

1918: DEFINING VICTORY

DEFENDING AUSTRALIA 1914-1918: THE OTHER AUSTRALIAN ARMY

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It's a long way from Villers-Bretonneux to Victoria Barracks. There were no battles on Australian soil during the Great War, no raids on our coast, not even a memorable act of sabotage. Still, hundreds of women and thousands of men defended Australian territory throughout the war. Police and private citizens monitored supposed disloyalty. Censors suppressed information deemed to be demoralising. A small expeditionary force conquered and garrisoned German New Guinea, securing the only land approach to Australian territory. Recruits for the Australian Imperial Force filled camps with armed and uniformed men who might be called on if some local military emergency arose. AIF recruits rejected for overseas service assumed the job of guarding defence installations and the camps in which so-called aliens had been interned. Naval reservists examined ships for contraband cargo. Women who wanted to take up arms began to drill and shoot unofficially.¹

In addition to this impromptu collective of defenders, an army existed to defend Australia from invasion and, more remotely, to train men for future service in the AIF. The army predated the war, and its mobilisation was our first military contribution to the war effort. Invasion never came, and the army was wound down after Gallipoli. But individual units performed garrison duty throughout the next three years, and there was a frantic effort to revive the army when German victories early in 1918 raised the prospect of war coming to Australia after all. This other Australian army is the subject of this chapter. Properly called the Australian Military Forces, I will call it in this essay by one of its vernacular and more evocative names: the citizen army.

The Army and Its Purpose

The citizen army was not an army as we understand one today. It had only a small cadre of professional soldiers, little military discipline, no obligation to serve outside Australia, indeed no real existence outside the few hours each week that its mostly part-time members changed into uniform after a day's work and assembled in drill halls around the country to practise drill and musketry. Australia's only military force when the war began, the citizen army was a product of a conscious determination to assert Australian home rule within the British empire, and of a less conscious inheritance of Britain's long citizen soldier tradition. Australians accepted the duty of contributing to imperial defence, but their contribution had to be voluntary. It must not compromise the authority of the Australian government, or a citizen's right to ignore the king's wars. Defence of hearth and home took strong precedence over imperial defence in Australia's prewar military system.²

Before the war the Australian government sanctioned vague plans to raise an expeditionary force to serve with the British army if war began. It would be formed of Australia's best men, of course, but they would be voluntarily recruited and amount to just one infantry division and one light horse brigade. At the same time, fear of Japanese attack on Australian soil yielded active preparation, not just vague plans. Millions of pounds were devoted to disbanding the old voluntarily-recruited citizen forces and to beginning to raise a vast compulsory militia from annual intakes of fit 18-year-old men.³ The militia would be complete only in 1920. Until then, rifle club members, who shot for military as well as sporting reasons, would bring it up to war strength in a crisis. Detailed defence schemes laid down when and where the militia, the rifle club reservists and the so-called permanent force, the citizen army's cadre of professional artillery and engineers, would concentrate if war began. First they would secure the capital cities, Newcastle and Thursday Island from attack. Then they would form a field army to repel an invasion by an 'Eastern power', a polite euphemism for Japan. Military enthusiasts sometimes talked of the German challenge before the war. The citizen army had a different enemy in its sights, and militia officers reminded their young soldiers they were training to beat back a coming Japanese invasion.⁴

1914: The Army Mobilises and Demobilises

When the imperial government signalled to the empire on 30 July 1914 that war with Germany threatened, senior officers in Australia pulled the defence schemes from their safes and began to mobilise the citizen army. Preliminary mobilisation began on 2 August.⁵ The artillerymen and engineers who constituted the bulk of the permanent force, the citizen army's small professional cadre, stood by the fixed guns at the capital cities, Newcastle and Thursday Island. About a thousand militiamen and rifle club reservists were called out. Some joined the permanent soldiers at the guns, or began guarding arms and ammunition factories, wireless stations and bridges, or where undersea telegraph cables came ashore. Most, though, assembled for a dramatic task. The government feared an attack on Thursday Island, key to the Torres Strait and a good base for a German admiral seeking to sink Australian shipping or a Japanese general assembling an invasion force. Accordingly Townsville's garrison artillerymen and the Kennedy Regiment, an infantry battalion recruited across northern Queensland, assembled for brief but intense training in preparation for sailing to the island to reinforce permanent force gunners and the local rifle club.⁶ The British empire was not yet at war, and some citizen soldiers proved slow to mobilise. Two rifle club reservists in Darwin refused to leave their beds when ordered to guard a cable landing place. Suspecting a hoax, they had to be hauled to their posts by the police. But men who put on uniform were hailed as heroes, and a Melbourne battalion was besieged by a rapt crowd when it held a ceremony on the night of 4 August to induct its third intake of recruits.⁷

On 5 August war came. Vigilant gunners at Queenscliff fired a warning shot over the German steamer *Pfalz* to prevent it from leaving Port Phillip. It was the first of many shots fired over the next four years near unidentified ships which failed to follow strict military navigation and identification procedures, and it was later proudly claimed as the first British shot of the war.⁸ Now came the first stage of full mobilisation, which aimed to protect the coastal cities with garrisons of all arms. Ten thousand militiamen received telegrams in red envelopes summoning them to drill halls around the country. After assembling and training for a day these men bedded down for a night on hard straw and marched off next morning.⁹ Geelong's militiamen were hailed by their local newspaper as heroes 'off to the front'. The Kennedy Regiment and the Townsville garrison artillery steamed for Thursday Island on 8 August 1914, a day which one journalist proclaimed would 'be remembered in the history of Australia as that on which the first contingent of her new citizen forces was sent forth on active service conditions'.¹⁰

The day almost did become memorable. On reaching Thursday Island the citizen artillerymen dutifully joined their permanent counterparts at the guns, but the Kennedy Regiment's ardent young infantry officers called for volunteers to return to their ship and sail on to real war. Nearly half the battalion answered the call. They landed at Port Moresby, found nothing to do, but encountered William Holmes' small expeditionary force on its way to seize German New Guinea. The Kennedy men asked to join the force. William Holmes declared them unfit for active service. The hasty mobilisation of an incomplete militia had not yielded a formidable army. There had been no proper medical inspections, no turning away of the youngest recruits. There were too few officers, not enough ammunition, only one set of clothes for each man, no tents or mosquito nets. Some men were without boots. The Kennedy men were not easily deterred by Holmes's declaration. When his force sailed for Rabaul they tried to follow it. But their ship fell behind when its crew refused to sail outside home waters, and the men were ordered home.¹¹

The return of the Kennedy Regiment to Australian territory ended any chance of Australia's citizen army seeing real war. German power in the Pacific was now collapsing, greatly reducing the chance of a raid on Australia. Japan was entering the war on the allied side, greatly reducing the chance of an invasion. Officers of militia units not called up for the first stage of full mobilisation were ordered to prepare for the second stage, during which many units would combine into an infantry division and light horse division that would operate against the invader. John Monash, commanding the citizen army's 13th Infantry Brigade, did his best to prepare his men for war, and reminded himself to prepare the clothing, kit items and food he would need, arrange a horse and saddle and obtain a map of the site where his

command would concentrate.¹² The reminder had proved unnecessary. With vast armies beginning to clash in Europe, detailed planning had at last begun for raising what would be called the Australian Imperial Force. At the close of August the government had decreed that only a small number of militia infantry battalions and light horse regiments need remain on duty at any one time, though for the moment the garrison artillery and engineers of the permanent force and militia were to stay put.¹³ The best officers and men of the citizen army began to join the AIF. John Monash swapped his brigade command in the militia for a brigade command in the AIF.

A reorientation of Australia's military system from home defence to expeditionary war was beginning. Not that the reorientation was immediately effected. By December 1914 the AIF had grown to twice its intended size—nearly 40,000 soldiers—but the citizen army remained far larger: over 100,000 soldiers, including 56,000 militiamen and 51,000 rifle reservists.¹⁴ Yet in terms of warlike activity the shift was already clear. Nearly 11,000 permanent and citizen soldiers had been mobilised for full-time duty since the war began, while twice as many men had already sailed overseas with the AIF.¹⁵ At the close of the year most of the militia's garrison artillerymen were dismissed from full-time duty.¹⁶ The appearance of a home-grown enemy would have halted the citizen army's demobilisation, but none occurred. An anticipated rising by Germans in Sydney over Christmas 1914 failed to eventuate, and the special trams which waited to bring soldiers into the city returned empty to their depots.¹⁷ Twenty non-uniformed members of the 82nd Infantry Battalion proved sufficient to help police kill the butcher and the ice cream vendor who, under a Turkish flag, fired shots into a passing train at Broken Hill on New Year's Day 1915.¹⁸ Australia's defence was being secured by soldiers in Europe and the Middle East, by sailors on distant fleets, by censors working with pens and typewriters, by William Holmes' force in Rabaul. The chance of conflict with Japan was being defused by silk-hatted diplomats in London and Tokyo. The citizen army, demobilised and without even saboteurs to suppress, was eclipsed by the AIF.

1915-1917: Garrison Duty and Decline

Demobilisation did not lead to disbandment. Raids by German cruisers and submarines were still feared. Australian governments still worried that Japan would take advantage of some allied reverse in Europe to conquer the South Pacific.¹⁹ Permanent artillerymen came to be drawn into the AIF's siege artillery brigade, but militia infantry and artillery units and, in remote areas, rifle clubs remained on call. They were summoned for periods of days, weeks or months throughout the war to guard seaward approaches to the large cities or patrol exposed stretches of coastline and isolated telegraph cable landing places. Usually three to four thousand soldiers were on full-time duty at any moment.²⁰

A typical stint of garrison service was performed by the New South Wales Mounted Rifles in 1915. Recruited across central New South Wales, this light horse regiment's three squadrons were mobilised one after another during March and April 1915 to guard Sydney's water supply from sabotage and to watch for raids on the city's northern coastline. A temporary headquarters was established at St Ives, an upper north shore suburb midway between the regiment's places of duty. But with the commanding officer away in Egypt with the AIF and with no real expectation of attack, no headquarters staff were present apart from the adjutant. Each squadron went on duty for just two weeks, which included a break of three or four days. Seventy or so horsemen performed long, lonely mounted patrols along sandy beaches each day. Another 20, or fewer, guarded pipelines and dams. Then came demobilisation, payment, a return to civilian life—punctuated by drill.²¹

Garrison duty could be more rigorous at times and places of heightened vigilance. Townsville's garrison artillery unit remained on duty at Thursday Island throughout the war, its members subject, so one later complained, to 'as rigid military discipline as obtained anywhere in the British Empire'.²² Two partial mobilisations occurred in February-March 1916 and April-May 1918, both in response to the presence of German raiders. Though not many more than the usual number of soldiers were called up in response, full-time service proved hard work. During the first partial mobilisation Sydney's garrison gunners performed 24-hour shifts, all the time exposed to sun, wind and rain. Their time off was more enjoyable, being

marked, so one officer recalled, by 'comfortable quarters, a bath, well-cooked meals, a bed-stretcher on a wide verandah ... a swim, a game of cricket or a few hours' fishing, and occasionally a half-day's leave'.²³

In mid 1915 the citizen army expanded according to prewar plans. New units were raised and 17,000 recruits were inducted. Recruits were told they had an important job to do. There might be no glory in their service, said one battalion commander, but there was 'the supreme merit of usefulness'. Local communities continued to support their citizen soldiers as they had done before the war, buying them musical instruments and presenting them with embroidered flags.²⁴ But if the citizen army was useful, the AIF was vital. During 1915 the AIF grew to include six divisions and 200,000 soldiers, and Australians found themselves maintaining two armies where they could barely afford to maintain one. Inevitably the citizen army began to yield to the AIF its camp facilities, its instructors, its weapons, its equipment, its uniforms, and most of its mature soldiers. By July 1915 one in six militiamen and one in four permanent soldiers had enlisted for overseas service. By the end of the year the militia had lost nearly all its adjutants and instructors to the AIF and somewhere between a quarter and a third of its officers. By the end of the war 50,000 militiamen had gone overseas.²⁵ Militia training was disrupted as early as August 1915, when officers began to be used as AIF instructors and annual camps were cancelled. Few militia units beyond the garrison artillery and engineers assembled for any training from October 1915 to July 1916. Some training camps were held in the second half of 1916 but there were no guns for the artillery, no horses for the light horse, sometimes no rifles for the infantry.²⁶ 'I do not think that anything very effective is now being done', worried James Catts, a State director of AIF recruitment who wanted a strong militia as a deterrent to Japanese attack.²⁷

Further annual intakes of militia recruits were signed onto militia muster rolls in 1916 and 1917. On paper the militia's numbers rose according to prewar plans: 70,000 men in mid 1916, over 100,000 after mid 1917.²⁸ But the drill halls were empty. Few recruits faced any heavier obligation than filling in forms and being examined by a doctor. Exemptions from training were granted any man who lived more than five miles from a drill hall, or whose family might experience 'hardship' if he wore uniform.²⁹ Quality declined as well as quantity. First-rate officers like Gordon Bennett and Iven Mackay went overseas. Second-rate ones like Robert Menzies of the Melbourne University Rifles and Arthur Calwell of the Yarra Borderers remained behind.³⁰ The most spectacular example of this disparity was seen in the Howell-Price family. While John, Frederick, Owen, Philip and Richmond Howell-Price were winning fame overseas in the AIF and the navy, their eldest brother, David, was winning notoriety in the citizen army by defrauding the government of £70,000.³¹ The quality of the men in the ranks also declined. Not only did the most experienced and mature men join the AIF, leaving the young recruits behind; in 1915 the government began to reorient senior cadet training, a vital preparation for militia service, from martial to gymnastic activities. Recruits no longer understood the basics of drill or even the need for discipline.³²

Both law and custom permitted the replenishment of the militia by conscription, a move which James Catts among others urged as a method of nudging more men toward joining the AIF and warning Japan that Australia was strongly defended.³³ But conscription into the militia seemed an impossibly antiquated measure beside the more pressing question of whether to follow New Zealand and Britain, cast aside the British citizen soldier tradition and its ancient resistance to foreign wars, and conscript men into what would become a single Australian army, able to fight anywhere on the globe. At plebiscites in October 1916 and December 1917 most Australians chose to keep their traditions intact, but as part of an official effort to prepare for a 'yes' vote at the first plebiscite, or even to prompt it, a limited conscription into the militia was held. It lasted just long enough to create administrative confusion and subject 37,000 men to a short training camp. More men obeyed the call-up than expected.³⁴ One who did not was John Curtin, a Labor journalist who had opposed compulsory military training before the war and was now working to oppose conscription into the AIF. Curtin was sentenced to three months' imprisonment but gaoled for just three days.³⁵

Though conscription was rejected and Australians maintained two armies throughout the war, the government strove to unite the militia and AIF in a limited way. Two attempts failed to raise and reinforce each AIF unit in the same district as a militia unit, thus linking the two armies at the community level. But after Gallipoli it was decreed that every militia unit would eventually be renumbered after an AIF unit from its State and share its battle honours and colour patches. The decree may also have been a way of easing amalgamation of the two armies if conscription were introduced. A second and more tangible link was to accompany the renumbering. A new reserve force would replace the rifle clubs after the war, to be formed of war veterans as well as from men who had passed through their eight years' militia service. The authorities hoped it would bring 200,000 AIF veterans into the citizen army. Drilling alongside the militia, these men would inspire youthful militiamen to emulate the heroes of Anzac. The first recruit entered the new reserve in March 1917. But few would be able to follow him until the war ended. In the meantime the militia languished.³⁶

The militia's decline was masked for a year or more by the rise of the rifle clubs. Raising a compulsory militia had brought some unwilling men into uniform, but it had also kept out willing men who were too old, too unfit or lived too far from the drill halls. The coming of war roused these outsiders to act. In Britain their counterparts formed a new volunteer force.³⁷ In Australia this was impossible. Too much prewar effort had gone into making citizen soldiering scientific to permit a return to old ways. The authorities told men unable to join the AIF, the permanent force or the militia to join the rifle clubs.³⁸ The result was an explosion of rifle club membership and activity. By the close of 1915 there were 103,000 club members. Most were professional men, clerks, public servants, or skilled workers in large shops and warehouses. Most lived in New South Wales, where Ambrose Carmichael, a Labor education minister, saw them as a future force of sharpshooters for the AIF. The rifle club movement resembled a nineteenth-century volunteer movement in its origin and activities. New clubs were based as much on workplaces and shared interest as on localities: there was a Government Printing Office club, a David Jones' employees club, an 'Athletic Sports' club, even a few trade union-based clubs. Meetings to form clubs were organised by local notables and spilled out of the town halls booked to hold them. Patriotic fervour and a fusion of hierarchy and democracy, obedience and egalitarianism, were the guiding spirit at the simple drills which clubs held once or twice a week.³⁹ In November 1915 Carmichael and a thousand other club members joined the AIF as its 36th Battalion, the so-called 'riflemen's thousand'. Otherwise nothing came of Carmichael's vision, and members stayed at home or joined the AIF individually—a course taken by nearly 26,000 by late 1917.⁴⁰ The rifle clubs continued to look impressive on paper for the rest of the war. Loss of members and facilities to the AIF and a dearth of ammunition and official support were the reality. By 1918 the clubs' rifle ranges were almost as quiet as the militia's drill halls.⁴¹

1918: Attempted Revival

The citizen army had virtually collapsed by the time the German offensive of March-July 1918 revived fears of Japanese attack on Australia. The prime minister wanted a new Monroe doctrine declared, warning Japan not to enter the South Pacific. But how would his threat be enforced? Some rifle club captains hoped their clubs would be revived and allowed to form a new citizen army.⁴² The government and its military advisers had other ideas. They enacted 'practical temporary measures to rebuild the militia: amalgamation of units, annual training camps, new uniforms, new equipment. Voluntary recruiting would be encouraged for the first time since 1912. Rejected volunteers for the AIF were 'earnestly urged' to join the militia, and 'carefully directed' to the nearest drill hall. Recruiting advertisements promised men they would 'never regret the experience gained' or 'the comradeships made' in the militia.⁴³

Militia training revived and garrison duties intensified, at least for some units.⁴⁴ It proved harder to fill the ranks than to train those already in them. Fewer than 500 men joined voluntarily.⁴⁵ After nearly four years of war, what man wanted to wear a uniform who had not already enlisted in the AIF or belonged to a rifle club? Why would he give up a day's pay to receive a half or a third the amount performing tedious drill? There was opposition to the militia revival as well as indifference. Employers and employees objected that camp training would disrupt war production. Rifle clubs were offended that the government had not

summoned them to save the day, and would not allow their oldest members to enlist in the militia. Australians who were weary of war suspected the government of using the militia revival to introduce conscription by stealth, or of forcing militiamen to guard German prisoners.⁴⁶ In any case, how was the part-time training of an army of infantry and cavalry really useful in a war being won by tanks, aeroplanes and heavy artillery? William Bolton, a politician and militia officer who had fought briefly at Gallipoli, echoed a growing opinion when he said that militia training was so unlike real war it was 'harmful to the military spirit'.⁴⁷ In July 1918 the defence department conceded that the attempt to revive the militia had failed.⁴⁸

The scheme for a reserve of veterans also stalled. It was clear from the brittle mood of men returning from the front that the reserve would attract veterans only if it offered an almost nominal training regime, granted officers seniority over their counterparts in the militia, and conferred complete exemption from compulsory militia service. When drumming up recruits, reserve organiser Kenneth Mackay promised that members would do no more than four days' drill a year. But such concessions threatened a permanent weakening of the citizen army by continuing to deprive it after the war of the best officers and the fittest, most experienced soldiers, and by subordinating it to an almost untrained force whose members might not accept being slotted into the militia's ranks in wartime. While Mackay and the authorities bickered over the merits of the reserve, militia units were renumbered after AIF units and 17,000 veterans joined the new reserve but did no training.⁴⁹ Australia ended the war, as it had begun it, with two armies, only now the militia was almost as much a paper force as the AIF had been in July 1914. Australia's citizen army not only played no part in the great allied victory over Germany, it was not even able to cheer for the winning team from the sidelines or supply useful reinforcements.

After The War

In the home front volume of the official history of Australia in the Great War, Ernest Scott wrote that the Great War had 'burst in upon' Australia's prewar military system 'like a vast flood smashing through a dam'.⁵⁰ The war did more than disrupt the system: it discredited it. War had not come to Australian shores, and the citizen army had not been used. Instead an expeditionary force had to be raised from scratch. But if war had come to Australia, the citizen army had seemed—when compared against the AIF—too youthful and amateurish to defend the country.

But what lesson would be drawn from this? After the war Harry Chauvel and other generals advised the government to train the militia harder, to place it under military discipline, to oblige it to serve overseas, and to dispense with scratch-built expeditionary forces. Ordinary Australians disagreed. The AIF had fought well, they said. Didn't this prove that peacetime training was pointless? And after four years of war drill seemed distasteful, something only militarists might enjoy. The generals wanted to prepare for the next war. The people wanted a rest from the last one. The people's view prevailed for nearly two decades. So in 1939 Australia went into a second world war with the same military system and with the same citizen army it had maintained in 1914.⁵¹

Should some members of the citizen army have been granted the status of returned soldiers? The garrison artillery argued they should, and petitioned the government and the repatriation department. Had they not been 'a vital link in the military chain'? Had they not been 'conscripted' on mobilisation and placed under military discipline? Had they not fired the first shot of the war? The military authorities were unmoved. The war had not come to Australia, they pointed out, and the garrison gunners could not have been sent out of Australia to fight in it. Men who did not and indeed could not have gone away could not be said to have returned.⁵² Returned soldiers agreed. Their main lobby group, today known as the Returned and Services League, refused to share the privileged identity of returned soldier with militiamen. A local RSL branch even protested that it was 'an insult to "diggers" to allow coldfooters [in the militia] to wear the colour patches so highly treasured by the men who had made the history attached to them'.⁵³ The defence minister put out a press release praising the gunners for doing their duty.⁵⁴ And with that piece of paper the members of Australia's other army of the Great War would have to be satisfied.

Endnotes

1. For these defence activities see Edmond Samuels, *An illustrated diary of Australian internment camps by an officer of the guard* (Sydney: Tyrells, 1919); Arthur Jose, *The Royal Australian Navy 1914-1918* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1938 [first published 1928]), 375-89 (on the naval reserve); SS Mackenzie, *The Australians at Rabaul* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1938 [first published 1928]); Ernest Scott, *Australia during the war* (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1938 [first published 1936]), 57-104 (on censorship); Jan Bassett, "'Ready to serve": Australian women and the Great War', *Journal of the Australian War Memorial* 2 (April 1983), 8-16; Guy Verney, 'The army high command and Australian defence policy 1901-1918', PhD thesis, University of Sydney, 1985, 203-5 (on a citizens' watch).
2. Craig Wilcox, *For hearths and homes: citizen soldiering in Australia 1854-1945* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1998), 1-73. For the British citizen soldier tradition see IFW Beckett, *The amateur military tradition 1558-1945* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991). The customary view, which I do not share, that colonial nationalism was solely responsible for Australian troops being withheld from imperial control underlies John Mordike, *An army for a nation: a history of Australian military developments 1880-1914* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association with the Directorate of Army Studies, Department of Defence, 1992).
3. Craig Wilcox, 'Relinquishing the past: John Mordike's "An army for a nation"', *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 40: 1 (1994), 58-62.
4. Richard Crouch, 'First steps in battalion training', *Commonwealth Military Journal*, July 1913, 398-9; 'Coast defence exercise 11th April 1914', series B197, item 1856/4/297, National Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA); 'Report on an inspection of the military forces of the Commonwealth of Australia by General Sir Ian Hamilton', 24 April 1914, *Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers*, 1914, vol 2, no 14; 'General scheme of defence Commonwealth of Australia', July 1914, item MP826/1/3 NAA; 'Melbourne (Port Phillip) defence scheme revised to 1st July 1914', item MP826/1/4e, NAA, *Officers' list of the Australian Military Forces 1st August 1914* (Melbourne: Government Printer, 1914); Wilcox, *For hearths and homes*, 62-73.
5. Note by Sellheim, 2 August 1914, item 3, series MP826/1, NAA.
6. Circulars received by 13th Infantry Brigade, 4 August 1914, folder 1178, Monash Papers, National Library of Australia MS1884; [JK Jensen], *Report upon the Department of Defence from the first of July 1914 until the thirtieth of June 1917* (Melbourne: Government Printer, 1917 [hereafter Jensen report]), 26-7; *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 August 1914, 10; *Argus*, 3 August 1914, 16, 4 August 1914, 10; *Geelong Advertiser*, 4 August 1914, 3, 5; *North Queensland Register*, 10 August 1914, 77, 88; David Horner, *The gunners: a history of Australian artillery* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995), 72-3.
7. *Geelong Advertiser*, 5 August 1914, 3; *Argus*, 5 August 1914, 9-10.
8. Jose, *Royal Australian Navy*, 45, 375-8, 547; Scott, *Australia during the war*, 35-7; Horner, *Gunners*, 73-5.
9. Memoir by Stanley Thomas, 13 November 1986, Australian War Memorial PR87/033; Hawker to Monash, 5 August 1914, & circulars received by 13th Infantry Brigade, 6 August 1914, folders 1170 & 1178, Monash Papers; *Argus*, 7 August 1914, 7 & 8 August 1914, 16; 'Fonsac' (WS Forsyth), *Garrison gunners*, (Tamworth NSW: Tamworth Newspaper Co, 1927), part 2, ch 3.
10. *Geelong Advertiser*, 8 August 1914, 4; *North Queensland Register*, 17 August 1914, 83-4.
11. Entries for 5 & 6 September 1914, Australian Naval & Military Expeditionary Force war diaries, & Howse to Holmes, 6 September 1914, Holmes Papers, Mitchell Library MSS15; Jose, *Royal Australian Navy*, 75-8; Mackenzie, *Australians at Rabaul*, 31-2; Geoffrey Bolton, *A thousand miles away: a history of North Queensland to 1920* (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1963), 320.
12. Circulars received by 13th Infantry Brigade and other brigade correspondence, 5-14 August 1914, folder 1178, Monash Papers.
13. Jensen report, 27; Sadler, evidence given to Howell-Price inquiry, 1 March 1917, file 474/8/218, series MP367/1, NAA.
14. Chief of the General Staffs statement for the Minister, 24 November 1914, file A1F112/2/218, series B539, NAA, *Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates* 75: 957-8, 20 November 1914, Pearce.
15. CPD 75: 1298, 3 December 1914, Pearce.
16. 'Fronsac', *Garrison gunners*, 90-1, 94.
17. Kelly to Legge, 26 December 1914, file 2021/1/64, series B197, NAA; Verney, 'Army high command and Australian defence policy', 201.
18. *Barrier Daily Truth*, 2 January 1915, 3, 4 January 1915, 3-4; *Barrier Miner*, 1 January 1915, 2, & 2 January 1915, 5, 'Special edition', Scott, *Australia during the war*, 111-12.
19. Entry for 1 September 1914, George Morrison diary July-September 1914, item 102, Morrison Papers, Mitchell Library MSS312; Munro-Ferguson to Harcourt, 23 November 1914, item 623, Novar Papers, National Library of Australia MS696; Catts to Pearce, 29 May 1916, file A264/1/242, series A2023, NAA; Vemey, 'Army high command', 180-200; Henry Frei, *Japan's southward advance and Australia from the sixteenth century to World War II* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1991), 92-102.
20. 'Statement of troops mobilized for home defence', 23 February 1916, file W246/1/938, and 'Statement of troops doing duty on home defence', 21 July 1917, file W246/1/2428, series B543, NAA; Horner, *Gunners*, 81-2.

21. Commander Coast Defences, 25 January 1917, and Assistant Adjutant General, 21 December 1917, file 474/8/218, series MP367/1, NAA.
22. Anderson to Minister of Defence, 1 March 1920, file 535/2/145, series MP267/1, NAA; 'Fronsac', *Garrison gunners*, 69.
23. Senior Officer Artillery Fort Largs to Paul, 19 April 1918, file AP161/1/1, NAA; 'Fronsac', *Garrison gunners*, 97-108, 144-8; Jose, *Royal Australian Navy*, 380-1. The quote is from *Garrison gunners*, 102.
24. *Argus*, 7 June 1915, 10, 21 June 1915, 13, 2 July 1915, 7; 'Notes for recruits' and WL Raws, 'Home training', *Australian Military Journal*, January 1916, 207-8, 241-8. The quote is from 242.
25. *Officers' list of the Australian Military Forces 1st September 1915* (Melbourne: Government Printer, 1915), *Argus*, 20 August 1915, 7, 20 November 1915, 19, 19 September 1917, 11; CPD 83: 2334, 20 September 1917, Pearce, and 89; 11536, 13 August 1919, Tudor, CH Brand, 'Leadership and Discipline', *United Service Journal* (NSW), January-February 1923, 8.
26. *Argus*, 7 August 1915, 18, 17 August 1915, 8, 10 September 1915, 5, 27 September 1916, 5, 19 September 1917, 11; Jensen report, 26; CPD 84 4057, 18 April 1918, Bolton.
27. CPD, vol 79, 10 May 1916, 7790, Catts; Dorothy M Catts, James Howard Catts MHR (Sydney: Ure Smith, 1953), 53-82.
28. *Argus*, 3 July 1916, 3, 9 May 1917, 11; *Commonwealth year books*, 1917, 987, and 1918, 1020-2.
29. 63rd & 64th Battalion muster rolls 1912-20, items 18/22-23, Australian War Memorial series AWM1; Victorian Scottish Regiment muster roll, 1906-18, item MP844/7, NAA; *Defence Act* amendment, no 36 of 1914.
30. A subjective judgement. Officers who served in and out of Australia are listed in *Officers' lists* for the Australian Military Forces and Australian Imperial Force, 1915-18.
31. File 474/8/218, series MP367/1, NAA (the quote is from Secretary of Defence to Treasury, 2 August 1918), 'Defence-navy and defence administration—royal commission second progress report', 14 February 1918, CPP, 1917-18 vol 4. no 42, 31; *Argus*, 23 March 1918, 7; *Australian Dictionary of Biography* 9: 381-2; this entry on the family strangely omits any mention of David Howell-Price's famous wartime fraud.
32. Inspector General to Secretary of Defence, 18 July 1917, file PB454/4/657, series MP367/1, NAA; Jensen report, 171-2; CPD 86: 6450-1, 27 September 1918, Pearce.
33. *Argus*, 6 May 1916, 17; Catts to Pearce, 29 May 1916, and 'A memorandum by the Executive Committee addressed to the members of the Australian National Defence League', May 1916, file A264/1/242, series A2023, NAA.
34. File A264/1/242, series A2023, NAA, 'Compulsory military service', 28 February 1917, CPP, 1914-17 vol 2, no 373; Jensen report, 223-33.
35. KS Inglis, 'Conscription in peace and war', R Forward & B Reece (eds), *Conscription in Australia* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1968), 41; *Australian Dictionary of Biography* 13: 551.
36. *Argus*, 21 March 1916, 7; files A325/1/47 & A325/1/50, series A2023, NAA; file 59272/806, series MP367/1, NAA; *Anzac Bulletin*, 11 April 1917, 16; *Commonwealth year book*, 1917, 1015; Jensen report, 208; Arthur Dean & Eric Gutteridge, *The Seventh Battalion AIF* (Melbourne: Purbrick, 1933), 7.
37. Beckett, *Amateur military tradition*, 237-43.
38. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 17 November 1914, 9.
39. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 8 January 1915, 8, 1 February 1915, 8, 5 February 1915, 9, 24 February 1915, 12, 4 March 1915, 10; EJ Hill, 'The rifle club movement in Australia', *Lone Hand*, May 1915, 355-6; 'Edgecliff Rifle Club ... syllabus of instruction', Edgecliff Rifle Club Papers, Mitchell Library MDQ358.24/1; *Australian Dictionary of Biography* 7: 563.
40. *Commonwealth year book*, 1917, 1017; *Australian Dictionary of Biography*: 7 563.
41. 'Secretary's report 1916-1917', Edgecliff Rifle Club Papers; *Argus*, 24 January 1917, 8, 3 May 1918, 7.
42. Pearce to Secretary [of Defence], 25 April 1918, and Adjutant General to Secretary of Defence, 27 April 1918, file 549/3/5, series MP367/1, NAA; CPD 84: 4061, 18 April 1918; George Pearce, 'Proposals of the government for home defence of Australia', 29 April 1918, CPP 1917-18, vol 4, no 89; *Argus*, 3 May 1918, 7; *Sydney Morning Herald*, 1 June 1918, 13; Clark to Secretary of Defence, 30 May 1918, file 549/3/82, series MP367/1, NAA; Scott, *Australia during the war*, 227.
43. Pearce, 'The citizen forces', 29 April 1918 and Adjutant General to commandants, 31 May 1918, file 549/3/5, series MP367/1, NAA; Conditions of service in the Australian militia forces', State Library of Victoria S355.04/W19, vol 166.
44. 26th Battalion cuttings book, 34, John Oxley Library OM69-28.
45. Adjutant General to Secretary of Defence, 6 July 1918, file 549/3/82, series MP367/1, NAA.
46. Commandants' reports May-July 1918 and Sellheim to Secretary of Defence, 18 July 1918, file 549/3/82, series MP367/1, NAA, *Argus*, 9 July 1918, 4.
47. CPD 84: 4057-61, 19 April 1918, Bolton.
48. *Argus*, 10 July 1918, 8.
49. File 584/2/19, NAA series MP367/1; Australian Military Forces, Military Orders 364 & 387 of 1918, 3 and 17 August 1918; *The Soldier*, 6 November 1918, 27, 29 November 1918, 6; *Argus*, 19 November 1918, 4 For an early demand that returned soldiers be relieved of compulsory drill see CPD 77: 4409, 25 June 1915, Greene.
50. Scott, *Australia during the war*, 195.

51. Wilcox, *For hearth and homes*, 83-6.
52. File AA535/2/126, series MP367/1, NAA.
53. *Commonwealth Law Reports* 29: 49-54, 10-11 November 1920; *Argus*, 24 January 1921, 6 (Garth Pratten of the Australian War Memorial directed me to this source); JB Hirst, 'Australian defence and conscription: a re-assessment', part 1, *Australian Historical Studies* 25: 101 (October 1993), 609.
54. 'For the press', c 10 May 1920, file AA535/2/126, series MP367/1, NAA.