



# Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected readings from the world's military journals

Issue No. 29  
April 2005

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Compiled by:



## **The CA's Introduction**

**Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.**



## **Editor's Note**

**The Land Warfare Studies Centre will be conducting the 2005 Rowell Profession of Arms Seminar on 23 June at the Telstra Theatre in the Australian War Memorial. Further details of the seminar are attached to this edition of the SOPD.**

# REGISTRATION FORM

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# Rowell Seminar 2005

**Confronting Asymmetry: Military Conflict  
in the Early 21st Century**

**Telstra Theatre,  
Australian War Memorial  
Thursday, 23 June 2005**





The Australian Army  
Land Warfare Studies Centre  
presents the third annual  
Rowell Profession of Arms Seminar

Confronting Asymmetry: Military Conflict  
in the Early 21st Century

Telstra Theatre  
Australian War Memorial  
Thursday, 23 June 2005

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**0745** Registration

**0830–0845** Welcome Address by Chief of Army

**0845–0930** Keynote Speaker

Mr Max Boot, Senior Fellow, National Security Studies,  
US Council on Foreign Relations  
*'Small Wars and the American Strategic Tradition'*

**0930–1015** Dr Coral Bell, Australian National University  
*'Asymmetric Wars'*

**1015–1045** Morning Tea

**1045–1130** Ms Marites Vitug, Editor-in-Chief,  
*Newsbreak* magazine, The Philippines  
*'The Threat of Terror in South-East Asia'*

**1130–1230** Mr Nick Warner, Department of  
Foreign Affairs and Trade  
*'The Australian Experience in the Solomon Islands: The DFAT  
Perspective'*

**1230–1330** Lunch

**1330–1415** Assistant Commissioner Ben McDevitt,  
Australian Federal Police  
*'The Australian Experience in the Solomon Islands:  
The AFP Perspective'*

**1415–1510** Panel Session

Ms Margaret Thomas, AUSAID  
LTCOL John Frewen, Australian Army  
*'The Australian Experience in the Solomon Islands: Other  
Government Agencies Acting in Supporting Role'*

**1510–1530** Afternoon Tea

**1530–1645** Mr Duncan Lewis,  
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet  
*'Emerging Security Structures for a Time of Uncertainty'*

**1645–1700** Closing Address by Chief of Army

<b>Article</b>	<b>‘Military Cultural Education’</b>
<b>Author</b>	Colonel Maxie McFarland
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Military Review</i> , vol. LXXXV, no. 2, March–April 2005, pp. 62–69.

## SYNOPSIS

This article addresses the issue of cultural education as part of professional military development from a United States (US) Army perspective. In the past decade, the US Army has engaged in lengthy overseas deployments in which mission performance demanded significant interface with culturally different populations. While noting that this type of deployment is nothing new, the author suggests that the end of the Cold War forced a new paradigm on prevailing ideas of national identity, increasing rather than decreasing the importance of cultural identity. This trend has in turn fuelled the potential for cross-cultural friction, making it imperative that all soldiers and leaders—military and civilian—appreciate the way in which societal and cultural norms operate and function.

McFarland begins by taking a broadly accepted definition of culture as the ‘origins, values, roles, and material items associated with a particular group.’ Noting that everyone has a culture that shapes how they see others, the world and themselves, he suggests that there are two levels of cultural education required for the modern military. At the base level is cultural literacy, which is about understanding individual cultural patterns and knowing one’s own cultural norms, and how these affect other cultures. More complex is the collective skill of cultural competency, which is the capacity to work with a different culture or cultures. These skills include managing groups from different cultures and organising activities for communities of mixed cultural origins. The author notes that these skills are not those associated with traditional military leadership but that the demands of future operations require even conventional forces to have the cross-cultural qualities traditionally associated with Special Forces.

The acknowledged challenge is the sheer diversity of the world’s cultures and while some training may be specifically targeted, it will be impossible to become wholly attuned to every culture of the United States’ potential friends and foes. The starting point, the author suggests, is to understand foundational cultural norms that have the greatest effect on military operations. Understanding patterns of communication styles, verbal and non-verbal; attitudes to conflict; approaches to competing tasks; different decision-making styles; attitudes towards personal disclosure; and approaches to knowledge and information could provide a framework for more general cultural-awareness education across all ranks. As well as studying cultural syndromes that provide a general frame of reference, the author identifies a number of specific areas where cultural studies might be focused.

Because cultural expertise takes time to develop, he acknowledges that there is a need to broaden the current programs and begin this type of education at entry point,

allowing sustained exposure and a whole-of-career approach for both soldier and officer. These studies could then more fully address the key factors that influence communication, including religion, tribal affiliation and nationalism. The author concludes that cultural education is not a new subject or issue; it is, however, a growing concern in the globalised world. By expanding its educational base to include general and targeted education and introducing cultural issues into training, the US Army will better prepare its soldiers and leaders for the challenges ahead.

<b>Article</b>	<b>‘Urban Warfare: A Soldier’s View’</b>
<b>Author</b>	Major General Robert H. Scales, US Army (Retd)
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Military Review</i> , vol. LXXXV, no. 1, January–February 2005, pp. 9–18.

### SYNOPSIS

Major General Scales begins by stating that the culture of the American Defense establishment is a ‘big-war culture’. Strategic threats were met with large-scale expenditure on ‘big-ticket’ programs. He points out that both during the Cold War and after, the US military has been involved in ‘unpleasantly real’ wars in complex terrain that neutralise the US technological advantage. He argues that close combat is a manpower-intensive activity that technology can make safer and more efficient. A fresh ‘bottom-up’ perspective is needed to provide infantry soldiers with the knowledge, technology and organisation that will enhance their close-combat effectiveness in complex urban terrain. Scales outlines eleven initiatives to help close-combat soldiers to ‘win and survive in direct tactical engagements’. These include:

**Knowledge of the enemy.** Such knowledge can be gained by using technology to identify all the threats in the immediate area. Soldiers need a means to access and filter all sources of information—strategic to tactical—that are relevant to their immediate area.

**Maintaining contact.** The officers of units in close combat need technology that allows them to see their soldiers ‘virtually’. Such a system would ideally provide a way to keep track of every soldier’s position as well as information on their emotional and physical condition. Scales argues that such technology will allow leaders to better select who should undertake different tasks.

**Signature Reduction.** The US advantage in night operations is being eroded. Scales argues that there is a need for soldiers to have an advantage over ‘a broader span of the sensor spectrum from visible light to infrared’.

**Close-in Killing.** Soldiers must have the same overwhelming dominance in killing as other force elements such as armour and artillery. The infantryman needs new small arms that are ‘highly lethal’ and easy to use in confined urban spaces. Scales gives the example of a ‘soldier-portable weapon that can be detonated over the enemy’s head’.

**Protection.** The author believes that too many infantrymen die because they have inadequate protection. He argues that the best protection is knowledge. A soldier who knows what is around the next corner or who is inside a building ‘needs little additional protection’.

**Tactical Medicine.** While the rate of survival for soldiers wounded in combat has increased markedly, Scales argues that more can be done in this area. He assesses the US centre of gravity as ‘dead Americans’; it is therefore important to improve the capacity of small and often isolated groups of soldiers to preserve life.

**Physical, intellectual and psychological fitness.** Greater attention is needed in selecting, bonding, and psychologically and physically preparing soldiers for close combat so that they can cope with the stresses of the urban battlefield. Scales believes that the biological sciences have a greater role to play in creating soldiers with good self-knowledge and small teams that are highly cohesive.

**Cultural Awareness.** Soldiers need knowledge of how the enemy thinks and acts. Scales advocates language training and thorough acculturation before deployment.

**Training.** While good training is central to the success of today’s force, Scales argues that the US military cannot afford to be complacent. The ability to move from close combat to providing humanitarian assistance and social services demands a more sophisticated infantryman. Such an individual is unlikely to come from a training system based on mass production.

**Small-unit effectiveness.** Time is critical to cohesion. Small combat teams must have the opportunity to develop fully. Scales suggests that such development will require at least a year.

**Supply.** As technology has become more complex, the non-technological stressors on combat soldiers have grown. According to Scales, soldiers in Iraq carry far heavier loads than the soldiers of World War II. Today’s soldier needs a new means of supply.

The article concludes that paying more attention to those soldiers who actually do the close-in fighting will have positive strategic consequences.


<b>Article</b>	<b>‘From Here to There’</b>
<b>Author</b>	P. H. Liotta and Richmond M. Lloyd
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Naval War College Review</i> , vol. 58, no. 2, Spring 2005, pp. 121–37.

## SYNOPSIS

Dr Liotta is the executive director of the Pell Center for International Relations and Policy, Salve Regina University, Newport, Rhode Island, and Dr Lloyd is a Professor at the US Naval War College, also at Rhode Island. In this paper they offer both a framework and a tool for understanding and addressing the linked concepts of strategy and force planning. Underpinning their approach is the dichotomy between the

scarcity of resources and balancing this with ends, means and risks. Their top-down approach seeks to provide a structured way of answering a series of fundamental strategic questions: What do we want to do? How do we plan to do it? What are we up against? What is available to do it? What are the mismatches? and Why do we want to do it?

**FIGURE 1  
STRATEGY AND FORCE PLANNING FRAMEWORK**



While acknowledging the inherent uncertainties in strategic planning, the authors suggest that those involved in formulating strategy must employ some form of rational approach in considering the numerous planning elements. In this way it may be possible to make more timely and informed judgments on complex strategic and force structure choice issues:

In presenting this framework, our purposes are to provide a tool for understanding the fundamental concepts of strategy and force planning and to offer a systematic approach to organizing a decision maker's thinking. The framework could variously be used as a guide to developing alternative strategies and future forces; as an aid to evaluating the arguments of strategists or force planners; and as a starting point for developing alternative approaches to structuring major force-planning decisions.

<b>Article</b>	<b>'How Has War Changed Since the End of the Cold War?'</b>
<b>Author</b>	Colin S. Gray
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Parameters</i> , Vol. XXXV, No. 1, Spring 2005, pp. 14–25.

### SYNOPSIS

In this article Professor Colin Gray, the Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, examines the question of what has changed in the nature of war since the end of the Cold War. He does this by essentially addressing what has not changed. Gray examines this central question from the perspective of the United States and the contemporary challenges of the transformation of the US military.

In Gray's assessment, less has changed than some commentators and theorists claim. He warns that predictions that the very nature of war has changed are erroneous and suggests that, if war's nature has changed, then it is no longer war. Gray points to the classical theorists such as Clausewitz, Sun-Tzu and Thucydides and suggests that the great Prussian's four elements of the 'climate of war' ('danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance'), combined with Clausewitzian 'friction', his 'remarkable trinity', and his emphasis on the moral qualities, still define war's enduring nature. Therefore, while it is important to focus on changes in the character of war, it is scarcely less vital to appreciate that the nature of war has not fundamentally changed.

Gray suggests failure to appreciate that there is more to war than combat has led the United States to accept that military victory over third-rate enemies is somehow an end in itself. Instead, he argues that the United States should be seeking the real objective of a better peace. Furthermore, while the contemporary trend in operations is running for inter-communal and transnational ethnic and religious strife, this trend is not new, nor should it be considered a permanent change, especially as these types of conflicts have occurred whenever empires and federations dissolve. The rise of religiously motivated terrorism has introduced a radical change in the contemporary security environment. However, Gray warns that the United States should be wary of assuming that its opponents over the past fifteen years and the types of missions that its forces have conducted represent some permanent change. The balance of power currently resides with the United States but this is not a permanent state of affairs. Gary believes that major interstate war is perhaps only 'enjoying an off-season'; it has not disappeared. In part, this trend may be due to the delegitimisation of war, brought about by the influence of the global media.

Gray has four key caveats on the degree of confidence that can be applied to predictions about the strategic future. These caveats are:

- the overriding and enduring importance of context when attempting to divine changes in the character of war;

- the perils of single-scenario planning;
- the uncertainty inherent in trend analysis; and
- the inability to predict the future with any degree of confidence.

The first caveat points to the enduring political, social, cultural and technological factors that shape the way in which war is employed as an instrument of policy. Gray suggests that, although there is the temptation to read contemporary trends in warfare as heralding momentous and radical change, the character of war continues to be shaped more by these political, social and strategic contexts than by more superficial changes inherent to military science. This issue leads directly to his second caveat, which addresses the unpredictability of the future. He warns that nations that base their defence policy on single contingencies risk being surprised by a future that does not conform to their careful plans. Gray gives the example of the Germans in the two world wars and says that US efforts at transformation may risk developing capabilities that prove irrelevant to unanticipated challenges. The third caveat also relates to prediction and reinforces the general unreliability of trend analysis as a guide to the future. The author suggests the strategic future is driven by consequences of visible trends. However, these trends interact in unpredictable ways that can trigger non-linear developments. His final caveat warns that we should be careful in assuming that contemporary theorists and officials are any better than their predecessors at predicting future threats.

<b>Article</b>	<b>‘Who Won the Battle of Fallujah?’</b>
<b>Author</b>	Jonathan F. Keiler
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Proceedings</i> , vol. 131, January 2005, pp. 57–61.

### SYNOPSIS

This article analyses the US military experience in the Battle for Fallujah—a battle lost in April 2004 and won in November 2004. The author sees the drawn-out process of establishing security in medium-sized cities such as Fallujah as the future of Marine Corps operations, and reflects on implications for US doctrine and TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures).

Following the ambush, murder and mutilation of four US contractors, Operation *Valiant Resolve*, led by 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, sought to capture and punish the insurgents responsible. The initial moves, on 5 April 2004, ran contrary to Marine doctrine, which calls for isolating the city prior to operations and overwhelming superiority during operations. A lack of troop concentration on the ground was supposed to be compensated for by increased firepower. However, Marine commanders were wary of collateral damage and the Marine force only secured a foothold in the industrialised outer suburbs of the city. By May, a political ‘resolution’ led to the formation of the Iraqi Fallujah Brigade to replace the Marines, widely perceived as a defeat of US forces and policy. The insurgents declared victory,

reinforced and rearmed themselves, and used Fallujah as a ‘stronghold and base for kidnappings, murders, and attacks that would cost the coalition dearly in the following months’.

In November 2004, a combined Marine – Army – Iraqi force of six battalions set about establishing control over a significantly depopulated Fallujah in Operation *al-Fajr*. Coalition casualties were 59 dead and 425 seriously wounded, with approximately 1200 insurgents killed. The author notes the high rate of US wounded that returned to duty—approaching 45 per cent. This casualty rate highlights how US policy accepts ‘considerable casualties to spare civilians and infrastructure and to appease the American and international media’. Of most concern is the moral and propaganda value that the insurgents gained from the first battle of Fallujah and the associated loss of morale and prestige that the Marines suffered. The author quotes one US official as saying, ‘The handwriting is on the wall. The Battle of Fallujah was not a defeat—but we cannot afford many more victories like it’.

<b>Article</b>	<b>‘The Guard and Reserve in America’s New Missions’</b>
<b>Author</b>	Frank G. Hoffman
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Orbis</i> , vol. 49, no. 2, Spring 2005, pp. 213–28.

### SYNOPSIS

The author, a Research Fellow of the United States (US) Marine Corps’ Centre for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, examines the role of the National Guard and Army Reserve in America’s Global War on Terror. He suggests that it is time to review the deep-rooted assumptions about the organisation of the institutions that make up the nation’s security system, particularly as the design and internal processes of these institutions are crucial to the preparation and conduct of the military’s missions against its new enemies.

While the author fully acknowledges the substantial contribution of America’s part-time forces in previous and current operations, he suggests that the strains on these institutions began to appear in the 1990s, and have now reached breaking point. He cautions, however, that simply increasing the size of the army is not the answer. There are, he observes, substantial barriers to this approach, and the answer to the problem is not in numbers alone. Rather, he observes that it is the absence of a grand strategy that identifies clear and achievable goals (matching ‘ends and means’) that can guide the integrated application of all elements of US power in pursuit of the nation’s interests. The effect of this lack of a grand strategy has been to stretch the military ‘to the edge’.

Hoffman then discusses the four schools dominating US strategic debate that will guide the use of the military and its capabilities including the roles, missions and tasks

of the reserves. He refers to these schools by the titles of the military revolutionaries, the classical republicans, the traditionalists and democratic globalists. While each of these schools has strong support, each also has limitations. These limitations are a product of the contemporary military context, which demands from military forces new domestic and global missions. The author believes that any proposal to alter the Reserve Component is bound to experience resistance from the supporters of all four schools of thought. However, any proposal concerning the Reserves must be cognisant of three enduring factors:

- The links between the Reserve and the public must be maintained.
- Proposals must recognise the concrete and cost-effective contribution that the Reserve system makes to national security.
- Proposals for changing the Reserves must acknowledge the uncertainties of the future.

From this foundation Hoffman proposes the types of missions to which the Reserve Component will need to contribute and for which it must be structured. In the first instance, the Reserve will have to continue to maintain a capacity to conduct ‘traditional’ warfighting, but without the luxury of formal mobilisation. The structure needed for this capability is a ‘strategic reserve’ of about five divisions, including a balanced set of focused-manoeuvre brigades (five each of heavy, medium and light). The second task to which the Reserve Component should contribute is stability operations and constabulary missions. The nature and frequency of these missions dictate that the designated organisations will have to be trained and equipped primarily for this role. To meet this need the author suggests a Reserve division comprising three to four Stability Enhancement Brigades. The third task is homeland security, for which he foresees some Reserve participation, but this will substantially be a task for the National Guard. Homeland security is an ideal task for the Guard and would need a total of three divisions, consisting of twelve Security Enhanced Brigades.

Hoffman concludes the article by stating that national defence is not a permanent structure. The US military has to be prepared to adapt, consistent with changes in strategic policy. To this end the author suggests that it is time to refocus attention on the role of the Reserve and Guard in order to meet the contemporary security challenges.

<b>Article</b>	<b>‘From My Bookshelf’</b>
<b>Author</b>	General Peter J. Schoomaker
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Military Review</i> , vol. LXXXV, no. 2, January–February 2005, pp. 80–3.

### SYNOPSIS

In this reading list, the Chief of Staff of the US Army provides the titles of twenty-five books that he believes can help to ‘develop confidence, military knowledge,

habits of reflection and intellectual growth' in military professionals. The list is subdivided into titles most applicable for Field Grade Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers, and one for Senior Leaders (above Brigade). The titles selected span subjects such as military history, operations and military theory, and leadership, as well as areas such as globalisation and terrorism. The titles listed in *Military Review* are a synopsis of the full professional reading lists available at <http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/reference/CSAList/list1.htm>.

<b>Article</b>	<b>'Armour in Urban Terrain: The Critical Edge'</b>
<b>Author</b>	Major General Peter Chiarelli and Majors Patrick Michaelis and Geoffrey Norman, 1st Cavalry Division, US Army
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Armor</i> , vol. 114, issue 2, March–April 2005, pp. 7–12.

## SYNOPSIS

This article is based on the experiences of Task Force (TF) Baghdad fighting against the militia of Shia cleric, Muqtada Al Sadr in Al Tharwa, Sadr City and An Najaf during the periods April to June and August to October 2004. The authors believe that the experiences recorded in the article should be a caution to those who believe the notion that heavy armour can be removed from the US Army's inventory as it adjusts its operational focus from manoeuvre warfare to an urban warfare context.

The authors relate how in Al Tharwa the armoured TFs were able to adapt standard US Army combined-arms doctrine to the challenges of operating in the alleys of the Iraqi urban environment. The main antitank weapons of the insurgents were disabled civilian vehicles, used as obstacles, and command-detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

The TF evolved a tactical formation in which mixed columns of A1A2 tanks and M2A3 fighting vehicles, moving in a box formation at speeds between 3 and 5 mph, could maximise the protection of the column against the enemy threat. Diagrams in the text illustrate the tactical formations adopted. The diagrams also indicate how the formation adopted was able to maximise the direct fires of the armoured vehicles. A number of vehicle upgrades—principally, sights and target acquisition systems—allowed the columns to achieve 360° coverage of the constantly changing urban battlespace.

In An Najaf, the terrain—a massive Moslem cemetery—dictated that the TF employ different tactics against the same enemy. The new formation for a combined arms patrol was an A1A2 and an M2A3 working abreast of each other, and an M1114 HMMWV trailing the armoured vehicles. The typical engagement for the TF in An Najaf was an ambush supported by IEDs, mines, small arms, mortars and RPGs. The tanks would often precede the Bradley in order to absorb the first shock of the ambush. The formation was mutually supporting, with the Bradley using its machine gun to protect the tank from attacks from elevated positions aimed against vulnerable

areas on its turret and deck. In other situations, tanks would lead the patrol with infantry mounted in M1114s acting as a reserve force. In all of the fighting the TF operated 'buttoned up' in order to avoid casualties from grenade attacks.

The article concludes by listing the characteristics that enabled the TF to operate successfully in the close-combat conditions of urban terrain. These were:

- adaptable leadership,
- confidence in its equipment,
- independent sights on its vehicles,
- the use of points of domination,
- the ability to create stand-off situations in close terrain, and
- the ability to create and take advantage of interior lines because of the formations adopted.

<b>Article</b>	<b>'Iraq: Italian Lessons Learned'</b>
<b>Author</b>	Riccardo Cappelli, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, University of Florence
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Military Review</i> , vol. LXXXV, no. 2, March–April 2005, pp. 58–61.

### SYNOPSIS

Cappelli's article details the experiences of the Italian forces operating as part of the US-led coalition in Iraq's southern Dhi Qhar province. The Italians faced the Madhi Army of Muqtada Al Sadr in the city of Nasiriyah. In a battle on 5 April 2004, 600 Italians were attacked by insurgents when their mechanised column came in sight of the Euphrates River. The Italians were mounted in a variety of vehicles, including the Centauro armoured reconnaissance vehicle equipped with 105 mm cannon, VCCs (a version of the M113) and soft-skinned VM-90P.

During the battle, which revolved around the crossing of three bridges, the insurgents fired over 400 RPG rounds. However, the Italian casualties were light due to the poor handling of RPGs by the insurgents, who engaged at distances that did not allow the grenades time to arm properly. Many RPGs also failed to detonate due to poor maintenance. Throughout the battle the insurgents received a constant flow of reinforcements, ammunition resupply and even used ambulances from the city hospital to take away their wounded. The insurgents were also frequently intermingled with women and children, making target acquisition and discrimination difficult, especially as the Italians lacked any air-reconnaissance assets, such as UAVs. The Italian helicopters were vulnerable to ground fire; therefore the force also lacked any form of air support. In the course of the battle, between 0600 and 1500, the

Italians expended 30 000 rounds of ammunition—a rate that had required resupply five times during the fighting. The final casualties were fifteen Italian dead, with estimates of the insurgent death toll ranging between fifteen and two hundred.

The lessons learnt from this and other major engagements included the observation by the author that Italy needs to spend more money in order to equip its soldiers to fight in urban environments. The list of equipment needed includes UAVs, more observation devices, tanks, combat helicopters and self-propelled artillery. As Cappelli notes, reducing firepower does not help the peace process: the issue is *how* the force is used, not its equipment. He also makes the case that the Italians require an armoured personnel carrier with more protection than that provided by the current M113 variant. The experience in Iraq has also underlined the need for an armoured, subsonic aircraft to provide air support in urban operations. In matters of doctrine and standard operating procedures, the Italian forces need to revise their existing practices in the light of their operational experiences in Iraq. Finally, the author believes that Italy's armed forces must launch an information campaign to alert Italian politicians to both the potential and limitations of military forces as an instrument of policy.