

# S O P D



Senior Officer Professional Digest

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## MESSAGE FROM THE EDITORS

This month the editors of the *Senior Officer Professional Digest* recommend ten articles drawn from professional and academic journals on the subjects of Clausewitz, strategic culture, climate change, Russia, China, North Korea, financial warfare, insurgency and the re-organisation of land forces.

Antulio J. Echevarria II has written the opening article in this issue of the *SOPD*, arguing that the late-Cold War interpretations of Clausewitz which, in part, helped the US Army rebuild itself after Vietnam are less accurate than first thought. Alan Bloomfield and Kim Richard Nossal complement Echevarria's work with an article of applied strategic theory, examining the conduct of both Australia and Canada over time, and commenting on how their strategic cultures have influenced their very different responses to the critical events of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

McKenzie Funk continues the examination of Canadian strategy, focusing on the Dominion's responses to issues of sovereignty in the Arctic, and the competition it faces for resources. Peter Brookes recognises that this competition will come from Russia's newly assertive foreign policy. Russia's *realpolitik* approach has not escaped the attention of Peter Ferdinand either, who has analysed Russia's burgeoning relations with China.

Paul J. Smith shifts the *SOPD*'s focus on great powers to the opposite end of the spectrum: non-traditional security issues. He analyses historical natural disasters and their effects on migration as a way to predict future contingencies, and concludes that the military will be heavily engaged in any major climate-change event in the future. Sheena Chestnut looks at the smuggling and counterfeiting activity of North Korea, while Paul Bracken's article examines a possible countermeasure to such crimes—financial warfare. Moving up the spectrum of violence, Bruce Hoffman writes about the 'Iraqi brand' of insurgency, its successes and its potentially global spread, while another author proffers a countermeasure, this time in the form of David Betz's article on 'redesigning land forces for wars amongst the people'.

Enjoy  
The Editors

**Antulio J. Echevarria II, 'On the Clausewitz of the Cold War: Reconsidering the Primacy of Policy in On War', *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 34, No. 1, October 2007, pp. 92–108.**

Clausewitz's *On War* provides the intellectual foundation for many political and strategic theorists of the Cold War. In this article, Antulio J. Echevarria II stresses the need to examine interpretations within their strategic context. He offers a well-rounded re-evaluation of the traditional perceptions of Clausewitz's theories, presenting the constituent elements of the trinitarian conception of war—government, military and populace—as equal partners, as opposed to those Cold War works that favour the primacy of policy. Echevarria argues that the trinity contained checks and balances that shaped conflicts into unique occurrences. Clausewitz illustrates this by contrasting the purpose of feudal conflicts with the Napoleonic wars.

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**'Although *On War* is a difficult read, we would be hard pressed to find another volume that explores the inner workings of war so rigorously.'**

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Echevarria maintains that the confusion over the interpretations of Clausewitz lies within the applied definitions of *Politik*, translated either as politics or policy. These terms, he argues, were used interchangeably by scholars of the Cold War-era to support their own designs, more than as a reflection of the intended interpretation. This article provides an innovative approach to the way in which

theories are interpreted within their strategic context, and serves to remind us of the limitations within which chance, hostility and policy interplay. Echevarria's interpretation of this foundational strategic text should be read widely within the Defence community, and especially by those who wish to enhance their understanding of Clausewitz's trinity in conflict.

*Antulio J. Echevarria II holds a PhD from Princeton University, and is currently the Director of Research at the US Army Strategic Studies Institute. He is a former US Army Armor officer.*

**Alan Bloomfield and Kim Richard Nossal, 'Towards an Explicative Understanding of Strategic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 28, No. 2, August 2007, pp. 286–307, <[http://post.queensu.ca/~nossalk/papers/Bloomfield\\_Nossal CSP 2007.pdf](http://post.queensu.ca/~nossalk/papers/Bloomfield_Nossal_CSP_2007.pdf)>.**

Strategic culture, as Alan Bloomfield and Kim Richard Nossal note, is a thoroughly contested concept. While scholars may have difficulty settling on a definition, they generally agree it is of utility as a supplement to quantitative measures of resources, forces and geography when determining a strategic entity's possible courses of action.

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**'[Strategic culture] ... provides a useful tool for examining and analyzing [sic] similarities and differences in ... political communities.'**

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Bloomfield and Nossal set out to prove the value of strategic culture by examining its place in Australia and Canada. While the theoretical material will be of little interest to those who have not studied International Relations as an academic discipline, the exploration of Australia and Canada's strategic cultures is engaging and pertinent. The comparison and contrast between Australia and Canada that the authors demonstrate allows the reader to better understand the factors motivating one of Australia's key allies. With the thawing of Canada's potentially lucrative Northwest Passage, and as competition with Russia and perhaps even the United States over Arctic resources approaches, Australian officers and policy-makers must be cognisant of the issues raised in this article so that they can position Australia—as an ally and 'strategic cousin'—appropriately.

*Alan Bloomfield is a doctoral candidate at Queen's University, Kingston in Ontario, Canada. He received both his Bachelor and Master's Degrees from Australian universities. Kim Richard Nossal is Professor and Head of the Department of Political Studies at Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario. His latest book, co-authored with Stéphane Roussel and Stéphane Pequin, is Politique internationale et défense au Canada et au Québec.*

**McKenzie Funk, 'Cold Rush: The Coming Fight for the melting north', *Harper's Magazine*, September 2007, pp. 45–55.**

By turns humorous, insightful, forward thinking and analytical, Funk's article on the carve-up of the Arctic and its ramifications of security and international relations is an interesting perspective on how climate change and technology are having far reaching effects. As the permanent sea ice of the Arctic melts, various nations are laying claim to shipping routes and natural resources that are potentially worth billions of dollars. Funk envisages that an Arctic settlement will be 'the last great imperial partition'.

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**'The \$49 million grossed by Al Gore's *An Inconvenient Truth* may have been global warming's first true financial windfall, but a new mentality is taking hold. Reports by Citigroup, UBS, and Lehman Brothers have recently advised investors on how to wring a buck out of global tailspin.'**

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While Antarctica is a more stable landmass than the ice of the Arctic Ocean, issues similar to those of the far North are being played out there as well that have a direct impact on Australia. Currently some 98 per cent of Antarctica is inaccessible, but global warming is likely to change this amount of ice cover, and like the Arctic, this may result in easier access to natural resources. While the Antarctic Treaty prohibits mining, this could also change. Antarctica's neutral status, first regulated in 1959,

could easily be challenged by a country willing to ignore the opprobrium of other nations in order to exploit the continent's wealth. Australia currently has the largest claim by area to Antarctic territory. This means the Commonwealth has the most to gain and the most to lose. The Australian Government and Defence forces should monitor developments in the Arctic as the Commonwealth may need to take similar action itself in the not too distant future.

*McKenzie Funk was formerly staff editor at National Geographic, and is now a contributing editor. He regularly writes for such publications as Harper's Magazine and Popular Science.*

**Peter Brookes, 'Russia resurgent: The bear is back', *Armed Forces Journal*, August 2007, pp. 10–12, 45, <<http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/08/2873884>>.**

Peter Brookes' article 'Russia Resurgent: The Bear is Back' is a welcome evaluation of Russia's desire to re-invent its national identity in a post-Cold War environment. The premise of this article is that the Russia emerging from the ashes of the Soviet Union is not necessarily anti-Western, but definitely not pro-Western either. Brookes maintains that President Vladimir Putin's Russia is one that actively seeks to reassert its place within the global order and with a clear vision of getting to the top.

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**'Today's Moscow is increasingly independent, prominent in global affairs, nationalistic at home, awash in energy wealth and bent on reasserting Russia as a great power with distinct interests.'**

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Citing examples of Russia's more confrontational foreign policy, Brookes concludes that it would be prudent to remain cautious about the extent of Moscow's intentions. Complacency in the West may have serious consequences in the coming decade. This article is particularly beneficial to those seeking insight into Russia's world view. With major trade agreements under negotiation, and in face of Russia's increasing military ties to our region, it is important that Australia does not discount the capabilities and risks of 'Russia Resurgent'.

*Peter Brookes is a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and is a Senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation in the United States.*

**Peter Ferdinand, 'Russia and China: Converging responses to globalisation', *International Affairs*, Vol. 83, Iss. 4, pp. 655–80.**

Peter Ferdinand's article examines how two economies with differing perspectives and histories have in recent years come to cooperate in a globalised world. This piece demonstrates in some detail the increased alignment of the Russian and Chinese Governments and in particular serves to highlight the importance of their relative distribution of national resources. One of the more interesting features of this article is Ferdinand's analysis of the transformations in Russia, characterised as radical economic and political reforms, as opposed to China's more measured adaptations to capitalism and globalisation.

This is the first of two articles on the Russian and Chinese relationship, the second of which shall appear in the next issue of *International Affairs*. It provides a good introduction to the second article that centres on foreign policy. For those wishing to follow the alignments between China and Russia, Ferdinand's work provides greater insight and understanding of the grand strategy behind this development.

*Peter Ferdinand is Reader in Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick. His latest book is Enterprise and welfare reform in communist Asia.*

**Paul J. Smith, 'Climate Change, Mass Migration and the Military Response, *Orbis*, Vol. 51, Iss. 4, Fall 2007, pp. 617–33.**

Paul Smith has chosen to write about climate change by framing it within an issue that is already of concern to states and military organisations worldwide—migration, and the challenges it poses to 'receiving states'. The author does an excellent job of explaining how different

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**'Public insecurity over migration—particularly acute, disruptive migration events—will pressure governments to resort to vigorous measures to ensure border security ... Thus, as international migration is viewed increasingly as a security concern, governments will be under greater pressure to rely on their military forces.'**

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patterns of migration can result in different responses. This is due not only to the numbers of people involved, but also how these population shifts are reported in the media and viewed by the public. Smith posits that if climate change events become more severe, the result could be a dramatic rise in the number of international migrants. Using case studies from past and current instances where military forces are used to manage mass-migrations, the author determines that the military is likely to be called upon to deal with these incidents in the future.

The Chief of the Defence Force, Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, last year identified climate change as a potential challenge to national security. Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty has also stated that climate change is one of the greatest security issues facing the country. The main impact of climate change with which the ADF is likely to have to contend is displaced populations, especially from the low-lying islands in our region. Consequently, ADF personnel need to develop a good understanding of all the factors involved as it is likely they will affect their working lives in the future.

*Paul Smith is an associate professor of national security affairs at the US Naval War College. His latest book is The Terrorism Ahead: Confronting Transnational Violence in the Twenty-First Century.*

**Sheena Chestnut, 'Illicit Activity and Proliferation North Korean Smuggling Networks', *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 1, Summer 2007, pp. 80–111, <<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/isec.2007.32.1.80>>.**

The threats posed by the nuclear proliferation of violent non-state actors and 'rogue states' is of considerable and growing concern to Western governments. The subject of Sheena Chestnut's article is the state most obviously at risk of such behaviour today: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Chestnut thoroughly explores North Korea's criminal smuggling enterprises, from its origins in 1976 to its present day form. In doing so she outlines how these activities have slipped from Pyongyang's control. The risk is that as Kim Jong-Il's oversight of the smuggling network lapses, the fractious chain of command may allow the proliferation of nuclear secrets and technology. This is alarming in and of itself, but Chestnut goes further to argue that Western anti-smuggling operations to date have met with only limited success. If North Korea chose to distribute nuclear material, there is little chance that such actions could be detected by the West.

The scale of North Korea's state-sponsored criminal activity is staggering. For example, the DPRK produces the highest-quality counterfeit US currency in the world, and maintains a money-laundering network throughout Asia, and the United States. For government personnel involved in combating these efforts, this article provides an excellent summary of available open-source information.

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**'When asked to summarize the threat posed by North Korea, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld mentioned the possibility of nuclear transfer first.'**

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Beyond Pyongyang's organised criminal activity, the author examines the factors she believes would be crucial in any North Korean decision to share nuclear secrets. For policy-makers, observers of the Six-Party talks and the military professional, the prospect of nuclear terrorism makes compelling reading. Chestnut's coverage of North Korean criminal smuggling and nuclear adventurism makes this article invaluable reading.

*Sheena Chestnut is both an Oxonian (MPhil) and Harvard student. She is currently completing her PhD at Harvard University.*

**Paul Bracken, 'Financial Warfare', *Orbis*, Vol. 51, Iss. 4, Fall 2007, pp. 685–96.**

As the Army makes rapid progress towards 'Hardening and Networking', and as other governmental agencies integrate with Defence to enable whole-of-government approaches to security issues, Paul Bracken writes on a topic where these two developments converge: financial warfare.

Bracken examines the distinction between financial warfare and economic warfare. The analogy he employs is the differences between precision strike and carpet bombing—one has precise, discriminating effect on a targeted individual, while the other is indiscriminate and affects whole countries or groups. Perhaps most interesting for Australia is Bracken's argument that financial warfare can now, by virtue of the increasing sophistication of field networks and the growing technological competence of military personnel, be used as an operational-level tool. Bracken maintains that financial warfare, at this level, can not only be used for damaging insurgent or terrorist leadership groups and their operations, but also as a source of intelligence or means for generating further information.

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**'Financial warfare complements military operations as well as information operations.'**

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As precision and diversity in effects become ever more important in 'wars amongst the people', financial warfare is likely to become a tool of ever-increasing importance to Australian commanders in both the offence and defence. Operations to protect Australia's economic interests, such as Operation RESOLUTE, are perfect examples of whole-of-government responses that may benefit from financial warfare. Bracken sounds the call for a greater rigour in studying and codifying this approach, and offers many useful suggestions and starting points for the military professional.

*Paul Bracken is Professor of Management and Political Science at Yale University.*

**Bruce Hoffman, 'The 'Cult of the Insurgent': its tactical and strategic implications', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 61, Iss. 3, September 2007, pp. 312–29, <<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/ftinterface~content=a781533210~fulltext=713240930>>.**

Bruce Hoffman offers an interesting article regarding the spread of insurgent tactics via a phenomenon he calls 'the cult of the insurgent'.

Hoffman maintains that Iraqi and Lebanese insurgents have married their classic advantages of stealth, surprise and mobility to standoff technologies such as remote-controlled IEDs, mortars and tactical missiles to create a lethal yet simple and cheap operational concept. These attacks, over time, have managed to inflict sufficient damage on counterinsurgents to cause strategic-level effects such as war-weariness among their domestic populations and governments. Hoffman argues that this method of 'standoff-insurgency' has created an aura of invincibility around Iraqi and Hezbollah insurgents, making their methods into a type of 'cult' that other groups worldwide are likely to adopt.

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**'Iraq's insurgents can today take great satisfaction from a job well done.'**

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and tactical missiles to create a lethal yet simple and cheap operational concept. These attacks, over time, have managed to inflict sufficient damage on counterinsurgents to cause strategic-level effects such as war-weariness among their domestic

Indeed, this type of insurgency is of such low risk and expense to the insurgent that it may be sufficiently cost-effective to tempt many hitherto non-violent groups into violent action. Within Australia's immediate neighbourhood, regional fundamentalist Islamic groups who showed restraint during such incidents as the 'Mohammed cartoons' affair or the opening phases of the war in Iraq may cross the threshold into violent insurgency. Non-Islamic groups, too, may escalate their actions, such as the restless political parties of Timor-Leste. Given the ease with which insurgents can arm themselves in this globalised world, and the relatively light human and financial costs required to wage 'standoff insurgency', the temptation to embrace violence may be too great to resist for many of the political opposition groups in our region.

*Bruce Hoffman is a Professor at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in Washington DC.*

**David Betz, 'Redesigning Land Forces for Wars Amongst the People', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 221–43.**

David Betz's article centres on a simple proposition—that the Western armies of today are fundamentally unsuited to wars 'amongst the people'. Designed to maximise firepower and

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**'We want our nation-builders to be open, approachable, and easy to communicate with. We want our soldiers to ... be the wrath of God, able to bring death and destruction anywhere at any time.'**

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minimise personnel, they are unable to wage wars that Betz believes require maximum manpower and moderate firepower. Pursuant to such a force, he advocates the rebalancing of armies from those dominated by mechanised forces to ones in which light infantry predominates. The author also argues for technological research redirected to help solve the infantry's age-old problem—weight versus personal protection.

To the Australian soldier, Betz's directions for success in wars like Iraq and Afghanistan will sound familiar. Indeed, he singles out the Australian Army as a force similar to the one he advocates—a large body of professional, highly-trained light infantry for the 'three block war', backed-up by a small cadre of mechanised, armoured and special forces.

However, while the Army of today matches Betz's prescription, this article makes other points that shows the Australian Army cannot rest on its laurels. For example, Army's LAND 125 'soldier-as-a-system' project must be shepherded to completion if the Royal Australian Regiment is to maintain the necessary capabilities to transition seamlessly between the 'three blocks', while Projects LAND 17 for new artillery and LAND 106 for upgraded APCs are needed to assure the force's high-intensity warfighting capacity.

*David Betz is a lecturer in the Department of War Studies, King's College, London. His latest book is Civil-Military Relations in Russia and Eastern Europe.*

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## FROM THE VAULT

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*This month the LWSC recommends:*

**R. S. Garland, 'The Conduct of Counter-Insurgency Warfare', *Australian Army Journal*, No. 200, January 1966, pp. 10–28.**

R. S. Garland's article contains the wisdom and experience of a soldier well versed in small-unit tactics and asymmetric warfare—knowledge gained from years of operational service. Garland argued that mobility, independence, deception and tactical surprise were the keys to counterinsurgency warfare. Because the conventional forces of the counterinsurgent were traditionally slow and ponderous, they were vulnerable to easy detection and ambush by insurgents. Garland believed the way to overcome this vulnerability was mobility and dispersion, combined with tactical deception. The author reasoned that many small, mobile and stealthy patrols would have a better chance of detecting the enemy than a few larger ones. Smaller patrols would better tempt the enemy into fighting. Once the enemy had been drawn into offering combat, the counterinsurgent's small, dispersed units would use their mobility and stealth to concentrate and crush the enemy.

To this end, Garland shunned heavy weapons and their attendant logistical apparatus, which, he argued, only provided the insurgent with easy targets and slowed the counter-insurgent. In their place, Garland preferred air support. The relative advantages and disadvantages between insurgents and counterinsurgents that the author lists—such as the counterinsurgents marked superiority at the tactical level, their superior communications, superior morale and superior firepower—all point to the viability of this approach.

Garland's article, while dated in some sections, generally weathers the test of time. However, therein also lays the limit of its usefulness to the present-day reader. Whilst it is a fine appraisal of some fundamental tenets of counterinsurgency warfare, it is perhaps too general for direct application to matters in Iraq today. The more particular tactics and suggestions laid out within

Garland's article are, of course, geared towards jungle warfare. In this environment, more obtrusive force protection measures were achievable than are possible in the highly populated, congested cities of Iraq. In the more sparsely populated country of Afghanistan, however, Garland's more specific suggestions may yet prove applicable.

Such limitations aside, however, Garland's article was based on years of solid experience, and gives an insight into the mind of an officer with considerable asymmetric warfare knowledge—both its prosecution and disruption—and thus represents an important resource for today's Army officers.

*Lieutenant-Colonel R.S. Garland, MC, had a long and eventful career in the Australian Army. He served in the Second World War as a section commander in the 2/3rd Independent Company, as a company commander in the 2nd New Guinea Infantry Battalion, and later in the Malayan Emergency with 3 RAR. He wrote this particular piece whilst commanding the Infantry Centre at Ingleburn.*

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## UPCOMING CONFERENCE

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
### *Chief of Army's Military History Conference 2007*

The Chief of Army and the Australian Army History Unit will host the 2007 Chief of Army's Military History Conference 2007 at the National Convention Centre in Canberra on November 1 and 2.

The conference topic this year is '1917: Tactics, Training and Technology', and will offer a range of speakers from the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, the United States and Australia.

The presenters will address a wide variety of topics that provide a holistic picture of tactics, training and technology in 1917, focusing not only on the Western Allies, but the German Army as well. Many of the basic tactics that the Australian Army utilises today were originally developed during the First World War, and this conference gives attendees the opportunity to understand the historical context in which they were formulated.

Time is running out to register for the conference. Fill out a registration form from the Army History Unit's website and return it before 21 October 2007.



For information on the conference, and a detailed program, visit the 'Army History Events' page of the Army History Unit's website: <http://www.defence.gov.au/Army/AHU/EVENTS/events-index.htm>