Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected readings from the world's military journals

Issue No. 32
July 2005

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Compiled by:

The CA's Introduction

Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.

Editor's Note

Please note that the Chief of Army's Conference will be held in Canberra on 22 and 23 September. For the conference program, click on the link below:

http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/Conf%20Activities/conference2005timetable.htm

Article	**'An Evolving View of Warfare: War and Peace and the American Military Profession'**
Author	Matthew J. Morgan, Chaminade University of Honolulu
Publication Details	*Small Wars and Insurgencies*, vol. 16, no. 2, June 2005, pp. 147–69

SYNOPSIS

The thesis of this article is that the style of warfare practised by the US Army has not prepared it to cope with military situations that do not result in decisive or measurable outcomes. The US Army is therefore reluctant to become involved in non-traditional missions such as humanitarian, stability, and peace support operations. However, Morgan believes that in the current security environment the US Army must overcome its lack of enthusiasm for peace-related operations, if it is to be successful in situations such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

The article draws on analysis of historical examples and contemporary experience to support the author's proposition that the US Army favours warfighting over constabulary/peace-keeping missions. While the US Army has a strong historical tradition of involvement in these types of missions, the bias towards warfighting, reflected in both organisation and doctrine, has the potential to damage America's strategic interests. This is especially the case where reluctance of the United States to involve its huge military capacity in humanitarian or stability operations challenges its perceived legitimacy to espouse human rights and other values.

The author also argues that, rather than viewing humanitarian and stability operations as a trade-off with the potential to diminish its combat readiness, the US Army must recognise that both are tools leading to the same goal. This is especially the case in the current security environment, where international peace may not be achievable, but the use of military forces in combat and non-combat roles can promote order and stability.

The article concludes by stating that the US Army needs a new professional paradigm in which non-combat roles are accepted as valid, though adjunct, military missions. American military professionals must come to see themselves as managers of warfare, which includes, but is not limited to, physical combat.

Article	**'Civil–Military Operations Centre'**
Author	Colonel James A. Pace, USMC
Publication Details	*Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 89, Issue 6, June 2005, pp. 10–13

SYNOPSIS

In this article, Colonel Pace, a USMC artillery officer, discusses the benefits of establishing a Civil–Military Operations Centre (CMOC) within the Marine divisional structure. As the author points out, prior to 11 September 2001, the armed forces of the United States were organised, trained and equipped for low- to high-intensity conflict in order to meet a range of traditional military threats. Missions such as nation building and stability operations were not viewed as 'appropriate' tasks for combat forces. However, in the context of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the debate over appropriate missions has been superseded by a situation in which American forces are required to retain the capability to meet traditional threats while also being able to conduct a range of stability and peace support missions that come under the rubric of Civil–Military Operations (CMO). In 2003, the USMC faced this reality when combat forces of the 1st Marine Division had to commence CMO tasks immediately after conventional hostilities had ceased in Iraq.

Pace feels that one way in which combat forces can be quickly reoriented to CMO tasks is by establishing a CMOC as an organic capability within the division. A CMOC would allow a Marine division to plan, execute and coordinate CMO, and thus become a more flexible and adaptable organisation capable of meeting the varied operational demands of the GWOT. During Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, the 11th Marine Regiment assumed the CMO role for the 1st Marine Division. A CMOC was established to provide functions such as security, electricity, water and medical support, as well as allocating priority of effort to CMO tasks.

In the Marine division, the artillery regiment is the logical organisation to assume the responsibility for this secondary mission. The artillery regiment has a robust C2 capability that reaches down to company level and its Table of Organisation provides it with a planning staff and a senior commander who is used to planning, coordinating, de-conflicting and executing complex fires. These capabilities give the artillery regiment the necessary skills and equipment to undertake the CMOC role. To address the need for civil affairs expertise, Pace suggests that there would be a requirement for more specialised training of Marine artillerymen and that the artillery regiment's Table of Organisation would necessitate the enhancement of embedded civil affairs staff to support the running of the CMOC from within the regiment.

The author concludes by noting that this kind of adaptation of traditional combat forces for the GWOT environment would enhance the mission flexibility of the Marine division across the spectrum of conflict.

Article	**'The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture'**
Author	Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy
Publication Details	*Military Review*, vol. LXXXI, no. 3, May–June 2005, pp. 53–9, <**http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/download/English/MayJun05/cassidy.pdf**>

SYNOPSIS

Lieutenant Colonel Robert Cassidy is a Special assistant to the Commanding General's Initiative Group, US Army Europe. In this article he proposes that the British Army's experiences in small wars and counterinsurgencies during the 19th and 20th centuries remain topical and salient. This premise is based on an assessment that the United States and its coalition partners are prosecuting counterinsurgency operations today in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that an analysis of British military culture is therefore important.

Cassidy believes that the US Army is undergoing a 'transformation in contact', and that a big part of transformation is about military cultural change. He observes that whilst the US military culture has exhibited a preference for a 'big, conventional-war paradigm', and that this preference has impeded its capacity to adapt to small wars and counterinsurgencies. Cassidy defines military culture as 'comprising the beliefs and attitudes within a military organisation that shape its collective preferences towards the use of force.

Cassidy first conducts a historical examination of the British Army to determine the origins of its 'small wars' culture. His analysis is that this culture may be traced to the Napoleonic wars, where because of the disparate balance between naval and land forces, Britain was compelled to adopt an 'indirect Fabian' strategy against the French Army in Spain. Wellington recognised Napoleon's superiority on land too well to risk a decisive battle, so he indirectly used 'pinprick' attacks to induce the French to concentrate against him while Spanish guerillas consolidated control over the countryside, attacking French outposts and lines of communication. Wellington was successful in harrying the French, and yet fought few open battles during the five years of campaigning.

Cassidy then turns to the perhaps more formative 19th-century experience of colonial wars that significantly influenced British military culture into the 20th century. He notes that the British approach emphasised small-scale rather than large-scale operations. Cassidy proposes two main reasons for British success in these colonial campaigns. First, he identifies the regimental system, where officers and soldiers serve together over long periods of time. Second, he notes the exclusive reliance on professional volunteer soldiers instead of draftees.

The main concern of Cassidy's study is the British practice and experience of 'counterinsurgency' warfare after 1945. Again, Cassidy poses some interesting explanations for British Army success by using selective examples. Cassidy believes that this success was based on three important characteristics of low-intensity conflict: experience, appropriate military skills, and flexibility. In perhaps the most important point in the article, Cassidy highlights that the key was to be found in the integrated civil–military approach taken by the British, where civilian officials remained in control of emergencies and were responsible for the broader political strategy and for propaganda. The British Army operated under civilian control, and accepted the requirement of employing minimum force. The British Army experience of 'imperial policing' made internal security operations the cultural norm and conventional war the exception (though Cassidy seems to have overlooked the experience of two world wars).

Cassidy concludes the analysis of British Army success in 'small wars' with an examination of British Army doctrine and principles. He observes that this doctrine was built on experience that the Army gained through its imperial policing activities in the Middle East, India and also Northern Ireland. He characterises this doctrine as a 'Fabian' strategy (an indirect strategy is perhaps what he means) with the use of indigenous forces. These 'stability' operations have dominated the British Army experience, and as such the principles have become central to the institution. Britain's small war army principally comprised light infantry, light cavalry and light artillery units, with the agility and logistical austerity to enable them to operate in remote and varied operational milieus with a decentralised command structure and the encouragement of junior officer and non-commissioned officer initiative. Cassidy concludes by noting the salience of these capabilities, principles and doctrine in ongoing US military operations worldwide.

Article	**'The Wrong Lesson'**
Author	Caroline Elkins
Publication Details	*Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 296, Issue 1, July–August 2005, pp. 34–7

SYNOPSIS

This interesting article by Caroline Elkins, an Associate Professor of history at Harvard, is a critique of the current trend in US military and security circles to uphold the British model of counterinsurgency tactics as suitable for today's conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Elkins begins by citing an influential article by John Arquilla (from the US Navy Postgraduate School), in which he urges the US to look carefully at the British imperial counterinsurgency efforts in 1950s Kenya. She quotes Arquilla as arguing that this campaign was a model from which the Bush administration could learn

lessons. In Kenya, Arquilla observes, the British, under the leadership of General Sir Frank Kitson, undertook a successful campaign against the Mau Mau insurgents. Specifically, Arquilla holds up the use of 'pseudo gangs' formed by teams of friendly tribesmen. Indeed, Elkins agrees that these pseudo-gangs were in fact a key element of the low-intensity operations that were deployed throughout the British Empire over that period. She further notes that the tactics developed by Kitson become in many ways the 'gold-standard' for disengaging from imperial occupation and defusing international threats.

Elkins then poses the key question as to whether these tactics, including the use of 'pseudo-gangs', are really the best model for the United States in its global war on terror. Elkins believes otherwise and states that arguments such as that used by Arquilla rest on a flawed historical analogy. Firstly, she states that British security tactics could not have succeeded without more severe and overarching measures of control imposed by the British—measures of police-state control. Elkins notes that, in addition to the much lauded targeting of terrorists directly, the British targeted the civilian populations as well (who often did harbour intelligence and provide illicit support to insurgents). Through measures including collective punishment, fines and curfews, detention without trial, expanded capital punishment, censorship, and restrictions on movement, British forces sought to intimidate civilians, separate them from the insurgents, and collect intelligence necessary to infiltrate terrorist networks. While these techniques may seem logical, Elkins notes that, in the case of Kenya, the British broke civilian support for the Mau Mau by systemising torture, inflicting heavy civilian casualties, and detaining nearly 1.5 million Africans.

The author goes on to highlight that the British adopted similar tactics and policies in Cyprus at the same time. There, they created 'Q' patrols to help suppress Greek Cypriot insurgents. The 'Q' patrols operated with a free hand in police-state conditions, developing snatch squads and interrogation teams that earned them the nickname of 'HMTs', or 'Her Majesty's Torturers'. Likewise, nearly twenty years later, the British directed counterinsurgency operations in Oman. There, the British Army Training Team raised 'firqats', by enlisting surrendered or defected rebels and giving them carte-blanche in their efforts to penetrate rebel networks. Here too, Elkins notes, the British employed harsh tactics, such as poisoning wells and cutting off food supplies. Significantly, Elkins proposes that in Northern Ireland, where British forces could not resort to such extreme measures, their success in breaking down terrorist networks was limited.

Elkins agrees that, from a military perspective, the recent Bush administration strategies and operations may be on the right track. American forces conducting British-inspired 'low-intensity operations' could help win the war on terror. However, Elkins believes that Britain's long-term strategies seem inappropriate for contemporary American foreign policy. Advisors from Britain's Colonial Office, who were central to the civilian control of security operations (indeed one of the key principles for counterinsurgency operations), often played a hand in drafting the new constitutions and legal systems that institutionalised coercion and political subjugation in Britain's former colonial states. Elkins states that in the final

accounting, repressive laws and undemocratic institutions, not peace and progress, are the primary bequest of the British to their one-time empire.

Elkins completes her article by noting that, not coincidentally, the Bush administration's war on terror is being waged in some of the same regions of the world. She notes that Condoleeza Rice has labelled Iran, Zimbabwe, Cuba, North Korea and Myanmar 'outposts of tyranny'. One of her responsibilities will presumably be to defend the practices—detentions in Guantanamo and commando death-squads in Iraq—that a strategy of low-intensity operations requires. Elkins would have us believe that, if history offers any lesson here, it may be that the real 'outposts of tyranny' are the institutions left behind by the colonial and military strategists in Britain's 20th-century empire.

Article	**'Who are Americans to Think that Freedom is Theirs to Spread?'**
Author	Michael Ignatieff, Harvard University
Publication Details	*New York Times Magazine*, 26 June 2005, pp. 42–7

SYNOPSIS

As Carr Professor of Human Rights at the Kennedy School of Government, Michael Ignatieff brings unique perspective to the long-term Jeffersonian project of spreading Republican democracy, implicit in US foreign policy since the Declaration of Independence in 1776. Ignatieff's exploration is couched in the mythology and reality of Thomas Jefferson's life—that 'slave-owning apostle of liberty'. Since the scandals over prisoner interrogation and detention in the war on terror and in Iraq, 'many Americans and a lot of the world [are] wondering whether Jefferson's vision of America hasn't degenerated into an ideology of self-congratulation, whose function is no longer to inspire but to lie'.

After a Cold War of support for dictators and autocrats, the words of American freedom ring hollow to those in Central America, the Middle East and Africa. And when the American President preaches God's plan for humanity, the world does not listen without justified scepticism. France, Russia and England have learnt from their (failed) imperial projects, leaving Jefferson's dream of spreading democracy the last imperial ideology, 'the sole survivor of national claims to universal significance'.

Ignatieff's real coup is to map the recent shifts in US policies toward exporting 'democracy' and 'freedom'—trends starting with Ronald Reagan and leading naturally to George W. Bush. The dark side of this shift has been an increasingly conservative, religious and ideological slant to US policies, such as cutting funds to international aid groups that promote condoms or offer abortions. Does the world

aspire to live free, governed by means of their own choosing? Probably yes, and this is the core of Jefferson's dream. Is the United States the best vehicle for spreading the dream: maybe. Why? 'American freedom aspires to be universal, but it has always been exceptional because America is the only modern democratic experiment that began in slavery.'

Article	**'Rethinking Military History'**
Author	Jeremy Black, Professor of History, University of Exeter
Publication Details	*RUSI Journal*, vol. 150, no. 3, April 2005, pp. 60–3

SYNOPSIS

Jeremy Black's article is a highly conceptual discussion of the need for change in the field of military history. Black makes the case that Western concepts of history, when applied to warfare, often result in a very deterministic perspective. The weakness of this conceptualisation of war is that it places too much emphasis on weapons and systems of organisation, rather than the human or cultural factors that lie at the heart of conflict. Even when Western military historians attempt to deal with cultural factors, the definitions they employ do not permit a detailed understanding of factors outside their own cultural experience.

The author believes that the cultural perspective in military history is not without value. However, for military history to become more useful to armed forces in the current security environment, there will have to be a rethinking of traditional concepts of the discipline. In the main, military history supplies answers rather than posing questions. Black says that the discipline of military history must move away from this prescriptive cast and adopt a more evocative and descriptive quality—history as questioning, not history as an answer. There are some major obstacles to achieving this goal, many of which relate to the discipline of military history itself. Primary among these is the general lack of introspection common in military historical writing. Black traces this problem to the discipline's strong attachment to the narrative form as well as the popularity of this form with publishing houses and readers. He concludes that military historians must begin to see themselves as operating within an intellectual discipline that deals with change and contingency, thus providing an interpretation of the character of the past, rather than the certitude presented by an unvarying data set.