

***A CENTURY OF SERVICE:
100 YEARS OF THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY***

***THE UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES
AND MINORITY INTEGRATION***

Alan Gropman

When considering how and why the United States armed forces integrated minorities in the past and integrates minorities (and women) today, five factors stand out:

1. The need for an adequate number of people to promote mission effectiveness.
2. The necessity for armed force units to be cohesive if they are to be effective in combat (or, for that matter, in support of fighting)
3. The fact that the United States armed services integrated themselves with a minimum of outside, political pressures (because key military leaders recognised the essential nature of the necessity for enough cohesive people to perform the missions assigned them by the national command authority).
4. The reality that politicians have tried and will continue to try to manipulate the racial, ethnic, and gender integration issue in the services with concern for the service secondary to social or political gain (which may be the same thing in the view of a politician).
5. The recognition that bigotry and sexism are powerful predilections that can make one act contrary to the interests of the service and the country, and also contrary to one's personal interests. Regarding point 5, because of the negative power of prejudice, it must be carefully monitored, guarded against, and overturned.

Recognise at the outset, that the United States military is the most racially and gender-integrated profession in the United States,¹ but also realise that the United States military is not perfect in regard to racial or gender integration. Its record in racial and gender integration has not always been consistently positive and has been and will certainly be in the future marred by bigotry.

A paper this brief calls for generalisations, and all generalisations contain some false elements. When compared to other institutions in the United States regarding racial or gender integration, the American military stands out as more successful than any other mass institution. It got to that point by seeing clearly the connection between non-discrimination policies and mission effectiveness. The generalisations regarding military racial and gender integration in this paper will be positive, but I recognise the exceptions to the generally successful record, and I acknowledge the shortcomings in policy and especially application.

Since this is an historical essay, let me pay homage to the historical law of multicausation. The military racial integration process in the United States had begun in World War II. It was surely hastened by American congressional and presidential politics and actions during and primarily after the war. It was, furthermore, expedited by articulate and forceful campaigning by black newspapers such as the *Pittsburgh Courier* and leadership organisations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). It was also accelerated by black protests against racial discrimination within both the military and greater civilian society. It was, moreover, encouraged by the changing, more tolerant human climate of the times. But for all of the influences delineated above this reform (and that is the correct word for military racial integration) was promoted mainly by the practical, pragmatic needs of the armed services.² Armed forces racial integration was carried out because of military necessity.

The first, and most prominent element or force in regard to integrating minorities and women in the American military, therefore, was and is the sheer need for people. Above everything, that is the essential motivator—the absolute necessity to populate the force with enough people able to perform the military mission. Clausewitz asserted that superiority in numbers is

the first principle of war, and Napoleon declared that God is on the side of the bigger battalions. The essentiality of people drove the armed forces to practise non-discrimination and equal opportunity and that is the reason why there are so many blacks in the United States military and the reason why there are so many women (and, incidentally, so many black women). Once the military needed to go outside the majority and also beyond just men to people the force—and this became even more crucial in the United States when the all-volunteer force instead of conscription became the peopling system—each of the armed services found it essential to practise nondiscrimination and equal opportunity. The need to people the force with talented men and women is the best antidote to bigotry. Why?

If one is required to turn to a minority population—blacks for example—to organise a force the size necessary to protect and promote national interests, or turns to women for the same reasons,³ then one immediately is confronted with the question: what kind of blacks or women does one want to recruit (either as officers or enlisted) and how does one retain trained and qualified superior people irrespective of race or gender? There is a simple answer to this question—the services want to enlist the best (the smartest, bravest, most disciplined people). How do the services enrol the best qualified? By promising equal opportunity or non-discrimination in all aspects of the military, for all—all minorities, both genders.

At the base of the ramp that runs from the Air Force Academy parade ground to the academy quadrangle are the first three words of a poem, 'Bring me men. .'. The whole line reads: 'Bring me men to match my mountains, bring me men to match my plains.' If that is the kind of men one wants, and when 'Bring me men ...' was put on that wall, there were no blacks or females at the Air Force Academy, what kind of blacks (or any other minority) and what kind of women does an armed service want? The answer the uniformed leaders give is this, they want all men and all women—blacks, Hispanics, Asian-Pacifics, etc—to match the mountains and to match the plains. That is, they want the best they can get. How does one get the best men and women into any profession? By ensuring that anyone entering has an equal opportunity to succeed. Equal opportunity and non-discrimination are not ends, they are means to an end, and the end is an effective military.⁴

Equal to the essential nature of populating the military in terms of motivating equal opportunity and non-discrimination programs is the necessity for cohesion. In a military unit cohesion is everything.⁵ Uniformed people fight for each other—for the people in the unit. A commander aspires to weld a unit so tightly together that the people would rather die than let down the others in the unit. Discrimination and cohesion cannot coexist. If there is discrimination in an armed service unit there will be no cohesion. The services are ruthless about rooting out discrimination because it destroys cohesion. Again, non-discrimination is not an end, but rather a means to an end, and that end is cohesion without which a military unit will not be effective in combat.⁶

The first points, then, are these: (1) the foundation for United States military racial and gender integration is the need for a sufficiently abundant number of effective people; such people are those with a high order of discipline and also high aptitudes and attitudes, and such people are definitely sought and seldom easy to find; (2) to get these people and to keep them and to ensure that the units that these outstanding people populate are cohesive, the United States armed forces practice equal opportunity and nondiscrimination.

The third point to be made is that the United States military integrated itself. Politicians served mainly as catalysts. That is, when the leadership of each service came to the conclusion that racial integration would be beneficial, segregation was abandoned.⁷ I recognise the services would not have been able to integrate racially if the commander-in-chief opposed it, and although President Harry S. Truman was a segregationist,⁸ he did not oppose military racial integration when it came. However and furthermore, despite his racial bias and segregationist attitude, he believed blacks deserved such civil rights as voting and opposed ruses like the whites-only-primary elections, falsely applied literacy tests, and poll taxes that prevented blacks from voting. Truman also lobbied hard for anti-lynching legislation. All of the above put him well in front of nearly all successful southern or border state politicians on the matter of race, but he was still a segregationist. Truman therefore is, indeed, complex, but for all his

belief in the 'little man' (and no part of the population was more disadvantaged than the black), he did not favour social integration. In other words, and we will deal with this below, Truman (and many of his biographers) takes (give him) credit for integrating military life, something he personally opposed for himself.

One could say he encouraged racial integration in the Air Force (the first service to integrate) by political actions taken during and inspired by the presidential campaign of 1948. He, however, did not order integration and failed to implement it in the services. Military integration in the Air Force was announced several months before Truman's Executive Order 9811, July 1948, and no other service followed the Air Force lead before or after the Executive Order until well into the Korean War. Truman's record on armed forces integration is ambiguous. The armed services' record is not.

When Truman issued Executive Order 9811, no service integrated a single person. In fact the Executive Order did not call for integration (the word is not used), just equal opportunity.⁹ The armed forces had argued in the past and even several services in July 1948—falsely of course—that they were in fact practising equal opportunity, although it was in a segregated environment (impossible to do of course, but that was the position taken by the military leadership, even if the Supreme Court of the late nineteenth century argued that 'separate but equal' was the law of the land).

Understand, furthermore, the military did not integrate to improve the lot of blacks in the general population; the armed services did not see racial integration as an ethical, moral or constitutional imperative. The military did nothing to help the life of blacks in racist communities, North and South, and the late 1940s were not good years for blacks. Lynching still occurred in the South and border states, schools were segregated in every state formerly in the Confederacy (and several that were not), and the differential in spending for white schools versus black schools was intolerably high. Colleges and universities in southern and border states were also segregated. Blacks were denied access to parks, swimming pools and libraries all over the South. Movie theatres and other public access facilities were also segregated. Housing was segregated in the South and much of the North. Transportation was segregated in southern and border states. These mores humiliated blacks, but the services paid no attention. They did not see their role as rectifying this social problem. The armed forces integrated racially to make better use of black people, and to enlist black people with talent—people who could perform the military mission—into the armed services. Each service came to the conclusion that segregation was unnecessary and in fact counterproductive, and when that conclusion was reached, that service integrated racially. Military racial integration was accomplished well ahead of American society.

The United States Air Force, for a prominent example, announced it would racially integrate in April 1948, three months before Truman's Executive Order. Why? Because the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Lieutenant General Idwal Edwards, had come to the conclusion that segregation was wasteful—maintaining two sets of barracks, mess halls, recreation facilities, transportation, etc—and, worse, was depriving the Air Force of blacks who could fly and fight, who could maintain and arm aircraft, and who had proven to his satisfaction that blacks could do anything whites could do if given the training and opportunity.

After World War II demobilisation, furthermore (and this is crucial), blacks were more eager to remain in the Air Force, and to enter the Air Force than whites. Blacks in the enlisted Air Force exceeded, furthermore, the black fraction of the American population, but blacks were limited to half the specialties in the Air Force because of segregation. There was only one, segregated, black, flying wing in the Air Force (flying single, reciprocating-engine fighters), and there were almost fifty white, flying wings. There were, moreover, surplus, qualified bomber pilots in this black fighter wing, left over from World War II, but these men could not be assigned to other wings because these were all 'white' wings. There were also engine mechanics in this black wing who would have been very useful in bomber outfits, but these too could not be reassigned because of segregation. There were high aptitude blacks who wanted to join the Air Force, but they were confined to menial tasks outside of the one, black fighter wing. General Edwards was Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and such limitations of assignment were anathema to people in the personnel management world.¹⁰

As much to the point, there was in fact no basis in science—anthropological, biological or sociological—for racial segregation. Blacks were not inherently or biologically inferior to whites. In other words, there was no justifiable foundation for segregation. Segregation was based on the shaky foundation of race prejudice.¹¹

Edwards called on a Lieutenant Colonel from his staff, one Jack Marr, to research the issue of racial superiority or inferiority as it pertained to the military. Marr looked at the success of the Tuskegee Airmen, their record in World War II, and also at the record of other black units in the Army Air Forces that had technical jobs. His focus was on the facts of success of the 99th Pursuit Squadron in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. He also inquired into the success of the 332nd Fighter Group that defended American bombers uniquely well—having never lost a bomber to an enemy fighter in 200 missions (about 10,000 sorties).¹²

The 332nd had escorted bombers to some of the most heavily defended targets in Hitler's Europe: Ploesti, Munich, Berlin for three examples. No white fighter unit, and all the rest were white, that stayed in the hunt nearly as long as the 332nd could claim never losing a bomber to an enemy fighter. Tuskegee Airmen shot down the third, fourth and fifth German fighter jets that were shot down by allied pilots in World War II. Pilots in the 332nd sunk a German destroyer with machine gun fire, the only such victory in the war, shot down more than 110 aircraft in air-to-air combat, destroyed another 150 on the ground, and ruined many German and Nazi-allied barges, locomotives and railroad cars.¹³

The 332nd flew as one fighter group among many others in XVth Air Force (all the rest were white) and was employed by General Nathan Twining, the XVth Air Force commander, as any other unit. The 332nd was scheduled as often as any other Group in Italy. All the aircraft were maintained by blacks, armed by blacks, and all the maintainers, armourers, cooks, clerks and pilots were supervised and commanded by blacks.¹⁴

Before World War II began, virtually nobody in the Army and the Army Air Corps who had rank or responsibility would have believed the Tuskegee Airmen could have accomplished all they did. Lieutenant Colonel Marr came to the conclusion that blacks who were given the same training as whites, and who had the same aptitude as whites (and aptitude test scores certainly verified many blacks had the capacity to succeed), would perform equally to whites. There was, therefore, no biological basis for racial segregation. The only basis for racial segregation was racial prejudice.¹⁵

Marr, at great risk to his career, reported his findings to General Edwards who convinced United States Air Force Chief of Staff, General Carl Spaatz, who announced in April 1948, that the Air Force intended to integrate racially. This announcement did not meet with the approval of the United States Army, but the Air Force had been independent of the Army for about six months and carried out integration in May 1949. The Air Force broke up the 332nd Fighter Wing at Lockbourne Air Force Base, Ohio, in May 1949, sending the men all over the Air Force—including four to Arizona to begin teaching whites how to fly. From that moment blacks joining the Air Force were assigned to the positions their aptitude called for and not to black units. It took two years to break up all of the black service units and send these men to integrated outfits.¹⁶

The United States Army and the United States Marine Corps did not integrate until more than two years later. They began the process during the Korean War and actually in Korea. Both services came to the conclusion that combat-effectiveness lay in the direction of integration and, therefore, integrated. It is more than arguable that the pressures of combat during the Korean War were the primary instigator of Marine and Army racial integration.¹⁷

The fourth aspect I mentioned in the introduction is the role played by politics. President Truman's motivation in 1948, for issuing Executive Order 9981 was political. He was in a very tight race for president and two of his three major opponents—Governor Thomas Dewey and former Vice President and cabinet secretary Henry Wallace were ardently campaigning for the black vote. Truman was known to be a segregationist and he became convinced by his aides—most prominent of whom on this issue was Clark Clifford—that he had to make

dramatic gestures to the black community to win the black vote, without which, in Clifford's estimation, he could not be re-elected. Politics, therefore, drove the decision to issue Executive Order 9981. In 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt, running for an unprecedented third term, needing to retain the black vote, promised if reelected to create a black flying organisation. He won and did as he promised, against the wishes of his uniformed generals and the leaders of the War Department. In the 1980s, a prominent member of the United States House of Representatives threatened to legislate a quota of 25 per cent women for the United States Air Force. An arbitrary number to be sure, and one that the Air Force has not been able to reach in a completely open environment¹⁸

Probably the most well-known political gesture is candidate Bill Clinton's promise if elected to order that gays be permitted to serve in the military openly (and that adverb is the key word) after he took \$6.2 million in campaign contributions from gay organisations in the election campaign of 1992. He asserted that he would do as President Truman had done, that is, integrate gays openly with a stroke of a pen as Truman had done with blacks.¹⁹ But Truman, as we have seen, had not done that. Bad history is a killer.

Clinton announced soon after inauguration his intent to carry out his promise and ran into objections from the uniformed military primarily because recruiting and retention—neither at that moment robust—would be deleteriously affected. Unquestionably homophobia among young Americans was the key factor, but that does not alter my point that the military was being used by Clinton as a social or political tool, as Truman had done in 1948 and Roosevelt in 1940, all presidential election years. Clinton ran into more substantive objections yet from the Congress, and in the end a compromise with the service chiefs was hammered out, and later a policy was legislated. This became the 'don't ask, don't tell, don't pursue' policy in the military, but the legislation enforcing that policy is strict.²⁰

Candidate Al Gore asserted in the presidential campaign of 2000 that he intended to reverse the 'don't ask, don't tell policy' (which was actually a law that only Congress could change) by executive order. He also said he would use as a litmus test for future senior commanders their ratification of a policy of gays serving openly. On both issues he was required to back-track immediately. He was brought up short by being reminded that the Congress had legislated limits on homosexuals serving openly which he could not overturn by executive order, and the notion of such a litmus test for senior commanders aggravated many more people than it attracted. Nowhere in any of these moves by Roosevelt, Truman, Clinton or Gore, is there so much as a word on what effect such moves would have on the military and, therefore, the national security of the state. There is definitely a bent by politicians to use the military for personal social or political purposes.

Finally, I want to deal with the notion that prejudice can be an overwhelmingly powerful emotion, blinding one to the country's interest and also one's own. Examples abound. The one I talk about the most is one I uncovered many years ago—the Freeman Field Mutiny, in which a medium-bomber group commander, eager to get his unit into combat so that he could probably be promoted to general, drove the unit into mutiny over his illegally segregating officers' clubs. The unit never got into combat because its morale collapsed. There are numerous examples of officers and non-commissioned officers discriminating against blacks during the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, 1970s provoking race riots, and, of course, diminishing the service's capability to perform its mission.

Finally, the services decided to fight bigotry directly by educating the troops at all levels and to teach the men and women in the military the costs of discrimination and what could be done to avoid it and prevent it.

In 1971, the Defense Department created the Defense Race Relations Institute to educate people at all levels of the price the military and the country paid for bigotry, prejudice, racism and the discrimination these led to. At the same time, the Defense Department mandated an equal opportunity staff at virtually all installations that was responsible for monitoring the social climate and also accountable for solving problems at the lowest level possible. The institute and the apparatus have existed for thirty years.²¹

The Defense Race Relations Institute broadened its mission and changed its name to the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute some years ago when it widened its canvas to take in more than just race discrimination. Today there is certainly as much emphasis on gender bias and sexual harassment as there is on racial discrimination. The Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (or DEOMI as it is called) carefully monitors the racial climate in all services, conducts and analyses equal opportunity climate surveys, and, most importantly, educates human relations officers in a multimonth course, to provide trained and educated people for military units to solve human relations problems in units.²²

We end as we began. The United States military is the most racially and gender integrated major institution in America because it practices equal opportunity. It does so because it would not be mission effective if it did not practice non-discrimination. Were it deficient in this its equal opportunity practices, it would not have the people necessary to protect and promote United States interests, and its military units would not have the cohesion essential to make them effective in combat.

Endnotes

1. See, for one example of the degree of military racial integration, Charles C Moskos and John Sibley Butler, *All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration The Army Way* (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 1, 2. The United States military 'is an organization unmatched in its level of racial integration. It is an institution unmatched in its broad record of black achievement. It is a world in which Afro-American heritage is part and parcel of the institutional culture. It is the only place in American life where whites are routinely bossed around by blacks.' Moskos and Butler are writing about the Army, but, as the statistics below will indicate, their comments apply to the other services as well. Moskos and Butler are experts on the United States Army specifically and the military in general. Moskos is probably the leading military sociologist in the world. See also Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, DEOMI Statistical Pamphlet 00-1, 'Demographic Trends in the Active Armed Forces' US Coast Guard, 1989-1999'. Blacks make up 26.5 per cent of the United States Army, more than twice the percentage blacks make up of the United States population, 18.7 per cent of the Navy, about 150 per cent of the black fraction of the population, 15.7 per cent of the Air Force, more than 125 per cent of the black fraction of the population, and 15.6 per cent of the Marine Corps. See also Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute Statistical Series Pamphlet no 00- 4, 'Semiannual Race/Gender Profile by Service/Rank of the Department of Defense & U.S. Coast Guard, September 2000'. Across all the armed services, black non-commissioned officers at the highest rank (E-9) serve well out of proportion to the black fraction of the population and usually the black fraction of the particular service. Thus blacks are 22.1 per cent of the enlisted force in all services, and 23 per cent of the E-9s. In the Army blacks make up 29.1 per cent of the enlisted, and 39.6 per cent of the E-9s. In the Navy 20.6 per cent of the enlisted are black, but only 9 per cent of the E-9s. In the Air Force, 11.4 per cent of the enlisted are black, and 18.5 percent of the E-9s. In the Marine Corps 16.2 per cent of the enlisted are black, and 30.3 per cent of the E-9s. In every service the percentage of officers is much lower than the percentage of enlisted. In the Army it is 11.4 per cent, Navy 6.5 per cent, Air Force 6.4 per cent, and Marine Corps 6.5 per cent. Despite the fact these figures are lower than the enlisted, they are out of proportion to comparable figures in any other walk of life in the United States. See Moskos and Butler, *All That We Can Be*, 47: 'If officers are the executives of the armed forces, the armed forces boast more black executives than any other institution in the country'. Women make up 15 per cent of the service officer corps and 14.5 per cent of the enlisted force. In the Army 7.2 per cent of the E-9s are women, Navy 4 per cent, Air Force 11 per cent, Marine Corps 3 per cent.

2. See Morris J. MacGregor's wonderfully detailed, well written and definitive account, *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1981). Other books that can be consulted are Alan L. Gropman, *The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964*, 2nd edn (Washington, DC Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998); Richard M. Dalfiume, *Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts. 1939-1953* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1969); Lee Nichols, *Breakthrough on the Color Front* (New York: Random House, 1954); Richard J. Stillman, *Integration of the Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces* (New York: Praeger, 1968). Dalfiume and I disagree about the role and motivation of President Harry S. Truman in promoting armed forces racial integration. Nichols' book is sentimental and journalistic, and Stillman's is polemical. I also want to insert early in this essay the argument that the services integrated racially because it was the militarily right thing to do. Racial integration in the military was carried out with celerity and thoroughness, especially in the Air Force, Army and Marine Corps, because it was motivated from within. There is no question that thoughts of racial justice were in the air in the mid-1940s and early 1950s, and that the prime military racial reformers were probably affected by these notions. Certainly some politicians were urging equal and civil rights for blacks. Unquestionably Harry S. Truman's Executive Order 9981 promulgated during the presidential campaign of 1948 had a catalytic effect on the mind and mood of some military leaders. There is no doubt in this historian's mind that eventually military racial segregation would have been overcome, but this process would have been years off had not some pragmatic military leaders sought to make the services more effective by integrating racially. The key civil rights and voting rights acts were not passed until fifteen years and sixteen years after Air Force racial integration, and it took the skilled manoeuvring of President Lyndon B. Johnson—a brilliant political and legislative tactician—to get the bills passed. And Johnson's legislative acumen needed Martin Luther King, Jr to bring the American majority to a peak of moral indignation over segregation, discrimination and racism. Truman is given much more credit than he deserves on this matter. See Gropman, *The Air Force Integrates*, 75-85; the first edition contains the relevant documents, including the regulations that governed integration.

3. See William S. Cohen, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2000), 105-9, and appendices F-20-F-23 on black and white propensity to enlist. These charts demonstrate that blacks have a much higher propensity to enlist in the military than whites. See especially 109 for the essentiality of equal opportunity in an all volunteer atmosphere: 'Entering the 21st century, the Department acknowledges that the continued success of the all-volunteer force and the continued achievement of national security interests requires the full use of the talents of quality recruits, irrespective of race, ethnic background, and gender'.

4. See Department of Defense Directive 1350.2, 18 August 1995, 1,2. This publication applies to everybody in the Department of Defense and demands support for the military equal opportunity program 'as a military and economic necessity' and charges the chiefs of the service with the

responsibility for 'eliminating any unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment'. The four-star leaders of their institutions must '[p]romote an environment free from personal, social, or institutional barriers that prevent Service members from rising to the highest level of responsibility possible. Service members shall be evaluated only on individual merit, fitness, and capability. Unlawful discrimination against persons or groups based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is contrary to good order and discipline and is counterproductive to combat readiness and mission accomplishment. Unlawful discrimination shall not be condoned'.

5. Here is what the United States Congress in Title 10 United States Code 654, Part ii—Personnel, Chapter 37—General Service Requirements, says about cohesion. First of all the 'primary purpose of the armed forces is to prepare for and to prevail in combat ... Success in combat requires military units that are characterized by high morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion . . . One of the most critical elements in combat capability is unit cohesion, that is, the bonds of trust among individual service members that make the combat effectiveness of a military unit greater than the sum of the combat effectiveness of the individual unit members.'

6. See Air Force Instruction 36-2706, 1 December 1996, Military Equal Opportunity and Treatment Program, 7: 'The primary objective of the EOT [equal opportunity and treatment] program is to improve mission effectiveness by promoting an environment free from personal, social, or institutional barriers that prevent Air Force members from rising to the highest levels of responsibility based on their individual merit, fitness and capability ... Unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment are contrary to good order and discipline and counterproductive to combat readiness and mission accomplishment . . . discrimination ... will not be tolerated'.

7. David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992). This is the definitive biography, but the author is an overwhelmingly sympathetic biographer. McCullough writes that Truman 'had strong opinions and no small share of bigotry', and used 'expressions like "coon," "nigger," freely (83). During World War I he wrote about his hate for orientals and his belief that he was 'strongly of the opinion that negroes ought to be in Africa ...' (86). McCullough wrote about Truman as a campaigner in 1940 (247): 'Privately... he still used the word "nigger" and enjoyed the kind of racial jokes commonly exchanged over drinks in senate hideaways. He did not favor social equality for blacks and he said so.' (My emphasis, recognising that Miller interviewed Truman decades after he left office, and the former president was still a social segregationist.) See also Merle Miller, *Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S Truman* (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Publishing Corporation, 1973), 183. Miller writes: 'Privately (Miller's emphasis) Truman *always* (my emphasis) said "nigger"; at least he always did when I talked to him. That's what people in Independence said when he was growing up. Of course, Independence was a Southern town, a border town, one of whose more prominent organisations has been the United Daughters of the Confederacy.' Well, all right, but Truman obviously knew the word was highly offensive to blacks because he never used it when on the political stump, when he campaigned in Harlem or on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial. Realise, further, Miller recorded Truman at the end of his life, long after he retired, and, apparently, long after he believed he needed to be politically correct. No matter what McCullough and Miller write in their overwhelmingly favourable volumes, Truman's nature regarding blacks comes through—he was and remained throughout his life, a segregationist. But, then again, Truman certainly transcended his origins and certainly was more tolerant than most politicians in Missouri, a slave state (that remained in the Union, however) before and during the Civil War, with strong Confederate sympathies afterwards. He, however, always thought himself representative of the little man, and 'he wanted fairness, equality before the law' for blacks and whites. Truman had indeed advocated civil rights for blacks in his hotly contested re-election campaign of 1948, but what I am dealing with here is motivation (always tricky). The impetus for his advocacy seems to have come from Phileo Nash and Clark Clifford recommending civil rights promotion in order to win the black vote in 1948. See Gropman, *The Air Force Integrates*, 79-82. Incorporated in these pages are the memoranda written to President Truman pushing the civil rights agenda for political purposes.

8. Executive Order 9981, July 1948: 'It is essential that there be maintained in the Armed Services of the United States the highest standards of democracy with equality of treatment and opportunity for all those who serve ... It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Armed Services without regard to race ... There shall be created in the national Military Establishment an advisory committee to be known as the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services ... the committee is authorized ...to examine into the rules, procedures, and practices of the Armed Services ... to determine in what respect such rules, procedures and practices may be altered or improved with a view to carrying out the policy of this order'. Significantly, the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment (the so-called Fahy Committee (after its Chairman Charles Fahy), was not established until 1949, well after Truman was safely elected, and it was disestablished long before the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy racially integrated

9. For Edwards's role and Marr's supporting research see Gropman, *The Air Force Integrates*, 67-72. I interviewed Edwards extensively (the interviews are in the Alan Gropman Collection at the Air University Library Archives, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama). He had no warm feelings for black people, but, on the other hand, he would not tolerate racial bigotry destroying the effective use of people.

10 Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marr, below in the text and in the subsequent footnote, made this point in his study. By this time, furthermore, and in the aftermath of the Holocaust and the propaganda campaign

during World War II for national unity, numerous students at various war colleges researched the bases for military racial segregation and unanimously came to the conclusion that there was no biological or other basis for segregation. Segregation was based on bigotry, was their conclusion. This is very different from the 'studies' done in the 1920s and 1930s at the Army War College. These found that blacks were biologically inferior. Read one line to make the point: 'The cranial cavity of the Negro is smaller than the white; his brain weighing 35 ounces contrasted with 45 for the white'. False, of course, but distortions like this were propagated by those in the United States who wanted to reinforce legal segregation. Blacks, moreover, in the same reports, were deficient morally: 'Perry thieving, lying, and promiscuity are much more common among Negroes than among whites. Atrocities connected with white women have been the cause of considerable trouble among Negroes'. Most damning of all, perhaps, in a military report: 'In physical courage it must be admitted that the American Negro falls well back of the white man and possibly all other races'. Therefore, racial segregation was required because blacks supposedly possessed 'physical, mental, moral and other psychological characteristics' that 'made it impossible to associate with any except the lowest class of whites [Negro] social inequality makes the close association of whites and blacks in military organisation inimicable to harmony and efficiency'. See Gropman, *The Air Force Integrates*, 2, 3. The document I am quoting can be found in the Air University Library Archives and also in the Army War College Library. It is the Army War College 'Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, The Use of Negro Manpower in War', 30 October 1925, worked on by the entire student body and faculty during academic year 1924/1925 and signed by the College commandant, a major general. At the Army War College library, one can find additional reports on the same subject, through 1939, all saying about the same thing. The point I am making here is that less than a decade later, the view on race changed in the military. There are more than a dozen studies done at the Air War College and elsewhere that deny biology or any other valid basis for race segregation. See Gropman, *The Air Force Integrates*, 198-9, for bibliographic citations for such studies at the Air War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces. I read all of these when writing *The Air Force Integrates* and perused others in various war college libraries. The difference in a short period of time is dramatic.

11. For Marr and his report and for Edwards's role see Gropman, *The Air Force Integrates*, 64, 72, 91, 99, 102. I interviewed Marr extensively and corresponded with him for several years. His objective report cost him his career. A bigoted senior officer opposed to racial integration destroyed him. Marr concluded that segregation was an unnecessary drag on efficiency, and Idrwal Edwards used Marr's work to justify Air Force racial integration. Regarding the combat success of the Tuskegee Airmen, instrumental in Marr's findings, one should look at Stanley Sandler, *Segregated Skies: All-Black Combat Squadrons of World War II* (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992). Sandler's is the best monograph dealing with the achievements of the Tuskegee Airmen.

12. See John L. Frisbee (ed.), *Makers of the United States Air Force* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987), 234-42, for a quicker summary of record of the 99th Pursuit Squadron and the 332nd Fighter Group. This is a biography by me titled 'Benjamin O. Davis, Jr.: History on Two Fronts'. The chapter covers Davis's entire active life in the Air Force and in government after his military service, and makes his command of the 99th and 332nd the nucleus of his active life.

13. For a focus on the treatment of the Tuskegee Airmen, the men of the 99th, 332nd and 477th Medium Bombardment Group, see Bernard C Nalty, *Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military* (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 143-61. This remains the best single volume on blacks in the American military.

14. See MacGregor, Jr, *The Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965*, 287-8, 342, 616. MacGregor is the definitive work on armed forces racial integration, dealing with all services (including the United States Coast Guard), and the most articulate argument on who and what integrated the United States military.

15. Gropman, *The Air Force Integrates*, 85-105. For the objections of the Army Secretary, Kenneth Royall, see 65-6.

16. MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces*, 428-72. MacGregor emphasises the role played by the Korean War and military pragmatism.

17. Gropman, *The Air Force Integrates*, 78-82, for the role Clark Clifford played in Truman's election campaign manoeuvring. See also pp. 4 and 6 regarding Franklin D. Roosevelt and the election of 1940. See MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces*, 18-19, for Roosevelt's actions in 1940. Regarding women in the Air Force, see *The New York Times*, 5 March 1984, 7.

18. The demand was made by a powerful member of the House of Representatives, Les Aspin, chair of the subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation in the House Armed Services Committee. Aspin later became the Committee Chairman and later yet Secretary of Defense. He proposed legislation that would force the Air Force 'to raise the proportion of recruits who are women to 25 percent by 1987 from the 1983 figure of 15 percent'. Aspin never mentioned where the figure '25 percent' came from, but with no bars to female enlistment, the percentage has not increased since Aspin made his demand. The services abhor arbitrary quotas. There were no limits on numbers of female in 1984 (although there were limits on the specialties women could fill), and in the year this chapter is written, with more than 99 per cent of the specialties in the Air Force open to women, the percentage has not increased. I find the role played by domestic politics in defense matters is often overlooked or grossly underestimated.

19. The press of the day had many articles regarding Clinton and his attempt to change the policy on gays serving openly. For a good summary of the way issue unfolded one might read *Air Force Magazine*, July 1993, 12. The magazine's editor in chief, John Correll, opposed Clinton's attempt to change policy, but he reports the facts straight. Importantly, he places the issue in context. Gay liberation organisations wanted to use the military to improve the civil rights and status of gay people by permitting them to serve in the military openly. It was not, as Correll pointed out, simply a matter of permitting gays to serve their country, as Clinton said many times.

20. On 13 July 1993 the Secretary of Defense promulgated a 'Policy on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces' (note the word 'conduct' because nothing in the policy denies the right of a homosexual to serve so long as he or she kept his or her sex life private and did not harass others in the military). The Congress passed legislation that is now the law of the land. It was promulgated under Title 10, the Armed Forces, Subtitle A, General Military Law, Part II, Personnel, Chapter 37, General Service Requirements, Section 654, Policy concerning homosexuality in the armed forces (note the limiting word 'conduct' is not used). It asserts in its first paragraph 'Section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the United States commits exclusively to the Congress the powers to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a Navy and make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces'. And 'there is no constitutional right to serve in the armed forces'. It argues later that 'unit cohesion' is essential to success in combat, and implies that open homosexuality would endanger cohesion. Further: 'The prohibition against homosexual conduct is a longstanding element of military law that continues to be necessary in the unique circumstances of military service . . . The armed forces must maintain personnel policies that exclude persons whose presence would create an unacceptable risk to the armed forces' high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability . . . The presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order, and discipline, and unit cohesion ... A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed forces . . . if one or more of the following findings is made ... the member engaged in, or attempted to engage in, or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts . . . that the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual unless . . . he or she is not a person who engages in, or attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts . That the member has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the same biological sex'. Later in the law, the Congress gives the Secretary of Defense the right to suspend the 'don't ask' part of the policy/law. In other words, if the Secretary of Defense wants to return to the policy whereby a person enlisting in the service had to declare his or her sexual preference, the Secretary was fully permitted to do so.

21. See the DEOMI [Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute] homepage on the world wide web. Here one can find the history dating back to 1971 and the reasons for the Institute's founding. Here one can find the Institute's mission 'To enhance leadership and readiness by fostering Equal Opportunity (EO) and Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) programs and positive human relations through world class education, training and research'. Here one learns that the Institute is accredited and offers college credit. Throughout readers will find that the organisation is promoting equal opportunity as a means to an end and the end is readiness, not helping members of a minority. This education program is open to Australian officers and enlisted personnel.

22. See Department of Defense Directive 1350.2, 'Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program'. This directive prescribes 'the functions of the Defense Equal Opportunity Council ... and the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute'. It states; 'It is DoD [Department of Defense] policy to: Support the MEO (Military Equal Opportunity) program as a military and economic necessity'. Military leaders at all levels 'are charged with promoting EO [equal opportunity] and affirmative actions, and for eliminating unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment within the Department'. Each service is charged with producing a regulation supporting the program. See, for example, Air Force Instruction 36-2706, 1 December 1996, 'Military Equal Opportunity and Treatment Program', which is a 42-page document. The United States military is serious about its non-discrimination programs.