



# Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected readings from the world's military journals

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Compiled by:





## The CA's Introduction

**Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.**

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'G. G. G.' followed by a long, sweeping flourish that extends downwards and to the right.



<b>Article</b>	<b>‘Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars’</b>
<b>Author</b>	Lieutenant General James Mattis, USMC and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Hoffman, USMCR, Retd
<b>Publication Details</b>	US Naval War College, <i>Proceedings</i> , vol. 132, no. 1233, November 2005, pp. 18–19

### SYNOPSIS

This article begins by noting that, due to recent operational experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, defence organisations in Washington are less likely to think of defence transformation purely in terms of technology and Revolutions in Military Affairs. The authors also point out that, while social, political and technological factors can influence the character of a conflict, they do not alter its basic nature.

The new American National Defence Strategy (NDS) considers threats in four categories: traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive. The current Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) is seeking to set priorities for the US Armed Forces in the context of these threats. In the past, emphasis on the more traditional threats has seen the United States (US) develop conventional capabilities that can outmatch conventional adversaries. However, this conventional dominance has provided the spur for state and non-state actors who want to oppose the US to select their tactics and techniques from a combination of all four categories, but especially the irregular, catastrophic and disruptive domains. The conflicts resulting from this merger of modes of warfare will be what the authors call Hybrid Wars.

The authors believe that, in order to be successful in this type of conflict, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces will need to be able to fight outside the neat distinctions outlined in the NDS. Taking General Krulak’s Three-Block War model as a starting point, Mattis and Hoffman add a new dimension – the Four-Block War. The added dimension is the psychological or information operations aspects of Hybrid Wars - a dimension in which troops may not be physically present, but are still able to communicate their message. This concept is based on the belief that insurgencies are wars of ideas and the US must be able to combat the enemy in this area, as well as in any physical battlespace. Troops need to be trained to send the right messages in order to combat enemy ideologies and perceptions and thus influence the civilian population among which such wars will be fought. Key tools in this battle will be cultural awareness and language training. Technology will play a part in these conflicts, but the human aspect will be dominant in winning the battle. The authors conclude that the troops who will win these Hybrid Wars must learn to read cultural terrain with the same skill as they can now read physical terrain.



<b>Article</b>	<b>'British Defence Policy and Doctrine: Expeditionary Operations in the Modern Era'</b>
<b>Author</b>	Lieutenant General Sir Robert Fry
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>RUSI Journal</i> , vol. 150, no. 6, December 2005, pp. 60–3

### SYNOPSIS

Sir Robert Fry outlines the recent British experience in expeditionary operations and how it will colour the immediate future of operations and commitments. He defines expeditionary operations as being 'the projection of military power over extended lines of communication into a distant operational area to accomplish a specific objective'. The article's main thesis is that, given her geography and the fact that she does not have to defend exposed land borders, Britain has been able to conduct a series of sustained expeditionary operations from the mid-seventeenth century through to the present day. In short, Britain is able to 'take as much or as little of war' as she wishes and to 'conduct operations on the ground of her political, economic and military choosing, displaced from the metropolitan centre of gravity, where even military defeat [won't] strategically compromise the homeland'.

Contemporary expeditionary operations fall into four distinct phases: conflict prevention or preparation; conflict; post-conflict; and the restoration of indigenous governance. Citing the example of the Balkans, Fry highlights the fact that the transition between these phases can be protracted and the overall period of conflict management can extend to a decade or more. Iraq provides a different model, where consent may be finite and the creation of indigenous political structures is driven by greater personal and confessional ambition than was seen in the Balkans.

Fry notes that, in the physical conduct of operations, the asymmetric advantage that the West brings to the formed conventional battlefield is overwhelming. Yet, as soon as operations extend beyond the conflict phase into the more subtle and insidious conditions of post-conflict, the asymmetric advantage on the unconventional battlefield turns to the terrorist, the dissident or the insurgent. This asymmetric paradox is one of the key issues that must be addressed in the transition between phases and the sustained conduct of post-conflict operations. Fry cautions about Network-Enabled Capability (NEC), stating that NEC simply compounds the asymmetric advantage enjoyed during the combat phase. However, NEC does not change the terms of engagement at either the tactical or the operational level. What NEC needs to do is to address the asymmetric disadvantage in the post-conflict phase.

In drawing lessons from the British experience in Fallujah, Fry claims that the British failed to apply their tactical doctrines to operational effect in pursuit of strategic goals. Tempo is the key to the conflict phase; however, when it comes to transition between



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rather than within phases, Britain failed in Iraq and showed herself unable to adapt its tactical doctrine to the particular operational circumstances. Had British forces been able to maintain the tempo of the conflict in the post-conflict operations, Fry argues that the insurgency, which was given time and space to form, would have remained dislocated.

<b>Article</b>	<b>‘Gaining the Knowledge to Win’</b>
<b>Author</b>	Lieutenant Colonel James P. West, USMC
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Marine Corps Gazette</i> , vol. 89, issue 12, December 2005, pp. 10–12

### SYNOPSIS

Lieutenant Colonel West’s article emphasises the importance of intelligence in war fighting: knowing both your own strengths and weaknesses and that of the enemy. He observes that too many people confuse knowledge with information. According to the author, the key to success is the timely acquisition, analysis and distribution of relevant information. West’s main thesis is that network-centric operations are the pathways towards ensuring the relevance and reach of information relevant to the battlespace.

West uses a detailed case study to illustrate his point. He concludes that the main goal is to get the relevant information to the lowest tactical level. West notes that individual Marines and units are already generating intelligence so that they can provide more robust reporting up and down the chain of command. In the context of USMC operations West stresses the creation of an approach in which ‘every Marine is a rifleman, every Marine is a logistician and communicator, and every Marine is an intelligence collector’.

<b>Article</b>	<b>‘Combat Health Support in the Army’s First Stryker Brigade’</b>
<b>Author</b>	Major Scott Doboszenski, US Army
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Army Logistician</i> , vol. 37, issue 1, January-February 2005, pp. 4–9 < <a href="http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb05/combat_support.html">http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JanFeb05/combat_support.html</a> >

### SYNOPSIS

This article begins by noting that doctrine is only ever a starting point for the procedures that will be employed on operations. The requirement to adapt arises,



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especially in conflicts such as Iraq, from the need to combat enemy tactics that play to their strengths and target the vulnerability of their opponents. The article then goes on to detail how Combat Health Support (CHS) was provided to the US Army's 3/2 Brigade Combat Team (BCT) operations in Iraq by the 296th Brigade Support Battalion from November 2003 to November 2004.

The 296th Battalion's assets were able to provide Level II medical support, with capabilities including:

- emergency dental care;
- limited x-ray facilities and laboratory services;
- evacuation and support elements; and
- medical operating systems focused on treatment of soldiers in the brigade's forward area.

Other unique assets included:

- medical logistics;
- mental health;
- preventive medicine sections; and
- two specialist personnel:
  - a medical-surgical nurse in charge of the patient holding section; and
  - a physical therapist.

During its time in Iraq elements of the 296th operated from six separate bases, which was a major departure from its training experiences at the National Training Centre and the Joint Readiness Training Centre in the United States. Split-base operations greatly enhanced the unit's flexibility, with resources being allocated on assessments of the degree of risk in the mission being supported, the proximity of the Area of Operations (AO) to hospitals and other relevant criteria. Normally, CHS is centrally located, but the 296th's allocation of resources was based on those units and missions with the greatest likelihood of trauma so that the ability to stabilise and evacuate combat and other casualties was maximised.

Similarly, with responsibility for the mental health of over 5 000 soldiers, assets were distributed in forward locations throughout the brigade's AO. This allocation allowed for early treatment and minimised evacuation from both the AO and Theatre. Similarly, preventive health specialists supported unit 13 separate Forward Operating Base (FOB) locations providing health surveillance, inspection and consultation services for the brigade. The article also discusses patient holding, physical therapy, dental and other medical support functions. Specialist IT programs were used to track, manage and report on medical operations and logistics, with mixed success. Due to the Improvised Explosive Device threat, 'soft-skinned' vehicles were not used for medical evacuation, with most casualty evacuation being done by UH-60 Black Hawk MEDEVAC helicopters.



During its year-long deployment the 296th faced many operational changes and had to respond with flexibility to both the demands of the supported brigade and the nature of the enemy's operations and threats. However, as the author points out, by adjusting their doctrine to meet both the needs of the soldiers they were supporting and the enemy threat, the 296th was able to ensure the best chance of survival for members of the 3/2 BCT.

<b>Article</b>	<b>'Countering Global Insurgency'</b>
<b>Author</b>	Lieutenant Colonel David Kilcullen
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Small Wars Journal</i> website, November 2004, < <a href="http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf">http://www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen.pdf</a> >

### SYNOPSIS

This article proposes a new strategic approach to the global War on Terrorism. The author argues that the War on Terrorism is best understood as a global insurgency, initiated by a diffuse grouping of Islamist movements that seek to re-make Islam's role in the world order. They use terrorism as their primary but not their sole tactic. Therefore counterinsurgency rather than traditional counter-terrorism may offer the best approach to defeating global *jihad*. However, classical counter-insurgency, as developed in the 1960s, is designed to defeat insurgency in a single situation or country. The doctrine demands measures – coordinated political-military response, integrated regional and inter-agency measures, protracted commitment to a course of action – that cannot be achieved at the global level in today's international system. Therefore, a traditional counterinsurgency paradigm will not work for the present War: instead, a fundamental reappraisal of counterinsurgency is needed, in order to develop methods that are effective against a globalised counter-insurgency.

Since the 1960s scientists have developed new approaches to systems analysis, based on the emerging theory of complexity, which *does* provide means for handling a globalised threat. Complex systems analysis of insurgent systems may be the tool needed to develop a fundamentally new version of counter-insurgency for the War on Terror. By applying the branch of complexity theory that deals with organic systems, the article develops a model of insurgencies as biological systems. This model identifies key system elements and means to attack them. The model also allows insights into the system's dynamics of global insurgency, the enabling role of culture in insurgent systems, evolution and adaptation in insurgent groups, insurgent ecosystems, and the nature of the Islamist 'virtual state'. An historical survey of five previous counterinsurgency campaigns provides a tentative validation of this system's approach.



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The application of the model generates a new strategy for the War on Terrorism – disaggregation. Like containment strategy in the Cold War, a disaggregation strategy has different meanings in different theatres or at different times. However, as a strategy it provides a unifying conception for the current conflict. Disaggregation focuses on interdicting links between theatres, denying the ability of regional and global actors to link and exploit local actors, disrupting flows between and within *jihad* theatres, denying sanctuary areas, isolating Islamists from local populations and disrupting inputs from the sources of Islamism in the greater Middle East. This idea also gives rise to an operational concept: the aim of counterinsurgency (hence the war aim in this campaign) is to return the insurgency’s parent society to its normal mode of interaction, on terms favourable to the West. This concept demands an understanding of what ‘normality’ is for a given society, and a realisation that military measures only create preconditions for other elements of national power to resolve underlying issues. The systems model also generates practical insights; the need for a common strategic understanding; a constitutional path to address legitimate grievances; understanding of the global insurgent ecosystem and our role in it; a tailored analysis of each insurgency, and improved cultural capability.

<b>Article</b>	<b>‘Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations: U.S. Army Transformation needs to focus less on warfighting and more on developing a truly adaptive force’</b>
<b>Author</b>	Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Military Review</i> , vol. LXXXV, no. 6, November-December 2005, pp. 2–15 < <a href="http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/NovDec05/index.asp">http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/NovDec05/index.asp</a> >

### SYNOPSIS

This article assesses the United States Army’s approach to and conduct of operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) Phase 4, in order to demonstrate that, whilst not yet another Vietnam, Iraq does need to be recognised as a critical watershed in the Army’s development.

Section 1 of the article (entitled ‘The extent to which US Army performance in OIF Phase 4 has fuelled the insurgency’) analyses the Army’s activity from the defeat of Saddam’s forces in conventional combat until mid-2005 to identify relevant trends and determine their impact on campaign success. The most striking feature is that those non-Americans consulted considered that the Army was too ‘kinetic’ – that is, too inclined to consider offensive operations and destruction of the insurgents as the key to a given situation, without considering the impact of this mindset.



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Too much of the force remained conceptually in warfighting mode in the post-combat phase, and failed to understand that every soldier becomes a civil affairs operator in counterinsurgency (COIN) and stabilisation operations. Indeed, despite its own multicultural nature, the Army was not culturally attuned to the environment. The Army's approach contributed to the Coalition's failure to exploit success immediately after the fall of Saddam. Thereafter, the only effective, and morally acceptable, COIN strategy was to kill or capture all terrorists and insurgents. Indeed, there was a 'preference for large-scale kinetic manoeuvre' and 'focus on killing insurgents, not protecting the population'. Moreover, a sense of moral righteousness combined with emotional volatility that were rarely far from the surface, manifested as deep indignation that could distort collective military judgement. For instance, when American contractors were mutilated in Fallujah, US commanders and staff were so deeply affronted that they became fixed on the total destruction of the enemy. Under emotional duress, even the most broad-minded and pragmatic officer reverted to type: kinetic reactions.

The Army may espouse mission command, but in Iraq it did not practise it. If there was a common trend it was for micro-management. Planning tended to be staff-driven and focused on process rather than end effect. The net effect of this problem was a highly centralised decision-making method that all too readily created inertia and discouraged lower level initiative and adaptability, even when commanders tried to encourage both of these qualities. The laudable 'can do' approach paradoxically encouraged a damaging optimism and discouraged junior commanders from reporting unwelcome news up the chain of command. In addition, Army personnel instinctively turned to technology in order to solve problems. They especially seek means to minimise frequent close contact with the local population in order to enhance force protection, with the result that they were further alienated from the Iraqis.

Section 2 of the article (entitled 'The root causes of the OIF Phase 4 trends identified in Section 1') considers the trends in the context of the Army as a whole to determine fundamental causes of the behaviour being exhibited by the Army in OIF. The key cause identified by the analysis is the Army's enduring conventional warfighting focus. For many, COIN and stability operations have been considered a diversion, to be undertaken reluctantly, and preferably by Special Operations Forces (SOF) and other specialised units, many of whom are in the Army reserves. The Army has been uncompromising in its focus on conventional warfighting. However, this approach is particularly ill suited to the nuances of COIN and thus compounds the problem. Indeed, the Army's organisational culture has tended to discourage adaptation to roles deemed outside its primary mission, namely everything other than conventional warfighting. The institutional focus is on technology and searches for the quick, convenient solution, often at the expense of the less obvious but ultimately more enduring one. Matters have been exacerbated by the 'de-professionalisation' of the Army, a symptom of which was the so-called exodus of the captains commencing in the mid-1990s, in the light of job dissatisfaction that arose in large part from the Army's zero-defects culture.



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Section 3 of the article (entitled ‘Observations on US Army response to OIF lessons’) assesses the Army’s response to problems identified from its operational performance. The Army already intends to bolster junior leadership training and is considering adjusting the balance of the Army’s core focus to include Operations Other Than War. However, the Army’s predisposition to warfighting is so deeply ingrained that it will take many years to effect the necessary transformation. Symptomatic of the issue is the Army’s ‘Warrior Ethos’ which enjoins the soldier to have just the one type of interaction with his enemy: ‘to engage and *destroy* him’ - not *defeat*, which could permit a number of other politically attuned options, but *destroy*. Such an ethos is not helpful to soldiers who need to understand that on many occasions in unconventional situations they must be soldiers, not warriors.

<b>Article</b>	<b>‘The New Political Reality of Pre-Emptive Defence’</b>
<b>Author</b>	Doctor Karl-Heinz Kamp
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Canadian Military Journal</i> , vol. 6, no. 2, Summer 2005, pp. 76–8 < <a href="http://www.journal.dnd.ca/engraph/Vol6/no2/10-ViewsOpinions1_e.asp">http://www.journal.dnd.ca/engraph/Vol6/no2/10-ViewsOpinions1_e.asp</a> >

### SYNOPSIS

The article notes that the major reason for American support for pre-emptive strikes is the acknowledgment of a fundamentally changed threat situation, recognising the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), improved means of WMD delivery, and progress with respect to range and accuracy of delivery systems. However, the fundamental debate about pre-emption and pre-emptive strikes has been clouded for many people in the West by the specific case of the 2003 war in Iraq.

The traditional North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) principle of waiting for the proof of an opponent’s intention before activating defensive measures was valid during the Cold War, but this policy is increasingly questionable today, where the proof of an opponent’s intention may be the use of a chemical weapon in a major city. In American usage, a *pre-emptive* strike is made when a threat is imminent and is widely considered legitimate. Similarly, NATO’s new concept to fight terrorism (MC 472) implicitly recognises the merits of pre-emptive strikes against terrorist threats. However, in contrast to pre-emption, *preventive* strike assumes that offensive military action by the enemy will soon occur – and this assumption is normally difficult to justify.

Under the United Nation’s (UN) Charter, the use of force is only legitimate for the purpose of self-defence or if mandated by the UN Security Council. Yet events in Kosovo and Iraq have contradicted the classic interpretation of the charter. Instead of calling for formal rules, future actions must be more about interpretation and



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judgment premised on such criteria as the imminence of danger, the plausibility of the threat and the proportionality of the means – none of which is precisely measurable. Pre-emptive action can only be justified in a case where the threat is exceedingly urgent and immediate. Certain criteria can be established:

- The opponents intention to inflict harm must be evident.
- Preparations and relevant measures to realise his intention must be recognisable.
- It must be obvious that non-action dramatically increases the risk or makes later reactions almost impossible.

As a rule, information provided by the intelligence services must accurately portray the actual threat, as well as the intentions and ‘strategic culture’ of the opponent. In essence, extreme situations may indeed require a preventive deployment of military force. As a deterrent to the cavalier use of military might, such action must then be bound to concrete conditions for which political decision-makers can be held to account.

<b>Article</b>	<b>‘Multinational Division Central-South’</b>
<b>Author</b>	LtCol Robert Strzelecki
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Military Review</i> , Vol. LXXXV, No. 6, November-December 2005, pp. 32–34 < <a href="http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/NovDec05/index.asp">http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/NovDec05/index.asp</a> >

### SYNOPSIS

This article describes how Poland, as ‘a lead nation’ in an operational area decided to structure a multinational division with contingents from 24 nations and conduct a stabilisation mission. The first Polish rotation of 2300 soldiers deployed in June 2003 and took over responsibility for an area in the Central-South (CS) sector, covering one-fourth of the country with 3-5 million, predominantly Shiite inhabitants. Initially, the Multi-National Division (MND) included the Spanish-led 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), a Ukrainian led BCT and a Polish led BCT. By June 2005 the Polish contingent numbered 1600 troops, alongside 4600 from fifteen other nations that remained as part of the MND CS. To facilitate communication between elements the MND CS conducts its daily routine in English.

Among the operational lessons learnt, the author lists a need for improved human intelligence, better training for military police, more flexible logistics, advance development of civil affairs (CIMIC) and psychological warfare units, and a greater number of field hospitals, including a combat stress clinic. He also notes that ideally units should be light, armoured and rapidly deployable. One major difficulty noted in



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the article was that, in a multinational organisation such as MND CS, creating standing operating procedures (SOPs) is impossible because of participating countries' conflicting national regulations.

<b>Article</b>	<b>'Leveraging Actionable Intelligence: Increase the speed and quality of tactical decision-making'</b>
<b>Author</b>	LtCol Paul A. Shelton
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Marine Corps Gazette</i> , vol. 89, issue 12, December 2005, pp. 16–17

### SYNOPSIS

The Marine Corps accepts that 'every Marine on the battlefield is an intelligence source', but it has not developed the required institutional focused on training and resourcing tactical commanders at the battalion level and below to conduct intelligence operations as an intrinsic part of combat leadership. However, it is precisely those lower echelon leaders who operate in the most time-constrained environment on the battlefield and who need more actionable intelligence. The Marine Corps Combat Development Centre (MCCDC) recently directed the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities (CETO) to examine how to improve actionable intelligence at the battalion level and below level. The goal of the project is to change 'intelligence' from a noun – something commanders receive from higher headquarters - to a verb - something leaders at all levels actively execute to gain a critical advantage.

The draft definition of actionable intelligence is 'specific, relevant, perishable intelligence ... that helps the decision-maker gain a temporal, psychological, positional or physical advantage over the enemy. It has a qualitative essence, timeliness and specificity that, when linked with the on scene decision maker's situational awareness, provides a level of knowledge that facilitates a decision which enables desired effects.' In essence, this definition captures the requirement for the small-unit leader to conduct a dynamic fusion of information and intelligence from local and all other external sources in order to improve the speed and quality of his or her decisions. The study concluded that:

- Battalions/squadrons should be staffed to support 24/7 intelligence operations.
- Intelligence and radio battalions should continue to use task-organised support teams.
- Units below battalion/squadron level do not need dedicated intelligence personnel, but the company first sergeants should be formally cross-trained on actionable intelligence as prerequisites for appointment.
- Miniaturised but light and robust equipment should be provided to companies and battalions to furnish them with multifaceted collection capabilities. This



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equipment should include imagery platforms (for 'seeing over the hill') and signals intelligence platforms (to detect anomalous signals or changes in the environment) but light multidisciplinary collection capabilities.

<b>Article</b>	<b>'A Time for War: Australia as a Military Power'</b>
<b>Author</b>	John Birmingham
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Quarterly Essay</i> , issue 20, 2005

### SYNOPSIS

Novelist John Birmingham's essay examines the way in which public perception of the military in Australian society and the capabilities of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) have evolved. He argues that a significant part of the Australian public was 'radicalised' and became anti-military during the Vietnam era. As a result of this process, Birmingham believes that 'Australian governments lost confidence in the use of military force as an instrument of policy'. He also argues that, after a professional and successful deployment in East Timor, public admiration for General Peter Cosgrove, and support for the ADF's operations in Afghanistan, have put to rest the 'ghost' of Vietnam within the wider community.

His evidence for this shift in public perception is that, despite opposition to the ADF's involvement in Iraq, the public continued to support the Defence Force. Indeed, as Birmingham notes, 'opinion surveys continued to find the ADF the most trusted and respected of all Australian public institutions'. This level of support continues unabated through constant media reporting of corporate 'mismanagement' and 'failures in military justice'. Birmingham's point is that from the 'fall of Saigon to the battle of Shahikot ... a lot more has changed than just the ADF'.

A crucial implication of Birmingham's thesis is the rise of militarism in the Australian community. However, he is quick to highlight this does not mean that 'belligerence has become a defining attribute of the Australian character'. Nor does it mean 'Australian governments will view every threat or problem through a militarised prism'. He also feels that the change in public attitudes does not mean that the 'Australian people have become warlike or enthralled by military culture'. Birmingham believes the implications to be broader. He sees the shift in public opinion as an indicator of the growing maturity of Australia. The nation has come to a point where Australians 'feel confident, not just of their place in the world, but more importantly, of their ability to act decisively in it'.



<b>Article</b>	<b>'After the Fight: Inter-Agency Operations'</b>
<b>Author</b>	Christopher M. Schnaubelt
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Parameters</i> , vol. XXXV, no. 4, Winter 2005-06, pp. 47–61 < <a href="http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05winter/schnaube.pdf">http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05winter/schnaube.pdf</a> >

### SYNOPSIS

Schnaubelt argues that the 'post-major combat operations phase in Iraq is a stunning example of how the failure to effectively plan and execute inter-agency operations turned what started out as a rapid victory into a long, hard slog'. He does concede that the situation is not as dire as the 'media would have the American public believe', but there is clear evidence of a breakdown in the implementation of the post-combat operations or Phase IV planning. The article argues that inter-agency operations need to become one of the highest priorities for the US Department of Defense. The author reviews the post-combat strategy and provides an outline of the command-and-control relationships between the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Combined Joint Task Force-Seven (CTJF-7). He highlights that the CPA reported to the Defense Department rather than the Department of State. Interestingly, this arrangement arose from lessons learnt in Bosnia where the lack of coordination 'prolonged involvement of all parties'. While the Phase IV strategy was clear, ambiguity remained in the roles and authorities of the key agencies.

Schnaubelt explores the relationships and responsibilities of the CPA and the CTJF-7 as well as the cultural and procedural differences between the two organisations. He concludes that more needs to be done in terms of educating leaders, both military and civilian, about the nature of inter-agency operations. He also offers a model of effective inter-agency coordination based on the Embassy Inter-agency Planning Group implemented by Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan. Finally, the author echoes Marine Corps General Peter Pace's suggestion that an 'Inter-agency Goldwater-Nichols Act' might be necessary to force cultural and organisational change. Schnaubelt acknowledges the limitations of this approach but argues that 'tinkering around the edges' of becoming joint and further technological improvements in combat capability are no longer enough; a 'quantum leap to inter-agency operations' is required.