

Land Warfare Studies Centre

Working Paper No. 106

**THE CAPACITY OF THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY TO
CONDUCT AND SUSTAIN LAND FORCE OPERATIONS**

by

Lieutenant Colonel Greg de Somer

August 1999

© Land Warfare Studies Centre 1999

This work is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of study, research, criticism or review (as permitted under the *Copyright Act 1968*) and with standard source credit included, no part may be reproduced by any process without written permission. Inquiries should be directed to the Director, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Ian Campbell Road, Duntroon ACT 2600.

Land Warfare Studies Centre

The Australian Army established the Land Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC) in July 1997 through the amalgamation of several existing staffs and research elements.

The role of the LWSC is to provide land warfare advocacy and to promote, coordinate and conduct research and analysis to support the application of land warfare concepts and capabilities to the security of Australia and its interests. The LWSC fulfils this role through a range of internal reports and external publications; a program of conferences, seminars and debates; and contributions to a variety of professional, academic and community fora. Additional information on the centre may be found on the Internet at <http://www.defence.gov.au/lwsc>.

Comment on this Working Paper is welcome and should be forwarded in writing to:

The Director
Land Warfare Studies Centre
Ian Campbell Road
DUNTROON ACT 2600
Australia

Telephone: (02) 6265 9548
Facsimile: (02) 6265 9888
Email: dir.lwsc@army.defence.gov.au

Land Warfare Studies Centre Working Papers

ISSN 1441-0389

Working Papers produced by the Land Warfare Studies Centre are vehicles for initiating, encouraging or nurturing professional discussion and debate concerning the application of land warfare concepts and capabilities to the security of Australia and its interests. Working Papers, by their nature, are not intended to be definitive.

The views expressed are the author's and not necessarily those of the Australian Army or the Department of Defence. The Commonwealth of Australia will not be legally responsible in contract, tort or otherwise for any statement made in this publication.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Greg de Somer graduated from the Officer Cadet School, Portsea, in 1984 and was commissioned into the Royal Australian Infantry Corps. His subsequent military career has involved a wide range of regimental, staff and instructional appointments, and extensive experience (three postings) in special forces. His most recent regimental posting was Officer Commanding 3 SAS Squadron, The Special Air Service Regiment in 1993–94. Throughout 1996–97 he was a tactics instructor and team leader at Tactics Wing at the Land Warfare Centre, Canungra. In 1998 he was the Chief of Army Visiting Fellow at the Asia–Australia Institute at the University of New South Wales. Lieutenant Colonel de Somer is currently posted to the Army’s ‘think tank’, the Land Warfare Studies Centre, as a Senior Research Fellow.

His overseas service includes a posting to the United Kingdom at the Directorate of Special Forces and SAS Group 1991–92.

Lieutenant Colonel de Somer holds Bachelor of Economics (1980) and Bachelor of Laws (1982) degrees, both from the University of Sydney; a Practical Legal Training Certificate from the New South Wales College of Law (1983); a Graduate Diploma of Defence Studies (1995); and a Masters of Defence Studies degree (1997) from Deakin University. He is also a 1995 graduate of the Army’s Command and Staff College. He was admitted as a solicitor by the New South Wales Legal Practitioners Board in 1998. Lieutenant Colonel de Somer is currently enrolled as a PhD candidate at the School of Politics, Australian Defence Force Academy, where he is writing a thesis entitled ‘The Redefinition of Asia’.

His Masters sub-thesis, ‘China’s Approach to Nuclear Arms Control in the Post–Cold War Era’, attracted significant professional and academic interest. Lieutenant Colonel de Somer has been a regular contributor to the *Australian Defence Force Journal*.

National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

De Somer, Gregory, 1960–.

The capacity of the Australian Army to conduct and sustain land force operations

ISBN 0 642 29521 2.

1. Australia. Army—Operational readiness. 2. Australia. Army—Reorganisation. 3. Combat sustainability (Military science). 4. Australia—Military policy. I. Land Warfare Studies Centre (Australia). II. Title. (Series : Working Paper (Land Warfare Studies Centre (Australia)) ; no.106).

355.033294

Acknowledgments

The author has received permission from the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade for the publication of this paper.

While it is difficult to list all those who influenced, and contributed to, the development of the Australian Army's Submission, the most prominent include Lieutenant General F. J. Hickling, Major General P. J. Abigail, Brigadier M. A. Swan, Colonel J. D. Kelly, Mr Mark Long and all the other members of the staff of Future Land Warfare Branch, Army Headquarters. The Army Submission was also discussed, and refined, in the normal higher Defence committee processes.

ABSTRACT

The Australian Army must be prepared to conduct land force operations throughout the spectrum of conflict. These land force operations are simplified into two main categories: warfighting (combat operations) and military support (peace and support operations). The fluidity of the strategic environment puts a premium on the Army's ability to be a flexible and agile organisation if it is to retain its effectiveness. To be flexible and agile, the Australian Army needs to develop and maintain a high level of warfighting capability, while retaining the ability to apply itself to military support operations. A mark of the Army's flexibility is its ability to offer the Government as broad a range of Military Response Options as possible to meet future national-security challenges.

The Army is structured for war and yet, of necessity, adapted for peace. This approach recognises that a balance must be struck between the immediate, mostly military support operations needs of today, and the potential warfighting possibilities of the future. This balance is difficult to achieve given current funding levels, the array of current and future tasks, and uncertain strategic circumstances.

In April 1999 the Minister of Defence requested that the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade investigate and report into the suitability of the Army to fulfil its role in peacetime, peacekeeping and war. This parliamentary inquiry provides the Army with a unique opportunity to raise awareness of the expanding role of land forces and the integral role they have in support of Australia's military strategies.

This paper is the conceptual and intellectual basis for the Army's Submission. It includes several aspects that do not appear in the

formal Army Submission. The aim of this paper is to discuss the capacity of the Australian Army to conduct and sustain land force operations. Five areas are examined. First, the paper discusses the nature of military power, the four key functions of military capabilities, and the utility of land forces. Second, the requirements demanded of the Australian Army are examined. Third, the paper analyses, and makes general assessments on, the Army's ability to meet these requirements. Fourth, the paper looks to the future: the nature of future conflict; the Army's approach to modernisation; the Restructuring of the Australian Army initiative; and the Army's plans for the exploitation of technology. The paper concludes by identifying the critical issues confronting the Australian Army and comments on how they are being addressed.

The paper makes the crucial point that the Army currently provides a range of options to Government, although significant capability limitations exist in critical areas such as the sustainment of operations and the ability to participate in mid to high-level conflict. The paper stresses that the capacity to provide Military Response Options to Government will degrade over time unless funding is increased.

THE CAPACITY OF THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY TO CONDUCT AND SUSTAIN LAND FORCE OPERATIONS

*There should be no doubt about this: [the Australian Army's] focus is—and must remain—the delivery of warfighting capabilities that are world's best practice. To aim for anything less would be an insult to our people in uniform; and a betrayal of the nation. I have seen the results of a peacekeeping culture in several armies in recent years. Those are not the kind of Army that this country needs. They are not the kind of Army that will earn the respect that is the foundation of successful peacekeeping.*¹

Lieutenant General F. J. Hickling, AO, CSC
Chief of Army

Introduction

The range of potential conflicts that may occur between the extremes of peace and total war is commonly referred to as the spectrum of conflict. The Australian Army must be prepared to conduct land force operations throughout this spectrum. These land force operations are simplified into two main categories: warfighting and military support operations.² These may occur in combination or discretely. Military support operations are operations other than combat operations. The distinction between the two relates to the focus of effort within each activity. In warfighting the focus is defeating an adversary by the use or threat of force. In military support operations the focus is overcoming a problematic environment, be it physical, social or political; the use of force may be required, but it is

¹ Chief of the Australian Army, Lieutenant General F. J. Hickling, Address to the National Press Club, Canberra, 14 April 1999.

² Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 1, *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, Doctrine Wing, Combined Arms Training and Development Centre, 1999, p. 2-10.

secondary to the objective of the operation. The Army further divides military support operations into peace and support operations. Examples of military support operations include disaster relief, humanitarian and peacekeeping operations.

The small size of the Australian Army, and the finite resources available to it, require priorities to be assigned that provide the Government with the most appropriate mix of capabilities across the spectrum of conflict relevant to Australia's strategic circumstances. From its warfighting capabilities the Army has been able to adapt to meet the requirements of military support operations. In military support operations the self-discipline, adaptiveness, logistic support and command and control processes that the Army maintains for warfighting have great utility.

The fluidity of the strategic environment puts a premium on the Army's ability to be a flexible and agile organisation if it is to retain its effectiveness. To be flexible and agile, the Australian Army needs to develop and maintain a high level of warfighting capability, while retaining the ability to apply itself to military support operations. A mark of the Army's flexibility is its ability to offer the Government as broad a range of Military Response Options as possible to meet future national-security challenges. The Army is structured for war and yet, of necessity, adapted for peace. This approach recognises that a balance must be accommodated between preparedness for current tasks and investment against an uncertain future. Consequently a balance must be struck between the immediate, mostly military support operations needs of today, and the potential warfighting possibilities of the future. This balance is difficult to achieve given current funding levels, the array of current and future tasks, and uncertain strategic circumstances.

Coinciding with the pursuit of a balance between future capability investment and today's preparedness is a joint parliamentary inquiry into the Army's capacity to fulfil its role in (what the Committee terms) peacetime, peacekeeping and war. This parliamentary inquiry by the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade provides the Army with a unique opportunity to raise awareness of the expanding role of land forces and the integral role they have in the support of Australia's military strategies. It is also an opportunity for the Army to seek recognition as a professional and well-managed organisation that currently has limitations in fulfilling its mission.

The inquiry will review the current and proposed changes to the Army to ensure that it provides viable and credible land forces able to meet a range of contingencies. In considering this matter, the committee was requested to take into account *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare* document, the Restructuring of the Australian Army initiative; the Defence Reform Program; Australian Defence Force preparedness and force structure; the role and impact on full-time and part-time personnel; and *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997*.³

An initial response to the inquiry by the Chief of the Defence Force was presented to the committee in early July 1999. The submission by the Chief of Defence Force provided the context within which to assess the Australian Army's capacity to provide the land operations component of a range of operational

³ Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Terms of Reference, *The Suitability of the Australian Army for Peacetime, Peacekeeping and War*, Parliament of Australia, Canberra, 28 May 1999. Information can be obtained from the inquiry's website at <http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/jscfadt>.

capabilities that could be required by the Australian Government. It also stressed that Australia's land forces will operate in conjunction with forces from the Navy and Air Force in most operations.

The submission by the Chief of Defence Force examined three areas. First, it provided an historical overview of the part played by Australian military forces in Australia's national life. Second, it described a general philosophy on what is involved in the decision to use armed force. Australia's military traditions strongly influence the conditions under which an Australian government may consider the use of armed force to protect Australia's interests. The final section outlined in general terms what should be expected from the Australian Army in the conduct of land operations.

The inquiry is important as the Army is currently at its highest readiness levels since the Vietnam War. During the Vietnam War, the Australian Army numbered about 48 000 personnel, and included conscripts raised under a national service scheme. Today, Australia faces challenging times strategically. The Australian Defence Force is seeking to be a benchmark military organisation by world standards.

The submission by the Australian Army has also been presented to the committee. This paper is the conceptual and intellectual basis for that submission. It includes several aspects that do not appear in the Army Submission. The most significant of these is the overview of the political, strategic and resource imperatives since the 1980s that have led to the current assessment of Army's capability. This paper owes an intellectual debt to the work of all those who contributed, and reviewed, the development of the Army's Submission.

The aim of this paper is to discuss the capacity of the Australian Army to conduct and sustain land force operations. Five areas are examined. First, the nature of military power, the four key functions of military capabilities, and the utility of land forces are described. The Army Model is introduced to provide a conceptual basis for the design of the Army that recognises the need for balance between the four key functions of military capabilities and the linkages between deployable forces and the wider community. A fundamental message is that credible land forces are critical to the promotion and protection of Australia's security and interests. Future conflict is likely to require greater emphasis on discrimination capabilities rather than relying simply on the precision delivery of weapons. Land forces offer the Government considerable utility and a range of unique capabilities across the spectrum of conflict.

Second, the requirements of the Australian Army are examined. The Army's aim is to provide a range of cost-effective land force options to Government at levels of preparedness that are appropriate to the prevailing strategic circumstances, and to continue to do this in the future. The Army has an integral role in support of Australia's military strategy. That role involves contributing to joint and coalition manoeuvre operations in a littoral environment, conducting protective and security operations throughout Australia, and contributing to coalition operations further afield.

Third, the paper analyses, and makes general assessments on, the Army's ability to fulfil these requirements. The condition of the Army-in-being across the four capability functions is assessed. A summary of the condition of the Army in terms of the components of capability (POSTED—Personnel, Organisation and management, Support and facilities, Training, Equipment and Doctrine) is also examined. As a result of various factors

that will be discussed, there are a number of deficiencies in the Army's capacity for warfighting in a medium to high-threat environment.

Fourth, the paper stresses the message that the Army is committed to a process of continuous capability improvement that will deliver a technologically effective, flexible and credible future Army. In order to remain an effective instrument of government policy, the Army has adopted a concept-led, capability-based approach to informing its modernisation program. However, an acceptable balance needs to be struck between current preparedness and future investment. This balance is difficult to achieve given present funding levels and the array of current, and likely future, tasks.

The paper concludes by identifying the critical issues confronting the Australian Army and describing how they are being addressed. The paper makes the crucial point that the Army currently provides a range of options to Government, although significant capability limitations exist in critical areas such as the sustainment of operations and the ability to participate in mid to high-level conflict. The paper stresses that the capacity to provide Military Response Options to Government will degrade over time unless funding is increased.

THE NATURE OF MILITARY POWER

The Four Key Functions of Military Capabilities

The most important output of the Australian Defence Force is the combat capability it offers to Government. The military capabilities that contribute to that output should embrace four key functions: force generation, deployment and recovery, combat operations, and sustainability. These key functions are

applicable to the whole of the Australian Defence Force and are exercised in every scale and type of operation. The capacity of the Australian Defence Force in these four key functions must also adapt in a timely manner to changes in the strategic environment and conflict-warning time.⁴

Force generation is the process of providing suitably trained and equipped forces and their means of deployment, sustainment and recovery to meet all current and potential future tasks, within required readiness and preparation times. Deployment and recovery involves the movement of combat forces to, within and from a theatre of operations. Combat operations are the means by which a force undertakes its warfighting mission. Sustainment is the process of enabling a force to maintain the necessary combat capability to achieve its objectives. It embraces all aspects of sustaining the manpower, equipment and stores that enable a force to complete its mission.

If a substantial imbalance exists between the capacities to perform these functions, a usable military capability may exist, but not for long. To be credible, a defence force must be able to meet the core requirements of these four key functions. Civilians and contractors may conduct many supporting activities relating to force generation, deployment and recovery, and sustainability, but each function must involve a core of military personnel. Combat operations are the exclusive responsibility of the Australian Defence Force. Any assessment of the suitability of the Australian Army, whether for warfighting or military support operations (peace and support operations), should be made with these four key functions in mind.

⁴ Conflict-warning time is defined as the preparation time Australia can expect prior to the outbreak of a particular conflict.

The Army Model

The Army requires the capacity to respond in a timely manner to short-term changes in the strategic environment, while remaining alert to the long-term trends affecting possible land force operations in the future. The Army Model provides a conceptual basis for the design of the Army that recognises the need for a balance between the four key functions of military capabilities and the linkages between deployable forces and the wider community. The Army Model is depicted in Figure 1.⁵




Figure 1: The Army Model

The Army Model consists of five elements; the Ready Deployment Force, the Latent Combat Force, the Enabling Component, and National and International Support. The Ready

⁵ The Army Model has been developed by various personnel within Army Headquarters, especially the staff of Future Land Warfare Branch.

Deployment Force provides the combat capability necessary to meet the requirements of designated Military Response Options within crisis-warning time.⁶ The Latent Combat Force provides the combat capabilities required to meet Military Response Options within capability-warning time⁷ and a reserve capacity to meet military response options not foreseen under crisis-warning time. The Enabling Component trains, supports and equips combat capabilities as they move through increasing levels of operational preparedness, until available for deployment as an element of the Ready Deployment Force, and it also sustains deployed forces. In many of these endeavours, the Enabling Component draws on support from the national and international communities by a variety of means, including the recruitment of personnel, the procurement of materiel and the provision of services. Collectively the various components of the Army Model enable the four functions that military capabilities should embrace.

The main characteristics of each Army element of the Army Model are:

- **The Ready Deployment Force.** The Ready Deployment Force contains combat, combat support and combat service support elements. The Ready Deployment Force's size and composition is determined by extant strategic guidance. It will consist mainly of full-time (Regular) forces but will also have

⁶ Crisis warning is defined in *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997* as the limited warning time likely in a crisis. Crisis warning is measured in days or months. *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997*, Directorate of Publishing and Visual Communications, Canberra, p. 44.

⁷ Capability warning is defined in *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997* as the warning time expected of a major capability development within the Asia-Pacific region that might threaten Australia. Capability warning is measured in years.

part-time (Reserve) elements, both individual and collective, which provide specific complementary capabilities at commensurate levels of readiness notice.

- **The Latent Combat Force.** The Latent Combat Force also contains combat, combat support and combat service support elements. The Latent Combat Force provides the mobilisation and expansion base and the means to sustain the Ready Deployment Force through individual reinforcement and individual and collective rotation. It provides a ready source of personnel and equipment to expand the Ready Deployment Force in response to changes in the strategic circumstance (mobilisation) and provides the expansion base for the Army. The Latent Combat Force is, in essence, the Army's strategic depth, enabling it to adapt to changes in the strategic environment. To do this, it must be able to generate military forces that will be effective in the future warfare environment. It is therefore essential that the Latent Combat Force be equipped and resourced to support the Ready Deployment Force and reflect the concept-led approach to force development adopted by the Australian Army.
- **The Enabling Component.** The Enabling Component contains individual training and base logistic support elements. The Enabling Component provides the means to facilitate the expansion of the Ready Deployment Force (mobilisation), to sustain the combat force and the means to generate new capabilities. The Enabling Component is vital to achieve and sustain the Ready Deployment Force, and directly affects Army's capacity to meet the Government's requirements. The Enabling Component has an expansion and mobilisation underlay of its own. It must possess sufficient surge capacity to meet the needs of short-notice increases in

demand. The Army elements of the Enabling Component are supported by other non-Army groups.

As changes in the strategic environment occur, elements of the Army should move between the Ready Deployment Force and the Latent Combat Force. For example, as crisis-warning time decreases or the range of anticipated crises increases, forces should move forward into the Ready Deployment Force. Alternatively, as crisis-warning time increases or the range of anticipated crises decreases, forces should move from the Ready Deployment to the Latent Combat Force. This mechanism is depicted in Figure 2.

Expansion of the Ready Deployment Force involves the mobilisation of the Latent Combat Force elements with support from the Enabling Component. The absence of Latent Combat Force elements at appropriate readiness, or inadequate surge capacity in the Enabling Component, will jeopardise the timely expansion of the Ready Deployment Force. An enabling component that is ‘asset stripped’, to support a particular short-term steady state, loses the capacity to respond in a timely manner to strategic turbulence.

The recent requirement for Army to add a second brigade to its Ready Deployment Force, with three months notice, is a good example of the importance of maintaining a balanced structure with complementary capabilities across all four key functions of military capabilities.




Figure 2. The Combat Force and Changes to Strategic Circumstances⁸

Without a Latent Combat Force and a responsive Enabling Component, the Ready Deployment Force would become locked into meeting the challenges of a particular contingency or range of contingencies, with little capacity to adapt in a timely manner to changes in the strategic environment. It is noteworthy that important contributions to three of the four functions that military capabilities should embrace—force generation, deployment and recovery, and sustainability—come from the Latent Combat Force, the Enabling Component, the national support base and international suppliers.

Preparedness

The preparedness of a force is a measure of its readiness to undertake particular operations and the period during which the force can be sustained in operations. Ready forces (such as the

⁸ Figure 2 has been developed by various personnel within Army Headquarters, especially the staff of Future Land Warfare Branch.

Ready Deployment Force) normally have their full complement of personnel and equipment and are trained to fulfil likely operational tasks. They are available for employment at short notice. Sustainability involves the provision of replacement personnel and materiel to maintain a deployed force during operations. Short-notice sustainability requires the ready availability of such personnel and reserve stocks within the force-in-being, while a longer-term requirement may be satisfied by the adoption of appropriate mobilisation processes based on recruitment and procurement.

High preparedness is costly and in peacetime it is not normally necessary to maintain all combat elements at high levels of readiness. The strategic circumstances and Government policy will determine the number and types of forces in the Ready Deployment Force. Other elements (for example the Latent Combat Force) may be maintained at lower levels, with mobilisation plans to support their transition to higher readiness. Shifts in preparedness imply shifts in resources, and an increase in the overall preparedness of an Army demands the allocation of additional resources.

Thus, preparedness is a management device that facilitates the matching of a rational force structure, with both manifest and latent capabilities, and with peacetime resource allocations. The preparedness profile of a force should be thought of as its *status quo ante*, its pre-deployment condition. Decisions to commit forces to operations set in train processes that attract additional costs.

A simple Deployment Cost Model is depicted in Figure 3. This model represents the indicative costs of preparing and deploying forces on operations. The area at the base of the model represents the cost of a steady state of preparedness. This is a

fixed cost, subject only to risk management variations, and is effectively the cost of maintaining the force-in-being. The triangular-shaped area represents the additional cost of deploying a force element to respond to a contingency. This involves the final preparation of the force, its deployment and sustainment, and the generation of rotational forces. This area represents the additional resource allocation required to conduct the operation and is a variable cost.




Figure 3: Deployment Cost Model⁹

Notes:

- (1) Preparedness resources provide forces at the required levels of readiness and sustainability.
- (2) Sustainment resources enable deployment of a force for a specified duration.

⁹ Figure 3 has been developed by various personnel within Army Headquarters, especially the staff of Future Land Warfare Branch.

- (3) Rotation resources support the generation of rotation or follow-on forces.
- (4) Operational Level of Capability (OLOC) is the task-specific level of capability required to conduct operations effectively.
- (5) Minimum Level of Capability (MLOC) is the lowest level of capability (task-specific) from which a force element can achieve its OLOC within Readiness Notice.

The Utility of Land Forces

Modern warfare is invariably a joint and combined activity, not a single-Service effort. It is about matching ends and means and integrating force with diplomacy to get the best results. In the Australian context, there is the need for an array of mutually supportive capabilities.¹⁰ The Gulf War of the early 1990s and the recent conflict in the Balkans demonstrate the utility of a balanced-force concept and the need for cooperative inter-Service strategies.

The nature of future land warfare will be shaped by perceptions about conflict, the requirement for land forces to operate within an integrated battlespace, and by the impact and application of advanced technologies. Land forces are increasingly likely to confront a variety of situations that occur in close proximity (both in terms of location and time), which demand different modes of operation and often diverse capabilities. These situations require land forces to be able to conduct both

¹⁰ Capability is the combination of force structure and its preparedness, and encompasses equipment, trained people to operate that equipment, facilities, and the total support required to operate efficiently and effectively.

warfighting and the full range of military support operations, often at the same time. This has been clearly demonstrated in the Balkans, where land forces have had to conduct combat, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations simultaneously on adjacent streets.¹¹

Conflict will increasingly occur in an environment in which combatants and non-combatants will be in close proximity. This proximity requires greater emphasis on discrimination rather than simply precision. In this regard, land forces are essential given their utility within both open and urban environments and their capability for subtlety, initiative and compassion. Land forces offer the Government considerable utility across the spectrum of conflict.

Land forces are the only forces that have the capacity to capture, occupy and hold terrain, and maintain a continuous presence. They can also help prevent conflict, stabilise collapsing societies, and provide enduring influence in ensuring peace. The most likely and foreseeable contingencies that might involve Australia in the near future would necessarily and predominantly require land forces. This requirement is reflected in the number of short-notice Military Response Options that would entail land force involvement and is demonstrated by the Government's recent decision to increase the proportion of the Army held at higher preparedness.

The deployment of land forces provides a clear and unambiguous message, clearly indicating Australia's strength of commitment. If required to contribute to a coalition to assure regional security, the deployment of land forces sends a clear

¹¹ John A. English and Bruce I. Gudmundsson, *On Infantry*, rev. ed., Praeger, Westport, 1994, p. vii.

signal of resolve and determination, and increases Australia's role in influencing post-conflict issues. The range of capabilities embodied within land forces means that the Army is able to offer considerable support to the Australian community in the event of natural disasters such as bushfires and floods. The Army also provides important contributions to Australia's ability to resolve terrorist incidents.

Credible land forces serve another, more subtle purpose: contributing to national security. Their existence and visibility are a reminder to potential adversaries and regional neighbours and allies of the nation's ability to defend itself against a range of threats; they also provide a tangible means of support to diplomacy. This latter effect is particularly marked in Australia's immediate region.

WHAT IS REQUIRED OF THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY TODAY?

The Government's 1997 foreign policy and strategic policy documents, *In the National Interest* and *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997* reflect an outward-looking approach and close integration of defence and foreign policies.¹² These two documents changed the focus of Australia's defence policy from defence of the continent and its approaches to a more outward-looking maritime–littoral focus.

¹² Commonwealth of Australia, *In the National Interest*, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 1997. Department of Defence, *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997*, Directorate of Publishing and Visual Communications, Canberra, December 1997.

To meet the strategic demands presented by Government policy, the Defence Organisation has to strike a balance across a range of separate but complementary considerations. These involve: *providing* combat-ready forces to deter and, if necessary, defeat attacks on Australia and its interests, should such threats emerge; *conducting* military support operations to protect Australia's national interests in circumstances short of war that can occur with little warning; and *shaping* Australia's strategic environment to minimise threats to Australia and its interests.

The Army functions within the context set by a combination of the enduring features of Australia's strategic environment; extant strategic guidance; the emerging military strategies; and an array of Military Response Options. As part of the Australian Defence Force, the Army has an integral role to play in support of Australia's military strategies. The Chief of the Defence Force has stated that the current strategic circumstances dictate the adoption of new approaches to the Army's force structuring. It is important to emphasise that, while changes in strategic circumstances can be very rapid, and unforeseen; and adjustments to preparedness can be achieved reasonably quickly given adequate resources, fundamental changes to doctrine and force structure take many years. The maintenance and management of land force capabilities is a long-term process; new skills take time to grow; equipment procurement can take more than seven years; and some major equipment fleets have a life extending to forty years.

Army's Role in a Maritime Concept of Strategy

Australia's military strategy is now based on a maritime concept, which is a strategic preference to achieve decisions in the maritime environment. The intention is to shape Australia's

strategic environment by working cooperatively with regional states to prevent threats arising or, when they do arise, to deal with them at a distance from Australia in the maritime approaches. These approaches are through the archipelago to Australia's north and encompass the 'littoral' environment in which the operational domains of sea, land and air merge. The maritime concept determines the Australian Defence Force's force structure.

The Army has an integral role in supporting Australia's military strategy.¹³ That role involves contributing to joint and coalition manoeuvre operations in a littoral environment, conducting protective and security operations throughout Australia, and contributing to coalition operations further afield.

In order to provide the Government with a range of options that it requires to pursue Australia's strategic policy, the Army must provide prepared land forces that are able to contribute to an array of tasks. These tasks are necessarily joint and may be coalition in nature. The Army seeks to ensure its effectiveness across the breadth of these tasks within the finite resources allocated to it. The Army's tasks, which embrace peacetime, peacekeeping and wartime tasks, are outlined below.¹⁴

¹³ For an excellent discussion on the place of the Army in an integrated maritime strategy, see Michael Evans, *The Role of the Army in a Maritime Concept of Strategy*, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Working Paper no. 101, September 1998.

¹⁴ The Chief of the Defence Force, in the Department of Defence Submission to the Joint Parliamentary Inquiry, indicated that Army needed to be able to provide the maximum possible combat capability across a wide range of Military Response Options and listed the following indicative tasks:

- to seize and protect forward operating bases;
- to eject an adversary from forward operating bases;

Manoeuvre Operations in a Littoral Environment. The Army must provide land forces that are able to:

- assist in developing strong relations with and between allies and regional neighbours in order to shape the regional strategic environment;
- optimise interoperability with the United States and New Zealand, and enhance interoperability with other regional countries;
- contribute to surveillance and intelligence gathering operations;
- contribute to strike or denial operations;
- help monitor and contribute to controlling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Asia-Pacific region, and more widely as necessary; and

-
- to participate in coalition warfare to support regional security;
 - to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance operations;
 - to conduct special operations; to conduct special recovery, counter-terrorist and combat search and rescue operations;
 - to provide service-assisted and service-protected evacuations;
 - to provide command, control and communications;
 - to provide operational-level sustainment of land-based operations; and
 - to provide humanitarian assistance.

These tasks represent a selection of discrete operational tasks related to particular contingencies.

- assist in the evacuation of Australian nationals from hostile or crisis environments within the Asia-Pacific region, and more widely as necessary.

Protective and Security Operations on Australian Territory.

The Army must provide land forces that are able to:

- contribute to the protection of Australia's offshore territories and resources;
- contribute to the defeat of military incursions into mainland Australia;
- protect centres of population, industry and Defence infrastructure throughout Australia from attack;
- contribute to an expansion and mobilisation capacity to counter a major and sustained threat to Australia;
- assist the Australian community during civil emergencies; and
- assist the civil authorities in protecting the Australian community from acts of violence or lawlessness, particularly terrorism.

Contributing to Coalition Operations Worldwide. The Army must provide land forces that are able to:

- contribute to United Nations and multinational humanitarian, disaster relief, peace, counter-weapons of mass destruction, and peace enforcement operations; and

- assist in maintaining strong relations with Australia's allies and historical partners in order to shape the strategic environment.

The Preparedness Requirement

The implementation of the Government's revised strategic policy has taken place against the background of economic crisis in the Asia-Pacific region and declining political stability in Indonesia and East Timor.¹⁵ By February 1999, these events had persuaded the Australian Government to expand the Ready Deployment Force to two brigades. These measures represented the most significant level of force preparedness by the Army since the end of the Vietnam War.

The Army preparedness requirement is defined in the Chief of Defence Force Preparedness Directive (a highly classified document) and embraces the following.¹⁶

- a Ready Deployment Force comprising a Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, two brigades with a mix of combat capabilities, a parachute battalion group, a logistic support force, and special operations elements, all at various degrees

¹⁵ The launch of *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997* coincided with the Asian Financial Crisis. It was assessed in *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997* that regional countries would continue to modernise their air and maritime capabilities. However, as events have unfolded, regional countries have restructured their land force capabilities. Regionally, there is no increased threat in the maritime environment. Rather, there is regional instability, which has the potential to increase the demand for Australian land force operations such as peacekeeping, provision of humanitarian aid and services, protected evacuations.

¹⁶ Chief of Defence Force Preparedness Directive 1998 (CPD 98), Amendment List 1 (AL1), dated 15 February 1999.

of higher readiness for a wide range of military tasks. These forces are made up of predominantly full-time units and involve approximately 70 per cent of the full-time Army Combat Force;

- sustainment periods that are matched to various contingencies;
- a follow-on force, comprising the integrated 7th Task Force, at medium readiness; and
- lower-readiness formations devoted and limited to the maintenance of core skills and professional standards.

The complexity and uncertainty of the regional strategic environment dictate that the Australian Defence Force must be capable of undertaking concurrent operational deployments involving significant land forces. This has imposed a demand on the Army that militates against the adoption of risk management solutions such as those employed in more benign circumstances when the Ready Deployment Force was smaller (simplistically characterised as the ‘basket of options’ strategic approach).

Strategic uncertainties and concomitant preparedness requirements suggest that the Army’s force structure should be designed to provide the maximum possible combat capability across a wide range of Military Response Options. Combat forces (both Ready Deployment Force and Latent Combat Force) should be maintained at appropriate levels of readiness and the Enabling Component should possess sufficient surge capacity to meet short-notice shifts in demand prompted by changes in the strategic environment.

All components of the Army should be able to contribute to the preparedness solution. All individuals should meet Army

Individual Readiness Notice requirements so that they can deploy on operations. The Ready Deployment Force must be backed up by individual reinforcement and individual and collective rotation elements at appropriate readiness levels and with suitable mobilisation processes.

The approach reflected in the Army Model is prompting changes to the traditional concepts of full and part-time service, a reconsideration of the roles and tasks to be performed by the two components, corresponding adjustments to resource requirements, and the design of effective and efficient mobilisation processes. The Army Model confirms the need for a 'total force' comprising full and part-time components, but one that is suited to contemporary and anticipated future requirements.

CAN THESE REQUIREMENTS BE MET BY THE ARMY- IN-BEING?

The Australian Army was formed from various colonial militias at Federation; since then it has evolved continuously to meet the demands of changing strategic circumstances, contemporary government direction and the constraints of available resources.¹⁷ Today's Army reflects this heritage of over a century of conflict, and it remains a force in evolution as well as a force-in-being. The Army has a history of success in meeting the challenges of both warfighting and military support operations. It is justifiably proud of that tradition and is confident of its place as one of the leading armies of the world,

¹⁷ See, for example, Peter Dennis, Jeffrey Grey, Ewan Morris and Robin Prior, *The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1995.

weight for weight. However, current excellence, while essential, is not enough: Australia's strategic circumstances have changed dramatically in recent times; and it is imperative that the Army measure itself—and is measured by others—against a more demanding strategic environment.

The basis of future Army development is today's Army-in-being. It is not possible to start with a 'clean sheet of paper' and it is inevitable, and indeed sensible, that the Army of the future include many legacies of the Army-in-being and its heritage. The current Army structure is the product of the political, strategic and resource imperatives of the 1980s and early 1990s. Annex A provides a detailed overview of the political, strategic and resource imperatives since the 1980s that have led to the current assessment of the Army's capability.

The 1987 Defence White Paper introduced the military strategy of self-reliance based on a layered defence-in-depth and the concepts of low-level, escalated low-level and more substantial conflict.¹⁸ The Army's role was defined as the defence of northern Australia against credible low-level contingencies and the provision of defensive depth on land should an enemy penetrate Australia's maritime approaches.¹⁹

In the early 1990s the Army planned against a background of two important factors. The first was the growing influence of joint-service doctrine. The second factor was the need for further restructuring for low-level land force operations in the defence of Australia. Both the doctrinal focuses on joint warfare and low-level warfare were reinforced by the strategic guidance

¹⁸ *The Defence of Australia 1987*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1987.

¹⁹ *The Defence of Australia 1987*, pp. vii-x; 24-7.

documents that emerged between 1990 and 1994. These included a force structure review in 1991, two strategic planning reviews between 1990 and 1993 and the publication of another Defence White Paper in 1994.²⁰

The threat that formed the basis of strategic planning and policy was assessed as follows: *'the most likely adversary scenario, which the land force would be required to deal with, would be concurrent operations by a number of special forces teams across northern Australia, possibly supported by terrorist actions in other areas'*.²¹ This threat was derived from what could plausibly 'leak' through the sea-air gap: small 'raider' elements with low combat capability.

Thus, the prevailing strategic guidance during this period postulated *levels of threat* as a force structure determinant. However, strategic circumstances presented a very low (indeed, negligible) probability of this threat materialising. This led to a strategic approach within Defence that exhibited the following features:

- no requirement for preparedness against the possibility of a defence of Australia contingency;

²⁰ Commonwealth of Australia, *Force Structure Review 1991*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1991, *Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1992. *Strategic Review 1993*, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993, *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994.

²¹ *Restructuring the Australian Army*, p. 16. Emphasis added.

- a minimal need for preparedness against the possibilities of a range of offshore contingencies requiring low levels of warfighting capability;
- little commitment to mobilisation and expansion arrangements;
- an emphasis on modernisation through investment (with priority to air and naval forces and constraints on the provisioning of land forces), and major changes to force disposition;
- and, in response to continuing funding constraints:
 - a shift in the balance of the Army with reductions to the full-time component and increasing emphasis on the integration of the full-time and part-time components;
 - erosion of the capacity to sustain the Reserve and low-readiness elements of the full-time component;
 - the adoption of a risk management approach to the maintenance of high-readiness elements;
 - continuing rationalisations and reductions in the support areas relevant to force generation and sustainability;
 - consequential ‘hollowness’ in the Army structure that was ‘acceptable’ (provided it did not breach viability levels) because the preparedness requirement was low, capability warning was long, and the probability of major direct threats to national security was negligible.

The Defence Reform Program and similar reforms over the last decade have been designed to minimise the employment of Defence resources for 'non-core' administrative purposes in order to maximise the combat capability of the Australian Defence Force.²² As a result, increases in combat capability have been at the expense of further reductions in the Enabling Component and the complication of the Army's management arrangements.²³ There is also increasing reliance on the national support base.

The Army experience of this period shows that, although strategic guidance can change rapidly and the preparedness of elements can be changed in a few months, significant changes to force structure will usually take years to mature.

Overall Assessment of Capability

The Army is in transition from one designed primarily for continental defence in benign strategic circumstances, to one suited to the needs of an uncertain future and the proactive maritime strategy required by *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997*. Nonetheless, the Army is capable of meeting the Government's stated needs and, in most likely circumstances, fulfilling the tasks identified by the Chief of the Defence Force. The Army has

²² The Defence Efficiency Review sought to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Defence Organisation. The Defence Reform Program represents a set of 149 specific initiatives that were drawn up in response to the Defence Efficiency Review.

²³ The Defence Reform Program has provided a funding mechanism for the movement of personnel to the combat force in order to accelerate the enhancement of capability. During the period 1998 to 2002 a total of \$532m will be reinvested from the Defence Reform Program towards enhancing Army's capability.

lifted readiness levels significantly and can now offer the Government a comprehensive range of force options. For example, the Army could meet the following requirements concurrently: a peacekeeping operation involving a brigade for several months, a short-term Services-protected evacuation operation and a counter-terrorist operation.

While the range of options is now much greater, there remain significant capability limitations in critical areas if the Army were required to engage a modern combat-capable adversary. The Army presently has some capability for warfighting in a medium to high-threat environment. Australia would be able to offer a brigade-sized contingent for a warfighting contingency in a coalition setting, but with considerable risk, and it is likely that the contingent would be deficient in aspects of firepower, manoeuvre and force protection. Examples of areas that suffer capability limitations include ground-based air defence systems; rotary wing assets and indirect firepower assets; and nuclear, chemical and biological defences.

Sustaining this level of commitment over time would be problematic. In general, the Army is too small and inadequately structured to conduct sustained close-combat operations in a modern battlespace. To achieve the increased readiness levels, the Army has had to move personnel and other resources from the Latent Combat Force to the Ready Deployment Force. It has also had to deplete the Enabling Component. As a result, the ability of the Army to sustain significant operations beyond a single short deployment will remain constrained until the deficiencies that have arisen in the Latent Combat Force and Enabling Component are remedied. Even with remediation, there would be limitations on the ability to rotate any significant deployed force during a prolonged commitment, including for military support operations. Should land forces be committed to

a protracted contingency, simultaneous mobilisation would be necessary, including the fast-tracking of materiel procurement. The demand for additional personnel would present particular difficulties. In a highly competitive employment market, it is unlikely that reliance on voluntary enlistment of personnel would suffice.²⁴

The Army can meet current readiness requirements with limitations and risks. The ability to sustain operations is highly dependent on the circumstances prevailing at the time.

THE CONDITION OF THE ARMY-IN-BEING

Key Capability Functions

Any assessment of the condition of the Army-in-being to conduct and sustain land force operations should be done in relation to four key functions of military capability: force generation, deployment and recovery, combat operations, and sustainability.

Force Generation

The capacity for force generation is sufficient for routine peacetime requirements. Rationalisations over the past decade have reduced the Army and supporting enabling elements to the extent that their capacity to support short-notice surge requirements has effectively been removed. For example, it is assessed that Training Command—Army will have difficulty

²⁴ During the conflict in South Vietnam, sustaining a task force of 6500 required a standing full-time Army of some 46 000 personnel which could only be supported by a National Service Scheme.

meeting all the potential individual training requirements necessary to sustain the enhanced Ready Deployment Force, remediate the personnel shortfalls in the lower-readiness formations, and fulfil the additional demands generated by Army support to the Sydney Olympics in 1999 and 2000. The Enabling Component would need to expand to support a large-scale force generation task.

The recent expansion of the Ready Deployment Force was achieved primarily through the redistribution of personnel and equipment from the Latent Combat Force. While this was a significant achievement, it has left the force seriously deficient and unable to repeat the performance. Remediation is essential to restore the Latent Combat Force. In addition, foreign military equipment is not readily procurable at short notice.

Force Deployment and Recovery

- **Movement Planning and Terminal Operations.** Key movement planning and terminal operations capabilities are available within the Australian Defence Force, with some augmentation provided from the national infrastructure. These capabilities are tailored for routine and small-scale deployments, and little redundancy is available. The Army has insufficient capacity to operate unilaterally a large point-of-entry offshore.
- **Strategic Lift.** The Ready Deployment Force is reliant on platforms of the Royal Australian Navy and Royal Australian Air Force for strategic mobility. The available lift capability presents a range of constraints on operational planning. Strategic lift capabilities will be improved when the Landing Platform Amphibious vessels and C130J aircraft enter service.

There will continue to be some reliance, however, on civilian assets. This is considered appropriate, provided availability is assured.

Combat Operations

- **Warfighting.** The Army has made advances in improving specific areas such as land force mobility. At the same time, it must be understood that the Army does not presently have the full range of capabilities it would need to be confident of successful operations in mid to high-intensity conflict. In a coalition setting, some or all of these capability gaps would have to be made up by coalition partners. It should be recognised, however, that within the Asia-Pacific region, only the United States is likely to have the range and depth of capabilities necessary to provide this level of support to Australia. If Australia were to lead a regional coalition, these deficiencies might not be offset.
- **Army Capability Outputs.** The Army contributes to a number of Defence Outputs²⁵ and is responsible for generating land forces for ten Army Capability Outputs. An assessment of these outputs, which are subject to periodic review, provides a more discriminating assessment of the Army's warfighting capability. The classified nature of some of the information on Army's capability outputs limits this assessment to general information on their current state.
- **Capability for Special Forces Operations.** This capability provides forces for a range of special operations tasks such as counter-terrorism, strategic strike, special recovery, and long-range reconnaissance. The Special Air Service Regiment is a

²⁵ There are twenty two Defence Outputs of which the Chief of Army manages four and the Army provides input to a further six.

proficient capability, which is well practised and appropriately resourced. A regular commando unit is being raised but will not be fully operational in the short term. A Reserve component provides an expansion base, albeit one for which legislative constraints limit operational employment opportunities.

- **Capability for Land Task Force Operations.** The capability for land task force operations is the fundamental Australian Army warfighting capability. It comprises several components held at varying levels of preparedness and resourced accordingly. Elements at higher-readiness notice generally have the bulk of their full complement of equipment and personnel in location, whereas lower-readiness elements are usually deficient personnel and rely on pooled equipment for training. Recent actions to expand the Ready Deployment Force have exacerbated the deficiencies in the lower-readiness elements. Deficiencies exist in night vision capability, surveillance, nuclear, biological and chemical defence, logistics and battlefield command, control and support systems. There are also deficiencies in maintenance and health personnel.
- **Capability for Mechanised Operations.** This capability comprises the 1st Brigade and its integral logistic support units. The existing level of capability is credible with regard to military support operations but only marginally competent in terms of conventional mid-intensity tasks. The Brigade is currently undergoing enhancement as part of the expansion of the Ready Deployment Force but this will not redress its deficiencies against warfighting tasks.
- **Capability for Light Infantry Operations.** This capability comprises the 3rd Brigade and the Parachute Battalion Group. It is an air-portable and airmobile

formation with a credible capacity for warfighting at the lower end of the intensity spectrum and for military support operations. Shortages of parachutes and airborne force communications constrain the operations of the airborne capability. Helicopter-borne tactical manoeuvre is constrained by the availability of only a single company-group lift capability.

- **Capability for Motorised Infantry Operations.** This capability is based on the 7th Task Force, an integrated formation of full and part-time personnel. It will be capable of conducting motorised operations for defeating attacks against Australia tasks when mobilised. The Task Force is the best equipped of the Army's Reserve formations to provide the basis for selected mobilisation or preparation of a rotation force; however, not all equipment or resources to maintain this capability at readiness are available. Only a quarter of Reserve personnel of the Task Force meet the requirements of the Army Individual Readiness Notice.
- **Capability for Protective and Security Operations.** This capability is predominantly provided by the Reserve component of the Army, and is focused on providing forces for defeating attacks against Australia. Current low-preparedness levels mean that there is little effectiveness for warfighting. The majority of formations in the 2nd Division are less than 40 per cent Army Individual Readiness Notice compliant.²⁶ The framework exists to

²⁶ This low level of AIRN compliance is a result of recent initiatives to improve medical, dental and physical-fitness, standards. These standards are an essential element of producing a usable Reserve. As well as requiring additional effort from Reservists these measures require the provision of additional resources by the Army. At

provide a 'follow on force' when mobilised. Legislation places considerable limitations on the employment of collective capabilities within the Reserve.

- **Capability for Army Aviation Operations.** The Army aviation capability provides integral airmobility, medium lift, reconnaissance, surveillance and aerial fire support to the land task forces and special operations capabilities. Both special operations (particularly counter-terrorist responses) and the 3rd Brigade rely heavily for tactical mobility on the same company-group lift helicopter capability. The reconnaissance and aerial fire support capabilities have little operational utility in their existing form.
- **Capability for Land Surveillance Operations.** This capability is based upon the Regional Force Surveillance Units, predominantly using Reserve personnel. It is a credible capability that is regionally focused; however, the capability has no operational experience and its surge capacity is constrained by manpower and equipment deficiencies.
- **Capability for Combat Support to Operations.** This capability comprises those elements of combat support that are not integral to other capabilities. It provides important specialist support, particularly construction engineering, topographical, electronic warfare, and intelligence support. Small elements of the capability are held at high readiness to support the Ready Deployment Force.

present, practical limitations are preventing full commitment by both parties.

- **Capability for Logistic Support of Land Operations.** The Logistic Support force includes a range of logistic support units providing supply, transport, repair, health and other functions to Land Operations. Collectively they are capable of supporting a single operation by elements of two task forces deployed in Australia; the force is optimised for continental defence and integration with the local civil infrastructure. The Logistic Support Force has critical personnel deficiencies in some trades and some equipment deficiencies. Elements of the Logistic Support Force are at high readiness to support the Ready Deployment Force.
- **Capability for Ground-based Air Defence.** This capability is an integral component of the Australian Defence Force Air Defence System, and comprises two guided missile batteries providing short-range point and area defence within low and medium-threat scenarios. Elements of this capability are held at high readiness to support the Ready Deployment Force. The life-of-type of the Rapier missile system, originally due to expire in 2000, is to be extended until the identification of a replacement system.

Force Sustainment.

- **Personnel.** There is limited surge capacity for individual reinforcement in the Enabling Component as well as shortfalls in the Latent Combat Force. This limitation on capability is aggravated at present by difficulties in recruiting and retaining personnel in the current economic circumstances, and the general unavailability of Reserves for operational deployment.
- **Materiel.** Resource allocations are sufficient to sustain the high-readiness operating requirements (including the

maintenance of the expanded Ready Deployment Force), but at the expense of lower-readiness elements, equipment pools and reserve stocks (which have been broached). Only part of the additional stocks required to sustain a deployed Ready Deployment Force will be able to be established within available resources. This has increased risk if, for example, significant mechanised and ground-based air defence assets were required. The viability of Latent Combat Force elements will be undermined if timely remediation does not occur. The procurement of replacement military equipment beyond attrition stockholdings is dependent on the availability of foreign-sourced military equipment and commercially available Australian equipment of lesser specification (commercial-off-the-shelf).

- **Lines of Communication.** The Australian Defence Force has little capability to maintain lines of communication to forces deployed offshore. There is increasing reliance on the national and international support base for this purpose.

The Components of Capability (POSTED)

The Army's capability is an amalgam of a number of contributing components: personnel, organisation, support and facilities, training, equipment and doctrine. Together, the components of capability—POSTED—provide the template against which the Army's physical requirements for fighting power can be checked and assessed.²⁷ A brief summary of the condition of the Army, in terms of these components, is as follows:

²⁷ *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, Doctrine Wing, Combined Arms Training and Development Centre, 1999, p. 2-10, p. 5-13.

- **Personnel.** Soldiers are the core of Army capability. They are central to the Army's operations in peace and war. The quality of the Army's personnel remains high, and adherence to Army's ethos and values remains sound.
- A more direct focus on operational capabilities and better management of personnel, through initiatives such as the Defence Safety Arrangement framework, are welcomed throughout the Army. Nevertheless, attracting and retaining the high-quality people we need to staff the Army is becoming more difficult in a buoyant economic climate. At present, recruitment and retention trends are negative.
- As of June 1999, the strength of the Australian Regular Army was 23 888. This comprised the fully trained force of 22 152 personnel, with the remaining 1736 undergoing training. The post-Defence Reform Program target strength is 23 000.
- Current trends indicate a steady decline in the number of trained personnel from just over 24 000 in January 1997 to just fewer than 22 000 in March 1999. This trend is a result of decreasing levels of recruitment and increases in the number of separations, but it should be viewed in the context of Defence Reform Program-related downsizing. Nonetheless, rising separation rates are a cause of growing concern with the 12-month rolling average slightly above the 15-year average.
- Recruitment trends for officer ranks remain close to desired levels, but there is concern that continued recruitment of high-quality officer candidates will become increasingly difficult over time. The level of recruitment for the non-officer ranks is more serious, with only 82 per cent of the

target achieved. Concerns exist over the ability to improve recruitment as a stronger economy causes greater competition for the employment of quality personnel.

- General Reserve strengths are also falling. This decline is a long-term trend. Numbers have fallen from 27 000 (nominally) in January 1991 to fewer than 20 000 in June 1999. General Reserves are also experiencing declines in recruitment levels and increases in discharges. Among a range of contributing factors, it is noteworthy that an ongoing drive for greater efficiency in the workforce discourages employers (both private and public sectors) from allowing employees to serve in the Reserve.
- **Organisation and Management.** The Army is experiencing organisational turbulence as it adjusts to changes in strategic policy and responds to efficiency imperatives. The principal vehicle for this change is the development of the post-Defence Reform Program Army force structure. Until this structure is finalised, Army management will be complicated by significant asset-liability gaps carried over from the pre-Defence Reform Program entitlements. Nevertheless, the Army's organisational structure is flexible and able to fulfil a broad range of disparate and complex tasks in support of the Government's requirements. The Army also has the capability to regroup its organisations to meet the specific requirements of each task. Peacetime structures aim at sensible groupings that provide training efficiencies, mindful that organisations that are likely to fight together should train together.

The current Army combat force structure is notable for the number of capabilities resident in single units and formations. The armoured, armoured reconnaissance, air defence artillery,

mechanised infantry, utility helicopter and parachute capabilities are examples of single-unit entities. The nascent motorised infantry capability is found only in 7th Task Force. While this feature of singularity is appropriate given Australia's strategic environment and likely operational requirements, the implication is that Army is constrained in terms of possible force options, redundancy and sustainability.

- **Support and Facilities.** Support is one of the key focus areas for Defence efficiencies. The earlier comments concerning force generation, deployment and recovery, and sustainability provide an overview of this component of capability. In addition, it should be noted that the past decade has been characterised by continuing logistic funding shortfalls that have degraded sustainability and overall support capacity and standards. The recent Australian National Audit Office Report on the condition of the Army's General Service Vehicle Fleets provides an example of the effects of this funding constraint.

The characterisation of support functions as 'blunt' has had the unfortunate effect of denying important modernisation initiatives, particularly in logistics information management systems, necessary to facilitate improved support management. These capabilities provide the Australian Defence Force with the indispensable sinews of war and their capabilities need to be held in balance with those for combat and combat support.

The standard of facilities is mixed but improving, and the rationalisation of assets in support of Army continues. The focus of facilities development in the last five years has been the provision of assets for the accommodation and training of the Ready Deployment Force land components in Darwin and Townsville. Robertson Barracks in Darwin is nearing

completion and the redevelopment of Lavarack Barracks in Townsville is commencing. The training areas for each northern region have been expanded, and following the completion of planned acquisitions in the Northern Territory, will meet the Army's requirements.

- **Training.** Individual training remains of a very high standard. The adoption of common standards and competencies across both full and part-time components is progressing. The Army's individual training is innovative and world's best practice, with the use of distributed learning being increased through all stages of career progression. The capacity for training supports peacetime steady states, but with little surge available. Any surge requirement would impact significantly on the provision of logistic support and the specialist courses that follow recruit training.

Collective training in the Combat Force is conducted primarily along traditional lines; although advanced simulation techniques are being introduced progressively. The planned introduction of a fully instrumented Combat Training Centre will be a major undertaking in the next few years. Collective training resources are allocated in accordance with preparedness priorities.

- **Equipment.** Army equipment is an eclectic mix. Some is new and world-class. Examples in this category include the new light armoured fighting vehicles, new command support system, small arms, communications, and night vision equipment, all of which are highly capable. Additional improvements are planned across a range of capabilities. However, many major items of equipment are aging and obsolescent or have increasing costs of ownership, for example artillery and mortars, air defence equipment, the

General Service vehicle fleet and aerial fire support. It is noteworthy that most major items of Army equipment are maintained in service over extended periods, up to forty years, and therefore require upgrades to retain their utility.

While generalisations can be misleading, equipment holdings and condition, as well as the availability of materiel stocks, are a significant limitation on the force generation and sustainment functions. Selection, acquisition and support of equipment are critical to the capability management process. In the past decade, limitations on materiel support and the availability of technical personnel have degraded fleet condition, particularly in the lower-readiness formations; and this has therefore impacted on capability sustainment.

- **Doctrine.** The Army is a large, diverse and complex organisation, the component parts of which are highly interactive and mutually reliant. The structure and interaction of Army's components are guided by Army's doctrine.²⁸ Good doctrine is an essential foundation of an effective fighting force and represents a substantial portion of Army's intellectual property. Doctrine evolves in response to changes in political, strategic, economic, environmental, societal and technological circumstances. It allows the development of concepts for operations and guides the adoption of new technology, tactics, techniques and procedures. Army's doctrinal publications present the basic principles and procedures governing how the Army goes about fulfilling its mission in a manner which can be disseminated down to the individual soldiers who need to know them. Having doctrine

²⁸ Doctrine is a set of principles describing how the Army will support the attainment of national objectives, particularly through the conduct of land operations.

to knit the components of capability together is critical to maximising the Army's operational effectiveness.

The Army recognises three levels of doctrine:

- **Philosophical.** This level of doctrine explains fundamental principles of military operations in a joint environment. Philosophical doctrine therefore envisages joint (or tri-service) operations as well as Army single-Service activities.
- **Application.** The application level of doctrine explains how philosophical principles are applied practically.
- **Procedural.** This level of doctrine includes minor tactics, techniques and procedures and provides sufficient detail to ensure effectiveness and interoperability.

The production of an integrated and complete set of doctrine is a major undertaking. Army is presently reviewing its doctrine to embrace a maritime strategy so that it remains relevant to the nation's security needs and aligned with Government's strategic policy. *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare* is the first product of this work. The review of the entirety of Army's doctrine, which necessarily flows from the production of *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, will take several years to complete.

The Army Reserve

Australia's Reserve forces have contributed to every warfighting and military support operation Australia has undertaken, including those since the end of the Vietnam War. There are fewer than 20 000 Australians who are currently active members

of the Army Reserve, which is a regionally distributed, part-time component of the Australian Army.²⁹

The Army Reserve comprises a large number of people who wish to make a productive contribution to Australia's national security and are dedicated to service in the Army. Most Reservists must balance the requirements of primary employers, families and the demands of Army service. That they achieve this balance is testimony to their commitment.

The Army Reserve is currently structured to provide a mobilisation and expansion base against the possibility of major attack on Australia.³⁰ The legislation that affects Reserve service, including the *Defence Act 1903* and Australian Industrial Relations Law, places considerable restraints on the employment of the Reserve for operations other than defeating attacks against Australia.³¹ Some small specialist elements have been employed as volunteers on operational deployments, but the vast majority of Reservists have not been available. As a result, the Reserve component has attracted a low priority for resource allocations

²⁹ The Army Reserve is by far the largest Reserve component, representing approximately 80 per cent of Australian Defence Force Reserve personnel.

³⁰ There are now two reasons to suggest that an exclusively or predominantly mobilisation and expansion rationale is no longer sufficient: turbulence in Australia's strategic environment and changes in Australia's management of strategic risk. Both are making the Australian Defence Force increasingly reliant on the Reserve component.

³¹ In addition, at present Section 118A of the *Defence Act 1903* prohibits employer discrimination against Reservists but the penalties are inadequate. Current legislation is inadequate in giving Reserves unequivocal assurance that their employment would not be lost because of a commitment to Reserve training.

compared with higher-preparedness elements. This has been barely sufficient to maintain viability levels; it has thus prompted questions concerning the relevance of the Army Reserve to the Australian Defence Force.

Current legislative limitations on the reliable availability of the Reserve component severely restricts the degree to which they can be depended upon to support the conduct, sustainment and surging of operations, especially concurrent operations. Unless Australia is directly threatened, Reservists are only available to the Australian Defence Force on an individual, volunteer basis. When availability is uncertain, funding is minimised; to do otherwise would be wasteful. This leads to doubts regarding competency, undermining the apparent utility of the Reserve component. A vicious cycle, driven by availability, is created. Today's low-availability, limited-competency Army Reserve is the result.

The Army Reserve has been the subject of many reviews over the past twenty five years, all aimed at improving the capability and utility of the component.³² All have assumed the predominance of the mobilisation and expansion focus in Reserve service and attempted to find measures that could sustain this approach in the face of changing strategic, economic, demographic, industrial and social circumstances. The outcome has been the evolution of a Reserve that provides minimal (very latent) collective capability. However, its existence as a source

³² See, for example, *The Australian Defence Force Reserves*, Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, November 1991. The implementation of previous Reserve studies has routinely foundered on a lack of consideration of the political dimension. The result has generally been inertia, particularly whenever legislative changes have been central to recommendations to enhance Reserve capability.

of personnel and equipment was central to the success of the recent preparedness enhancement.

The manpower and other resource constraints now applying to the full-time component of the Army make the enhanced availability of Reserves critical to the provision of credible military responses. The Reserve structure and capabilities are needed both to supplement and to complement the full time component of the Army; and to provide a base from which individual reinforcements and individual and collective rotation elements may be drawn. This may involve changes to roles and tasks for some Reserve units.

Legislative changes are needed to support the Army Reserve so that this component can play a full part in enabling the Army to better provide land force elements across the required range of Military Response Options. The introduction of legislation would dramatically raise the contribution that Reservists feel that they are able to make to the defence of Australia.³³

WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

The Nature of future Conflict

There are two major influences that will impact on the nature of future conflict: trends in the international system and continuing advances in both civil and military technology. The significant drivers of change within the international system that are likely

³³ Any legislative amendments to support the Reserve would require the Government to conduct complex and contentious negotiations with employer groups, unions, the Australian Defence Force and Reservists themselves.

to continue to influence land warfare are globalisation, demographic shifts, environmental change, international political cohesion, alliances and alignments, access to knowledge, and public perceptions and attitudes. Technological developments, while not providing a solution to future conflict, are enhancing the speed, range, stealth, precision, lethality and flexibility of weapons and equipment.

The future threat environment is difficult to predict. The prevailing view from Australia's strategic guidance, and confirmed by regional developments since the release of *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997*, is that the future security environment will be characterised by uncertainty and will therefore become more complex, ambiguous and unpredictable.³⁴ However, the fundamental causes of conflict remain enduring. They are largely based on emotion—fear, greed, hatred and ambition—coupled with political, economic, religious ethnic, nationalistic and environmental interests. The fundamental character of war will also remain unchanged.³⁵

Defence utilises strategic assessments and future warfare concepts as the basis for identifying future conflict trends and challenges. The assessment is that the following two generic threat environments provide a useful basis for the future capability development of the Australian Defence Force:

- **Low–medium technology massed conventional forces, with the possibility of inserts of high technology.** This view is predicated on the continued trend of nations equipping themselves with as many advanced and high-technology

³⁴ Paul Dibb, *The Remaking of Asia's Geopolitics*, Working Paper no. 324, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, April 1998.

³⁵ *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, op. cit.*, chap. 2.

weapons and equipment as they can afford. Consequently, at a time of considerable geo-political readjustment, there will continue to be a risk of major regional conflict, and more remotely the possibility of general war, between similarly equipped and trained forces. This ‘symmetric’ form of conflict—the defeat of an adversary with similar capabilities to us—is a demanding benchmark requiring well-trained, well-equipped professional armed forces, long-term planning and continuous modernisation.³⁶

- **Low-technology, irregular forces, with the possibility of insertions of high technology, perhaps incorporating asymmetric threats against Australia’s national interests and civil society.** This view identifies a threat from states and non-state bodies that ignore accepted rules of armed conflict and resort to different methods such as terrorist or criminal acts to achieve their purposes. These adversaries differ from us in size, capability, sophistication, perceptions, values and motivation, and will seek to exploit our weaknesses. As the trend towards more expensive high-technology equipment increases, asymmetric threats will assume greater significance.³⁷ Asymmetric threats require an understanding

³⁶ There are numerous articles that examine this generic threat environment. See, for example, Mackubin Owens, ‘Technology, the RMA, and future War’, *Strategic Review*, vol. XXVI, no. 2, Spring, 1998, pp. 63–70. See also the discussions in Paul Dibb, ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs and Asian Security’, *Survival*, vol. 39, no. 4, Winter 1997–98, p. 95; Paul Dibb, ‘Defence Force Modernisation in Asia: Toward 2000 and Beyond’, *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, vol. 18, no. 4, March 1997, pp. 347–60; Paul Dibb, ‘The relevance of the Knowledge Edge’, *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 134, January/February 1999.

³⁷ Several analysts have highlighted the growing symmetrical nature of conflict and emphasised the concern that the employment of

of the characteristics, intent and mode of operations of likely irregular force threats in order to develop and maintain the capabilities we need to defeat them.³⁸ In particular this requires greater emphasis on establishing conditions of domestic security, given the likelihood of asymmetric threats occurring on Australian sovereign territory.

These two views provide the threat extremes that the Australian Defence Force must be able to defeat. However, they are not mutually exclusive, and it is likely that future conflict will be an amalgam of both, whereby the adversary seeks to avoid our strengths and exploit our weaknesses. Additionally, the increasing trend for the international community to involve itself in the internal workings of other countries to resolve internal crises adds further complexity to the range of capabilities required. Future conflict is therefore likely to be multifaceted, prolonged and often linked to broader international issues. Consequently, the Australian Defence Force must remain a balanced force able to field a range of capabilities needed to seize the initiative and defeat the adversary.

While the fundamental nature of war will not change, the Australian Army will need to exploit information-age technologies to create knowledge-based organisations. This

asymmetric warfare will enable potential adversaries to challenge more technically advanced militaries. See Lawrence Freedman, 'The Changing Forms of Military Conflict', *Survival*, vol. 40, no. 4, Winter 1998–99, pp. 39–56. See also Lawrence Freedman, *The Revolution in Strategic Affairs*, Adelphi Paper 318, Oxford University Press for the IISS, Oxford, 1998; David Tucker, 'Fighting Barbarians', *Parameters*, vol. 28, no. 2, Summer 1998, p. 70.

³⁸ Christopher Bellamy, *Spiral Through Time: Beyond 'Conflict Intensity'*, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, The Occasional No. 35, August 1998.

exploitation will involve the continued development of dynamic warfighting concepts that take full account of Australia's unique strategic circumstances.

The Australian Army's Approach to Modernisation

The Chief of the Defence Force has stated that the current strategic circumstances dictate the adoption of new approaches to the Army's force structuring.³⁹ In this context, it is useful to stress that fundamental changes to doctrine and force structure take many years, while changes in strategic circumstances can be very rapid and unforeseen and adjustments to preparedness can be achieved reasonably quickly given adequate resources.

Typically, it takes a decade to identify the need for, and introduce into service, a major platform. Development of professional mastery in the operation of a major platform may take even longer. Some major equipment fleets have a life extending to forty years. Consequently, the Army requires the capacity to identify its major capability requirements well in advance. It also requires adaptive and flexible capabilities that can be employed for an extended period.

In the light of the deficiencies identified in the current Army, and to ensure that future trends affecting the Army's capability requirements are considered and incorporated in the major Defence planning processes, the Army has moved from a platform replacement focus to a concept-led approach to capability development. This approach is aimed at transforming the Army from one that was designed in the Industrial Age to

³⁹ Admiral C.A. Barrie, *Defence Submission to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade*, 2 July 1999, p. 6.

one that is suited to the demands and possibilities inherent in the Information Age. It uses warfighting concepts to identify how the Army intends to fight in the future, thereby providing a framework to coordinate the convergence of force development with doctrine and training.

The vision for Army modernisation is that it will be evolutionary, utilising the concept-led approach for achieving the knowledge edge and maximising the utility of emerging military technologies. This means that the Army-in-being, while possessing the capabilities required by Government, must also evolve continuously towards a force construct appropriate to anticipated future needs—the Enhanced Combat Force. This transition will be through a process of continuous improvement and modernisation.

The rapid rate of technological change necessitates that the Army attains a capability to evaluate new operating procedures and technologies, prior to the purchase of assets and infrastructure. A solution is seen in the establishment of sufficiently realistic evaluation processes, based on rigorous wargaming and simulation.

The Army has made progress in investing in the infrastructure to enable the implementation of its new modernisation processes. The Army Management Framework facilitates the achievement of continuous capability enhancement by the implementation of what is referred to as the Army Capability Management System. This implements an iterative process, driven by Defence Outputs, which is managed to deliver against combat Capability Output Master Plans. The future warfighting concepts central to this program are delivered in the Army Continuous Modernisation Plan and will be expressed in forthcoming doctrinal publications.

The Revolution in Military Affairs is a result of the convergence of key enabling technologies and is changing the business of warfighting.⁴⁰ Consequently, the Army is faced not only with a changing geo-strategic situation, but also with changes in core business practices, many of which are heavily technology-dependent. The current geo-strategic environment and Government policy require the Army to be able to operate offshore, with rapidly deployable and retrievable forces, in a potentially high-technology threat environment. These factors place increasing resource burdens across the whole of the Australian Defence Force. A concept that would be relevant for the Australian Army is for an integrated, digitised force, invariably joint, postured for warfighting in a multinational alliance or coalition context, adaptable to other tasks and threats (both symmetric and asymmetric) to afford the maximum utility throughout the spectrum of conflict.

To prevent significant increases in training times, and hence total costs, efficient achievement of different and higher skill levels will necessitate increased exploitation of the latest simulation and training technologies and techniques. Such exploitation will minimise both the support staff and infrastructure required, and

⁴⁰ The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is concerned with the application of the revolution in information processing to military forces. Previous RMAs indicate that the mere acquisition of equipment to possess new technology is insufficient without appropriate tactical and operational doctrines and force structures. While there is no doubt that information warfare has enormous potential and is the key to the RMA, doubts exist due to the problematic issues of integration and the degree of change required. Possibilities range from incremental levels of change and optimisation through radical reform of organisations and doctrine.

also the time invested in individual training and development activities.

Restructuring of the Australian Army

The Army in the 21st Century Review identified the requirement for a versatile force structure that would allow the Army to operate effectively across the spectrum of conflict and provide the means for continuous adaptation.⁴¹ The *Restructuring of the Australian Army 1997* initiative aimed at addressing deficiencies identified by the *Army in the 21st Century Review*.⁴²

The Army in the 21st Century Review was hampered by the failure of the 1994 Defence White Paper⁴³ to consider requirements for land force operations beyond either continental defence against an adversary of rudimentary military competence or offshore operations of a limited nature. Consequently, its core philosophy was based on the assumption that ample time would be available to develop sufficient land combat power from forces designed around a mixture of regular and reserve manpower at every level. This philosophy was logical at the time, but rapidly changing strategic circumstances, and Government's response, rendered it obsolete. As a result of

⁴¹ Australian Army, *An Australian Army for the 21st Century*, Directorate of Army Public Affairs, Canberra, October 1996.

⁴² House of Representatives, Ministerial Statement, 'Defence Policy' by the Hon. Ian McLachlan, AO, MP, Minister for Defence, 15 October 1996. See Department of Defence, *Restructuring the Australian Army*, Directorate of Publishing and Visual Communications, Canberra, 1996.

⁴³ Commonwealth of Australia, *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994.

these deficiencies it was decided in 1997 to start a series of trials of some of the concepts that underpinned *The Army in the 21st Century Review*.⁴⁴

The purpose of these Restructuring the Army trials is to inform decisions on the development of an Army in the next century that is effective, affordable and sustainable. The objectives for the trials cover six critical areas for future capability development. These areas are combat effectiveness, affordability, sustainability, doctrine, simulation, and decision-making systems.

Although the formal trials will be complete by April 2000, *The Restructuring of the Australian Army* Trial has now matured into a process of continuous modernisation. The intention is to develop, and test iteratively, operational concepts that integrate emerging technologies and procedures into land force operations. By 2010 it is intended that, with adequate resources, the Australian Army will be built around a modern high-technology Enhanced Combat Force consisting of highly mobile task forces and units, a Special Operations Group and a Logistic Support Force capable of conducting dispersed, joint and coalition operations. The Enhanced Combat Force will need to continue to develop and evolve to remain abreast of the needs of Government into the future.

The results of the Restructuring of the Australian Army Trials conducted in 1998 suggest that, with some modifications, the task force structure postulated in *Army in the 21st Century Review* provides an appropriate doctrinal model for a fully mobilised Army to meet protective tasks against a low-level

⁴⁴ Australian Army, Office of the Chief of Army, 'Restructuring of the Army Trials Master Plan', 6 June 1998, p. 1.

threat on the Australian continent. However, the majority of the more likely strategic possibilities call for land capabilities that are optimised for offshore deployments, probably in joint and coalition operations, in a littoral environment. Possible structures and concepts for operation for these tasks are being examined as part of the Restructuring the Army process in 1999.

Plans For Exploiting Technology

The Enhanced Combat Force of 2010 will bear many physical similarities to the Army-in-being, primarily because of the significant number of legacy principal equipments that will remain in service. While the Army will introduce some significant new systems that will offer opportunities to adopt new operational paradigms, such opportunities will be few. The introduction of new systems will likely be characterised by the selective use of new technologies that exploit 'quantum shifts' or provide particularly high returns, and the use of commercial solutions. A list of current procurement proposals, and projects with a potential direct impact on Army capability, is at Annex B.

The optimisation of legacy systems will be a significant theme in Army modernisation. Of necessity, some capability enhancement programs will be equipment-based and selective enhancement of existing platforms will occur. However, the utilisation of high pay-off technologies; the selective application of digitisation; the exploitation of innovative ideas, growth paths, and systems integration; and innovations in Army doctrine and organisational concepts can potentially provide low-cost, high-return capability enhancement and will be pursued vigorously.

The Army is mindful that it cannot afford to pursue high-cost, high-technology equipment solutions that promise much but do

not offer a real capability improvement.⁴⁵ The Army must invest in flexible, adaptive options with high growth potential that maximise the capabilities of its personnel.

WHAT ARE THE CRITICAL ISSUES AND HOW ARE THEY BEING ADDRESSED?

From the discussion that has taken place so far, it is possible to list several of the most critical issues confronting the Army and its capacity to conduct and sustain land force operations. These include:

- the limited capacity for warfighting, now and in the future, particularly in components such as firepower, C4ISR (the acronym for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance), and survivability;
- the adequacy of resources and the balances between preparedness and modernisation, and readiness and sustainability;
- the deficiencies in various aspects of sustainability: concerns about the remediation of preparedness donor elements; the logistic support for deployed force elements; the finite operating and reserve stocks of materiel; and mobilisation processes and arrangements;

⁴⁵ Admiral C. A. Barrie, 'Change, People and Australia's Defence Capability for the New Century', *Australian Defence Force Journal*, no. 134, January/February 1999, pp. 1–10.

- the difficulties of recruiting and the retention of personnel in a highly competitive employment market;
- the lack of availability and capability of the Army Reserve; and
- the limited force generation surge capacity of the Enabling Component.

In identifying these critical areas, further comment is required on two specific themes: ‘structured for war—adapted for peace’ and ‘a question of balance’.

‘Structured for War—Adapted for Peace’

The Defence Mission requires the Australian Defence Force to focus its resources and energies primarily on the task of preparing and training for armed conflict. The military strategic framework requires a diverse array of capabilities. Modern warfare has now become so complex, and the international political and economic environment so fluid, that the Australian Defence Force has to develop and maintain a wide range of military capabilities and professional warfighting skills, independently of any immediate military threat.

The focus of land force operations for the Australian Army is—and must remain—the delivery of warfighting capabilities that are world’s best practice. At the same time, preparedness has now become a central theme for the Army. While the Army needs to maintain a base for mobilisation and expansion, it must now devote most of its finite resources to meeting near-term requirements. The Army must, therefore, strike a balance for

land force operations between the immediate, mostly military support operations needs of today, and the potential warfighting possibilities of the future.

The small size of the Australian Army, and the finite resources available to it, require priorities to be assigned that provide the Government with the most appropriate mix of capabilities across the spectrum of conflict relevant to Australia's strategic circumstances. From its warfighting capabilities the Army has been able to adapt to meet the immediate requirements of military support operations. The performance of the Australian Army in these operations over the last fifty years has shown that the self-discipline, adaptiveness, logistic support, and command and control processes that the Army maintains for warfighting have great utility in other environments.

A credible land force, able to fulfil the full range of tasks required, cannot be adequately maintained with only 23 000 Regular personnel in the Army. This level of manning necessitates that:

- Reserves be available for operations, and that some specialist capabilities be maintained only in the Reserve component;
- civilians and contractors be employed whenever feasible and acceptable;
- joint rather than single-Service solutions be adopted where appropriate;⁴⁶ and

⁴⁶ This is intended to cover elements such as individual training, medical, legal, dental and logistic functions.

- military personnel be employed only where military skills and experience are necessary.

‘A Question of Balance’

The generation and sustainment of capability requires investment of capital and resources for operating costs. There is an ongoing conflict of priorities between short-term crisis-warning requirements, with an emphasis on preparedness costs, and the long-term capability-warning requirements, which emphasise capital investment. In reality, there is a range of contingencies over the medium term that might require a balance between these extremes. The most immediate issue that the Army must confront is adapting to the Government’s requirement for increased preparedness. This represents a change in emphasis, not only for the Army, but also for Defence as a whole.

This increase in preparedness levels creates another challenge of balance for the Army. It is possible to continue investment in future capability and, at the same time, maintain high readiness. However, maintaining high readiness without adequate sustainability is a short-term option only—an option that does not appear suitable to Australia’s uncertain strategic environment. All these needs compete for the same resources.

The cost of increasing preparedness is substantial. While readiness can be raised in the short term, sustainment of this effort and longer-term investment will have to be balanced off against each other, unless there is an increase in the current resource allocations for Defence. The Defence Organisation must now ensure that it reaches a new balance between investment and preparedness that meets the immediate needs without cutting off the flow of resources into future capability.

This balance is one that applies across the whole range of Defence outputs, including those to which the Army contributes.

How are the Critical Issues Being Addressed?

Warfighting Capability. The Army has initiated a program of continued modernisation that will marry emergent future land warfare concepts, that are responsive to evolving strategic guidance, with warfighting capabilities being acquired through the Defence investment program. *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare* outlines the broad intent for the future application of land forces. This document is in turn being supported by studies and concept development in the areas of future firepower; command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; force protection; and logistical support. These concepts identify the Army's key requirements and how the land force intends to use and manage such technologies that are intended to be used, and managed by the land force.

While assisting coordination of the Army's modernisation program, these concepts inform the wider Defence Organisation and thus provide the opportunity for synergistic force development. By developing these concepts, the Army is identifying how it intends to meet the challenges posed by rapid advances in technology and ongoing strategic turbulence, while exploiting existing warfighting systems to best effect.

Several acquisition projects have commenced that will help to redress some of the limitations and to equip the force of the future. New equipment must be multi-functional, flexible, compatible with existing systems, and have the potential for technological growth. The central acquisition focus for the

immediate future will be in supporting the soldier in the twenty-four-hour environment; command, control and communication; information acquisition; mobility; firepower; and logistic support. The Army is well advanced in preparing for new night observation and surveillance equipment, the introduction into service of a new range of armoured vehicles, the ongoing development of the Battlefield Command Support System, new armed reconnaissance helicopters, and airborne surveillance systems.

Remediation of Preparedness Donors. In order to provide the Australian Government with a wider range of strategic response options, the Chief of the Defence Force directed in early 1999 that the Army expand the Ready Deployment Force.⁴⁷ This expansion will enable concurrent operations in a range of operational settings and threat environments. The Chief of Army issued a directive to provide strategic direction for the expansion of the Ready Deployment Force.⁴⁸ The raising of the Army's preparedness levels is a fundamental requirement for enhancing Australia's capacity to respond to a range of regional pressures. The Army must be in a position to provide, at short notice, a range of deployable capabilities that are structured, trained and equipped for a broad range of operational environments and threat levels.

Raising the Ready Deployment Force preparedness has required a considerable amount of equipment to be redistributed throughout Army. Equipment in Land Command lower-readiness units and Support Command—Army-managed

⁴⁷ CDF Preparedness Directive 1998 (CPD 98), Amendment List 1 (AL1), dated 15 February 1999.

⁴⁸ CA Directive 5/99, Mobilisation Directive – Expansion of the Ready Deployment Force, dated 27 April 1999.

regional loan pools has been affected most. The Army is currently planning to replace equipment taken from these organisations but the level of replacement is resource-constrained.

Recruiting and Retention. To attract and retain quality personnel in a more competitive environment, it will be essential to ensure that recruitment and employment policies have a sufficiently wide appeal to meet the changing expectations and needs of the Australian workforce. The Army must effectively contribute to the development of personnel policies, particularly those that recognise the unique nature of Army service, and offer remuneration and conditions of service that are commensurate with that contribution. Increasing personnel costs will need to be addressed through personnel management and organisational efficiencies rather than through any diminution in the level of service provided.

The personnel component of the Army's capability will continue to be of crucial importance. It must therefore be a central factor in planning the introduction of all new systems that make up the Army's capability outputs.

Adequate Resources. The funding requirement to meet Defence needs is significantly larger than current Defence allocations, and competition for resources within the Defence Portfolio is strong. The Government strategy of pursuing efficiencies in Defence through the auspices of the Defence Reform Program is releasing funding for redirection to the enhancement of combat capability. Army capability has benefited from this with \$532m being allocated over a five-year period.

However, the costs of remediation of preparedness donors and initiatives to overcome recruiting and retention problems, and funds to offset the increasing costs of capability, are not addressed in this outcome. It is apparent that these critical requirements are not achievable within current resource allocations to Defence. The point has now been reached where it is difficult to see how the full range of military options available to Government can be maintained in a viable, sustainable way with current levels of resource allocations.

Increased Availability of Reserves. The Army is undertaking a comprehensive review of the Army Reserve, and the need for changes in the arrangements pertaining to Reserve availability is manifest. This outcome requires support from Government, including legislative amendments to the *Defence Act 1903* and the development of complementary workplace protection legislation. With such enabling legislation in place, changes to the nature of Reserve service, including to some unit roles and tasks, will be practicable, and the case for adequate resources for Reserve elements can be made more compelling. An important outcome of this initiative should be the redressing of some of the Enabling Component deficiencies discussed in this paper. The Reserves need to be given a mission that is, in the words of the Chief of the Army, ‘relevant, achievable and credible’.⁴⁹

Conclusion

At the end of the war in Vietnam, the Australian Army had to transform itself. This transformation saw it move from a conscript-based, single-Service-focused organisation that relied

⁴⁹ Lieutenant General F. J. Hickling, *Address to the Defence Reserve Association*, Canberra, 15 May 1999.

on larger allies to provide operational-level leadership and logistic support, initially to one postured for self-reliant defence of the Australian continent in benign strategic circumstances, and subsequently to one postured for joint and coalition operations in the Information Age. That transformation demands that the Army meet the challenges posed by the Revolution in Military Affairs, an uncertain strategic environment, and the ongoing needs of self-reliance and joint operations. The Army is still in the transition to one more suited to the needs of an uncertain future and the proactive maritime strategy required by *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997*.

To facilitate these changes, the Army is re-examining the use of land forces as part of the joint warfighting team in operations across the full spectrum of contemporary conflict. The force structure and preparedness priorities for the Army are being carefully defined in the context of high operational and training tempos and the enduring need for resource efficiency. Credible land forces remain critical to the promotion and protection of Australia's security and interests. Future conflict is likely to require greater emphasis on discrimination capabilities of land forces rather than relying simply on the precision delivery of weapons.

All elements of the Army must have roles and tasks that are relevant to Australia's strategic requirements, are achievable with available resources and are credible. The Army must be seen as a key component of the Australian Defence Force's range of capabilities. It must be interoperable with allies, strategically mobile, amphibious-capable, and properly prepared for land force operations.

The Army presently provides the Australian Defence Force with an array of land force capabilities that are able to meet

immediate needs. These capabilities are adequate for peace and support operations, albeit with a constrained ability to sustain a commitment. The Army has lifted readiness levels significantly and can now offer Government a comprehensive range of force options for the types of contingencies likely to arise in the short-term. To achieve this the Army has had to redirect personnel and other resources from the Latent Combat Force and Enabling Component. As a result, the Army would need mobilisation and additional resources to sustain significant operations over an extended period. There are, however, a number of deficiencies in the Army's capacity for warfighting in a medium to high-threat environment.

The strategic shift in *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997* has had significant resource consequences for Defence as a whole. Adequate resources are required if the Army is to play its part in the Australian Defence Force achieving strategic influence, operational impact and tactical success.

A restructured Army Reserve, with adequate resources and with an appropriate role, which is responsive to potential strategic demands, is fundamental to preparing the Army for the future. This will probably require legislative amendments and other forms of support from the Government to encourage wide community support for service in the Reserve.

The Army provides the nation with value for money in terms of the range of military options it can support. However, costs are increasing, and there is little potential for further internal efficiency gains through restructuring and rationalisation. The critical issues raised in this paper will require additional funding, beyond the levels of savings postulated under the Defence Reform Program, if they are to be fully addressed.

Over the past century, the Army has always met the nation's needs in times of crisis, whether in peace or war. Its record of achievement is a source of pride to its members and the nation as a whole. At the end of the 20th century, the modern Army differs markedly from its roots in many aspects, but it continues to honour its traditions and its heritage and it remains committed to its mission, Serving the Nation.

Annexes:

- A. What led to the condition of the Army-in-being? (overview of the political, strategic and resource imperatives since the 1980s that has led to the current assessment of Army's capability)
- B. Procurement Projects and Proposals with an Influence on the Army's Capability

Annex A

WHAT LED TO THE CONDITION OF THE ARMY-IN-BEING?

An overview of the development of strategic guidance and policy since 1987 will assist in understanding why the Army is what it is now.

The Army is a large, diverse and complex organisation, the component parts of which are internally highly reactive and mutually reliant. The structure and interaction of Army's components are guided by Army's doctrine.⁵⁰ The current Army structure is the product of the political, strategic and resource imperatives of the 1980s and early 1990s.

The 1987 Defence White Paper introduced the military strategy of self-reliance based on a layered defence-in-depth and the concepts of low-level, escalated low-level and more substantial conflict.⁵¹ The strategic guidance of the 1987 Defence White Paper confirmed the broad thrust of Army reorganisation and development since 1977.⁵² The Army's role was defined as the defence of northern Australia against credible low-level contingencies and the provision of defensive depth on land should an enemy penetrate Australia's maritime approaches.⁵³

⁵⁰ Doctrine is a set of principles describing how the Army will support the attainment of national objectives, particularly through the conduct of land operations.

⁵¹ *The Defence of Australia 1987*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1987.

⁵² See Paul Dibb, *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, March 1986.

⁵³ *The Defence of Australia 1987*, pp. vii–x, 24–7.

In the early 1990s the Army planned against a background of two important factors. The first was the growing influence of joint-service doctrine. The second factor was the need for further restructuring for low-level land force operations in the defence of Australia. Both the doctrinal focus on joint warfare and low-level warfare were reinforced by the strategic guidance documents that emerged between 1990 and 1994. These included a force structure review in 1991, two strategic planning reviews between 1990 and 1993, and the publication of another Defence White Paper in 1994.⁵⁴

The *Force Structure Review 1991*, which was essentially a resource redistribution exercise driven by budgetary constraints, envisaged an Army of 54 980 with a combat force of 11 000 regulars and 24 200 reserve personnel. The Army was to be based on ten brigades, with an emphasis on independent brigade operations in the north. The 1990 and 1993 strategic reviews continued to focus the Army on low-level conflict.

The threat that formed the basis of strategic planning and policy was assessed as follows: *'the most likely adversary scenario, which the land force would be required to deal with, would be concurrent operations by a number of special forces teams across northern Australia, possibly supported by terrorist*

⁵⁴ Commonwealth of Australia, *Force Structure Review 1991*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1991, *Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1992, *Strategic Review 1993*, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993, *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994.

actions in other areas'.⁵⁵ This threat was derived from what could plausibly 'leak' through the sea-air gap: small 'raider' elements with low combat capability.

The 1994 White Paper, *Defending Australia*, reaffirmed the 1987 strategy of defence in depth, but replaced the 1987 matrix of low-level, escalated low-level and more substantial conflict with the dual terms short-warning conflict and major conflict. The White Paper described short-warning conflict as: '*the types of conflict which could be sustained by capabilities available in the region*]... *The scale and intensity of short warning conflict could range from small raids to larger and protracted operations*'.⁵⁶ It confirmed that the Army's main role remained the defence of northern Australia through surveillance and reconnaissance, protection of assets and infrastructure, and interception and defeat of hostile forces.

The 1994 Defence White paper also announced a reassessment of land force structure and capabilities entitled *The Army in the 21st Century Review*. The Review aimed at examining the number and readiness of infantry units, the benefits of additional ground reconnaissance units, the balance between Regular and Reserve elements and the resource implications required for further change. The review was hampered by the failure of the 1994 White Paper to articulate a vision of the transition from low-level to major conflict based on the scale and duration of the Australian response. Accordingly, guidance appeared to be based on an unrealistic expectation of force expansion. The concept of short-warning conflict therefore had limited

⁵⁵ Department of Defence, *Restructuring the Australian Army*, Directorate of Publishing and Visual Communications, Canberra, 1996, p.16.

⁵⁶ *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*, pp. 23–4 and 48–52.

usefulness for the development of doctrine for operations in the defence of Australia. Short-warning conflict did not reflect the need to define Army's role in a more comprehensive definition of Australian strategic interests which reflected a better interaction of defence with foreign policy.

It is important to note that the prevailing strategic guidance during this period postulated *levels of threat* as a force structure determinant. But strategic circumstances presented a very low (indeed, negligible) probability of this threat materialising. This led to a strategic approach within Defence that exhibited the following features:

- no requirement for preparedness against the possibility of a defence of Australia contingency;
- a minimal need for preparedness against the possibilities of a range of offshore contingencies requiring low levels of warfighting capability;
- little commitment to mobilisation and expansion arrangements;
- an emphasis on modernisation through investment (with priority to air and naval forces and constraints on the provisioning of land forces), and major changes to force disposition;
- and in response to continuing funding constraints:
 - an erosion of the capacity to sustain the Reserve and low-readiness elements of the full-time component;

- the adoption of a risk management approach to the maintenance of high-readiness elements.
- continuing rationalisations and reductions in the support areas relevant to force generation and sustainability; and
- consequential ‘hollowness’ in the Army structure that was ‘acceptable’ (provided it did not breach viability levels) because the preparedness requirement was low, capability warning was long, and the probability of major direct threats to national security negligible.

The Defence Reform Program and similar reforms over the last decade have been designed to minimise the diversion of Defence resources to ‘non-core’ administrative activities, in order to maximise the combat capability of the Australian Defence Force.⁵⁷ As a result, increases in combat capability have been at the expense of further reductions in the Enabling Component and the complication of Army’s management arrangements.⁵⁸ There is also increasing reliance on the national support base. The

⁵⁷ The Defence Efficiency Review sought to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Defence Organisation. See *Future Directions for the Management of Australia’s Defence*, Report of the Defence Efficiency Review, Department of Defence, Canberra, March, 1997. The Defence Reform Program represents a set of 149 specific initiatives that were drawn up in response to the Defence Efficiency Review. See ‘Defence Budget Continues Government Commitment to Boosting the Combat Capabilities of the Defence Force’, Minister for Defence, Media Release, MIN 72/97, p. 3.

⁵⁸ The Defence Reform Program has provided a funding mechanism for the movement of personnel to the combat force in order to accelerate the enhancement of capability. During the period 1998 to 2002 a total of \$532m will be reinvested from the Defence Reform Program towards enhancing Army’s capability.

Defence Reform Program is now impacting on almost every area of Defence activity.

As a result of efforts to adapt to short-warning conflict, the Army was ill prepared for the shifts in Australia's strategic circumstances which have occurred over the last few years and, in particular, the adoption of a more outward-looking approach and the closer integration of defence and foreign policies. This maturing was reflected by the close coordination between the Government's 1997 foreign policy and strategic policy documents, *In the National Interest* and *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997*.⁵⁹

Despite this shift in strategic thinking, the force structure determinant for the Australian Defence Force remained defence of the continent. Consequently, the Army pushed ahead with investigating the main principles and concepts of *The Army in the 21st Century Review* to guide what was now called Restructuring the Army.⁶⁰ In December 1996, a Chief of the General Staff Directive issued procedures for the development of trials based on the concepts of *The Army in the 21st Century Review*.⁶¹ The force structure priority for the Army remained the development of military forces for the defence of the continent on the continent.⁶²

⁵⁹ Commonwealth of Australia, *In the National Interest*, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 1997.

⁶⁰ House of Representatives. Ministerial Statement, 'Defence Policy' by the Hon. Ian McLachlan, AO, MP, Minister for Defence, 15 October 1996, pp. 1–4.

⁶¹ CGS Directive 13/96, 20 December 1996.

⁶² Australian Army, *An Australian Army for the 21st Century*, Directorate of Army Public Affairs, October 1996, pp. 3–4.

Within three years of the release of the 1994 Defence White Paper, the focus of Australia's defence policy changed from defence of the continent and its approaches to a maritime–littoral focus. Since 1997, the Army has been reviewing its core functions, processes and doctrine to reflect the central role that land forces have in Australia's maritime strategy.

In February 1997, in the Army's publication, *Restructuring the Australian Army*, the Minister of Defence announced that the Restructuring the Army plan should be steered in a direction 'to better meet the Government's strategic posture'.⁶³ The Government stated that, while defence of Australia remained a foremost concern, 'the land force must be capable of conducting offshore operations, either unilaterally or as part of a coalition'.⁶⁴

In November 1997 the Government's strategic posture became clearer with the publication of *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997*. The new strategic review began a shift away from the narrow policy of continental defence of Australia towards a broader maritime concept of strategy that recognised the Asia-Pacific region as being central to Australian security.

Although this maritime concept of strategy envisaged the use of mainly air and naval forces, the emphasis on reactive, low-level contingencies—contingencies central to the Restructuring the Army plan—was replaced by a wider range of possible conflicts, including overseas deployments. This approach undermined many of the assumptions of *The Army in the 21st Century*

⁶³ Ian McLachlan, Message from the Minister, preface to *Restructuring the Australian Army*, p. iv.

⁶⁴ *Restructuring the Australian Army*, p. 3.

Review, which was based on detection, protection and response operations on Australian soil.

Australia's Strategic Policy 1997 advanced three basic tasks for the Australian Defence Force: defeating attacks on Australia, defending Australia's regional interests, and defending Australia's global interests. The concept of warning was defined as having two dimensions: capability warning for major attacks and crisis warning for short-notice conflict. Although defeating attacks against Australia remained the core force structure priority, regional conflicts were declared to be more likely than direct attacks on Australia. This was the first time that guidance was able to separate the different ideas of importance and likelihood.

As a result, *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997* stated that '*preparedness levels will be determined more by the requirements of regional operations and deployments in support of global interest ... than by the needs of defeating attacks on Australia*'.⁶⁵ The Army was required to maintain a regular brigade group at a high level of readiness to provide a response capability. This was described in *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997* as being '*particularly useful for short notice operations overseas*'. This decision affected both the concept behind, and the resources available to, the Restructuring the Army scheme as derived from *The Army in the 21st Century Review*.

The impact of *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997* meant that the focus of the Army development had to shift from dispersed and defensive operations towards deployments for offshore roles. Army adjusted to the new strategic policy environment, and it was in June 1998 that a revised Restructuring the Army Trials

⁶⁵ *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997*, p. 41.

Master Plan stated: 'trials will be conducted within operational scenarios drawn from analysis of *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997*'.⁶⁶ The abrupt shift in strategic guidance rendered much of Army's doctrine, which was focused on continental defence, obsolescent.

In October 1998, the Chief of Army announced that the Army would embrace a maritime concept of strategy.⁶⁷ This announcement represented a watershed, ending one era of doctrine and force structuring and introducing another. After a quarter of a century of preparing for continental defence, the Army was embarking on an outward-looking approach that recognised the probability of offshore deployments. As a result, the Army had to put priority into forces that could be used to project power and influence the maritime approaches, and it had to shift its focus to increased force preparedness.

This change has taken place against the background of economic crisis in the Asia-Pacific region and declining political stability in Indonesia and East Timor.⁶⁸ By February 1999, these events had persuaded the Australian Government to expand the Ready Deployment Force to two brigades. These measures represented

⁶⁶ Australian Army, Office of the Chief of Army, 'Restructuring of the Army Trials Master Plan', 6 June 1998, p. 1.

⁶⁷ Lieutenant General F. J. Hickling, Chief of Army, 'Address to Senior Offices', Chief of Army Exercise, Brisbane, 22 October 1998.

⁶⁸ The launch of *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997* coincided with the Asian Financial Crisis. It was assessed in *Australia's Strategic Policy 1997* that regional countries would continue to modernise their air and maritime capabilities. However, as events have unfolded, regional countries have restructured their land force capabilities. Regionally, there is not an increasing threat in the maritime environment. Rather, there is regional instability that has the potential for land force operations.

the most significant level of force preparedness by the Army since the end of the Vietnam War.

In March 1999, the Army's new keystone doctrine manual Land Warfare Doctrine 1, *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, was published.⁶⁹ *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare* describes the central role for land forces in Australia's maritime strategy.

⁶⁹ Australian Army, Land Warfare Doctrine 1, *The Fundamentals of Land Warfare*, Doctrine Wing, Combined Arms Training and Development Centre, Puckapunyal, 1999.

Annex B

**PROCUREMENT PROJECTS AND PROPOSALS WITH
AN INFLUENCE ON THE ARMY'S CAPABILITY**

- ADF Joint Command Support System
- Airborne Surveillance for Land Operations
- Air-to-surface Stand-off Weapon to provide strike aircraft with a general-purpose stand-off capability against unitary targets.
- Amphibious Watercraft
- Armed Reconnaissance Helicopters
- Australian Light Armoured Vehicle (ASLAV)
- Black Hawk Simulator and Maintenance Training Aid
- Bushranger Infantry Mobility Vehicles
- Chinook Helicopter Acquisition
- Combat Training Centre
- Communications Electronic Warfare System for Ground Forces
- Defence Communications Wide Area Network (DEFNET)
- Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ)
- Ground Based Air Defence Weapon System
- Joint Intelligence Support System,
- Leopard Tank Thermal Sight
- Medium Recovery Vehicles
- Narrowband Secure Voice Equipment
- Night Fighting and Surveillance Equipment (NINOX)
- Overlander (wheeled non-armoured field vehicles)
- Battlefield Command Support System, automated command support system
- CURRAWONG, satellite communications capabilities

- PARAKEET, Battlefield Telecommunications Network for the ADF
- PARARE—Digital Topographic Support to the ADF
- RAVEN, integrated single channel radio system
- WAGTAIL, combat net radios
- Trucks, Trailers & Semi-trailers
- Very Low Level Air Defence Weapon System—Clip-on Night Device (COND)
- Very Low Level Air Defence Weapon System Alerting and Cueing System (VACS)
- Regular Commando Capability
- Joint Theatre Distribution System (Logistic Command and Control, situational awareness, distribution means)
- Bulk Liquid Distribution (water, fuel, waste)
- ADF Deployable Medical capability
- Air Drop Sustainment
- SASR specialist equipment
- Remote Mine Neutralisation System
- Wet gap crossing capability
- Global Positioning System equipment
- Medium Tactical Airlift Capability
- Light Tactical Airlift Capability
- *SPEAKEASY* replacement
- Defence Communications Network Operations Centre
- HF Modernisation (fixed sites and upgraded radios for tactical forces)
- Landing Platform—Amphibious
- Space Based Infra-red Surveillance System (SBIRS)
- F111 Air to Surface Stand-off Weapons
- Air Traffic Control
- Air Defence Control and Reporting Units