

S O P D



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MESSAGE FROM THE EDITORS

This month the Editors of the *Senior Officer Professional Digest* recommend ten articles drawn from professional and academic journals on the subjects of Reconstruction, Insurgency, Terrorism, Globalisation, China and Climate Change.

Mick Ryan, Commander of Australia's 1 Reconstruction Task Force, offers his considered views on how reconstruction operations 'fit in' to counterinsurgency (COIN). The nature of the twenty-first century insurgency against which Lieutenant Colonel Ryan and his forces have been engaged forms the focus of Steven Metz's article, while Anthony Vinci examines the deeper philosophical underpinnings of such insurgents and terrorists. H R McMaster highlights the lessons to be learned from fighting such foes in Iraq and Afghanistan, and also warns of the mistakes that are being made. Many commentators think that one such mistake would be disengagement from Iraq; Christopher J Fettweis argues that withdrawal may not be as bad as many believe.

Globalisation has certainly been a powerful force in shaping events in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the imbalances in wealth that it brings about are thought by many to be one of the causes of terrorism. Alan Krueger argues against this concept, while Pankaj Ghemawat challenges the very idea that globalisation creates imbalances in wealth. From terrorists to states, globalisation is a powerful force—particularly for China. As it seeks to integrate globally, its increasing wealth has brought increasing power. Michael Krepon presents a collection of views on China's pursuit of military space power and Joanna I Lewis focuses on how China will negotiate its role in climate change. Finally, John Podesta and Peter Ogden ponder the security implications of climate change.

Enjoy
The Editors

Mick Ryan, 'The Military and Reconstruction Operations', *Parameters*, Vol. XXXVII, Iss. 4, Winter 2007–08, pp. 58–70,
<<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/07winter/ryan.pdf>>.

Reconstruction continues to be an important element of ADF operations overseas. Military-led reconstruction not only provides services in areas that have been devastated by conflict, but also form an important part of any 'hearts and minds' counterinsurgency campaign. Reconstruction teams in Iraq and Afghanistan have been instrumental in helping to develop local capacity, while also providing a platform for information operations in complex environments. With this article, Lieutenant Colonel Mick Ryan RAE outlines some of the important considerations for reconstruction operations as part of counterinsurgency task forces.

'If reconstruction forces are to have any chance of executing the right project at the right place and time, while ensuring robust force protection measures, HUMINT needs to be effectively employed.'

A major emphasis of this article is the importance of intelligence to reconstruction projects. While a formal intelligence capability may be included with reconstruction teams, it is the day-to-day contact with the local populace that provides valuable human intelligence (HUMINT). Information operations also provide reconstruction teams with the intelligence they need to carry out their mission effectively—namely the local threat

situation and the local community's needs. As the ADF continues to engage in reconstruction projects in various locations, Lieutenant Colonel Ryan's points will be of much interest to both planners and operators.

Lieutenant Colonel Mick Ryan commanded the Australian 1 Reconstruction Task Force in Uruzgan Province, Southern Afghanistan, from August 2006 until April 2007. He is a graduate of the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College and School of Advanced Warfighting.

Steven Metz, 'New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency', *Parameters*, Vol. XXXVII, Iss. 4, Winter 2007–08, pp. 20–32,
<<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/07winter/metz.pdf>>.

The release of General Petraeus' Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine has prompted a number of authors to comment on its efficacy—or lack thereof. While Steven Metz's article is not directly aimed at the new FM 3-24, it does criticise the US Army for learning the wrong lessons from the insurgencies of the past.

Metz's main concern is that these twentieth century insurgencies are very different in nature from those of the twenty-first century. While twentieth century insurgencies were initiated by single, ideologically motivated movements aiming at assuming governmental power, today's insurgents form fractious groups with varying motivations aiming at securing a 'prominent share' in what Metz characterises as a 'market of violence and power'. Greed—not ideology—the author insists, is the dominant motivation of twenty-first century insurgents.

Metz's argument is solid, well reasoned and convincing. Given the primary focus afforded twentieth century insurgencies in the research and planning that went into FM 3-24, Australian officers and policymakers would do well to read Metz's article. This piece will assist them in identifying the possible shortcomings of the new US doctrine, and may thus highlight possible areas where unique Australian approaches could add to any coalition COIN effort.

'Americans ... viewed counterinsurgency as a variant of war. This disconnect is even more dangerous today, largely because twenty-first insurgencies have diverged significantly from their forebears.'

Dr. Steven Metz is Research Professor and Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department at the US Army War College. His latest publication, upon which this article is based, is entitled Rethinking Insurgency and is available from the Strategic Studies Institute website at <<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=790>>.

Anthony Vinci, 'Becoming the enemy: Convergence in the American and Al Qaeda ways of warfare', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 69–88.

The idea of Existential and Instrumental ways of warfare is a concept that has been long debated by strategy academics. The two most obvious proponents of these divergent ways of war today are, of course, al-Qaeda and the United States respectively. Vinci argues, however, that this distinction is eroding, and that both the United States and al-Qaeda are becoming more and more alike in some respects in their approach to war.

The instrumental approach to warfare is one which the readers of the *SOPD* will be very familiar with, and thus needs no explanation—war essentially is seen as a tool with which to effect policy. Vinci argues that al-Qaeda's existential approach to warfare, on the other hand, is not a means-end approach, but is rather a way of living. Violence for al-Qaeda is not practical, but symbolic—it is used to demonstrate one group's weakness and another's strength. The perceived weakness of the target group is then used to split that group apart and sap its morale until it is finally driven into retreat.

Vinci's article offers a number of insights into al-Qaeda's philosophical approach to war, throwing into relief the counterproductive elements of the Coalition's strategy. An increased understanding of al-Qaeda and Islamic, Arab and Middle Eastern cultures has ameliorated the worst of these problems, and has, he argues, led the United States to pursue a method of warfare similar in some respects to al-Qaeda's. Limitations of understanding remain however, and ensure that problems still persist. Vinci's article provides the reader with an understanding of these limitations in the Coalition's strategy, as well as a deeper understanding of al-Qaeda's guiding influences. With this information, Australian and Coalition officers can develop better solutions to problems and prosecute a more effective campaign against terror.

Anthony Vinci recently completed his PhD at the London School of Economics where his research focused on the international relations of armed groups.

H R McMaster, 'On War: Lessons to be Learned', *Survival*, Vol. 50, No.1, February/March 2008, pp. 19–30.

H R McMaster offers a critical view of the 'transformation' paradigm at work within the United States Armed Forces in this article. His primary concern is that the theoretical basis of transformation has been proven false on the battlefields of Iraq, Afghanistan and Southern Lebanon.

McMaster's criticism of 'transformation' ranges across several areas, and each point is coherently argued and backed with evidence. For example, he argues against the central 'transformation' idea that better Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) technologies will abolish the 'fog of war'. McMaster cites the 3rd Infantry Division's crossing of the Euphrates River in Iraq in 2003 as an example of the fallacy of this argument. During this operation, a whole host of advanced ISR assets failed to detect an entire Iraqi armoured brigade. The fog of war, McMaster argues, is still a battlefield reality.

'Correcting the persistent flawed thinking about future conflict requires overcoming significant obstacles and acknowledging that adversaries will force real rather than imaginary wars upon modern military forces until those forces demonstrate the ability to defeat them.'

Just as officers and policy makers were swept along by the promise of a 'revolution in military affairs' in the 1990s, only to find out that their computer simulations were disproved in Iraq and Afghanistan, today's decision makers must remember that theory will always have to evolve to match practice. McMaster's article serves as a cogent reminder that if theory is divorced from battlefield reality it must be abandoned—whatever the vested interests.

H R McMaster is a US Army Colonel and a Senior Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Christopher J Fettweis, 'On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq', *Survival*, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, Winter 2007–08, pp. 83–98.

Australia is soon to withdraw the Overwatch Battle Group (West) from Iraq. Moreover, it is possible that the next President of the United States will also withdraw large numbers of US troops. Consequently, a substantial reduction in Coalition forces will represent a significant change to the strategic situation in Iraq. Christopher Fettweis' article offers a well-argued vision of what may transpire in the event of such a withdrawal.

Fettweis rejects the apocalyptic vision of Iraq's future that many observers in the United States and around the world project post-withdrawal. He thinks that the reality will be far more palatable to Coalition interests compared with the widely prevalent idea that Iraq will become a sort of 'state of al-Qaeda'. Fettweis is quick to point out that the

'Fortunately for a nation on the edge of defeat, none of those catastrophes [that are widely envisioned] are particularly likely.'

future Iraq will not be a haven of democracy and liberty, but that it will not become an Islamic caliphate either. The author's arguments resonate with restrained academic judgment, and show that, while the reality of the withdrawal from Iraq will not be pretty, it will not be an unmitigated disaster either. Senior officers and commanders would do well, therefore, to read Fettweis' article to prepare themselves for the realities of the Australian withdrawal that is soon to come, and the US force reduction that is likely to follow.

Christopher J Fettweis is Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs in the National Security Decision Making Department of the US Naval War College.

Alan Krueger, 'What Makes a Terrorist', *The American*, Vol. 1, Iss. 7, November/December 2007, pp. 16–24, <<http://www.american.com/archive/2007/november-december-magazine-contents/what-makes-a-terrorist>>.

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, various sectors of Western society have come to question what drives someone to become a terrorist. A popular explanation has been that people are driven to extreme views and violent actions by deprivation, both in terms of economics and education. This theory was rapidly embraced by politicians and activists around the world, often in a hope that the new focus on fighting terrorism could be used to reduce poverty.

What at first examination looks to be an obvious correlation does not stand up to scrutiny, however. In his article Alan Krueger explains that '[s]uch explanations have been embraced almost entirely on faith, not scientific evidence.' Krueger goes on to outline a history of study into the correlation, or lack thereof, between inequity and various types of hate crime, including terrorism. It quickly becomes apparent that in many cases terrorists and suicide bombers are better educated and come from more materially better-off backgrounds than the average individual of the population they live among.

Krueger's work points to the fact that understanding terrorist organisations, and the motivations of those who join, are a lot more complicated than assuming adherents are driven by a lack of opportunity. Anyone who wishes to comprehend the motivations behind the actions of terrorist groups should carefully consider the arguments put forward by Krueger.

'Most terrorists are not so desperately poor that they have nothing to live for. Instead, they are people who care so fervently about a cause that they are willing to die for it.'

Alan Krueger is the Bendheim Professor of Economics and Public Policy at Princeton University and has been an adviser to the National Counterterrorism Center in the United States. This article is adapted from his new book What makes a Terrorist: Economics and the Roots of Terrorism.

Pankaj Ghemawat, 'The World's Biggest Myth', *Foreign Policy*, November/December 2007, Iss. 163, pp. 52–5.

Ghemawat's argument is simple: despite the agreement of many academics and commentators that globalisation leads to increased market share for fewer and fewer large corporations, it is simply not true. Ghemawat's brief factual and statistical analysis reveals this fallacy.

Australia's entire governmental apparatus agrees that globalisation is an important force to be considered when shaping national foreign policy. Ghemawat's engaging article therefore represents a critical interpretation that will be of value for all policymakers and military officers, as it offers a critique of one of the most common assumptions regarding globalisation—one that will certainly be pivotal in shaping both Australia's and other regional nation's policies today and in the future.

Pankaj Ghemawat is Anselmo Rubiralta Professor of Global Strategy at IESE Business School, University of Navarra, Spain. He is also the Jaime and Josefina Chua Tiampo Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School. His latest publication is Redefining Global Strategy, published in 2007.

Michael Krepon (ed.), 'China's Military Space Strategy: An Exchange', *Survival*, Vol. 50, No. 1, February/March 2008, pp. 157–98.

*This article is a collection of correspondence submitted to the Editor of *Survival* regarding Ashley Tellis's article, entitled 'China's Military Space Strategy' (*Survival*, Vol. 49, Iss. 3, pp. 41–72). Tellis's article was examined in Issue 53 of the SOPD (September 2007). The original article can be found at <<http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section~content=a780978527~db=all~fulltext=713240928~dontcount=true>>.*

Ashley Tellis's 'China's Military Space Strategy' was an insightful and provocative piece which examined China's possible motives in pursuing an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability. Tellis's hawkish argument that the United States must assume the worse about China's intentions, and 'run an offence–defence arms race in space, and win' raised great consternation in the strategy community, and numerous commentators contacted both *Survival* and Tellis himself about his article. Compiled as 'An Exchange', *Survival* presents here several of the best responses as well as a rejoinder from Tellis.

In these letters and essays, five authors take issue with different elements of Tellis's argument ranging from his central thesis, to factual matters, to matters of logic and analysis. Each author offers a different perspective for engaging with the original work, and taken together form an excellent précis of the debate surrounding this critical strategic issue.

Joanna I Lewis 'China's Strategic Priorities in International Climate Change Negotiations', *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 31, Iss. 1, Winter 2007–08, pp. 155–74, <<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1162/wash.2007.31.1.155>>.

Upon accession to office late last year, the new Commonwealth Government's first official act was to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This clearly signalled the importance which climate change will have

in the new government's foreign policy and strategic agenda. However, in global terms, Australia is a relatively minor player and its influence on emissions reduction targets and other such measures will be modest. It is the major economies, such as China and the United States, that will make or break the global response to climate change.

Joanna I Lewis's article therefore appears at a crucial moment for Australian officers and policymakers. Within it, she outlines China's strategy for, on the one hand ensuring that its economic growth proceeds apace unhindered, while on the other hand mollifying the international community's concerns over its high pollution levels. Critically, Lewis identifies China's position as hinging upon its developing nation status—a status it uses to ignore the large emissions reduction targets that other countries of similar economic stature have yet themselves to meet.

'China has ratified the primary international accords on climate change—the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol—but as a developing country, China has no binding emissions limits under either accord.'

As the Government has signified its intentions to focus more on both China and climate change, a confluence between these two policy foci is likely. Accordingly, it is incumbent upon senior officers to understand the position of China regarding climate change, and how this key strategic actor will seek to position itself in negotiations over this vital strategic, economic, diplomatic and political issue.

Joanna I Lewis is a Senior International Fellow at the Pew Center on Global Climate Change. She is also an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service in the Science, Technology and International Affairs program.

John Podesta and Peter Ogden, 'The Security Implications of Climate Change', *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 31, Iss. 1, Winter 2007–08, pp. 115–38, <http://www.twq.com/08winter/docs/08winter_podesta.pdf>.

It has now been recognised that climate change will have security implications. This was officially acknowledged in Australia with the release of *Joint Operations for the 21st Century* last year. Within this document, some of the more obvious security issues associated with climate change were identified including major population shifts and mass crop failures. But what of the security implications? What demands will these challenges place on military forces? How will these events produce phenomena that will affect security, and where will they happen? John Podesta and Peter Ogden's article addresses these questions and others.

For example, the two authors explain how China's decreasing environmental quality has led to numerous protests by large numbers of citizens. In response, the Chinese government has used the PLA to crush these outbursts. Podesta and Ogden argue that such violent measures may, in the future, strain relations with the West—just as the Chinese response to democracy protestors at Tiananmen Square did.

'Climate ... crises are all the more dangerous because they are interwoven and self-perpetuating: ... Once underway, this chain reaction becomes increasingly difficult to stop.'

The authors examine climate change and its implications in several vulnerable regions such as South Asia and the Middle East, and the consequences of such eventualities for major actors like the United States and the European Union. Australian officers will find the section on South Asia particularly interesting, but the nature of the globalised world means that climate change events in all regions will have a local effect. Podesta and Ogden's article offers both a summary of what is likely to happen, and acts as a starting point for assessing what such events will mean—if anything—for the ADFs training, doctrine and force structure.

John Podesta is President and CEO of the Center for American Progress in Washington DC, and was President Bill Clinton's Chief of Staff. Peter Ogden is a Senior National Security Analyst, also at the Center for American Progress.

REFLECTIONS

'Reflections' has been designed by the Editors of the SOPD to showcase the most influential texts from history regarding operations, strategy and politics. This month the Editors of the SOPD recommend:

Winston Churchill, *Sinews of Peace (Iron Curtain Speech)*, 1946,
<<http://www.hpol.org/churchill/>>.

In 1946, at Westminster College Missouri, Winston Churchill gave one of the most important and memorable addresses of his long and distinguished career. In the 'Iron Curtain' speech Churchill showed his mastery as a statesman by balancing praise for the USSR as a wartime ally with concerns about the spread of tyranny under the aegis of Soviet expansion.

While the Iron Curtain is now gone, the concerns Churchill raised still bear consideration. His idea that the 'over-all strategic concept' that should guide Western powers is 'nothing less than the safety and welfare, the freedom and progress, of all the homes and families of all the men and women in all the lands' remains the shaping principles of today's strategists and policy makers. The threats identified by Churchill—war and tyranny—continue to be the driving concern for Australia and its allies, albeit in new forms. Churchill envisaged that these scourges could be defeated by equipping the United Nations with an international armed force and by the spread of democracy in the form of free elections, freedom of speech and courts independent of the executive. These responsibilities remain of vital importance to Churchill's successors today as they were in 1946.

'Ladies and gentlemen, the United States stands at this time at the pinnacle of world power ... with primacy in power is also joined an awe-inspiring accountability to the future.'
