

# S O P D



## Contents

### 2 ARTICLE SUMMARIES

Winning Souls and Minds *by John D Carlson*

Powers of Persuasion *by The Economist*

3 Battle of the (youth) bulge *by Neil Howe and Richard Jackson*

Land Warrior *by W W Prior*

4 Web War I *by Stephen Blank*

5 Needed: A National Security Simulation Centre *by Rachel K Hanig and Mark E Henshaw*

6 The U.S. Navy's Maiden Voyage *by Ryan Kelty*

Making Revolutionary Change *by Charles J Dunlap Jr*

7 The Next Asian Miracle *by Yasheng Huang*

Closing Time *by Caitlin Talmadge*

### REFLECTIONS

8 Address Before a Joint Session of Congress *by Harry S Truman*

The **Senior Officer Professional Digest** is a publication of the Land Warfare Studies Centre. Feedback regarding this publication is welcome and should be addressed to the Director.



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## MESSAGE FROM THE EDITORS

This month the Editors of the Senior Officer Professional Digest recommend ten articles drawn from professional and academic journals on the subjects of 'hearts and minds', counterterrorism, demographics, information war, intelligence analysis, civilianisation, counterinsurgency, India and Iran.

Winning 'hearts and minds' is critical to any counterinsurgency campaign, and this month's first three recommendations cover some of the many ways in which this can be achieved. John D Carlson examines the utility of studying religion for counterinsurgent (COIN) forces, *The Economist* focuses on the rehabilitation of terrorists in Saudi Arabia, and Neil Howe and Richard Jackson explore the demographics of instability and violence.

Such soft-power approaches are only one half of the picture in any COIN campaign—killing and capturing the enemy is of course the other. Given the increasing importance of information technology (IT) to this task, W W Prior's article is timely. Within, he analyses the uses of the new US 'Land Warrior' equipment in Iraq. Stephen Blank looks at the warfighting-support capabilities of IT, examining the computer attack on the Estonian Government last year. Rachel K Hanig and Mark E Henshaw discuss the ability of IT to support training in their article, building a case for the use of simulation to support the intelligence community.

While IT and other technologies will help multiply the effectiveness of small, all-volunteer forces, there will always be a struggle to field sufficient numbers of troops. Ryan Kelty examines the US Navy's innovative mixed, civil-military warship crewing arrangements which the RAN experimented with in the Vietnam War. Charles J Dunlap makes the case for increased use of airpower in COIN, noting the reduced personnel numbers such an approach would entail.

Switching focus from irregular foes to nation-states, Yasheng Huang analyses Indian and Chinese economic development, reaching a series of interesting conclusions in the process. Finally, Caitlin Talmadge examines Iran's military capabilities and its ability to operate in the Persian Gulf littoral.

Enjoy  
The Editors

**John D Carlson, 'Winning Souls and Minds: The Military's Religion Problem and the Global War on Terror', *Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 7, Iss. 2, pp. 85–101, <<http://www.usafa.edu/isme/ISME07/Carlson07.html>>.**

Religion is central to the many Islamic extremist groups that the United States, Australia and their allies are fighting in the Global War on Terror. Islam and the various cultures and languages present in the Middle Eastern Area of Operations are now on the curricula of many military schools. John D Carlson argues, however, that these efforts should go even further.

Carlson advocates not just the teaching of Islam to soldiers, but the teaching of religion in general. He believes that by critically analysing what makes a religion a religion, soldiers will not only better understand their friends and enemies, but will also understand how religion affects their own perceptions of the operational environment. Carlson does point out that democratic military forces should rightly remain secular, and makes the distinction between religious understanding and religiosity. Understanding the difference and acting on it is critical to success when Australian forces are operating in cultural and religious environments very different to those they experience at home.

The author's conclusions are interesting and unique, and point to the type of innovative thinking about education that is critical to success in today's and tomorrow's complex operations.

*John D Carlson is Assistant Professor of Religious Studies at the Department of Religious Studies, Arizona State University. He is co-editor with Erik Owens of The Sacred and the Sovereign: Religion and International Politics.*

**'Powers of persuasion', *The Economist*, Vol. 388, Iss. 8589, 17 July 2008, <[http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story\\_id=11701258](http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11701258)>.**

As the West attempts to understand a new radical Islamist enemy, it is becoming increasingly clear that the reasons people choose to become militants are often complex. In Saudi Arabia, security authorities have taken this message on-board when dealing with captured militants. In response, they have adopted an extensive program of deradicalisation, and combined it with a concurrent policy of tough policing. This new technique is seen by many as a breakthrough in the Global War on Terror.

This short article from *The Economist* gives a brief outline of a new program being used in Saudi prisons to turn around jihadists. Its underpinning principle is to treat the militant as a victim, and then make them see the error in their ways. In addition, this technique includes a program of psychological counselling, skills training and a process of reconnection with their families and friends. This is in turn combined with measures bringing

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**“It should not be a trial of the people ... it should be a trial of the ideology of al-Qaeda. The real victory over al-Qaeda will be when we defeat the ideology.”**

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advantages to family and tribal elders. This is in an attempt to remove the appeal of extremists in the society to which the rehabilitated prisoners will return, and also to build up a network that will support future good behaviour.

Whether this program will succeed is not yet known. However, as Western countries continue to deal with the problem of what to do with radical Islamists, it is in their interests to look at some of the different approaches in use around the world. This article examines one approach that is certainly worthy of consideration.

**Neil Howe and Richard Jackson, 'Battle of the (youth) bulge', *The National Interest*, Iss. 96, July-August 2008, pp. 33–41.**

Many recent articles have discussed the importance of demographics when considering future security strategy. While it is widely known that the populations of developed countries are ageing, it is less completely understood that the developing world is also aging. This is due to lower mortality rates and a concurrent fall in fertility rates. If these combined factors continue as the current trend suggests, the median age in a typical developing country in 2050 will be similar to that of the United States today. While many experts see this as a positive development, Neil Howe and Richard Jackson contend that such arguments are deeply flawed.

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**'What we need to worry most about are large and rapidly developing countries that could either slip into chaos or become affluent, technologically advanced and civically cohesive, yet hostile to liberal democracy.'**

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Howe and Jackson believe that the most serious security threats caused by shifting demographic trends are not found in countries with very young populations and poor economies. They see the gravest problems arising in countries that are in the process of developing their economies while undergoing demographic change. These are countries that have the capacity to carry out military action but do not yet have the ability to manage

conflict. The authors bolster their argument with historical examples, pointing out that most of today's developed nations underwent revolution, civil wars and genocides when going through similar transition periods. It is naïve to believe that this will not be repeated by today's developing nations. As this article points out, state failure in Pakistan or Iran is much more likely to have wide-ranging effects than if similar problems occurred in Somalia or Sierra Leone.

*Neil Howe and Richard Jackson are, respectively, a senior associate and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. They are co-authors of The Graying of the Great Powers: Demography and Geopolitics in the 21st Century.*

**W W Prior, 'Land Warrior: Dominating Dismounted Operations', *Infantry*, Vol. 97, Iss. 3, May/June 2008, pp. 12–14.**

Australia's Projects LAND 125 and LAND 75, which provide communications and other equipment for infantry forces, are approaching a point where frontline soldiers will soon have

revolutionary new capabilities. While the Department of Defence and the Army have both conducted thorough experiments to determine the validity of the 'soldier as a system' approach, W W Prior's article offers actual field experience of this type of system.

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**'The combination of situational awareness, imagery, dynamic graphics and communications at our fingertips is an incredible advantage to ... leaders on the streets and in the palm groves of Iraq.'**

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Prior, a lieutenant colonel in the US Army, deployed his Fourth Battalion, Ninth Infantry Regiment to Iraq in April 2007. Equipped with both the Stryker vehicle set and with the US Land Warrior kit, Prior's experience provides a valuable insight into how 'soldier system' equipment will act as a force multiplier when issued to Australian forces.

Prior's article is clear, concise and thorough. He lists the problems and limitations of the Land Warrior system, as well as the many benefits, some of which are not immediately apparent to the casual observer of this technology. Accordingly, Prior's article is an engaging piece for the senior officer, civilian policymaker and defence scientist alike.

*Lieutenant Colonel W W Prior is Commanding Officer of the Fourth Battalion, Ninth Infantry Regiment, Second Infantry Division, US Army. He graduated from West Point in 1987 and holds a Master's Degree in Applied Physics from Stanford University.*

**Stephen Blank, 'Web War I: Is Europe's First Information War a New Kind of War?', *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 27, Iss. 3, pp. 227–47.**

In 2007, the world saw one of the most open uses of a new dimension in military operations—the cyber-attack. While never proved conclusively, it is believed that the Russian Government was behind this wide-ranging cyber attack on Estonia. Simultaneously with the cyber-assault, anti-Estonian protests broke out in Moscow and Tallinn, and Russia placed economic sanctions on their small neighbour. This multifaceted strategy represented a concerted attempt by Moscow to pursue their national interests in the Baltic region. Stephen Blank uses this Estonian example to highlight the emerging threat of cyber-war.

Recently, cyber-criminals were able to 'tap into' wireless networks to gain masses of personal information for financial gain. This underlines both the pervasive nature of electronic information and its vulnerabilities. While governments and defence departments may argue that they have security networks in place to keep their information safe, the only truly safe system is one that is not connected to a network—something that is not possible in today's environment. The examples used in this article underline how governments are now willing to use cyber attack as a tool of foreign policy. While planners within the ADF need to consider the implications of securing the technology systems within their own organisation, it is imperative that resources are also allocated to

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**'[T]he strategy involved here goes beyond Russia's tense relations with its state neighbors, Baltic or otherwise, to encompass global potentials for waging such war against hostile governments, as part of an insurgency within a state or a takeover from within.'**

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considering the other aspects of society that are vulnerable to cyber-attacks, whether they be launched by state or non-state actors.

*Dr Stephen J Blank has been the Soviet bloc and post-Soviet world expert at the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute since 1989. Prior to that he was Associate Professor of Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education at Maxwell Air Force Base.*

**Rachel K Hanig and Mark E Henshaw, 'Needed: A National Security Simulation Center', *Unclassified Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2008, pp. 11–18, <<https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol52no2/pdf/U-%20Studies%2052-2%20-Jun08-SecuritySimulation-Web.pdf>>.**

Poor intelligence analysis can lead to poor policy and negative outcomes for the government. Rachel K Hanig and Mark E Henshaw argue that 'practice makes perfect' when it comes to intelligence analysis, and to this end they propose a 'national security simulation centre'.

This simulation centre would offer the intelligence community what the ADF and other advanced military forces have had for years—high fidelity simulation systems to train their personnel in situations as close to reality as possible. When these personnel are called on to operate in real-life situations, the constant practice that simulation allows them means that they are better able to cope with the stress, uncertainty and 'friction' of reality.

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**'Intelligence analysis too often is like investing in the stock market—past performance is not an indicator of future results.'**

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Hanig and Henshaw show that this simulation centre would also have benefits for intelligence analysts beyond being able to practice their trade more frequently. It would allow exercises to be staged that bring together many disparate groups and enable them to learn each others' capabilities and limitations, as well as provide a venue for

experimentation with new analytical techniques. The feedback from exercise umpires would be invaluable as it would provide intelligence analysts with detailed commentary on their accuracy and performance.

The authors' suggestions are directly applicable to Australia, where enthusiasm for simulation is obviously high. The Defence Organisation's new Joint Decision Support and Simulation Centre in Canberra is potentially one home for this novel approach to the improvement of intelligence analysis. Hanig and Henshaw's article provides many ideas to help make such a concept reality.

*Rachel K Hanig and Mark E Henshaw's article was a winning entry in the 2007 DNI Galileo Competition for proposing innovative solutions to US intelligence community challenges. Both authors are analysts with the Information Operations Center of the CIA.*

Ryan Kelty, 'The U.S. Navy's Maiden Voyage', *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 34, No. 4, July 2008, pp. 536–64.

The civilianisation of many roles within the ADF has been a largely successful policy. Today, more officers and soldiers are posted to units with combat and combat support specialties which has helped to increase the ADF's capability.

The US Armed Forces have undertaken a similar approach to personnel management. Ryan Kelty's article focuses on one of the more novel approaches that the US Navy has taken to counter human resource difficulties: integrated crews. Kelty's subject is a US ship that put to sea with uniformed combat systems operators and command staff, and a civilian engineering and maintenance crew. The vessel's deployment was successful, and the civilian mariners worked well with their US Navy shipmates.

Kelty's detailed research and surveys of the crew draws out many interesting and surprising dimensions of the mixed, civil/military crew approach. With Australia's own navy struggling to attract sailors, Kelty's article about mixed crews and the challenges associated with them makes for intriguing reading.

*Ryan Kelty is Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Department of Behavioural Sciences and Leadership, United States Military Academy.*

Charles J Dunlap Jr, 'Making Revolutionary Change: Airpower in COIN Today', *Parameters*, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 2, Summer 2008, pp. 52–66, <<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/08summer/dunlap.pdf>>.

Close Air Support is mostly thought of as a tool for the conventional battlefield, where the tremendous weight of fire that aircraft can bring to bear can be vital. Counterinsurgency, on the other hand, calls for more finesse—or so many would believe. Charles J Dunlap Jr, however, proves that this is not always necessarily the case.

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**'Giving some credence to the soft power techniques that popularized FM 3-24 does not change the fact that there was an extraordinary amount of "killing and capturing" during 2007 ... As regrettable as it may be, killing does seem to suppress violence in locations where "hearts and minds" remain mostly "lost."'**

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Examining the new US Army and Marine Corps COIN Doctrine, FM 3–24, Dunlap agrees that a population-centric approach is critical to winning the COIN fight. However, unlike some proponents of the new US approach, the author maintains that 'killing and capturing' insurgents is also still important. Dunlap shows that, in 2007, during the surge of US forces into Baghdad, demand for air strikes increased significantly, as did requests for aerial surveillance and reconnaissance. He argues that this jump in demand is because airpower today

has undergone a revolutionary development: persistence. Now that aircraft and UAVs are able to loiter over the battlespace for many hours, they are approaching a point of responsiveness that will enable them to decisively influence ground operations.

For Australian officers, Dunlap's argument shows that an innovative, joint approach to operations can reap great rewards. Dunlap's article is therefore best read as a catalyst for equally innovative thinking on joint operations problems unique to the ADF.

*Major General Charles J Dunlap Jr is Deputy Judge Advocate General, Headquarters US Air Force. General Dunlap has served operational tours in the Middle East and Africa, including service on Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.*

**Yasheng Huang, 'The Next Asian Miracle', *Foreign Policy*, July/August 2008, pp. 32–40.**

China's rapid economic growth, impressive as it is, is in danger of being overshadowed by another emerging power—India. Yasheng Huang's concise article focuses on the economic development of these two 'Asian Tigers'.

Huang argues that India's historically modest growth rate was the result of illiberal and restrictive politics that hampered India's investment in human capital. This is surprising, and stands in direct contradiction of many development theorists who argue that it was India's liberal democratic politics in the 1970s and 1980s that contributed to its sluggish growth. Huang maintains that a closer examination of Indira Gandhi's rule during this period shows that she presided over an increasingly inflexible, centralised and authoritarian government that constrained human and economic development.

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**'If India, with its noisy, chaotic, and lumbering political arrangements, can grow, then no other poor country must face a Faustian choice between growth and democracy.'**

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Huang's comparison of China's and India's development makes for interesting—and revealing—reading. His conclusions regarding China's current economic state are just as surprising as his observations of India's history. His insights and analysis, therefore, are worth the time of senior officers and policymakers looking for a fresh take on these important issues.

*Professor Yasheng Huang teaches at the Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His latest book is entitled *Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics*.*

**Caitlin Talmadge, 'Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz', *International Security*, Vol. 33, No. 1, Summer 2008, pp. 82–117, <[http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3301\\_pp082-117\\_Talmadge.pdf](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3301_pp082-117_Talmadge.pdf)>.**

As the 'tanker wars' dragged on through the 1980s, oil prices rose sharply but only fell slowly. With spare capacity in both production and refining at historic lows, similar events today could cause much greater price spikes. In the current economic climate, coming on top of already high prices, this could have potentially catastrophic, worldwide economic ramifications. Caitlin Talmadge's analysis of the Iranian capability to block the Strait of Hormuz is therefore vital reading for Australian strategists and government economists.

Talmadge examines Iran's capacity to mine the Strait of Hormuz and cover this chokepoint with cruise missiles. With Iran's still rudimentary, but improving air defences, clearing this minefield could be difficult. Talmadge concludes that keeping this waterway open would be hampered by the fact that it would rely on two low-density/high-demand assets: mine countermeasures craft and forces for the suppression of enemy air defences.

Talmadge's analysis is thorough and robust, and her assumptions clearly laid out. She avoids unfounded speculation and makes level-headed judgments throughout her piece. Her conclusions have ramifications for Australia: the RAN could be called on to offer MCM craft and expertise in the event Iran mined the Strait. Australian officers and planners, therefore, would do well to read Talmadge's article as a starting point for more detailed thinking regarding how Australia might act in such an event.

*Caitlin Talmadge is a doctoral candidate in political science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She was previously a Fellow at the John M Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University.*

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## REFLECTIONS

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*'Reflections' has been designed by the Editors of the SOPD to showcase the most influential texts from history regarding operations, strategy and politics. This month the Editors of the SOPD recommend:*

**Harry S Truman, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, 12 March 1947,**  
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm>.

The Cold War period of interventionist American foreign policy was most clearly signalled by President Harry Truman's address to Congress in 1947. It was a firm statement by the United States that it would not tolerate further Communist advances in Europe, and that it would mobilise the resources necessary to defend the free world.

Truman's speech set the tenor for the next forty years of the Cold War. With his address, Truman foreshadowed the United States' future policy of assisting those countries facing Communist intimidation, insurgency or infiltration. While the Soviet Union no longer exists, and Communism is in retreat, the Truman Doctrine lives on. Today, however, the threat is Islamic extremism, and President George W Bush's aid to Pakistan and other countries would be immediately familiar to Truman were he still alive.

The Truman Doctrine is the foundational text for present-day US foreign policy. It echoes clearly in President Bush's rhetoric today and will no doubt remain a factor in US foreign policy well into the future. It is, therefore, of considerable interest to officers and policymakers.

*Harry S Truman was born 8 May 1884 in Lamar, Missouri. After service in the First World War, Truman was elected Senator from Missouri on 3 January 1935. After several high-profile successes, he was elected the Vice President of the United States, and sworn in to the office on 20 January 1945. After President Franklin Roosevelt's death, Truman became the 33rd President of the United States of America. He oversaw the Allies' final victory over the Axis, and witnessed the rise of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. He was re-elected to the Presidency in 1948, leaving office in 1953. He died on 26 December 1972.*