



Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected readings from the world's military journals

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The CA's Introduction

Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.



Editor's Note

On 15 July 2004, the Land Warfare Studies Centre in association with the Centre for Command Leadership and Management Studies, Australian Defence College, will be conducting the **2004 Rowell Seminar**, entitled: ***Ethics, Moral Values and the Australian Military Profession in the 21st Century***

Details of the seminar are available on the LWSC website:
<http://www.army.gov.au/LWSC>

- Article Title** The Professional Edge
- Author** Major General James N. Mattis, USMC
- Publication Details** *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 88, No. 2, February 2004, pp. 19 – 20.

Synopsis

This brief article was written to serve as a reminder that professional reading is still important to the modern-day warrior. In his introduction, the author echoes the thoughts of Otto Von Bismarck when he notes that, ‘by reading, you learn through others’ experiences – generally a better way to do business – especially in our line of work where the consequences of incompetence are so final...’ An officer with recent command experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq, Mattis firmly believes that his professional reading made an important contribution to his ability to cope with the situations he faced in these deployments.

His list of references ranges broadly across the canons of history, philosophy and the military art. Mattis also provides examples of the books he read to prepare him for particular missions such as the 1991 Gulf War, Afghanistan and Iraq. Ultimately, says Mattis, the real advantage of being able to draw on the works of such men as Slim, Fuller, Lawrence and Marcus Aurelius is the understanding that ‘we face nothing *new* under the sun’ (emphasis in original). The 5,000 years of military experience available in books is, he feels, still relevant to war in the Informational Age. For Mattis, today’s commanders and staff officers cannot afford ‘the luxury of ignorance of their profession’.

- Article Title** To What End? War Reporting in the Television Age
- Author** Ed Braman, Zenith Entertainment
- Publication Details** *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 148, No. 6, December 2003, pp. 26 – 30.

Synopsis

In this article, Braman, a current affairs film maker, surveys fifty television war reportage. He begins with the key question: In war, what job is the media *really there* to do? (emphasis in original). While the technical ability of the

media to cover warfare has increased remarkably, many journalists now find themselves confused about their role. Critical decisions about what purpose or ends reporting should serve have not kept pace with the sophistication of the means to gather information. The coverage of the war in Iraq emphasised many of these problems. Media analysts have debated aspects such as the sensationalism that characterised much of the reporting. Other concerns have been with bias or whether embedding reporters with military units was just an ingenious form of censorship.

For Braman, the lack of clarity that dogs television reporting is due to a mismatch between the logic of its ambitions and the cultural climate in which it has developed. Other news media, such as newsreels and radio, were at their peak during the two world wars when a shared sense of threat created an atmosphere of consensus. This consensus allowed the media to adopt clear and easily defined roles, such as bolstering the national war effort. Television, however, has matured in a social climate of argument, debate and insecurity. During the 1950s and 1960s regional conflicts replaced global ones and moral and political justifications were hotly contested. This atmosphere of controversy destroyed the social consensus of previous eras.

To demonstrate his thesis Braman uses historical case studies of the Vietnam and Falklands Wars. He believes that the sheer complexity of the war in Vietnam, coupled with the unfettered access to battlefields granted to reporters, made any consensus between government policy, the public and the media impossible. In the Falklands, the British government, alerted to these problems, devised a news management strategy that embraced the media and thus took firm control. Turning to Iraq, Braman believes that television networks were never better technically equipped to cover a war. However, as a medium, television was just as confused about its role as it had been in Vietnam and Falklands. In short, the medium could cover more, but convey less in terms of insight, context or significance. The challenges faced in covering the war were huge. The viewing tastes of contemporary audiences further compounded the dilemmas of television reporting. The search for novelty, the voyeuristic approach to human drama (as seen in shows such as *Big Brother*) and the trend away from in-depth analysis, combined to create the feeling that, while extensive, television's coverage of the war was strangely unsatisfying. The only consensus created by this new paradigm of war reporting is the shared experience of television itself.

The article concludes with the author stating that there are no easy answers to creating a type of television war reportage that is able to convey the complexity and meaning of warfare. However, that difficulty is no excuse for

shying away from the problem. Otherwise, the networks will just content themselves with providing what technology has the *means* to deliver to their audiences, while sidestepping the more difficult question: *to what end?* (emphasis in original)

Article Title	Education, Like Camouflage, Is Continuous
Author	Major Paul Greatsinger, Deputy Director, Senior Leader Development Program
Publication Details	<i>Marine Corps Gazette</i> , Vol. 88, No. 4, April 2004, pp. 24 – 26.

Synopsis

This article is a review of the USMC's Senior Leader Development Program (SLDP). While a lifelong commitment to learning has long been part of the USMC's Professional Military Education (PME) system, the educational programs directed towards the development of senior officers have, in the past, lacked formality, structure and focus. Development of the SLDP was undertaken by a retired general officer with over 40 years of service and a small team of serving officers. The approach they took was to identify the following seven key competencies:

- Warfighting
- Executive-level Leadership
- Joint and Coalition Operations
- Transformation and Change Management
- National Security Policy and Procedures
- Best Business Practices
- Knowledge Management

The program had to address these competencies within the limitations imposed by the already busy schedules of senior officers. The solution was to devise a system of core and complementary courses. Core courses are mandatory for one and two star officers, while the complementary courses are for specialised appointments and career tracks. All one star officers attend senior officer orientation and warfighting courses. They also attend a Capstone course at the National Defence University, which is mandated by federal law. They then attend the US Navy's Executive Business Course and the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course (JFOWC). The JFOWC, which is

conducted by the Air University at Maxwell AFB, focuses on joint warfighting at the operational and strategic levels and is intended to prepare officers to become joint task force commanders.

The ten complementary courses available cover a range of military, senior academic and business programs. While in theory all of these courses are available to every senior officer, the goal is to synchronise complementary courses with promotion and/or particular assignments. Another new PME opportunity is the Marine Corps Commandant's Strategic Leadership Seminar (SLS) conducted for the first time in January 2004. The SLS aims to further develop links between the USMC, academia and the corporate America. The SLDP is intended to be an evolutionary program. It aims to ensure that every course attended by a senior USMC officer is worthy of both their time and resources that the Corps will dedicate to funding that attendance. Ultimately, however, the SLDP aspires to the goal of providing the Corps Commandant with highly qualified senior officers. Details of the SLDP can be found at <http://www.mcu.usmc.mil/sldp>.

Article Title	Armour and Future Urban Warfare
Author	Professor Richard Ogorkiewicz, RMCS, United Kingdom
Publication Details	<i>Armor</i> , Vol. CXIII, No. 2, March-April 2004, pp. 22 – 25.

Synopsis

Professor Ogorkiewicz is a world renowned authority on armoured vehicle technology. He begins this article with historical examples that illustrate the problems faced by armoured units in urban areas and confirm the established view that such operations are strictly the domain of dismounted troops. However, he also notes that the use of tanks in urban operations significantly reduces infantry casualties. On balance he believes that tanks do have a vital role in urban operations. He also points out that, due to rapid urbanisation around the globe, in the future it will almost be impossible for armoured units to avoid operating in urban areas. In the light of these conclusions the article examines how armoured platforms will need to adapt to the conditions of close combat in urban areas.

The analysis focuses on three key aspects of armour: firepower, protection and mobility. While gun calibres may not change, adjustments in armament will reflect the reduced need for long range engagements with hostile armour and a move towards various types of high explosive (HE) ammunition for use against buildings. Thermobaric munitions may also be used against troops in buildings or bunkers. Other technical requirements will be increased ability to depress guns and guns that can be employed in both direct fire and indirect fire roles. Armoured support vehicles may be developed with the aim of suppressing fire from enemy infantry to allow tanks to move closer to strong points before engaging them. The protection required by armoured vehicles operating in urban areas will also differ from that of tanks designed for engagements in open terrain.

The predominant threat in urban operations comes from shoulder-fired weapons and from all directions. While traditional armoured vehicles are well protected from frontal attacks, few have adequate rear protection. Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA) is highly effective against RPGs and shaped charge weapons, but constitutes a considerable danger to dismounted troops. The British are pioneering an Electromagnetic (EM) armour, as a safer alternative to ERA and early tests show that it is effective against RPGs. Other nations are developing Active Protection Systems (APS) against anti-tank missiles. APSs fire fragmentation grenades or attempt 'soft kills' by electronic spoofing techniques, but the first type may be as dangerous as ERA for dismounted troops and the second type may not work in urban terrain. Mobility has been a key to the survival of tanks in open terrain, but is less important in urban operations. This factor will diminish the case for wheeled vehicles over tracks because pin-jointed metal tacks as far less vulnerable than tires. The article implies that a number of changes to tank design need to be considered if armour is to effectively adapt to future urban operations.

Article Title	The End of Alliances? Not So Fast
Author	Kurt Campbell, Senior Vice President and Director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies
Publication Details	<i>The Washington Quarterly</i> , Vol. 27, No. 2, Spring 2004, 151 – 163.

Synopsis

Campbell's article begins by surveying the history of the US alliance system in the sixty years following the end of World War II. He believes that the concept of alliances still has validity, but what is now emerging is a system quite different from that which became familiar in the Cold War. The new system will be a flexible mix of ad hoc coalitions that can be assembled rapidly for specific tasks and older, more established alliances. He notes that new, ad hoc partners, while enthusiastic, may not have as much military capability and experience as traditional partners, who will thus remain important. One key offset of the flexibility of this new system is that the US may be forced to take on greater military burdens when it operates with less-able partners.

In the past, alliances were frequently regionally based. Campbell provides a typology of alliances in terms of nuclear family (the closest US allies), extended family (states that, although not formal allies, had significant relations with the US over a long period) and friends and acquaintances (states without formal arrangements with the US). He believes that these same categories, with just a few changes, provide a useful mechanism for looking at current developments within the US alliance system. While there has certainly been a shift in US relations with many of its allies, Campbell thinks that it is too soon to make definitive statements. The flexibility that the Bush administration has gained from the formation of ad hoc coalitions cannot counter the value that experienced military partners bring to an alliance. The recent falling out with traditional nuclear-family members such as Germany and France over Iraq is hopefully a temporary phase. The author concludes that alliances are not dead. In the new security environment of the 21st century they still have great utility, although they may look and behave differently to their 20th century counterparts.

- Article Title** Coherent Joint Warfare is Our Silver Bullet
- Author** Major Michael R. Lwin, US Army
- Publication Details** *Proceedings*, US Naval Institute, Vol 129, No 10, October 2003, pp. 56 – 59.

Synopsis

The author of this article is a psychological warfare operations officer, who thus provides an interesting perspective on this topic. He begins by defining coherent joint warfare as ‘forces thoroughly integrated to fully exploit the synergism of land, sea and air combat capabilities’. The author suggests that today’s joint commander has five functional elements he can direct against an enemy: land, air and maritime power together with special forces and information operations capabilities. Moreover, since war has become more complex, victory is now achieved by directing all of these capabilities against an opponent. This is because it is no longer possible to think of an enemy as possessing a single centre of gravity; rather, opponents should now be thought of as comprising several critical target sets.

These target sets must be attacked using the full joint capabilities now available. Otherwise, it is possible for the enemy to resist the limited use of force for limited aims. The author provides examples of how enemies have adapted to a limited use of force - air power in Kosovo or air power and special forces in Afghanistan - to demonstrate this point. He then develops some general principles for planning joint operations to ensure that all of an opponent’s critical target sets are considered throughout a campaign. The article concludes by stressing that to maintain its edge in coherent joint warfare, the US must always consider the concept as a total package consisting of highly trained forces, flexible organisations and advanced technology.

Article Title	Four Wars and Counting
Author	Anthony Cordesman
Publication Details	<i>RUSI Journal</i> , Vol. 149, No. 1, February 2004, pp. 24 – 30.

Synopsis

The subtitle of this article is, *Enduring Conflict and the Need for a New Approach to US Strategy and Force Planning*. Cordesman believes that, almost without noticing it, the US has drifted into four separate and simultaneous conflicts:

- In Iraq, US forces face a low intensity conflict,
- In Afghanistan, the US and its allies are still fighting and also engaged in the task of nation building,
- The global war on terror continues, but (for the author) in an increasingly confused form, and
- In Israel and the Palestinian Territories, while US troops are not directly involved, there is the perception, especially in the Middle East, that the US and Israel are co-belligerents.

Only one of these operations – Iraq – might be called optional and other potential conflicts and flash points threaten to develop in Iran, Korea and South America. The reality is that the US is now fighting, not two major regional contingencies (as it once planned to do), but three low intensity conflicts, with deep strategic involvement in a fourth.

The body of the article develops the author's proposition that US military planning and strategy must be re-evaluated in the light of these realities and lists (and elaborates on) ten major alterations required to adjust US strategy and force planning to these new conditions:

- Neither theory nor capabilities afford the necessary basis for strategy and force planning in the current situation,
- The US is a global power with limited resources. Coalitions and alliances are just, if not more, important than ever.
- Although the conditions under which they might be employed are for more complex than in the days of the Cold War, deterrence and containment are still critical tools.
- US security strategy must tie in diplomacy and military power so that fighting becomes the last resort and other means are used to limit the number of fights as much as possible.

- Due to the narrow focus of security policy on warfighting, the US is badly prepared for conflict termination.
- Greater strength and more leveraging of technology will not solve America's problems.
- The crucial lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq are the limitations of technology-based, transformation style, forces.
- The US has some very difficult decisions to make about resources.
- The Executive branch cannot be allowed to let major divisions grow between key departments (such as State and Defence) and the National Security Council must enforce inter-departmental co-ordination.
- Threats from terrorism and Islamic extremism cannot be dealt with in terms of ideological prejudices.

Cordesman believes that there are a number of implications for US Strategy and Force Planning flowing from this situation. The US must:

- Avoid further strategic adventures, if possible,
- Accept the cost of winning the peace in Iraq,
- Accept the cost of winning the peace in Afghanistan,
- Stop dealing with the war on terrorism in terms of slogans, ideology and oversimplifications and start dealing seriously with regional allies, and
- Stay the course in the Arab-Israeli peace process.

The author observes that the US faces some very difficult political choices that will be extremely hard to deal with effectively, especially in an election year. Politically, a bi-partisan approach is required. Meanwhile, US think tanks and the media will have to approach these problems in a much more sophisticated manner. Cordesman concludes by saying that 2004 is going to be a tough year. 'In fact', he says, 'its going to be a tough decade'.

Article Title Fixing the Mix: How to Update the Army's Reserves

Author Lawrence Korb, Senior Fellow at the Centre for American Progress and former Assistant Secretary for Defence Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Logistics (1981-1985)

Publication Details *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 2, March/April 2004, pp. 2 – 7.

Synopsis

Korb begins by noting that while the technological aspects of force transformation have been vindicated by the rapid US-led victories in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Army's personnel system requires urgent attention. The all-volunteer Army which the US created after Vietnam and the 'Total Force' concept (Active Duty, National Guard and Reserve) is under considerable stress as the US struggles to meet its numerous international deployments. One reason for this problem is that many of the functions allocated to the reserve elements – civil affairs, military police and engineers – are those now most in demand for peacekeeping and stabilisation operations. Nor was it considered thirty years ago that the police, firefighters and medical personnel who joined these reserve units would be needed for homeland defence tasks in their civilian capacities.

These problems really came to the fore after September 11, 2001. To meet the demands of the war on terror, Active Duty, National Guard and Reserve units were deployed. Korb and other commentators now believe that the Army is over-stretched. Another problem is that, as US commitments expanded, overseas deployments for all Army components have become longer and longer. National Guard and Reserve units have been deployed on short notice and many have had their deployments extended. In one community in West Virginia, the police force is now down by 25% because its members are deployed overseas, but these same men are among the first responders for any emergency in their community. All of these problems have had a serious impact on overall Army readiness with only two of the Army's ten active divisions ready for conflict outside Afghanistan and Iraq. Not surprisingly, morale is poor and over 50% of soldiers in a recent survey said that they would not re-enlist when their tours end and the Pentagon lifts its 'stop-loss order' that currently prevents troops from retiring or leaving the service at the end of their engagements.

To address these serious problems the Army needs to grow. There also needs to be a re-balancing of those functions that now rest largely in the National Guard and Reserve units back to Active Duty units. New formations, especially trained for stabilisation operations, should be created to allow combat units to be rested and ready for other contingencies. In addition, personnel whose civilian jobs are key to homeland defence must not be allowed to join National Guard and Reserve units. Korb concedes that making these changes to rebalance the Army will be expensive, but they are also in the long-term interest of the US.

Article Title	Joint Professional Military Education
Author	Major Kenneth Knarr, USMC
Publication Details	<i>Marine Corps Gazette</i> , Vol 88, No 4, April 2004, pp. 26 – 28.

Synopsis

This article begins by noting that since the end of World War II the US military establishment has wrestled with the problem of defining the proper balance between joint and single service professional military education (PME). Responsibility for joint education rests with the Secretary of Defence and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) who have set out their vision for joint education in the Officer's Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP). Over the past two years, a number of courses have been devised to translate this vision into reality.

The body of the article describes the continuum of joint education courses from senior lieutenant to lieutenant general. Development of these courses has been undertaken by organisations that already have an established role in joint training, such as the National Defence University (NDU) and the Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC). A course for company grade officers has been developed by the NDU and JFSC based on the syllabi of an advanced joint PME course and a joint planners orientation course. The key difficulties involved in devising this course, once again revolved around the balance between joint and single service education. Another problem was to decide on the correct level of war to form the context for the teaching of joint educational courses.



Other initiatives about to come on line are an joint advanced warfighting school (JAWS) and specialised courses for one and two star officers such as Capstone and Pinnacle. Pinnacle will be designed as a short mentoring based program involving the CJCS, his deputy and other senior government officials both civil and military. The rationale behind the continuum is that the battlespace is now joint and budgetary constraints are forcing the Services to work closely together. In this situation JPME is a natural subset of single service PME programs.