

# S O P D



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#### Land Warfare Studies Centre

Ian Campbell Road  
Duntroon ACT 2600  
Australia  
+61 2 6265 9624

[lwsc.publications@defence.gov.au](mailto:lwsc.publications@defence.gov.au)

## MESSAGE FROM THE EDITORS

This month the Editors of the *Senior Officer Professional Digest* recommend ten articles drawn from professional and academic journals on the subjects of 'The End of History?', the Shia Crescent, coalition command, public diplomacy, cyberwar, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Indian Ocean trade dynamics, infrastructure and water crises.

Robert Kagan's article opens this edition's recommendations. In his article, he critiques Francis Fukuyama's (in)famous 'End of History?' essay, and shows that Western nations still face numerous challenges and a 'peace dividend' remains elusive. Forces hostile to the West are arrayed across the globe, but the 'Shia crescent' in the Middle East is of particular concern—Pat Proctor examines this area and draws some surprising conclusions.

When the challenges from anti-Western forces become open enmity, military operations become necessary. Such operations, epitomised by the Coalition operations in Afghanistan, are exceptionally challenging, and Ian Wood writes of the difficulties facing coalition commanders. These campaigns, characterised by their length, and their proximity to civilian populations often become wars of ideas against irregular foes. Information operations and public diplomacy then become critical tools, and Humphrey Taylor covers these topics in his article, while Charles W Williamson III examines offensive options for an emerging front in the war of ideas: cyberspace. Closer to home, these long, drawn out battles require political stamina and popular support, and the painful legacy of mental injuries that result from combat operations can dampen morale if left untreated. Fittingly, Sue Halpern's article examines a new and novel way for treating PTSD.

Shifting focus to economic matters, Martin Walker offers an excellent analysis of trade among Middle Eastern, Asian and African countries, Jodi Liss examines the use of currency as a weapon, and Bruce Seely writes about infrastructure, its effect on economic performance and its ideal form. Finally Upmanu Lall, Tanya Heikkila, Casey Brown and Tobias Siegfried present a concise article on 'water crises'—an issue that if left unresolved could have dire economic, political and human consequences.

Enjoy  
The Editors

Robert Kagan, 'The End of the End of History', *The New Republic*, 23 April 2008, <<http://www.tnr.com/environmentenergy/story.html?id=ee167382-bd16-4b13-beb7-08effe1a6844>>.

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of decades of nuclear standoff, political leaders, scholars and strategists believed that a new era of peace and prosperity would surely prevail. Representative of this hope was Francis Fukuyama's article 'The End of History?', which proclaimed that democracy had won its final triumph, and that conflict—which had characterised history up to that point—would 'end' as the world quickly transitioned to a capitalist, democratic and culturally homogenous 'new world order'.

Robert Kagan's article demonstrates that twenty years on the world looks nothing like the peaceful, almost utopian environment which Fukuyama had predicted. Russia is reasserting its military power and has aligned itself with China and other Central Asian states, while Islamic fundamentalism has emerged as another challenge. Kagan examines each of these elements in turn, as well as some others, summing up the many facets of current reality that taken together thoroughly discredit Fukuyama's thesis. While Fukuyama's arguments have already been challenged by others, Kagan's conclusions are unique.

Kagan warns against complacency in the West. While many strategic thinkers have accepted that Fukuyama's enlightenment-driven ideas were incorrect, they have not pursued this realisation to a useful conclusion—Azar Gat being one notable exception. Kagan argues that the failure of democracy to prevail and 'end history' means that the struggle continues between democratic and authoritarian societies. Today, however, globalisation has levelled the playing field. Economic and human development is now open to all societies regardless of political organisation, and authoritarian regimes can accordingly claim legitimacy for their positions of power. The old methods of competition where the 'moral right' laid on the side of the democracies are increasingly invalid. Kagan's article solidly advances the notion that a confidence born of international institutionalism and 'democratic exceptionalism' is no longer valid.

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**'The economic and ideological determinism of the early post-Cold War years produced ... assumptions that shaped both policies and expectations. One was an abiding belief in the inevitability of human progress ... a faith born in the Enlightenment.'**

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For the Australian officer, this will entail new thinking about how to conduct operations 'among the people' where Fukuyama's enlightenment idea that 'democracy is best' can be extraordinarily damaging, and seen even as neo-colonial arrogance by the indigenous population. Democracy, Kagan argues, is no longer viewed in many parts of the world as a universal good. Kagan's piece offers a sound basis from which to begin the new thinking required to operate within such a challenging cognitive environment.

*Robert Kagan is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund. His latest book is The Return of History and the End of Dreams.*

Pat Proctor, 'The Mythical Shia Crescent', *Parameters*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 1, Spring 2008, pp. 30–42, <<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/08spring/proctor.pdf>>.

Most writing on the political situation in the Middle East will at some point turn to the importance of loyalties that cross national borders. A prominent theme since late 2006 has been the idea of a 'Shia Crescent', an allegiance lead by Iran and encompassing Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.

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**'This intellectual shorthand may be blinding the United States to opportunities that could yield tangible progress on several strategic fronts in the Middle East, while providing a new ally in the global war on terrorism.'**

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Developing an over-arching theory is a goal of many analysts and strategists, but pragmatic observations are often more useful. By seeing everything through one specific lens important information can be lost or, even more troubling, facts can be wilfully misinterpreted in an attempt to make them 'fit the discourse'. As Pat Proctor points out, such action can obscure important opportunities that can yield much needed progress. Relying on 'intellectual shorthand' to interpret events is a simplistic method in any situation; it is downright dangerous when dealing with a region as complex and volatile as the Middle East.

Developing an over-arching theory is a goal of many analysts and strategists, but pragmatic observations are often more useful. By seeing everything through one specific lens important information can be lost or, even more troubling, facts can be wilfully misinterpreted in an attempt to make them 'fit the discourse'. As Pat Proctor points out, such action can obscure important opportunities that can yield much needed

In his analysis of the political situation within the supposed Shia Crescent, Proctor deftly questions if such an allegiance exists, and points out how such an assumption could damage Western attempts to bring peace and stability to the Middle East.

*Major Pat Proctor participated as a joint operational planner in the 2007 campaign redesign for Operation Iraqi Freedom. He holds a Masters Degree in Military Arts from the US Army Command and General Staff College and is a student at the School for Advanced Military Studies.*

**Ian Wood, 'Preparing for Coalition Command – The Three Ps: People, Processes, and Plans', *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 8, No. 4, Winter 2007–08, pp. 44–52, <[http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol8/no4/PDF/07-wood\\_e.pdf](http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/engraph/Vol8/no4/PDF/07-wood_e.pdf)>.**

The majority of strategic commentators argue that Coalition operations involving highly integrated forces will continue to increase in importance for countries like Australia. While the modest size of the ADF largely precludes it from leadership roles in such a coalition, such a role is not impossible—East Timor proves that point. Ian Wood's article offers some incisive points regarding the command of coalition forces.

Wood's article is realistic—he acknowledges that friction and even discontent can occur between coalition partners. Based on his experience in various coalition headquarters, Wood concludes that such friction is often the biggest factor in the poor performance of coalition forces. Accordingly, his article offers a methodology for coalition commanders to help them avoid the worst of inter-ally fighting, and to make the most of their force.

Military operations are already complex enough without the need for commanders to manage different equipment, rules of engagement, tactics, techniques and procedures, as is likely to be found in a coalition. However this is often the reality for coalition commanders. Wood's article offers senior officers a method to forge the disparate elements of their coalition force into a seamless, lethal instrument.

*Commander Ian Wood of the Canadian Forces is currently serving as the Executive Assistant to Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff. He is Commanding Officer Designate of HMCS Protecteur.*

**Humphrey Taylor, 'The Not-So-Black Art of Public Diplomacy', *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 24, Iss. 4, Winter 2007–08, pp. 51–9.**

A consequence of the war in Iraq, and to a lesser extent Afghanistan, is a downturn in favourable attitudes towards the United States. Combined with a perception of questionable decision making by the US Administration regarding important ideas such as climate change, the United States is damaging its ability to develop goodwill, despite the effort that goes into public relations. The importance of this is far reaching and fundamental—the United States cannot rely on the support of its allies if the leaders of those allied countries are beholden to constituents who may or may not be supportive of the initiatives of the United States.

Public perception of policy can often be as important as the policy itself. As Taylor points out in this article, foreign opinion is driven most often by events and actions rather than words and spin. As we come to realise the importance of perception and communication in the operations that the ADF is presently involved in, it would be wise for policy makers to heed Taylor's advice that 'public diplomacy should be focused mainly on what [leaders] do and not just how they present themselves and their policies to the world', both in terms of how we present our intended message to the world, and how we interpret the statements of others.

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**'... public diplomacy should involve both give and take. It should help improve communications but it should also influence what the United States government does, and what our leaders say or do not say.'**

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*Humphrey Taylor is Chairman of the Harris Poll, a service of Harris Interactive. He has had responsibility for more than 8000 surveys in more than 80 countries.*

**Charles W Williamson III, 'Carpet bombing in cyberspace', *Armed Forces Journal*, May 2008, <<http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/05/3375884/>>.**

It is sometimes said that 'the best defence is a good offence', and Charles W Williamson III's article about attacking in cyberspace has certainly been written with that in mind.

Put simply, Williamson argues that military computer network operations today are primarily defensive in nature. In order to take the offensive in cyberspace, the author suggests that a military robot network, or 'botnet', be constructed. This network of remotely controlled

computers would be harnessed to flood enemy computers with internet traffic and overload them. This approach to computer network attack is known as a distributed denial of service attack (DDOS), and has been successfully employed by criminals and possibly even states against major companies like Yahoo! and CNN, and even small countries.

Williamson delves into the legal and diplomatic details regarding the use of an offensively oriented botnet, as well as providing ingenious suggestions for the cheap and rapid construction of such a network. He also outlines a simple plan and rationale for the command and control of a military botnet. Williamson's article is well worth reading in light of Australia's significant progress towards a network centric capable force. It is an article that is directly applicable to Australian circumstances.

*Colonel Charles W Williamson III, US Air Force, is the staff judge advocate, Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. He served as the first staff judge advocate for the Joint Task Force-Computer Network Operations.*

**Sue Halpern, 'Virtual Iraq', *The New Yorker*, 19 May 2008,**  
[http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/05/19/080519fa\\_fact\\_halpern](http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/05/19/080519fa_fact_halpern).

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a condition that affects a significant number of former and possibly serving ADF personnel. Sue Halpern's article examines a new and unique method of treatment—virtual-reality immersion therapy.

Halpern's engaging article covers the work of Albert Rizzo, a clinical psychologist from the University of Southern California, who has developed a virtual reality set based on the computer game *Full Spectrum Warrior*. This set is used by clinical therapists to immerse their patients in a virtual version of their PTSD-triggering event. By gradually exposing the patient to the event, therapists hope to eventually de-sensitise the sufferer to the point where they are no longer affected by PTSD. Halpern points out that success rates from early clinical trials are extremely encouraging.

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**'I'm not someone who responds to sitting with some guy, talking about my whole life ... So V.R. therapy, maybe it will work. We're a video-game generation. It's what we grew up on. So maybe we'll respond to it.'**

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Personnel continue to remain central to the ADFs ability to generate military capability and effects on the battlefield—they are the Defence Force's competitive advantage. As such, their mental health and wellbeing is a critical priority for senior officers who want their personnel to operate at peak effectiveness. Halpern's article shows that new technologies, combined with original thinking and ingenuity, can be decisive in treating this difficult condition, and can help senior officers and policymakers do their very best for the personnel of the ADF.

*Sue Halpern holds a Doctorate from Oxford University. She is a former Rhodes Scholar and Guggenheim Fellow, and is a scholar-in-residence at Middlebury College. She has written several books on medical and psychological issues, including her latest book Can't Remember What I Forgot.*

**Martin Walker, 'Indian Ocean Nexus', *The Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 32, Iss. 2, Spring 2008, pp. 21–8.**

Martin Walker's article offers a very interesting examination of what he believes is the engine of growth driving the rapid development of China, India, the Middle East and Africa. Harking back to the days of the British Empire's rapid rise, Walker argues that these regions, which he refers to as CHIMEA, are growing by virtue of 'triangular trade' facilitated by the Indian Ocean.

Essentially, Walker argues that Middle Eastern oil, shipped across the Indian Ocean, fuels the developing economies of India and China. In turn, profits from these sales furnish the development of Middle Eastern countries. India and China send excess capital generated by their growth to Africa, who in return provides the Middle East, China and India with raw materials. This triangle of trade all centres on the Indian Ocean which, the author reminds us, could become a battleground as vicious as any previous conduit of wealth.

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**'[T]he trade that is now flourishing across the Indian Ocean is ... binding the Indian Ocean nations and China into a potential new hub of the global economy.'**

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Walker is not blind to the geopolitical challenges that such a trading system faces, and he examines each of these in turn. These include the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa, the enmity and tension between China and India, and China's reluctance to aid in the development of what could one day become a Middle Eastern or African competitor.

Though brief, Walker's article is dense with ideas that demonstrate the growing global strategic relevance of the waters close to Australia. While some may argue that the CHIMEA bloc may be more a *Chimera* bloc, the fundamentals and dynamics behind Walker's argument are all demonstrably true. Senior Defence personnel would do well to take note of Walker's ideas and how the reality they present may affect Australia's strategic policy in the future.

*Martin Walker is a Senior Scholar at the Wilson Center and is Director of A T Kearney's Global Business Policy Council.*

**Jodi Liss, 'Making Monetary Mischief', *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 24, Iss. 4, Winter 2007–08, pp. 29–38.**

Money is obviously critical to all military endeavours—indeed, all too often it is the financial factor that limits the capability of the ADF. However, Jodi Liss's article takes another look at money in military matters, examining the uses of currency itself as a weapon.

While economic warfare is not new—Germany's U-boat campaign of the Second World War being one famous example—currency speculation as a form of warfare is. Jodi Liss argues that because of the increasingly interconnected nature of the global economy, as well as its ever increasing speed, countries are becoming more vulnerable to the deliberate devaluation of their currency. Liss highlights some examples and case studies, but the facts and logic of her argument stand solidly by themselves.

The Asian financial crisis of 1997 is a stark reminder of the vulnerability of our immediate neighbourhood to currency shocks. As Liss points out, these can cripple a country's ability to afford the weapons and materials it needs to mount military operations, as well as damage a regime's reputation among its people. Liss's article stands out among those written on the subject as it deals with the practical issues of using currency as a weapon rather than the theoretical, including an analysis of possible defensive measures that a country may employ to counter such an attack. This well-written, practically focused piece is certainly worth the time of all senior officers and policy makers.

*Jodi Liss holds a Masters of Security Studies from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. She has been a consultant for the United Nations and the United Nations Development Programme.*

**Bruce Seely, 'The Secret Is the System', *The Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 32, Iss. 2, Spring 2008, pp. 47–59.**

Mayor of New York Michael Bloomberg once said 'Infrastructure isn't sexy or glamorous, and it doesn't make for great headlines'. However, infrastructure is vitally important to any modern society, and a lack of consideration regarding its development and maintenance can lead to economic loss, military ineffectiveness and even chaos. While the cliché may be that an Army 'marches on its stomach' the reality is that a modern military force relies on its infrastructure.

While Bruce Seely focuses on the problem of inadequate infrastructure in the United States, many of the points raised are equally applicable to an Australian defence context. This article, like many written about modern logistics, showcases FedEx and UPS as case studies of effective distribution systems and networks. Adopting such corporate models is a point worthy of contemplation for ADF logistic planners, even if they are radically different to the current compartmentalisation of the ADFs logistic planning and responsibility by Group, Service, Corps, mode etc. Another point worth considering is that of bottlenecks in the supply chain. When these occur in the corporate world the result is a loss of business. In the military world, supply chain investment tends to be overlooked in the battle for peacetime funds as the need for such investment is decidedly less pressing. A lack of investment will reduce capability. However, this lack may not be discovered until it is required, when it is too late. It is like safety—good infrastructure is considered the norm and doesn't attract comment, while bad infrastructure can be catastrophic if it is pushed to the limit.

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**'It is fitting in a way that our debates over infrastructure have been so long and drawn out. The undertakings themselves are by definition large, expensive, and protracted.'**

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*Bruce Seely is Historian of Technology and Chair of Social Sciences at Michigan Technological University. His latest book, co-authored with Mark Rose and Paul Barrett is The Best Transportation System in the World: Railroads, Trucks, Airlines, and American Public Policy in the Twentieth Century.*

**Upmanu Lall, Tanya Heikkila, Casey Brown and Tobias Siegfried, 'Water in the 21st Century: Defining the Elements of Global Crises and Potential Solutions', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 61, Iss. 2, Spring 2008, pp. 1–17.**

This excellent article by Upmanu Lall, Tanya Heikkila, Casey Brown and Tobias Siegfried opens the latest edition of the *Journal of International Affairs*—an edition devoted to water issues around the globe. While the editors of the SOPD commend the entire edition of the Journal to readers, this capstone article provides an eloquent précis of the state of the discourse regarding water as a security issue.

The authors argue that water issues, when considered locally, are widespread and common across the globe. Whether it be the construction of dams upstream, drought, lack of infrastructure or environmental degradation, almost every country around the world currently faces some sort of water issue. When taken together, and considering the interconnected nature of many countries' ecosystems, these problems combine to be a greater concern than the simple sum of their parts.

The authors examine the three types of water issue—access, scarcity and pollution—offering useful ways to think about these problems, readily characterise them, and constructively group them. The four scholars also dwell upon agricultural water usage, conclusively demonstrating that the farming sector is the only one which can possibly deliver the quantity of savings required to avert future water crises.

Refreshingly, the authors steer well clear of alarmist and apocalyptic predictions. Instead, they build on a solid foundation of facts and clear, level-headed reasoning. Senior officers will find this article an excellent way to quickly get up to speed on this critical issue of environmental security—one that will only continue to increase in importance as climate change takes its toll on regional water resources.

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**'Perhaps the way the global water crisis has been defined—whether the world will run out of fresh water—is the wrong way to look at the problem.'**

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*Upmanu Lall is the Alan and Carol Silberstein Professor of Engineering at Columbia University and a Senior Research Scientist at The International Research Institute for Climate and Society. Tanya Heikkila is an Assistant Professor at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. Casey Brown is leader of the water sub-program and an Associate Research Scientist at The International Research Institute for Climate and Society of the Earth Institute at Columbia University. Tobias Siegfried is a Fellow at the Earth Institute and is an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University.*

*'Reflections' has been designed by the Editors of the SOPD to showcase the most influential texts from history regarding operations, strategy and politics. This month the Editors of the SOPD recommend:*

**Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', *The National Interest*, Iss. 16, Summer 1989.**

Francis Fukuyama's 'The End of History?' is one of the most important essays of the post-Cold War era. Published in 1989, when the Soviet Union was on the brink of collapse, this article did much to shape the debate on the nature of the new world order.

Fukuyama predicted that in this brave new world the opportunities for the West would be immense. Societies would naturally become more like the West—democratic, secular, individualistic and materialistic. Democracy would prevail as the dominant political system and trade would flourish, as would peace. The downfall of Fukuyama's thesis was his inability to accept that the post-Cold War era also contained hazards for the West. Robert Kagan's recent article 'The End of the End of History', which is recommended earlier in this edition of the *SOPD*, makes this point quite succinctly.

While 'The End of History?' did much to shape the strategic and policy debates of its time, its fundamental failure to anticipate the future shows senior officers the absolute imperative of critically engaging with their environment. The Chief of Army stressed this very point in his introduction to the *Chief of Army's Reading List* published in 2007, in which he commended the late Colonel E G Keogh's approach to military studies. Keogh, the long-serving editor of the *Australian Army Journal*, wrote that a 'critical, challenging approach' is an 'essential requirement ... for success.' Senior officers who read Fukuyama's article will find it a stimulating exercise in critical thought as they seek to pick out the flaws in what was, at the time, an extremely persuasive argument.

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**'But the century that began full of self-confidence in the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started ... to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism.'**

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*At the time he wrote the article, Francis Fukuyama was the Deputy Director of the US State Department's policy planning staff. He also had worked as an analyst at the RAND Corporation. Today, he is the Bernard L Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy and the Director of the International Development Program at The Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.*