



Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected readings from the world's military journals

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CONTENTS

ROEs

US Army Transformation: A UK Perspective

The USMC and Seabasing

EBO Targets Ground Forces

Getting Serious about Iraq

Al-Qaeda: The Case of 'Ngruki Network' in Indonesia

'The Bush National Security Strategy: An Evaluation'

'Integrated warfighting: Toward a Joint Transformational Framework'

The CA's Introduction

Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "A. Lee", with a long, sweeping underline.

Editor's Note

Please note that the next issue of the SOPD in November 2002 will be the last for this year. Publication will resume in February 2003.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

Article Title 'ROE' Rhymes with 'We'

Author The Centre for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) and HQ Marine Corps Judge Advocate Division, International and Operational Law Branch (HQMC JA [JAO])

Publication Details *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol 86, No 9, September 2002

Synopsis

This brief article discusses the question of where the primary responsibility for the development of ROEs rests. The article puts forward the proposition that, in the USMC, the development of ROEs should be a task for both operators and Judge Advocates (JAs). However, there is a tendency for operational staff to abrogate their responsibility for developing ROEs to the lawyers, but in most cases ROEs are devised for a specific mission and the operations staff will have a much better idea of the commander's requirements. Indeed, in some cases ROEs may not require JA input at all- for example if a commander withholds the authority for using certain weapons systems for fear of escalating a conflict. At the other extreme ROEs are not just legal rules, but something that will influence the tactics and weapons systems used in the mission to achieve the commander's intent. The article concludes that the best way of developing effective ROEs is by close collaboration between the operations staff and the JAs. ROEs are the responsibility of 'we'.

Article Title US Army Transformation: The UK View

Author Colonel William Moore, Royal Artillery

Publication Details *Military Review*, Vol LXXXII, No3, May-June 2002

Synopsis

This article gives a British view of the US Army's transformation program. The author notes that the US transformation process is one of the more adventurous military programs in the world today. He believes that transformation is a logical program that will focus the US Army on rapid effect and deployability. The program also has minimal risk, as it

Senior Officer Professional Digest
improves the legacy force and maintains considerable warfighting capability, while building its interim and objective forces.

The transformation program is also holistic. It is not focussed on equipment at the expense of doctrine, but this wider focus is not being clearly communicated to allies, many of whom only see transformation as posing considerable barriers to interoperability. The US recognises that the future battlespace will be joint and shared with many other agencies. This requires a totally integrated approach in which the ability to conduct coalition operations will be important. However, the US needs to communicate its concepts to allies so that, even if they can't afford to keep up technologically, they understand what the US is doing. The UK shares many of the ideas upon which transformation is based, but the British approach is, by necessity, more incremental than that of the US. The British are attempting to identify key technologies and plan to introduce them progressively as they are proven to be viable – a process of evolution, rather than revolution.

The size of the UK Army will not allow it to develop niche capabilities. Thus light, medium and heavy forces will be 'packaged' and used appropriately across the spectrum of conflict. While the mechanism by which this will be achieved has yet to be determined, the author notes that the US and UK concepts are similar – only the ways and means differ. The article ends by noting that over reliance on technology in warfare is a great concern and that armed conflict has always been, and will remain, centred on issues of people and territory, tasks that demand the use of land forces. The author concludes, 'Killing at a distance using high-tech sensors linked to long-range weapons systems from all services against a matched enemy in a warfighting operations is an entirely logical solution. But even sophisticated enemies will not wish to subject themselves to such high-tech destruction and defeat, and technology might not have the desired effect on less sophisticated adversaries. We should be wary of analysts who say we can always win at a distance. History does not bear this out.'

Senior Officer Professional Digest

Article Title Marine Corps Warfighting Lab Looks and Seabasing

Author Colonel Vincent J. Goulding, USMC (Ret), strategic planner at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab

Publication Details *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol 86, No 9, September 2002

Synopsis

This article discusses the work that the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) has been doing on a concept called seabasing. While the MCWL normally works on tactical matters that directly concern the Marine ground task force (MAGTF), it has recently taken a broader focus and looked at operational matters that touch on joint and inter-service issues. Seabasing is one such issue and the author claims that if the MCWL gets this concept right it will 'be one of the most transformational things in the Department of Defence.'

Seabasing is not about platforms, but rather it is about manoeuvre and options. Linked in to the US Joint Forces Command's idea of Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO), seabasing builds on the USMC's traditional expeditionary ethos. RDO proposes that future operations will occur with little warning in theatres where the constraints will be political, geographical as well as hostile forces capable of opposing entry. RDO proposes that mission designed ships, both naval and commercial could be used in lieu of fixed land bases. Due to capabilities provided by vertical lift aircraft, mission designed ships could act as intermediate staging or advance bases that would reduce the vulnerability of the entry forces and also provide greater mobility, flexibility and inherent force protection to a joint force commander.

In 2004, Seabasing will be the subject of experimentation in OLYMPIC DRAGON 04 (OD 04). The experimentation process in OD 04 will test a range of emerging operational concepts, such as seabasing and ship-to-objective manoeuvre (STOM) and consider the C2 requirements for the Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB). The concept of Seabase operations has four essential characteristics:

- arrival and assembly at sea,

Senior Officer Professional Digest

- selective offload,
- indefinite sustainment and,
- the ability to reconstitute at sea.

The development of future platforms will be critical to the success of the Seabasing concept and the MCWL will use experimentation, modeling and simulation to translate the concept into a capability. The Seabasing concept aims to enable the USMC to use the oceans of the world as high-speed avenues of approach from which it will launch expeditionary operations. The USMC sees this concept as a major contribution to transformation and joint warfighting.

Article Title Air Power Targeting Theory: A Key Element in Transformation

Author Lieutenant Colonel Price T. Bingham, US Air Force (Ret)

Publication Details *Military Review*, Vol LXXXII, No. 3, May-June 2002

Synopsis

This article discusses the US Air Force's effects-based operations (EBO) as an important adjunct to transformation in the US Forces. As the author notes, EBO is little different from the functionally oriented targeting theory used by airmen in the WW2 strategic bombing campaigns. The idea behind this targeting theory is to create effects by making it impossible for a specific system to perform vital functions. The aim is to achieve effects across the whole system without causing total destruction. Compared to attrition-oriented targeting, which aims at massive destruction, the author says EBO has the potential to yield considerable advantages because it achieves the objective rapidly, without causing excessive casualties or collateral damage. Current interest in this targeting theory can be traced to the demonstrated ability of stealth and precision-guided munitions in the Gulf War and Kosovo, which overcame the problems of high losses and poor accuracy that handicapped strategic bombing in WW2. More recently, advances in technology seem to suggest that EBO has advantages over attrition for the targeting deployed land forces.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

In the context of US Defence Force transformation the potential of functionally oriented targeting is measured against five key requirements:

- Target identification – political economic or military nodes that perform vital tasks are selected and analysed on the basis of the effect created if they are destroyed;
- Target location – must be reliable and precise;
- Attack system survivability – requires acceptably low loss rates;
- Munitions – precision guided to avoid civilian casualties and collateral damage; and
- Assessment – rapid and reliable judgements on how targeted systems have been damaged.

There are many challenges in strategic targeting. Both the Gulf War and Kosovo demonstrated how counter-measures such as camouflage, deception and the use of mobility could make targeting difficult. An adversary's willingness to put hostages and civilians in target areas is another significant problem. However, technological developments in surveillance and targeting now have the potential to make EBO useful against the motorised transport used by conventional land forces. The mobility of such forces makes target location information perishable and unreliable and is an important factor in force protection. EBO theory and technologies have the potential to deny them mobility, thus disrupting their operational effectiveness. By targeting transport nodes (refuelling and repair centre or bridges and tunnels), EBO can stop 'militarily significant vehicular movement' and degrade or destroy the ability to conduct operations. Close battle may still be necessary, but the enemy will be disoriented and weakened.

Achieving these effects does not require the destruction of large numbers of vehicles. The author believes that paralysis of land operations can be achieved by the destruction of relatively few vehicles. The key is to create a widespread psychological perception of danger from air attack in the minds of soldiers – as occurred in WW2, the Gulf and Kosovo. Technologies such as JSTARS and the new multi platform – radar technology insertion program (MP-RTIP) now allow 24-hour all-weather targeting capability through C2ISR. JDAM with wind-corrected munitions dispenser systems can do the rest. The key to making these and other emerging technologies work in this way in through a functional theory of targeting in which key cause and effect relationships guide air operations against enemy ground forces.

Senior Officer Professional Digest
Article Title Getting Serious about Iraq

Authors Philip H. Gordon, Martin Indyk and Michael O' Hanlon

Publication Details *Survival*, Vol. 44, No. 3, Autumn 2002 pp. 9-22.

Synopsis

This article takes a clear-eyed look at the problems confronting the United States should it attempt to use military power to bring about regime change in Iraq. Written by three prominent Senior Fellows in Foreign Policy Studies at the influential Brookings Institution in Washington DC, they conclude that, while deposing the Ba'ath regime in Iraq is advisable, it will require a significant investment of resources. They distinguish the type of operation that is required from those that took place in Afghanistan and argue that the US and its military coalition partners would need to field forces 'large enough to defeat Iraq's military, unit by unit if necessary, while also establishing order throughout Baghdad and possible other cities'. Consequently the coalition will need to field significant land forces, including a large armoured component.

The authors argue that a military venture of this scale must have widespread international and regional support. It needs to be demonstrably legitimate and the US requires access to a full range of regional land, air and sea bases before commencing operations. To do this the US cannot develop its policy unilaterally, but must seek to involve the widest range of partners and should enlist the support of unequivocal United Nations Security Council resolutions.

Most significantly, the authors argue that to be worthwhile, any international coalition must be prepared to commit to the long-term reconstruction of Iraq—not only to undo the damage of war but to rectify the depredations of the Hussein Regime over the last twenty-three years. Toppling Saddam will remake the security dynamics of the Middle East in a similar manner to the restoration of Europe and Japan after the Second World War. Consequently, it is essential that a military victory would be followed by the more demanding responsibility of stabilising and rebuilding Iraq.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

Article Title Al-Quaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the 'Ngruki Network' in Indonesia

Author International Crisis Group

Publication Details Indonesia Briefing, Jakarta, 8 August 2002, www.crisis.web.org

Synopsis

This paper, published only a month before the terrorist attacks in Bali provides an excellent analysis of the origins and aims of the *jemaah islamiyah* in Indonesia. It examines the key figures in the network and their links to international radical islamic groups such as Al-Qu'aeda. It concludes, presciently, that while the proponents of radical terrorism are few, they can still do an immense amount of damage. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the network established by Abu Bakar Ba' Asyir and his colleagues at his religious school at Ngruki enjoys widespread support among legitimate political and religious groups who were previously in no way connected to Al-Qu'aeda. The Ngruki network, more popularly known as the *jemaah islamiyah* was radicalised by repression under the Suharto regime—consequently there is a very great danger that indiscriminate reaction to terrorist activity will build further support for its members.

Written before the Bali attacks, the report argues against the implementation of a repressive Internal Security Act. Such legislation was rapidly adopted in the wake of the nightclub bombings. Rather idealistically, the report suggests that as terrorist activity is clearly criminal, then 'it would lessen the chance of turning criminal suspects into heroes if the label 'terrorist' was dropped altogether'. It is also suggested that: 'Defining terrorism or distinguishing between other forms of military, guerrilla, or criminal activity, is highly subjective.' This finding avoids the obvious conclusion that the bombers' intention was to wage war on the state by causing indiscriminate casualties amongst the Hindu Balinese, Muslims and Westerners alike. The attack was not launched for conventional criminal reasons.

Nonetheless, the report makes the sound point that the root causes of the terrorist violence were the indiscriminate use of force by the state. Unless the national and international response to these outrages is more selective, discriminate and effective than in the past, we will run the risk of establishing the conditions for further outbreaks of terrorist activity.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

Article Title ‘The Bush National Security Strategy: An Evaluation’

Authors Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay, James Steinberg

Publication Details *Policy Brief*, The Brookings Institution, 4 October 2002, www.brookings.edu

Synopsis

This article is a brief, critical and incisive analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the new *National Security Strategy of the United States* which was issued by President Bush on 20 September 2002. The authors are all senior members of the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution in Washington. They conclude that while the Strategy’s overarching goals make sense, there are a number of shortcomings in the way that it seeks to achieve them.

The Strategy is a forthright document that avoids the resort to inane platitudes and deliberate ambiguities often found in such documents. The Strategy calls for the United States to ‘use its unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence’ to establish ‘a balance of power that favors human freedom’ and to defeat the threat posed by ‘terrorists and tyrants’. It represents a dramatic reversal of America’s often isolationist policies and represents a vision of a ‘distinctly American internationalism’. However the authors argue that: ‘A national strategy that trumpets freedom in the abstract but subordinates it to counterterrorism in reality opens U.S. foreign policy to charges of hypocrisy’. The US must be consistent in demanding the same respect for human rights of its allies as it does of its enemies.

Second, the article criticises the administration’s assertion of a right of pre-emptive attack without adequate explanation. Boundaries are not placed on the doctrine and it is unclear where the dividing line between active deterrence and aggression lies. The authors are concerned that the assertion of such a right might come back to haunt the United States. Third, the Strategy emphasises ad hoc coalitions for specific operations over formal alliance partnerships. The authors argue that over-reliance on opportunistic coalitions will not provide the long-term security that more established relationships can. Finally, the authors question whether the strategy provides the right sort of assistance to states that are failing and may become threats to security. They also point out a lack of detail in what is required to rescue states that have already failed.

Senior Officer Professional Digest

Article Title ‘Integrated warfighting: Toward a Joint Transformational Framework’

Author Lieutenant General Edwin P. Smith, USA

Publication Details *Armed Forces Journal International*, September 2002, pp. 68-74.

Synopsis

Although written in the all-too-familiar jargon of the era of transformation, this article, written by the Commanding General, US Army Pacific, makes some very cogent points about the adjustments that are necessary if modern armed forces are to become truly joint. General Smith points out that the most likely adversaries have already transformed: ‘These enemies, individually, organizationally, and philosophically, were amorphous, tribal in logic and loyalty, evasive, naturally persistent, and culturally driven.’ He appears frustrated with the lack of progress towards seamless interoperability between the armed services and advocates the adoption of concepts of operations based on a philosophy that is ‘joint-interagency-coalition’ in nature.

General Smith sees a continuing role for the services—as force providers of highly interoperable, tailorable capability packages. These include:

- critical enabling force modules, designed to help shape or restore conditions of security;
- initial entry forces, first strike capable;
- follow-on force with deterrent capabilities and the ability to conclude any conflict; and
- strategic defence forces designed to deter and defeat those enemies that might use weapons of mass destruction.

General Smith suggests that the task of transformation is being achieved through experimentation and training and that truly joint doctrine needs to be developed to ensure that the services can keep pace with the rate of change. Given his emphasis on the role of coalitions, and his current posting, the Australian Army would do well to take his ideas into account.