

***A CENTURY OF SERVICE:
100 YEARS OF THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY***

***MINORITIES AND THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY:
OVERLOOKED AND UNDERREPRESENTED?***

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'Very few of the new manifestations in war can be ascribed to new inventions or new departures in ideas. They result mainly from the transformation of society and new social conditions.'¹

Clausewitz was not the first writer to recognise that changes in society influence the character of armies and the way in which they make war, but he was one of the first to analyse at length how the basis of war was shifting in his time from the aristocratic class to the people as a whole. In place of war limited by resources and manpower a new form of warfare had arrived which drew on the entire population with commensurate increases in power and ambition. Subjects became citizens and citizens acquired the duty of military service for their country. Essential in Clausewitz's view, especially after Prussia's stunning defeat by France in 1806, was the creation of a military spirit among the populace and the opening of the officer corps to those with talent who could bring education and professionalism to the business of war.

After the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815 armies became more national, less willing to accept foreigners in their ranks and more suspicious of the practice of officers changing from one army to another (as Clausewitz himself had done in 1812). Foreign troops had been found not always reliable and national loyalty promised to provide the motive power for mass armies, encouraging volunteers, making conscription workable and providing the glue to hold a state's forces together.² In turn, many European armies in the nineteenth century promoted nationalism by breaking down parochial ties, reducing language barriers and actively rousing patriotism among the population.³

Three principal themes—which remain with us today—can be identified in these social and political changes. First, the idea that citizenship and military service are closely linked, that fighting for one's country is a duty of the citizen which goes alongside the rights he enjoys. The exclusion of women from this duty was to become an issue in democracies only in the late twentieth century.⁴ Second, the idea that since armies are national they should exclude those who do not belong to the nation and share its values. Third, the idea that armies, having ceased to be the instrument of kings save in ceremonial terms, now represented the people both symbolically and substantively. The composition of the nation's forces was thus a matter of public concern.

These ideas often proved controversial. Disagreements arose within armies and between armies and governments about the extent to which military forces should become more representative. Should privileges continue for the aristocratic class—by tradition the most loyal of all to the monarch? Should money and land be a factor in securing commissions—since these meant officers had a stake in the country? Should foreign nationals be enlisted in any circumstances? Should immigrants belonging to alien cultures be permitted to serve? Should Jews or other racial minorities who were citizens be accepted? Most armed forces and governments have at times considered it self-evident that certain ethnic or migrant groups could be disloyal. They have also believed that native populations are unsuited to modern warfare, that women have no role to play in fighting, that homosexuals undermine military discipline and cohesion. All of these issues troubled not only armies but also politics.

The mass conscript armies which became a feature of the European scene for much of the twentieth century were by their nature highly representative of the wider society. But for reasons of military effectiveness they naturally excluded those too old, too young, too unfit, too illiterate, too incompetent or too unwilling to fight. As well, exemptions were often granted to those who were married, in certain occupations or undertaking study. Women were

excluded as a matter of course. Frequently difficult questions arose as to whether recent migrants should be conscripted or, at the other end of the scale, those of aboriginal descent. No-one believed that armed forces should be perfectly representative of wider society.

In the last quarter of the twentieth century conscript armies steadily went out of fashion. Smaller, volunteer forces had to compete for recruits on the open market. In the absence of conscription the question arose whether armed forces could or should remain representative of the wider population along particular dimensions. Was there an obligation to recruit from groups such as ethnic or religious minorities, native peoples, immigrants, women, homosexuals and so on? Would armed forces benefit or lose from doing so? In democratic societies, at least, debate arose about the wisdom and justice of including or excluding such groups.

Further questions focused on whether particular groups should be fairly represented not only in the military as a whole but within its components—such as each of the services, officers and other ranks, regulars and reservists, fighting and support units. During the Vietnam War, for example, it was frequently claimed that blacks were overrepresented in front-line combat units in the US Army and consequently suffered disproportionate casualties. Analysis, however, does not back up this claim either in Vietnam or in subsequent conflicts.⁵ And if misrepresentation was found, what was to be done about it? Should quotas or targets be set? Pursued to its logical and absurd conclusion, the search for perfect representativeness would mean turning away qualified individuals if their group was already fully represented; it would also mean dismissing personnel if the matching group in the population shrank in size.

Nonetheless, it is sensible for armed forces to ask themselves from time to time whether they are reasonably representative of society across the board—and if not, whether such a situation can be justified. It may be they are failing to draw recruits from particular groups or are favouring some groups over others, either deliberately or inadvertently. Remedies might be found which would improve capability, enhance public support, and increase equity in the military. Failure to act might mean lost opportunities for recruitment and retention, as well as outside bodies, including government or the courts, taking steps to change matters, perhaps in ways that do not suit the military.

This essay focuses on the how the ADF and the Australian Army in particular have dealt with two minority groups: Aboriginal and Torres Strait islanders (ATSI) and migrants from non-English speaking backgrounds (NESB). In large part because of its numbers, Army has been more to the fore than its sister services in dealing with questions of representativeness; it has also pursued different policies at times. This essay examines the following topics:

- Australia's policies and practices from 1901 to 2001 and their interaction with wider social and political changes
- the relationship between representativeness and military capability
- factors influencing the recruitment and retention of minority groups, and strategies for improving representativeness
- comparisons with other organisations and with other seemingly similar issues such as the role of women and the acceptance of homosexuals in the armed forces.

The conclusion assesses how the military have accepted or resisted, followed or led changes in the wider society.

Australia 1901-2001

An episode in the early history of the Australian army illustrates a significant clash of ideas on social representativeness—in this case between the government and its British military adviser. Field Marshal Lord Kitchener's proposal for a military college in Australia recommended that fees be paid by cadets (more accurately, by their parents) to ensure that only people with a substantial interest in the nation would fill the officer corps. The government took a contrary view, insisting that egalitarian principles were more appropriate to

Australian society. Politicians also feared that militarism would result from 'a closed and elitist military caste which derived its authority from social standing'. As well, opening the officer corps to all levels of society would make the proposed universal military training scheme more politically acceptable.⁶ The Military Board argued pragmatically that impoverished officers would probably serve for longer periods than wealthy ones.⁷

Also evident from the earliest years of Federation was the government's determination to preserve a White Australia and an even whiter army. Parliament's first legislation restricted migration in order to preserve ethnic homogeneity, enshrining a White Australia policy that lasted until the late 1960s. Accordingly, the Defence Act of 1903 required volunteers for military forces to be 'substantially of European origin or descent'.⁸ Recruiters and medical personnel were left to make the necessary judgements. Similar exclusions applied to the universal training scheme that commenced in 1911. The Royal Military College which opened in the same year was limited to natural-born British subjects, provisos being added in 1914 that they also be 'substantially of European origin or descent' and after World War I that they be of 'British origin or descent'.⁹

Up to the middle of the century the principal ethnic minority in Australia was Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island people.¹⁰ Considered inferior races, their place in Australian society was a subordinate one, if they had anyplace at all. ATSI were denied citizenship and remained without a vote at federal and state elections. A series of Protection Acts treated them as inferior and backward up to 1939 when a policy of assimilation into the white community was adopted. If they had a warrior tradition, it was believed to be that of tribal warfare not Western style armies. Accordingly, many regarded them as unsuitable for military discipline and training. Their supposed lack of a work ethic was a common complaint.

Rather than reject a society that marginalised them, however, many ATSI were willing to participate in Australia's wars. A few Aboriginal trackers served in the Boer War, about four-to-five hundred volunteered for service in World War I, and some 3000 were formally enlisted in World War II (out of a total of about 85,000 ATSI or little more than 1 per cent of the Australian population).¹¹ Considerable numbers of Australians of Chinese extraction also served in both World Wars.¹² Officially excluded minorities got into uniform because for various reasons some in the recruitment process either ignored or bent the rules about European descent. It was the exigencies of war, in particular, that also caused official minds to become rather more open.

In May 1940 Army still formally regarded the enlistment of soldiers of 'non-European origin or descent' as 'neither necessary nor desirable'.¹³ Mixing blacks and whites, it was argued, would result in less cohesive and effective fighting units. Doubts were also expressed about the loyalty of Aboriginals, some of whom were suspected of assisting the Japanese.¹⁴ The Air Force was less concerned than Army on such matters, focusing on the technical skills of potential recruits as well as being short of manpower due to the Empire Air Training Scheme. The Navy was more concerned, believing that confined living on board ship made mixing of races unworkable.

By July 1940 Army decided that Aboriginals already enlisted would be allowed to stay and that suitable 'half-castes' would be permitted to join.¹⁵ With the threat from Japan even more apparent by 1941 irregular units were set up in northern Australia, notably the Northern Territory Special Reconnaissance Unit (NTSRU), to make use of the local knowledge and bushcraft of Aboriginals.¹⁶ A Torres Strait Light Infantry (TSLI) battalion and other units were also formed with white officers and NCOs.¹⁷ Many other ATSI supported the military effort in an unofficial capacity. Even those formally enlisted in the TSLI, however, were underpaid (about one-third of their full entitlement) while those in units such as the NTSRU and the Melville Island Patrol received no pay at all.¹⁸

The efforts of minorities in World War II were not recognised by immediately ending discriminatory policies. ATSI who had served in the war were given the vote, a mark of citizenship, but a ban was placed on further recruitment. When Arthur Calwell announced the new migration program in 1945, he pointed to the important contribution it would make to the

defence of Australia.¹⁹ But any recruits from migrant background were naturally expected to be primarily British or at least European. This made it easier to eliminate references to race in the Defence Act in 1951, a move also motivated by the development of closer relations with Asian countries to counter the perceived communist threat.²⁰

The compulsory military service schemes that operated between 1951-59 and 1965-72 did not progress the cause of minorities very far. Both initially excluded ATSI though the later scheme was amended in 1967 to require them to register. One justification for differential treatment was that military service should not be imposed on those who were not full members of the community: no conscription without political representation. Thus ATSI were not treated as full citizens until a referendum to amend the Constitution was passed in 1967 and were not required to enrol and to vote until 1983. Some in favour of conscripting aboriginals argued that they should be prepared to bear the burdens if they wanted equal citizenship, while others believed that conscription would signify or facilitate acceptance of their equal status in the community.

Whatever the merits of such arguments, they were rendered irrelevant by administrative difficulties.²¹ The decision to register aboriginals from 1967—the year of the citizenship referendum—ran up against the fact that each State had its own definition of aboriginality and often different administrative practices for recording dates of birth (essential to the ballot system). Efforts by Commonwealth and State governments to have the Department of Labour and National Service determine aboriginality by administrative decision were successfully resisted by the Department. The matter remained unresolved by the time conscription ended.

Another controversial issue in the 1960s was whether or not to conscript migrants who had settled in Australia but had not yet become naturalised. (None had been called up in the 1950s.) Public opinion seemed to think it only fair that people who had chosen Australia as their home should accept the duty of defending it.²² One poll reported 89 per cent in favour once Australian conscripts were already fighting in Vietnam.²³ To many it was an appropriate test of a migrant's commitment to Australia. The government prevaricated: objections were likely from foreign governments whose former citizens were to be conscripted; some governments might respond by conscripting Australians overseas; prospective migrants would be discouraged by fear of conscription; and some individuals might face military service in Australia as well as their home country. Besides, the Army was unenthusiastic, citing language problems and difficulties with security checks.²⁴ It was also the case that the Army did not need more personnel; conscription was already highly selective.

Some migrant communities also opposed the idea but the Australian government bowed to popular pressure. The rules adopted, however, required registration only for those migrants who had been in Australia for at least two years; in addition, non-British migrants could defer their service until the age of 21, giving them the option of leaving Australia as an adult.²⁵ They would also be permitted to return to Australia at any time, though remaining liable for military service up to the age of 26. In the event, few actually saw military service since language and security checks still proved major barriers.

The election of a Labor government in 1972 and the abolition of conscription created an entirely new set of circumstances. Henceforth the services had to rely on attracting sufficient volunteers to maintain their numbers. Attention therefore had to be paid to the attitudes of individuals towards military service and to the changing nature of society as a whole. One wider development of significance was the expansion of non-European migration, notably from Asia, following the end of the White Australia policy in the late 1960s and Australia's withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972. Successive governments also placed greater emphasis on the values of multiculturalism in Australian society and its institutions.

A series of legislative and institutional initiatives not only promoted the value of multiculturalism in society as a whole but also enacted equal rights and the ending of discrimination. The rights of all citizens, including indigenous and migrant minorities, received legal protection and public affirmation from governments of both left and right. It also became widely accepted that the Defence Force as the principal symbol of national unity should adopt

and implement such principles as far as military efficiency permitted. By the early 1990s, however, some were beginning to wonder whether the ADF had fully adjusted to the changing times. An evaluation of recruiting in 1991 by the Inspector-General Division of Defence also flagged the need to examine the prospects for increasing enlistment among the migrant community.²⁶

In late 1991 a report was commissioned by the Minister for Defence Science and Personnel, Gordon Bilney, after a resolution at the ALP conference called for a recruiting policy that aimed at 'an ethnic balance more representative of the wider community' in the ADF. A study of minority issues in the ADF, including ATSI and NESB representation, was commissioned from four academics—three from ADFA, one from ANU.²⁷ The report not only surveyed the composition of the ADF but also examined recruiting practices, personnel policies and military traditions to see whether they worked against the recruitment and retention of minority groups.

An immediate problem for the survey was that Army had no record of the ethnic background of its personnel for the reason that it now recruited Australian citizens regardless of origin. The Report therefore relied on a mixture of personnel records from Navy and Air Force (which did collect country of birth of members and their parents) and a survey of Army personnel to identify the place of birth of members and their parents or their self-identification as ATSI.²⁸ The response rate for the ARA was just over 70 per cent, for the Army Reserves only 45 per cent. Another issue was that of privacy: can members be required to declare their ethnicity? In the event, the Report relied on voluntary reporting, while noting the probability of underestimating the size of minorities as a result. Some ATSI, for example, stated that they wished to be recorded simply as Australians.

The 1993 Report remains the most thorough and comprehensive study of ethnic representation in the AIDF to date. Table 1 shows the number of ATSI personnel (column 1) and their percentage of the ADF as a whole (column 2) according to service. Column 3 compares the proportion of ATSI in the ADF with the proportion of ATSI in the general workforce (one per cent) within the age range 15 to 54 years according to the 1986 Census; column 4 does the same comparison for those in the 15 to 24 age bracket (where ATSI represent 1.58 percent of the workforce). In these two columns a percentage of 100 per cent means that the proportion of ATSI in the ADF exactly matches the proportion in the comparison group; less than 100 per cent indicates under representation in the ADF, above 100 per cent indicates over-representation. In all tables figures for the RAN and RAAF refer only to the full-time component.

TABLE 1 ²⁹
ATSI in the ADF

	Number	ATSI% in ADF	Workforce 15-54 (1%)	Workforce 15-24 (1.58%)
ARA	399	1.19	119	75
ARES	224	1.33	133	84
RAN	44	0.26	26	16
RAAF	30	0.14	14	9

In terms of ATSI representation it is clear that Army does better than Navy and Air Force. The reason for this appears to be the more technical nature of these two services, requiring higher levels of training and qualifications to which ATSI generally have less access for a variety of reasons. At the same time, Army has more opportunities to employ less technically skilled personnel in, for example, combat and reconnaissance units.

It is also clear that ARES does better than ARA. The principal factor is that ATSI make up approximately half of the Far North Queensland Regiment and of the North West Mobile Force (Norforce) which is based in Darwin. These Regional Force Surveillance Units offer unique opportunities for service by ATSI: they will not be deployed away from their home area and are required to meet standards lower than for regular service (hence they cannot transfer to the regular forces without going through the normal recruitment process).

Army's good showing compared with the civilian workforce in the 15-54 age bracket must be tempered by the fact that ATSI in the community are markedly underrepresented in the workforce in this age range. In addition, the comparison with the 15-24 age bracket where younger ATSI are doing better in employment terms is probably a better test. While the age range 15-54 covers virtually all ADF members, about 40 per cent of members were under 25 and about 60 per cent under 30 in the early 1990s. (By 1999 a majority were still under 30 though the figure had slipped to 53 per cent.³⁰)

Table 2 shows the percentage of ADF members born in Australia (column 1), the percentage of these with one or two NESB parents (column 2), the percentage of those born overseas in English-speaking countries (column 3) and the percentage of those born overseas in Non-English-speaking countries (column 4). Table 3 refers to those in the 15-24 age range. In each Table the bottom row provides comparable Figures for the civilian workforce. The anomaly noted earlier—that some born in non-English-speaking countries are likely to have English-speaking parents—applies both to ADF members and the civilian workforce.

Table 2³¹
ADF by birthplace and parentage
15-54 age range

	Australian born	NESB parent(s)	Overseas born (ES)	Overseas born (Non-ES)
ARA	85.1%	6.6%	10.1%	4.8%
ARES	85.2%	8.3%	8.9%	5.9%
RAN	83.0%	6.1%	13.6%	3.4%
RAAF	84.0%	7.1%	11.6%	13.2%
Workforce	75.3%	6.9%	11.6%	13.2%

Table 3³²
ADF by birthplace and parentage
15-24 age range

	Australian born	NESB parent(s)	Overseas born (ES)	Overseas born (Non-ES)
ARA	89.3%	7.8%	6.7%	4.0%
ARES	88.6%	10.3%	6.4%	5.0%
RAN	89.3%	7.5%	8.1%	2.6%
RAAF	89.5%	8.9%	7.3%	3.2%
Workforce	85.5%	13.4%	8.2%	6.3%

Table 2 shows that while all three services have fewer Australian-born members than the civilian workforce (by about ten percentage points), they seem to have attracted Australian-born personnel with one or two NESB parents roughly in proportion to numbers in the civilian workforce. Table 3, however, which reflects more recent recruiting, shows that in the younger age bracket none of the services does particularly well, though ARES does better than the others. This suggests that the ADF has not been attracting the children of migrants in recent times as well as in the past. This is most likely due to the greater proportion in the migrant intake of ethnic groups with relatively low propensity to enlist.

In terms of recruiting those born overseas in English-speaking countries (mostly UK and New Zealand), all services have done well in the 15-54 age group though ARES trails the rest. In the 15-24 age group ARES also trails but the three full-time services all do worse than against the 15-54 age group. Again, this suggests that more recent recruitment has failed to attract members of a group on which it could rely in the past.

The picture with regard to recruiting those born overseas in non-English speaking countries is somewhat different. For the age range 15-54 all services perform poorly, though this might reflect the high number of older migrants in the workforce who lack English language skills and/or who migrated after prime recruiting age. The more recent picture is encouraging, suggesting that the ARA and ARES in particular are attracting a reasonably high proportion of the younger group of migrants born in non-English speaking countries. But both could do better.

There were also wide variations in the propensity to enlist as between different national groups.³³ Better represented in the ADF at the time of the survey were those born in (or with parents born in) Germany, Holland, Malta, India and Malaysia; less well represented were those with Polish, Yugoslav, Greek, Italian, Lebanese and Vietnamese backgrounds. These findings, however, are liable to considerable fluctuation over time.

Following the 1993 Report the ADF increased its efforts to stimulate minority recruitment, including use of ethnic press, television and radio, issuing publications in several languages and greater training for recruiting staff.³⁴ Defence Force advertising and press material included more faces of non-European appearance. For ATSI a Recruitment and Career Development Strategy was established with the aim of bringing representation in the ADF from about 0.7 per cent to about 2 per cent in line with their presence in the community by about 2005.³⁵ A newsletter for ATSI was established, a cultural awareness program developed, attitude surveys conducted, and a video highlighting ATSI members produced.

How well the ADF has in fact done in the last decade is difficult to judge. Apart from the scarcity of information, comparisons of changes in the composition of the ADF are problematic since methods of calculation vary over time; response rates to surveys differ; assessments may or may not include reserves; ATSI and NESB may or may not be included separately; distinctions may or may not be drawn between first and second generation migrants and so on. At the same time, of course, the size of migrant groups against which the ADF is measured will grow or decline, thereby changing the baseline for comparative figures.

Figures from the 1999 ADF Census indicate that with regard to ATSI, at least, the ADF has succeeded in attracting significant numbers in all services.

TABLE 4
ATSI representation

	1992 Survey	1999 Census ³⁶
ARA	1.19%	1.6%
ARES	1.33%	2.0%
RAN	0.26%	1.4%
RAAF	0.14%	1.0%

The 1996 Australian Census provides a benchmark of 1.8 per cent ATSI in the general population (as opposed to the workforce).

Figures for other minorities are less easily compared since detailed information is lacking. The ADF Census 1999 shows that both ARA and ARES have 87 per cent of members born in Australia which is essentially the same as the 1992 survey (The RAN is 86 per cent, RAAF 85 per cent—both slight increases over 1992). By contrast some 76.7 per cent of the general population were born in Australia. Indicative, too, is the fact that some 95 per cent of full-time ADF members speak only English at home compared with about 75 per cent in the general population.³⁷ A study of applicants (not necessarily successful) for the ADF conducted between January 1998 and May 1999 found them less than representative, with both general and officer applications for the Army being more unrepresentative than the other two services.³⁸ Overall, therefore, no major changes are evident in terms of increasing NESB recruitment in recent years.

How Does Representativeness Bear on Military Capabilities?

In considering military effectiveness it is clear that old arguments about mixing ethnic groups being detrimental to cohesion and old stereotypes of certain races being inherently lazy or ill-disciplined are well and truly gone. On the contrary, the benefits of diversity are widely acknowledged and welcomed as is the value of recruiting from a wider base among the population. There is no doubt that the ADF is committed to ensuring minority groups are not the subject of discrimination. Debate is more about whether the ADF has done enough to maximise minority recruitment and to minimise discrimination against those individuals it does recruit.

Nonetheless, some of the arguments against the presence of minorities need to be considered.³⁹ One concern is that diverse migration in recent years makes possible the importation of ethnic rivalries into the ADF with consequent damage to cohesion. The chief response to this is that the socialisation and strong discipline of the armed forces is likely to overcome any minority factionalism. Another concern relates to deployments overseas where members may come into contact with people of the same ethnic background or another community likely to be hostile towards their ethnic background. It would have been unwise, for example, to send a soldier of Vietnamese origin to the UN operation in Cambodia or a Yugoslav Australian to the Balkans. But this is a minor issue, to be dealt with case by case rather than by any policy of exclusion.

As far as the benefits of increasing minority recruitment are concerned, the first and most obvious is that it promises to secure more personnel at a time when the recruiting environment is highly competitive. Thus only about twelve per cent of young people consider the military as a career.⁴⁰ This may have improved to 14-18 per cent by 2000 according to one study, though the 'East Timor effect' may prove only a temporary boost.⁴¹ Also important is that about 40 per cent of the indigenous population are under fifteen compared with 20.7 per cent (and declining) in the rest of the community.⁴² Anything which expands the target population is welcome.

Second are the benefits to the ADF as an organisation of having cultural diversity. There is, in fact, a business case for successful diversity in an organisation—better leadership and management, increased capacity for innovation, greater creativity and innovation, improved problem solving, easier integration of new personnel, reduced absenteeism and a more productive workforce.⁴³ This is quite apart from questions of equity and individual rights. A reputation as an employer who welcomes recruits from a wide range of backgrounds and who treats them fairly and equally is another desirable consequence of successful diversity policies.

Third, minority groups offer valuable skills to the ADF. The bushcraft and local knowledge of ATSI, for example, contribute to surveillance of northern Australia and would be highly relevant to any defence against invasion or infiltration of northern Australia. Language skills are another specific asset. Arabic speakers were used in the Gulf War of 1990-91 with one ADF member of Arab background employed as an interpreter for the captain of a RAN ship. In East Timor the Army has made much use of the language skills of a member of Portuguese origin. Special forces, in particular, are likely to find knowledge of foreign languages and cultures useful.⁴⁴

Fourth, benefits arise in the form of better understanding of other communities with whom the Defence Force has to deal. Army, in particular, benefits from good relations with ATSI communities, especially in the north where military capability depends heavily on support from the local population such as assisting patrols in the bush or providing information about unusual movements of ships, aircraft or strangers. Knowledge of different cultures is also likely to assist the ADF in understanding other countries, especially regional neighbours. Again, Army in particular often finds itself on the ground dealing with local communities in places such as Bougainville, East Timor and Malaysia. At the strategic level, the ability to empathise with other cultures may improve decisions on defence policy and avoid the ethnocentrism that often pervades strategic thinking.⁴⁵

Finally, the standing of the Defence Force in the community is likely to be enhanced. Public support is likely to be strengthened if all groups can be seen to be participating ('our ADF'). An ethnically diverse military also demonstrates that the burdens of security—as well as the benefits of employment—are being fairly shared in the community. General public approval may also be helpful in gaining the approval of political leaders, securing more resources, and ultimately ensuring the backing of the community in times of conflict.

What Factors Influence the Recruitment and Retention of Minority Groups? What Strategies Exist for Minority Recruitment?

Despite the significant benefits of high representativeness, the ADF has not achieved optimum levels. Many of the factors making for underrepresentation in the ADF were analysed in the 1993 Report. Most of them, it turns out, are beyond the control of the services, having to do with the inherent nature of ethnic communities and especially migrant groups. A major thrust of the Report—though this was not its intention—was to explain why NESB (especially first generation) are underrepresented in the Defence Force and why, in fact, this is likely to remain the case.⁴⁶

One factor is the age profile of new arrivals in Australia who are predominantly over 25 years of age. Most ADF recruits first think about joining in their mid-teens and make the final decision to join before they are twenty. Even if migrants have thought about a military career while still in their home country, they will not easily transfer it to another armed force. In addition, migrants are more likely to be married, if only because of the age factor, and this is a further deterrent to enlistment in the Defence Force.

A second important factor is proficiency in English. The ADF must have personnel who are able to understand written and spoken orders, instruction manuals, training systems and so on, and who are able to use English effectively to communicate to others—often in situations of danger and urgency with no room for error. It is no surprise that in general migrants are less proficient in English than those born in Australia. The 1991 Census showed about 400,000 people born outside Australia assessing themselves as having poor English, an increase of nearly twelve per cent compared with the 1986 Census.⁴⁷

A third factor predisposing some migrants against a military career is their experience of war and conflict. Many come from countries that have lived in the shadow of the Cold War or suffered internal strife. For them settling in Australia may have been a chance to escape from and forget about conflict. Nor is a military career likely to appeal to those who have had negative experiences with armed forces in their own country, whether as victims or conscripts.⁴⁸ Some migrants also believe that Australia's military forces are unnecessary for a country that is secure and peaceful.⁴⁹

Finally, two technical barriers to recruitment can be mentioned. Security checks normally require a person's history to be traced back ten years which may be difficult with regard to a number of overseas countries. Citizenship status can be another barrier to entry into the ADF (as it is to the Public Service and the Australian Parliament). Recruits must be Australian citizens or be eligible to become citizens. This may delay those who have difficulty in obtaining citizenship or disbar those who are unwilling to renounce their original citizenship for various reasons. Certain migrant groups also have a historically low rate of taking up citizenship, not least those from New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom.⁵⁰

The factors discussed so far relate primarily to first generation migrants but they reach down in various ways to the second generation. First, parental attitudes are an important influence on recruiting so that any reluctance to enter a military career on the part of first generation migrants may serve to discourage their children. Other factors can reinforce this. Some migrants, for example, come to Australia seeking economic advancement for their family so that a military career for their children seems unattractive. Similarly, some migrant groups, particularly those from Asia, tend to see entry into mainstream professions such as medicine

and the law as paths to success for their children. Other groups look to private enterprise to provide rewards and encourage their children to follow in the family business. Finally, some migrant and ATSI families may be particularly reluctant to see their children join an organisation likely to post them anywhere in Australia—or even overseas—for lengthy periods. Their greater involvement in reserve forces which do not require such mobility supports this interpretation.

Second, there are various multiplier effects from first to second generation migrants. Given that parents—as well other family members and friends—are less likely to have served or be serving in the Australian military, this removes one of the major influences in favour of enlistment. Similarly, if parents are less likely to encourage their children to enrol in cadet units, this reduces another positive factor favouring recruitment.⁵¹ It is significant that recruiters are reported as less influential in the case of migrants than non-migrants (perhaps reflecting greater influence on the part of parents).⁵²

The 1993 report found little bias in the selection process itself except possibly in one or two minor instances—for example, the reference to Christian names on certain forms.⁵³ Most recruiters were found to have a general understanding of and sensitivity towards applicants from an ethnic background. The ADF probably compares well with any organisation in the country for the rigour and consistency of its selection procedures. Unlike private industry, the process is relatively open, it must follow certain routines and it is subject to scrutiny by senior officers. Complaints can also be made to members of Parliament. If discrimination against NESB and ATSI exists at this point, it is marginal and unintentional.

Retention of minority groups is a key factor since higher attrition rates will negate efforts to improve recruitment. No figures are available on minority retention as such but it is clear that with minor exceptions the ADF treats minority groups fairly once enlisted. The 1993 report found that about seven per cent of NESB and ATSI recruits reported some cases of prejudice e.g. in promotions or the allocation of tasks. But few lodged complaints and even fewer pursued the matter formally. While there are obvious disincentives to the pursuit of grievances, there is clearly no widespread or systematic discrimination. This is also evidenced in terms of representation in the officer corps and other ranks. In a sophisticated analysis the report finds, with the partial exception of Aboriginals, that those with ethnic backgrounds are fairly represented in the officer corps.⁵⁴

The report also examined potentially difficult issues for migrant and ATSI groups relating to dress requirements, dietary needs and religious observance.⁵⁵ Any of these could be instrumental in deterring potential recruits or causing those enlisted to leave. Again, the report found a wide degree of tolerance, for example, of dress required for religious reasons. In the US, by contrast, the wearing of the yarmulke by a Jewish serviceman became an issue for the courts. The bottom line for the ADF, of course, is military effectiveness which must not be compromised—but cultural and religious groups have no argument with this.

A complex and contentious issue discussed in the report is the suggestion that ADF's overall character which it projects to the public may deter non-Anglo-Saxon recruits.⁵⁶ Historical British connections account for constant references to the Queen (as in the oath of allegiance), use of the prefix 'Royal', affiliations with British units, and the wearing of Scottish or British regalia by Army bands. Directly or indirectly, the report suggests, many non-Anglo-Saxons may be dissuaded from joining up or staying in. The proposed answer was to emphasise and develop the ADF's Australian character—the Army's reversion to the slouch hat, for example—with a view to improving its attractiveness to minority recruits wishing to identify fully with their new country. At the same time, it was suggested, the ADF would become more attractive to younger people in general who are less attached to Britain and British institutions.⁵⁷

Discussion of changing public perceptions of the ADF indicates some of the complexities in strategies that might be used to increase minority recruiting. Changes in ADF traditions and adoption of more 'modern' ways, for example, may not prove beneficial. It should not be assumed that migrants dislike tradition, even that of their new homeland. Recruits from

migrant communities may be quite conservative and be deterred by a Defence Force that seems to adopt change too readily. It is also possible that a culturally diverse ADF will put off a proportion of young Australians whether due to simple racism and xenophobia or to a perception that the ADF discriminates in favour of minorities.

A similar difficulty relates to the encouragement of cadet units. One study has proposed that greater support be given to cadet units where NESB representation is high.⁵⁸ This may serve to increase recruits from such a background but promoting cadet units might also attract many non-minority recruits. Clearly, any strategy that makes the ADF more attractive or that reinforces existing factors in favour of recruitment in general are liable to work across the board without necessarily attracting recruits from particular minorities. This is not to say, of course, that such strategies should be eschewed.

Other strategies target minority recruits directly rather than indirectly and are less likely to have wide range effects. Among first generation migrants it is age, language and personal experience that make many of them unpromising prospects for recruitment. The ADF can do little about these factors which appear likely to persist over time. Whether greater impact can be secured among second generation migrants is the key question, given that parents are always going to be important influencers. Strategies have been devised that focus on parents' attitudes—for example, pamphlets about the ADF in foreign languages designed for the families of prospective recruits. Greater use of ethnic personnel for recruiting, and greater awareness of ethnic and aboriginal issues among recruiters are also sensible moves.⁵⁹ But it is possible that the ADF could be perceived as trying to win young people away from their families.

Difficulties also exist with regard to targeting particular minority groups. If a given ethnic community is found to be significantly underrepresented, for example, should that group be the focus of greater recruiting effort—or should it be concluded that the group is inherently disinclined to enlist and efforts directed elsewhere? Conversely, ethnic groups already well represented in the ADF might be the most promising groups for further recruitment. The reactions of community organisations also need to be taken into account. Some might object to being targeted, some to not being targeted.

Finally, there are strategies that reduce some of the barriers to enlistment in the recruitment process itself. Accepting lower literacy levels may also be possible in some situations where military benefits exist. Army, for example, already accepts some Aboriginal recruits with lesser standards into reserve units where their specialised local knowledge compensates for deficiencies in formal English. Some efforts may also be made to bring potential recruits up to the required educational standard but this is not directed specifically at minorities. Greater flexibility may be possible with regard to security and police checks, noting, for example, that the Army already discounts minor criminal records in the case of more promising Aboriginal applicants. Speeding up citizenship procedures would be another obvious move but the requirement of citizenship must clearly remain.

How much the ADF can increase its representativeness remains an open question. There are many factors the ADF simply cannot change in relation to minorities. Securing proportional representation of ATSI across the board depends in some measure on these groups gaining equality with the bulk of society in terms of schooling, health and employment prospects. Of the strategies which target minorities directly, some, such as entry standards, seem to be of limited value. Some, such as focusing on parental attitudes, are more difficult but promise greater returns. In all cases, however, it seems that diminishing marginal returns are likely to set in. Increasing efforts further will prove more and more costly while the response continues to diminish.

Comparisons

How does the ADF compare with other military forces on the question of representation? There are strong parallels with the experience of blacks in the US forces who fought in the Civil War on both sides, in World War I (about 300,000) and in World War II (over one million) while being systematically denied equal civil and political rights.⁶⁰ For decades blacks were segregated within the military but in 1948 President Truman, albeit for electoral advantage, set racial integration as a goal for the military. No time limit was set but shared experience of combat in the Korean War helped speed up the process. Compulsory service in the 1950s and during the Vietnam War also ensured proportionate black representation in the military. With the all-volunteer force in 1973 the US military made substantial and successful efforts to minimise discrimination in the treatment of black personnel. Surveys report that blacks in the military perceive less racism than blacks in civilian society, while rates of dismissal of blacks are lower in the military than in the public service.⁶¹

In the United Kingdom the level of representation of minorities, notably blacks and Asians, is far below their numbers in the general population. In 1987-8 ethnic recruitment was reported to be only one per cent compared with four per cent minority representation in the general community; and an independent study by management consultants found racist stereotyping and language to be entrenched in the services.⁶² The government ordered programs to reduce racism in the services.⁶³ It also pressed for better recruiting of ethnic minorities.⁶⁴ The armed services are publicly committed to improving the situation and have set what seems to be a modest target of two per cent. The British Army achieved this goal in 1998-99 though the Royal Navy (1.6 per cent) and the Royal Air Force (1.4 per cent) fell short.⁶⁵

The New Zealand Defence Force is committed to cultural diversity and in 1997 included 22 per cent Maori and Pacific Islanders, who make up even higher proportions of other ranks. The long-term importance of recruiting from these groups is reinforced by the fact that there are twice as many Maori and Pacific Islander children under the age of fifteen as there are European children.⁶⁶

Compared with civilian organisations in Australia the ADF probably scores reasonably well in the treatment of minorities. In contrast to much of private enterprise, the ADF has processes and procedures which make discrimination in recruitment, conditions of service and dismissal far more difficult. The ADF also appears to be doing better than some police forces. The NSW police force, for example, has only about two per cent NESB personnel compared with about sixteen per cent in the state as a whole despite government commitments and considerable efforts by police leaders.⁶⁷ Reasons given for poor representation parallel those found by the ADF: ethnic communities who have out-dated ideas about the police in Australia, parents who do not approve of the police as a career, and the absence of role models already in uniform.

The question of minorities resembles other issues faced by armed forces. The role of women and the admission of gays, for example, have been controversial in Australia as in many other countries.⁶⁸ In these two cases, as with minorities, discriminatory attitudes are found among service personnel and the community at large. In each case, personnel policies have existed in the past which have formally excluded these groups from equal membership, often on the grounds of a threat to military cohesion. Women, like minorities, have also had to overcome stereotypes about suitable occupations, about their capabilities and their impact on male co-workers. In each case, too, attitudes in society have become more positive, assisted by legislative and institutional measures outlawing discrimination.

But each issue is distinct in its own way. The acceptance of gays in the ADF raised concerns about sexual identity which go far deeper than factors such as colour of skin or language spoken. It may have been the very inability to distinguish gays that was a major source of resistance. The acceptance of women in the ADF obviously differs from that of minority groups in that females are not a minority but constitute about half of the population. The *Sex Discrimination Act* of 1984 still permits the exclusion of women from combat roles although this is currently under examination. By contrast, once minorities have been accepted, they have generally been able to take part in combat.

In all these comparisons, it may be noted, the ADF, like other militaries, is generally held to a higher standard. This is in part because it represents and symbolises the community in ways no other organisation does, and is expected to embody society's values and aspirations in the way it deals with minorities. The ADF is also assumed to be better able to control and manage its members than other organisations. Even the most authoritarian and disciplined organisation, however, cannot shift attitudes and prejudices among its members simply by fiat. Education and enforcement of appropriate rules helps but these require time to take effect. Full acceptance of minorities within the military is probably not possible until society itself has changed in the desired direction.

Exclusion and Inclusion

With regard to the inclusion or exclusion of minorities, armed forces are unlikely to be totally out of step with views prevailing in society. They may, however, lead or follow in varying measure. For seventy years after Federation military forces reflected more or less faithfully Australia's predominantly European society, albeit one that included greater numbers of non-British background after World War II. Nonetheless, the military showed some ability to adapt in recruiting ATSI in both World Wars almost regardless of official policies. The threat to the nation in World War II, in particular, led to a distinct change of policy and the creation of ATSI units. Once the war was over, however, the reluctance to recruit ATSI in peacetime returned. Some attempts were made to include ATSI in the compulsory service scheme in the 1960s but with little effect.

One obvious lesson is that existing preferences and prejudices that exclude ethnic minorities can be and often are put aside in time of emergency and/or manpower shortage. Somehow their presence becomes not only acceptable but also effective despite what has been asserted previously about loss of cohesion. Such ambivalence might seem justified on the grounds that a focus on actual war-fighting will overcome any tensions or differences. But this seems a dubious argument since it assumes that minority and majority service members are unable to focus on their professional responsibilities in peacetime.

In the relationship between minorities and the military individuals and communities such as ATSI have faced a dilemma. To oppose compulsory or voluntary military service makes them more liable to be considered as 'outsiders' who do not merit or who are simply not interested in full citizenship. On the other hand, to accept military service may be seen as acquiescence in a social and political system that unfairly excludes or disadvantages them in other respects. This sort of dilemma is still evident today. Reports of ethnic under-representation in the ADF can lead some in the community to conclude that non-English migrants are not pulling their weight. Yet minority members themselves may regard service in the armed forces as a way of demonstrating their desire to be good citizens, in the hope that the community will recognise their contribution and grant equal status. Certainly, many ATSI have been proud of their military service and have seen it as a means of achieving personal and even political goals.

Whether the ADF *can* do much more to increase the level of representativeness remains a moot question. The goal is set to some extent by wider community concerns such as principles of equal opportunity as well as by internal factors such as the need for a wider recruiting base and increased organisational effectiveness. These aims are worthy but not necessarily achievable. The principal factors making for under representation of ethnic groups in the ADF compared with the population in general are largely characteristics of the first generation migrant population, some of which flow into the second generation. The ADF cannot expect to be able to overcome or modify them in large measure. ATSI groups mostly do not share the characteristics in question but are disadvantaged by their relative lack of access to education and training in the community at large.

There has never been any significant support existing inside or outside the Defence Force for fixed quotas, positive discrimination or lowering standards for particular groups. Such moves would certainly create public concern and lead to tensions within the ADF. The one target that has been set relates to the recruitment of ATSI. Concerns in Australia in recent times have focused less on the representation of particular groups as a whole than on protecting the

rights of individuals whatever their background. Ensuring absence of discrimination at the micro-level, it is assumed, will minimise under representation at the macro-level. What remains will be due to inherent and unchangeable factors.

It is significant that minority groups in Australia are many in number but none constitute a large part of the population. Even the largest communities such as Italians, Greeks and Yugoslavs each constitute only a small percentage of the whole. In the US, by contrast, blacks and Hispanics constitute very substantial minorities and their treatment by the military attracts greater attention. Annual reports on the racial balance in the services are made to Congress. Another important characteristic in the US is that the sizeable black population in the US remains readily identifiable—and identifies itself as such—from generation to generation.

In Australia only the small Aboriginal population and those of Asian origin remain more or less distinguishable through the generations. High levels of marriage outside ethnic groups—estimated at 60 per cent and over—also progressively reduce the distinctiveness of these communities. By the third generation the process of assimilation is often complete and the birthplace and language of a person's grandparents may well be irrelevant to the disposition to enlist in the military. This underscores the focus of government policy which is primarily to protect the rights of individuals rather than to protect the rights of groups. It also accords with the Defence Force's claim that it simply recruits 'Australians' regardless of national, cultural or racial background.

Endnotes

I am grateful to Robert Hall, Manager, Australian Defence Studies Centre, and Colonel Geoff Hay, Action for People Plan Team, for assistance with this essay.

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 515.
2. Barry R. Posen, 'Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power', *International Security* 18: 2 (Fall 1993).
3. Bruce D Porter, *War and the Rise of the State* (New York Free Press, 1994), ch. 4.
4. See, for example, April Carter, 'Citizenship and Military Service', in Wayne Hudson and John Kane (eds), *Rethinking Australian Citizenship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 181-2.
5. Black fatalities in Vietnam were 12.1 per cent of combat deaths—comparable to the number of blacks in the population at the time Charles C. Moskos and John Sibley Butler, *All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way* (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 8-9.
6. CD Coulthard-Clark, *Duntroon: The Royal Military College of Australia, 1911-1986* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1980), 13.
7. *Ibid.*, 23.
8. Jeffrey Grey, *The Australian Army* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), 122.
9. Darren Moore, *Duntroon: The Royal Military College of Australia 1911-2001* (Canberra: The Royal Military College of Australia, 2001), 21.
10. The most valuable source of historical information on ATSI and Australia's military forces is Robert Hall, *The Black Diggers Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in the Second World War* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989). See also Robert A Hall, *Fighters from the Fringe: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Recall the Second World War* (Canberra: Aboriginal Studies Press, 1995).
11. Hall, *Fighters from the Fringe*, 1.
12. Morag Loh and Judith Winternitz (eds), *Dinky-Di: The contributions of Chinese immigrants and Australians of Chinese descent to Australia's defence forces and war efforts 1899-1988* (Canberra: AGPS, 1989); Robert A Hall, ' " An Invitation to National Disunity": Chinese Support for Australia's War Effort in the Second World War and the White Australian Response', *War & Society* 8: 2 (October 1990).
13. Grey, *The Australian Army*, 122.
14. Hall, *Black Diggers*, 115-16.
15. Grey, *The Australian Army*, 123.
16. Robert A Hall, 'Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in the Second World War', in Desmond Ball (ed), *Aborigines in the Defence of Australia* (Canberra: ANU Press, 1991), 44.
17. Hall, *Black Diggers*, 37-8.
18. These anomalies were not remedied by the government until 1986 and 1992. I am grateful to Robert Hall for information on this matter.
19. Ann-Mari Jordens, *Redefining Australians: Immigration, Citizenship and National Identity* (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1995), 137.
20. Loh and Winternitz, *Dinky-Di*, 41.
21. See Peter Edwards, *A Nation at War: Australian Politics, Society and Diplomacy during the Vietnam War, 1965-1975* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian War Memorial, 1997), 79.
22. *Ibid.*, 103.
23. Jordens, *Redefining Australians*, 145.
24. *Ibid.*, 145-9.
25. Edwards, *A Nation at War*, 103, 367.
26. *Defence Force Recruiting Program Evaluation* (Canberra: Inspector-General Division, Department of Defence, August 1991), paras 205-9, 234c.
27. Anthony Bergin, Robert Hall, Roger Jones and Ian McAllister, *The Ethnic Composition of the Australian Defence Force*, 2 vols (Sydney: Unisearch, University of New South Wales, 1993) [hereinafter *Ethnic Composition*].
28. On the difficulties of setting criteria for ethnicity and gaining accurate information about individuals, see *Ethnic Composition*, 36-8. Birthplace, for example, obviously does not equate with ethnicity if parents are Australians living or travelling overseas.
29. Based on Tables 4.2, 4.5, A4, B4, C4 and D4 in *Ethnic Composition*.
30. *Australian Defence Force 1999 Census: Public Report* (Canberra: Defence Personnel Executive, 1999), 5.
31. Based on Tables 4.5, 4.6, *Ethnic Composition*.
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ethnic Composition*, Tables 4.4 , 4.7.
34. A wide range of measures were recommended: *Ethnic Composition*, 222-37.
35. *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Recruitment and Career Development Strategy* (Canberra: Director General Personnel Policy and Plans, DPUBS: 24220/96, 1996), 2, 31.
36. *Australian Defence Force 1999 Census*, 26-7.
37. *Ibid.*, 7.
38. Major A . Goyne, *The Ethnic Composition of the ADF Applicant Pool 1998-99* (Canberra Defence Force Psychology Organisation, Research Report 1/2001, February 2001).

39. *Ethnic Composition*, 210-12.
40. Graham Sloper, 'The Recruiting Environment to the Year 2000', in Sue Moss (ed), *Who Will Join? ADF Recruitment Policy to the Year 2000* (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1994), 10.
41. New Focus Research Pty Ltd, *Report on Research into Tracking of Community Attitudes Towards Defence Force Careers*, prepared for Defence Force Recruiting Branch, September 2000, 7.
42. *Defence Personnel Environment Scan 2020*, Report for the Directorate of Strategic Personnel Planning and Research, Department of Defence, August 2002, §§ 3.11, 3.13.
43. Christine Silk, Rachele Boyle, Annie Bright, Marilyn Bassett, and Nicola Roach, *The Case for Cultural Diversity in Defence*, Report sponsored by the Defence Equity Organisation, October 2000, 11-12 and ch. 2 passim.
44. Evidence from the US, however, suggests that minorities are significantly underrepresented in special forces units. Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Margaret C Harrell, and Jennifer Sloan, 'Why Don't Minorities Join Special Operations Forces?', *Armed Forces & Society* 26: 4 (Summer 2000).
45. See Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (London: Croom Helm, 1979).
46. Hugh Smith, 'Minority Representation in the ADF. Does It Matter?', *Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter* (August-September 1993), 33-5.
47. 'Poor English a problem for 400,000', *Canberra Times*, 6 September 1993.
48. *Ethnic Representation*, 20-1. A high proportion of NESB recruits had fathers with experience of conscript military service: *Ethnic Representation*, 67.
49. M. Morrissey and C. Mitchell, *Females and Ethnic Minorities Attitudes to Defence* (Wollongong: Centre for Multicultural Studies, University of Wollongong, 1988).
50. *Ethnic Composition*, 152-4.
51. Ian McAllister, 'Recruiting and the Australian Services Cadet Scheme in 2000', in Moss(ed), *Who Will Join?*, 42. McAllister concludes that membership of 'open'—but not school-based—cadet units increases recruitment. See also *Ethnic Composition*, xix-xx.
52. Sue Moss, 'Survey of the Military Profession', in Moss(ed), *Who Will Join?*, 55.
53. *Ethnic Composition*, ch 11.
54. *Ibid*, ch 7.
55. *Ibid*, ch 14.
56. *Ibid*, ch 10.
57. The British Army also stands accused of being too focused on its British heritage, a factor said to reinforce belief in the superiority of the white race: Reggie von Zugbach and Mohammed Ishaq, 'Managing Race Relations in the British Army', *Defense Analysis* 16: 2 (August 2000), 191.
58. Silk et al, *The Case for Cultural Diversity in Defence*, 69. It would be essential that cadets units not discriminate directly or indirectly against minorities.
59. *Ethnic Composition*, 16.
60. Moskos and Butler, *All That We Can Be*, 16. On the history of blacks in US forces and range of issues relating to integration see Bernard C. Nalty, *Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military* (New York: Free Press, 1986); and Martin Binkin and Mark J. Eitelberg, *Blacks and the Military* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982).
61. Moskos and Butler, *All That We Can Be*, 5-6.
62. Martin Shaw, *Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization and War at the End of the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 143.
63. See von Zugbach and Ishaq, 'Managing Race Relations'.
64. See Asifa Hussain, 'Managing Ethnic Minority Recruitment in the Uniformed Services: A Scottish Perspective', in Alex Alexandrou, Richard Bartle and Richard Holmes (eds), *Human resource management in the British armed forces: investing in the future* (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 129-31.
65. von Zugbach and Ishaq, 'Managing Race Relations', 197.
66. Silk et al, *The Case for Cultural Diversity in Defence*, 28.
67. 'Police failing to attract ethnic recruits', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 30 April 2001. There are about two per cent ATSI in the police force which is in line with the general population.
68. See, for example, Hugh Smith, 'Debating Women in Combat', in Kathryn Spurling and Elizabeth Greenhalgh (eds), *Women in Uniform: Perceptions and Pathways* (Canberra: School of History, University College, UNSW, Australian Defence Force Academy, 2000); *Homosexuality and the Australian Defence Force: Individual Rights versus Organizational Realities*, Working Paper No. 5 (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1992).