



Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected Readings from the World's Military Journals

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The CA's Introduction

Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "A. H. H." followed by a long, sweeping underline.

Editor's Note

Please note that the next issue of the SOPD will be published in June 2003.

Article Title	‘Transformation or stagnation? Rethinking Australia’s Defence’
Author	Alan Dupont
Publication Details	<i>Australian Journal of International Affairs</i> , vol. 57, no. 1, April 2003, pp. 55-76.

Synopsis

This article is one of the clearest critiques of Australian strategic orthodoxy yet written. The author is a senior fellow in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. He argues that the Defence Minister, Senator Robert Hill has clearly identified the fact that in a globalised world ‘geostrategic considerations should no longer define Australia’s military posture and priorities’. He suggests that traditional strategic thinkers have resisted this view and wish to focus strategic planning on conventional threats to Australian sovereignty. He points out that in our current and likely strategic environment the threat of invasion or raids is highly improbable.

Dupont’s central thesis is that Australia’s defence strategy is rooted in the past and that it continues to give insufficient weight to transnational threats such as ecological breakdown, population issues, transnational crime, apocalyptic terrorism, disease and competition for resources. He considers which states might seek to threaten Australia and concludes that the risk is minimal. In any case, he points out that such a deterioration in our regional security situation would involve a major conflagration that would draw a response from the US.

Perhaps most significantly, he points out that the challenge of conducting complex operations across the spectrum of tasks required of the ADF means that forces need to be prepared not only to win wars, but also to guarantee the peace. He concludes

that Australia's security challenges differ little from those of other pluralist, open societies:

In fact, the probability of the ADF being deployed on complex peace keeping, nation building and low intensity warfare tasks is arguably greater because we live in a part of the world where failed states, weak states and hostile non-state actors are an integral part of the strategic landscape. Virtually all Western forces have accepted the reality that they must become smaller, multi-skilled, less platform oriented and able to deploy highly capable forces, quickly over long distances . . .

Article Title	'Australian for Alliance'
Author	Paul Kelly
Publication Details	<i>The National Interest</i> , Spring 2003, Issue 71, pp. 87 – 94.

Synopsis

Paul Kelly, editor-at-large of *The Australian* newspaper, begins by posing the question of "what does it mean for a middle-sized regional power to be a friend and ally of the United States in the 21st Century?" He casts a sceptical eye over recent events that have divided global and Australian opinion on whether America is a benign hegemon or rampant imperial hyperpower. Kelly contrasts the invocation of the ANZUS treaty and the warm intimacy between John Howard and George W. Bush with widespread public opposition to military intervention in Iraq. This opposition was fuelled by the lack of UN Security Council endorsement and by the fear that Australia has become a prime terrorist target through its alliance with the US.

The US is clearly Australia's most important international relationship, and, as the author points out, the ANZUS alliance has been assumed by its architects and their successors to be about American help for Australia's national security. This reversal of presumption has sparked debate on several critical areas of the alliance relationship:

- Are there dangers and costs of joining US coalitions?
- Do alliance actions undermine the Australian regional security environment?
- Can the US play constructive international-system leadership roles?
- Will those roles be helpful or harmful to junior allies?

Kelly goes on to examine the re-interpretation of the ANZUS alliance, given that it was founded on the threat of "the common enemy of Asian communism." He identifies three basic themes to be addressed:

1. Is America prepared to accommodate the rise of China and work to integrate it into a constructive Sino-American framework, given Australia's place in Asia and the importance of China as an Australian market?
2. How will the US pursue its struggle with Islamic terrorism, through unilateral military approaches (hard power) or methods inclusive of multilateral and diplomatic means (soft power)?
3. How will the ANZUS alliance be relevant to an Australia that exists in a Southeast Asian region with Islamic terrorism both endemic and growing?

The author pares these issues, looking for the complex interactions underlying each. Firstly, he focuses on the threat of

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reaction and over-reaction between the US, China and Taiwan and the broad economic and political implications for Australia. Secondly, Kelly points to divergence between Australian and US national interests, such as the need for a vibrant and functional international system. Lastly, since the exposure of Jemaah Islamiyah as a force in the region, Kelly looks to the need to address the problems and sensitivities of nations like Indonesia, the key regional factor in Australia's security environment.

The author concludes by highlighting the role that junior partners can play in shaping the policy direction of the major party in a strong alliance relationship. In a city like Washington, where the domestic voices are loud and many, the opinions of the wider world can be drowned out. Yet Australia, with much capital in the wake of Iraq is in a position to try to shape US policy. The key is to use our position and influence in a way that yields benefits to Australian national interests and our regional affairs.

Article Title	'The Military Lessons of Operation Iraqi Freedom'
Author	Michael P. Noonan
Publication Details	Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, http://www.fpri.org/enotes , 1 May 2003

Synopsis

The author, Deputy Director of the Program on National Security, examines the early military lessons of *Operation Iraqi Freedom*. He points out that the 2003 operation was remarkable because it took half as long as *Operation Desert Storm* with about a third as many troops and accomplished a far grander goal than that of 1991. The lessons learned from the 2003

campaign will drive transformation across the US services, determining the types and numbers of forces required over the next decade.

Noonan concentrates on the 'macro-level' lessons of *Operation Iraqi Freedom* weighing them against such theories of war as information operations, effects-based operations and rapid decisive operations. Immediate lessons are seven in number:

- 1. Synergy of effects and speed of transition are vital in the battlespace**
- 2. The spectrum of conflict requires multidimensional capabilities**
- 3. Concepts of autonomous and centralised operations should replace categories of conventional and unconventional operations that have effectively blurred**
- 4. Improved education is needed for sound-decision making in autonomous missions**
- 5. US forces must become more expeditionary and more deployable**
- 6. Full-spectrum operations are labour-intensive**
- 7. Iraq was an industrial-age enemy whose most effective fighters were irregulars**

- 1. Synergy of effects and speed of transition are vital in the battlespace:** there was a remarkable evolution in combined operations and jointness from operations undertaken earlier – even from those in Afghanistan in 2001-02. Air-ground coordination, special operations forces (SOF)-main force cooperation and the application of both rapid manoeuvre/precision strike and close combat techniques demonstrated synergy of effects. When Coalition tactics were countered by Iraqi forces, there was rapid transition by Coalition forces to new and innovative methods. A good example of this speed in transition was that of Iraqi troops

learning to avoid SOF-directed aerial precision strike by detecting vapour trails and then digging in, only to be pounded into submission by 105mm howitzers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

2. **The spectrum of conflict requires multidimensional capabilities:** Operation Iraqi Freedom confirmed that the US military must be able to perform with multidimensional skill across the spectrum of conflict and be able to transition quickly from warfighting to peacekeeping. The V Corps commander, Lieutenant General William Wallace is quoted: *‘one day our troops are kicking down doors and the next they’re passing out Band-Aids. And in some cases they’re kicking down doors without really knowing if they are going to have to pull a trigger or pass out a Band-Aid on the other side’.*
3. **Concepts of autonomous/centralised operations should replace conventional/unconventional operations that have effectively blurred:** in Operation Iraqi Freedom, nearly eight per cent of the force package in theatre was SOF. It is thus better to conceive of operations as either autonomous or centralised rather than as conventional or unconventional. Autonomous operations require smaller, well-equipped forces such as SOF that concentrate on achieving effects beyond their organic size. Centralised operations, involving main force units, on the other hand, still rely more on mass and stricter command and control. Noonan comments, *‘in the current strategic environment, both types of operations serve their purposes. Although this will continue to be the case going into the future, economy of force considerations and the combined arms synergies of our forces will most likely favour more autonomous units’.*
4. **Improved education is needed for sound-decision making in autonomous missions:** this will be essential for officers and senior NCOs to be able to discriminate the important from the trivial in the deluge of information that permeates

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Gulf War, but rather the shift in world power towards American unipolarity, a shift that is incompatible with the way the UN is expected to work. Glennon comments that in 2003, *'with the dramatic rupture of the UN Security Council, it became clear that the grand attempt to subject the use of force to the rule of law has failed'*.

The UN Security Council has fallen prey to geopolitical forces that are far too strong for any legalist institution to withstand. In 2003, the question facing the UN was not whether the use of force was lawful, but whether it was wise. The fate of the Security Council was sealed long before President Bush's accusation that the UN would, if it failed to deal with Iraq, *'fade into history as an ineffective, irrelevant debating society'*. The rise of American unipolarity, the Bush Doctrine and the new US doctrine of preemption have displaced the multipolar global order in favour of American unipolar power. It was this shift in geopolitics that led, for example, to France's attempt to turn Europe into a counterweight to the United States. China, Germany and Russia too have little desire to acquiesce to the dictates of US power.

There are also cultural differences at work over the use of force. Many Americans reject supranationalism on the European Union model and there was no effective international law forbidding intervention in either Kosovo or Iraq. States pursue security by pursuing power. France, Russia and China used the UN Security Council because it afforded them veto power; the US ignored the Security Council because it interfered with its unipolar interests. The Council became the arena for great power politics on a new 21st century model. Glennon comments, *'the truth, therefore, is that the Security Council's fate never turned on what it did or did not do on Iraq. American unipolarity had already debilitated the Council, just as bipolarity paralysed it during the Cold War'*.

For France, the Security Council was a weapon in trying to impose multipolarity to check US power. The real failure of the Security Council, was based on geopolitics not law. We are seeing the workings of political realism in a new era in which the principle of sovereign equality disables the UN in dealing with emerging crises such as WMD and the denial of human rights. There is every possibility that in future, ad hoc international coalitions will replace UN mandates and that the UN will go the way of the League of Nations. In the end, *'nations will continue to disagree on when force should be used. Like it or not, that is the way of the world'*.

Article Title	'The Responsibility to Protect'
Author	Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun
Publication Details	<i>Foreign Affairs</i> , November-December 2002, vol. 81, no. 6, pp. 99-110.

Synopsis

This article suggests that the debate over the emerging principle of humanitarian intervention needs to be reframed as a positive 'responsibility to protect' that is vested in the international community. The authors are Gareth Evans, the President and CEO of the International Crisis Group and former Australian Foreign Minister and Mohamed Sahnoun, Special Adviser on Africa to the UN Secretary General. Together they co-chaired the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. This article presents the conclusions of the commission's report.

The authors argue for the existence of an emerging norm in international law – the responsibility of the international community to react to situations where there is a compelling need to protect the fundamental human rights of citizens. This duty may involve military intervention and is activated when a state fails in its fundamental sovereign responsibility of respecting the dignity and human rights of its own citizens.

To justify military intervention, the authors argue that six principles have to be satisfied. These principles are based on just war theory. The first of these is the ‘just cause’ threshold. This is crossed when a state has caused, or is likely to cause, large-scale loss of life by either intention or failure to act. It is also crossed when a state is involved in ‘ethnic-cleansing’ – however that is carried out. Four precautionary principles also apply. These are that for a military intervention to take place there needs to be a ‘right intention’, it needs to be a last resort, minimum military force should be employed to accomplish the purpose and there must be a reasonable prospect of success. Finally, there needs to be a ‘right authority’. Ideally this will be the Security Council of the UN. The authors acknowledge that this is problematic and warn that if the UN fails to act in a ‘conscience-shocking situation’ its status may be irreparably damaged. They hold the situation in Kosovo up as a model of inaction. This article was written before the War in Iraq, but some consideration of how these principles applied to that situation might be valuable for the reader.

Article Title *Future War/Future Battlespace: The Strategic Role of American Landpower*

Authors Steven Metz, Raymond A. Millen

Publication Details Strategic Studies Institute
Monograph, US Army War College,
Carlisle PA, March 2003,
<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/sfandec.html>

Synopsis

In this monograph, the authors, who are both senior researchers at the US Army's Strategic Studies Institute, argue that the Army's capabilities are essential in meeting the complex challenges of the contemporary global security environment. They conclude that we are witnessing a '*marked decline of large-scale state-on-state warfare and the rise of ambiguous, protracted indecisive conflict in complex environments*'. They also suggest that the international community has an interest in harnessing US military might and that accordingly, the US should '*adopt a broad spectrum strategy based on partnership and shared risks for long term national interests*'.

The monograph examines the threat posed by asymmetric methods of attack. The authors argue that aggressors will have to weigh the risks associated with using means that are considered unacceptable or illegitimate. However, non-state actors have been empowered by the ready availability of weapons of mass destruction and are prepared to use mass-casualty terrorism as a tool. The novel threat posed by non-state actors is that unlike traditional adversaries, they seek victory by avoiding defeat. This strategy poses a substantial challenge to conventional military forces.

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The authors argue that although the US Army prefers to fight rapid, decisive operations, it must become adept at ‘protracted, complex and asymmetric warfare’. The Army must do more than simple warfighting. It needs to cooperate with and provide security to coalition partners, other government agencies and non government organisations. The *Objective Force* model for the future army is a modular one that enables the Joint Force to deploy adaptable and flexible force packages. The authors envision land forces that combine strategic speed of reaction, decisive and precise actions, adaptability, coalition interoperability and the ability to sustain operations in protracted and complex conflicts.

Article Title	‘Winning Future Battles: Why the Infantry Must Change’
Author	Major Lloyd D. Freeman
Publication Details	<i>Marine Corps Gazette</i> , April 2003, vol. 87, no. 4, pp. 54-58.

Synopsis

The author invokes the performance of US Marine units in Afghanistan to argue that the changing nature of combat operations requires radical transformation of infantry units extending down to the squad level. Currently a student at the Naval Postgraduate School, Major Freeman had wide ranging experience as a company commander with a Marine expeditionary unit on operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan. He argues that given the combination of excellent communications and precision munitions on-call the traditional battalion/regiment structure is inflexible and inefficient.

'democracy is always thought of as the antithesis of empire, but one of the dramas of American power in the twenty-first century is that empire has become a precondition for democracy'.

After September 11, Americans like the Romans before them facing the Goths, were 'awakened to the barbarians' in the form of asymmetric terrorism. The struggle against barbarism is not new, but *'what is new is the connection between barbarian asymmetric methods and a global ideology, Islam, that provides a bottomless supply of recruits and allies for a global war'*. For the first time the American homeland is in the crossfire of antagonists who wish the Arab world to return to AD 640 and the time of the Prophet.

American empire in the post-Cold War world is inevitable not only because the US confronts global terrorism but because the world is also faced by post-colonial state disintegration. To maintain order, the US cannot escape acting. Its dilemma is the classic imperial one: balancing hubristic overreach with prudential caution. The illusion of America during the 1990s was the idea that the post-Cold War world could be governed successfully using the tools of the Cold War built by Churchill and Roosevelt. The reality today is that the US is the West's last military nation-state, an unwilling imperial power in a world of postmodern, postmartial nation-states stretching from Europe to Canada.