

***THE SECOND FIFTY YEARS:
THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY 1947-1997***

***ONE ARMY
Major-General KG Cooke***

In his letter announcing this conference, the Chief of Army stated that 'This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the decision by Government to establish a large, permanent component of the Army, to stand alongside the traditional part-time force'. So, today the spotlight is on the Regular Army and the enviable role of the other speakers is to remind us that we have a fine Regular Army that, for its size, is virtually without peer in the world. It is an Army of which all of us are justifiably proud.

Mine is the unenviable task of commenting on the history during the same period of that traditional part-time force to which the Chief of Army referred. I noted that the title given to me was 'One Army'. It reminded me of the principle adopted by the Peoples' Republic of China in its move towards the integration of Hong Kong—'One Country: Two Systems'. My topic could well be 'One Army: Two Systems'.

Sadly, in the years since the Second World War, I can only report a continuing saga of lost opportunities and frustration for the Citizen Military Forces and the Army Reserve, despite the efforts of many dedicated Regular and citizen-soldiers, politicians and public servants. To bring out lessons I must unfortunately emphasise the negatives and pass over many outstanding achievements.

Sadly, too, I will say things at times that risk irritating some people present today (something I find personally upsetting because I have many friends in the audience as well as persons for whom I have high regard and respect), but I cannot be hypocritical and can only tell the story as, I believe, the majority of citizen-soldiers see it.

But in tackling this contentious subject, I am encouraged by the very fact that, firstly, I have been asked to speak at this conference at all and, secondly, by further comments by the Chief of Army that we must use the experiences of the past to help us meet the demands of the major restructuring on which the Army is embarking. I believe that there are still many lessons to be learned about part-time forces.

So my presentation is not intended to be destructive, but is made in the hope that, as the Army enters yet another era of restructuring, some lessons from the past can help to ensure that we do not repeat mistakes but, this time, will succeed in creating the very best Total Force of which this country is capable.

To start with, we must not forget that Australian soldiering did not begin in 1947. From as early as 1800 onwards we had a succession of evolving types of forces that saw growth from small groups of local citizen volunteers, through structured colonial volunteer units and then a more formalised militia, until in 1901 defence was centralised under the new Commonwealth Government, thereby creating the Australian Military Forces. It was mainly these Volunteer and Militia units that formed the basis of Australia's expeditionary forces from the mid-1800s until the end of the Second World War.

Australian Expeditionary Forces

		<i>Enlisted</i>	<i>Served Overseas</i>
1869	New Zealand	2500	
1885	Sudan	750	
1899-1902	South Africa	16,175	
1914-1918	First World War	416,809	331,781
1939-1945	Second World War	727,703	396,661

That these forces were predominantly formed from citizen volunteers was necessarily due to the token strength of our Permanent Forces at the time, for example:

Australian Permanent Army Strengths

1914	2989
1935	1800
1938	2795
1939	3572

With these figures freshly in mind, let me up front grasp the nettle on one of the most emotive parts of this study. There has been and, I am sad to say, even today, still is in some circles, much heat generated by the fact that a large number of command and other senior appointments up to and including the Second World War were held by non-Regular officers. Yet this is understandable if looked at objectively, not, in my submission, because of any sinister plot, but because of the following factors:

- the Royal Military College was not established until 1911;
- the relatively small number of Regular soldiers as a percentage of the forces raised;
- the existence of a pool of citizen-soldiers with proven operational experience, from South Africa for the First World War and from the First World War for the Second World War; plus
- the need to use the small number of professionally trained officers with the requisite skills that were available to fill key senior staff appointments.

My understanding from the perspective of a young CMF officer in Victoria has been just the opposite of what appears to be the conventional wisdom on the Regular side of the house. When it appeared post-1947 that the CMF was being downgraded and that perhaps one underlying reason was a desire on the part of some senior Regular officers to lock out non-Regulars from command, our ex-AIF officers had no real argument, in principle, with qualified Regulars being preferred. Most had served with first class Regular soldiers during the war for whom they had a high regard. What worried them was that membership alone would become the criteria of selection. In the traditions of the AIF, they sincerely believed that the Australian soldier deserved the best leaders the country could produce, whatever their background and pedigree. And Army would need a plentiful supply. The argument was that if a Regular was truly professional and capable, what would he have to fear?

Furthermore, one of my old Commanding Officers used military history to highlight that, since we are not an aggressive nation, we will usually be on the back foot in the early stages of a conflict and in such circumstances losses can often be high. So, he would argue, we should not put at risk the bulk of our small professional Army up front.

Finally, there is the danger in today's world that if a Regular Army promotes the belief that it, either wholly or substantially, can provide the country's defence, it will run the risk of isolating itself from the community. People will no doubt be more than willing to say, 'Well, let's leave it to them'.

I believe that these three principles are still generally subscribed to by today's Reserve. It is accepted that in the reality of today's world key appointments will, prima facie, be held by capable Regulars. But there is also a realisation that because of the demographic and economic conditions Australia will face for the foreseeable future, there will never be enough of them. That is why there is a strong belief that as many as possible of the best young men and women in our community, whatever their peace-time origins, must be encouraged to devote part of their time, to the limit of their individual abilities, to learn military skills and so prepare for the defence of the country.

Australia simply cannot afford to ignore and lock out some of the best potential talent it has. So my primary plea to all concerned, in the best interests of the nation, is to adopt an open-minded approach that will give us the best land force that the combined resources of the community can produce. So, against the background of Australia's military evolution, what was the situation as we saw it in 1947?

- Citizen-soldiers had demonstrated for over 150 years a willingness, particularly as volunteers, to defend their country.
- They had served with distinction in two major wars and in other lesser conflicts, as well as keeping alive the skills of soldiering in the difficult years of peace.
- Like today's Regular Army, they were respected around the world for their soldierly qualities—not perhaps for the spit and polish of the parade ground, although they could turn that on too when called upon—but certainly for qualities of courage, resourcefulness and leadership.
- For various cultural and historical reasons, the concept of a volunteer citizen army fitted comfortably into Australian society.

Let us now skim through some of the main events post-1947 as they impacted on the CMF. Many may be perceptions only, but they had a cumulative effect. In the time available I can only list a selection of items and then deal in the most superficial way with them, as some topics in themselves warrant a much fuller debate:

1946-47

In response to the uneasiness generated by the Cold War, unofficial 'staff groups' of veterans began to form. They conducted TEWTs, held information and teaching sessions and lobbied government for positive action on defence. As such, they represented community attitudes in a traditional way.

1948

The CMF was re-raised on traditional pre-war lines with limited Regular Army support. Training was an extension of the Second World War practice. My first camp as a young officer was a brigade minefield breaching operation at night—but my platoon sergeant had done it for real as a sapper at El Alamein some few years before.

1950

The Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, outlined the Government's policy for the Citizen Military Forces:

- to be increased from 18,000 progressively through 30,000 to 50,000;
- service would be anywhere in the world (but call-out still limited to a formal declaration of war);
- to be 'enlisted and trained as a force which, with Regular units fed into it, is itself an expeditionary force'.

1951

The first postwar National Service scheme was introduced, but for home defence only, and to bolster the CMF. It obligated 18 year olds to serve 98 days full-time followed by three years part time. With units at full strength and flush with Second World War equipment, some ambitious and worthwhile training resulted.

1959

That National Service scheme ceased. A number of draftees served on for many years, some to high rank.

1960

A Pentropic structure was introduced for the Australian Army. The Pentropic organisation probably marked the low point of the CMF and a level from which it never really recovered. There was an overwhelming feeling of betrayal when it was realised that the traditional units were to be disbanded in favour of a 'regimental' system. This was foreign to Australians where traditions from two wars were battalion—and not regimentally—based. The artificial 1 & 2 RQR/RNSWR/RVR/etc structure was resented and seen by many as a deliberate attempt to destroy the long established citizen force traditions. Because these traditions went deep into history, the reorganisation also shut out the civil communities and the AIF Associations who saw their familiar and much-loved titles disappear.

Army paid no regard to local or traditional sensitivities. In 1980 when I was on a recruiting tour of Ballarat, the Mayor took me into the main Council Chamber to proudly show me the 8th Infantry Battalion Colours, on the wall above the Mayoral chair. I said what a pity it was that Ballarat did not then have its own battalion and it was my aim to see the local company built up to that level again. The Mayor said to me, 'General, we do not understand this 2RVR nonsense. What the Army does not realise is that two generations of men from Ballarat have fought and died in the 8th Battalion. When the Army gives us back our 8th Battalion then Ballarat will give the Army its young men again'. In fact, from the day the 8th Battalion was absorbed into 2RVR, the Ballarat Council would not allow that unit to exercise its inherited Freedom of the City until the title was eventually changed back to 8th/7th Battalion, Royal Victoria Regiment.

Many members resigned in protest, including most of the Second World War officers and NCOs still serving, as well as those for whom no establishment vacancy existed.

From a CMF organisational point of view, the reorganisation was a disaster. Spread of command was too far geographically and too remote personally.

1964

Another National Service scheme was introduced but this time to boost the strength of the Regular Army. There was a CMF option included, in that potential draftees could secure exemption from full-time service by signing on with the CMF for six years. This was counter-productive. It resulted in the CMF in general being classed as 'draft dodgers'. Also, many good serving soldiers (especially officers and NCOs) enlisted as individuals in the ARA or went on full-time duty. Other young men of good quality who might normally have joined the CMF went instead into the National Service system. Furthermore, with the demands of Vietnam, the CMF was left with minimal Regular Army support and so standards deteriorated even further.

Legislation extended the ability to call out the CMF in time of a declared defence emergency as well as on a declaration of war. But, with nothing tangible flowing from this, it had no effect at unit level.

1965

Regular units were committed to Vietnam and Malaysia. Despite the Regular Army being dramatically overstretched there was no attempt made to use existing CMF units, although, unlike the two world wars, all territorial limits on their employment had by then been removed.

1971

Military Board Minute 40/71 redefined the role of the CMF:

- (1) to augment the Regular Army in time of defence emergency or time of war;
- (2) with the Regular Army, to provide the basis for expansion of the whole Army on general mobilisation.

This clearly reversed the policy introduced in 1950 and officially allotted the CMF a minor or supplementary role. I am not necessarily questioning the policy—just drawing attention to what was perceived to be a further downgrading of the citizen force with no compensating factors to make members feel they still had a worthwhile job to do.

1972

National Service Mk II was abolished. Those who had opted for the CMF as an alternative of course left immediately.

1973

As the CMF was showing adverse symptoms, particularly diminished numbers and lack of a clear role, aggravated by the earlier actions we have noted, in May the Government established the Millar Committee to enquire into the CMF.

1974

In March the Millar Committee tabled its very comprehensive Report. Its recommendations included:

- restricted manning (which formalised 'hollowness' for which the Reserve itself is now condemned);
- further amalgamation of units and a consequent reduction in opportunities;
- the change of name from Citizen Military Forces to Army Reserve (a title used since to reinforce in the minds of the public, the politicians, the bureaucracy, the Regular Army and the Reserve itself that it can only ever be a second, third or even fourth eleven);
- that Australia should have one Army (or 'Total Force' as Millar preferred to call it) with two complementary elements, the Regular Army and the Army Reserve.
- improvements in training, administration and conditions of service.

Overall, it was considered to be a good report. But it fell down in its implementation, with the 'nasties' and those parts which had no cost implications being acted on speedily, with other ideas being slow to see daylight or never at all. In general it is seen to have fallen far short of its potential because there was never the will nor the resources given to effectively implement its major reforms.

It is interesting to recall its macro-considerations:

- That a Reserve of partly-trained Army units and personnel is an essential component of the defence of Australia.
- That such a Reserve is only possible and effectual if the Government of the day, the community, the Regular Army and the Reserve believe it has a role which gives it present significance, which provides for effective action in the future, and which it is known the Government will implement if necessary.
- That any Reserve component must be prepared for total integration with the rest of the Army in the event of call-up for full-time duty, and that in peace both Regular and Reserve components should be treated and act as part of a single force.
- That the Reserve should be divided into operational units, logistic units and a training organisation, geared to provide both an effective operational force at short notice and also the basis for expansion over a longer term.
- That there should be an appropriate professional relationship between the designation and size of Reserve organisations, and between rank and responsibility within them.

I suggest that these principles are still relevant today, especially points two and three.

1976

A Government White Paper confirmed support for Millar and predicted that the ongoing reorganisation would raise the effectiveness of the Reserve. Fine words but again there were no commitments of substance.

1979

The outbreak of hostilities in Afghanistan saw a major expansion of the Reserve announced but, in retrospect, this is now looked on primarily as a political exercise. Much hard work went into expansion and many former members returned. But the momentum was not maintained.

1983

Taxation of Reserve pay was introduced. This had adverse effects on morale out of all proportion to its substance. Firstly, it focussed soldiers' minds on how much or rather how little they were being compensated for Reserve service, which before had never really been an issue. Secondly, it put most spouses off-side as for them the only compensation for disruption to family life was the occasional bonus which represented a new refrigerator, new school clothes for the kids, and so on. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it carried a not so subtle message to Reservists that neither the politicians nor the Regular military really cared or were prepared to acknowledge in an overt and tangible way that they, the Reservists, were doing a worthwhile job.

1985

The Government appointed Paul Dibb to conduct a review of Australia's defence capabilities. His was a far-ranging and sometimes contentious report. Some comments affecting the Reserves included:

- 'There is no common understanding between the Government's military and civilian advisers about what the ADF should be structured to do.'
- 'The Army Reserve has suffered over the years from lack of purpose.'
- 'The "Total Force" concept advocated by Dr Millar could have remedied this situation but it has been implemented only recently' —ie ten years later.
- Although emphasising the need for Reserve forces, the Review did not address adequately the readiness needed by the Army Reserve nor did it provide impetus for change to reflect the new emphasis that was proposed in Reserve employment.

Dibb did not, as had been hoped, solve the problems.

1986

The Army Reserve Review Committee published a report on the Force Structure and Tasks of the Army Reserve. Some of its main points were:

- the Reserve could be restructured to make a valuable contribution to defence in concert with the Regular Army;
- manning—or rather lack of it—was the key issue;
- a need for a greater commitment from the Regular Army to training the Reserve and the manning of command and administrative appointments where these could not be filled by a suitable Reservist;
- integration was essential and, where not possible, more structured affiliation was required;
- a 26,000 ceiling was sufficient to permit the deployment and sustainment of one Division on low level conflict operations and to secure some vital assets—it would not also permit an expansion base if hostilities were protracted or were to escalate;
- two battalion brigades should be adopted for planning and training;
- a need to increase training days, capital procurement, administrative outlays and additional RAAF air hours.

Negative results were these:

- brigades were reduced to two battalions, further increasing 'hollowness';
- more units were amalgamated over vast distances;
- there were reduced postings available for Reservists and the resultant surplus of personnel was wasted;
- although the need for increased resources was emphasised, these did not flow as a result of the Review.

1987

A White Paper titled the *Defence of Australia 1987* (DOA87) followed the Dibb Review twelve months later. This reflected both the strengths and weaknesses of Paul Dibb's Review. It did, however, state that:

- 'our requirements for land warfare cannot be achieved without extensive Reserve participation'.
- 'Since World War II the Reserve has provided the expansion base for the Army. It will now, in addition, be required to contribute to operations which might arise in the shorter term as part of the Total Army.'
- 'The Government will continue to give priority to our increasingly effective Reserve Forces.' (Many with closer knowledge of the subject would question this wording.)

Also in 1987, Mr RJ Cooksey undertook a report to Government entitled a *Review of Australia's Defence Facilities*. It addressed (amongst other things) Reserve accommodation. It was not acted upon at the time but was seen as another backward step as it advocated a lesser Reserve presence in the community.

1988

Call-out of Reservists short of Declaration of War or Defence Emergency became law, thus removing the final impediment to inclusion of the Reserve in contingency planning. The legislation did not, however, include any protection of Reservists' civilian interests in the event of call-out in situations short of a Defence Emergency. I was the Chief of the Army Reserve at the time. When the then Minister told me that he had won Government support to proceed, I pointed out that call-out per se was only part of the requirement. Complementary provisions were necessary to protect Reservists' civilian interests to make it effective. He acknowledged

this but said he wanted to move as quickly as possible to get the concept of call-out locked in and undertook to follow up with separate protective legislation as soon as possible. I believe the Minister was sincere in what he said. However, he went on to another portfolio and later the Government changed. Still, ten years after that conversation, we seem as far away as ever from seeing protection for Reservists.

What I did find was an almost immediate and unbelievable backlash from sections of the Regular Army and the bureaucracy. Much of it was the 'green eyes' syndrome. I have listened to numerous arguments that 'you cannot give that to Reservists when we Regulars don't get anything like that'; or 'why should Reservists get that when professionals don't'. I have even heard direct boasts that the protective legislation will NEVER see the light of day. Despite strenuous efforts by some people with broader vision and a better understanding of the realities of the situation, it seems to me that this boast may be borne out because there has been ten years without positive results—much of it in the best 'Yes, Minister' tradition. When Reservists and their families see other legislation of a more complex nature on other subjects pushed through in a fraction of the time and assess just how vulnerable enlistment makes them, they feel badly let down.

1989

Reports by Dr Ross Babbage and Dr Nick and Mrs Judy Jans separately examined personnel issues for the ADF.

1990

Dr Alan Wrigley presented a report addressing just how the Australian community could play a greater role in defence. His recommendations centred on making greater use of civil infrastructure and industry for support activities and increasing the Reserves (or 'Militia' as he called it).

1990-91

The Australian National Audit Office undertook an audit of the Army Reserve. Its report was subsequently used to beat the Reserve around the ears once more. It contained 90 recommendations—however, none of the complaints were within the province of the Reserve but were imposed either by Government or by higher defence policy.

1991

An Interdepartmental Committee was established to examine Dr Wrigley's proposals. While favouring a Ready Reserve system (advocated by Babbage and the Jans), the IDC indicated support for the General Reserve if, *inter alia*:

- changes to the Reserves were linked to an overall upgrading of the importance of the Reserves; and
- Reserves had a clearly defined defence role.

Also in 1991, the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade conducted a far ranging in-depth study of the Australian Defence Force Reserves. The Committee found (what we in the Reserves all knew) that 'when it came to Reserve issues, there was a demonstrable gap between force development rhetoric and action'. It also highlighted many deficiencies of all types and recommended that Army Reserve units be fully equipped for their vital asset protection role as soon as practicable.

The Force Structure Review of 1991 was aimed at producing a more efficient and combat effective force that was affordable on both the short and longer term. It was influenced by the greater use of Reserves, in particular the role of the Ready Reserves. The Ready Reserve

Programme was introduced. In the light of its later demise I shall not spend time on it except to say that I attended a briefing at 6th Brigade where the staff proudly told a gaggle of us 'olds and bolds' what a success it was turning out to be. The officer concerned said, 'Of course, we did have problems at first. However, we learned quickly and these have been overcome'. Then, in a voice which was clearly telling us a trade secret with pride, he went on:

We found that dealing with the Ready Reservists was different from handling normal Regulars. So, what we had to do was, firstly, give each unit a clear role and make sure the soldiers understood it. In other words, we had to give them a purpose for their training. Secondly, we had to give the units training specifically designed to prepare them for that role. Thirdly, we had to give them the equipment necessary to perform that role. Fourthly, we had to increase the number of Regular personnel to guarantee top quality training and administration.

He stood back and beamed triumphantly. I caught the eye of another ex-senior Reservist across the room and we both studied the ceiling for several minutes. What we had been treated to was, in simple terms, what the Reserve had been literally begging for since the early 1950s.

In passing, another matter that always puzzled me about the Ready Reserve was being constantly told by Regulars that they gave an unique opportunity for the Army to have influence back into the community. What had the CMF and Army Reserve been doing during the preceding 50 years? The level of influence of the General Reserve far exceeded any that the younger members of the Ready Reserve, who were in the main students or unemployed, could possibly exert. And, on the same subject, I heard an Army public relations spokesman talking on radio several months ago propounding an 'Adopt a Digger' scheme. He said that 'the Army is an insular community that lives within its own military community because of its operational methods—so it needs to show that the military is human, has feelings and does its job well.' I ask you to consider what an on-side Reserve can do with no extra cost or effort to help in this regard.

Finally in 1991, the 3rd Division was disbanded—on its 75th birthday. This was another retrograde step for the Reserve that was handled with no sensitivity or public relations acumen.

1997

We now arrive at 1997.

- The Ready Reserve programme was terminated.
- The Defence Reform Programme was introduced. I mention it merely because it contained no reference to Reserve Forces. I do not quite know whether to be relieved or worried about that.

Looking back over the period 1947-1997, critics will point to continuing weaknesses in the Reserve. There will be little argument on this. What I think is truly amazing is not what faults exist in the citizen force, but how much it achieved against all odds and, indeed, the very fact that it has survived at all.

So, finally, in 1997 we finish with Restructuring the Army. This document admitted that 'the concept of a Total Force has so far proved difficult to turn into reality'. It also talks about the 'arbitrary distinctions between full-time and part-time service personnel'. So there at least seems common ground in conceding that little appears to have changed in principle in the last half century, despite all the reviews, enquiries and commissions.

I shall not attempt to discuss common principles arising from restructuring the Army, such as those affecting force structure, the concept for land operations, the principle of embedding, etc, although I know there are concerns held by many in both Regular and Reserve camps

about these. Let me just touch on some matters that are of particular concern to the Reserve. What have we learned in the last 50 years? What can we do to improve on past efforts? I will not try to do so in detail but just comment in the hope that some present today may be prompted to consider the problems more deeply and search for possible solutions.

- I am sure I do not need to comment further on the need for a clear role for the Reserve and realistic tasks for units.
- By further amalgamating and restructuring units, we again risk losing a number of serving officers and other ranks.
- I understand there is already a surplus to proposed new establishments. If we repeat past mistakes we will arbitrarily waste away these members in whom we already have a sizeable investment. Then inevitably we will need to start the expensive business of recruiting and training over again. I would argue that we should find ways to retain any surplus for future use and not become driven by tidy staff tables.
- What about multiple manning to help retain and train personnel and achieve more efficiency in units?
- The need for more thorough induction training has long been acknowledged. However, it is considered that this should be done by offering options that will not deny sizeable and important sections of the community the right to serve. Enlistment of school leavers and students to take advantage of their time availability is supported. However, the Army will be the loser if it adopts this as the only option. It will be denied recruits with trade and other specialist skills, those with experience in management and administration, persons of status and influence in the community and, generally, that constituency that has always made citizen forces so valuable, usable and adaptable.
- I am worried by comments I hear from some Regulars that Reservists must be trained to identical skills and standards as Regulars. If this is achievable on a part-time basis, why do we need a Regular Army at all? We must stop trying to clone a Reservist in the same image as a Regular. We should not be trying to train part-time members for the equivalent of a long term professional career. Reservists are enlisted to do specific jobs in the event of defence emergencies. To ensure that they reach competency in those particular tasks and that scarce resources are used wisely, training should be concentrated on those Reserve-specific skills.
- Some, by option and availability, may be able to reach the same levels as their Regular counterparts and opportunities should be available for them to do so.
- It will, admittedly, mean more work to structure Reserve training for the specific roles and tasks. It will mean producing syllabi that are different from the Regular requirement and sometimes different syllabi within a single Corps for different Reservists. For example, in the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps, should a battalion medical orderly do exactly the same training as an orderly in a hospital? I don't know—but this sort of question needs to be asked of almost all military skills if we are going to produce achievable objectives without waste of resources. Then, too, if a hospital orderly is reposted to a battalion we will know what additional skills (if any) he will need to acquire.
- Let me assure you that it is not possible simply to transpose Regular course packages to the Reserve by changing the title at the top of page one. I once worked with a fine Regular major on his first posting to the Reserve. He came from the Infantry Centre and immediately produced a new training syllabus for the Battalion. When I read it I saw he had listed on every Tuesday night for six months two periods—the M60 machine gun and voice procedure. When I queried this he replied that it was the exact syllabus used for the ARA course at the Centre and was the only way to cover the subjects to ARA standards. I pointed out that, in theory, this may be so but, before the six months was over, he would be lecturing to empty classrooms. After a short time with us he learned to understand the citizen-soldier better.
- I hope we shall see more use made of correspondence courses, distance and remote learning.
- Something that has always puzzled me about the Army is its reluctance to recognise civilian skills. I once commanded a formation that included Supplementary Reserve units with restricted training obligations. One squadron had a number of soldiers

whose civilian jobs with statutory authorities required them to drive fork lifts and other equipment. Yet the Army would not let them touch equivalent plant unless they first completed a minimum six week full-time course—ie three years of their prescribed Reserve service. I tried to cajole the system into simply trade testing them but, no, they had to do the course. What a waste! There should be a ready recognition of civilian qualifications with only top-up training as necessary.

- I must address the frequently made claim that Reservists cannot cope with the high technology of a modern Army. It seems that many Regulars do not understand that technology in civilian life is just as advanced or often more so than that found in the Australian Army. Conversion is only a matter of training. After all, most complex military equipment is designed, manufactured and serviced by civilians—just like those who join the Army Reserve. Maybe Reservists can even add to Army's technological capabilities.
- Allied to the question of training packages, proper assessments must be made—including, I suggest, for the Regular component too—as to what degrees of readiness are really needed for what elements of the Total Force. From time to time, these will need to be adjusted to meet changing strategic circumstances. I suggest that we do not need the whole of our Army to be ready for high intensity combat tomorrow.
- The question of warning time should influence the degree of availability that is required of individual Reservists in various units from time to time. Instant availability of all members is neither realistic nor necessary. Proper treatment of this aspect will also permit a Reservist to transfer to a lower priority unit in the event that business or family commitments undergo a temporary change so the Army does not lose its investment in him or her altogether.
- Matters such as these will require detailed personnel management.
- There must be genuine career planning for Reservists. If it is perceived that they will be kept down by an artificial glass ceiling then Defence can expect a backlash. This will need the involvement of Reserve planners and counsellors and involve wide consultation.
- What about a 'Stand-by Reserve' or whatever name is preferred to replace the present Regular Army Emergency Reserve and the Inactive Army Reserve with a minimal annual requirement (say, one week-end for updating and kit and medical checks) and with, perhaps, shadow postings to vacant positions? Maybe it should include officers and other ranks. This would be one way of retaining both Regulars and Reservists with temporary problems and provide a worthwhile pool of replacements.
- In recent times I believe a quest for secrecy has needlessly fuelled fears both within and outside the Reserve. Please remember that all concerned are sincere. Just because they do not agree with all aspects of official policy at all times does not mean any lack of bona fides. I remember one wise old CGS who said: ' We Regulars are not very good at managing the CMF. We do not really understand the problems. But we have a good pool of citizen-soldiers who have been doing this for a long time. What we really ought to do is rely on them and then give them all the help and support we can'. There is an immense reservoir of goodwill that can be tapped. There are also formal agencies in every State like the Defence Reserves Support Committee and the Defence Reserves Association.
- Do not underestimate the latent enthusiasm of the average Reservist. He or she will respond and can achieve far more in less time than Army may be accustomed to.
- During the last 50 years the Reserve has functioned almost in isolation. Now, integration in virtually all units is proposed. There are concerns at the proposed levels at which integration may occur. The lower the level that this takes place, the more difficult it will become. There may be substantial differences, too, between integration in specialist and logistic units (especially those that have some civil connection) and combat units. Obviously integration within an infantry battalion will be much more difficult than in, for example, a field hospital. But whatever the Corps and level, the Regular Army at all levels must condition itself to cultural integration. If present prejudices and attitudes prevail then I have grave concerns for the future of integration.

- Finally, as we have seen over the last 50 years, all the good intentions will come to nothing unless adequate resources are put into making the part-time component truly effective.

We now seem to have, with the Defence Reform Programme and Restructuring the Army, a circuit breaker. The truth is that the Regular Army needs a strong Reserve and the Reserve needs a strong Regular Army. Australia needs them both.