



Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected readings from the world's military journals

Issue No. 42
September 2006

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Compiled by:





The CA's Introduction

Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.

P.F. LEAHY
Lieutenant General
Chief of Army

Editors' Note: The Army Abstracts Online website offers you a wide range of up-to-date articles of interest from the military, strategic and international relations literature. You can access the Abstracts site at: <http://www.defence.gov.au/army/AbstractsOnline/default.asp>



Article	'Time to Move On in the Policy Debate'
Author	LTCOL Mark O'Neill
Publication Details	<i>Australian Journal of International Affairs</i> , Vol. 60, No. 3, September 2006, pp. 358–63

SYNOPSIS

Lieutenant Colonel Mark O'Neill is the Army Fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy. He responds to an article written by Paul Dibb in the June edition of the same journal, in which Dibb continued to argue in favour of the primacy of strategic geography rather than the Howard Government's current focus on strategic interest. In this article, O'Neill argues that continuing the debate about whether or not geography should be the chief focus in Australian defence policymaking is costing other aspects the opportunity for development. O'Neill believes that 'the reality of today's security environment no longer fits the theory that underpinned the 'Defence of Australia' paradigm and now, twenty years later, it is time for the defence policy debate to move on'. From Dibb's article, O'Neill identified three key problems:

- the article's strong support for the re-establishment of the link between strategic geography and force structure ignores the reality of defence operational activity;
- the article does not correctly situate the role of geography and the national interest in strategy formulation; and
- Dibb's analysis of Australia's involvement in past conflicts, the term 'expeditionary' war, and the decision to update the Army's tanks, are flawed.

In response, O'Neill outlines the following six arguments:

- Operations, such as those in East Timor (1999 and 2006), have proven that the nexus between strategic geography and ADF capabilities has proven increasingly irrelevant over the last 20 years.
- Geography is important, and it has not changed. However, what geography means to Australian security has changed significantly since the late 1980s. 'Geography is not an objective for government defence policy. It is a constraint equal of many others that affect the achievement of the national interest'.



- Dibb's assertion that Australia fights 'other people's wars' does not stand up to scrutiny of the historical context within which Australians have fought.
- There is balance in ADF force structure policy: 'The Chief of Army has pointed out that the 'sea-air' gap (crucial to 'The defence of Australia' policy paradigm), is actually a 'land-sea-air-land' gap. It is a bridge with land at both ends'. Dibb's support of strong naval and air components at the expense of the land component 'leaves the ADF unbalanced and less capable'.
- By implying that any policy or acquisition is sinister if it is associated with the term 'expeditionary', Dibb is confusing means and ends. It doesn't matter where the national interest requires military action, whether in Australia or overseas, the type of military capability required is similar.
- Finally, it is a misconception that the update of Australia's tank capabilities is for the purpose of expeditionary warfare. In fact, it reflects an understanding of today's complex battlefield and the proliferation of highly lethal, easily acquired, man-portable weapon systems that have rendered the infantry more vulnerable than ever.

O'Neill concludes that the Defence of Australia/strategic geography paradigm only provides for limited circumstances. He believes that possessing a flexible defence policy allows for the 'high order defensive capabilities' favoured by Paul Dibb, while still enabling the ADF to operate successfully in regional missions.

Article	'What Were the Causes of 9/11?'
Author	Peter Bergen
Publication Details	<i>Prospect Magazine</i> , Issue 26, September 2006 < http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=7717 >

SYNOPSIS

Five years on, everyone has a theory about the real causes of 9/11. They range from the nutty (it was the US government) to the plausible but flawed (a response to foreign occupation) to the credible (collateral damage from a clash within Islam).

— Peter Bergen



In this article, Peter Bergen, author of the book *The Osama bin Laden I Know* and Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation in Washington, DC, examines the theories of what caused the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. In 2004 Osama bin Laden claimed that al Qaeda was solely responsible for the 11 September attacks, which the US Government's 9/11 Commission also concluded, but the purpose of this article is to consider the bigger question: 'what caused al Qaeda to launch the attacks?' Bergen believes that the '[e]xplanations for the attacks can be sorted into two categories—the seemingly plausible but flawed, and the more credible.'

Plausible but flawed theories:

- poverty;
- madrasas (religious schools);
- the CIA;
- weak and failing states;
- Saudi financiers;
- the Saudis in general;
- the Clash of Civilisations; and
- the death rattle of political Islam.

The most credible explanations (in ascending order of importance):

10. radicalism caused by the Afghan jihad;
9. a particular reading of Islamic texts;
8. decline and stagnation in the Middle East and the 'humiliation' of the Islamic world;
7. the spread of communications technology;
6. authoritarian Middle East regimes incubating militants;
5. the alienation of Muslim immigrants in the West;
4. US foreign policies in the Middle East, in particular its support of Israel;
3. bin Laden is an astute tactical leader and rational political actor fighting a deeply felt religious war against the West;
2. 9/11 was the collateral damage of a clash within Islam; and
1. the 9/11 attacks were the fruit of bin Laden's flawed strategic reasoning.

Bergen argues that '[n]one of the ... explanations is alone sufficient to explain the attacks, but together they do help us to understand 9/11.' He



notes that '[s]ome of the harshest critics of the 9/11 attacks have been al Qaeda insiders'. He believes that:

9/11 was collateral damage in a civil war within the world of political Islam. On one side there are those, like Bin Laden, who want to install Taliban-style theocracies from Indonesia to Morocco. On the other side there is a silent majority of Muslims who are prepared to deal with the west, who do not see the Taliban as a workable model for modern Islamic states, and who reject violence.

Bin Laden and his attacks on the United States have created an ideological movement, often referred to as "Binladensim". Currently, Binladenism is drawing enormous energy from the war in Iraq, and as Bergen predicts, it will probably gain further supporters from the invasion of Lebanon. He concludes by arguing that the new generation of militants borne from these recent conflicts will be bin Laden's legacy.

Article	'Averting Failure in Afghanistan'
Author	Seth Jones
Publication Details	<i>Survival</i> , Vol. 48, No. 1, 2006, pp. 111–28

SYNOPSIS

Seth G. Jones is a political scientist at the RAND Corporation and Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. In this article, he argues that the deteriorating security environment in Afghanistan demonstrates that the current US and NATO strategy has not been successful. To date this strategy has involved, in his words, 'establishing security with a light footprint'. The result, however, has been an increase in insurgent violence, a continuing drug cultivation problem, entrenched warlords who have retained power in much of the country, and deep concerns amongst Afghan leaders about America's long-term commitment as well as NATO's ability to fight insurgents.

Although reliable security data concerning Afghanistan is limited, Jones draws his conclusions from five proxy indicators—insurgent attacks, public perception of security, power of warlords, drugs, and the rule of law—all of which, upon careful examination, have worsened. Of these five indicators, the most significant long-term security challenge in Afghanistan will be the violence of lingering insurgents. The insurgency



comprises of indigenous resistance groups, such as the Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami, as well as foreign jihadists, which consist of a loose network of Muslim extremists. A civilian network that provides logistics supports the insurgents, whose success or failure depends on the network's ability to gain support from the indigenous population.

Professor Jones argues that the core objective of Afghan, US and NATO leaders must be the establishment of a secure environment in which 'Afghan people and goods can circulate safely, and licit political and economic activity can take place free from intimidation'. Next, the capacity to secure its own environment needs to be developed for the Afghan Government. The author's 'winning plan' is built upon four pillars. First, the number and capability of international and Afghan forces needs to be increased. Second, US and NATO leaders have to develop a long-term strategy for dealing with insurgents and warlords. Third, financial assistance must be increased. Finally, the last pillar is time: the United States must commit to rebuilding and stabilising Afghanistan long-term. 'The Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami and foreign jihadists are betting that the West doesn't have the political will to remain in Afghanistan for the long run'. Professor Jones concludes by emphasising that '[p]roving them wrong is the key challenge'.

Article	'Understanding Full Spectrum Operations: Insights from Operation Enduring Freedom'
Author	Michael W. Isherwood
Publication Details	<i>Joint Force Quarterly</i> , Issue 42, 3rd Quarter 2006, pp. 62-4 < http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4219.pdf >

SYNOPSIS

Colonel Michael W. Isherwood, Deputy, Air Component Coordination Element of the Combined Joint Task Force-76, argues in this article that the experiences of joint warfighters in Operation Enduring Freedom provide a valuable understanding of what constitutes 'full spectrum operations' today. The author's purpose is to gain an understanding of and appreciation for full spectrum operations by describing how the concept has worked for operations in Afghanistan. By emphasising the importance of cooperation and collaboration between American agencies,



as well as international governments and non-government organisations, the author argues that full spectrum operations are best understood in this context because the concept is working.

Isherwood concludes that the initiatives undertaken by Provincial Reconstruction Teams— in combination with the support of the US military and coalition forces—have generated enough momentum for Afghanistan’s institutions to gain strength and eventually eliminate the root causes of insurgency. He believes that ‘[t]he country’s potential was made possible by executing full spectrum operations’.

Article	‘Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities’
Author	Michael R. Melillo
Publication Details	<i>Parameters</i> , Vol. XXXVI, No. 3, Autumn 2006, pp. 22–35 < http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/06autumn/melillo.pdf >

SYNOPSIS

Colonel Michael Melillo is the Chief of Operations and Training Branch at the Security Cooperation Education and Training Center, Quantico, Virginia. In this article the author argues that US military leaders—past and present—suffer from acute ‘tunnel vision’ that has prevented defence planners from recognising military vulnerabilities. This has become especially evident during the Global War on Terror, where US armed forces have faced the strongest resistance from insurgents using irregular warfare, not conventional means:

Looking back now, four years into the Global War on Terrorism, one can plainly see the US military was blinded by its preference for conventional war and failed to recognize the threat posed by irregular enemies. The military culture has long been convinced that technological overmatch was the prescription for security...

Melillo believes that, in order to remedy this strategic flaw, US military leaders need to overcome an inherent cultural resistance to non-traditional wars. His analysis begins by examining the ‘Traditional American Way of War’, in which he highlights the US military’s preoccupation with



technology since the Second World War. Next, the author examines the Iraq War, which he argues can be viewed as two wars: the first being the initial invasion and subsequent regime change in Baghdad, with the second war continuing today. Although the second war, what he calls a ‘small war’, is not new to the US military, American forces are proving ineffective at these types of operations.

America’s experiences in Iraq have begun some transformational changes within the US military. In particular, US military leaders have realised that the ‘long wars’ of the past will now consist of counterinsurgency, stabilising, and nation-building operations, and they will dominate future warfare. Melillo concludes that the transformation currently occurring in the US military is not tied to technology or the traditional American way of war, but to its culture.

Article	‘Canadian Special Operations Forces: Transforming Paradigms’
Author	COL J. Paul de B. Taillon
Publication Details	<i>Canadian Military Journal</i> , Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 2005–2006, pp. 67–76, < http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol6/no4/09-Ops_e.asp >

SYNOPSIS

Colonel Taillon is a reservist and a student of the US Army War College. In this article, the author is arguing for the creation of a reserve Canadian Special Operations Forces (CANSOF) squadron to ‘provide a trained and operationally ready cadre of SOF operators, support personnel and staff able to augment CANSOF when required’. This is in light of the Canadian Government’s reported goal to double the size of its SOF to 600 personnel, which will prove to be a most difficult task considering the size of the Canadian Forces (CF) as well as the particularly stringent requirements of the SOF selection process. He believes that the ‘CF might have to shift the [focus of the] SOF recruiting and selection process, looking instead to reservists and to Canadians who already have the identified skills and capabilities’.

Other recommendations include:



- incorporating language capabilities and cultural sensitivities into SOF units. One such way could involve directly recruiting second-generation Canadians of various ethnic groups;
- the creation of a highly flexible administrative structure;
- ascertaining if comparable SOF skill sets already exist in certain civilian occupations, such as the police force and emergency services;
- consider developing a covert operational capability; and
- re-allocating some SOF tasks, such as Foreign Internal Defence operations, to light infantry battalions, making it a stepping-stone for those interested in becoming CANSOF operators.

Taillon concludes by emphasising the value of the CANSOF:

CANSOF has strategic utility, embodied in the economy of force reality and the expansion of strategic choice that CANSOF offers senior government and military decision-makers. If properly manned, trained, equipped and deployed, CANSOF can offer the prospect of a favorably disproportionate return on the military investment

Article	‘The U.S. Military’s Manpower Crisis’
Author	Frederick W. Kagan
Publication Details	<i>Foreign Affairs</i> , Vol. 85, No. 4, July–August 2006, pp. 91–110

SYNOPSIS

Three hundred forty-five million dollars can, roughly speaking, buy one F-22 Raptor—the U.S. military’s new stealth fighter plane—or pay the average annual cost of 3,000 soldiers (although it would cost far more to equip, maintain, and deploy either the fighter or the troops). The soldiers are the better investment.

— Frederick W. Kagan

Frederick W. Kagan is a residential scholar at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and specialises in defence issues and the US military. In this article, Kagan argues that human capabilities are equally, if not more so, important than military technology. The long-term deployment of US soldiers to Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrates



that this neglect is costing the Army the ability to sustain itself while deployed on operations. Yet next year's budget will require the US Army to shed at least 30 000 troops. Why, Kagan asks, has 'Washington ... steadfastly refused to address the issue?' He argues that it stems from two beliefs about the nature of war, which are held by senior officials in the Bush Administration. The first, also shared by Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) advocates, holds the notion 'that war is fundamentally about killing people and destroying things'. The second belief is 'that military preparations should be guided by the business principle of investing in success'. The flaw in both beliefs, Kagan asserts, 'is that they take parts of the problem to be the whole'.

Although the US military's manpower crisis predates the current Bush Administration, its consequences have been exacerbated by their decision to enshrine business principles in the military transformation agenda. Kagan believes that this approach has thrown the US armed forces off-balance. The US armed forces are now extremely good at locating and destroying targets from thousands of kilometres away, but despite these developments in technology the military cannot determine the intention of their targets. Kagan believes that '[w]ar is fundamentally a human activity, and attempts to remove humans from its center... [is] likely to lead to disaster'.

Article	'Manning Priorities — Does the Army Have Them Right?'
Author	LTCOL David Pentney (Retd)
Publication Details	<i>Canadian Army Journal</i> , Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 68–79

SYNOPSIS

Lieutenant Colonel David Pentney (Retd) is a former infantry officer in the Canadian Army. In this article, the author examines why the Canadian Army, which is over 52 000 strong (as of October 2005), has difficulty sustaining 10 per cent of that number on contemporary operations. Petney begins his analysis by first discussing the Canadian Army's current manning priorities. The author then considers how the Army evolved into its current structure. Finally, Pentney offers some suggestions toward restructuring the Army so that it can sustain itself while on operations.



The author's analysis reveals a serious problem with the Canadian Army's structure, especially the Regular Field Units. Compared to its wartime structure, the Regular Field Units during peacetime are reduced to 54 per cent of its effective strength. Other units, for example the Support Infrastructure, maintain an effective strength of nearly 98 per cent. Pentney believes this is the reason why the Canadian Army struggles to sustain itself during peacetime operations, because 'the actual pool that provides the majority of personnel to conduct and sustain overseas operations is fewer than 12,000'. To rectify this shortfall, the author recommends the following:

- The Regular Field Unit should be the Army's first manning priority.
- Cease taking positions out of the Regular Field Unit in order to employ them elsewhere, particularly senior Army officers.
- Reviewing the wartime and peacetime structures of the armed forces. The Army needs to change the way it uses the peacetime establishment.

Pentney concludes by re-iterating his belief that over the past fifteen years, the Army's Regular Field Unit has been reduced to the point of being ineffective. This article is of interest to anyone grappling with issues of force structure and force transformation.

Article	'The All-Volunteer Army: Can We Still Claim Success?'
Author	MAJGEN Walter L. Stewart Jr. (Retd), US Army
Publication Details	<i>Military Review</i> , Vol. LXXXVI, No. 4, July–August 2006, pp. 101–7 < http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JulAug06/indexjulaug06.asp >

SYNOPSIS

The great national experiment with an all-volunteer military is a failure that awaits truth or tragedy for confirmation.

— Major General Walter L. Stewart Jr. (Retd)

MAJGEN Stewart has commanded every level of the Army National Guard and has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the United States and Europe. In this article he argues that the current state of



the US all-volunteer armed forces cannot be described as a success. Despite monetary inducements, the US population increasing by 100 million since the mid-1970s, and the opening of most military occupations to female recruits, the US military still struggles to reach recruiting targets. Stewart believes that '[a]fter 3 decades, our national experiment with an all-volunteer force has foundered during its first encounter with combat operations that last for an extended period of time'.

Stewart argues for a return to the conscription military system. He believes that the 'great, republican equity of our draft and draft-induced armies was abandoned because of a false perception of racial and social inequity'. The article is divided into two parts. The first discusses the objections made to the Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, which included: erosion of civilian control, reliance on the economic underclass, racial imbalance, isolation of a professional military, the principle of shared sacrifice, military adventurism, force expandability and affordability. The second comprises of quotes and discussion points from well-known scholars and military leaders throughout history who have at one time or another questioned the viability of an exclusively volunteer force, such as former US President George Washington.

The author believes that the United States needs to return to a 'draft-induced military', in particular a draft army that was 'able to sustain itself during 17 years of cold war combat in Korea and Vietnam'. Stewart says it is important now because the US Army can barely sustain itself against a few thousand terrorists. How would it cope against a professional army ten times the size?

Article	'An Urban Operations Training Capability for the Canadian Army'
Author	MAJ Greg Burton, Director of Land Requirements Coordination, Canadian Army
Publication Details	<i>Canadian Army Journal</i> , Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 91–113

SYNOPSIS

Given ... the compounding value of urban population centres as strategic, economic, and political centres of gravity, one can expect



that most future conflicts will involve fighting in the streets as an important operational component. It is not beyond reason to imagine that eventually urban warfare will become synonymous with warfare, a norm rather than an exception.

— MAJ Greg Burton

Major Greg Burton studies the deficiency that exists in the Canadian Army's urban operations training capability. The author identifies the necessary requirements to overcome this deficiency by 'proposing that a capital project be initiated to deliver an effective urban operations training facility'.

Most countries have accepted that military operations will increasingly be executed in urban environments, Burton argues that Canada's tactical doctrine needs to new approach. Current approaches to doctrine and training view urban warfare as a scenario, or in the author's words, 'another "special" environment'. He believes this view is deceptive. Urban warfare already occurs and is almost a norm rather than an exception.

Burton quotes the Canadian Army's 'now-defunct' urban operations working group, which identified three capability deficiencies:

- there is no doctrine or tactics above the rifle company;
- training is extremely limited and there are no current [as of 2002] plans to update training needs or to introduce urban related lessons into either officer or non-commissioned member Development Periods;
- the Army has purchased some equipment to increase individual performance, and yet lacks the formal direction which would make it essential that equipment operate in the urban environment.

In relation to the training deficiency, the urban operations working group released these findings:

- Current concepts, doctrine and equipment are designed for an open battlespace where the enemy can be easily detected and engaged with stand-off fire.
- Urban operations require the ability to apply precise scalable effects. While the Army is not optimized for urban operations, the infantry-centric nature of the force structure facilitates Army of Tomorrow [urban operations] initiatives.



- Training provides the highest pay-off in the near and mid-terms; however, the design and content of all aspects of individual and collective training require a fundamental shift from open terrain to complex terrain.
- Close combat will remain inevitable and the individual soldier remains an essential element of urban operations.

Burton concludes that ‘an urban operations training system is required to provide the conditions for developing improved performance’. It must include training capabilities at all levels, simulation models and techniques must be exploited, an urban training capability at home and in-theatre, facilities such as urban training sites and live fire ranges, and all must be standardised and interoperable. This system requires a long-term investment. He believes that the ‘Canadian Army needs to invest in an effective urban operations training capability if it is to be strategically relevant and tactically decisive on future domestic and international urban operations’.

Article	‘Upping the Stakes: Demand Rises for New-Generation Tactical UAVs’
Author	Andrew White, Jane’s Reporter
Publication Details	<i>Jane’s International Defence Review</i> , No. 3, July 2006, pp. 34–9

SYNOPSIS

The successful use of tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAVs) in military operations around the world has prompted many Western militaries to demand greater technological capabilities from the next generation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In this article *Jane’s* reporter Andrew White investigates the growing importance of UAV systems to contemporary military procurement and planning. He argues that ‘the current use of TUAVs is creating a sea change in operational procedures and a reduction in battlefield casualties’.

This article is of interest to anyone involved in the planning or development processes of UAV technology. It covers the development of the Warrior and Raven systems by the United States, the advances made by the United



Kingdom with their Watchkeeper system, and the Skylark 1 system which is currently being used by the Australian and Israeli armed forces.

White reports that the desire for greater flexibility for users of these systems on the ground is the driving force behind the coming generation of TUAVs. Key functions being planned for the next generation include remote video transceivers (that will allow operators to receive and disseminate information quicker and easier) and greater interoperability between all technological platforms used by the US military and its regional allies. As a result, soldiers on the ground are now demanding ‘more flexibility from a new generation of UAVs ranging from “pocket-sized” micro-UAVs and “backpackable” systems to the larger Extended Role/Multi-Purpose systems.’ It is estimated that up to 84 per cent of all unmanned aerial systems (UAS—the US Department of Defense no longer refers to the same technology as UAVs) built before 2016 will be small and hand-held.

Article

‘Marine Corps Equipment After Iraq’

Author

Lawrence J. Korb, Max A. Bergmann, *Centre for American Progress*, and Loren B. Thompson, *Lexington Institute*

Publication Details

<http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=2028223>

SYNOPSIS

This report is a joint project between two American research and education institutes, the Center for American Progress and the Lexington Institute. Over the past three years, Marine Corps equipment readiness has significantly worsened because it is being used well beyond its designed purpose, abused by the harsh Iraqi environment, and materials are depleted due to losses in combat. In order to maintain acceptable readiness levels, the Marines have been taking equipment from non-deployed units and reserved stocks around the world. Thus, the authors believe, this is ‘limiting their ability to respond to contingencies outside of Iraq’. Restoring the Marines’ ‘ground and aviation equipment to its pre-Iraq level, as of the summer 2006, will require \$12 billion plus an additional \$5 billion each year the Marines remain in Iraq’.



The report is twenty-five pages long (not including endnotes) and it analyses the following issues:

- the impact of the war in Iraq on the readiness and reliability of Marine Corps equipment;
- the lessons learnt from the Iraq operation about equipment deficiencies in the Marine's active and reserve forces;
- the near-term steps required to repair or modify equipment so that the Marine Corps can support continued operations in Iraq and other commitments, such as the counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan or a campaign on the Korean peninsula; and
- the long-term steps required to rebuild or replace aging Marine Corps equipment so that it can participate in the fast-paced, networked military operations of the post-Iraq period.

The authors' near-term recommendations support the Marine's Corps request for reset funding in the 2007 fiscal year and at least two years after the deployed forces leave Iraq. Congress should also supply the resources necessary to cover the procurement and depot maintenance items that were unfunded requirements in the fiscal year for 2007. Finally, the Department of Defense should conduct and submit to Congress a comprehensive review of new equipment for active and reserve components to ensure a full recovery as well as to meet future commitments.

Long-term recommendations include:

- Unless the Defense topline budget is changed, the Marines should receive an increase in their share of the Navy budget.
- The Marines should join the Army in producing and funding a comprehensive plan for continuous enhancement of heavy armoured vehicles.
- The Marines should consider purchasing MH-60 Knighthawk and H-92 Superhawk helicopters to bridge the gap between the CH-46E Sea Knight and CH-53E Super Stallion helicopters and when the MV-22 Ospreys reach full operational status.
- Congress must fund Marine Corps procurement at a steady rate of \$3 billion per year.



- The Marines need to review its heavy-armoured vehicle fleet to meet its future commitments.

Article	'Force Protection in Urban and Unconventional Environments'
Author	US Defense Science Board Task Force, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, US Department of Defense
Publication Details	< http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2006-03-Force Protection Final.pdf >

SYNOPSIS

This report is the final product of the Defense Science Board Task Force, which was requested by the Under Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate force protection in the context of post-major combat operations conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. The task force's focus was not on short-term fixes but rather to prepare the Department to meet future challenges. The report begins by describing 'force protection':

Force protection is not an end in itself. Furthermore, protecting the force is not only, or even mainly, about defensive measures. To the extent that "force protection" connotes bunkers and barbed wire, it is not a helpful term ... [P]rotecting the force depends on information, an offensive mindset, winning trust, hearts and minds, as well as defensive measures.

This report offers two major themes. The first empowers the 'strategic corporal'. The second accelerates the transformation of the Department of Defense to an adaptive learning organisation. With these themes in mind, the task force provides nine recommendations:

1. Make training, leader development, and professional military education (with special attention to Junior Officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) much higher priority elements of force transformation.
2. Charter a fast-track team to address the serious problems that afflict United States attempts to conduct information/influence operations.



3. Rapidly implement section 5.5.2 of Department of Defense Directive 3000.05¹ on Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, Reconstruction Operations.
4. Provide much easier access to intelligence at tactical levels (battalions and below).
5. Establish aggressive red teaming to emulate the cultural predilections, motivations, objectives, internal planning, technical and operational capabilities and decision processes of potential adversary groups and uncommitted populace.
6. Evolve a new approach exploiting the networking innovations going on in the field, the considered assignment of military personnel returning from theatre, and the experience of Joint Forces Command's (JFCOM's) Operation Iraqi Freedom Lessons Learned activity.
7. Initiate a major technology effort aimed at breakthrough enhancements to training and leader development with special attention to junior officers and NCOs, home-station training and non-kinetic operations.
8. Provide for more rapid insertion of new capabilities, including enhanced language translators, into the field.
9. Focus JFCOM's Joint Urban Operations Office on just a few critical needs rather than attempt to create and oversee a comprehensive master plan.

¹ Directive 3000.05 can be found in PDF format at <www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d300005_112805/d300005p.pdf> [first accessed 5 September 2006].