



Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected readings from the world's military journals

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Compiled by:



The CA's Introduction

Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.



Editor's Note

Please note that the Chief of Army's Conference will be held in Canberra on 22 and 23 September.

Chief of Army Conference 2005

22-23 September, National Convention Centre, Canberra

DAY 1: NEW DIMENSIONS IN STRATEGY AND MILITARY POWER

Session:	Title:	Speaker:
0800	Conference Registration - National Convention Centre, Canberra	
0830-0845	Welcome Address	Chief of Army
0845-0930	Keynote 'Strategy and Campaigning: Ends, Ways and Means'	Major General Jonathan Bailey, British Army, Retd
0930-1015	'Military Power and Strategic Decision'	Dr Stephen Biddle, US Army War College
1015-1045	Morning Tea	
1045-1130	'New Strategic Dimensions for Australia'	Dr Rod Lyon, University of Queensland
1130-1215	'The New Geopolitics of Asia: Implications for Australian Security'	Professor Robyn Lim, Nazan University, Japan
1215-1315	Lunch	
1315-1400	'Australia and ANZUS'	Professor William Tow
1400-1500	Panel: 'Military Power and the Emerging Strategic Balance in Asia'	<i>India:</i> Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi, Retd, Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), India <i>China:</i> Dr You Ji, University of New South Wales, Sydney <i>Japan:</i> Dr Alan Dupont, Lowy Institute, Sydney
1500-1530	Afternoon Tea	
	Panel: Insurgency and the Future of War	
1530-1700	'The Sling and the Stone: <i>Fourth Generation Warfare</i> ' Colonel T. X. Hammes, US National Defence University	'In Defence of Classicalism: Strategy, Insurgency and the Future of War' Dr Michael Evans, Land Warfare Studies Centre
1830-1900	NETWORKING DRINKS Foyer of National Convention Centre	
1900-2230	CONFERENCE DINNER Speaker: HE, Major General Michael Jeffery, Governor General of Australia	

DAY 2: NEW DIMENSIONS IN WARFIGHTING AND MILITARY OPERATIONS

Session:	Title:	Speaker:
0830-0915	'The Nature of War in the Early 21 st Century'	Major General Jim Molan
0915-1000	'Urban Operations in the 21 st Century'	Dr Alice Hills, Leeds University
1000-1030	Morning Tea	
1030-1115	' <i>OPERATION LICORNE</i> Recent French Peace Enforcement Operations in Côte d'Ivoire'	Brigadier Jean-Albert Epitalon Head of Army International Relations Branch, French Army Headquarters
1115-1200	'Chemical, Biological and Radiological Threats'	Mr Jehudah Fehlauer NATO CBR Adviser
1200-1300	Lunch	
1300-1400	Australian Operations Panel	<i>Army Perspective:</i> Land Commander, Australia <i>RAN Perspective:</i> Maritime Commander, Australia <i>RAAF Perspective:</i> Air Commander Australia
1400-1445	'The Australian Federal Police Regional Counter-terrorism Strategy'	Assistant Commissioner Ben McDevitt, Australian Federal Police
1445-1515	Afternoon Tea	
1515-1645	Panel Discussion: 'Trends in Training, Leadership and Professional Military Education for the 21 st Century'	<i>Training:</i> Major General Richard Wilson, Training Command – Army <i>Leadership:</i> Dr Leonard Wong, US Army War College <i>Education:</i> Dr Russell Parkin, LWSC
1645-1700	Closing Address	Chief of Army

Article	'Boots on the Ground: The Impact of Stability Operations on the Armies That Must Conduct Them'
Author	Major General Jonathon P. Riley
Publication Details	Heritage Lectures No. 893, Delivered June 18, 2005. Published by the Heritage Foundation August 08, 2005, http://www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/hl893.cfm

SYNOPSIS

Major General Jonathon Riley is the Commanding General, Multinational Division (South-East) and General Officer Commanding British Forces Iraq. In the lecture, delivered in Paris, he presents a divisional commander's view, and recollections of, service in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans. He describes all these operations as complex; involving kinetic warfighting, counter-insurgency, information operations, humanitarian support, civil-military cooperation and security-sector reform all running concurrently in the same battlespace.

Riley begins by addressing the challenges faced by the 'division' as a legacy structure, in his view the lowest level at which deep (shaping), close (decisive) and rear (sustainment) operations are organised, and the lowest level that plans and conducts operations simultaneously. Today, the divisional level of command must concern itself with a variety of tasks much wider than the simple introduction of kinetic violence into the battlespace. Riley is concerned that this sort of complexity raises a question about the British Army's training at formation level. He is unsure that the claim of 'training for worst case' (i.e. warfighting) is true. The entire collective training regime and output is based on the maxim that warfighting is the most demanding activity, and all other operations are seen as stepping down. Riley contends that counter-insurgency and Operations Other Than War are in fact more complex and just as demanding in other ways.

Warfighting requires weapons systems that deliver destructive effect. Operations Other Than War require arguably a far greater range of capabilities and individual skills to ensure success. Riley's observation is that this level of capability and complexity is rarely practiced during collective training in the British Army. He does not advocate stopping combined-arms training, nor does he underestimate the importance of preparing and equipping for war. However, he does suggest that the traditional approach to training must be modified to take account of the most demanding situation that will actually face the man on the ground, and not the most demanding situation that will ever face the British Army.

Riley presents a range of opinions on the multinational angle of contemporary military operations, the demands of security sector reform (including military and police models), the proper role of civil police, the difference between consent and enforcement in counter-insurgency operations, and the importance of Civil-Military Cooperation teams in reconstruction.

Riley concludes by considering how the experience of operations in northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Iraq has changed the British Army. On the positive side, the British Army has learned to delegate authority to lower levels, has learned how to deal with the media, has become used to uncertainty and cultural asymmetries, and has become reasonably good at switching from fighting to post-conflict activities. At the same time, Riley contends that they have taken risks with warfighting capability, sacrificing training for the general in order to prepare for the particular, and that they have become very subject to the long political screwdriver. He finishes by noting that the British Government and high-command have consistently failed to recognise that, while embracing a degree of high-technology, forces should not abandon all those low-tech skills built up over the years of operational experience.

Article	'Campaign Design for Winning the War and the Peace'
Author	Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre Lessard (Canadian Forces)
Publication Details	<i>Parameters</i> , vol. XXXV, no. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 36–48

SYNOPSIS

Pierre Lessard's article is concerned with the relationship between campaign design and strategic ends. The author is a member of the directing staff of the Canadian Forces in Toronto and has served in both Germany and Bosnia. Lessard believes that there is currently fault-line between strategy and operational art, and thus the 'current Western interpretation of campaign design must reunite with its strategic roots of ends and means in its quest to seek ways of winning both the war and the peace'.

Lessard argues that current interpretations of campaign design have a fixation on an enemy's centre of gravity, a concept that is being challenged in modern operations. The diffusion of the enemy across the conflict environment has made it harder to find sufficient connectivity between those elements that must exist for the centre of gravity concept to work. Despite this factor, a focus among many Western armies on the centre of gravity still exists and is separating campaign designs from overall strategic objectives. The 'danger is when the importance of the centre of gravity is elevated above that of strategic objectives, to the point that it acts as a pole of attraction for many other elements of campaign design.'

Lessard first asks what is strategy? Adopting Liddell-Hart's famous definition, the author sees strategy as 'the art of distributing military means to fulfil the ends of policy.' Therefore, the question becomes what exactly are 'the ends'? Lessard outlines the difficulties of defining the ends, including lack of clarity provided, the

dynamic nature of strategy and differing personalities trying to interpret the objectives. Lessard argues that ‘acknowledging the inherent difficulties – and even incoherence – of strategy leads us to a new campaign design model.’

Lessard’s idea of campaign design involves linking ‘a single set of evolving Campaign Termination Conditions linking Campaign Objectives directly to policy goals.’ Within this, lines of operations are drawn not between actions and supporting operations, but between effects and their relationship with the campaign objectives and termination conditions. Lessard also comments on the importance of aligning both military and civil efforts to the same campaign objectives and termination conditions. Coalition operations in Iraq are used as an example to demonstrate how such a campaign design may be applied and the potential benefits it can deliver.

Article	‘Legal Opinion on the Status of Non-Combatants and Contractors under International Humanitarian Law and Australian Law’
Author	Professor Donald Rothwell, Challis Professor of International Law, University of Sydney
Publication Details	Available from Australian Strategic Policy Institute, http://www.aspi.org.au/pdf/ASPIlegalopinion_contractors.pdf

SYNOPSIS

This article presents a legal opinion about the status of non-combatants and contractors under international humanitarian law and Australian law. The opinion was commissioned by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) as research for its publication *War and Profit; Doing Business on the Battlefield*.

Rothwell starts by outlining the international law framework that is applicable for Australia in its consideration of the status of non-combatants and contractors. From there he moves on to examine a number of issues and different situations affecting the legal obligations and rights of contractors, non-combatants and the ADF in a conflict zone. The topics covered by the opinion include:

- The Status of Civilians in Armed Conflict
- Armed Civilians and their status under international law
- Protections enjoyed by Civilian Contractors and ADF obligations
- Operation of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols in Conflict Transition Zones
- Status of Force Agreements and Civilian Contractors
- Regulation of Australian-based operators in foreign conflict zones
- Extraterritorial operation of the Defence Force Discipline Act
- Extraterritorial operations of the Crimes (Overseas) Act 1964

Rothwell covers each topic in detail, explaining the difference between the law as applied in an international conflict and a non-intrastate context.

Article	'Understanding Islamism'
Author	International Crisis Group
Publication Details	Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report no 37, 2 March 2005, < http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3300&l=1 >

SYNOPSIS

This report is concerned with analysing different forms of Islamism, with the aim of providing a greater appreciation of the threats facing the West. The report starts by noting that official commentary, following 11 September 2001, has tended to lump all forms of Islamism together. This tendency has ignored the fact that Islamism, or Islamic activism, covers a wide variety of different perspectives and beliefs. The article focuses on achieving a level of analytical clarity by outlining important differences between the various types of Islamic activism.

The starting point is to distinguish between Shiite and Sunni Islamism. Shiism is a minority variant of Islam and Shiites predominantly find themselves as minorities within states. This has seen Islamic Activism among the Shiite community largely directed at defending the interests of the Shiite community in relation to other populations and the state. The leading political role within this community is traditionally played by scholars and religious authorities, (*'ulama*). The Shiites are considered to be remarkably unified in their approach and beliefs.

In contrast, Sunni Islamism has been often portrayed as unified in their commitment to fundamentalism, and the biggest threat to the West. This idea, however, ignores the fact that Sunni Islamism is not monolithic and has crystallised into three distinctive types: the political, missionary and *jihadi*. 'All these varieties of Sunni activism are attempts to reconcile tradition and modernity, to preserve those aspects of tradition considered to be essential by adapting in various ways to modern conditions; all select from tradition, borrow selectively from the West and adopt aspects of modernity. Where they differ is in how they conceive the principal problem facing the Muslim world'.

Political Islamists focus on 'Muslim misgovernment and social injustice and give priority to political reform to be achieved by political action'. Missionary Islamists 'make an issue of the corruption of Islamic values and the weakening of faith and give priority to a form of moral and spiritual rearmament that champions individual virtue as the condition of good government as well as of collective salvation'. Jihadi Islamists 'make an issue of the oppressive weight of non-Muslim political and military power in the Islamic world and give priority to armed resistance'. The

problem of which of these three forms will prevail is becoming an increasingly important question for both the Muslim world and the West.

The report ends with a warning: ‘While the West in general and the US in particular ought to be modest about their ability to shape the debate among Islamists, they should also be aware of how their policies affect it. By adopting a sledge-hammer approach which refuses to differentiate between modernist and fundamentalist varieties of Islamism, American and European policy-makers risk provoking one of two equally undesirable outcomes: either inducing the different strands of Islamic activism to band together in reaction, attenuating differences that might otherwise be fruitfully developed, or causing the non-violent and modernist tendencies to be eclipsed by the *jihadis*’.

Article	‘Network-Enabled Battle Command’
Author	Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, US Army
Publication Details	<i>Military Review</i> , vol. LXXXI, no. 3, May–June 2005, pp 2-5, < http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/download/English/MayJun05/wallace.pdf >

SYNOPSIS

This article is concerned with the relationship between Network Centric Operations (NCO) and Command. The author is Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, the Commanding General of the Combined Arms Centre at Fort Leavenworth. He has served in various command and staff positions in the continental United States, Vietnam, Germany and Iraq.

The article begins by noting the paradoxical nature of technological innovation in military transformation. On the one hand such innovations can help overcome existing challenges on the battlefield, but on the other hand they present new challenges. The article then demonstrates how NCO solves old problems but creates new challenges for command on the battlefield. ‘The problem that NCO helps solve in a dramatic way is situational understanding of the battlefield and support to decision-making at every level of command’. While doing this ‘the network-centric concept [also] introduces a dangerous temptation to shift responsibility for making military decisions from commanders to the systems themselves’.

Wallace believes that the best way to conceptualise NCO is a commander-centric approach, whereby the emphasis is on the human and not the technological. The benefits offered by NCO do not remove the need for the commander to use the judgement and instincts acquired during years of training and personal experience. Wallace writes that ‘in exercising leadership the commander combines the art and science of warfare in thinking and action: the science deals with facts and processes

based on principles derived from the physical world – this is where the network is the most useful: the art emphasises using intuitive faculties that are acquired from education, training and experience and personal observation.’

Wallace concludes by arguing that the advantages of using a network in military operations are numerous and should be recognised. The benefits listed include an increase in situational awareness of the battlefield, a greater sharing of information and an increased ability of a commander to reach different elements on the battlefield. However, Wallace adds ‘despite the benefits of using a network, it would be folly to lose sight of the fact that it is still merely a tool to aid the commander in understanding and decision making.’ He concludes that, ‘At the end of the day, the commander must exercise the art of the Battle Command using the best available information in an uncertain environment to make tough decisions that put soldiers’ lives on the line.’

Article	‘Developing National Resilience’
Author	Sir David Omand, former UK Cabinet Office Security and Intelligence Co-Ordinator
Publication Details	<i>RUSI Journal</i> , August 2005, vol. 150, no. 4, pp. 14–18

SYNOPSIS

This article is based on an address that the author delivered before the July suicide attacks in London. He begins by defining resilience as, ‘the capacity to absorb shocks and to bounce back into functioning shape, or at least...to prevent stress fractures or even system collapse. Governments have a role in fostering resilience because, as the author states it is ‘an undoubted public good.’

However, in developing national resilience there are many factors that need to be taken into consideration. Managing the risks involved is not open to simple calculations and, with the complex responsibilities for security spread across many areas of government, there is a danger that important issues will be overlooked because they fall outside the boundaries of departmental budgetary guidelines. This consideration means that there is a real requirement for ‘visionary’ leadership from the nation’s political leaders in order to create a consensus around a well-defined strategic purpose. Omand likens this requirement to translating the military concept of commander’s intent into a civil context.

The article next considers the role of technology in aiding the development of resilience. Surveillance technologies have been employed in the UK to reduce risk in areas such as unsecured radiological devices in industry and other measures have been used to identify and protect critical components of national infrastructure such as telecommunications, power, water and banking. The important point that Omand makes in this area is that the future application of technology to such purposes is

limited by two factors: a paucity of imagination and, failure to win public support for the risk management strategies adopted.

These are important matters for counter-terrorism strategies, especially in the light of the demonstrated propensity for terrorists to deliver massive attacks in major cities in the attempt to destroy the sense of security of those who must live and work there. Moreover, as Omand points out, due to modern management practices, much the flexibility and spare capacity that nations could once call on in a crisis has been removed. This factor alone makes a society such as Britain more vulnerable to the shocks of terrorist attack on vital infrastructure.

Omand believes that one way in which a complex society can build greater resilience is by creating a public consensus that will be able to insulate it against the worst strategic shocks. By working with all elements of the society — industry, the professions local government, etc — the national government should attempt to create an understanding of the main types of risk, not just in the short term, but also for the medium and long term. While not all the dangers identified will be preventable, just engaging in the process will enable the national government to project a sense of leadership and build public trust and confidence in the government's readiness to deal with large-scale emergencies. In addition, the process will allow the government to understand the direction in which industry and commerce are being led by economic pressures and develop its legislations programs accordingly.

The article concludes with Omand stressing the central role of government in building national resilience is by providing strategic leadership, in the area of counter-terrorism, but also more widely in general public security. However, while the government must lead this process, industry, academia, the emergency services and the general public all have a role to play in developing the nation's course of action.

Article	'The Road to Mission Command: The Genesis of a Command Philosophy'
Author	Dr Stephen Bungay, a Director of the Ashridge Strategic Management Centre
Publication Details	<i>British Army Review</i> , no. 137, Summer 2005, pp. 22–28

SYNOPSIS

As the title suggests, this article is an historical analysis of the evolution of the concept of mission command and its use in the German, US and British Armies. While the bulk of the article traces the development of this philosophy of command from the defeat of Prussia by France in 1806, the narrative is interspersed by analysis that highlights why mission command evolved to meet the highly competitive demands of modern warfare.

The main concepts of the philosophy are examined and placed in their original context, illustrating that the process of development lasted well over one hundred years. The author identifies the importance of training and education in creating leaders capable of dealing with the autonomy that lies at the heart of the philosophy. Contrasts with competing ideas of command are drawn to demonstrate the importance of trust in mission command ideal.

The article concludes by stating that the human mind has evolved to deal rationally with anarchic situations. Mission command, because it places humans at the centre of decision making, is the most appropriate philosophy for coping with the chaos and complexity of warfare.

Article	‘The Lost Meaning of Strategy’
Author	Hew Strachan, Chichele Professor of the History of War, Oxford
Publication Details	<i>Survival</i> , vol. 47, no. 3, Autumn 2005, pp. 33–45

SYNOPSIS

The author is the Director of the Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War. In this article he provides an examination of the shifting meaning of the word ‘strategy’ over the past three centuries. Strachan despairs that *strategy* has become synonymous with *policy*: ‘The word ‘strategy’ has acquired a universality which has robbed it of meaning, and left it only with banalities.’

He highlights the current usage, drawing examples from the Bush Administration (‘the forward strategy of freedom’), the Blair Government (‘the UK’s strategy for policy, public service delivery and organisational priorities’), and the business studies and publishing industries (*Sun Tzu: the Art of War for Managers – 50 Strategic Rules*). Strachan then looks at the classical understanding of the term ‘strategy’, which was traditionally the art of the leader in war. He traces the origins of the modern usage to the bifurcation of war in the 17th and 18th centuries into ‘strategy’ and ‘tactics’. This process was a product of the professionalisation of armies and the intellectual movement referred to as the Enlightenment. Strachan notes that the works of Clausewitz and Jomini begin to codify this change: ‘Strategy was only one of three components which made up war – the central element sandwiched between national policy on the one hand and tactics on the other. Each was separate, but the three had to be kept in harmony.’

He then raises the question of ‘the operational art’ in the Western tradition and understanding, how it fits in with ‘strategy’ and ‘policy’. He also examines the use of the term strategy by Liddell Hart, J.F.C. Fuller, Julian Corbett, Alfred Thayer Mahan, and the French admiral Raoul Castex. Modern understandings of ‘strategy’ and

‘policy’ came from different contexts (instrumental rather than existential perspectives such as Clausewitz), thus further complicating the meaning of the term. This problem was further exacerbated during the Cold War. Nuclear weapons and the works of strategists such as Thomas Schelling concentrated on the narrow idea of ‘deterrence’. He believes that during this period, the term ‘Strategy was appropriated by politicians and diplomats, by academics and think-tank pundits, and it became increasingly distant from the use of the engagement for the purposes of the war.’

In concluding, Strachan attempts to offer a way forward: ‘The state therefore has an interest in re-appropriating the control and direction of war. That is the purpose of strategy. Strategy is designed to make war useable by the state, so that it can, if need be, use force to fulfil its political objectives...Awesome military power requires concepts for the application of force that are robust because they are precise.’