



Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected readings from the world's military journals

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CONTENTS

The British Armed Forces – Which Way to Turn?

Joint Doctrine – Engine of Change?

More Than Technology is Needed to Win Wars

The Army Profession: Ostrich or Phoenix?

Deconstruction of Army Leadership

Justifying War

Perpetual Wars and the Future of Democracy

The Modular Army

Pilots Spurring Training, Tactics Revolution

Lethal in the Littoral: A Smaller, Meaner LCS

Redefining the Enemy

The CA's Introduction

Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.



Note: the 2004 Rowell Profession of Arms Seminar, **'Ethics, Moral values and the Australian Military Profession in the 21st Century'** is filling fast.

Program and registration information available from
<http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/Conf Activities/2004 Brochure.pdf>

- Article Title** 'About Face: The British Armed Forces – Which Way to Turn?'
- Author** Air Marshal Timothy Garden and General Sir David Ramsbotham
- Publication Details** *RUSI Journal*, vol. 149, no. 2, April 2004, pp.10–15

Synopsis

The authors of this article begin by highlighting the fact that, not for the first time in its history, UK defence policy appears to be geared to meeting the requirements of an ally – the United States. Unlike the losses incurred in the First World War, when Britain was closely tied to its ally, France, the losses from the close relationship with the United States amount to more than lives and treasure. By being closely tied to the United States, the authors believe that Britain has lost influence in the Middle East – an area where it has long had particular interests and ties of friendship. However, they also feel that the UK faces greater costs because it must try to match its armed forces with the most technologically advanced country on earth, while maintaining its capability to undertake a range of tasks from aid to the civil power through to fighting a major war.

In the Cold War period, the UK's armed forces had set and relatively stable commitments. These commitments included the defence of Great Britain, obligations to NATO, some UN operations, and vestigial imperial tasks in Hong Kong and the Falklands. There was some tension between the NATO tasks and the need for broader capabilities, especially given limitations on defence spending. However, the end of the Cold War saw the relative certainties of the period vanish. In the 1990s the armed forces faced a number of reviews in which operational capabilities were reduced and the forces downsized.

Although, some senior defence officials argued that the uncertainty of the post-Cold War world demanded the ability to respond to unknown future security threats, the argument did not sway governments. Predictably, the smaller, under-funded UK armed forces were challenged by participation in UN operations on a number of continents. Medical and repair facilities were stretched and troops lacked adequate training for tasks such as de-mining. The First Gulf War showed up further deficiencies in areas such as

supply. Mobilisation of the Territorial and other reserve forces was also required to meet the demands made by the war.

Despite the number of peacekeeping and stability operations in which the British armed forces have participated since the end of the Cold War, the 2003 Defence White Paper puts primary emphasis on the ability to work with the US in high-intensity operations. This priority will require investment in expensive technologies for warfighting, while other useful capabilities such as conflict prevention, nation-building or counter-terrorism receive less emphasis. However, the authors believe that the UK government wants both high end capabilities and the ability to deploy on humanitarian missions without paying the price necessary to achieve such divergent goals.

With meagre budgets, forces are stretched further in by the range of operational deployments and acquisition programs are shaved in order to operate within very limited means. The result, according to the authors, is an incoherent defence program. The British government does not want to fund the defence forces to carry out all of the tasks it still requires from them, but it refuses to make the difficult political decisions about which capabilities it is prepared to do without. The costs of some programs – Nimrod maritime patrol aircraft and the Eurofighter – have blown out. Moreover, even existing acquisition programs now do not match the purposes for which they were originally ordered. For example, the Eurofighters about to be delivered are air defence versions, when air-to-ground versions would be more useful.

The government is also happy to assume that all is well within the Services themselves, simply because they are successful in the missions assigned to them. In reality, all the Services are facing serious strains. Frequent deployments affect retention, training and reserves in all three Services. In the long-term, this will affect levels of experience and therefore operational capability, the authors feel that this is a problem no responsible government can ignore.

The solution proposed by the authors is specialisation. They believe that the UK's armed forces have world-class skills in the areas of conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction. For the foreseeable future the US will remain unchallenged as the world's sole superpower. For this reason, the authors feel the ability to contribute to US-led coalitions of the willing in high intensity operations should not come at the cost of losing important capabilities in the areas of stability and peace support operations. The move to specialisation would also make procurement priorities clearer and would enable the UK to build a force that is well-equipped and readily

deployable to global trouble spots. They also feel that it would be a tragedy if this opportunity were to be lost due to underinvestment.

Article Title	‘Joint Doctrine - Engine of Change?’
Author(s)	Stephen Cimbala, Penn State University and Commander James Tritten, USN (Ret.) former member of staff at the Joint Warfighting Centre, US Joint Forces Command
Publication Details	<i>Joint Forces Quarterly</i> , Winter 2002-2003, no. 33, pp. 90–5

Synopsis

This article begins with the observation that doctrine, which is concerned with how the military thinks, learns from experience, and trains, is a relatively neglected area in the process of transformation currently being pursued by the US armed forces. This is despite the fact that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of the Office of Transformation, Vice Admiral Cebrowski have both acknowledged the role of doctrine in transformation, especially in key areas such as education, leadership, training, experimentation and readiness. The development of AirLand Battle doctrine in the 1970s and 80s provides an example of how doctrine can be a vital engine of organisational change. However, the precise relationship between doctrine and change remains a controversial issue for defence professionals.

The authors discuss, with reference to historical examples, how the contentious nature of doctrine makes its precise role as an engine of change unclear. The natural tendency of doctrine towards abstraction and generalisation can be frustrating for operational and tactical commanders faced with practical battlefield problems. Also, the fact that each service has its own unique doctrine means that joint doctrine will be the result of negotiation between the services. The interaction between technology and doctrine is another factor that is not well understood, even by military professionals. The assumption that advanced technology confers military superiority is incorrect. New technologies can be a liability without adequate consideration of how they should be implemented in the field. This practical application of new technologies requires changes to organisation, planning and training, which all impact on doctrine.

The causal relationship between doctrine and the concepts from which it develops must also be well understood if the process of doctrinal development is to be successful. While new concepts are generally developed as part of the acquisition process for new equipment, there are also a whole range of factors which feed into this process. The authors provide a very useful list of What Doctrine Affects and What Affects Doctrine to illustrate the complexity of this relationship.

Consistency will, the authors believe, be important in ensuring both the speed and success of transformation at the doctrinal level. As concepts are developed and approved they need to be published as joint doctrine, which in turn will impact on single service doctrines, requiring them to change. In the 1970s and 1980s, a cascading effect occurred during the US Army's development of AirLand Battle doctrine. When the changes to keystone doctrine were made, subordinate branch and functional publications had to be revised in order to reflect the new operational concepts. With the introduction of electronic publication of doctrine, this cascading effect will be more effective as changes to doctrine are promulgated rapidly. The consistency achieved through this process also has the potential to increase the effectiveness of joint warfighting capabilities.

There is also a close link between training and doctrine. Doctrine is the basis of joint exercises and operations. Along with training courses, exercises and operations build support for new ways of doing business and can even, over time, assist in developing a joint military culture. Lessons learned and the results of training exercises or operations can also feed valuable information into this process. Similarly, there is a reciprocal relationship between doctrine and organisation. New doctrines may require substantial shifts in organisational behaviour that might be resisted by sections of the institution. Armed forces are almost inherently opposed to changes that appear to threaten their independence or established modes of operation. In terms of achieving successful innovation, the authors believe that not only must someone within the organisation own the process of change, but the process needs to be driven by individuals or groups who are well placed within the organisation. The authors illustrate this point by showing how the joint staff was able to promote the concept of a joint force air component commander (JFACC).

Joint doctrine is only one element in an effective process of transformation. It requires more than just manuals to successfully introduce new doctrine. Doctrinal change must be based on a sound understanding of what doctrine

is and what it can and cannot do. Moreover, it requires skilled and sensitive leadership to guide the organisation through the process of change. When the concepts have been developed they must be transmitted via training and education to simultaneously reflect and refashion the way armed forces think, train and fight. Without such a supporting program the best doctrine in the world, can pave the way for military failure.

Article Title 'More Than Technology is Needed to Win Wars'

Author Sandra I Erwin

Publication Details *National Defense Magazine*, vol. 88, issue 607, June 2004, p. 12

Synopsis

This article examines the emphasis on investing in new technologies for the military and asks the question whether the obsession with technology has blinded US forces to the 'cultural side of wars' — the ability to understand the enemy's intent, motives and will.

The author argues that the American nation needs to invest in new technologies but must be careful that this investment supports an operating idea or concept. Technology should not lead the military; instead, ideas should lead the development of technology.

Drawing on the current experience in Iraq, the author argues that, while overpowering US technology is winning battles, it has not helped achieve strategic objectives such as stabilising Iraq and creating conditions for a new regime.

The question as to whether the US military's hi-tech weaponry could compete with guerilla tactics was explored through the example of a war game hosted by the US Army and the Joint Forces Command in May 2004. In this wargame, the growing reliance on satellite imagery and airborne sensors provided the enemy with a distinct advantage in that the red commander was able to overwhelm the blue commander's sensors by dispersing his forces geographically, creating confusion, overloading information pipelines and disrupting accurate analysis of the material gathered.

The lesson for the future is that hostile forces may not be scared away by overwhelming force and advanced technology. The challenge is to understand the enemy and devise the means to defeat him quickly and decisively.

Article Title ‘The Army Profession: Ostrich or Phoenix?’

Author Major Sean Herron, US Army

Publication Details *Military Review*, vol. 84, no. 1,
January–February 2004, pp. 61–6

Synopsis

The article examines the notion of the US Army as a profession in the light of growing uncertainty about the nature of military professionalism. As evidence of this, the author, a student at the US Army Command and General Staff College, cites the reduced status of the military, which is reflected in the growing tendency for the Army to be treated as just another government agency, devoid of real professional status.

To ground his discussion on a sound theoretical foundation, Herron draws on the work of Don M. Snider, who has written extensively on military professionalism in the American context, especially the US Army. Snider’s recent study, *The Future of the Army Profession*, postulates that the US Army is currently experiencing a growing uncertainty about the nature of military professionalism.

Snider puts forward three tenets of professionalism – expertise, jurisdiction and legitimacy – and Herron uses these three areas to discuss two types of professionalism: theoretical and practical. The components of theoretical professionalism, according to Herron, are those professional components that make up the ideal but do not prescribe the means by which it can be attained. The components of practical professionalism are those components by which the professional ensures its survival and future growth.

Expertise is the body of professional knowledge that members of the profession have mastered. Importantly, this knowledge is not common within the society at large and is not acquired by people outside the

profession. One problem for the military, unlike other professions, such as law or medicine, the military (in a democracy) must relinquish control of warfare to civilians, which hampers efforts to maintain a unique professional identity. As well as relinquishing control, the military also assumes the responsibility for advising civilians on how best to use its expertise. This situation requires the Army to develop officers skilled, not only in their own profession, but also knowledgeable in the workings of government. However, Herron believes, the Army promotes officers on the basis of their professional practical skills as combat soldiers; very few officers will have the opportunity to develop the type of intellectual abilities required for working within the political milieu of policy-making.

Jurisdiction is the area in which a profession applies its expertise. The Army does this on the battlefield. Downsizing and the move to contract-out or privatise some military functions can encroach on the professional jurisdiction of the Army. Both on and off the battlefield the Army must be careful to identify those key professional skills and competencies that make soldiers different from other professionals. By identifying its key professional skills and nurturing them within the organisation, the Army will be able to protect its professional jurisdiction and enhance its legitimacy.

Legitimacy is the acceptance of a profession's expertise by those outside its ranks. It entails a set of values and a common ethical and legal framework for controlling its membership from within. The problem with such systems of self-regulation is that they can become too rigid or too bound up in tradition, which can alienate the profession from the wider society. When this alienation occurs a profession can lose its legitimacy. Alienation of the Army would happen if the service were to be perceived by the public, not as a viable profession, but merely as another instrument of government. In theory, this would mean that the design and use of military power might then be determined by public opinion.

To ensure that the Army is able to maintain its expertise, jurisdiction and legitimacy, Herron believes that the service should focus on practical professionalism – ie. those components by which the professional ensures its survival and future growth. Noting that education is the foundation of the profession, he identifies five areas in which this can be done:

- Initial education – to provide a strong sense of identity and firm grounding in professional skills.

- Developmental education – to ensure that the Army’s professional skills are relevant, including a focus on professionalism as an aspect of military service.
- Membership in professional organisations – because such organisations help to broaden professional expertise and act as forums for discussing professional issues and imparting a common identity.
- Giving back to the institution – members have a responsibility to give back to the organisation by advancing its body of knowledge and writing for professional journals. This behaviour promotes discussion and debate and is an important method of self-development.
- Encouraging discussion and debate – this means fostering an environment in which free exchange of ideas is possible, even if they run counter to accepted thinking. A healthy dialogue encourages professional reflection and develops critical thinking skills which can be used to solve professional problems.

A key to maintaining the Army’s relevance as a profession is leadership, especially at the senior level. To maintain its professional identity, the author believes that the Army must work on the components of its practical professionalism in order to strengthen and develop the institution into the future.

Article Title ‘Deconstruction of Army Leadership’

Author Colonel C.R. Paparone

Publication Details *Military Review*, vol. LXXXIV, no. 1, January–February 2004, pp. 2–10

Synopsis

In this short article, Colonel Paparone, an instructor at the U.S. Army War College, provides a provocative discussion on US Army leadership. He contends that US Army leadership doctrine is based on an attempt to maintain the status quo and on a romantic myth — as such the US Army risks defining and addressing the wrong problem. Studies at the US Army War College indicate that, despite the presence of doctrine, there is no common understanding of leadership and that individual and collective views are based on upbringing, experience, education and training. Whilst

diversity is welcomed in society, it is not necessarily embraced by the military.

Paparone provides a synopsis of current US Army leadership doctrine. He then deconstructs the current approach, finding that Army leadership is based on an assumption of hierarchy – which amounts to the best way to organise for accountability and control. This results in the fact that training, education and development are conducted in such a way as to ensure that the qualities of those at the highest echelons are replicated. Colonel Paparone goes on to state that the transformational changes and human dynamics of the 21st century will no longer allow a leader to base their effectiveness on position, rank or the assumptions of hierarchy.

By applying modern leadership theory, Paparone believes that a reconstructed leadership model is possible. He concludes by recommending that a reconstructed model must take into account new reference points such as: organisation as a complex system, sense making in organisations, building trust as an alternative to formal control, and valuing paradox and reflectivity. Finally, Paparone invites readers to challenge his view, so that doctrine can match reality.

Article Title ‘Justifying War’

Author Michael Quinlan

Publication Details *Australian Journal of International Affairs*,
vol. 58, no. 1, March 2004, pp. 7–15

Synopsis

Sir Michael Quinlan GCB, former Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the UK Ministry of Defence, argues that, while war cannot be completely eliminated, it must be kept under ethical scrutiny and discipline. He argues that the classical framework of ‘Just War’ thinking remains the best and most robust analytical tool for that purpose. He also cautions that several features of the modern world require us to think carefully about how we should bring that framework to bear.

Sir Michael examines the concept of morality of going to war, *jus ad bellum*, and the elements of the ‘Just War’ doctrine, including the range of criteria that must be satisfied if war is to be ethically justified. These six

criteria are: ‘just cause’, ‘proportionate cause’, ‘right intention’, ‘right authority’, ‘prospect of success’, and ‘last resort’. He also examines the concept of the morality of actions in war (*jus in bello*) and its criteria of ‘discrimination’ and ‘proportionality’.

The author applies these concepts to the war in Iraq and admits that he was opposed to that war but refers to it in this article because of its powerful illustrative significance:

- There is no customary international law, or consistent practice, that legitimates external military intervention to remove internally nasty regimes.
- The concept of ‘deterrence’ needs to be examined more carefully.
- In relation to Iraq, he poses the question as to why deterrence could not continue to work and points out that in war there must be an honest weighing of proportionate and comparative risk both to US forces and Iraqi civilians.
- With regard to the issue of ‘proportion’, he argues that there has to be a clear and honest appraisal of the evils of war and the evils it is intended to rectify.
- Finally, the author comments on the comparisons that we are able to make when judging what benefit a war is likely to achieve. He argues that these comparisons are not between the effects of fighting the war and those of doing nothing; rather, it is between fighting the war and whatever would be achieved by other means.

The ‘Just War’ criterion requires that there be a genuine expectation that the outcome will leave matters better overall than they would have otherwise been. He argues that the jury is still out today on that aspect with respect to war in Iraq.

Article Title 'Perpetual War(s) and the Future of Democracy'

Author Peter Marden

Publication Details *Futures*, vol. 36, no. 5, June 2004, pp. 565–581

Synopsis

The author claims that, in the wake of 11 September, democracy is fighting more than one perpetual war; it is fighting numerous wars to preserve the fabric of democracy. Although the term 'perpetual war' belongs in the context of the militarised state in readiness to fight the battle, the author contends that the term should be extended to elucidate the crimes against democracy from within liberal democratic states.

He suggests that the connective web between the 'war on terrorism' and these internal wars is clear. In addition, he feels that the international stage of conflict is being driven by a neo-liberal polity which actively supports a social setting that requires the further expansion of wealth. He believes that neo-liberals have marketed this state of affairs by demonising those who appear to threaten the status quo. This stage of conflict 'involves a war on refugees, a war on the deserving poor, a war on the welfare state – essential a war in perpetuity on dissent, difference and radical alternative thinking.' The author concludes that, despite the range of views - from ostracised dissenter to compassionate citizen - the very complexity and fluidity of liberal democracy may be its salvation.

Article Title 'The Modular Army'

Author Colonel J.A. Bonin and Lieutenant Colonel T.E. Crisco

Publication Details *Military Review*, vol. LXXXIV, no. 2, March–April 2004, pp. 21–7

Synopsis

In this article the authors provide an insight into the US desire to provide joint force commanders with a campaign quality army that can dominate in highly complex, uncertain and dynamic security environments. In this environment, the US Army proposes to focus on the brigade as the predominant 'unit of action'. The authors describe how, historically, the

United States has oscillated between fixed and *ad hoc* structures at brigade and divisional levels. The solution proposed by the authors is based on designing mission-specific units, which are then aggregated into brigades through a process called ‘force tailoring’ (task organisation/battle grouping).

The authors state that forces will be tailored from the complete set of units held on the order of battle to meet the force commander’s requirements. To allow force tailoring, all units of action will need to be as self-contained as possible to facilitate ‘plug and play’; units of employment (force headquarters) will be completely independent; and peacetime relationships are no longer to be as fixed or as important as they currently are. These characteristics are aggregated into the term ‘modularity’. The authors also note that the new ‘modular’ army will need to be organised by echelon, region and joint function. Finally, they see that the challenge involves maintaining the advantages of fixed structures, while providing planners with opportunities for flexibility and adaptability.

Article Title ‘Pilots Spurring Training, Tactics Revolution’

Author Roxana Tiron

Publication Details *National Defense Magazine*, vol. 88, issue 607, June 2004, pp. 27–9

Synopsis

Army aviators who are revisiting the lessons of Vietnam, together with their recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, are leading a revolution in combat helicopter training. These veteran pilots are returning to flight schools to pass on an array of new combat tactics and techniques, such as manoeuvring flight - a skill not taught for decades.

Many of the Vietnam-era tactics had to be re-learned. Aspects of flight training, such as weapon delivery techniques and flight power management, had to be re-examined. The team-mix on-board the helicopter was also a critical consideration. Experienced pilots were necessary to mentor their less experienced colleagues.

The role of attack helicopters in urban areas was also re-defined with less static hovering and more manoeuvre needed to avoid rocket-propelled

grenades. Another lesson from Iraq is that the connection to ground troops has to be strong, achieved by having an aviation officer embedded with the ground troops.

The article summarises these lessons in detail. Clearly, *Operation Iraqi Freedom* has re-defined the way in which attack helicopters are being used, especially in urban areas.

Article Title	‘Lethal in the Littoral: A Smaller, Meaner LCS’
Author	J. F. Solomon
Publication Details	<i>Proceedings</i> , United States Naval Institute, vol. 130, issue 1, January 2004, p. 36

Synopsis

In this article Solomon lists characteristics he believes will ensure the optimisation of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) for naval operations in the littoral. He observes that the Aegis class of vessels is too big for the LCS mission and advises planners to take care to ensure that mission creep and escalating requirements do not result in an LCS which will be difficult to operate in the littoral or too expensive to lose.

Solomon spends some time in describing the range of littoral threats: mines, mobile antiship cruise missiles, small boats armed with light stand-off weapons, or submarines. These threats are escalated if tactics are employed to saturate ship defences, using an ambush mode of attack from concealed positions in the coastal topography. He suggests that this type of combat should be considered ‘guerilla warfare going to sea’.

Solomon stresses that the LCS should not be considered part of a ‘conventional’ naval battle group, but believes that the LCS should be built as an advanced scout and hunter-killer system for battle in a high-threat environment. Conceptually, the LCS is a ship that can take the fight into the enemy’s home waters, in particular to permit the deployment of troops ashore or conduct stand-off missile attacks – that is ‘...offensive capability disproportionate to its size’.

The last section provides a comprehensive description of the types of characteristics, capabilities, weapons and sensors that the LCS should possess – preferably in a modular form so that the ship could be optimised,

both in port or afloat. Finally, Solomon concludes by advising that we should focus on the ‘war of our day’ rather than perfect the systems for a past age. He suggests that the USN has some history in littoral combat and should apply those lessons to the new security context.

Article Title	‘Redefining the Enemy – The World has Changed, but our Mindset has not’
Author	B.M. Jenkins
Publication Details	<i>Rand Review</i> , vol. 28, no. 1, Spring 2004, www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/spring2004/ , pp. 16–23

Synopsis

In this article Jenkins contends that the threat has changed, but that the US has neither determined the essence of the threat nor made the necessary changes. He believes that many in authority continue to believe that international terrorism remains a ‘war on the margins’ and that eventually, we will be back to the ‘main game’ — state-on-state war. He cites the conflation of threats, a concentration on hypothetical future conventional wars, the debate whether terrorism should be treated as a crime and the consignment of ‘lesser contingencies’ to ‘other war’ rather than ‘real war’.

Jenkins then goes on to describe the new world disorder: war beyond the Cold War; countering proliferation; the soldiers of terrorism; combating organised crime; and the smaller but more virulent form of modern technical destruction. Unfortunately, Jenkins does not provide a comprehensive antidote to these challenges, but he does warn that advanced societies have been destroyed by less sophisticated societies in the past and implies that the same may happen again. Fortunately, the article contains four related Rand readings that those interested in the new security environment might find useful.