational compartmentalisation. Those fault-lines have impaired mobilisation and peace-to-war transition as well as wartime operations by implanting habits, attitudes and reflexes that lack function, or work against it. The hardy persistence of literally feudal forms, including structure, terms and certain values and attitudes, seems all the more remarkable in view of all that has gone on in society and in science and technology. Eisenhower learned that just after World War II when he proposed making the freshman year at the service academies a uniform one without service distinction, as did those members of Congress between the world wars who proposed a Department of National Defense, again and again, to no avail. Many remedies have been proposed for such parochialism, but the basic human impulses to define and hold territory are honed to a fine edge in military socialisation. If 'jointness' and 'combinedness' can only really flourish as a function of frustration, stress and defeat in war, is there really a reasonable prospect of overcoming 'limited parochial identification' in peacetime? Does budgetary competition assure a permanent nemesis to effective jointness in peacetime and a hindrance to it in war? Would it all fade away if funds were apportioned as a fixed share over time? Or would 'service unspecific' entry level training, random assignments across services, or assignment of officers—or even NCOS—to another service every second or third promotion step move us any closer to 'jointness' than linking incentives and penalties to career progression, or exhortations to do the right thing, or showing examples of what happened when things went wrong have in the past? Correspondingly, in the domain of combinedness, is too much familiarity as threatening to national interests as accord is to service interests in the realm of jointness? Is some irreducible degree of internecine and international hostility and pride always going to work against effective rapport in both realms? Are the both still dependent, as at Quebec, Fort Donelson and Kwajalein, on rapport between a few individuals?

If anti-'jointedness' and combinedness' are really products of elemental territoriality, that may seem to offer an excuse to do nothing. It does not get past the dilemma that differences in socialisation, habit and expectation, however functional or inadvertent, offer vulnerabilities for a clever foe to exploit. Obviously, developing interservice, interethnic, political, social and international empathy, and instilling tolerance, let alone a working familiarity with other services' functions, are not now part of basic military socialisation and training. Interestingly, 'combinedness' has tended to be more a product of experience than 'jointness', and has tended to flourish more at higher echelons. Again and again, experiences of various nations' forces abroad since 1940 have been that implanting attitudes conducive to 'combinedness' effectively in any nation's armed forces is a daunting task, one not to be done by edicts and quickly, but steadily, and over time. The EAGLE CLAW fiasco in 1980 dramatised how the failure of operational elements to rehearse together could produce a negative sum. The vast array of historical cases of both 'jointness' and 'combinedness' suggests how critical a lack of awareness and of effective bridging mechanisms may be in the turbulence of war, as in such disparate cases as the spring of 1918 on the Western front, the Anglo-French pseudo-alliance of 1939-40, ABDA and Vietnam.

If history shows anything in all this, it is that ignoring such dissonance, and failing to expect it and deal with it steadily and carefully, increases the risk that crucial reflexes and sensitivities needed to manage it will not be there when the proverbial balloon goes up. Beyond that, if history is used as a guide, it must be used in large enough doses to prevent too close a focus on a single or few instances, or relying on specific models and methods—or interpretations. The wide splay in judgements among historians regarding such subjects as the importance of air power in maintaining imperialism between the world wars, the military prowess of the *Wehrmacht*, the utility of strategic bombing, including the atomic bombings of Japan, the state of American coastal defences in 1941-42, and a literal host of personalities underlines how far

history, like the art of war, is from being a science. Most important, it is neither experimentally verifiable, nor replicable, and lies closer to both literature and the drafting of legal briefs.<sup>61</sup> Just as many forces shaped what became 'history' in the modern world—the invention of the printing press, the rise in literacy, mass marketed books and periodicals, a massive expansion of higher education—so other influences are now at work. As Carl Becker noted in the late 1930s, in his seminal essay 'Everyman His Own Historian', popular culture, in such diverse forms as historical fiction, film and more recently television, has been displacing academic 'professional' history as the basis of individuals' historical sense, not only of masses, but of elites as well.<sup>62</sup> The looming imponderable is what computerisation of research gathering and analysis will do to the shape of military history, especially in allowing the framing of more complex data arrays and objective analysis, including dynamic modelling, that moves closer to science, and farther away from the tendentious and Macaulayesque lyricism and advocacy that has passed for serious history—including or rather, especially, military history—over the last two centuries.

At the same time, the resistance of many historians—and military professionals—to the implications of social science research is also being undermined, although with relatively slight effect so far. Indeed, little contemporary military historiography resembles the quantitative approach of Livermore, Lewis Richardson or the Carnegie-sponsored studies of World War I. Much of that ground has been abandoned to social scientists interested in conflict dynamics. As provocative and indeed outrageous as some of their hypotheses and findings may be to historians and military professionals, they may yet find richer ores in respect to 'jointness' and 'combinedness' in anthropology and the behavioural sciences, since there are enough fragments of tribalism and psychopathology in the record of 'jointness', 'combinedness' and strategic planning<sup>63</sup> to allow future generations to rework the tailings of old proverbial mines, as Herbert Hoover did in Australia in his youth—and became wealthy.

In the meantime, those searching for guideposts in history should proceed warily, restraining their hunger for clear, simple models, and simple solutions to intricate problems. They may wish to keep in mind the warning of Konrad Lorenz and others who have wandered the eldritch landscape of complexity, that the realm of theory tends to make 'black and white' distinctions, while shades of grey predominate in the 'real world'.

### Endnotes

1. *Joint Military Operations: A Short History* (Westport, 1994). While many of the citations below are from that study, they are illustrative, and do not exhaust its references or the full bibliographies of cases cited, or the broader subject/s of 'jointness' and 'combinedness'.
2. For example, *The Cambridge Ancient History*, Donald Kagan's series on the Athenian Empire, esp *The Archidamian War* (Ithaca, 1974); FE Adcock, *The Greek and Macedonian Art of War* (Berkeley, 1937); Steven Runciman, *Byzantine Civilization* (London, 1959); and Hans Delbrück, *History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History*, trans Walter J Renfro, Jr (Westport, 1975).
3. For example, Garrett Mattingly, *The Armada* (Boston, 1950), and John Knox Laughton (ed), *State Papers Relating to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada Anno 1588*, 2 vols (London, 1894).
4. For example, Gertrude Selwyn Kimball (ed), *Correspondence of William Pitt When Secretary of State With Colonial Governors and Military and Naval Commissioners*, 2 vols (New York, 1969), and Basil Williams, *The Life of William Pitt Earl of Chatham*, vols i & ii (London, 1996).
5. For example, J Christopher Herold, *Bonaparte in Egypt* (New York, 1962), Michael Duffy, 'A Particular Service: The British Government and the Dunkirk Expedition of 1793', *English Historical Review* 91 (July 1976): 529-54; and Brian Lavery, *Nelson's Navy: The Ships, Men and Organization, 1795-1815* (Annapolis, 1989), esp 310-16.
6. A survey related to jointness is Rowena Reed, *Combined Operations in the Civil War* (Annapolis, 1978).
7. The most useful recent account is K Jack Bauer's *Surfboats and Horse Marines: US Naval Operations in the Mexican War, 1846-1848* (Annapolis, 1969), 63-97.
8. A succinct account is John Sweetman, 'British Invasion of the Crimea', 79-87, in Merrill Bartlett (ed), *Assault from the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare* (Annapolis, 1983).
9. For example, John Gooch, *The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c 1900-1916* (London, 1974).
10. *The Final Report of the Dardanelles Committee* [Cmd 371] (London, nd (1919])

11. For example, Maurice Hankey, *The Supreme Command*, 2 vols (London, 1961)
12. CV Osborne, *The Conquest of Morocco* (London, 1936).
13. Brian Bond, *British Military Policy Between the Two World Wars* (Oxford, 1980); and Stephen Roskill, *Naval Policy Between the Wars*, 2 vols (Annapolis, 1976).
14. Felix Atwater, 'United States Army and Navy Development of Joint Landing Operations, 1898-1942' (Duke University: PhD dissertation, 1986); and John B Hattendorf, B Mitchell Simpson III and John B Wadleigh, *Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the US Naval War College* (Newport, 1984).
15. Faris R Kirkland, 'The French Air Force in 1940: Was It Defeated by the Law or by Politics?' *Air University Review* 36: 6 (September-October 1985), 101-17.
16. Saburo Hayashi and Alvin Coox, *Kogun: The Japanese Army in the Pacific War* (Quantico, 1959).
17. Many details that can be found in John Erickson's classic trilogy, *The Soviet High Command: a military-political history* (Boulder, 1984), *The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War with Germany* (London, 1975) and *The Road to Berlin: continuing the history of Stalin's war with Germany* (London, 1983), and in SM Shtemenko's *The Soviet General Staff at War* (Moscow, 1970).
18. Especially Operation WESERUEBUNG: a detailed account of its planning is Walter Hubatsch, *Weseruebung* (Coettingen, 1960), esp chapter 2, 39-60; for general details, see Cajus Bekker, *The Luftwaffe War Diaries*, trans. & ed Frank Ziegler (Garden City, 1986); for the gravity effect of cross-service needs and responses, see Paul Deichmann, Noel F Parrish, and Albert Simpson, ed, Littleton B Atkins, *German Air Force Operations in Support of the Army* (New York, 1962), esp 125-32, 157-67.
19. Amphibious Warfare Headquarters, *History of the Combined Operations Organization, 1940-1945* (London, 1956).
20. For example, John C Ries, *The Management of Defense: Organization and Control of the US Armed Services* (Baltimore, 1964); Lawrence Korb, *The JCS: The first Twenty-Five Years* (Bloomington, 1976); the multi-volumed *History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*, esp vol 1 (Washington, DC, 1979); Mark Perry, *Four Stars* (Boston, 1989); and Gordon D Batcheller, 'The Eclipse of the Joint Chiefs of Staff', *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1991, 32-4.
21. Details are scattered throughout the official histories of all major Allied nations in World War II, especially the British official histories on *Grand Strategy* (ed JRM Butler; London, 1956-76), H Hall Duncan's *North American Supply* (London, 1955), MM Postan, *British War Production* (London, 1950), several volumes of *The United States Army in World War II* (the 'green books'), such as Forrest C Pogue's *The Supreme Command* (Washington, DC, 1954), which deals with strategic planning; Frank Wesley Craven and James Lea Cate's *The United States Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago, 1943-58), Samuel Eliot Morison's *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* (Boston, 1947-62), and many hundreds of unofficial studies of wartime diplomacy and planning, such as Chester Wilmot's *The Struggle for Europe* (London, 1952), and of the individual armed services, as well as biographies and memoirs, such as General Sir Frederick Morgan's *Overture to Overlord* (London, 1950). Descriptions of actual planning process are rare.
22. For example, Robert Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago, 1962), James A Huston, *One for All: NATO Strategy and Logistics Through the Formative Period, 1949-1969* (Newark, 1984); and Roger Hill, *Political Consultation in NATO* (Queen's University (Canada): Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1978), esp 40-7.
23. Jeffrey A Karn, *Soviet Command and Control in an Historical Context* (Monterey: US Naval Postgraduate School, MS Thesis, 1981).
24. A useful overview, albeit written before the opening of many relevant documents, is Hugh Thomas' *Suez* (New York, 1967).
25. Herbert Y Schandler, 'JCS Strategic Planning and Vietnam: The Search for an Objective', in Harry Borowski (ed), *Military Planning in the Twentieth Century* (Washington, DC, 1984), 295-314; George S Eckhardt, *Command and Control, 1950-1969* (Vietnam Studies series) (Washington, DC, 1974); *The Pentagon Papers: The Department of Defense History of US Decision-Making on Vietnam* (Senator Gravel edition) (Boston, 1971); and Robert W Komer, *Bureaucracy at War: US Performance in the Vietnam Conflict* (Boulder, 1986).
26. That may take the working of the 'Thirty-Year Rule', as it has with Suez Planning processes were out of view in *The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons* (London, 1982) (Cmd 8758), although some details appeared in William Jackson and Lord Bramall, *The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff* (London, 1992), 403-19.
27. Several DESERT STORM post-mortems have offered views of planning, some hagiographic, some tendentious. That, too, may become clearer in the fullness of time. While much operational documentation was in the form of highly perishable computer data, considerable detailing on planning is visible in Edward C Mann III, *Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates* (Montgomery, 1995).
28. Histories of strategic planning include Paul Y Hammond, *Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century* (Princeton, 1961); and Harry Yoshpe, *Plans for Industrial Mobilization, 1920- 1939* (Washington, DC, 1945). A theoretical essay about planning that had a shaping effect on actual planning is John A Warden III, *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat* (Washington, DC, 1988).
29. Lawrence Martin (ed), *The Management of Defence* (London, 1976).

30. For example, Terry L Haynes, *Understanding US Strategy: A Reader* (Washington, DC, 1982); Gregory Palmer, *The McNamara Strategy and the Vietnam War: Program Budgeting in the Pentagon, 1960-1961* (Westport, 1978), and Harold Brown, *Thinking About National Security: Defense and Foreign Policy in A Dangerous World* (Boulder, 1983); James Bellini and Geoffrey Pattie, *A New World Role for the Medium Powers: The British Opportunity* (London, 1977); for a sequence of critiques of US limited war policy and planning, see Paul Blackstock, *The Strategy of Subversion Manipulating the Politics of Other Nations* (Chicago, 1964); Klaus Knorr (ed), *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence, 1976); and Stephen T Hosmer, *Constraints on US Strategy in Third World Conflicts* (New York, 1987).
31. For example, *Planning US Strategic Nuclear Forces for the 1980s* (Washington, DC, 1978); Raymond L Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (New York, 1958); and Desmond Ball, 'Soviet Strategic Planning and the Control of Nuclear War', in Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen P Miskiewicz (eds), *The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War* (Lexington, 1986), 49-68; and Bruce G Blair, *Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat* (Washington, DC, 1985).
32. Details of command structure and process are rarely as coherently presented as in James D Hittle's *The Military Staff: Its History and Development* (Harrisburg, 1961); these are often found in the flow of larger works, such as the description of staff organisation and battle plot system in John Jellicoe (Admiral of the Fleet Lord), *The Grand Fleet* (New York, 1919), 40-5.
33. For a variety, see Keith Neilson and Roy A Prete (eds), *Coalition Warfare* (Waterloo, Ont, 1983).
34. Beyond such standard treatises as Maurice's *Strategikon* (6th century AD), Bernard Brodie's *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton, 1959), Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York, 1963), and BH Liddell Harts *Strategy: The Indirect Approach* (London, 1954), are such diverse approaches as George Gray Aston, *Sea, Land and Air Strategy: A Comparison* (Boston, 1914), 'Aquila', 'The Influence of Modern Techniques of War on Strategy', *RAF Quarterly* 20: 1 (January 1949), 23-30, JW Williams, *The Compleat Strategyst* (New York, 1954); and the survey of Chinese strategic writings by Harold von Senger, *The Book of Stratagems: Tactics for Survival and Triumph*, ed & trans Myron Gubitz (New York, 1991).
35. For example, Bruce Palmer, *Grand Strategy for the 1980s* (Washington, DC, 1978).
36. Carl H Builder brings these elements together analytically in *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore, 1989).
37. For American definitions, see the most recent edition of Joint Chiefs of Staff *Official Dictionary of Military Terms* and appropriate sections in the *Federal Register*, and JCS publications in the 'joint' series—'JCS Pubs'
38. An early attempt, of some value although shaped in the shadow of his failure as the ground commander at Gallipoli, was General Sir Ian Hamilton's *The Soul and Body of an Army* (New York, 1921), esp 247-57.
39. An exception is Colin Gray, 'National Style in Strategy: The American Example', *International Security* 6: 2 (Fall 1981), 21-48.
40. For a description of American tri-service squabbling over Congressional cuts in the airborne boost intercept programme, see 'Jointness Be Damned', *Aviation Week and Space Technology* 141:15 (10 October 1994), 21.
41. Cases include the Boxer Rebellion relief expedition, units of the American Expeditionary Force in France in World War I, and elements serving under foreign command in Russia during that conflict and afterward. In the Sicilian, Italian and Normandy campaigns, US ground, air and sea forces served under British commanders and, after the forming of NATO, under German command.
42. Jointness and interservice rivalry were dealt with in the vaguest terms *en passant* in an overview of 'stresses and strains' in Charles H Coates and Roland J Pellegrin, *Military Sociology: A Study of American Military Institutions and Military Life* (College Park, 1965), 147-8.
43. For example, those of the US Navy's Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral Ernest J King, with most of his British counterparts during World War II.
44. For example, that of US Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and Field Marshal Sir John Dill, head of the British military mission in Washington.
45. Notable exceptions are the bold and feisty correspondences of Admiral Lord Fisher and Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris.
46. Recent examples are HP Wilmott's *Grave of a Dozen Schemes: British Naval Planning and the War Against Japan, 1943-1945* (Annapolis, 1996), and Edward S Miller's *War Plan Orange: The US Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945* (Annapolis, 1991).
47. Thomas Molyneux, *Conjunct Expeditions: Or Expeditions That Have Been Carried on Jointly by the Fleet and Army With a Commentary on a Littoral War* (London, 1759).
48. Harold Winton, for example, saw it as a 'partnership severely strained' and a 'dialogue of the deaf': 'Partnership and Tensions, the Army and Air Force Between Vietnam and DESERT SHIELD', *Parameters* 26:1 (Spring 1996), 100-19.
49. For example, the French-Spanish scheme to land in Britain during the American Revolution described in A Temple Patterson's *The Other Armada: The Franco-Spanish Attempt to invade Britain in 1779* (Manchester, 1960); the American campaign in Cuba, 1898, depicted caustically by Walter Millis in *The Martial Spirit* (New York, 1931), 245 ff, the rejection of an American College of National Defense by the Joint Board at three separate points during the 1930s, noted by Louis Morton, 'Inter-Service

Cooperation and Political-military Cooperation', in Harry L Coles (ed), *Total War and Cold War Problems in Civilian Control of the Military* (Columbus, 1975); the feeble collaboration between the Low Countries, Britain and France in 1939-40, traced in Ronald Charles Hood III, *Royal Republicans: The French Naval Dynasties Between the World Wars* (Baton Rouge, 1985), 9-91, 139-40 and 192- 93; Dominique Boussard, *Un Problème de Defense Nationale: L'Aeronautique Militaire au Parlement, 1928-1940* (Vincennes, 1983); and Gabriel Auphan and Jacques Mordal, *French Navy in World War II*, trans ACJ Sabalot (Annapolis, 1959). Anthony Martienssen saw the German Navy's Biggest threat [in 1943 coming] not from the Allies but from the German High Command', in *Hitler and His Admirals* (New York, 1949), 150.

50. For a recent perspective, see William J Toti [Cmdr, USN], 'It's Broken! Fix It!: Why the Joint Staffs JWCA Doesn't Work', *Armed Forces Journal International* (April, 1966), 28, 30, 32 and 34.

51. See Glenn K Otis [Gen. US Ret], *Employing the Options: How a joint Force Commander Views Roles and Missions* (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1994), 4.

52. See NW Emmott, 'RAF: The Impossible Dream', *US Naval Institute Proceedings* 95:12 (December 1969), 26-39.

53. J Henry Doscher, Jr, *Subchaser in the Pacific* (Austin, 1994), 38-41.

54. Including Marathon, Sphacteria, Vera Cruz, US Civil War, Gallipoli, Alhucemas, and such structures as ISTDC, Combined Operations and Amphibious Command.

55. For example, Gibraltar, 1703, New Providence, 1776, Tanga, 1914, New Orleans, 1815, Cuba, 1698, the 'Battle of the Smiths' in 1944, and the Vietnam War.

56. Such an anti-history might also include such tracts and briefs as the treatises of Mahan, Douhet and Maxwell Taylor, and Alexander P DeSeversky's *Victory Through Air Power* (New York, 1942), Marshall Andrews' *Disaster Through Air Power* (New York, 1950), and William Bradford Huie's *The Case Against the Admirals* (New York, 1946).

57. For example, wimping, wussing, finking, or selling out, knuckling under, and caving in.

58. For example, wise guy, wise ass, smart ass, know-it-all, walking encyclopedia, educated idiot.

59. A prime example is General of the Army Omar Bradley's 'Fancy Dans' jibe at the US Navy's sartorial vanity when testifying as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before Congress during the 'Battle of the Potomac' in 1949, in *US Congress: House Committee on Armed Services Hearings*, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 7 October 1949.

60. For evidence of valiant efforts, see Jim Velezis and Jim Toth, 'The Color Purple', *Parameters* 19: 4 (December 1989), 110-11.

61. A recent instance is Daniel A Baugh, Confusions and Constraints: The Navy and British Defence Planning, 1919-1939', in NAM Rodger (ed), *Naval Power in the Twentieth Century* (Annapolis, 1996), 109-15, which attributes weak interwar interservice collaboration in Britain to the air force's indifference to, sometimes wariness of, combined-arms operations', due to doctrines designed 'to insure independence of their service', and which certainly contributed greatly to ... the sudden collapse of the defences of Norway, France, and Singapore' (p 115).

62. As a teacher of cadets at Texas A&M and the Naval Academy in the late 1980s, the author witnessed the effect on recruiting/self-recruiting of the films 'Top Gun' and 'The Hunt for Red October'.

63. A very recent example is Blema S Steinberg, *Shame and Humiliation: Presidential Decision Making on Vietnam* (Pittsburgh, 1996).