

S O P D



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Contents

2 ARTICLE SUMMARIES

The Pentagon's Wasting Assets *by Andrew F Krepinevich*

Assurance and US extended deterrence in Nato *by David S Yost*

3 The Nuclear Doctrine and Forces of the PRC *by Mark Schneider*

4 Tokyo's nuclear option *by Toshi Yoshihara and James R Holmes*

5 The Strategic Gap in British Defence Policy *by Hew Strachan*

Exercise United Shield 2008 *by Mungo Melvin*

6 The SAS and the Concentration of Military Power *by Anthony King*

7 Information Counterrevolution *by Adam Elkus*

Target Analysis of Shining Path Insurgents in Peru *by William Yaworsky*

8 Learning Under Fire *by Phillip Rotmann, David Tohn and Jaron Wharton*

NEW PUBLICATION

9 *Distributed Manoeuvre: 21st Century Offensive Tactics*

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MESSAGE FROM THE EDITORS

This month the Editors of the *Senior Officer Professional Digest* recommend ten articles drawn from professional and academic journals on the subjects of US primacy in the twenty-first century, extended deterrence, Chinese nuclear proliferation, Japanese nuclear options, British defence policy, conventional war planning, the British SAS, social networking, psychological operations and institutional adaptation.

Recent diplomatic manoeuvring to further the cause of global nuclear disarmament has gained much traction in the media and within academic circles. While rarely admitted, what is likely to hinder these efforts is the fact that nuclear deterrence and its effect upon strategy is increasingly central to discussions among regional militaries and policy-makers. Andrew Krepinevich helps to explain why this is the case in his piece which focuses on the deteriorating state of the United States' global military primacy in the twenty-first century. David S Yost explores the concept of extended deterrence and the implications of Krepinevich's observations for those sheltering under the US 'nuclear umbrella'. The effect that this development will have on our regional neighbours and allies is explored in articles by Mark Schneider, and Toshi Yoshihara & James R Holmes in their respective investigations of the nuclear capabilities and options of China and Japan. Hew Strachan examines British strategy broadly in his article, briefly touching on problems with their nuclear deterrent's public image.

The Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Ken Gillespie, has stressed the importance of conventional warfighting for the Australian Army in several speeches that he has given since assuming his current position. In 'Exercise United Shield 2008', Mungo Melvin takes readers back to Cold War Europe and analyses NATO's conventional interoperability and capabilities, drawing lessons for Western armies that are pertinent today. The remaining recommendations this month focus on many of the vital supporting capabilities for conventional warfighting. Anthony King focuses on the British SAS, illuminating its effect upon traditional infantry capabilities. Utilising social networking as part of Information Operations (IO) is generally seen as having utility for broader goals: a view that Adam Elkus contests. Psychological Operations (PSYOP) fit into this vital IO line, and with intensified Coalition operations underway in Afghanistan, William Yaworsky's article on PSYOPs is timely. Finally Phillip Rotmann, David Tohn and Jaron Wharton explore the importance of institutional adaptation and dissent within the US military, highlighting the vital role such activity plays in all aspects of martial success.

Enjoy,
The Editors.

Andrew F Krepinevich, 'The Pentagon's Wasting Assets', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 88, Iss. 4, July/August 2009, pp. 18–34.

Australia's strategic environment is rapidly changing. Once-poor South East Asian states are now becoming wealthier, and their military power has increased commensurately. India's dramatic growth as a maritime power has seen its international profile, especially on the Indian Ocean rim, rise dramatically. However, many commentators maintain that the primary factor in the changing strategic environment is the rise of China and the relative decline of US military power in the Western Pacific. This does not automatically mean that China is a threat to Australia—it is not. Australia and China enjoy cordial diplomatic relations and a mutually beneficial economic relationship. However, China's relationship with the United States is not as obviously positive, and any confrontation between these two states risks being extraordinarily damaging to Australia's national interests.

'The military foundations of the United States' global dominance are eroding.'

Andrew F Krepinevich's excellent article focuses on this relative decline in US military power, describing the technologies and processes that are contributing to the rising uncertainty in international relations. While states like China and

Iran are focusing on broad modernisation programs, they are both pursuing anti-access capabilities as a matter of priority. Krepinevich points to USMC Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper's outstanding performance as the 'red team' during Exercise MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002 as an example of the devastating effect such capabilities can have on US power projection.

For senior Australian officers, Krepinevich's article helps them maintain their situational awareness of the changing military balance in the Western Pacific. Policy-makers have already responded with the new Defence white paper, *Force 2030*, which funds new and additional capabilities necessary to counter—if necessary—the more potent forces standing up throughout the Asia Pacific region. But as Krepinevich's article shows, even these potent new capabilities can be challenged by the increasingly capable military hardware proliferating throughout Australia's region. Senior officers must, therefore, work hard to ensure that the Adaptive Army initiative bears real fruit—conventional operations in our region are likely to result in significant attrition of the ADF. Accordingly, the Army must be ready to increase its operational resilience. The Chief of Army's renewed focus on conventional warfighting and realistic formation-level training shows the way; Andrew F Krepinevich's article shows the 'why'.

Andrew F Krepinevich is President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. His latest book is Seven Deadly Scenarios.

David S Yost, 'Assurance and US extended deterrence in NATO', *International Affairs*, Vol. 85, Iss. 4, pp. 755–80.

From the onset of the Cold War, Australia has relied on the United States to deter nuclear attack on Australia and its deployed forces, just as many European and Asian countries have done. However, the logic of what is known as 'extended deterrence' has never been tested. This is fortunate for

Australia as, according to David S Yost's potentially controversial formulation, Australia lacks those measures that European powers have come to view as necessary for 'nuclear reassurance'.

Yost explains that the single most persuasive aspect of the United States' guarantee of extended deterrence to its NATO partners is that it has some 'skin in the game'—that is, it will directly suffer in the event of a nuclear attack on its allies. This is because the United States has stationed US personnel and nuclear weapons on their territory, forming the 'trip wire' for US nuclear retaliation.

While Australia has some US personnel deployed on its territory at Pine Gap who could potentially play a role in the early warning of nuclear attack, there are no US nuclear weapons deployed in Australia. Moreover, any such deployment seems to be quite unpalatable to the Australian electorate. Nor does Australia possess the automatic guarantee of defence aid contained within Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. Rather, the promise of assistance contained within the ANZUS treaty is viewed by some commentators as being comparatively less robust.

Clearly, Australia and the United States are the strongest of allies, and it is almost inconceivable that the United States' nuclear umbrella would, in the event of war, suddenly be drawn in, thereby leaving Australia 'out in the rain'. However, events can often overtake the plans of senior officers, strategists and policy-makers and, in this event, considering the worst possible scenarios is prudent. According to Yost's theorem, Australia's assurance of extended deterrence is lacking and could potentially fail. While debatable, as an exercise in worst-case forecasting, Yost's article certainly will interest senior Defence personnel.

David S Yost is a Professor at the US Naval Postgraduate School. He has published numerous articles and books on nuclear strategy, including The US and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe.

Mark Schneider, 'The Nuclear Doctrine and Forces of the People's Republic of China', *Comparative Strategy*, Vo. 28, Iss. 3, pp. 244–70.

'China is the only nuclear power that is increasing its strategic nuclear forces, both qualitatively and quantitatively.'

With the growing academic consensus that US power in the region is being challenged by the steady growth of Chinese military capabilities, the US nuclear umbrella is once more beginning to attract a high level of attention. Unfortunately, since the Cold War, this umbrella is seen by some

as being a lot less protective. Japan has long voiced concerns about the credibility of the United States' guarantee of extended deterrence. Now, South Korea is voicing similar concerns, having stated recently that they were unsatisfied with US nuclear guarantees despite President Barack Obama's written assurances.

At present, the United States can easily maintain a nuclear umbrella over its Asian allies because China cannot threaten the United States with massive retaliation. However, as China's nuclear forces modernise and expand, there may come a time when China can do so. Mark Schneider's article examines China's nuclear expansion, which he sees as being characterised by an increasingly muscular stance on nuclear weapons. As Schneider argues, China is moving well

beyond the natural expansion of its deterrent forces and is pursuing modern tactical nuclear warfighting systems. China's military doctrine has kept pace with these technological developments, and nuclear warfighting concepts now appear in its strategic literature.

With attention focused on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States' East Asian allies fear that China's growing power and influence is escaping the attention of US foreign policy-makers. With the substantial pressures on the US economy and defence budget, these same allies fear that Washington may not have the capacity to maintain its overmatching nuclear deterrent against Beijing. When these two factors are considered together, it is not surprising that Japan and other Western-bloc countries in Asia are revisiting their indigenous nuclear options. For the Australian officers tasked with defending Australia in this dynamic strategic environment, Schneider's excellent article provides a thorough and detailed grounding in one of the driving forces behind this strategic complexity—China's modernising nuclear forces.

Mark Schneider is a senior analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy. Dr Schneider earned his Ph D in history at the University of Southern California and Juris Doctorate from George Washington University.

Toshi Yoshihara and James R Holmes, 'Thinking about the unthinkable: Tokyo's nuclear option', *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 62, Iss. 3, Summer 2009, pp. 59–78.

As other authors recommended elsewhere in this edition of the *Digest* have argued, the United States' extended nuclear deterrent in Asia is seen as being under strain. In this light, Toshi Yoshihara and James R Holmes offer an intriguing article on one aspect of the potential 'fallout' of a failed US nuclear umbrella—a sovereign Japanese nuclear deterrent force.

Yoshihara and Holmes's thorough examination covers the political and diplomatic precursors necessary for such a breakout to occur, concluding that while it is not likely, recent events indicate that it is certainly not impossible. Echoing the argument of Schneider's article recommended above, the authors conclude that, if the balance between Chinese and United States' nuclear forces shifts in favour of China, Japan's sense of security under the US nuclear umbrella may conceivably decline. This, the authors argue, would be the most likely cause for a Japanese nuclear 'breakout'. The authors' review of Japan's technical capability is similarly thorough, and they systematically disassemble notions that Japan could achieve a nuclear weapons capability in weeks or months, demonstrating that the most likely figure is a year.

For senior officers faced with the increasingly opaque and uncertain strategic environment described in *Force 2030*, articles like Yoshihara and Holmes's are valuable as they provide objective, dispassionate analysis useful for working through the implications of worst-case scenarios. Examining these more pessimistic potentialities is now critical because, as other works recommended this month argue, and as *Force 2030* cautions, 'the primacy of the United States [in Asia] is increasingly tested.' As the nuclear-armed powers reposition themselves, there is likely to be significant concern among Asian states, just as there was during the last shift in Asia-Pacific nuclear power alignment. During that period of the Cold War, President Nixon forged an alliance of convenience with China that saw the major powers actually come closer to each other, lessening the threat that the People's Republic posed to the Western bloc. Yet *Detente* still triggered crash nuclear programs in both South Korea and Taiwan. Senior officers can use

articles like ‘Thinking about the unthinkable’ to help guide their own thoughts on the implications for Australia of a situation where it appears that the nuclear powers are actually moving *apart*.

Toshi Yoshihara is a Professor at the Strategy and Policy Department, US Naval War College. James R Holmes is a Senior Research Associate at the University of Georgia Center for International Trade and Security.

Hew Strachan, ‘The Strategic Gap in British Defence Policy’, *Survival*, Vol. 51, No. 4, August–September 2009, pp. 49–70.

Professor Hew Strachan is one of the leading academics in the fields of military history and strategic studies today. His article—a warning of a ‘strategic gap in British Defence Policy’—should therefore be taken seriously by Australian officers, and seen as a credible ‘question mark’ over the future direction of one of Canberra’s closest allies.

Strachan manages to cover significant ground in a short space, and it is accordingly well beyond the Editors to attempt to summarise it here. However, that said, there are several points that bear repeating. For example, one of his more alarming contentions is that the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent force has become divorced from mainstream defence debate and that, as a result, it is increasingly becoming irrelevant. This is not because the VANGUARD/Trident force has lost its utility, but because the electorate’s perception of its utility has changed as the clarity of its purpose faded after the Cold War. Australian strategists need to be wary of such creeping perceptions of irrelevance regarding the United States’ deterrent force, and should be concerned that similar misperceptions do not arise here in Australia.

Strachan’s article is full of similarly relevant points for Australian officers, strategists and policy-makers. His writing is concise and his arguments are eloquently made. Accordingly, the Editors strongly commend this article to the readers of the *SOPD*.

Professor Hew Strachan is the Chichele Professor of the History of War at All Souls College, Oxford, where he serves as Director of the Oxford Leverhulme Centre Programme on the Changing Character of War. He recently presented a seminar to Australian Defence Organisation personnel as part of the LWSC’s Changing Character of War Seminar Series.

Major General Mungo Melvin, ‘Exercise United Shield 2008’, *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 154, No. 3, June 2009, pp. 36–43.

‘A policy without an effective strategy is like a knight without either shield or sword.’

A range of commentators have expressed considerable consternation over the disparate and divided Coalition alliance operating in Afghanistan. They regularly raise the need for an overall ‘unity of effort’ in the ongoing counterinsurgency. In this recent article for *The*

RUSI Journal, British Major General Mungo Melvin rewinds the clock and revisits the battle that

never occurred—Fulda Gap. In doing so he explores the realities of Cold War conventional war planning and highlights the lessons this holds for military alliances and interoperability in the Twenty-first century. As Melvin posits, ‘over the last twenty years, collective understanding of military strategy and the operational art that bridges this to tactics have diminished.’

Without doubt, NATO’s conventional strategy towards Warsaw Pact forces was neither flawless nor guaranteed to succeed—no strategy is or can be. Yet, as Melvin outlines, the necessity for the Western Europe to defend against the Soviet threat provided an impetus for the development of clear linkages between the strategic, operational and tactical towards a comprehensive containment policy. While large scale conventional war now appears unlikely, many of the more possible challenges of the near future still necessitate the need for clear strategies and interoperability with allies. Thus, the Editors of the *SOPD* recommend ‘Exercise United Shield 2008’ for its insights into Cold War strategic planning between allies, as well as for its observation of conventional war planning and reflections upon many of the ‘bread and butter’ issues of that time that might otherwise be forgotten today.

Major General Melvin is currently the General Officer Commanding United Kingdom Support Command, Germany.

Anthony King, ‘The Special Air Service and the Concentration of Military Power’, *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 35, No. 4, July 2009, pp. 646–66.

Our definition of ‘niche capabilities’ may be outdated. From an initially ‘strategically minor but innovative’ role, in just over half a century, British Special Forces have evolved into the option of first resort toward the ends of policy. This article assists in answering the question of why and how this has occurred. From Anthony King’s sociological perspective of the British armed forces, the rise of the SAS (Special Air Service) ‘represents an institutional reformation...of historic importance’—the concentration of military power.

‘Its current indispensability is an achievement not an inevitability’

This article is highly recommended, due to the author’s careful and considered analysis of British defence policy, its effect on the force structure of British armed forces, and the rise of the SAS within this context. It is likely that this article will stimulate debate, particularly in response to the author’s statement that, ‘the current position of the SAS at the heart of Britain’s defence posture has not been a neutral and objective process. It is the result of intense lobbying and consternation.’ This article offers senior officers valuable insight into the effect Special Forces have had on the strategic and operational levels of war and the consequent implications for traditional infantry capabilities. King has identified a great transformation in Western military affairs that has relevance for the Australian Army and Defence planners. ‘The Special Air Service and the Concentration of Military Power’ is both timely and pertinent to Australian strategic debate.

Anthony King is a professor of sociology at the University of Exeter.

Adam Elkus, 'Information Counterrevolution', *Small Wars Journal*, 6 July 2009, <<http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/07/information-counterrevolution/>>.

'What seemed like a huge "Army of Davids" was in reality a small group of users whose tweets were replicated en masse by their followers.'

If we are to believe 'infoenthusiasts', social networking, emerging technologies and new media are transforming the very fabric of our cultures and societies. At the extreme end of the spectrum, it is argued that the end is nigh for 'the Fourth Estate' itself. Commentary of Iranian 'tweets' following this year's volatile presidential election continues to reflect this view—the masses are speaking, the whole picture is in view. However, as Adam Elkus argues in *Small Wars Journal*, these individuals and their supporters are 'more transfixed with the medium rather than the message', and arguably it is the message which ultimately counts.

According to Elkus, Twitter and its peer technologies are little more informative and illuminating than their 24-hour news service counterparts. What might appear to be a sea of pluralistic, unfiltered information may in fact merely constitute a mirage conjured by the few, spread like wildfire through the diffuse nodes of social networks. This article does not dismiss the utility of social networking altogether however, it does attempt to balance the prevailing view that our access to relevant information will be revolutionised though 'tweets' alone. The Editors recommend this article for the unique angle it takes towards this nonetheless important and timely debate, and also for its reflections upon the 'strategic, operational and tactical' nature of information in this new century. Those who explored similar articles recommended in last month's *SOPD* would do well to read 'Information Counterrevolution.'

Adam Elkus is an analyst specialising in foreign policy and security. He is currently Associate Editor of Red Team Journal.

William Yaworsky, 'Target Analysis of Shining Path Insurgents in Peru: An Example of US Army Psychological Operations', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 4, August 2009, pp. 651–66.

As counterinsurgency warfare continues to evolve, this article provides a timely reminder of the important role that Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) play within any comprehensive warfighting strategy. William Yaworsky outlines the practical application of PSYOPS doctrine by the Peruvian Armed Forces as they sought to neutralise the Shining Path guerrilla movement. Assisting them in their mission was the US Army's 1st Psychological Operations Battalion who provided advice on campaign development, target analysis and product development.

Although conducted in 1988, the US/Peruvian collaboration is an example of the vital role that psychological operations play within broader counterinsurgency operations. The identifying of specific target audiences, assessing of vulnerabilities, and development and deployment of products that influence the enemy are core elements of any long-term warfighting strategy. The successful use of PSYOPS against the Shining Path guerrillas provides lessons for the current fight against the Taliban, particularly due to the similarities between the two insurgencies.

With operations in Afghanistan intensifying, it may be time to consider the more aggressive use of PSYOPS. Yaworsky's article provides an excellent basis for conceptualising such operations, as well as practical evidence of effective methods used during Peru's counterinsurgency effort. Furthermore, the US/Peruvian collaboration provides an excellent model for contemporary PSYOPS planning and training between a highly sophisticated external force and the military of the nation facing the insurgency. Senior officers will find this article valuable for the practical lessons it identifies out of the often complex and abstract process of PSYOPS warfare.

Dr William Yaworsky is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Texas at Brownsville.

Phillip Rotmann, David Tohn and Jaron Wharton, 'Learning Under Fire: Progress and Dissent in the US Military', *Survival*, Vol. 51, Issue 4, August–September 2009, pp 31–48.

The US military that commenced operations in Afghanistan in 2001 is the same military that operates in Afghanistan in 2009. It is, however, one that has gone through a substantial process of self-learning and reflection, triggered through open dissent within senior and junior ranks. Ultimately, though, this transformation required adaptability, resilience, flexibility, and most importantly corporate will to enact organisational change. As has been demonstrated throughout history, it is under fire and in view of imminent failure that successful military organisations demonstrate their true flexibility. Defeat meets those who cannot.

'This internal capacity must transcend traditional doctrinal frameworks and be deeply embedded in the military's institutional culture'

However, these virtues cannot be built into an organisation as if they were a capability or a weapons system. Rather, they are of an organic nature, which grow within organisations that foster openness and empower their people. As the authors of this article observe, it is without these characteristics that 'institutional inertia' takes hold and failure looms 'in times of internal and external stress.' The United States' Iraq experience between 2003 and 2007 is testament to this. This article is fascinating, not so much for answering 'why' but also 'how' adaptation occurred in the US military. The Editors recommend this article to all senior officers as it demonstrates both the top-down and bottom-up nature of adaptation, and its relevance for the Australian Army, particularly within the Adaptive Army concept.


Phillip Rotmann is a McCloy Scholar at the John F Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Colonel David Tohn is an active-duty Military Intelligence Officer in the US Army. Captain Jaron Wharton is currently serving as a Public Service Fellow at the John F Kennedy School of Government and is an active-duty infantry officer in the US Army.

Working Paper Series

The Land Warfare Studies Centre is pleased to announce the release of the latest volume in its Working Paper Series: Justin Kelly and Mike Brennan's *Distributed Manoeuvre: 21st Century Offensive Tactics*.

Successfully conducting an offensive action remains as much the 'gold standard' for military commanders today as it was in the days of Napoleon, Frederick or Caesar. However, *how* commanders actually do it has changed as dramatically as society and technology has changed. How to conduct offensive action successfully in today's unique technological and tactical circumstances is the focus of this working paper.

The authors offer readers the benefit of their combined twenty years of study into this topic, arguing that it is actually some of the *continuities* in offensive and defensive tactics that help illuminate the path forward for today's warfighters. Kelly and Brennan conclude that the seemingly impenetrable defence that insurgents and other 'invisible' combatants possess can be overcome. The solution lies in the innovative combination of organisations, technologies and techniques that will restore the promise of decision to the offensive.



Distributed Manoeuvre: 21st Century Offensive Tactics is available from the LWSC website at <http://www.defence.gov.au/Army/lwsc/docs/wp134.pdf>