



# Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected readings from the world's military journals

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Compiled by:





## **The CA's Introduction**

**Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future.**

**The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.**

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'P.F. Leahy', with a long, sweeping underline.

**P.F. LEAHY**  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Army



<b>Article</b>	<b>'Planning Lessons from Afghanistan and Iraq'</b>
<b>Author</b>	Colonel Joseph Collins, National War College
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Joint Forces Quarterly</i> , Issue 41, 2nd quarter, 2006, pp. 10–14, <a href="http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4105.pdf">http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4105.pdf</a>

### SYNOPSIS

Colonel Collins is a professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. He begins his article by identifying nine shortcomings in the preparation and conduct of Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. He then highlights that many of these planning problems were also common to other complex contingencies such as Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Collins concludes that: '...in the future, we will have to adapt planning to a dynamic security environment and numerous challenges. Not only will we have to do better in mid-range interagency planning, but we will also have to develop and refine new capabilities to deal with the nonmilitary aspect of contingencies. In turn, this will require changes in the organizational cultures of the Armed Forces and the Department of State.'

Collins argues that the first step in the process of reform is for planners to appreciate the security environment in which future operations are likely to take place. This environment will require the armed forces to 'think beyond the last bullet of a climactic battle'. There is a need for the United States to become more proficient at 'bridging success in battle and victory in war'. Interagency solutions are required to cope with the concurrent activities of counterinsurgency, humanitarian assistance, stabilisation, civil governance, reconstruction, and an omnipresent media. He concludes that 'In the next decade, the need for effective joint, combined, and interagency planning will remain significant. Major institutional planning changes will require complementary changes in organizational cultures'.

Colonel Collins concludes with eight recommendations for improving mid-range planning:

1. 'we need a new charter for complex contingency planning';
2. 'every executive department should insist on interagency experience for its most senior civilians and make it mandatory for promotion to the senior



- executive or foreign service’ and ‘Interagency experience should count as the equivalent of joint experience for military officers’;
3. ‘we need a better system for exporting interagency groups to the field’;
  4. ‘the military establishment needs to focus its planning more on victory in war, not on success in climactic battles’;
  5. ‘the Department of State and USAID personnel and organizations need to become more operational (that is, able to lead in the management of grand enterprises in unsafe and austere environments)’;
  6. ‘for the State Department and USAID to become more operational, they must be better funded across the board’;
  7. ‘to get better at planning and executing complex contingencies, we will have to untangle the legal authorities that hobble the Departments of State and Defense’; and
  8. ‘to gain legitimacy and promote better burden sharing, the United States should make its most powerful allies full partners in complex operations’.

<b>Article</b>	<b>‘The US Military After Iraq—A Speculation’</b>
<b>Author</b>	Eliot Cohen
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>RUSI Journal</i> , vol. 151, no. 1, February 2006, pp. 20–22

### SYNOPSIS

The author makes clear that this article is, as its name implies, speculative. He has visited Iraq and has discussed the future of the US military with many of its senior officers. He believes that the war in Iraq will prove to be the defining experience for the current officer corps of the Army and the USMC. It represents a watershed in the development of the profession, as were the Civil War, World War Two and the Vietnam War. In his words, “Iraq is going to leave an imprint—profound and lasting—on the current generation of young officers, who in time will be taking over the Army and the other services.”

He is dismissive of the analogies with the Vietnam War, which have been invoked to suggest that the Army and Marine Corps are at breaking point. He argues that the US military has performed well in Iraq, notwithstanding being inadequately prepared for irregular warfare, which has intensified since the end of major conventional operations in 2003. Cohen contends that only



catastrophic defeat breaks military forces and this simply will not occur in Iraq.

In his view, the military has adapted well for the challenge of irregular warfare and has emerged battle-hardened by the operations in Iraq. While some junior officers are being promoted too early and the intelligence level of recruits has dropped slightly, those who argue that the military is being irreparably damaged by the Iraq War are mistaken.

He cites numerous positive indicators to differentiate the response of the military to the Iraq War from that of Vietnam, including drug abuse, internal conflict and a sense of futility among junior leaders. None of these phenomena, according to Cohen, are present today. Nor has the public esteem of the military been undermined by the war despite the divisiveness of the domestic political debate. Indeed, the strained relations between some senior officers and the Administration have reversed an undesirable trend towards political partisanship within the military that began during the Clinton presidency.

However, Cohen identifies serious, long-standing weaknesses in the professional military education system, which need to be rectified, especially in relation to understanding irregular warfare. He is concerned that the number of officers undertaking post-graduate education has 'fallen sharply'. However, he is encouraged that officers with recent direct experience of combat are urgently attempting to develop coherent doctrine to meet this challenge.

<b>Article</b>	<b>'Educating for the Future'</b>
<b>Author</b>	Colonel John A. Toolan, Director Command and Staff College, and Charles D. McKenna, Dean of Academics, CSC
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Marine Corps Gazette</i> , vol. 90, no. 2, February 2006, pp. 12–13

### SYNOPSIS

This brief article examines the ongoing evolution of studies at the USMC's Command and Staff College (CSC). Prompted by recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, which highlight the deficiencies in education exposed by these experiences, the CSC was 'challenged [by] the limited treatment of IW [Irregular Warfare] and were looking for



greater understanding regarding interagency operations, cultural intelligence, and improved campaign design techniques’.

By redesigning the curriculum to include more emphasis on both the Marine Corps Planning Process and the ‘cultural lens model’, the CSC was able to move from a ‘top-down’ approach (theoretical to practical) toward an integrated, concurrent program based around four themes: Language Training (particularly Arabic), Operational Art, Cultural and Interagency Operations, and Warfighting. The cultural lens model ‘highlights the importance of culture and how it impacts upon achieving progress.’ The new program culminates in a final exercise scenario, which for the 2005–06 year will be ‘to study the issues facing Iraq, with the objective of defeating the insurgency and restoring a stable environment’.

<b>Article</b>	<b>‘Transforming Officer Distance Professional Military Education’</b>
<b>Author</b>	Col. Terrence K. Kerrigan, USMC (ret.) and James I. Van Zummeren
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Marine Corps Gazette</i> , vol. 90, no. 2, February 2006, pp. 23–25

### SYNOPSIS

The US Marine Corps’ College of Continuing Education (CCE) has introduced a transformation strategy dubbed ‘Son of Seminar’. This means that they’re revamping the traditional method of self-paced correspondence education (the ‘box of books’) toward online seminar-based programs ‘to more closely parallel the learning experience of students in our residential schoolhouses’.

By introducing greater interaction between students and teachers—as well as more practical exercises, short writing assignments, seminar discussions, and student presentations—the program uses proven adult learning methodologies ‘to reinforce educational objectives while encouraging students to apply creative and critical thinking skills’.

Given the challenges of operational tempo and geographical distance, it is hoped that the new approach to teaching and learning will allow professional military education to become an ongoing career process, rather than a set of discrete events detached from work and family.



**Article** **‘Professional Military Education: A Valuable Tool for Preparing for War’**

**Author** Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Barr

**Publication Details** *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 90, no.1, January 2006, pp. 52–3

### SYNOPSIS

Professional Military Education (PME) is one aspect of training for war; however, it is too often the last consideration when training plans are developed. This article describes how one command has attacked this issue and underscores the relevance of PME in preparing for operations in Iraq.

Beginning in 2003, the Commanding Officer, Marine Aircraft Group 29 (MAG 29) initiated a program of instruction to better prepare field grade officers to fight the Global War on Terrorism. The PME syllabus adopted a building-block approach, incorporating a series of books, papers and lectures on Islam and Islamic terrorism, and featured a two-day commander’s cultural awareness seminar.

Cultural awareness is seen as the key to success on the battlefield. The article stresses the unequivocal fact that US forces do not understand the inner workings of Middle Eastern cultures, their attitudes and motivations. The local population must be viewed as ‘the key terrain’ that is being contested by both insurgents and the government. The PME syllabus provides the cornerstone for upcoming deployments and subsequent operations in Iraq.

**Article** **‘Cultural Education and the Reading Program’**

**Author** Captain Peter J. Munson

**Publication Details** *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 90, no. 1, January 2006, pp. 49–51

### SYNOPSIS

This article outlines the objectives of the US Marine Corps professional Reading Program. Due to the sensitive issues currently facing deployed Marines, the Corps deems it critical that professional reading address



regional issues in a framework that ‘serves as a bridge between an understanding of the strategic landscape and the unique decision-making requirements for each combat situation’. To achieve this goal, books on the list must be properly matched to operational requirements. This involves operational as well as cultural education.

The goal of cultural education is described as needing to be ‘rooted in explanations that make groups in other cultures, and their motivating issues, recognisable to Marines’. Even where other cultures appear hostile, there is a need to understand the viewpoint that creates these characteristics. Viewing every culture as an ‘exotic other’ yields no useful lessons for military operations.

Whilst the article focuses on ‘the Arab Mind’, its conclusions are valid for any culture. There is no book that provides a definitive starting point for understanding the complexities of any region. Whatever one uses as an entry point for regional studies, there are several issues to remember. In general, any work that describes a group as completely ‘exotic’ is likely to be unhelpful because a wholly unique culture yields no points of reference for outsiders. Fortunately, cultures are not wholly unique; people are subject to similar political, social and economic factors. The important factors from region to region are generally recognisable with a little study to understand how people view their circumstances.

The recommendations for cultural reading include the need to highlight works that provide Marines with insight not only into cultural differences but also the similarities that make others recognisable. Works should also provide ways of discerning between sub-groups and their specific motivations. Works must provide Marines with the ability to understand alternative viewpoints in cultures around the world. Finally, Marines must understand how civilians, insurgents and terrorists view events around them. These viewpoints cannot be ignored simply because we do not agree with them.



<b>Article</b>	<b>'Intelligence, Policy, and the War in Iraq'</b>
<b>Author</b>	Paul R. Pillar, Georgetown University
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Foreign Affairs</i> , vol. 85, Issue 2, March/April 2006, pp. 15–28, <a href="http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessav85202/paul-r-pillar/intelligence-policy-and-the-war-in-iraq.html">http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060301faessav85202/paul-r-pillar/intelligence-policy-and-the-war-in-iraq.html</a>

### SYNOPSIS

The author served with the Central Intelligence Agency as the national intelligence officer responsible for the Middle East from 2000 to 2005. He argues that the proper relationship between intelligence gathering and policy-making sharply separates the two functions. Ideally the intelligence community should collect information and evaluate its credibility prior to combining it with other information to make sense of situations that may impact on national security.

Although this ideal model is not always adhered to in practice, thus blurring this distinction. The Bush Administration completely repudiated this model in the lead up to the Iraq War. According to the author the Administration did not use intelligence to inform decision-making but rather to justify a decision already made.

Indeed, the author rejects the assertions that the Iraq War was preceded by an intelligence failure. He points out that the October 2002 *National Intelligence Estimate* (NIE) made clear three things:

- Saddam was unlikely to use WMD against the US unless his regime was in mortal danger;
- Iraqi society was likely to be unreceptive to rapid democratisation and that there was likely to be widespread armed resistance to an occupier even to the extent of a guerilla war; and
- and that the regional consequences of a US invasion would probably include increased terrorism and enhanced credibility for militant Islamists.

That such analysis did not shape policy was due, according to the author, to the politicisation of the intelligence analysis process. Such politicisation occurred subtly. Pillar believes that analysts understood early in 2002 that



the Administration was intent on a war with Iraq. This led the majority to shape their findings to avoid offending policy makers.

He concludes that the Iraq War has severely damaged the US intelligence community and that it will not be an easy task to repair it. He suggests that it is vital to implement a number of steps to restore the effectiveness and credibility of the intelligence community's relationship with the policy making process. His key recommendations are:

- that the United States emulate the United Kingdom model, under which the intelligence community be precluded from engaging in debate or advocacy of policy still under debate;
- that the legislative branch (Congress) be empowered to monitor the intelligence-policy relationship through the development of an ombudsman role; and
- greater independence for senior intelligence officials, who presently serve at the pleasure of the President, with a consequent inhibition of their willingness to provide fearless advice.

<b>Article</b>	<b>'Britain at War—From the Falklands to Iraq'</b>
<b>Author</b>	Lawrence Freedman
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>RUSI Journal</i> , vol. 151, no. 1, February 2006, pp. 10–15

### SYNOPSIS

The author examines the use of military force in a coalition setting by the United Kingdom since the Falklands War in 1982. He argues that the abortive unilateral British intervention in the Suez Crisis in 1956 deeply affected the strategic culture of the United Kingdom. Since then, Britain has been particularly sensitive to the need to secure United States support for the projection of military force. Management of the politics of the Atlantic Alliance has defined the scope and content of British military interventions since the Falklands.

Freeman believes that the UK has been more consistently willing to deploy military forces in pursuit of policy objectives than the United



States. Indeed, he argues that the 2003 invasion of Iraq, while consistent with British willingness to use force, was an aberration in US policy. He details British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher urging both US Presidents Reagan and Bush to be more forceful in the Falklands crisis and the First Iraq War.

Freedman asserts that Prime Minister Blair conforms to this British tradition in relation to the use of force. In successive crises in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone, he was willing to commit British land forces. Especially in the Kosovo crisis both the Government of the United Kingdom and its armed forces were less casualty averse than its US counterpart. As Freedman notes ‘If contemporary wars were wars of choice, then the British were likely to choose one way and the Americans the other.’

Accordingly, the author concludes Britain’s wars and military deployments since Suez have been characterised by the tension between a reluctance to act unilaterally but a more robust attitude to the use of force than its major ally. However, when, the United States and the United Kingdom do operate together, they enjoy an unassailable conventional military advantage. For this reason, it is likely that British counterinsurgency capabilities will continue to be tested in the immediate future.

<b>Article</b>	<b>‘Defense Transformation and the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review’</b>
<b>Author</b>	Ryan Henry
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Parameters</i> , vol. XXXV, no. 4, Winter 2005–06, pp. 5–15, <a href="http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05winter/henry.pdf">http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05winter/henry.pdf</a>

### SYNOPSIS

The author has been Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy since 7 February 2003. He argues in this article that the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) has evolved from a purely policy document for a finite timeframe into an instrument of ongoing defence transformation. He asserts that ‘The QDR has changed dramatically, not merely because experience offers valuable lessons, but even more because the importance of periodic review as a tool of transformation in our strategies and capabilities has grown exponentially since the end of the Cold War.’



The author traces the evolution of defence transformation initiatives since the end of the Cold War, beginning with the Bottom-Up Review in 1993. Initially, the United States developed the ‘two Major Theatre War (MTW)’ concept to frame force structure options in the absence of a peer competitor. However, US experiences in Somalia and Bosnia, and their failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide, led the Department of Defense (DOD) to question whether the MTW construct and the associated heavy conventional force model was appropriate to the post-Soviet security environment.

Since the initial QDR in 1997, the DOD has grappled with the problem of planning for an expanding spectrum of complex contingencies within a finite resource allocations. Ultimately, this has forced the abandonment of specific threat-based scenario planning and the adoption of capabilities-based planning. Especially since 11 September 2001, the US has become more conscious of the importance of so called ‘lesser contingencies’, from post-conflict stability operations in Afghanistan and current counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, to emergency response situations in Liberia and Haiti.

In order to be able to respond to such diverse and unexpected contingencies, decision-makers require a broad range of options. Structuring forces to meet predetermined threats no longer suffices. Rather than focusing on specific threats, planners must focus on capabilities. The key issue facing the United States over the next few years will be how to transform a legacy force designed for the traditional operational environment into a force that can adapt to numerous unexpected events across the spectrum. The author concludes that the QDR has become the basic vehicle through which this can be achieved.

<b>Article</b>	<b>‘Are We Ready for an Interagency Combat Command?’</b>
<b>Author</b>	Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Naler, G-3 Operational Planner, II Marine Expeditionary Force
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Joint Forces Quarterly</i> , Issue 41, 2nd quarter, 2006, pp. 26–31, <a href="http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4108.pdf">http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4108.pdf</a>

### SYNOPSIS

Lieutenant Colonel Naler begins by questioning whether the United States is agile enough to respond globally, short of a major theatre war. Naler concedes that since 11 September 2001, the United States has



shown that it can respond but he questions whether the United States is 'postured to sustain this war and, at the same time, prepare for future conflicts'. He argues that 'an integrated civil-military combatant command is the model for the United States to deter and defeat adversaries and engage regional partners in the 21st century'. Moreover, this command would 'provide the nucleus for interagency reorganization'.

Naler highlights that while the National Security Council is the correct model for planning and assessing the United States National Security Strategy, it is not 'optimized to coordinate and implement this strategy on a daily basis'. Naler then builds on comments made by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace (USMC), and the former Commander of the US Central Command, General Anthony Zinni (USMC), who have identified the problem and potential remedies. Naler's solution is:

'An integrated civil-military combatant command is the model for the United States to deter and defeat adversaries and engage regional partners in the 21st century. Properly structured to include interagency representation, a combatant commander's headquarters and associated staff would provide the nucleus for reorganization. Integrating interagency representatives into key leadership and staff positions would create a cohesive group that would feel the pulse of the region and be guided by the NSS to follow the President's intent. This operational headquarters would serve as the strategic interpreter for subordinate units and institutions within the area of responsibility (AOR). The geographic and functional combatant commanders would possess the infrastructure and resources to assemble an integrated civil-military staff that incorporates the capabilities into a model for unity of effort. The characteristics of each interagency partner would reside in one organization empowered to plan, execute, and assess complex contingency operations with the full measure of the combined instruments of national power.'

Naler then argues for a 'more inclusive' list of instruments of national power and proposes an interagency command structure. He identifies that an investment in education will be required but also that aligning multiple agencies in this way 'should create efficiencies and reduce redundancy' within the Government.