

Land Warfare Studies Centre

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**THE WAY AHEAD?
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO INTEGRATING
THE RESERVES IN 'TOTAL FORCE' PLANNING**

by

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABCA	American–British–Canadian–Australian armies (Agreement)
ADF	Australian Defence Force
ARNG	Army Reserve National Guard (US)
FTRS	Full-Time Reserve Service
HRR	High Readiness Reserve
IFOR	Implementation Force (in Bosnia)
MARFORRES	Marine Forces Reserve (US)
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force (US)
MoD	Ministry of Defence (UK)
MTW	main theatre war
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDHQ	National Defence Headquarters (Canada)
OOTW	operations other than war
PSYOPS	psychological operations
RFPB	Reserve Forces Policy Board (US)
RFSU	Regional Force Surveillance Unit (Australia)
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
R-Net	Reserve Information Network
RNR	Royal Naval Reserve (UK)
RMR	Royal Marine Reserve (UK)
SCRR	Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves (Canada)
SDR	Strategic Defence Review (UK White Paper)
SFOR	Stabilisation Force (in Bosnia)
SR	Sponsored Reserve (UK)
TA	Territorial Army (UK)
TAVRA	Territorial Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve Associations (UK)
USMCR	United States Marine Corps Reserve

ABSTRACT

This paper examines contemporary reserve force planning in Britain, Canada and the United States (US), and considers how the Australian Defence Force might benefit from that experience. All three countries have adopted the US-initiated concept of the 'Total Force'—an integrated, 'seamless' military comprising both full and part-time components. However, as a consequence of cultural, budgetary, political and historical factors, each country has arrived at a different model. Despite having achieved considerable improvements in their force structure and operational capabilities, many of these initiatives appear provisional and short sighted, limited by a narrow perception of contemporary operational requirements. With the exception of the US Marine Corps, few combat forces appear to have established the internal synergies that will enable them to sustain a coordinated regular–reserve response to a full range of contingencies.

Concentrating on ground forces, as the most numerically significant element of most countries' reserves, the paper suggests that the contemporary focus on military support operations such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance is likely to degrade the ability of Western states to respond to more significant threats. Currently, reservists are being widely used for individual reinforcement and augmentation of forces deployed on military support operations. For the most part, the integrated 'Total Force' concept has been taken to mean that reserves can be 'penny-packaged' to relieve under-resourced regular components. In a truly integrated army, providing reservists with the opportunity to serve full-time on operations enhances the abilities of the reservists and the capabilities of the regular force. Unfortunately, this is generally not the case; a reserve that is a mere 'temp pool' does not make optimal use of either component. This trend derogates the ability of reserve units to train and organise themselves for higher-level operations and ultimately does away with the core strategic rationale for reserves, which is to act as a national mobilisation base. Moreover, reliance on individual reservists as a stopgap measure to address personnel shortfalls only appears to damage the total force. Similarly, the tendency to concentrate reserve capabilities in combat support and service support functions will restrict a country's ability to sustain anything other than low-level operations. Although reserve units might not attain the same level of warfighting skills as their regular counterparts in time of peace, they have the potential to act as a substantial force multiplier in war.

The post–Cold War period has been one of strategic turbulence and uncertainty. Despite this, some pundits suggest that war between states is a thing of the past—a belief not supported by current events in the Balkans, the Gulf and the Indian subcontinent. Accordingly, planning processes that obviate a state's ability to generate the most combat power when required do not make the best use of the available manpower. The paper also suggests that Western military forces need to adopt a more creative and utilitarian approach to the use of reservists. As information warfare becomes a reality, more technological expertise will be found in the civil sector than the military. With modern forces adopting the 'concept-led, capability based' doctrinal paradigm, force planners will need to think laterally to develop forces able to anticipate threats and win in the new era of conflict.

**THE WAY AHEAD?
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO INTEGRATING
THE RESERVES IN 'TOTAL FORCE' PLANNING**

Generations of officer cadets in English-speaking armies have watched the 1944 film *The Way Ahead* as a part of their leadership training. In the film, an earnest, rather callow David Niven forges an infantry platoon from a varied and often unwilling bunch of conscripted civilians. Aply assisted by a regular non-commissioned officer, the erstwhile civilians do become a unit and the film concludes with them attacking into the fog of battle. The character played by Niven is, of course, also a civilian—a prewar territorial faced with similar transitional problems to those of his troops—and the theme is one that has dominated thinking about the employment of reserves throughout this century. In most countries they have traditionally been seen as a manpower expansion base, generally not available except in times of dire emergency requiring general mobilisation. The problems faced by Niven and his sergeant reflect the reservations that many full-time soldiers have had to the use of 'amateurs'.

During the Cold War, issues of discipline, relative competence and the administrative untidiness of moving from an all-professional force made the use of reservists appear, to some, an option only worth invoking in extremity. As a result, many Western armies allowed their reserve establishments to run down. In the post-Cold War era, with western armies rebuilding themselves as leaner, more professional, technologically based weapons of state policy, the question has been asked: Do we still need reserves? At least, do we need large numbers of part-time soldiers who will be slow to mobilise and whose military skills will inevitably lag behind their full-time colleagues? In a time of fiscal stringency, are these industrial-age forces diverting much-needed resources from the more efficient and highly trained information-age warriors?

Rhetorical questions usually seek no response, but in this case the answers are surprising. In the US, Britain, Canada and New Zealand more emphasis is being placed on the employment of reserves, though each country continues to wrestle with the problem of how best to utilise their services. Bucking the Cold War trend, some of the most advanced and combat-capable forces are those that have made intelligent use of their reserves. All four countries have found it impossible to sustain operations for any length of time without mobilising their reserve combat and combat support capabilities.

These countries' recent reviews of their respective reserve forces contain serious lessons for Australia. Not only are they Australia's colleagues in the American-British-Canadian-Australian (ABCA) armies' interoperability relationship, but the forces concerned are similar in type and face common issues in terms of their potential employment. There are lessons to be learnt, as the planning factors for each system are significant for the other states. On the other hand, reserves—even more than professional armies—are as deeply embedded in, and reflective of, their social origins and circumstances as they are the product of their strategic environment. It is, therefore, not possible to draw simple lessons from a straightforward comparative study of reserve force planning. What is obvious, however, is that the strength as well

as the weakness of these forces lies in the particular (some might say peculiar) position that they occupy in their communities.

This paper examines the recent reviews of reserve force roles and structures taken in the ABCA states, with the exception of New Zealand. Although New Zealand is an associate member of the ABCA structure, its Territorial Force is currently undergoing a 'Reorientation process' that appears similar to the British experience, albeit on a much smaller scale. As the New Zealand Army is still evaluating the proposed structure and has reserved its conclusions for the time being, any comment at this stage would be speculative.

The paper also examines some of the proposals for reserves that have arisen out of contemporary assessments of the function of the military. There are some limitations on this approach, the major factor being that in peacetime it is difficult to assess objectively the contribution to national security provided by the existence of reserves. Partly, this is because few reserve units are capable of short-notice deployment, and estimates of their degree of readiness vary considerably. To a certain extent, this constraint has been obviated by the fact that all three countries are reliant on their reserve components to sustain their current overseas operational commitments.

The issue of force structure planning is also an emotive one. Few participants in debates that are increasingly defined by diminishing resources have been able to remain dispassionate. This factor is common to all three of the countries examined in this paper. The ultimate test of the value of reserves lies in the part that they would be called upon to play in a major war. Short of that, any appreciation of their worth must commence by considering the contribution they make to the military power of the state and their ability to enhance operational performance. As strategic circumstances dictate, the need for reserve forces to provide a warfighting capability may diminish and may be replaced to a certain extent by a reinforcement function. However, as governments are finding in the wake of the Kosovo conflict, such forecasts of future requirements are uncertain at best. These considerations have driven the reviews considered here, although it is worth noting that, in the cases of Britain and Canada, government-generated strategic forecasts of future contingencies appear to continue to underestimate the forces required to participate in modern conflict. It will be argued that, as in the past, major conflicts generally arise with little notice, and despite the best intentions no government can guarantee that it will not need to deploy substantial forces within a very short time.

It should also be noted that there is a considerable difference between the experience of the different armed services. Navy and Air Force Reserves are largely specialist or platform-based; accordingly, many of the technical skills that part-time personnel provide are easily translated from the civil sector. Air traffic control, ship maintenance and air and sea transportation functions do not require a high degree of specifically military knowledge. Indeed, many civilian specialists have the opportunity to develop a higher level of expertise in these areas than their full-time military counterparts. Even in combat, many Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard pilots in the US have undertaken more operational deployments than their regular counterparts—not surprising given their relatively small numbers, elite skills and expensive training. However, most reserve pilots have prior full-time service. The same cannot be said of army reserves. While ground forces perform functions

ranging from combat manoeuvre to combat support to combat service support, the collective warfighting skills required by large groups of troops are particular to the military and take time to acquire. Army reserves are also by far the most numerically significant of all the services. Accordingly, while each of the ABCA countries is examining reserve policy in general, most of these countries are currently focusing debate on the future of Land Force reserves.

From Cold War Legions to Flexible Response—the British Experience

The end of the Cold War resulted in a dramatic decrease in the size of British forces. In particular, this decrease has led to a transformation of their reserves. Political change in Britain, combined with the changed strategic situation in Europe, has left the military trying to adapt its force structures to meet the problems of an uncertain and unstable world. On 8 July 1998, the Blair Government delivered the Strategic Defence Review White Paper (SDR) entitled ‘Modern forces for a Modern World’, which formed the basis of a restructuring exercise that is still in progress. However, this is only the most recent example of a decade-long trend to force reduction that has impacted on both regular and reserve forces. An institutional momentum in favour of smaller, readily deployable forces seems to have developed but has not been matched by an increased ability to sustain operations. It appears that the British Government is trying to have its cake and eat it too—expecting that, even though it is scaling down its warfighting capabilities, it will be able to maintain a range of manpower-hungry overseas commitments at less cost.

The first step in this process was the 1990–91 *Options for Change* force structure review that cut the strength of both regular and part-time armed forces by 30 per cent across the board. The Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) lost its dedicated vessels and was radically reduced to a manning level of 2400 tasked only to provide individuals for sea duty. The Royal Marine Reserve (RMR) was restricted to 900 troops dedicated solely as wartime reinforcements for 3 Commando Brigade. The Royal Auxiliary Air Force retained 1400 volunteers for airfield defence, air movements and medical tasks. The Territorial Army (TA) establishment, designed for deployment onto a nuclear battlefield in northern Europe, was reduced from 91 000 to 63 500. Three years later, the Defence Costs Study recommended that the TA be further reduced to 42 000, but in the face of determined resistance from the Territorial Auxiliary and Volunteer Reserve Associations (TAVRA) lobby, that figure was modified to 56 700.¹

The axe fell most heavily on the combat elements of the TA. Forty-one infantry battalions were reduced to thirty-three. No longer was it considered necessary to maintain large forces prepared for a continental war, and together with the loss of the British Army of the Rhine commitment, went the perceived need to maintain units for home defence. The very nature of the Army changed from being ‘threat-based’, with a clearly defined role in West Germany, to being ‘capability-based’, with a wider range of functions; the emphasis moved away from warfighting to operations other than war (OOTW). Consequently, the focus moved from providing formed units to seeing the TA as a form of general reserve capable of producing trained individuals or sub-units as replacements or supplements with special skills.²

¹ Ian Kemp, ‘A cut too far’, *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, vol. 29, no. 25, 24 June 1998, p. 20.

² Francis Tusa, ‘Calling the “Ever Readies”’, *Armed Forces Journal International*, September 1994, p. 43.

This change was implemented by the Reserve Forces Act 1996 (UK), which made the conditions of Reserve service far more flexible than before. Where previously mobilisation of Reserve forces had required a major conflict threatening Britain's security, the Act created a number of new categories of service and the ability to call out reservists for humanitarian disaster relief and OOTW.³ In large part, this change reflected the reality that had overtaken the British Army, with a regular personnel shortfall of 5 per cent, rising to 7.5 per cent in the infantry; the Army was increasingly stretched to meet its commitments, particularly those that arose at short notice. Accordingly, to date, over 4000 TA volunteers have served with the Implementation Force/Stabilisation Force in Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR), making up 10 per cent of the total UK force, while an additional 1500 volunteers served with other regular units between 1994 and 1998.⁴

The legislative reforms were long overdue; the end of the NATO forward-basing and home defence commitments left the TA without a role. The conditions of reserve service meant that the reserve was effectively prevented from supplementing the regular army in any circumstances other than general war. Not only were the circumstances in which the Reserves could be mobilised broadened, but the ability of reservists to volunteer for full-time service was expanded. Previously a reservist wishing to undertake full-time service with regular forces was required to resign, join the regular forces on a short-term 'S-type' engagement, then formally reapply to rejoin the reserve. This process was replaced by a Full-Time Reserve Service scheme (FTRS), which enables reservists to be employed full time in specific posts. Regardless of whether this job involves operational deployment, the human resource outcome is the same: the relatively cheaper reservist frees up limited manpower resources and introduces greater flexibility into the service's ability to react to short-notice commitments.

Other categories of service were created under the 1996 Act to increase the 'functionality' of the reserves. Resurrecting an idea that had been utilised in the 1960s, the Act authorised the creation of a 'High Readiness Reserve' (HRR)—a class of volunteers that, with the consent of their employer, accept an increased liability for call-out. Although the numbers involved in this group are small (around 3000), the HRR has acquired significance out of proportion to its numbers by providing specialist skills in short supply. Similarly, the introduction of a 'Sponsored Reserve' (SR) scheme now enables the employees of civilian defence contractors to volunteer to carry out their job as reservists in an operational environment.⁵ There has been some concern that the ability to deploy contract staff on operations will result in employers 'conscripting' employees for service. However, this approach seems to offer the armed forces the capacity to obtain and operate technical equipment as required and at a fraction of the costs attached to maintaining a regular capability.⁶

³ Reserve Forces Act 1996 (UK), ss. 52, 54, 56.

⁴ Kemp, 'A cut too far', p. 20; Brigadier Richard Holmes, 'Volunteer Reserves: Usable and Relevant', *RUSI Journal*, April 1998, vol. 143, no. 2, p. 22. The figure of over 4000 troops as of April 1999 was provided to the author by a senior Territorial officer.

⁵ *Reserve Forces Act*, Ministry of Defence Press Release 081/96, May 24, 1996 at <http://www.coi.gov.uk/coi/depts/GMD/coi8858b.ok> (Downloaded 27 April 1999).

⁶ Nigel Vinson, 'A Territorial View over the Hill', *The International Security Review 1999*, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London, 1998, pp. 43–7.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has had some difficulty in launching this program but the trials have become the object of keen interest in Australia and elsewhere.⁷

Given the increased liability for call-out, the Reserve Forces Act makes provision to ameliorate the financial impact of compulsory service on both employees and employers. Traditionally governments have been wary of being seen to impose on reservists for fear of electoral fallout. While most reservists have been shown to accept call-up for a major emergency, they, their families and employers are likely to resent an unnecessary mobilisation. In any case, as the US experience of Desert Shield showed, a large-scale call-up results in significant social and economic disruption for the whole community. Many reservists earn considerably more in their civil occupations than in their military employment. Extended service can therefore mean severe financial hardships for their dependants as well as problems in cases where reservists have financial commitments such as mortgages. To address these problems, the Act makes provision for special payments to make up the difference in salary. Similarly, safeguards for employers are built into the legislation, providing for payments to offset the additional costs that may be incurred when an employee is called out.⁸

These provisions are potentially sensitive, particularly for regular personnel who might perceive that they are not being paid at the same level as part-timers while sharing the same discomforts and dangers. However, to date there appears to have been widespread acceptance of the notion, on the basis that the reserves represent an opportunity cost: a relatively cheap asset in peacetime, they are worth the extra expenditure when required. The British Government is effectively assuming an insurance liability against the social costs of mobilisation. Also, realistically it would be impossible to demand that reservists commit themselves to possible call-up when the potential sacrifice is prohibitive.

On taking office, the Blair Labour Government announced that it would conduct a Strategic Defence Review to streamline the armed forces and enhance their capabilities. The issue of reserves was high on the agenda and has been one of the most controversial outcomes of the review, which concluded that, in the changed strategic environment, there was no need to 'maintain additional combat units and support services against the possibility of a general war in Europe.'⁹ The new

⁷ Deployment of Civilian Contractors (DOCC) Project, *The Deployment of Civilian Contractors in Support of Australian Defence Force Operations*, Project Discussion Paper, Directorate of Industry Engagement, National Support Division, ADHQ, March 1999, pp. 180; 182.

⁸ Reserve Forces Act, ss. 83–84. For attitudes to the impact of compulsory call-up in the UK and the US, see 'Volunteer Reserves: Usable and Relevant', pp. 22–3; United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Committees, *Reserve Forces: Proposals to Expand Should include Numerical Limitations*, GAO/NSIAD-97-129, Washington, 18 April 1997; M. Gebicke, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Military Personnel, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, *Reserve Forces: Observations on the Ready Reserve Mobilization Income Insurance Program*, GAO/NSIAD-97-154, Washington, 8 May 1997. It is also worth noting that Singapore has a similar system, the fundamental principle being that the reservist will suffer no financial loss as a result of being activated for reserve service.

⁹ *Strategic Defence Review: 'Modern Forces for a Modern World'*, chap. 5, para. 105, 8 July 1998, <http://www.mod.uk/policy/sdr/chapt05.htm> (Downloaded 9 July 1998).

structure was launched in November 1998 as *Modern Forces for the Modern World: A Territorial Army for the Future*.¹⁰ In keeping with the perception that less land power was required, the TA was reduced from 56 000 members to 41 200, the bulk of the cuts being in units with combat roles; whereas the Naval, Marine and Air Force reserves remained substantially untouched. Thirty-three infantry battalions were cut to fifteen, seven armoured regiments to four and nine engineer regiments to five.

The changes were based on a philosophy that the TA should be more relevant, usable and integrated—the last requirement being perhaps the most persuasive in shaping the TA's new mission, which is:

To provide formed units and individuals as an essential part of the Army's order-of-battle for operations across all military tasks in order to ensure that the Army is capable of mounting and sustaining operations at nominated states of readiness. It is also to provide a basis for regeneration, while at the same time maintaining links with the local community and society at large.¹¹

However, the decision to cut the territorial's combat capability calls into question whether they can be both a basis for regeneration as formed units and a pool of labour that is capable of sustaining the Army's immediate operational requirements. If units are to maintain any level of readiness in peace, they need to train as units. Current indications suggest that the Army's numbers might have dropped below the critical mass necessary to field anything more than units formed on an *ad hoc* basis for particular operations. While this is perhaps sustainable in the short term and on low-level operations, it does not seem a sound foundation for unit capabilities and morale if operational tempo were to increase.

A senior TA officer who indicated that SDR was predicated on maintaining a fully recruited regular army establishment has taken up this concern. He pointed out that the regular army was finding it impossible to attract sufficient recruits and that, instead of gaining the extra 3500 soldiers assigned by the review, it has lost another 1000 from its already under-recruited strength. This exacerbates the problems that the Army has been facing as a result of continuing commitments in Bosnia and Northern Ireland, as well as its other historically based obligations to deploy troops overseas. With a stated requirement for six deployable all-regular brigades, the Army faces either deploying hollow units or backfilling with regulars from elsewhere, increasing the pressures that have been causing people to leave the forces. On supposedly short-term operations such as the IFOR/SFOR commitment to Bosnia, the ability of the TA to provide infantry has been halved. To April 1999, the TA had produced over 4000 troops—mostly serving with the regular battalions of their regiments—in the wake of the cuts to combat units even that ability to provide supplementary forces has been dramatically circumscribed.¹²

Effectively, the territorials have become a manpower supplement for the regular forces and (with the exception of the HRR and SR) do not provide any substantial

¹⁰ http://www.army.mod.uk/ta/forward/for_top.htm (Downloaded 27 April 1999).

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² These observations are based on correspondence with a senior TA officer.

additional capability in themselves. The failure to utilise the TA as a complementary resource has drawn the most criticism, with the House of Commons Defence Committee issuing a report on SDR that argues that the reduction in strength of the TA is misconceived. The Chair of the Committee, Bruce George MP, has pointed out that the focus has shifted from utilising the combat capability of the reserves as a resource for general war to using it as a cheap method of relieving overstretch in the regular forces. While recognising the need to supplement forces that have a range of overseas commitments, the Committee has argued that utilising reserves to meet peacetime contingencies may make it impossible to preserve any 'capacity for rebuilding to meet any newly emerging major threat'. Additionally, the Committee is cautious about changing the force structure until the integrated manpower concept has been proven.¹³

Another member of the Committee, Julian Brazier MP, has gone further. He asserts that SDR is predicated on three new, as yet unproven, rules of warfare:

First, that you can take your time to get ready. Second that war takes place in ideal conditions for the use of air power and high technology, with no difficult terrain or complicating civilian populations and thirdly, that allied casualties are rare and occur only through military incompetence.¹⁴

Brazier argues that the underlying assumptions driving the operational requirements need to be reconsidered and that the blithe expectation of post-Cold War stability is not justified by current events. With the heaviest cuts falling on the infantry, yeomanry and Royal Engineers, SDR is reducing precisely those skills that only the Army can provide. Should a short-notice requirement arise, medical and technical skills might be regenerated reasonably quickly from the civil sector, but combat capabilities will take far longer. Brazier points out that this problem is compounded by the fact that reservists are being trained to fill gaps in regular units. Though theoretically TA units would be employed as units in a major conflict, this is like planning for the 100-year flood. In the event of an emergency, instead of having a deployable capability, the army is likely to find its regular forces fully committed, while its second-line forces will not be trained beyond sub-unit level. In any case, surviving TA units are likely to deteriorate in the short term as the unit cohesion that was a product of their corporate function wastes away.

Despite what appears to be a major downgrade of combat capability, the British Government has adopted a more active approach to mobilising manpower. Emphasising the need for reserve participation in force projection operations, the SDR required serving reservists to make a positive commitment to the possibility of active service. The philosophy driving these changes is that reservists should not be asked to volunteer twice, once in the first place and then again for a particular operation.

¹³ Bruce George MP, 'Political Perspectives on the Outcome of SDR: The House of Commons Defence Select Committee Report', *RUSI Journal*, October 1998, p. 29; *House of Commons Select Committee on Defence—First Report*, Session 1998–99, 27 January 1999, <http://www.parliament.the-stationery-off...a/cm1999899/cmselect/cmdfence/70/7002.htm> (Downloaded 19 May 1999).

¹⁴ Julian Brazier TD MP, 'TA or not TA?', *Army and Defence Quarterly Journal*, vol. 129, no. 1, January 1999, p. 5.

Instead there is a new expectation that selective call-up of key personnel will occur for operations as required and more general mobilisation will take place for more substantial operations.¹⁵ Utilising the Reserve Forces Act, the MoD is seeking to guarantee the availability of personnel for operations as they arise. The review indicates that selective ‘compulsory call-out is envisaged for a range of situations well short of a direct threat to the United Kingdom’.¹⁶

To achieve a better transition to operational deployment, two new human resources and training initiatives have enhanced the effective management of TA personnel. The first of these is the establishment of a Reserves Manning and Career Division in the Army Personnel Centre, which centralises the coordination of all personnel management for the TA. This initiative ensures that management practices mirror regular army processes. More importantly, it provides a central point for identifying individuals for mobilisation. To achieve smoother integration of military and civil careers, soldiers are to be provided with a personal development record for use in both military and civilian contexts. The second innovation is the creation of a Reserves Training and Mobilisation Centre specifically tasked with providing pre- and post-deployment training for individual TA volunteers and Regular Reserves. The creation of a ‘clearing house’ for TA reinforcements emphasises the fact that the reserves are seen as a manpower supplement (rather than as units that complement regular capabilities) and brings into question the ability of the TA to provide formed combat units to meet major contingencies.¹⁷ As the SDR was carried out at a time when the British commitment to Bosnia was expected to wind down, the unexpected emergency in Kosovo during the implementation of the review has led to what one commentator termed ‘considerable soul-searching’. It remains to be seen whether Britain can afford to maintain the limited force structure of the Strategic Defence Review.

Individual Augmentation or Mobilisation Base—Canada’s Experience

The Canadian experience of attempting to integrate their reserve and regular forces into a coherent whole has been remarkably like Australia’s, though perhaps more traumatic. A country with broadly similar political and military history, Canada remains more reliant on its reserve forces than Australia has become. Despite its professed need for an integrated reserve force, there have been major problems in implementing the ideal of a ‘Total Force’, which was the priority established in the Canadian 1987 Defence White Paper. Although there have been three major reports and a host of demi-official and academic commentaries in the last twelve years, Canada has continued to face major obstacles to utilising its reserve capabilities fully.

¹⁵ Holmes, ‘Volunteer Reserves: Usable and Relevant’, p. 23; General Sir Roger Wheeler (CGS, UK), *Address to Royal United Services Institute*, Wednesday 17 February 1999, transcript provided by CGS Secretariat, p. 3.

¹⁶ *Strategic Defence Review*, Supporting Essay 7, para. 22.

¹⁷ This approach might be contrasted with the Australian Army Training Command’s establishment of Regional Training Centres. These centres are designed to conduct individual training and support collective training for both regular and reserve personnel. Using Distance Education and Training or Technology-based Training formats, common competency education will be offered across the Army on an ongoing basis. Rather than reinforcing the distinct nature of the reserves, this initiative contributes to the concept of the ‘One Army’. Major Andre Greenberry, ‘Distance no Object: Regional Training Centres’, 1998 *The Australian Army in Profile*, Canberra, Defence Public Affairs Organisation, 1998, pp. 19–23.

One of the main issues has been continuing antagonism between many senior regular officers and the militia. Like Australia's historical experience of Staff Corps – Militia antipathy, a destructive culture of conflict has frustrated successive ministries' attempts to forge a unified and complementary force.¹⁸ Given a high level of confusion as to the role of the reserves and the general demoralisation resulting from the Somali debacle, it appears that Canada is only now creating a relevant, viable and sustainable structure for its forces.¹⁹

Perhaps the major driving force behind change to Canadian force structure has been the issue of cost. As Professor John English, the most critical and scholarly partisan of the Canadian Army, has pointed out:

Of approximately ten billion dollars devoted to defence in 1997, nine billion went to field about 65 000 regulars and one billion to field around 30 000 primary reservists, which worked out to \$138 461 per regular and \$33 333 per reservist. But the question must be asked in respect of soldiers, who is really the more cost-effective? From all indications, regular force personnel may be close to pricing themselves out of existence, especially as all too many of them constitute little more than an army of clerks. A militia soldier, conversely, can be brought up to regular force combat standard in three months.²⁰

English argues that a country such as Canada, with rare overseas combat commitments and a limited tolerance for high peacetime defence budgets, should invest in a larger and more capable reserve force. The regular force should direct its efforts to the primary role of training the reserves—as it would in a major war.

Canada's reserves consist of the Primary Reserve, the Supplementary Reserve, the Cadet Instructors List and the Canadian Rangers. The Primary Reserve consists of the Naval Reserve, the Air Reserve, the Communications Reserve and the Militia (or Army Reserve). The current establishment of the Primary Reserve is 30 000. The Supplementary Reserve consists of between 15 000 and 20 000 retired officers and soldiers who do not actively take part in training, but who have volunteered to be

¹⁸ Major General R. I. Stewart (Retd), 'Army Regular and Militia as a Team?', *National Network News*, vol. 4, no. 1, January 1997, http://www.sfu.ca/~dann/nn4-1_7.htm (Downloaded 22 April 1999); Desmond Morton, *What to tell the Minister*, 28 April 1998, <http://www.dnd.ca/eng/min/reports/Morton/MORTONe.htm> (Downloaded 22 April 1999).

¹⁹ Canadian Airborne Regiment soldiers deployed with the United Nations Operation in Somalia were involved in the torture and murder of a prisoner. Troops may also have been responsible for the killing of another Somali who had been shot while attempting to enter the Canadian compound. Subsequent investigations uncovered an inappropriately belligerent and often overtly racist culture in the force. The scandal cost the careers of the Minister of National Defence, a Deputy Minister, three Chiefs of the Defence Staff and resulted in the disbandment of the Airborne Regiment. See John English, *Lament for an Army: The Decline of Canadian Military Professionalism*, Irwin, Toronto, 1998, chap. 1; Report of the Somalia Commission of Enquiry, <http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol1/v1c14e.htm>, Ministry of Public Works and Services, 1997 (Downloaded 7 June 1999).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

available in the event of an emergency. The Canadian Rangers number almost 3000 members and provide a military presence in the sparsely settled areas of Canada, which cannot be easily covered by other elements of the Canadian Forces. They undergo minimal annual training but provide an observation capability, aid in search and rescue, and act as guides and advisors to units operating in their areas.²¹ Most of the problems of the last twelve years have related to the employment of the Militia, the largest of the elements of the Primary Reserve, which a planning strength of 18 500 and strong regional ties and historical traditions. The greatest challenge to the notion of a 'Total Force' is the problem of upgrading Militia capabilities and employing them effectively. As successive reviews have indicated that the other reserve components are generally well employed and integrated, the main focus of change is the Militia.

The principle of a Total Force comprised of integrated full and part-time personnel was first adopted officially in the 1987 White Paper on Defence and confirmed in the 1994 White Paper. The main rationale for this move seems to have been the high cost of maintaining an all-volunteer, full-time military force. The 1987 White Paper determined that, by improving training and equipment, the reserves could relieve the problems of 'overstretch' in the Regular Force. Almost by default, it seems that army planning became largely based on the idea of the Militia as a resource to provide reinforcements from individuals up to formed sub-units to fill out Regular Force units in the event of a requirement.²² At the same time, the conflicting pressures of a downsized Regular Force and increased overseas peacekeeping commitments in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti and Cambodia meant that the participation of reservists in overseas operations became critical. In Bosnia, the Militia contribution to regular units averaged 20 per cent, rising to 40 per cent in some units. This trend was confirmed in the 1994 White Paper, which stated that the role of the Land Forces Reserve is primarily force generation to allow augmentation to the Regular Force. However, many—particularly Militia officers—felt that this role detracted from the primary function of the reserves to provide the framework for the mobilisation of the Army in an emergency.²³

This problem was reinforced by a strong feeling in some circles that, in the wake of the Cold War, Canada required only a constabulary force. Following the 1994 White

²¹ Department of National Defence Backgrounder, 'The Reserves', <http://www.lfaahq.hlfx.dnd.ca/fyi/reserves.html> (Downloaded 22 April 1999); Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces Information Kit, 'Restructuring the Reserves', 6 July 1998, http://www.dnd.ca/menu/infokit/2_6_ehtm (Downloaded 21 May 1999); National Defence Backgrounder, 'Highlights of National Defence change initiatives', October 1997, http://www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/oct97/hichinit_e.htm (Downloaded 22 April 1999). The Canadian Rangers function in a similar way to the Australian Regional Force Surveillance Units (RFSU) and make extensive use of the local indigenous population.

²² *Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canada* (1987 White Paper on Defence), Queen's Printers, Ottawa, 1987, p. 65; NDHQ Program Evaluation E2/94, *Implementation of the Total Force Concept*, Final Report, 30 November 1995, <http://www.cfsc.dnd.ca/info/tf/index.html> (Downloaded 22 April 1999), paras 1-1, 1-2, 93.

²³ Report to the Minister, *Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves*, 30 October 1995, chap. 3, <http://www.dnd.ca/eng/min/reports/restructuring/e-p2-c03.html> (Downloaded 22 April 1999); *Implementation of the Total Force Concept*, para. 119.

Paper, the influential Canada 21 Council—consisting of former cabinet ministers, leading businessmen and academics—suggested that future forces would not need to be designed for participation in high-intensity military operations.²⁴ Having sent over 100 000 peacekeepers abroad since 1948, peacekeeping not warfighting had become the essential function of the armed forces. Although the Canadian experience of operations in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda showed that downgrading combat capability was a tragic mistake, force structures and combat capabilities were not geared to the most basic mission of a defence force. More recently, two independent advisers to the Minister of Defence separately argued that the basic mission of the Canadian Forces had to be warfighting and preparation for warfighting, and that they had be able to ‘fight a limited conventional war of high-intensity, air/land battle, in coalition with our allies’. Both advisers made recommendations along the lines that:

The regular forces and the reserves must be recruited, trained, equipped, structured, organized, and led in such a fashion that the government of Canada can respond *immediately* with an appropriate level of force when necessary, and particularly when called upon by our allies to contribute to the defence of our mutual interests.²⁵

The Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves (SCRR) had considered these issues and outlined them in its report, which it submitted in October 1995. The Commission found fault with the four-stage mobilisation plan outlined in the 1994 Defence White Paper. This paper had accorded the Reserve Force a major role in the first two stages of mobilisation—force generation and force enhancement—but only in the context of providing individually selected reservists, rather than whole platoons or companies. The main role of the reserves—enabling force expansion and national mobilisation—had been discounted. The Commission identified a widespread perception that the Militia had become a ‘temp pool’, resulting in units being robbed of their best soldiers and losing their ability to prepare for their role as the basis of national mobilisation. There appears to have been some cause for this concern. Retention rates for reservists returning from peacekeeping operation were often poor and many were processed out of their units within a day of return from operations. While the Commission recognised that the augmentation role of the reserves was critical to Canada’s peacekeeping operations, it concluded that ‘Canada’s peacekeeping commitments are, by definition, transitory and thus may not continue into the future. To base fundamental policy decisions on present commitments does not strike us as wise.’²⁶

²⁴ Centre for International Studies, *Canada 21: Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century*, Toronto, 1994.

²⁵ David Bercuson, *The Bercuson Report*, chap. 2, <http://www.dnd.ca/eng/min/reports/Bercuson/Berc2E.htm> 1997 (Downloaded 7 June 1999), emphasis in original; Desmond Morton, *What to tell the Minister*, Introduction ‘An Unmilitary Military?’. Professor Bercuson pointed out that the 2^d Battalion, Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, which forced the Croatian and Bosnian Serb armies to disengage in the Medak pocket in the summer of 1993 could only do so because it was trained and equipped to fight a high-intensity battle. He contrasted this with the inability of Canadian troops at Kigali, Rwanda, in 1993 and Dutch troops at Srebrenica, Bosnia, in 1995 to intervene to prevent massacres.

²⁶ *Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves*, chap. 3.

Although the Commission's recommendations have been at least partly frustrated by government caution and budgetary constraints, they do provide an indication of how a reserve force might enhance its collective capabilities while providing its members with a meaningful role.²⁷ The first recommendation addressed the problems of morale arising from the 'penny-packeting' approach of utilising individual reinforcements on peacekeeping missions, by suggesting that Area commanders 'provide formed platoons and/or sections for incorporation into Regular Force units proceeding on peacekeeping duties'.²⁸ This recommendation also suggested that junior reserve officers be employed, where practical, in command of troops rather than in staff positions, as was most frequently the case. These suggestions were mirrored in the finding of the National Defence Headquarters Evaluation of the Total Force Concept that:

The role of each Reserve Unit should be specified. Where the role is augmentation, it should be specified which Regular Force unit or formation the Reserve unit will augment and Reserve units should be closely linked with the Regular Force units or formations they will support.²⁹

Both the SCRR and the NDHQ investigations, conducted concurrently but separately, arrived at a similar conclusion: the relationship between the regular and reserve forces had to be formalised in order for these forces to be adequately integrated. The Defence Force needed to achieve equivalent training standards for both forces, though the SCRR recommended that, as far as possible, training courses be made accessible to reservists by presenting the courses in two to three-week modules. The Defence Force was to consolidate the 'twinning' of the two components of the Service by cross-posting regulars and reserves, by making regular officers serve with the reserves and by opening the staff college to reservists as well as developing an appropriate curriculum dealing with reserve and mobilisation matters.³⁰

Having addressed the immediate, though perhaps short-term, problems of augmentation of peacekeeping forces, the Commission also found that, despite mobilisation remaining the most significant function of the reserves, no detailed plan existed. To rectify this deficiency, it recommended the drafting of a national mobilisation plan containing 'clearly defined roles for the Reserve Force, and especially the Militia, as the basis for recruitment training, and the provision of formed units'.³¹ In the case of a major conflict, the Commission argued that the Regular Forces of 60 000 could not sustain a massive increase, as they would be fully committed from the outset. Accordingly, it was determined that the building blocks of full Land Force mobilisation would have to be the Militia structure. The SCRR found

²⁷ Major D.M. Genest, 'Improving the Operational capability of the Militia: What needs to be Done?', *Exercise New Horizons 1997-98*, Paper submitted to the Canadian Forces College, War Peace and Security, <http://www.cfcsc.dnd.ca/irc/nh/nh9798/0038.html> (Downloaded 22 April 1999). For details of the adoption of the SCRR's recommendations, see VCDS—Key Reports on Change Implementation, http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/vcds/dndhqsec/keyreports/reques_e.asp

²⁸ *Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves*, Recommendation 1.

²⁹ *Implementation of the Total Force Concept*, para. 1-10 (d).

³⁰ *Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves*, Recommendations 28 and 29.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Recommendation 4.

the Militia's current organisation for mobilisation to be wanting, with too many top-heavy and hollow units being incapable of providing adequate training. The main thrust of the report was that, to become effective, units had to be amalgamated into more efficient, larger organisations.³²

The Canadian Government rejected two of the Commission's key recommendations relating to the extension of the Supplementary Reserve and the passage of job protection legislation. Seeking to capitalise on the country's investment in training personnel, the SCRR suggested that all honourably released members be automatically transferred to the Supplementary Ready Reserve for a period of five years or until the age of fifty-five, after which they would be placed on a Holding Reserve List to sixty-five. This plan was intended to ensure that the forces retained access to a large pool of trained service personnel who might otherwise be lost to them. The proposal was not accepted on the grounds that it was tantamount to a form of conscription, though it was implied in the Commission's report that volunteering for military service once involved the acceptance of a long-term commitment.

With respect to job protection legislation, the Commission argued that reserve service beyond the standard two-week absence from work was analogous to jury service and that the Government might properly act to guarantee the right of reservists to serve their country. Again, this was rejected on the basis that it could lead to indirect discrimination at the time of hiring, as an employer faced with two similarly qualified candidates might discriminate against the one with reserve obligations.³³ Although it discussed the possibility of offering tax credits to employers in compensation for the loss of the services of their employees, the Commission does not seem to have considered any positive compensation structure such as the British model.

Despite these setbacks, the Government accepted thirty-six of the Commission's recommendations, the majority being implemented in a program entitled the 'Land Force Reserve Restructure'. The Army is replacing fourteen militia districts with an organisation of ten brigade groups and is providing the new establishments with more clearly defined roles and missions. Preparing for national mobilisation has been recognised as the 'core' business of the reserve, with the proviso that, 'in periods of reduced threat, priority of employment will be augmentation and sustainment of the Regular force.'³⁴ Augmentation is no longer restricted to individual reinforcements only. Perhaps most importantly, reserve force planning is no longer a matter of meeting short-term operational commitments or suiting the political fashion of the day. The Canadian experience has not been to question the worth of the Reserves; the experience of utilising them on peacekeeping operations has militated against that. Instead, Canada has sought to gain value from the force-in-being, while preserving the longer-term capability of the militia to respond in an emergency.

³² These findings mirror those of the 1974 Millar Report in Australia and indicate that there is very little new under the sun in reserve force planning. See the *Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces*, AGPS, Canberra, 1974.

³³ *Ibid.*, chap. 14; VCDS—Key Reports on Change Implementation, Recommendation 41, http://www.vcds.dnd.ca/vcds/dndhqsec/keyreports/reques_e.asp.

³⁴ Genest, 'Improving the Operational capability of the Militia'. Paraphrases Lieutenant General W. Leach, Chief of the Land Staff, 'Action Directive—Land Force Reserve Restructure', NDHQ File 1258-110/3290-2-8-2 (A/Comd), 20 December 1996, pp. 2–3, footnote 33.

The Seamless Military—Constructing the United States Total Force

At first glance the idea of learning from US reserve planning seems unlikely. With over 1.3 million active personnel and 1.5 million active and inactive reservists, the sheer scale of the world's only superpower's forces dwarfs its closest allies. However, perhaps more than any other state, the sheer magnitude of the United States' military commitments has caused them to rely on Reserve Forces. As the Secretary of Defense William Cohen said of them, 'We could not maintain our military without the Guard and Reserve. It would be cut in half. We couldn't do the job in Bosnia, we couldn't do it in the Gulf, we couldn't do it anywhere'.³⁵

Despite the disparity between the massive resources invested in the US Reserves and the experience of other countries, there are lessons to be drawn from the American approach. It was the US Army, in the wake of the Vietnam War and the cessation of conscription, that originated the policy of the Total Army. In recent years the US has been the most ready of all the Western democracies to mobilise reservists for service overseas. The military faces, within its ranks, the issue of intra-operability between highly technological, readily deployable, professional forces and less easily deployable part-time forces—a factor of great interest to those states that expect to have to serve as coalition partners with them in the future. The cultural and historical rift that has developed between the National Guard and the regular armed forces is similar to that in other countries and is writ on a much larger scale, with greater potential costs and consequences. Perhaps most significantly, the US defence establishment has devoted enormous intellectual capital to determining how best to utilise its reserves. By comparison, the work undertaken in Britain, Canada and Australia is generally less well resourced and often short-sighted. In America, it is a major political issue with implications for future force projection. Its use of reserves determines where it will fight and for what cause, and is a significant issue for its allies.

America's military consists of five active and seven reserve components. Each branch of the services—the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Coast Guard—has a full-time (or active) component. In addition, the reserves consist of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Coast Guard Reserve, Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard. The institution of the National Guard is one peculiar to the US and traces its origins to the colonial militias that evolved as 'dual mission forces with dual loyalties'. The Guard is composed of fifty-four state and territorial forces of differing types, strengths and roles. These forces are answerable to the state governors in peacetime, but are also available to the Federal Government in time of war or national emergency. The Guard has a constitutional mandate to maintain these divided loyalties and proudly proclaims that it:

has two roles—one as part of the nation's entire military force, and the other to the respective states for emergency response and community support missions. Serving these roles creates our three missions—to participate in global security for the United States, to provide

³⁵ Office of Reserve Affairs Homepage, <http://raweb.osd.mil/home.htm> (Downloaded 26 May 1999).

emergency response at the state level, and to give support to local community needs . . . The relationship is unique and sets the National Guard apart from other military reserve forces. The root for this dual role began with the militia forces that were part of earliest Colonial America and remains increasingly viable as the nation prepares to enter the next century.³⁶

The Guard receives more than 90 per cent of its funding from the Federal Government, and units that achieve federal standards receive federal recognition in peacetime. However, until mobilisation (or ‘federalization’), the Federal Government has only an advisory and coordinating function.³⁷ In these circumstances it is easy to understand the frustration of regular officers, who see resources being directed away from maintaining more focused capabilities.

Superimposed on this structure are five different categories of reserve service, comprising both state and federal forces. The most significant of these categories are the Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve, which comprise the bulk of what is called the Ready Reserve. The Selected Reserve currently numbers almost 900 000 members who complete an annual training obligation in their units. The Individual Ready Reserve is made up of former regulars and federal reservists who have not completed their service obligation and who can be called up for active service if the President declares a national emergency. The Selected Reserve receives the most exposure because the President is authorised to order it to active duty at his own discretion in circumstances short of a declared war or national emergency.³⁸ President Bush was the first Commander-in-Chief to utilise this power on a large scale for Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm when he activated 202 337 Selected Reservists and 20 277 members of the Individual Ready Reserve. Since then, President Clinton has made a practice of calling up the reserves. Recent examples include Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti where 2300 served; Operation Joint Endeavor/Decisive Edge in Bosnia-Herzegovina where over 18 000 have served; and most recently the authorisation for 33 102 reservists in support of operations in Kosovo. At the time of writing it seems that further call-ups are likely.

In addition to these call-ups, US reservists voluntarily undertake a much broader range of operational tasks than any other country allows its forces. In 1996 alone, more than 11 000 reservists from forty units were deployed overseas to more than fifty countries. In the same year the Army National Guard provided 400 soldiers (72

³⁶ ‘The National Guard in a Nutshell’, The National Guard Website, <http://www.ngb.dtic.mil/> (Downloaded 2 June 1999).

³⁷ Charles E. Heller, ‘Total Force: Federal Reserves and State National Guards’ in Samuel Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor Jr., *America’s Armed Forces: A Handbook of Current and Future Capabilities*, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1996, pp. 152–3; Major Jeffrey Jacobs, ‘The Conspiracy Theory’, *Armed Forces Journal International*, January 1998, p. 31.

³⁸ Call-up is authorised by *Title Ten, United States Code, Armed Forces*, s. 12304. This is known as a Presidential Selected Reserve Callup or PSRC. Not more than 200 000 members may be on active service at any one time and are authorised to serve for 270 days. The authority of Congress is required to extend the time further, which it did for units engaged in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm during 1990–91.

per cent of the total) to the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai and over 1700 Marine Reserves were deployed in support of 100 separate counter-narcotics operations. The Marines were used on missions throughout the Caribbean and border regions of the US, with fifteen operations taking place outside the continental United States. President Clinton has faced widespread criticism for employing the military for a far wider variety of tasks than their core warfighting function. Regardless of this criticism, the current tendency to use the military for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, while simultaneously reducing the size of the regular component, necessitates the use of reserves.³⁹

The use of reservists overseas realises the 'Total Force' policy implemented by the US Department of Defense since the end of the Vietnam War. The policy was adopted at a time when conscription ended and an all-volunteer force was introduced. Given the greater cost of a volunteer force and the diminished post-Vietnam establishment, the guaranteed availability of a reserve expansion base was very attractive. However, as the Cold War progressed, the role of reserves was largely perceived in the US as being limited to reinforcing a European battlefield, as it had been so perceived in Britain. Combined with the domestic responsibilities of National Guard units, no substantial level of integration or interoperability with the Regular component was achieved. The end of the Cold War changed all that—the US dramatically reduced its armed forces, shrank its budget, but retained the same range of overseas commitments. If anything, those commitments increased as the US emerged as the only superpower. The lack of a global balance of power meant that the global hegemon had to be capable of rapid and flexible response—a requirement first tested in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The armed forces were left with no option but to take reserves seriously.⁴⁰

Unfortunately, the two components of the armed forces share a 200-year-old history of distrust. Most recently this has been displayed in an acrimonious exchange of articles and letters in the military professional press. Senior National Guardsmen have accused the Army leadership of 'duplicity, deception and defamation, intended to strangle the Army Guard by starving it of public support, equipment, modernization and missions'.⁴¹ Critics of the Guard respond that if it wants to:

³⁹ Stephen Duncan, *Citizen Warriors: America's National Guard Forces & the Politics of National Security*, Presidio, Novato, 1997, pp. 132, 216–23; William S. Cohen, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress*, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1997, pp. 221–8; Reserve Forces Policy Board (RFPB), *Annual Report 1997*, <http://raweb.osd.mil/rfpb/Chapter1.htm>, chap. 1, 'Roles, Missions and Operations' (Downloaded 26 May 1999).

⁴⁰ R. Sortor, T. Lippiatt, J. Michael Polich, *Planning Reserve Mobilization: Inferences from Operation Desert Shield*, RAND, Santa Monica, 1993; John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, Center of Military History, US Army, Washington, 1998, chap. 13, 'The Total Army', pp. 357–77; Heller, 'Total Force', pp. 145–6.

⁴¹ Jacobs, 'The Conspiracy Theory', pp. 30–1; see also Major General Robert Ensslin, 'The Army's Civil War', *Armed Forces Journal International*, September 1997, pp. 66–7; Lieutenant General Herbert Temple, 'Salvaging the Disaster', *Armed Forces Journal International*, April 1998; George Wilson, 'Is Reserve-Active rift Mending?', *Army Times*, 12 October 1998, p. 70.

become a more valued part of the Total Army, it needs to forget the conspiracy theory and start soldiering. Rather than spending their energy focused on illusory external threats, senior Guard leaders need to focus internally on making ARNG units more combat-ready.⁴²

Much of the dispute focuses on the fact that the National Guard's high priority round-out brigades were not deployed in the Gulf conflict despite having a dedicated role as part of a 'Total Force' formation. While the reasons for this are unclear, the issue remains how best to integrate a force that serves many masters.⁴³

The federal–state divide in the military complicates the matter. The Army, Navy Air Force, Coast Guard and Marine Corps reserves are federal reserves under the direct control of the Federal Government. The National Guard has a power base in each of the states and a powerful standing lobby organisation in Washington. By comparison, the federal reserves are well integrated with their regular counterparts. Taking the Army as an example, only 47 per cent of the total force are regular, the remainder being Guardsmen or federal reservists. As a result of the Clinton administration's 1993 'Bottom-Up Review', the Army Reserve has an almost exclusive combat support and combat service support function. The Army Reserve now offsets shortfalls in these skills in the regular force and frees up regular manpower for rapid-deployment combat roles. Thus, while the Army Reserve represents only 4 per cent of the total army combat structure, it represents 36 per cent of its combat support and combat service support structure. On the other hand the Army National Guard represents at least 48 per cent of the combat elements of the army and 29 per cent of the support structure. These figures do not reflect a complementary system, so much as alternative forces in being, which, for historical reasons, have developed very different sets of priorities.⁴⁴

A major bugbear for reserve force planning in the US has been the question of readiness. As the US mobilised for Desert Storm, many senior active-duty army officers questioned whether they could deploy reserve combat formations at all—a reservation not shared by the Marine Corps. Former Army Chief of Staff General

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ It is unclear why the Army Reserve National Guard (ARNG) units were not deployed. The argument tends to focus on the 48th Brigade (Georgia ARNG), 24th Mechanized Infantry Division. The planning time for post-mobilisation training was set at 34 days, but the unit was required to retrain in areas in which it was already qualified which took it 54 days to achieve. The unit was certified for deployment ninety days after call-up, but was never deployed as the war was over by then. See Lieutenant Colonel David T. Fautua, 'How the Guard and Reserve Will Fight in 2025', *Parameters*, vol. XXIX, no. 1, Spring 1999, p. 134; Ensslin, 'The Army's Civil War'; Temple, 'Salvaging the Disaster'; Colonel Robert Killabrew, 'How it Was', Letters to the Editor, *Armed Forces Journal International*, May 1998, p. 6; Sortor *et al*, *Planning Reserve Mobilization*, pp. 9–10.

⁴⁴ Heller, 'Total Force', pp. 155–6; Major General Thomas J. Plewes, 'Army Reserve: A True Partner in America's Army', *Army*, October 1998, pp. 103–11. Combat structure is defined as infantry, armour, artillery, air defence, special forces, combat engineers, combat aviation. Combat support includes signals, chemical, military police, civil affairs, engineers, aviation, military intelligence, psychological operations. Combat service support consists of medical, finance, supply and service, quartermaster, transportation, ammunition, judge advocate general, railway and maintenance.

Gordon Sullivan even testified before Congress that it would take a full year to train a National Guard Division for deployment. This estimation was not backed up by any data, and a subsequent independent study by the Institute for Defense Analysis determined that ninety-four days would be sufficient. Given the capability represented by an entire division, and the fact that its subordinate elements could be made ready at even shorter notice, three months does not seem an inordinate amount of time to deliver such forces.⁴⁵

The issue has become a priority for Army force development. The Bottom-Up Review is founded on the notion of a full partnership between the active and reserve elements of the 'Total Force'. The US Government required that the armed forces be capable of winning two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts. As the US Department of Defense faced substantial budgetary cuts, the Bottom-Up Review recommended that reserve force levels be substantially increased. The 1997 *Report of the Secretary of Defense to Congress* stated that:

As a result the Reserve components are counted on to provide compensating leverage to offset the risks of a smaller active duty force. Reserve Component combat and support roles have been expanded in all post-Cold War operations, including explicit recognition of the Guard's state role as an integral component of US security. This means that though the Reserve components were erroneously perceived during the Cold War as back-up forces of last resort, attitudes are changing. Smarter use of the Guard and Reserve was identified as a move that could make a big improvement in the effectiveness of the Total Force.⁴⁶

The implementation package adopted by the Army emphasises a 'seamless, integrated force' and is outlined in a paper entitled *One Team—One Fight—One Future*, which was released by the former Army Chief of Staff, General Dennis Reimer. The paper expressly rejects 'the notion that modern war is too complex for Reserve component forces' and goes on to describe a process where integration is achieved by brokering understanding between all stakeholders. Although this process recognises the political realities of achieving change, it reflects the particular problems of a tripartite force when the Chief of Staff has to manage a bargaining process to achieve his aims within his own organisation.⁴⁷

The scale of the reforms is massive, and the reforms have attracted both praise and criticism. It is not possible to consider them all in a paper of this length. One aspect that does stand out, however, is the interpretation that the Army places on the notion of 'integration'. As a consequence of the failure to deploy Guard units for Desert Storm, the Army has abandoned the practice of 'rounding out' active-duty divisions by building them with two active brigades and one Guard brigade. Instead the design for the new FORCE XXI Heavy Division incorporates reserve billets into the force structure. The reservists will fill headquarters, combat service support and aviation

⁴⁵ Brigadier General Reid K. Beveridge, 'Breaking the Mold', *Armed Forces Journal International*, October 1997, pp. 50–1.

⁴⁶ Cohen, *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress*, 1997, p. 219.

⁴⁷ 'One Team—One Fight—One Future', Army Chief of Staff Homepage, http://www.hqda.army.mil/ocsa/ot_text.htm (Downloaded 25 May 1999).

positions, but as individuals or small units. The main factor determining their employment is how much time is needed to train them before a deployment. As combat manoeuvre units require time for collective training, the reservist function will remain limited to individual specialist skills. This trend is reflected in reservists' numbers, in the first restructured division, the 4th Division: of 15 719 troops, there are only 417 reservists, or 2 per cent of the total. Realistically, it would appear that the positions are little more than tokens.⁴⁸

In a recent article, Lieutenant Colonel David Fautua, a regular army officer serving as chief of plans and operations at the US Army Reserve Readiness Command, contrasted the integrated division structure with the notion of the round-out brigade. The last remaining round-out brigade is the 11th Armored Cavalry 'Blackhorse' Regiment, the Army's 'opposing force' at the National Training Center. Demonstrating the potential of reserve forces, Fautua pointed out that Blackhorse's reserve element—the 1st Squadron, 221st 'Wildhorse' Cavalry of the Nevada National Guard—had crushed a regular brigade combat team in several encounters. He ascribed Wildhorse's warfighting skills to the fact that, as a formed unit, the 1-221 Cavalry was the optimum-sized unit capable of being integrated into a larger formation. Fautua's argument was that, as a battalion-sized unit is the lowest army echelon capable of operating as an independent entity, it offered the 'least complicated matchup' with a combat command structure. Good leadership, good relations with the Blackhorse Regiment and first-rate training had made the unit fully compatible with its parent formation.⁴⁹

Stephen Duncan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs in the Reagan and Bush administrations, took up the problem of striking a balance between unit cohesion and the need to adapt to meet operational requirements. Recognising that reserve units that had trained together for many years often had an institutional integrity and *esprit* that many regular units would envy, he recommended that where possible operational deployments should be at unit level. However, he did point out that reservists should accept that they may be deployed in more *ad hoc* formations than the ones they train in. He pointed out that:

The uncertainty and potential range of future contingency operations require the ability to tailor military forces with specific functional capabilities to particular missions and geographical areas as evolving events require, rather than to rely on the "all purpose, balanced-unit force of traditional, industrial age warplanning." The adaptive joint task force package concept has demonstrated potential, and so long as the tactical integrity of their (small) units is preserved, reservists—especially those whose skills place them in high demand—must be prepared to be a part of its development.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Fautua, 'How the Reserve Will Fight in 2025', pp. 131–2; Jason Sherman, 'Bulking Down', *Armed Forces Journal International*, July 1998, pp. 32–5.

⁴⁹ Fautua, 'How the Reserve Will Fight in 2025', pp. 142–3.

⁵⁰ Duncan, *Citizen Warriors*, pp. 230–31.

While the US Army still seems to be coming to terms with the problem of integrating full and part-time forces for combat deployments, it has long shaped the way that the Marine Corps prepares for war.

‘Ready, Relevant and Efficient’—The US Marine Corps Reserve Model

The size of the US Army, and the fact that it has two separate reserves—with quite distinct identities, tends to obscure its relevance for forces that need to provide responses for a range of contingencies with a much smaller manpower base. Perhaps a better example is the US Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR), which represents a much smaller percentage of the Total Force, but which is fully integrated and contains a broad range of warfighting capabilities. The USMCR vision is compatible with its parent organisation; unlike the other reserves, it is part of the Corps’ front-line Major Theatre War (MTW) forces and its mission requirements are such that it is expected to deploy at short notice with little or no ‘work-up’ training.⁵¹ As the nation’s ‘911 Force’ the Marine Corps has not been backward in using reserves.⁵² During World War II, 68 per cent of marines were reservists; in Korea the entire USMCR was mobilised; and at Inchon half the 1st Marine Division was comprised of reservists. More recently over 31 000 reservists were activated for the 1990–91 Gulf War and over 13 000 were deployed to South-West Asia.⁵³ Unlike the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve, USMCR combat units were deployed whole and fought a number of successful actions—one tank company destroying thirty T-72 tanks, four T-55 tanks and seven personnel carriers in a half-hour dawn battle without any loss to itself.⁵⁴

Although the Marine Corps represents only a small proportion of US forces, its reserve component stands comparison with the total armed forces of many a smaller nation. It represents one-third of the Corps’ total manpower and one-quarter of its combat manoeuvre elements. With 105 000 personnel in forty-seven states, including 42 000 active selected reservists (shrinking to 39 000 by 2003) the Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES) consists of four major subordinate commands. The force

⁵¹ ‘The mission of the USMCR is to augment and reinforce the active force by providing qualified units and individuals in time of war or other national emergency. In the augmentation role, the USMCR provides trained and equipped units, detachments or individuals to active commands to bring their force structure to the level required for war or other national emergency. In the reinforcing role, the USMCR provides similar assets to provide depth, replacements or capabilities in the active force.’ See RFPB, ‘Roles, Missions and Operations’, *Annual Report 1997*.

⁵² ‘911’ is the common emergency services telephone number in the US. The Marine Air–Ground Task Force (MACTF) constitutes an expeditionary ‘force-in-readiness’ that ‘can be rapidly deployed to a regional crisis within a relatively short time period, that is armed with sufficient firepower to accomplish military missions, and that is able to offer maximum flexibility in the achievement of specific geostrategic goals’. A. Millett, ‘The Marine Corps’, in Sarkesian and Connor, *America’s Armed Forces*, p. 140.

⁵³ Major General David Mize, Commander Marine Forces Reserve, *COMMARFORRES Planning Guidance (CMFRPG)—A Road Plan to Relevance, Readiness, and Efficiency in the 21st Century*, 1 January 1999,

<http://www.marforres.usmc.mil/MFR+Planni...668d723480862566f3005cf0a0?OpenDocument> (Downloaded 25 May 1999); Heller, ‘Total Force’, pp. 171–2.

⁵⁴ S. Duncan, *Citizen Warriors*, pp. 97–9.

includes the 4th Marine Division, the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, the 4th Force Service Support Group and the Marine Corps Reserve Support Command. The 4th Division comprises nine infantry battalions, two tank battalions, one armoured infantry assault battalion, one light-armoured battalion, and combat and combat support units. The Aircraft Wing has nineteen squadrons of fixed and rotary wing aircraft, and an anti-aircraft battalion. The Service Support Group is composed of seven support battalions, while the Support Command is responsible for administering the Inactive Ready Reserve and maintaining their readiness for a mobilisation recall.

The reserve forces are not intended to fight as formations, but augment the Corps' three active-duty Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF) with formed units at the battalion and aircraft squadron level. The last MARFORRES commander, Major General Thomas Wilkerson, explained that high reserve readiness was maintained by organising at a lower level than the Army:

Your skills don't diminish as rapidly if you're focused on maneuvering as a battalion or a squadron inside a much larger entity than if your job is to be a divisional commander and take the whole division through operations at division- and corps-level. A battalion is an entity that we can keep at a higher state of readiness with a smaller investment in training than would be required for a larger force.⁵⁵

Force readiness is achieved by a training system that focuses on facilitating the reservists' transition to the full-time warfighting mode. A high level of interoperability with the full-time component is achieved by having common operational plans and accordingly the reservists are able to boast that they 'train like we are going to fight'. As the reserves deploy with the active MEF, they train on a regular basis with their counterparts as well as with other Services. The current Commander MARFORRES set out the need for common training when he pointed out:

Our Reserves don't make a 4th MEF. They come in and fill out the holes in our three active duty MEFs. We don't have enough active-duty personnel to meet all of our warfighting requirements, so we need our Reserves fast. 'Total Force' means a lot to us, because that's how we're going to fight in any serious contingency.⁵⁶

The most recent training initiative adopted by the Marine Reserves has been the establishment of a computer Intranet called the Reserve Information Network (R-Net). Not only does the Net provide an instantaneous command and control tool that flattens out the more cumbersome hierarchical structure of the past, but it has revolutionised military training, by allowing on-line 'distance learning' packages to be delivered to reservists. The Australian Army's Training Command aims to have a similar on-line training system before December 2005.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Glen W. Goodman Jr., 'Reserves in Readiness', *Armed Forces Journal International*, January 1998, p.18; see also Heller, 'Total Force', pp. 172-4.

⁵⁶ Goodman, 'Reserves-In-Readiness', p. 18.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*; Greenberry, 'Distance no Object', pp. 20-1.

The Marines encourage the idea of a seamless 'Total Force' by facilitating movement between the active and reserve components. The Corps encourages personnel to move from the Active Component into the Selected Reserve at the completion of their full-time service. Given that many Marines serve only one period of enlistment and then move into the civilian workforce, this is an excellent way of retaining access to trained manpower with minimal cost. The strong *esprit de corps* amongst Marines helps promote this trend, and service with the reserves is not considered second-class duty.⁵⁸ The notion that 'there is no such thing as an ex-marine' is strongly cultivated within the Corps.

This synergy is reinforced by the 5000 active-duty support personnel that are posted into reserve units to serve in administrative and/or instructional positions, and who mobilise and go on operations with their units. Given the current selected reserve strength of 42 000, that figure compares more than favourably with the ARNG, whose 367 000 reservists are supported by only 200 active component support staff. Though 5000 regular staff represents a substantial investment, the returns are great—unit capabilities are substantially enhanced for less than 2 per cent of overall Marine Corps manpower costs. Unlike postings within other services, a posting to the USMCR is not considered a career dead-end or 'lost time'; active staff on duty with the reserve are individually selected by central command selection boards and receive command credit for that time.⁵⁹ As the former Marine Corps Commandant General Charles Krulak stated:

I did away with the term 'Reserve' when it was attached to a unit. I do not think in terms of a Reserve or a regular unit. Since we now equip, train and promote what used to be called Reserve units the same way we do our regulars, we no longer have to worry about who we send because we know we are sending the very best.⁶⁰

From 'Gung-ho' to Geek Warfare—An Alternative Reserve Vision

Most reserve force planning continues to be of an essentially conservative type and largely fails to take into account the revolutionary possibilities for waging warfare outside the constraints of the traditional battlespace. The idea of a 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA) has received a great deal of attention in the US, but planning for 'New Age' warfare tends to concentrate on new ways of projecting traditional military force. Although contemporary technology does offer new information, sensor and weapons systems to the commander, the real 'revolution' is the creation of a new environment in which actors (state and non-state) may degrade each other's power. The reliance of modern technological states on computerised databases, electronic communications and automated infrastructure makes them particularly susceptible to attack. In this new paradigm for conflict, it is possible for a modern

⁵⁸ 'Opportunities for Prior Service Marines', *Marine Forces Reserve Homepage*, <http://www.marforres.usmc.mil/domino/html/MFR.NSF/8e7e7562a41c9a84862565ec00614f8c/970e3e22afa6049a862565ec0061ca4b?OpenDocument> (Downloaded 29 May 1999).

⁵⁹ Jacobs, 'The Conspiracy Theory', p. 31; Goodman, 'Reserves-In-Readiness', p. 18.; Major General James Livingston and Colonel Eric Chase, 'Marine Reserve Force: Critical Back-Up Muscle for America's Post-Cold War Force-In-Readiness', *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 78, no. 3, p. 15; John C. F. Tillson, 'Improving the Management of Reserve Forces', *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 16 Summer 1997, p. 40.

⁶⁰ RFPB, 'Roles, Missions and Operations', *Annual Report 1997*.

state to have its basic utilities disabled, its financial institutions closed, its internal communications compromised and its institutional records erased—all without a shot being fired.⁶¹ Although this possibility smacks of a Tom Clancy novel, the fact is that all major states now require a defensive and offensive information warfare capability. Armed forces have not yet responded to this requirement by developing a category of ‘warrior’ capable of waging war in cyberspace.

The US Department of Defense has recognised the need to reshape its response to the changing technological environment, the Secretary of Defense admitting that:

In recent years, the Department has focused its information operations development efforts on tactical support to warfighting. The Department must now expand these efforts to the full range of potential national security missions, for both peacetime and war . . . Such capabilities developed in the military and intelligence communities must be fully integrated into military planning and operations.⁶²

However, there is no need for the full-time component to develop these capabilities and, in fact, it is inappropriate for them to do so. Given that the main driving force for the development of information technology is the private sector, a number of commentators have argued that the necessary technical skills would best be located in a ‘Military Technology Reserve’. This notion is being trialled by the US Department of Defense’s Directorate of Net Assessment, which has sponsored a study of the feasibility of establishing an information warfare red team in the Vermont National Guard. Comprised of Army and Air Guardsmen, the team operates as an opposing force during wargames conducted by the National Defense University and the Joint Command & Control Warfare Center. The experiment found that there was already a substantial body of expertise among reserve personnel—even in a force as small as the Vermont National Guard. With a combination of military perspectives and civilian acumen, the team members bring to exercises an understanding of how the use of information impacts on every aspect of modern life. A participant in the study, Brigadier General Bruce Lawlor, argues that it would be most sensible to harness these skills rather than ‘reinvent the wheel’. He points out that the military:

cannot compete with the private sector for people highly skilled in the information trades. It is simply unreasonable to expect that adequate numbers of individuals with valuable knowledge of information systems will forego the financial rewards of a successful civilian career to join the armed forces. It is not unreasonable, however, to assume that such individuals might be willing to contribute their talent

⁶¹ The range of potential threats was recently outlined by Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, US Army, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, in a speech entitled ‘Global Threats and Challenges: The Decades Ahead’, Washington, D.C., February 2, 1999, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1999/s19990202-hughes.html> (Downloaded 3 June 1999).

⁶² William S. Cohen, ‘Information Operations’, chap. 2., *Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and Congress*, 1998, <http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr98/chap2.html> (Downloaded 3 June 1999).

to the national defense—albeit at a reduced rate of compensation—on a part-time basis.⁶³

Inviting (and receiving) criticism, Lawlor argues that much of the military regimentation that supports traditional military roles would be unnecessary and a disincentive to the highly skilled innovators who would be expected to staff this type of unit:

Traditional “weekend drills” should be discarded in favor of flexible work schedules and much of the established military regimen, such as fitness tests, height and weight standards, and age restrictions, waived. Individual and collective training should be focused on military theory, strategy, operational art, tactics and the planning process. In short, military service should be redefined to recognize the unique characteristics of the individuals being sought and the specialized warfare they will fight.⁶⁴

While this proposal does not necessarily reflect the future shape of conventional reserve forces, it does reflect one way in which the traditional strengths of the reserves—flexibility and economy—might be well utilised. Reservists working in the new techno-military environment would be available at minimal cost; not only would most of their training be at no cost to the military, but their skills would be made available at a fraction of their market value. In this instance, at least, it appears that reserve-force initiatives might help shape the future direction of warfighting.

Historical and Cultural Constraints on ‘Total Force’ Structural Planning

There appears little doubt that reserve forces will continue to be utilised in the Western democracies and that they will be used for a wider variety of operational tasks than were considered in the past. The main issue is how to establish an appropriate synergy between full and part-time components to produce the most effective ‘Total Force’. Britain, Canada and the US have adopted, at least in principle, the idea of integration. The notion of the 19th-century rifle volunteer has been replaced by that of the citizen soldier who ‘value-adds’ by bringing skills and manpower resources to organisations whose resources rarely match their operational requirements. Similarly, the idea of the ‘natural’ citizen soldier—be he Aussie digger, American backwoods frontiersman, or doughty Tommy—has given way to an acceptance that the part-time soldier must be equipped and trained to the same level as his regular counterpart if he is to survive and prevail in battle. This is not a new

⁶³ Brigadier General Bruce M. Lawlor, ‘Information Corps’, *Armed Forces Journal International*, January 1998, p. 26.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 28. While generally receiving support for information-age forces, criticism was generally levelled at the proposed elimination of physical standards for reservists. See Robert Traurig, ‘One Team, One Fight’, Letters to the Editor, *Armed Forces Journal International*, June 1998, p. 5.

lesson for Australia, both the First and Second AIF as well as the Militia battalions of Kokoda made a bloody transition from citizen soldiers to professional fighting forces.

Successive commentators have observed that the 'Total Force' does not imply the total amalgamation of regular and reserve forces; given their different circumstances, it is foolish to believe that they are completely interchangeable.⁶⁵ Reservists provide both supplementary and complementary skills. In some areas they merely reinforce existing skills, while in others they bring capabilities that the regular force does not have. As individuals or sub-units, reservists can augment regular units and will thus sustain them, but the utility of reservists is limited—they add no long-term capability. This is not to detract from their contribution. Reservists serving full time in the force-in-being are a part of the national risk-management strategy, but they are not assets that can be duplicated should there emerge a need for a numerically enhanced force. Most significantly, the existence of formed reserve units provides a force multiplier capable of supporting and sustaining operations.

Despite the demonstrable need for a cohesive, integrated total force, it appears that cultural conflict between reservists and regulars is everywhere an obstacle to change. Instead of seeing limited resources as a common problem, they become the subject of intra-service competition. Commenting on the US experience one pundit remarked:

Cooperation and trust are central to the total force. But lack of trust between the active and Reserve components is an impediment. The resulting competition is dysfunctional. We can no longer afford to maintain ineffective or overlapping capabilities because of poor cooperation or distrust among services or between components.⁶⁶

Unfortunately, too often, factors other than objective strategic considerations shape force planning. Budgetary constraints, cultural prejudices, current ideological preoccupations and the periodically fashionable assumption that war is a thing of the past all operate on the minds of the planners, both military and political. The problems of brokering an effective force structure that will be capable of keeping pace with operational tasking mean that the end result often pleases no-one.

Perhaps the most obvious example of this was the failure of the US Army to deploy its ARNG round-out units for Operation Desert Storm. Although in the final analysis these units were not required, perhaps the lesson that should be learnt was their speed in training up as formed units after mobilisation. These units were ready for combat within a relatively short time of having been called up. Even then, the units spent much of their time reacquiring qualifications that they had already attained. What appears to have been lacking was the will to deploy reserve combat forces.⁶⁷ It is too late to engender the culture of the Total Force once the shooting has begun. While platform-based services have a chance of integrating their relatively small reserves, of all the ground forces considered in this paper, only the US Marines appear to have developed a cooperative system that meets their operational requirements. Their

⁶⁵ Louis Zurcher and Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, *Supplementary Military Forces: Reserves, Militias, Auxiliaries*, Sage, Beverley Hills, 1978, pp. 12–28. For a Canadian example see Genest, 'Improving the Operational capability of the Militia'.

⁶⁶ Tillson, 'Improving the Management of Reserve Forces', p. 40.

⁶⁷ Duncan, *Citizen Soldiers*, pp. 65–73.

adaptive, modular approach to force composition and operational tasking provides a positive example as to how Australia might best utilise its reserves.

Several initiatives undertaken by ABCA Reserve forces have proved successful. These include facilitating movement between the full-time and part-time components; promoting whole-force *esprit de corps* by making reserve postings for regular personnel worthwhile and rewarding; training and mobilising units as a whole; and ensuring that reservists have a relevant and credible mission to perform. Many reserve forces became moribund during the Cold War because they were held back as forces of last resort for a major conflagration. The function of post-Cold War armed forces has changed, and with it so must the reserves. It is arguable that the military has experienced the same processes that have transformed the nature of work and production in the private sector. The ideal reservist is a multiskilled professional who can bring a range of abilities to a task, possibly at short notice, and to meet a particular demand. Mirroring new production methods, reserve units are not necessarily the tools of industrial-age standardisation processes, but might well find themselves deployed on a 'just-in-time' basis in a force structure tailored to the particular contingency. One thing is certain: in the face of new threats to state and global security, and with the military being expected to provide an ever-expanding suite of responses, no defence force will be able to sustain operations without a coherent total force, consisting of both full and part-time personnel.

Conclusion

The primary function of peacetime military establishments remains that set down by the Cardwell Committee, which accomplished wide-ranging reforms in the British Army of the 1870s. That task was:

1. to place in the field immediately on the outbreak of war, in the highest state of efficiency, as large a force as is compatible with the peace-time military expenditure; and
2. to maintain that force in the field throughout the continuance of hostilities undiminished in numbers and efficiency.⁶⁸

Modern armed forces are required to do that, and a great deal more—they provide constabulary forces for peacekeeping tasks; assistance on humanitarian and disaster-relief missions; police functions for counter-narcotics and border protection operations; and a range of other community-related functions. It is easy to forget that their primary function is fighting their country's wars. The political realities facing armies in the post-Cold War world are that they will continue to be expected to perform a range of non-traditional tasks. Despite this, one lesson that we can draw from recent experience is that denuding the military of its ability to sustain warfighting capabilities for the duration of hostilities is short sighted in the extreme.

⁶⁸ Sir Michael Howard, *Studies in War and Peace*, Temple Smith, London, 1970, p. 90.

While general war against the Soviet Union is no longer on the cards, recent years have seen Western forces deployed to a number of major regional conflicts, and they are required to sustain a more demanding operational tempo than was generally the case for most of the Cold War. To relieve personnel shortages in regular forces, reserve forces have been used as a temporary stopgap measure. In the short term, this augmentation function has enabled the British and the Canadians to meet their peacekeeping obligations and has made it possible for the US to deploy an army against Iraq successfully. However, by reducing the combat elements of each force to a finite number of deployable units, it has blunted their combat capabilities and limited their ability to continue to sustain forces for any length of time.

As Julian Brazier MP has argued of Britain, if the Government 'is naive enough to accept the comfortable assertion that future wars will be solvable by the rapid application of high technology alone, they can indeed simply shape their forces in a way that suits their "peacetime" commitments'.⁶⁹ However, if we accept that the international situation provides no such guarantee that western countries such as Australia might not have to provide substantial forces at short notice to meet a crisis contingency, then Australia needs to preserve a credible mobilisation base. The document *Australia's Strategic Policy* concluded that:

. . . decisions on the posture and preparedness of the ADF cannot be based on any robust estimate of the amount of warning we would get at the outset of a crisis, because such events are inherently unpredictable. The management of the problem this poses is one of the key challenges to Australian defence planning.⁷⁰

Professor Bercuson's report to the Canadian Minister of National Defence might serve as a reminder that Australia also requires a broad-spectrum insurance policy for a range of military contingencies. Bercuson argued that the armed forces needed to be prepared to fight 'a limited conventional war of high-intensity, air/land battle, in coalition with our allies' at any time. He concluded that:

The blunt fact is that the future is not predictable. *No one could have forecast the Korean conflict, the Six Days war of 1967, the October War of 1973, the Falklands War, or the 1991 war in Kuwait even six months before they broke out.* In each case, war—or the crisis which lead directly to war—broke out quickly, with virtually no prior warning. *The bitter truth is that Canadian troops in large numbers could be fighting and dying in some remote corner of the world six months from now, but if they are, they won't be ready.*⁷¹

With a small combat force, Australia is a country that should be particularly aware of the constraints placed on its ability to protect its interests. Two regular brigades are insufficient to execute 'deterrence, compellance and reassurance operations across three potential theatres: continental, offshore and regional-international'.⁷² The

⁶⁹ Brazier, 'TA or not TA?', p. 13.

⁷⁰ Department of Defence, *Australia's Strategic Policy*, Canberra, 1997, p. 38.

⁷¹ Bercuson, *The Bercuson Report*, chap. 2. Emphasis in original.

⁷² Michael Evans, *The Role of the Australian Army in a Maritime Concept of Strategy*, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 101, Canberra, September 1998, p. 41.

Australian Army's recent keystone doctrine publication, *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, stated that the Army must be capable of 'contributing to joint and coalition manoeuvre operations in a littoral environment, conducting protective and security operations throughout Australia and contributing to coalition operations further afield'.⁷³ Undertaking any one of these tasks in an operational environment would exhaust the Army's first-line capability. Even without sustaining battle casualties, the ordinary attrition of operations in the field will rapidly degrade a task force-sized group. Without a 'round-out' and 'follow-up' combat capability, the Australian Army will not be able to remain effective in meeting its responsibilities.

The experience of Australia's close allies is particularly relevant as the Army plans for an 'Army-After-Next', the force that will exist in twenty to thirty years time. At the time of writing, a number of studies into enhancing reserve capabilities are in progress. For those with a long-term memory, it has ever been so. Like Canada, Australia cannot, with a relatively small army, afford to continue to maintain two separate force structures. However, no action plan for employing reservists can afford to ignore the reality that they represent a different form of human resource than their regular colleagues. Pretending that reservists are only 'part-time regulars' ignores the fact that their work patterns, professional and family obligations, and career structures are generally very different from those of full-time soldiers. All three armies examined have found that reservists represent a very broad church and are not best served by over-simplification. Some form of supplementary reserve, on the British model, perhaps best performs technical, combat service support tasks. More 'sharp end' combat support is well served by reserve units on the US Army Reserve model. Younger reservists (who comprise the bulk of combat units) are best able to find the time to undertake periods of full-time service and are more likely to be readily available for augmentation and operational tasks. As the US Marines have found, reserve combat forces are probably best deployed as a collective capability, though their training should take place in an integrated total force context.

The idea of a 'seamless, integrated total force' requires that reserve capabilities both complement and supplement the regular force. Assigning the reserves a limited role will degrade the force's ability to sustain even low-level operations and destroys its ability to rapidly generate additional, collectively trained, combat-capable units for a higher-level contingency. While most reserve units will not be ready to deploy on the day that they are called up, that is not their purpose. In most contingencies some warning will be given before they are committed to action—as was the case in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. In the less likely event of an emergency requiring immediate deployment, the mobilisation base (which consists of most reservists) would be required to provide follow-on units and a sustainment capacity.

Australia would also benefit by emulating the example of highly motivated and well-integrated reserve forces such as the USMCR and the US federal Army Reserve. As both forces are expected to be capable of deploying at short notice, they have cultivated a whole-force synergy in peacetime. The unedifying squabbles involving US National Guardsmen or Canadian Militiamen and their regular colleagues indicate that it is too late to create a coherent force once the shooting starts. Significantly, US

⁷³ *Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, Doctrine Wing, Combined Arms Training and Development Centre, 1998, p. 3-21.

and Canadian experience indicates that both armies have been most successful in integrating formed reserve units at battalion level into their force structure. For a ready-deployment combat force, this seems to be the most effective way of developing the level of flexibility and preparedness required to provide forces tailored to a particular contingency.

Other initiatives to maximise the utility of reserves merit serious attention in Australia. As the exploitation of new technologies to conduct both defensive and offensive information operations becomes one of the essential capabilities required of the Defence Force, it would be foolish not to take advantage of the skills base in the civil sector. To attempt to replicate those skill sets by training regular personnel would be unnecessarily costly and might still produce a second-rate capability. Similarly, other essential tasks including civil affairs, psychological operations (PSYOPS), military policing and medical services might be largely, or even completely, undertaken by reserve units. Reserves can provide a whole suite of options to complement regular forces, particularly where asymmetric threats and peacekeeping or peacemaking functions are involved. The USMC Civil Affairs Groups provide an example of a capability that is entirely drawn from the reserve. Conducting PSYOPS might even provide honest and creative employment for whole teams of public relations and advertising spin-doctors!

Historically, a rift between their regular and reserve elements has divided the force structures of all the ABCA partners. As Australia plans to restructure its forces to meet the challenges of a dramatically new strategic environment, it would do well to learn from its allies. The creation of a 'Total Force' requires both macro and micro-planning. Macro-planning requires that the traditions, cohesion and enthusiasm of reserves be preserved and grafted to the professionalism of the regular force. This requirement entails that reserves be given a mission that is, in the words of the Chief of Army, 'Relevant, Achievable and Credible'.⁷⁴ Micro-planning means making legislative provision that will enable reservists to down their ploughs and to take up the sword.

In an age where national interests are not constrained by state borders, modern reserve forces will be required to serve overseas. Like its allies, Australia will probably have to call on its reserve forces for overseas service. It is to be hoped that Australia will not have to resort to the legalistic sleight-of-hand that saw militia battalions deployed to the equator in World War II. Similarly, should Australia have to call on its citizen soldiers they might expect that, like their allies, their country will have made provision for the preservation of their jobs, their families' financial security and their reintegration into society on their return. In this, at least, the British model provides a positive precedent.

Successive studies of the Reserve have fallen by the wayside or have been only partly implemented because the will to bring about change has been lacking. The most recent report on the strategic rationale of the Reserve points out that:

⁷⁴ Lieutenant General F. J. Hickling, *Address to the Defence Reserve Association*, 15 May 1999, Canberra.

The implementation of previous Reserve studies has routinely foundered on a lack of consideration of the political dimension. This has often been manifest in conflicting advice provided from Defence to Government, an absence of consideration for broader national political issues and a lack of consensus building within the disparate interest groups of the broader Defence community. The result has generally been inertia, particularly whenever legislative changes have been central to recommendations to enhance Reserve capability.⁷⁵

To that statement might be added a lack of processes within the Army to enable it to bring about change. The precedent of far-reaching and often radical change in the forces of Australia's allies might act as a spur to a more clear-sighted consideration of the strategic and human resource issues associated with the use of reserves. As our allies have learnt, the need to make the most of scarce manpower is not a novel notion. As long ago as 1794, President Washington recommended to Congress that:

The devising of a well regulated militia would be a genuine source of legislative honor and a perfect title to public gratitude. I therefore entertain a hope that the present session will not pass without carrying to its full energy the power of organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and thus providing, in the language of the Constitution, for calling them forth to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.⁷⁶

A consideration of the ABCA record of force planning might provide Australian military policy planners and legislators with the experience to avoid the errors of the past and create an information-age force capable of meeting Australia's security needs into the 21st century.

⁷⁵ Colonel Mark Sampson, *A Strategic Rationale for the Army Reserve: Draft Interim Findings*, Reserve Study Team, Army Headquarters, 27 May 1999, para. 8.

⁷⁶ George Washington, Sixth Annual Message to Congress, 19 November 1794, Philadelphia, <http://www.virginia.edu/gwpapers/annualmessages/message6.html> (Downloaded 4 June 1999).