



Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected readings from the world's military journals

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Compiled by:



The CA's Introduction

Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.



Editor's Note

**This is the final SOPD for 2004.
Publication will resume in 2005.**

Article	‘Understanding Fourth-generation War’
Author	<i>William S. Lind, Director of the Centre for Cultural Conservatism of the Free Congress Foundation</i>
Publication Details	<i>Military Review</i> , September–October 2004, vol. LXXXIV, no. 5, pp. 12–16

SYNOPSIS

Lind’s article lays out a framework for understanding what he calls ‘the Four Generations of Modern War.’ Lind believes that modern war began with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, when the state established a monopoly on war. Prior to this event he says that many non-state entities—families, tribes, religious groups, cities and merchant enterprises—had fought wars by using various means.

The first generation of modern warfare was the age of line-and-column tactics, between 1648 and 1860. This period was characterised by formal battles, and battlefields were orderly. The significance of this last point, Lind says, is that it created a military culture of order—uniforms, saluting, rank structure—which differentiated the military from civilians. However, from about 1860 onwards, technological innovations (rifled muskets, machine guns and so on) began to break down the order and make the tactics of line-and-column suicidal. These events have created a contradiction in which military culture is at odds with an increasingly disorderly battlefield environment.

Second-generation warfare was one answer to the contradiction between military culture and the disorderly battlefield. Developed by the French in World War I, it was a methodical, attritional approach to warfare based on centrally controlled firepower, particularly massed artillery. This approach preserved the culture of order by focusing on synchronisation and discipline. Lind observes that the relevance of this approach is that the United States learnt it from the French in World War I and that it is still the way the United States fights today—that is, by ‘putting steel on target’—in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, aviation assets have replaced artillery as the main sources of firepower.

Third-generation warfare is also a product of World War I. German manoeuvre tactics, based on speed and surprise, relied not on firepower, but rather mental dislocation of the enemy to achieve their effect. This style of warfare is a nonlinear approach to battle in which decentralisation and initiative are required instead of synchronisation and discipline.

Decentralisation and initiative are important in fourth-generation warfare, but in a radical change from the Westphalian system, the state has lost its monopoly to conduct warfare. The success of non-state opponents such as al-Qa’ida, Hamas and

the Revolutionary Forces of Columbia are cited in this regard, but Lind notes that the most ‘steadfast’ opponent of the West is Islam. Other dangers that Lind sees from this source are related to what he calls ‘invasion by immigration’ and ‘a poisonous ideology of multiculturalism’. For Lind, the war in Iraq is a potential ‘powder keg’ that could explode, releasing a variety of Islamic non-state actors to attack America and Americans.

The remainder of the article lists particular problems that Lind sees with the ability of the United States to fight fourth-generation opponents. These problems include:

- America’s lack of manoeuvre forces and the slow speed of its ground troops;
- the need to examine the ethical and moral conditions under which fourth-generation war is fought;
- the need for cultural intelligence in post-conflict operations;
- the type of Special Operations Forces required for fourth generation war;
- examining new approaches to the problem of force protection;
- new methods of occupation of enemy states; and
- new approaches to coalition warfare based on the strengths that various nations bring to the alliance.

The article concludes with Lind suggesting that the US armed forces do not ‘get’ fourth-generation warfare. For Lind, fourth-generation war is a return to the way in which war worked before the rise of the state. To understand this concept, he suggests studying the late Middle Ages. While none of these problems are new in an historical sense, they represent new challenges to national armed forces that have been designed to fight the armed forces of other states.

Article	‘Conflict Termination in Iraq’
Author	<i>Christopher Tuck</i>
Publication Details	<i>RUSI Journal</i> , October 2004, vol. 149, no. 5, pp. 17–21

SYNOPSIS

In this article, Christopher Tuck—a lecturer in the Defence Studies Department of King’s College London and at the British Joint Services Command and Staff College—examines the challenges of conflict termination and its application to the present situation in Iraq. Tuck believes that Iraq is an example of the difficulties that Western states have in translating military success into the attainment of long-term political objectives.

The author begins by outlining the differences between the terms *conflict termination* and *conflict resolution*. He defines the first term from a strategic perspective as the actual termination of armed conflict in ways that best support the political end-states set for a conflict. In contrast, the second term involves a wider spectrum of activities and aims at the more difficult resolution of the disputes that led to armed conflict in the first place. Conceptually he suggests that the two should not be seen as distinct phases; rather, conflict resolution should be seen as an umbrella concept indicating objectives for conflict termination (where effort should be directed), and providing the unifying element between conflict termination efforts and other activities such as post-conflict peace-building.

These differences can be seen in the present dilemma facing the coalition forces in Iraq, where the defeat of Saddam's army terminated only one dimension of a more complex 'layered' conflict. What Iraq demonstrates is that, in the globalised environment of the 21st century, the cessation of one form of conflict—for example, traditional state versus state—may not prevent other local, national, regional and international forces from creating multiple and fragmented layers of conflict above and below the state level. This is especially the case in Iraq, where the conflict is linked to other broader ideological struggles, which only blur the lines between conflict termination and resolution.

The challenges in Iraq are further exacerbated by the Western paradigm that focuses on a sequential campaign with its identifiable watershed between war and peace. The first of these two states is essentially seen as the province of the soldier and the second primarily the realm of the politician. The defeat of the Iraqi army, despite the formal declaration of an end of hostilities, did not lead to the end of fighting. This inconclusiveness has caused inordinate difficulties for the Coalition, which is attempting to conduct peace building before the conflict has in reality been terminated.

In the author's opinion, the premature declaration of the end of hostilities has now left the civil and military authorities with a perpetual challenge. On the one hand there is a persistent 'mission creep', as the military commitment has to be expanded to try and establish some form of confidence-building security, and 'mission cringe', as political pressure mounts to draw down the military presence to demonstrate progress towards a return to some form of 'peace'.

In conclusion, the author suggests that coalition difficulties in Iraq reflect a gap in Western thinking about conflict termination, which artificially and arbitrarily forces a non-existent divide between peace and war, 'stove-piping' military and political roles. This problem ultimately reflects a conceptual focus that does not acknowledge the complexity of contemporary security threats and the employment of military force in conflict termination and resolution.

Article	'Fallujah and the Future of Urban Operations', The MAJGEN Richard C. Schulze Memorial Essay
Author	<i>Colonel Gary Anderson, USMC (Retd)</i>
Publication Details	<i>Marine Corps Gazette, November 2004, vol. 88, no. 11, pp. 52–6</i>

SYNOPSIS

The Battle of Fallujah referred to in this essay is the one that occurred in April 2003. As the author points out, this battle confirmed everything that the United States Marine Corps had predicted about urban operations in ten years of experimentation. These predictions included factors such as conducting combat in places where the civilian population is still in place, the 'three block war' and the use of asymmetric tactics.

The experimentation program, which included a range of projects, identified the things that the Marines were doing incorrectly:

- bunching up,
- the need for 360° security, and
- improper use of combined arms.

As Anderson notes, the battle for Fallujah showed that, with training and increased resources, the Marines had improved in all of these areas. While body armour, new technologies (for example, mini UAVs), training in cultural intelligence and better doctrine put right many of the problem areas identified by experimentation, the Marines still did not technologically dominate the urban combat environment.

However, the enemy were also adapting. Snipers were a key problem. Enemy fire often came from protected sites such as mosques and schools or around civilians to shield their activities. Insurgents were also skilled in information operations—for example, using the bodies of young volunteers for propaganda purposes. The use of civilian vehicles to transport insurgent forces also proved a problem for the Americans. However, the ability of the Marines to dominate the skies day and night did limit the insurgent's tactical mobility. For Anderson, the answer to problems such as fighting among civilian populations and protected sites lies in the development of nonlethal weapons. Another solution lies in the ever greater precision of both ground-based and air-launched support weapons.

Anderson concludes his essay by stating that the Marines need to retain a leadership role in the development of urban operations. For him it is an important part of the Corps' heritage as America's 'forcible entry' service. The key to maintaining this

leadership role in urban operations is twofold: selection of the best urban warriors to develop doctrine and training techniques, and the provision of a realistic and large-scale urban training facility, where they can hone their skills.

Article	‘Back to the Street without Joy: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam and Other Small Wars’
Author	<i>LTC Robert M. Cassidy, US Army, Europe, Commanding General’s Initiatives Group</i>
Publication Details	<i>Parameters</i> , Summer 2004, vol. XXXIV, no. 2, pp. 73–83

SYNOPSIS

The thesis of this article is that, while the US Army has had many successful experiences in small wars, the bitter experience of the Vietnam War has meant that the lessons learnt about fighting guerrillas were not embedded or preserved in the army’s institutional memory. However, in the light of the counterinsurgency campaigns in which the United States and its allies are currently engaged, the lessons from similar experiences in the past have become highly relevant. These lessons are difficult ones to learn, especially for a force that has been focused on large-scale conventional warfare for most of the 20th century.

The bulk of the article is taken up with an examination of US attempts at pacification and counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Drawn from recent scholarship on the war, these studies concentrate on the period after the 1968 Tet Offensive. During this period, under General Creighton Abrams, US forces began to consider the war as a single conflict, rather than the two-war focus (big-unit battles and counterinsurgency) that had existed under his predecessor General Westmoreland. While the United States still eventually lost the war, the Marines and US Army Special Forces had begun to have some significant successes using the counterinsurgency and pacification techniques that Cassidy examines.

Going further back in history, Cassidy notes that the Marines had significant experience and success fighting guerrilla-style opponents during the ‘Banana Wars’ of the 1920s and 1930s. The Marine Corps’ *Small Wars Manual* (1940) was an attempt to codify this experience, some of which resurfaced in pacification programs directed by the Marines in Vietnam. In early 2004, a draft addendum to the *Small Wars Manual* (1940) was written ‘not to supplant the earlier version but to complement it by linking it to the 21st century’.

In addition, he discusses the US Army’s success in the Philippine Insurrection from 1899 to 1902 through the balanced and sound application of ‘sticks and carrots’. He also briefly examines the Indian Wars fought by the US Army in the 19th century.

The article concludes by noting that this rich history of successes is very relevant to the problems that face the US Army today. His point is that counterinsurgency wars are winnable, but only with the right mindset, techniques and training.

Article	'Unending War at the End of History'
Author	<i>John Gray, Professor of European Thought , London School of Economics</i>
Publication Details	<i>Australian Financial Review, Friday 5 November, 2004, p. 12</i>

SYNOPSIS

John Gray's review of Bernard-Henri Lévy's book *War, Evil and the End of History*, is one philosopher's reaction to another philosopher attempting to make sense of our troubled age. Lévy's earlier work *Who Killed Daniel Pearl?* mixes investigative journalism with fiction in an attempt to unravel the events surrounding the kidnapping and murder in Pakistan of *The Wall Street Journal* reporter. Lévy himself is an interesting personality. A French intellectual who is frequently criticised as a populariser of ideas, Lévy renounced Maoism in the 1970s at a time when the USSR and China were still fêted by large sections of the intelligentsia in many Western countries. As Gray points out, this unpopular stance was later vindicated by history as the Berlin Wall fell and China turned towards capitalism.

War, Evil and the End of History is divided into two parts. The first is Lévy's report from war-ravaged nations such as Columbia, Angola and Sri Lanka. The second part of the book contains Lévy's personal meditations on the horrors of the purposeless wars that he has outlined in the first section of the work. Gray finds merit in both sections of the book. His review mentions Lévy's interview with a female suicide bomber who was trained by the Tamil Tigers. Drawn to the cause by personal motivation for revenge, her determination faltered while she was working under cover in a Colombo restaurant. As Gray points out, the details of her training are both interesting and bizarre. This report provides a valuable insight into the mentality of the suicide bomber that is outside the usual context of Islamist-inspired terrorism.

The second section of *War, Evil and the End of History* contains difficult and interesting meditations on how such successive and purposeless wars have come about and what they ultimately mean. As Gray concludes, Lévy is 'one of the few [intellectuals] struggling to understand the present, and for that reason he is a thinker that we cannot afford to do without.'

Bernard-Henri Lévy, translated by Charlotte Mandell, *War, Evil and the End of History*, Duckworth, London, 2004, 400 pp.

Article	'Security in the Pacific Rim: A New Zealand Perspective'
Author	<i>Russell Marshall, New Zealand High Commissioner to the United Kingdom</i>
Publication Details	<i>RUSI Journal, August 2004, vol. 149, no. 4, pp. 46–50</i>

SYNOPSIS

Marshall begins his survey of New Zealand's security policy with a brief explanation of why cultural, economic and historical links to the United Kingdom and Europe have been displaced by a more regional perspective. As he notes, New Zealand is located in a quiet part of the planet, but one that, in an increasingly globalised environment, is not immune from the problems of the world. Moreover, new security threats such as HIV/AIDS, SARS, terrorism and environmental issues have not displaced traditional problems such as tensions in the Korean peninsula and across the Taiwan Straits. Indeed, these various problems, both old and new, have created a very complex environment that demands new responses.

So far as the South Pacific is concerned, the romanticised view of a quiet and peaceful backwater has been replaced by the realities of political and economic problems in many regional developing nations. The economic fragility of many of the region's micro-states makes them vulnerable to transnational crime syndicates and terrorism, while demographic and environmental stresses have been the cause of political and ethnic violence.

New Zealand's response to these challenges is based on a respect for human rights, belief in the international rule of law and a commitment to multilateralism. In this context, defence forces are seen as just one part of the solution to the nation's security problems. New Zealand aims to foster a variety of multi-agency links with nations in the Asia-Pacific to combat problems such as illegal immigration, transnational crime and terrorism. On issues such as the maintenance of a peaceful international order and sustainable development, New Zealand believes that strong multilateral systems based on fair rules will unite the international community. This focus is mirrored in the recent deployments of the New Zealand Defence Force to areas such as Bougainville, East Timor, the Solomon Islands and Afghanistan. In the light of these experiences, the armed forces are being reconfigured and updated. In a parallel move, the country's international aid budget is also receiving a new regional emphasis.

Via bodies such as the South Pacific Forum, The Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation group, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Five Power Defence Arrangement, New Zealand wants to work on regional solutions to regional problems. For Marshall, a good example of this philosophy in action is New Zealand's participation in the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. Another key security focus for New Zealand is disarmament and nonproliferation in the Pacific Rim region. The

deployment of New Zealand forces to Afghanistan and Iraq on both operational and humanitarian tasks is a recognition that there is a need for every nation to contribute to collective efforts in order to tackle threats to international security. The article concludes by restating New Zealand's primary commitment to regional issues, but also a desire to maintain contributions to collective action against international security threats.

Article	'Indonesia's Quiet Revolution'
Author	<i>Lex Rieffel, Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC</i>
Publication Details	<i>Foreign Affairs, September–October 2004, vol. 83, no. 5, pp. 98–110</i>

SYNOPSIS

Rieffel's article surveys the development of the *reformasi* program that began with the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998. The popular, largely media-inspired image of Indonesia is of a nation in turmoil. However, this article provides an account of the quiet overhaul of the political system that has laid the foundations for better governance in the world's fourth most populous country.

The article provides a detailed analysis of reforms to both the presidency and the political party system, and how these have played out in the recent series of national elections. There is also discussion on how the military's role in politics, while still important, has undergone significant change in the past six years. Despite a lack for support from President Megawati, key macroeconomic reforms have created a fragile stability that is threatened by old problems such as corruption and a deep, continuing economic malaise, which will present a significant challenge to the new government. However, Rieffel believes that, with continuing hard work on its fundamental economic problems, the political reform process and business confidence could become mutually reinforcing.

Notwithstanding the many dire social, economic and political problems faced by the new Indonesian Government, the author is optimistic that recent political reforms have done the groundwork for Indonesia to become a successful constitutional democracy. However, he also concludes that, without sufficient continuing momentum, especially in the economy, these reforms could stall and see Indonesia return to the endemic problems of the past.

Article	‘The Need for New International Rules’
Author	<i>Sir Crispin Tickell, Chancellor of the University of Kent and former British Permanent Representative to the United Nations</i>
Publication Details	<i>RUSI Journal, August 2004, vol. 149, no. 4, pp. 8–12</i>

SYNOPSIS

This article puts forward a practical case for reform of the United Nations (UN) and makes an appeal for the UN to retain the high ideals that gave birth to the organisation in 1945. As the British Permanent Representative from 1987 to 1990, Tickell was at the UN during a period in which Cold War confrontation was giving way to a mood of co-operation. He provides a very personal account of the changes and opportunities that he witnessed during this period, and records both the successes and failures that resulted. The willingness of the UN to use force to protect the international order demonstrated that the organisation’s Charter was still a potent tool. However, the challenges presented by environmental issues presented the UN with a new set of problems undreamt of by its founders.

Many of the problems facing the UN came to a head in the crisis over war with Iraq in 2003. This crisis has prompted a review of the UN’s institutions in an attempt to ensure that they remain relevant half a century after they were inaugurated. Tickell makes the point that many people place far too much faith in the ability of the UN to solve problems. This trust places more responsibility on the organisation than the UN can possibly carry. If these difficulties are to change, the UN must change too. The author sees that, whatever the changes made at the UN, they will have to provide the organisation with more power—political, financial and administrative—to fulfil the high ideals embedded in the Charter. The best way to achieve this result will be through an effective form of multilateralism, from which even the United States cannot stand aloof.

Article	'Individual Ambition: Creating the Need for Leadership', second place essay in the Hogaboom Leadership Writing Contest
Author	<i>1st Lieutenant J. Raymond Liebenguth, student at Naval Justice School, Rhode Island</i>
Publication Details	<i>Marine Corps Gazette, October 2004, vol. 88, no. 10, pp. 30–1</i>

SYNOPSIS

Lieutenant Liebenguth's short essay makes the point that ambition should be encouraged in military leaders. Recently, in the United States, ambition has been seen as a negative trait leading to such problems as the ENRON accounting fraud and other major corporate crimes. The US Marine Corps recognised fourteen leadership traits, but Liebenguth makes the case that, in order to be successful, a leader also needs ambition. However, his definition of ambition is one in which moral values balance the personal drive of the individual. Leaders should be builders who perpetuate their own qualities in those who come after them.

Article	'Machines, the Military, and Strategic Thought'
Author	<i>Colonel Antonio M. Lopez, Colonel Jerome J. Comello, Lieutenant Colonel William H. Cleckner, all US Army (Retd)</i>
Publication Details	<i>Military Review, September–October 2004, vol. LXXXIV, no. 5, pp. 71–7</i>

SYNOPSIS

The authors—professors of computer science, military studies and operations research respectively—provide an interesting exploration of functional network-centric operations. They ask: 'in which ways can developments from the study of Artificial Intelligence aid the military and strategic realms?' Their answer: Intelligent Agents—smart programs that build on the metadata implicit in World Wide Web pages to sort and evaluate incoming information, automatically minimising overload for the analyst or policy maker.

By mixing historical cases and future predictions, the authors lay out how intelligent software agents take over the first-level processing of data into useable information, and thence into 'knowledge'. As the authors point out:

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Recently, the military has used computers in smart weaponry and battlefield digitization. The military can now think differently by adapting intelligent-agent technology to support military thinking at a much higher level of thought than ensuring bombs are on target or knowing unit battlefield locations.

Couched in Clausewitzian terms, the article describes how to attack the centre-of-gravity strength of the postmodern enemy—their dispersed, networked connections—by using data-mining and pattern recognition applications dipping into email exchanges, finance transactions or people movements.

For example, the intelligent software could be programmed to know organisational relationships between the CIA and the FBI, ensuring that the right jurisdictions and notifications were addressed as suspicious patterns emerged in the data-stream. The model described in the article also allows for the evaluation and discernment of ‘knowledge’ implicit in an Effects-based Operations methodology.