

# Intelligence in Counter Insurgency at Task Force Level

Originally published in the Australian Army *Training Information Bulletin* 13/70 October 1970.  
Prepared by the AHQ Battle Analysis Team 1970.

**NB:** This publication was DECLASSIFIED by DATD Minute A83-10193, 2371/90 of 1.8.1990. The document has been copied verbatim from a document held in the Aust Int Corps Museum. Parts are missing from the source document, these parts are indicated as they occur.

## Chapter 1 - Introduction

### Chapter contents: Aim; Definitions

101. One of the most important factors in the prosecution of counter insurgency operations is 'intelligence'; the lessons from the Malayan Emergency, Indonesian Confrontation, Cyprus and Vietnam all support this.

102. In Vietnam at the present time, about 10,000 US servicemen (or approximately 3% of the total force) are directly employed on intelligence activities. The Vietnamese employ many times this number of personnel on intelligence and in all it is assessed that about 6% of all service personnel in Vietnam are engaged on full time intelligence activities.

103. The nature of the war in Vietnam and the scale of the Australian commitment dictates that our intelligence requirement is in many respects different from that envisaged when the various training pamphlets of 'The Division in Battle' series were produced. This initially confronted 1 ATF with several problems which had to be solved by experiment and expediency.

104. This paper looks briefly at some of those problems and traces the development of the intelligence system to the organization which existed in May 70.

### Aim

105. The aim of this paper is to study the practice and function of intelligence at HQ 1 ATF in order to determine any changes in the system necessary to best meet future counter insurgency situations.

### Definitions

106. **Combat Intelligence.** That knowledge of the enemy, the weather and geographical features required by a commander in the planning and conduct of combat/tactical operations.

107. **Counter Intelligence (CI).** That aspect of intelligence activity which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage, individuals against subversion and installations or material against sabotage.

108. **Information (Intelligence).** Unprocessed material of every description including that derived from observations, reports, rumours, photographs, etc, which when analysed produces intelligence.

109. **Intelligence.** The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation of all available information, which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of operations and which is immediately or potentially significant to military planning and operations.

110. **Counter Insurgency.** Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government independently of with the assistance of friendly nations to defeat insurgency.

111. **Technical Intelligence.** Technical intelligence involves the collection and processing of information about enemy arms, armament, equipment and the technical effects of our counter measures, and its subsequent timely dissemination as intelligence.

112. **Essential Elements of Information (EEI).** The critical items of information regarding the enemy and his environment required in order to make timely decisions.

113. **Source.** A 'Source' is any person or persons or any equipment or system which produces information.

114. **Agency.** An organization (or person), which has or controls its own sources and obtains information from them. This information may be processed and the resultant intelligence disseminated by the agency concerned, (eg, divisional intelligence units, intelligence sections, engineer or artillery intelligence organisations).

## Chapter 2 - Development of the Intelligence Organization Within AFV

**Chapter contents: Background; Present Organization of Intelligence Within 1 ATF; HQ 1 ATF Intelligence Staff; Detachment 1 Div Int Unit**

### Background

201. The first Australian Army troops who went to South Vietnam in 1962 were a contingent of 30 Australian Army Training Team advisers (AATTV). The strength of the AATTV was subsequently increased to 80 in 1964 and then to 100 in 1965. Although no intelligence component was included in the AATTV organization, several members from the Intelligence Corps were team members and it was from these that the Army obtained its first close experience of the problems faced by Intelligence in the country. Some of the material provided by AATTV was used by the Army Intelligence Centre for subsequent training of AATTV members and in the training of intelligence personnel who eventually became members of intelligence staffs and units serving in Vietnam.

202. IN 1965, an Australian infantry battalion with some supporting sub-units arrived in Vietnam and was placed under operational control of the US 173rd Airborne Brigade in Bien Hoa Province. At the same time, a small Australian force headquarters (AFV) was established in Saigon. In September 1965, an Australian intelligence officer was posted to HQ 173 Bde as Bde S2 (Intelligence Officer) and this officer, together with the Australian battalion intelligence staff was able to gain experience in relation to brigade operations in South Vietnam. This experience was of value in the subsequent training of intelligence personnel for appointment within 1 ATF.

203. In May 1966, 1 ATF, 1 ALSG and additional staff for HQ AFV arrived in Vietnam and these forces, less HQ AFV, commenced to establish a base at Vung Tau. In June 1966, after the area was secure, the Task Force established a forward operational base at Nui Dat.

204. The intelligence organization at HQ AFV, HQ 1 ATF and 1 ALSG in May 1966 was:

a. *HQ AFV*. GSO3 (Int) (Capt).

b. *HQ 1 ATF*.

(1) GSO3 (Int) (Capt).

(2) Operator Int (Sgt).

(3) Operator Int (Cpl)

c. *Det 1 Div Int Unit (attached to HQ 1 ATF)*. This detachment had no fixed establishment as such but the fourteen all ranks were grouped into the following sections:

(1) *PW Interrogation Section*.

(a) Capt.

(b) Two operators, intelligence.

(2) *Counter Intelligence Section*.

(a) WO2.

(b) Six operators, intelligence.

(3) *Air Intelligence Section.*

(a) WO2.

(b) Three operators, intelligence.

d. *HQ 1 ALSG.* One Capt.

205. Besides being very much under strength for the task, the 1 ATF intelligence staff was confronted with many unforeseen problems in the development of the intelligence collections system. The sources available were basically the same as those available at the present time (1970) (Annex E) but the development of a sound working relationship with US and ARVN agencies was hampered by:

a. The lack of knowledge by Australian staffs of both the Vietnamese and American systems of operations. This led to misunderstandings among the personalities concerned.

b. Lack of understanding of the Vietnamese as a race. This was compounded by the lack of fluent Australian interpreters and the lack of knowledge in the manner of using Vietnamese interpreters.

c. An obvious mistrust with the GVN staffs of each other and of both American and Australian staffs. For example, the Province Chief openly voiced his mistrust of his senior Vietnamese intelligence officer.

d. The general attitude of the civilians in the Province who had been subjected to many years of VC influence despite token GVN representation in the major population centres.

206. Additionally there was no intelligence base available in the Province and even the available maps were unsuitable for the conduct of operations. Neither HQ IIFV nor 18 ARVN Div was able to provide much intelligence of value and the Commander 1 ATF was forced to originate operations without anywhere near the depth of intelligence data normally considered necessary. Operations were continually being conducted with the aim of obtaining information which could be used to develop the data base upon which aggressive operations could be planned.

207. In this early period, intelligence tended to be a collection of unevaluated items of information. Often even this was available for dissemination to units only after a particular operation had been mounted.

208. In an attempt to improve this unsatisfactory situation, additional intelligence personnel were provided and at the same time concerted efforts were made to co-ordinate the main intelligence providers in the Province. These efforts included the development of a liaison system and the attempt to have a weekly intelligence exchange conference at Province Headquarters. These conferences however, soon proved to be of little value because of the internal jealousies, competition and general mistrust which existed between the various staffs. It was found that liaison with each group separately was of more value in obtaining information even though this was expensive in time and manpower. This same situation exists today despite concerted efforts by all previous intelligence staff to rectify it.

209. The build up of the Task Force which took place in late 1967 enlarged its operational potential but served to highlight the inability of the intelligence organization as a whole to match the operational potential. However, with the accumulation of our own local knowledge and continual refinement of our own techniques, this has been largely corrected.

210. A comparison of the establishment of the intelligence organization within 1 ATF as it was in May 1970 with the organization that existed in 1966 (para 204) gives some further indication of the difficulties under which operations were first conducted.

### **Present Organization of Intelligence in 1 ATF**

211. There are four components of intelligence in 1 ATF:

- a. HQ 1 ATF Intelligence Staff.
- b. Det 1 Div Int Unit attached to HQ 1 ATF.
- c. Unit intelligence staffs.
- d. RAAF Intelligence which is part of the liaison team from RAAF contingent Vung Tau attached to HQ 1 ATF.

### **HQ 1 ATF Intelligence Staff**

212. **Organization.** The organization of the HQ 1 ATF intelligence staff is:

- a. GSO2 (Int).
- b. GSO3 (Int).
- c. IO (Capt).
- d. MILO (Capt).
- e. Ssgt, Sgt, two Cpls, one Pte Int.

213. **Role.** The role of the HQ 1 ATF Intelligence staff is to provide the Commander and HQ 1 ATF staff with timely and accurate intelligence.

214. **Duties.** The duties of the officers mentioned above are detailed in Annex A.

215. **Split of HQ 1 ATF.** When the headquarters is split into Main and Rear, the composition of each group will be dictated by the scale and nature of operations to be conducted. In most past cases however, the GSO2 (Int), the IO and two NCO Operators, Intelligence constitute the intelligence group of main headquarters. The splitting of the intelligence staff results in a reduction of the overall production of intelligence because it is not possible for either of the split components, to process fully the volume of information available to the Task Force. There is also duplication of effort in many areas of intelligence interest. An ACV is available to the intelligence group at a forward base when established, but the only voice communications available are the 1 ATF Command Net and insecure telephone with the result that the control and direction of the Rear headquarters intelligence component is reduced. There is a need to improve the system for the passage of intelligence information which is often highly classified.

### **Detachment 1 Div Int Unit**

216. The detachment of 1 Div Int Unit has no fixed establishment and the 15 other ranks, all classed as Operators, Intelligence, can be organized at the discretion of the OC.

217. In the period 1966 - 1968, this unit maintained a good balance of junior and senior NCO intelligence operators but since then the replacement system has proved to be inadequate in that relatively junior insufficiently trained and inexperienced personnel have replaced senior and experienced NCOs. In 1969 for example an experienced SSGT and SGT were replaced by a Cpl and a Pte (NS) respectively. As both these senior NCOs had been employed on active CI tasks relating to the detection and eradication of the VCI, their replacement by these junior members seriously hampered the CI effort for some time.

218. The detachment has, since its initial deployment in 1966, retained its basic functional organization of photo interpretation, counter intelligence and PW interrogation sections. There has been a need however, to alter the title of two sections to more clearly depict the main functions. The formation of an administration section became essential to meet the many domestic unit requirements which exist. Also, under the terms of an Australian and Vietnamese agreement, an ARVN Military Intelligence Detachment was attached to 1 ATF and, as their function is to provide intelligence support to 1 ATF, they were placed under command of the OC Det 1 Div Int Unit.

219. The organisation of the detachment is:

**OC (Capt)**

**with ARVN Liaison Team (Admin only)**

<b>Admin Sect</b>	<b>Counter Intelligence Sect</b>	<b>Air Intelligence Sect</b>	<b>Linguist Sect</b>	<b>Attached MID</b>
Two ORs	Eight ORs	Four ORs	1 Offr and 4 ORs from the AFV Linguist Pool. Attached Six ARVN NCO Interpreters	Attached ARVN Mil Intr Detachment (7-10)

220. **Role.** The primary role of Det 1 Div Int Unit is to provide intelligence support to 1 ATF as directed by GSO2 (Int) HQ 1 ATF.

221. **Tasks.** The tasks of the OC and details of the sections of the detachment are at Annex B.

222. **Split of HQ 1 ATF.** When the HQ is split into main and rear, an element of the Det 1 Div Int Unit may become part of Main Headquarters. This usually includes at least two linguists who in addition to their role of interpreting and translation are employed on battle intelligence tasks. However, they have not been trained as intelligence operators and their value in this respect is limited.

## **Chapter 3 - Organizations and Staff in Vietnam Who Provide Intelligence**

**Chapter contents: HQ AFV; HQ 1 ALSG; MACV; Combined Intelligence Centre Vietnam (CICV); CMIC; CMEC; CDEC; Mobile Teams; HQ III Corps; HQ II FFV; 18 ARVN Div; MACCORDS Advisory Team 89; Phouc Tuy Vietnamese and Civilian Staffs**

301. There are a vast number of organizations and staffs in Vietnam providing intelligence or information which is available either directly or indirectly to 1 ATF. Those of principal concern are:

- a. HQ AFV.
- b. 1 ALSG.
- c. US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV).
- d. Combined Intelligence Centre Vietnam (CICV).
- e. HQ III Corps.
- f. HQ II Field Force Vietnam (IIFV).
- g. 18 ARVN Div.
- h. MAC CORDS Advisory Team 89.
- i. Phouc Tuy Province Civilian and Military Staff (including District and village staffs).

### **HQ AFV**

302. The intelligence staff at HQ AFV comprises:

- a. GSO2 (Int).
- b. GSO3 (Int).
- c. WO2 (Operator, Intelligence).
- d. Sgt (Operator, Intelligence).
- e. Cpl (Operator, Intelligence).
- f. Pte (Operator, Intelligence).
- g. SGT (Linguist) from the AFV pool of linguists. The remaining members of this pool are attached to HQ 1 ATF.

303. This staff has the role of providing the Commander AFV with intelligence in relation to the whole of South Vietnam and adjoining nations where events and actions in those countries affect operations in Vietnam. Additionally, they provide intelligence support to 1 ATF. It is interesting to note how this organization has expanded from one captain only, that existed when 1 ATF was first deployed.

## **HQ 1 ALSG**

304. The intelligence staff at HQ 1 ALSG comprises:

- a. IO (Capt).
- b. SGT (Operator, Intelligence).
- c. Cpl (Operator, Intelligence).

305. This staff provides the Commander 1 ALSG with intelligence relating to III Corps area with a specific interest in enemy activity in Phouc Tuy Province and in the Vung Tau area. Additionally, they are concerned with the vetting of the large civilian work force employed by 1 ALSG.

## **MACV**

306. The intelligence component of MACV (J2 Staff) is responsible for the institution and development of intelligence integration and of combined intelligence programmes. They have the intelligence units, specialists, communications, equipment and facilities to acquire and process information on the whole of Vietnam and bordering countries. The end product of this effort is made available to all intelligence staffs throughout Vietnam.

307. Many of the J2 MACV intelligence units, specialists and resources are engaged in combined US/GVN/FWMAF intelligence activities. This conforms with one of the principles of intelligence in counter insurgency operations. Furthermore it is one of the J2 MACV's aims to improve the GVN intelligence organization by working with the Vietnamese rather than merely advising. Unfortunately this has not been fully realised at province and district levels. Part of the cause is that the term adviser has been retained.

## **Combined Intelligence Centre Vietnam (CICV)**

308. CICV is the major intelligence production facility in Vietnam and is a joint ARVN/US organization functioning under the direction of both J2 MACV and the J2 staff at the Vietnamese Joint General Staff Headquarters.

309. CICV is responsible for the production of studies on specific intelligence problems and is organized into the following production branches:

- a. Order of Battle.
- b. Area Analysis.
- c. Technical Intelligence.
- d. Imagery Interpretation.
- e. Research and Analysis.
- f. Target Presentation.

310. The material received by this centre from all sources throughout the country is collated using electronic processing and the intelligence produced forms a basis upon which lower level intelligence assessment can be made. Of some value are the pattern analysis studies in that they include terrain and engineer intelligence as well as a part history of enemy activities in an area. The value of these studies is limited because of the inaccuracies and outdated information that the reports sometimes contain.

311. Subordinate to CICV are three specialized centres:

- a. Combined Military Interrogation Centre (CMIC).
- b. Combined Material Exploitation Centre (CMEC).
- c. Combined Document Exploitation Centre (CDEC).

### **CMIC**

312. This centre processes those PW and Hoi Chanh (returnees) who are considered to be of long term intelligence value. Some interrogation reports from this centre are disseminated to 1 ATF but because of the time involved in the long term exploitation of the PWs or detainees, they tend to be of general interest only.

### **CMEC**

313. This is the technical intelligence centre in Vietnam to which all captured weapons and equipment of an unusual nature or for which there is a special requirement, are evacuated. The centre tests and evaluates captured material and in time issues reports, weapon recognition books, studies on VC medicines and other similar publications.

### **CDEC**

314. To this centre every captured document in Vietnam is sent and a staff of 200 translators working round the clock produce a translated precis of most documents and a full translation of important documents. The original and translation are then photographed on micro film and the film stored. The centre, depending on its current work load can process a document captured by the Task Force immediately, if the initial readout by 1 ATF makes this seem worthwhile, and have a precise translation back to the Task Force in signal form in 12 hours to 24 hours. The full translation takes 48 hours to 7 days. The Task Force receives all CDEC reports and can request any full translation the intelligence staff think could be useful. CDEC will also produce a consolidated readout on any specific subject from the computer data base as well as producing documents to aid in the identification of standard enemy document formats.

### **Mobile Teams**

315. Each of these three centres is able to provide teams to conduct limited field exploitation. The capture of large caches of enemy documents or weapons, etc, could require the assistance of a team from CNEC or CDEC.

### **HQ III Corps**

316. At HQ III Corps, which is the senior Vietnamese Headquarters in the Corps tactical zone in which 1 ATF operates, there is an intelligence staff (G2) and a Vietnamese military intelligence detachment (establishment of 76 personnel). Additionally there is a US intelligence adviser with his US military intelligence detachment (28 personnel). Under control of the G2 staff is a Combined Interrogation Centre (CIC). A III Corps LO (ARVN Maj) is attached to HQ 1 ATF.

### **HQ I IFFV**

317. Located at Long Binh in Bien Hoa Province I IFFV, whose Vietnamese counterpart is HQ III Corps, exercises operational control over 1 ATF.

## **18 ARVN Div**

318. HQ 18 ARVN Div is located at Xuan Loc in Long Khanh Province which is north of Phouc Tuy. This HQ is responsible for a Division Tactical Zone of which Phouc Tuy is a part and as such the military affairs conducted by ARVN personnel in the Province are conducted and co-ordinated by HQ 18 ARVN Div.

319. The S2 (intelligence staff) at HQ 18 ARVN Div exercises intelligence control over the Vietnamese military intelligence staffs in Phouc Tuy.

## **MACCORDS Advisory Team 89**

320. The military and civilian advisers in Phouc Tuy Province are grouped into the Military Assistance Command and Civilian Office for Revolutionary Development Support (MACCORDS Advisory Team 89). The members of the team are superimposed on the civil and military organizations at branch head level in the Province.

321. This advisory team, through its association with the Province organizations is able to provide 1 ATF with some information and intelligence which may or may not be forthcoming from Vietnamese sources.

## **Phouc Tuy Vietnamese Military and Civilian Staffs**

322. By virtue of their regular contact with the indigenous population these staff would appear to be of immense intelligence value. In practice, the intelligence that they provide is frequently inaccurate or distorted.

323. As part of the combined US and GVN pacification programme, efforts have been made in Phouc Tuy to develop intelligence and operations co-ordination centres at province and district level. These are known as PIOCC and DIOCCs and have the aim of co-ordinating those military, paramilitary and civilian staffs and agencies concerned with the detection and elimination of the enemy. The primary goals of these centres are:

- a. Exploiting VC infrastructure intelligence.
- b. Evaluating and disseminating the information for planning quick reaction operations.
- c. Providing intelligence support for military operations.

324. The principle of establishing these centres is sound but they have not been a success. It would be very easy to attribute this to the Vietnamese being unenthusiastic. However, just as 1 ATF has problems handling the mass of intelligence and information available, so too do the Vietnamese, but they also have the additional problem of a mass of well-intentioned advice often based on limited military experience. Some of the advisers, even at Province level are only second lieutenants with little or no formal intelligence training.

325. *Unreadable in source copy.*

## Chapter 4 - Intelligence Requirements

401. The GSO2 (Int) is responsible for planning intelligence activities to meet the requirements for future operations. In doing this, he must ensure that his resources are allocated to reflect the correct priorities. Priorities may change rapidly in counter insurgency warfare and the closest liaison must be maintained between the Commander, the operations staff and the intelligence staff.

402. The essential elements of information do not, in general terms, vary from operation to operation. SOPs require units to:

- a. Provide comprehensive reports on enemy installations discovered.
- b. Complete contact/incident reports and these are followed up by an After Action contact/incident report.
- c. Report on VC mine/booby trap incidents.

403. Contact and incident reports sometimes require additional investigation to resolve particular intelligence aspects. For example, a recent report stated that a patrol had been fired on by a heavy machine gun. As the suspected enemy unit involved in this contact was not known to possess such a weapon, an investigation was made which revealed that no heavy machine gun was in fact used and additional information obtained confirmed the suspected identity of the unit.

404. The Task Force intelligence staff are required to maintain a continuous development of the enemy picture without ever losing sight of the effects the current Task Force operations are having on the enemy's thinking. To quote one intelligence officer, sometimes in trying to see ahead, we fail to take sufficient account of what is happening now on both sides; this is an easy trap to fall into, especially when there are many directions to look in at any particular time. This comment by an experienced senior intelligence officer illustrates the importance of collocating the intelligence and operations staffs.

405. The 1 ATF intelligence staff are also tasked by G2 (Int) at IIFFV to maintain continuous collection and reporting on the EEIs as directed by the Commanding General IIFFV. These are obtained through 1 ATF's normal collection system.

406. IIFFV sometimes has a requirement for intelligence for which special arrangements must be made for its collection and handling. For example, a request to 1 ATF for details of the 'VCI system of recruiting' would require an extensive check of existing records and the activation of sources within the Province.

407. All or most of the intelligence requirements are needed continually and often concurrently which can impose a severe strain on the Task Force intelligence resources. A fairly typical example of the range of concurrent operations requiring support from the intelligence staff is shown at Annex D.

## Chapter 5 - Combat Intelligence

Chapter contents: General Function; Collection of Data; Co-ordination of the Intelligence Collection Effort; Collation of Intelligence; Maps; Pattern Analysis; Dissemination of Intelligence

### General Function

501. The prime function of the combat intelligence staff at HQ 1 ATF is to provide the commander with accurate, detailed and timely intelligence. This intelligence results from the application of a system based on conventional intelligence techniques, adapted to the situation in Phuoc Tuy and tailored to exploit the characteristics of the enemy. The main areas in which the conventional system has been adapted are in the initial handling of information received and in the collation means used. Details of these variations are discussed later.

502. The system used by 1 ATF follows the standard intelligence process which is:

- a. *Determining the Problems.* Deciding what knowledge of the enemy is required, within certain limits of time and space.
- b. *The Intelligence Appreciation.* A forecast of enemy intentions based on the available information.
- c. *Collection.* Planning and executing the collection of the further information necessary to improve or test the accuracy of the forecast.
- d. *Collation.* The routine office work involved in the receiving, sorting, evaluating and recording of information.
- e. *Interpretation.* Turning information into intelligence.
- f. *Dissemination.* Distributing intelligence and/or information to users in time to be of maximum value.

503. The forecasting of enemy intentions is a difficult task in an insurgency environment because of:

- a. The elusive nature of the enemy.
- b. Their ever changing organization and strength.
- c. Their careful compartmentation.
- d. Their ability to blend as individuals into the local population and the resultant difficulty in identification.

504. This problem can be overcome only by exploiting every intelligence information source and collection capability.

## **Collection of Data**

505. Information and intelligence data is received at the Task Force in three ways:

- a. As regularly disseminated intelligence from various intelligence agencies.
- b. As information received from sources who consider the Task Force has a need for particular items.
- c. As a planned requirement whereby sources are requested to collect information essential to the Task Force in order to meet the requirements of the Commander. These requests are usually made on a priority basis which is integrated within a particular time frame.

506. The existence of large individual or joint national intelligence agencies contributes to a continuous flow of intelligence data, all of which has to be examined but only part of which may be of use to the 1 ATF intelligence staff. The volume of information provided far exceeds that which would normally be made available to the Task Force if it were operating as part of a larger operational formation. This is one reason why the strength of the Task Force intelligence staff has doubled from the number considered sufficient when 1 ATF first deployed.

507. The sources which provide information or intelligence data to 1 ATF are many and varied and may be grouped as:

- a. Sources organic to 1 ATF.
- b. Sources in Phuoc Tuy Province.
- c. Other sources.

508. The sources within these groups are discussed in Annexes E and F.

509. All these sources are either tasked or requested to provide specific information as part of the 1 ATF intelligence collection system used to solve a particular problem. However, it is important that sources do not restrict their efforts to specifically requested data but report all pertinent information of intelligence interest.

510. Of interest are three of the more technical surveillance sources currently being used by 1 ATF. These are:

- a. Airborne Personnel Detector.
- b. Side Looking Airborne Radar.
- c. Infra-red (Red Haze).

A general description of these equipments is given at Annex G.

## **Co-ordination of the Intelligence Collection Effort**

511. The intelligence data which is received from all the sources is of such volume that it is not possible to log and record it all in the manner laid down in intelligence training pamphlets.

512. The only information which is recorded on the Intelligence Log is extracted from the pink copy of AAF C157 (Incoming Telephone/Radio Record) passed from the command post and USAF Operations Room. These log entries are made by the Cpl Intelligence Operator who ensures the GSO2 (Int) sees the log frequently. The AAF C157 copy is destroyed daily and the intelligence log is destroyed after three months.

513. All other information received is passed to the GSO2 (Int) who:

- a. Evaluates it in accordance with his knowledge of present and future requirements.
- b. Determines any necessary follow-up action to substantiate the information received.
- c. Passes it to the commander and/or operations staff if of immediate value.
- d. Passes to GSO3 (Int) for subsequent collation.

514. Much of the information received, particularly that from Sector of Province sources has to be very carefully evaluated to determine its validity because past experience has shown that a large percentage of information received from other than organic sources is of doubtful value and without corroboration cannot be fully accepted. The time and effort which have been expended in the past on verifying information from sources with unknown or doubtful credibility have proved to be generally unwarranted, but in spite of this, it is necessary to read, and collate all that is received otherwise some valuable information may be missed by default.

515. As an example of the problems of evaluating this information, an intelligence message was recently received from the Sector (Vietnamese) intelligence officer stating in categorical terms that D440 and D445 enemy battalions intended to disband as formed units and establish sapper teams to terrorize and sabotage pacification efforts in the rural areas of the Province. As the Task Force had received other evidence indicating this possibility and had commented accordingly in a 1 ATF INTSUM, the GSO2 (Int) was interested in determining the source of the apparent additional information held by the Sector Intelligence officer. The MLO was requested to check this out and it was found that no additional information was held at Sector; the Vietnamese intelligence officer had merely used the 1 ATF INTSUM as the basis of his message without additional collateral.

516 to 522. *Missing from source document.*

523. The teleprinter page copies are disposed of as follows:

- a. Copy 1 goes to the chronological log file with the TF Battle Int Section.
- b. Copy 2 is sent periodically to the Int Centre.
- c. Copy 3 is scanned for detail of:
  - (1) Contacts.
  - (2) Bunker systems.
  - (3) Air strike on base camps.
  - (4) Mines and booby traps.
  - (5) Suspected Minefields.
  - (6) Tunnel Installations.
  - (7) Caches.
  - (8) Secondary Explosions.

(9) Road Blocks.

(10) AA fire and tracks (only for 1:25,000 maps).

524. This detail is logged in a 'map update' book which is passed every 3 to 4 weeks to 1 Topo Svy Tp for preparation of overprinted maps. These are produced at three monthly intervals or on demand for specific operations. Eight map sheets of the 1:50,000 series are updated as a standard requirement.

525. Requests for 'information data bases' are met by producing the detail previously recorded and stored on filed paper tapes by areas. Other work requirements and machine commitments do not permit continuous updating of these tapes and therefore any necessary updating must be done at the time of request. This involves manually sorting into chronological order the recently made tapes and running them through the taped recorded information first, followed by previously recorded detail.

526. This is basically a one level retrieval system, ie, by area, although particular time spans can be easily selected. It represents a step in the direction of full scale computerizing of all the intelligence information available to 1 ATF.

## Maps

527. The following maps are maintained by the Int Staff at 1 ATF:

a. *Master Int Maps to scale 1:50,000.* This map is the current overprint and is used as a working map in the Int Office. No specific information on the enemy is kept on it.

b. *GSO2 (Int) Office Maps.* The GSO2 (Int) keeps the following maps:

(1) *A Reference Map* (scale 1:50,000). This map is the current updated overprint and is used as a reference map for place names and current boundaries and areas of operations.

(2) *A Working Map* (scale 1:25,000). This map is the current updated overprint and is used by the GSO2 (Int) for analysis studies and briefings.

(3) *A General Incident Map* (scale 1:50,000). This map is erased daily and marked with occurrences of the day by the Int Sect marking CPL.

c. *Air Int Target Prediction Map.* This map (scale 1:50,000) is a Topo Svy overprint with the following data added:

(1) Airborne Personnel Detector (APD) readouts.

(2) Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR) readouts.

(3) Infra-red (IR) (Red Haze) readouts.

(4) Visual Reconnaissance (VR) sightings.

This information is recorded in a colour code for particular periods (usually three month intervals). On this map a pattern develops which when used in conjunction with the target register book gives an indication of possible targets. These targets are compiled by the RAAF IO for the GSO2 (Int). This information is discussed at the Targeting Conference held daily as well as being used by the GSO2 (Int) for follow-up action considered necessary.

528. It will be noticed that there is normally no map on which is recorded information on the enemy compiled from all sources. Such a map would appear to be invaluable.

### **Pattern Analysis**

529. The concept of pattern analysis is outlined in Annex C. The only pattern analysis carried out at present on a routine basis by 1 ATF relates to:

- a. VC unit movement - A long term study of D445 reported locations is maintained, with every significant location since 1963 plotted.
- b. Reported VC/NVA unit locations - The GSO2 (Int) uses the pattern analysis technique to correlate reports of enemy unit locations and to tasks surveillance means such as visual reconnaissance, Red Haze, SLAR and APD.
- c. Infiltration and supply routes - The GSO2 (Int) examines infiltration routes as an aid to recommending suitable deployments to cut off enemy re-supply.
- d. Sensor Reports - All SLAR, Red Haze, APD and VR reports are plotted in an overlay and examined by the RAAF IO for suitable targets. The background map is an overprint showing enemy installations and contacts which assist in the correlation of sensor returns to these known features.

530. Pattern analysis as a technique was started in 1 ATF in late 1967. Although its potential is recognized, it has not been fully developed as yet due to staff shortages and lack of suitable storage and retrieval facilities.

531. Interpretation is a continuous process done with the aim of determining the enemy's activities and intentions. Once the information received has been collated, it is passed back to the GSO2 (Int) who, by a system of analysis, integration and deduction formulates conclusions. This requires a thorough knowledge of enemy doctrine, tactics, strengths and weaknesses in organization and logistics.

532. As part of his analysis, the GSO2 (Int) looks for indications of a pattern of activity and once this begins to develop, he activates additional sources to provide more detailed information or to substantiate information already received. An example of how this can develop is:

- a. A Hoi Chanh reports that an enemy force is based in area X. The area indicated could well encompass eight or more map squares because of the lack of knowledge of map reading by the average Vietnamese.
- b. Pattern analysis reports for the general area which have been compiled over a period of time are studied. This may assist in defining the likely area.
- c. Additional sources both airborne and ground are employed and their reports when related to existing information, may further define a possible target including its size and nature.
- d. Once the GSO2 (Int) is satisfied that the indicators available are sufficiently sound to base his conclusions he will advise the Commander of the most likely course of enemy action.

533. Because of the enemy's habit of moving and living in small dispersed groups, it is extremely difficult and usually impossible to arrive at more than general locations. The intelligence upon which Operation Townsville (Apr 70) was based was collected over a period of three weeks and it was assessed by the GSO2 (Int) that the VC Ba Long headquarters was in an area covering about eight map squares. This intelligence proved to be accurate and the operation resulted in the discovery of practically all of the Ba Long Province headquarters and administrative units. The initial stages of this operation above accounted for:

- a. Ten enemy killed.
- b. One PW captured (a local force VC commander).
- c. Capture documents of immense value.
- d. Numerous bunkers and defence works destroyed.
- e. A quantity of ammunition, supplies and equipment destroyed and the disruption of the (*unreadable in source*) complex in the area.

### Dissemination of Intelligence

534. Intelligence is disseminated by HQ 1 ATF in three ways:

- a. Documentary.
- b. Verbal.
- c. Technical.

535. The means selected for dissemination depends upon the detail, and importance of the information and intelligence, its intended use, the users' resources for handling the material and available communications.

536. **Documentary.** Documents are the main way used to disseminate information. Documentary reports include:

a. *Intelligence Summary (INTSUM)*. This is issued every 24 hours covering the period 0001 hrs to 2400 hrs. An example of a completed INTSUM dated 4 Apr 70 is in Annex H.

b. *SUPINTREP*. This report is published weekly and in a review of the enemy in the III CTZ. It also reviews the enemy situation in Phouc Tuy Province with an assessment of future activity and trends. An example of a SUPINTREP for the period 24-30 Mar 70 is in Annex I.

c. *Special Intelligence Reports*. These are prepared as required and are usually concerned with specific requests from IIFFV or units of 1 ATF. Such things as Imagery Interpretation Reports, Interrogation Reports and Document Exploitation Reports may be issued either as annexes to the INTSUM or as special intelligence reports. An example of a Special Intelligence Report is in Annex J (*not in source document*).

d. *IIFFV PERINTREP and INTSUMs*. These are received from IIFFV and re-distributed to units in 1 ATF. They provide a comprehensive account of enemy activity in the III Corps area. They also include intelligence factors of interest.

e. *Intelligence Annex to Operations Orders*. Each battalion produces comprehensive intelligence annexes to its operation orders. The material used by the battalion intelligence officers is a combination of their own collated information and additional material provided by HQ 1 ATF and other sources. A typical annex includes:

- (1) An overprinted map of the area of operations in which the battalion is to deploy, showing:
  - (a) Land cleared areas.
  - (b) Routes of enemy infiltration.

- (c) Known, or suspected enemy base areas, caches and camps,
  - (d) Mine incidents.
  - (e) Contacts.
- (2) Topographical information if not already recorded on maps or other reports.
  - (3) Meteorological data.
  - (4) Photos and photomaps.

537. **Verbal Dissemination.** Intelligence and information data are also disseminated by HQ 1 ATF by means of briefings, conferences and liaison. Verbal dissemination is satisfactory for matters of general interest or in answer to a specific and limited question, but documentary means should be used for disseminating important and complex matters.

538. **Briefings.** The Commander's weekly briefing conducted at HQ 1 ATF provides the intelligence staff with the opportunity to give all unit commanders a general view of the enemy situation in the Province and surrounding area. The format of the intelligence presentation is: *(rest of chapter is missing is source document)*.

## Chapter 6 - Other Intelligence Aspects

601.

This chapter deals with:

- a. Intelligence Training.
- b. Intelligence Research.
- c. Engineer Intelligence (*section missing from source document*).
- d. Weather Intelligence.
- e. Technical Intelligence.
- f. Artillery Intelligence.
- g. Intelligence Communications.
- h. Intelligence Liaison.

### Intelligence Training

602. A considerable amount of in-theatre training has been required to bring certain intelligence personnel filling specialist or semi-specialist appointments to a satisfactory standard. Such appointments include:

- a. Air intelligence members.
- b. Other ranks engaged in battle intelligence collation.
- c. Counter intelligence members.
- d. Officers and NCOs engaged in liaison duties with other nationals.

603. Whilst undergoing this training, these members are not fully productive and impose additional strain on an already taxed organization. It raises the possibility of conducting more specialized training in Australia for those posted to fill specialist appointments in Vietnam, even though this may inhibit flexibility in any subsequent cross posting needed in-theatre.

### Intelligence Research

604. The intelligence research done at HQ 1 ATF is limited to that required to resolve particular and immediate intelligence problems. This research is not done in any depth because trained personnel and information storage and retrieval facilities are not available. The institution of pattern analysis in the collation process has become the basis of the research programme but it is only possible to store incident and contact reports as they occur.

605. The intelligence and information received from CICV and IIFFV on many aspects of the enemy is limited in value to the extent that it is based on a regional or country wide study and does not include those precise details of the local enemy which are necessary for the accurate assessment of his future intentions. The intelligence staff at HQ 1 ATF believe that the following analysis should be conducted:

- a. All documents captured in the Province.
- b. The enemy logistic system and courier routes throughout the Province.
- c. The enemy recruitment and training methods used locally.
- d. The enemy battle techniques.
- e. Sociological factors which lead to a better understanding of the Vietnamese and thus the enemy.
- f. The terrain of the Province and the effects of weather on the conduct of operations.
- g. The long term objectives of the enemy within the Province.
- h. Vulnerabilities of the various enemy units and groups.
- i. Enemy procurement methods.

605 to 609 a. to c. *Missing in source document.*

d. *Zones of Entry.*

(1) Airfields.

(2) Helicopters LZs.

(3) Ports.

(4) Beaches.

e. *Lines of Communications.*

(1) Roads.

(2) Bridges.

(3) Waterways.

(4) Railroads.

f. *Cultural Features.*

(1) Population.

(2) Urban districts.

(3) Agriculture.

(4) Industry.

(5) Water supply.

(6) Electric power.

- (7) Public health.
- (8) Tele-communications.
- (9) Hamlet evaluation.

610. This information is supplemented by a number of maps (scale 1:50,000) and tabulations devoted to:

- a. Entry zones.
- b. Lines of communication.
- c. Cross-country movement.
- d. Vegetation.
- e. Soils and geology.
- f. Potential avenues of movement and key terrain.

611. Within 1 ATF this basic information is maintained in the Engineer Int Cell of 198 Engineer Works Section and also by GS (Int); however, no systems exists for its routine updating and supplementing from field reconnaissance concluded by 1 ATF.

612. Other aspects of Engineer Intelligence are discussed in the Battle Analysis Team's Report on Engineers in Counter Insurgency.

### **Weather Intelligence**

613. Weather intelligence with 1 ATF is obtained from two sources:

- a. IIFFV Monthly Climatic Summary for III Corps Tactical Zone.
- b. CICV Tactical Scale Study for Phouc Tuy and Southern Binh Tuy.

614. This information is not to be confused with short term weather forecasting, as used by aviation and other field units, or with meteorology required by artillery units, which are obtained from other sources.

615. The IIFFV Monthly Climatic Summary for III Corps Tactical Zone bases its information on recordings made at 13 reporting stations throughout the zone. The information is a statistical history of past occurrences and is intended to be used as a general guide and not as a specific forecast. The summary covers the following aspects.

- a. Precipitation - statistical study of rainfall patterns.
- b. Thunderstorms.
- c. Cloudiness.
- d. Visibility.
- e. Temperatures.

- f. Relative humidity.
- g. Surface winds.
- h. Turbulence.
- i. Typhoons & tropical storms.
- j. Flying weather - ceilings and visibilities.
- k. Density altitudes.
- l. Light data - for Bien Hoa.
- m. Tide data - for Cape St Jacques.
- n. Tide data corrections for other stations.

616. These monthly publications are filed so that trends more than one month ahead may be provided on request by reference to the past years report.

617. The Tactical Scale Study is produced annually by CICV for each province in SVN and amongst other data gives the following:

- a. Precipitation and thunderstorms.
- b. Cloudiness and visibility.
- c. Temperature and relative humidity.
- d. Winds.
- e. Light data - moon rise and set.

This information is less detailed in nature and correct for one particular location only near the centre of the province.

618. These two sources satisfy the need for the Task Force for weather intelligence. However, due to the volume of information it is not distributed automatically to units, but made available upon request. Significant seasonal trends and their possible effects on military operations are issued by IIFFV and disseminated as an annex to the 1 ATF INTSUM. The seasonal notes for the commencement of the 1970 wet season are shown in Annex K.

### **Technical Intelligence**

619. There are no technical intelligence staff on the HQ of 1 ATF or in the Det 1 Div Int Unit.

620. Enemy equipment and weapons of interest are directed by the IO to the appropriate arms and services specialists. They are identified where possible by the use of illustrated US handbooks on enemy equipments and the item passed to CMEC whenever additional information is required. Crater examination and fragment identification is carried out by the Task Force Artillery Intelligence Officer (TFAIO).

621. Information on captured enemy items of interest is normally disseminated by means of annexes to the daily INTSUMs and special INTREP. Very little new or uncommon equipment has been captured or found by the Task Force of late but during the years 1967-68, there was sufficient to partially employ a technical officer.

## **Artillery Intelligence**

622. Artillery Intelligence and the duties of the TFAIO are outlined in Training Information Letter 11/69 '1 ATF Fire Support Co-ordination Centre and FCCs'.

## **Intelligence Communications**

623. When the Task Force is split there is a need for secure communications between the forward and rear intelligence elements. At present this requirement can be met in several ways:

- a. Use of the TF secure command net voice.
- b. Use of the RA Sigs common user secure signal centre teletype system.
- c. Use of the insecure telephone channels supported by codes.

624. Although this is satisfactory for most requirements, there appears to be a need to develop a secure means of communicating purely intelligence matters not only between the two elements of the Task Force HQ when split, but also, at times, from task force HQ to major units.

## **Intelligence Liaison**

625. From the time the Task Force was first deployed it was found essential to develop intelligence liaison with the many sources and agencies available to 1 ATF. Initially the bulk of this liaison was conducted by the GSO2 (Int) or selected members of the intelligence staff from either the HQ or the Detachment 1 Div Int Unit.

626. As the amount of liaison requirements increased, a Military Intelligence Liaison Officer (MILO) was added to the establishment of the GS(Int) HQ 1 ATF. When the DIOCOs were formed in each district and emphasis was placed on the detection of the VCI at all levels a corporal (operator, intelligence) from the CI section of the detachment 1 Div Int Unit was deployed to each of the five District headquarters for liaison duties.

627. 1 ATF liaison officers are also located at each District headquarters. This had led to some duplication of effort as some of the area of interest to intelligence are similar to those of the operations staff. None of the personnel employed on permanent intelligence liaison for HQ 1 ATF has received any formal training in liaison duties. They have many diverse tasks calling for tact, persistence, experience and knowledge of Vietnamese and American customs and methods. The effects of this lack of training cannot be fully gauged, but this liaison has been less productive than was first expected.

628. The MILO and Intelligence liaison NCOs are continually confronted with an apparent lack of co-operation and support from those Vietnamese staffs whom they approach on intelligence matters. This can create a difficult situation particularly when they are tasked to collect information on particular incidents or in the substantiation of other source material. One of the main difficulties confronting those engaged on this sort of liaison is the inability to communicate. One CI NCO is a linguist and the others all have to rely on Vietnamese Sergeant interpreters.

629. The indifferent results so far achieved by the DIOCCs and our inability to communicate adequately at a district and village level highlight what is the most important gap in our sources of intelligence, namely we are not able to get effective access to the information known to the Vietnamese people themselves.

## Chapter 7 - Conclusion

701 to 705. *Paragraphs missing from source document.*

### US Support

706. The intelligence support provided to 1 ATF by the US staffs and agencies covers a wide field and is of great value. In any future contingency where an Australian task force is required to operate independently without that support, there will be the need to increase substantially the intelligence support provided to a task force from our own resources. This support would, in particular, be concerned with:

- a. PW Exploitation.
- b. Document Exploitation.
- c. Surveillance and other technical devices which provide information.
- d. Counter intelligence with emphasis on agent control.
- e. Weather Intelligence.
- f. Technical Intelligence.

707. All the technical surveillance aids used by 1 ATF belong to the US Army or Air Force. Without these aids there would be a severe reduction of valuable information and as such there is a need to develop an Australian capability to conduct at least some of the technical surveillance required by a task force engaged in counter insurgency operations.

### Establishment

708. The establishment of intelligence staff of HQ 1 ATF when first deployed to Vietnam was inadequate. It was not able to meet the requirements of the commander or to exploit to the best advantage even the limited information available to the Task Force at that time. For most future counter insurgency situations where a task force is operating independently, an intelligence staff at least commensurate with the existing organization of HQ 1 ATF would be a minimum requirement.

**Chapter contents: Liaison; Intelligence Requirements US Support; Establishment**

### Annexes:

- A. Duties of HQ 1 ATF Staff
- B. Description and Functions of Components of Det 1 Div Int Unit
- C. Pattern Analysis
- D. Range of Concurrent Intelligence Requirements
- E. Sources of Information Organic to 1 ATF
- F. Sources in Phuoc Tuy Province.
- G. Technical Surveillance Sources Airborne Personnel Detectors

H. 1 ATF INTSUM NO 104/70

I. 1 ATF SUPINTREP 13 - 70 Period 24 - 30 MAR 70

J. Special Intelligence Report. (*Not present in source document*).

K. Summary of Weather Condition III CTZ - Month of April

## **Annex A. Duties of HQ 1 ATF Staff**

### 1. GSO2 (Int)

- a. To advise the Comd on all intelligence matters.
- b. To direct and co-ordinate all intelligence gathering, collating and dissemination agencies with 1 ATF.
- c. To direct and task, through the OC Det 1 Div Int Unit, the Counter Intelligence and Linguists Sections of that unit.
- d. To direct and task, through the OC Det 1 Div Int Unit, the attached ARVN Military Intelligence Detachments.
- e. Regular briefings.
- f. Interrogation of important prisoners and returnees.
- g. Liaison with units, IIFFV and flanking formations and units on intelligence matters.
- h. Security officer for HQ 1 ATF.

### 2. GSO2 (Int)

- a. To understudy the GSO2 (Int).
- b. To supervise and ensure the efficient running of the Battle Intelligence Section.
- c. To task that section on the specific requirements of the Comd, and the GSO2 (Int).
- d. To task and co-ordinate the activities of the Air Intelligence Section of Det 1 Div Int Unit.
- e. To attend to all GS (Int) matters referred to HQ 1 ATF.
- f. To be the Assistant Security Officer for HQ 1 ATF.
- g. Regular briefings.
- h. Duty officer in the CP once every ten days on the 2400-0800 hrs shift. Also, occasional day shifts when the permanent CP duty officers are absent on leave or through sickness.
- i. Interrogation duties of important prisoners and returnees.

3. Both the GSO2 and GSO3 are required to work long hours (averaging 14 hours per day) seven days a week to ensure the efficient functioning of the intelligence system. Little time is available for either officer to engage in intelligence liaison with units, higher and flanking formations and Vietnamese staff.

### 4. IO.

- a. To maintain current Order of Battle records on all enemy main, local and guerilla force units against which 1 ATF may be deployed.

b. Understudy the GSO3 (Int) and be available to accompany the commander on liaison visits when the GSO2 and GSO3 are not available.

c. Preliminary reading of all captured documents with the following aims:

(1) To identify units and individuals mentioned.

(2) To set out the order in which documents are to be translated.

(The IO is assisted by a linguist from the Det 1 Div Int Unit in this task).

d. Prepare Annex A (Interrogation Reports) and Annex B (Captured Document Reports) for the daily INTSUM.

e. CP Duty Officer about every 10 days on the 2400-0800 hrs shift.

5. MILO.

a. To liaise regularly with Sector and Sub-Sector Intelligence agencies.

b. To liaise regularly with the Province and District Intelligence and Operations Co-ordination Centres (PIOCC and DIOCC).

c. Provide from time to time advice to the Vietnamese Intelligence staffs.

d. To co-ordinated with OC Det 1 Div Int Unit, the 1 ATF targeting of Viet Cong infrastructure (VCI).

6. The OR members of the GS (Int) HQ 1 ATF carry out general battle intelligence duties, and in particular:

a. Collection and passage of information/correspondence.

b. Issue of intelligence publications.

c. Maintenance of ORBAT files.

d. Logging and map marking.

e. Production of the intelligence data base.

f. Subject filing and typing.

Further details of their duties are indicated in the discussion on collation.

7. The other rank staff at GS (Int) HQ 1 ATF is supplemented by the attachment of one corporal and one private. The corporal is supernumerary to establishment and was attached to GS (Int) because he elected to extend his time of service in Vietnam and, as he had been a member of a battalion intelligence section, it was considered that he could be employed to best advantage at GS (Int). The private comes from the CI Section of the Detachment 1 Div Int Unit and he and the supernumerary corporal assist in maintaining the extensive ORBAT files and personality records. Much of the information handled by these personnel is related to the VCI in the Province and can therefore be considered to be both Battle and Counter Intelligence interest.

## **Annex B. Description and Functions of Components of Det 1 Div Int Unit**

### **OC**

1. The OC of the detachment has the following functions:
  - a. Implementation of the intelligence policy as directed by the GSO2 (Int).
  - b. Command of the Det 1 Div Int Unit.
  - c. The co-ordination of the information collections effort undertaken by sections of the detachment (less air intelligence section).
  - d. The planning, conduct and/or supervision of all exploitation of:
    - (1) Prisoners.
    - (2) Returnees.
    - (3) Detainees.
  - e. The supervision (involving detailed checking) of captured document translations.
  - f. The planning, co-ordination and supervision of counter intelligence activities both active and passive.
  - g. The tasking and co-ordination of intelligence liaison associated with the operations of the unit.
  - h. Case officer (ie, responsibility) for all CI investigations.
  - i. Command post duty officer on an average of one eight hour night shift each seven or eight days. This duty is between the hours of 2400 and 0800 hrs.
2. The OC's responsibilities are made more difficult by the dispersed location of his force, the lack of trained administrative personnel and the mixture of posted, attached and detached persons under his command, including 26 Vietnamese soldiers.
3. The OC is required to conduct interrogations because there are insufficient trained interrogators available to cope with the number of personnel required to be exploited.

### **Military Intelligence Detachment (ARVN (10 MID))**

4. This Vietnamese military intelligence detachment is attached to the TF from III Corps (ARVN) under the terms of an agreement concluded between the Vietnamese army and the Commander AFV in 1966.
5. The organization of 10 MID is:

<b>ADMIN</b>	<b>ORBAT</b>	<b>OC (Capt)</b>	<b>DOCUMENT EXPLOITATION</b>	<b>PW, DETAINEE AND RETURNEE EXPLOITATION</b>
(four ORs)	(two ORs)		(two offrs and three ORs)	(two offrs and three ORs)

6. With the exception of the four administrative personnel, the members of this detachment are intelligence trained and support 1 ATF by undertaking:

- a. Document exploitation.
- b. Interrogation.
- c. Intelligence collection.
- d. Liaison with other Vietnamese staffs.
- e. Training of Australian intelligence personnel.

7. **Document Exploitation.** By maintaining personnel on call at the Det 1 Div Int Unit 24 *rest of paragraph is unreadable in source document.*

8. **Interrogation.** As for document exploitation, the interrogatin facility this detachment provides, assists in rapid exploitation of prisoners, detainees and returnees.

9. **Training of Australian Intelligence Personnel.** Simply stated, the Australian members of the Det 1 Div Int Unit learn from the Vietnamese and they learn from the Australians. The association between Vietnamese and Australian interpreters is of considerable value in improving the Australians' language proficiency. The MID members also advise on Vietnamese culture so essential to interrogation and not readily found in textbooks.

10. One of the major advantages of having the MID is that it offers continuity to the Task Force intelligence effort. At present, about half of the existing MID have been with the detachment since 1966.

### **Administration Section**

11. Because there is no provision in the establishment for an administration element of the Det 1 Div Int Unit it has been found necessary to employ two operators intelligence on full time administration tasks. With the various attachments, the detachment has over the period had to administer as many as 106 personnel at one time including 85 Vietnamese nationals. At the present time, the detachment administers 46 personnel of which 26 are Vietnamese.

12. One Cpl (operator intelligence) and one pte are currently employed full time on tasks such as:

- a. Unit administration.
- b. General correspondence, typing and filing.
- c. Photo copying.
- d. Vehicle maintenance and documentation.
- e. Unit Q records and laundry.

13. In addition to these tasks, it is frequently necessary to employ these soldiers as drivers or armed escorts in vehicles. Whilst they do provide a reserve of trained intelligence effort their employment on such duties is that the expense of unit administration.

## AIR INTELLIGENCE SECTION

### Background

14. This section now consisting of 4 ORs has been in existence since 1 ATF was first deployed in Phouc Tuy. They are employed on a wide range of tasks relating to the processing of intelligence available from aerial reconnaissance and surveillance systems used in support of 1 ATF.

### Responsibilities

15. In the initial stages emphasis was placed on visual reconnaissance later followed by the build-up of an air photo library. With the increase in surveillance means the section's scope has broadened considerably over the past two years to include the following:

- a. The planning, liaison co-ordinating and requesting of aerial surveillance from those agencies operating in the 1 ATF area of interest.
- b. Maintaining an Air Photo Library and data base for other sensor systems.
- c. Conducting and co-ordinating a hand-held photography programme.
- d. Providing Air Photo coverage for operations, terrain studies, engineer resources and any other requests for which surveillance is required.
- e. Briefing and advising the staff and Unit Comds on all matters pertaining to aerial surveillance.
- f. Conducting airborne personnel detection operations. (See Annex I).

16-22. *Paragraphs missing in source document.*

23. Limited colour photography is also available; this has the following advantages and disadvantages over black and white:

#### a. *Advantages:*

- (1) True colour, paths, trails, etc, show up much more readily.
- (2) Changes in vegetation and varying types of vegetation more easily discernable.
- (3) There is greatly increased target contrast, eg, a black artillery or mortar barrel will be seen even if in a shadowed area. Objects in cloud shadow are more easily detected.

#### b. *Disadvantages:*

- (1) A great increase in film processing time (approximately 3 to 1).
- (2) Greatly increased cost (approximately 5 to 1).
- (3) When used in a high resolution camera system colour film has somewhat less target resolution.

24. Camouflage Detection film (CD) is also available on a very limited scale due to cost and processing difficulties. Whilst it is able to detect dead foliage and tracks due to its distorted colour response, its use is not justified within 1 ATF because the enemy normally use only live foliage for camouflage, and track networks are too extensive for detailed studies of their usage.

25. The ordering and usage rates of air photography missions within 1 ATF are shown below. The average mission covers about 100 map squares.

<b>Average Monthly Mission Rate</b>	<b>Ordered</b>	<b>Received</b>	<b>Cover Loaned to Units</b>
From Jun 66 to Mar 70	16.2	15	15.1
For year 1968	21	18.9	9
For year 1969	24.5	21.4	22
For year 1970 (3 months to date)	11	8	26

## COUNTER INTELLIGENCE SECTION

### Background

26. The size and functions of the counter intelligence (CI) section have varied with the changing nature of the Task Force's concept of operations.

27. From the initial deployment to the present time the following functions have been undertaken in varying degrees of priority and scope:

- a. Military Security tasks.
- b. CI support to TF operations when HQ 1 ATF was split into forward and rear headquarters.
- c. CI support in cordon and search operations.
- d. Collection of information and intelligence.
- e. Advice and assistance in the implementation of civil control measures.
- f. Interrogation of PW, detainees and returnees.
- g. Photography.
- h. Planning and assistance in the conduct of operations to detect and eliminate the VCI.
- i. Maintenance of CI records.
- j. Liaison as directed by the OC Detachment 1 Div Int Unit.

28 to 31. *Paragraphs missing in source document.*

- a. Opportunity collection.
- b. The use of CI Liaison NCOs who reside in and operate throughout each of the five district headquarters.
- c. Preparation and updating of black lists in each area.
- d. Planned collection by making Voluntary Information Payments. The details of this system are shown in Appendix 1.

### Advice and Assistance in the Implementation of Civil Control Measures

32. Advice and assistance have been given to both 1 ATF troops and Vietnamese military and civilian police personnel in the control measures and procedures of establishing and operating check-points.

33. This assistance was particularly valuable in the establishment of the refugee village at Ap Soui Ngh. The CI section devised the population control plans for this operation and were responsible for the planning and subsequent documentation of the village census which included:

- a. Photographing every man, woman and child in family groups.
- b. Interviewing each adult person and recording:
  - (1) Age and sex.
  - (2) Date and place of birth.
  - (3) Next of kin.
  - (4) Background.

These details were recorded both alphabetically and by houses for future reference.

- c. Advising village officials on the necessity to report information which came to their attention.
- d. Investigating incidents in the village.

### **Interrogation of PW, Detainees and Returnees**

34. Because of their local knowledge of Phouc Tuy Province, CI personnel often conduct interviews and interrogations of PW, detainees and returnees, on behalf of Det 1 Div Int Unit. At one time this was practically a full time function because of the number of civilians detained daily in restricted areas on the perimeter of the 1 ATF base.

### **Photography**

35. Apart from providing photographic evidence associated with cordon and search operations, the CI section are tasked with photographing bodies of VC killed in patrol clashes or incidents in the general area of the 1 ATF base. The photographs are used in an effort to identify the enemy KIA and involve the interviewing of local authorities.

### **Detection and Elimination of the VCI**

36. The CI section used to be responsible for the planning of selective 'pick up' operations which were aimed at detecting and eliminating the VCI in Phouc Tuy Province. These operations were called 'Acorn' operations.

37. The first Acorn operation was conducted in the second half of 1967 and was a selective area search by 1 Div Int Unit following a cordon and sweep by a company of infantry. Often the areas were individual hamlets or even houses. One such operation, conducted on 25 Sep 68 against a part of An Nhut village resulted in 16 detainees from a total of 32 who were targeted. This operation took four weeks to prepare and involved detailed investigation and briefing of those taking part. The speed with which these operations were conducted was the essence of their success and in one operation in which 13 of 26 targeted suspects were detained the task was accomplished in 35 minutes.

38. A total of 52 Acorn operations achieved the following results:

- a. 11 VC KIA.
- b. 9 VC PW.
- c. 106 VCI detained.

- d. 248 suspects.
- e. Capture of large quantities of:
  - (1) Documents.
  - (2) Weapons.
  - (3) Equipment.
  - (4) Foodstuff.
- f. Numerous hides, tunnels and caches were destroyed.

39. Acorn operations along the lines detailed above have been discontinued because the development of the Phung Hoang/Phoenix Programme (VCI eradication by the Vietnamese). This has resulted in a significant decrease in the detection and eradication of the VCI in the Province.

### **Maintenance of CI Records**

40. CI records on all aspects of the enemy's covert activities have been maintained by the CI section. The information obtained in these records have come from many sources but mainly from local police and authorities and include:

- a. Black lists including aliases.
- b. Dossiers on suspects, suppliers to the VC, known VCI members.
- c. VC terminology including place names and nicknames and code words used.
- d. Resources and population control measures.
- e. Infiltration entry and exit points to villages and hamlets.
- f. Enemy espionage and sabotage activities.
- g. Terrorist activities.
- h. Lists of sympathisers.
- i. VC families.
- j. CI operations files.
- k. VCI ORBAT.
- l. Letter box numbers (VC postal system).
- m. Village and hamlet plans depicting each dwelling and structure.
- n. Details of enemy hides, tunnels and caches.
- o. Records of Bushman Scouts (ex VC) employed by 1 ATF in scouting and similar operational tasks.

- p. Control of access by civilians to the Task Force.
- q. Military Security files.

**Liaison as Directed by OC Detachment 1 Div Int Unit**

41. Because of their wide network of contacts throughout the Province and in particular amongst the civilian authorities the CI personnel have been used extensively on all aspects of liaison for 1 ATF. Until a regular TF liaison system was developed, the CI personnel were used and tasked to perform liaison duties on behalf of all branches of the staff of HQ 1 ATF.

42. It has been found that a limitation of this liaison is that it is very difficult for an inexperienced NCO, with only limited military service, to interview district senior advisers and district chiefs with the necessary military authority. A certain amount of value to be gained by liaison visits is therefore lost unless the visits are done by the OC or Section Commander and this is only possible on some occasions.

**Present Organization and Function of the CI Section**

43. **Organization.** The current organizations of the CI Section are:

<b>Section Commander (SSGT)</b>	
<b>2IC (SGT)</b>	
<b>Intelligence Liaison Detachment</b>	<b>CI Records Detachment</b>
Dat Do District (Cpl)	Cpl
Duch Thanh District (Cpl)	Pte
Long Dien District (Cpl)	
Long Le District (Cpl)	

It was found unprofitable to have a NCO at Xuyen Moc District (the fifth district in Phouc Tuy) and therefore the OC Section currently has this responsibility.

**44. Functions.**

- a. *Section Commander.* (S sgt).
  - (1) Supervise and co-ordinate the intelligence tasking and reporting of the CI liaison NCOs at districts.
  - (2) Maintain liaison with Vietnamese intelligence staffs in the Province as a supplement to that conducted by the MILO.
  - (3) Supervise unit administration.
  - (4) Compile and disseminate weekly returns on PW, Hoi Chanh and detainees.
  - (5) Military security tasks including passes, security checks and vetting Vietnamese and Chinese.

(6) Follow up investigations of incidents reported by CI liaison NCOs as directed by OC detachment.

b. *2IC Section (SGT)*. Apart from providing general assistance in all the tasks performed by the OC Section, this NCO is used extensively as a relief liaison NCO when leave, rest and sickness results in absence from district posts.

c. *CI Records Detachment*. See Annex A para 7.

d. *Intelligence Liaison Detachment*. Four cpls are currently employed as intelligence LOs at four district headquarters.

### **Linguist Section**

45. The linguist section with a current strength of one officer and four OR Australian personnel is not part of any fixed establishment, being attached from the AFV pool of linguists. Only the officer is a permanent attachment to HQ 1 ATF.

46. HQ AFV can generally provide four OR linguists to 1 ATF but other force requirements and availability of linguists arriving from Australia sometimes reduced this number.

47. Supported by the document exploitation and interrogation personnel from the ARVN MID, this section undertakes the following tasks:

a. Captured document exploitation.

b. Prisoner, Detainee and Returnee exploitation.

c. Interpreter and translation tasks as directed by the OC Det 1 Div Int Unit.

### **Exploitation of Captured Documents**

48. A simplified flow diagram showing the exploitation of capture document is shown in Appendix 2. All documents captured or found by units in the field are passed to their Int Section for immediate scanning. The material, complete with an identification of capturing unit and location then passes to the IO at Task Force HQ who advised Det 1 Div Int Unit.

49. Det 1 Div Int Unit produces a 'readout', ie, a brief description of the document and if they are of obvious immediate value commence a translation. 10 MID then conduct a document exploitation, ie, they extract the intelligence value from the document. This is translated into English by the Div Int Unit linguists and distributed on behalf to GS (Int), who may include a summary from the captured documents as an annex to the daily INTSUM. The documents are held for 24 hours to allow other interested parties to request copies, and then passed to CDEC for further processing.

50. In the absence of capturing unit instruction CDEC sorts documents into 4 categories and processes them as follows:

a. *Category A* - Immediate value - full translation, document retained.

b. *Category B* - Some value - full translation, document retained.

c. *Category C* - Minimal value - not translated unless requests - document generally destroyed.

d. *Category D* - Valueless - document destroyed.

51. Where the document has some local value such as evidence for local convictions, etc, its return from CDEC to the PIOCC is requested. CDEC 'readouts' and full translations are received at GS (Int), exploited, and distributed with a copy to the original capturing units.

### **Limitations of Document Exploitation**

52. Limitations of the present system are:

a. Most captured documents from the field arrive on afternoon aircraft flights having been acquired some time during that day. In order to provide timely readouts this necessitates the linguists, both Australian and Vietnamese working overnight.

b. As the same staff (linguist section) is required for both PW interrogation by day and document translation by night a large influx of either leads quickly to staff fatigue.

c. The rate of document flow also determines the amount of time that can be exploited to any one item. With a large work load only readouts and limited exploitation can be attempted and full translations will be delayed whilst they pass through the CDEC system.

### **Exploitation of PW/Detainees and Returnees**

53. A simplified flow diagram for the handling of PW/Detainees and Returnees is shown in Appendix 3 (*missing from source document*).

54. The individual upon being detained in the field is immediately questioned as to his reason for being there, and other points that may have immediate military value. He is then transported to the PW cage at Nui Dat for initial interrogation and classification into:

a. PW.

b. Detainee.

c. Returnee.

## **Appendix 1 to Annex B. VOLUNTARY INFORMANT PAYMENTS (VIP)**

1. A voluntary informant payment programme was instituted by MACV with the intention of making available special funds to be used for the payment of rewards for weapons and information.
2. Minimum amounts authorized to be paid for weapons were stipulated. Examples are:
  - a. Grenade 200 dollars VN.
  - b. Pistol 500 dollars VN.
  - c. Mines 200 dollars VN.
  - d. RPG 7 3,000 dollars VN.
3. Payment for information was also authorised under the VIP but the operating conditions imposed were so limiting that its practical value was almost useless. As a result, 1 ATF ceased to avail itself of this fund and on 7 Mar 70 advised AFV accordingly and returned all money held. On 12 Mar 70 however, AFV advised 1 ATF that the accounting procedures had been modified and advance 1 ATF 80,000 dollars VN with which to continue the VIP funds.

## **Annex C. Pattern Analysis**

### **Introduction**

1. Pattern analysis involves meticulous application of basic combat intelligence collection, collation, interpretation and dissemination principles. It is a process of correlating data about selected incidents or occurrences in order to determine the existence, or otherwise of patterns or trends.
2. In CRW the enemy generally operate in widely separated units controlled and supplied by relatively primitive communications and logistic systems. This imposes a requirement on their commanders for simple and repetitive operations. Pattern analysis allows these constraints to be fully exploited.

### **Scope of Analysis**

3. Pattern analysis may be applied to many incidents and occurrences, such as:
  - a. Logistic installations.
  - b. Logistic and personnel movement.
  - c. Movement of units.
  - d. Reported movement of identified and unidentified units.
  - e. Confirmed and unconfirmed intelligence reports.
  - f. Incident reports.
  - g. Contact reports.
  - h. Ground to air fire reports.
  - i. Friendly order of battle and operations.
  - j. B52 strikes and secondary explosions.
  - k. Imagery and sensor reported enemy locations.
4. Several of the above data groupings are concerned with friendly forces and are more correctly the responsibility of the Operations Staff rather than the Intelligence Staff. Others such as track locations may not be kept because of the overwhelming volume of incoming information in relation to the existing recording and collation facilities and others may not be analysed because of the paucity of reported incidents.

### **Method of Operation**

5. Data on selected incidents or occurrences are recorded on a map or overlay and as patterns in both location and time can occur a colour coding is usually adopted for differing time periods. These maps are examined for trends or patterns after each addition of new information; in particular recurring events at the same locations over both short and long time intervals are sought, as these are good indicators of base camps or caches.
6. Correlation of information from several sources, achieved by superimposing several overlays, can often provide confirmation of individual indicators. A typical example is the correlation of VR, ground patrol and airborne sensor reports.

## **Annex D. Range of Concurrent Intelligence Requirements**

### **Annex E. Sources of Information Organic to 1 ATF**

#### **General**

1. All units of the Task Force represent sources of information for the intelligence staff at HQ 1 ATF. For example, Armour and Infantry provide information on enemy movement, tactics, weapons and installations as well as spot reports on prisoners and documents captured. They also provide details of terrain and going. Engineers through their study of terrain and mines are also an important source as are Artillery through their study of enemy indirect fire attacks and crater analysis.

#### **SAS**

2. The SAS Sqn has a special relationship with the intelligence staff. The GSO2 (Int) in accordance with the Commander's overall policy, assesses those areas for the Task Force's area of responsibility or interest in which SAS patrols might be able to provide useful information (including negative information). The squadron Commander and the GSO2 (Ops) on the headquarters co-ordinate the mechanics of the patrol tasking as required by the Commander. After a patrol the GSO2 and/or GSO3 (Int) debriefs the patrol commander in the presence of the GSO2 (Ops) and the Squadron Commander. From the information provided by SAS an assessment can be made of areas for future operations. Although much of this can be done initially from the air, confirmation by ground patrol is most desirable.

#### **Aviation**

3. The Recce Flt provides the Task Force with valuable information on a continuing basis. There is a set programme which involves visual reconnaissance of the whole of the TAOR daily with extra attention being paid to priority areas as laid down by the GSO2 (Int). The Flight also undertakes specific reconnaissance missions for the intelligence staff, particularly in connection with handheld photography and bomb damage assessments.

4. RAAF crews and USAF FACs attached to the Task Force as a result of routine flights also provide information especially on enemy bases and trail development.

#### **Civil Affairs**

5. 1 CA Unit is an important source of information and intelligence embracing political, environmental, economic and social matters which it requires for its own function but which are also of value to the intelligence staff.

#### **Psyops Staff**

6. Although primarily a user of intelligence, the psyops staff because of the detailed research they carry out, provide the intelligence staff with information on both the enemy and on the civilian community. This information includes sociological, political and economic aspects which when related to the enemy can indicate his strengths and weaknesses.

#### **Topo Svy Troop**

7. This troop, in the preparation of updated maps, village plans and overprints seeks out and record changes and variations in topography throughout the Province. The detection of new tracks, the construction of houses and the location of bridges and fords are all of value as indications of patterns of activity.

## **Bushman Scouts**

8. In early 1968, MACV formally established the Kit Carson scout programme whereby returnees were provided to tactical forces to assist in:

- a. Patrolling and scouting.
- b. Combating guerillas.
- c. Intelligence.
- d. Psychological operations.

## **Annex F. Sources in Phuoc Tuy Province**

1. The sources in the Province are grouped as follows:

a. *Vietnamese Military and GVN Staffs and Units:*

- (1) Province Headquarters GVN Staff.
- (2) District Headquarters GVN Staff.
- (3) Village and Hamlet officials.
- (4) National Police.
- (5) Special Police.
- (6) Police Field Force.
- (7) Provincial Reconnaissance Unit.
- (8) Chieu Hoi Centre.
- (9) Vietnamese Information Service.
- (10) ARVN military staffs at sector and sub-sector headquarters.
- (11) Regional forces.
- (12) Popular forces.
- (13) Peoples self-defence forces.
- (14) Revolutionary development cadres and staff.

b. *Other Vietnamese Groups and Individuals.*

- (1) Local dignitaries such as elected members of the Province, District and Village committees.
- (2) Religious leaders.
- (3) School teachers.
- (4) Village medical personnel.
- (5) Local villagers, tradesmen and shop owners.

### **Advisory Staff both Military and Civilian**

2. The advisory staffs in the Province are organized into MACCORDS Team 89 under the control of the Senior Province Adviser. The organization of MACCORDS Team 89 is shown in outline in Appendix 1.

3. Augmented to a small degree by Australian personnel this advisory staff is associated with all aspects of political, social, economic and military affairs in the Province. They maintain close contact with all Vietnamese officials both civilian and military at all levels of the administration. By virtue of this contact with the Vietnamese in general, they are frequently in a position to obtain information of value to the intelligence staffs at 1 ATF. This information is however seldom forthcoming without being specifically requested.

**APPENDIX: 1. MACCORDS Team 89 - Outline Organization.**

## **Annex G. Technical Surveillance Sources**

### **Airborne Personnel Detectors**

#### **Introduction**

1. Several versions of personnel detectors (people sniffers) both man pack and air portable have been developed, but present interest rests only in the air portable versions. The instrument in use at 1 ATF and described here is the XM3, an airborne device weighing 80 lb, operated by the Air Int Section of Det 1 Div Int Unit using four RAAF Iroquois helicopters.

#### **Principles of Operation**

2. All human beings and human actions such as smoking, cooking, moving about, digging, etc, exude vapour, the particle content of which in suitable devices can be used as a condensation nuclei. These nuclei in a saturated water vapour atmosphere at low pressure obscure a light transmission and provide a quantitative readout on a meter and a paper strip chart.

3. The XM3 detector draws air from a scoop mounted on the exterior of a helicopter and carries out 5 sampling cycles each second. A second detector unit which will be sensitive to ammonia is being developed.

#### **Method of Use**

4. The detector is used on days of relatively low wind velocities and is flown at tree top level across and back over the area under surveillance at 500m intervals commencing from the down wind end. Two gunship helicopters fly above and behind the detector aircraft to provide protection and immediate fire support, and a further helicopter flying at 1,000 ft provides accurate navigation.

5. Significant responses are plotted by the navigating aircraft on the plot of the course flown by the detector helicopter. These responses are subsequently analysed by the Air Int Section, ie, corrected for detector and operator response times and prevailing wind velocities, vetted for friendly forces locations and recent artillery gunfire or bush fires and passed to the GSO2 (Int) and RAAF IO. The latter keeps a sensor response overlay and generates likely target lists from the pattern formed.

6. Detector indications alone are currently used for immediate response fire from the escort gunships.

#### **Limitations**

7. APD missions cannot be flown in days of high wind or in rain. They are of no value if flown over populated areas or friendly troop concentrations, and false responses can be got by overflying areas subjected to bombardment, land clearing operations or recent bush fires within the last 24 hours.

8. Because of the large aircraft requirement (4 Iroquois) the time available to APD is limited to about 1 to 1½ hours per day; this time is utilized by flying areas of reported enemy locations as indicated by other sources, rather than flying general search patterns.

#### **Manpower, Effort and Time**

9. Within 1 ATF the following times are typical of the effort of a APD task of 1 hour duration on station:

Machine checks	5 mins
Clearance	1 hour
Aircraft loading	15 mins
Aircrew briefing	15 mins
Debriefing	5 mins
Interpreting Analysis (up to)	45 mins
Reporting	5 mins
Post mission maintenance	15 mins
<b>Total time</b>	<b>2 hrs 45 mins</b>

10 to 18. *Missing in source document.*

### **Principles of Operation (of the Red Haze IR system)**

19. The detecting set is a passive gyro stabilized two channel receiving system that detects infra-red and visible light radiation from the earth's surface by means of an optical scanning process. The detector output appears both as a display on a television type presentation of the earth's surface directly beneath the aircraft and as a permanent record on a 5 inch wide film. The film capacity is sufficient for a sortie of from 2 to 3 hours.

20. The set is simple to operate and has an angular resolution of 4 milli radians, ie, it can resolve a 4 ft x 4 ft target at 1,000 ft and can operate under the following conditions:

Altitude	500 to 3,000 ft
Ground velocity	80 to 300 knots
Operating temperature	40 to 132 degrees F

21. The set is capable of continuous scanning over an 80 degree strip of terrain, 40 degrees each side of the aircraft and since the sensitivity is dependent upon altitude a balance must be made against area covered in each pass over the target zone. In SVN due to climate considerations the best operating height has been found to be between 1,500 and 2,000 ft. This enables a strip of only 750 to 1,000 m wide to be scanned.

22. The set responds to temperature differences over 3 degrees C and is capable of detecting hot sources such as open fires, chimneys, vehicles, and powered boats and to a limited extent extremely cold objects which contrast with the background heat radiation. It has been found that discrimination between a number of sources depends upon range and spacing of the sources.

### **Limitations**

23. The set has only a limited capability to detect sources of heat underneath jungle canopy and the VC have developed a counter to it with their Huong Cam cooking stoves. It may be used in limited inclement weather but heavy cloud reduces its effectiveness and it is of little value during thunderstorms and rainstorms.

24. The complete surveillance system consists of the airborne detector and displays together with a radio set and a ground based information centre in order that telemetered information may be displayed, processed and interpreted on the ground while the aircraft is still in the air. This system is limited to about 50 km range from the ground information centre because of telemetry performance limitations and is not deployed within 1 ATF.

### **Employment within 1 ATF**

25. All Red Haze missions are flown by the US Army 73 SAC located at Vung Tau. The normal nightly request, selected by the GSO2 (Int), is for 4 primary zones each 10 km and two secondary zones of similar size. On the long term average about half the requested coverage is flown, the occurrence of missions varying from once per fortnight to once every other night. Telephone readouts in the form of Grid references in cipher are received at 1 ATF from 73 SAC within 1 to 1½ hours of mission completion, followed by a confirmation signal message. Responses vary from a few to hundreds and need to be sanitized, ie, edited for recent gunfire, bush fires, friendly troops and populated areas before being acted on by the operations and intelligence staffs.

### **Interpretation**

26. This is carried out by the US Avn Coy. There is little difficulty in detecting heat sources although classification and identification of sources is rarely possible.

27. The value of the image depends upon reliable navigation of the aircraft which is achieved on most occasions by doppler radar.

## **Annex H. 1 ATF INTSUM NO 104/70**

1. 1st Australian Task Force INTSUM No 104/70.
2. Period covered from 140001H to 142400H Apr 70.
3. **Summary of Enemy Activity.** There were 10 contacts with Task Force elements.
  - a. *Ground Activity.*
    - (1) *AO AUCKLAND:*
      - (a) (141000H) at YS695834 V/6RAR/NZ found a track, South-North mov in last 2-3 days. A metal sign indicating mines and booby traps was found.
      - (b) Instal loc by V Coy 6RAR/NZ on 131440H Apr 7 at YS693846 (INTSUM 103/70 para 3a(1)(d) refers) also contained 4 bunkers 10' x 8' x 4' intact with o/head structure partially damaged. 2 x SKS Rifles, 2x DH8 Claymores, 17 Local Patt Grens, 4 lbs, Explosive, 1 X 44 Gal Drum half filled with petrol and 1 notebook captured.
      - (c) (140955H) at YS 688772 B/6RAR/NZ contacted 2 en poss MF carrying wpns and webbing. Results unk.
      - (d) (140955H) at YS 719872 elms D/6RAR/NZ loc an en camp cont 2 huts, a cooking area and tunnels 3' x 2½' x 30' with 18" OHP. 1 hut had seating for 24 pers. Found were 1xSKS minus butt, 1xWP Gren, 1x10" Circular Claymore, 1x8lbs Rectangular Claymore, 3xRifle Grens, 2 flags (SVN Youth Movt), Qty docus, small amount gun powder, safety fuzes and graphite, a set of scales with weights and cast iron forge. Eqpt destroyed docus evac. Area last used 5-6 months ago by large group and recently by small group.
      - (e) (141330H) at YS696848 2/V/6RAR/NZ loc 5 old bunkers and a cook house with tables and chairs. Recovered was 1xChicom Gren.
      - (f) (141335H) at YS695852 2/V/6RAR/NZ loc 4 old bunkers and 1 small cache. Recovered were 2xold rifles and ammo. Both destroyed.
      - (g) (141450H) t YS699831 1/V/6RAR/NZ loc a cache cont 32x82mm mortar rds also in area were parts of a demolished truck and yokes for oxen.
      - (h) (141400H) at YS645914 SAS Ptl contacted 2 en who wdr north with unk results.
    - (2) *Other Areas:*
      - (a) (140005H) at YS403631, YS4101640, and YS404647 9/C Coy, 10PI and a Ptl from HQ D Coy 8 RAR had three contacts. 9PI initiated contact with 6 en moving east to west, the en wdr and were engaged by 10 PI. Ptl D Coy engaged 1 en approaching from the east. Res of all contacts 5 VC KIA (BC), 1 VC WIA (poss). 1xAK47, 2xpistols, 6xAK47 mags, 1xM1 mag, a qty of docus, 4 packs containing food, a qty of civilian clothing, 3 transistor radios, a qty of soap, 1xUS compass, 1xtorch, 1xdiary, 1xhammock, and a small qty of med docus.

*Comment:* Ident as sup party from CHAUC DUC attempting to enter HOA LONG. See Annex A intg report of rallier.
      - (b) (140315) at YS432633 7/C Coy/8RAR contacted 2 en carrying 1xRPG2 and 1xAK47 moving along track from west to east. Following contact one en wdr north then east. Res: 1 VC KIA (BC) 1 VC WIA (poss) 1xAK47 and webbing CIA.

(c) (141600H) at YS435857 elms of 3 Cav contacted 5 VC in open. Res: 2 VC KIA 1 VC WIA, 1 VC PW.

*Comment:* Further PW captured by Ptl 2 US Bde. Bunkers searched by 2 Bde indicate possible Rear Service Gp.

(d) (141720H) at YS442865 elms of 3 Cav contacted 1 VC with AK 47. Neg res.

(e) (141414H) at YS499563 elms 1 Fd Sqn were engaged by 1 VC who fired an RPG2 rd and wdr towards Phouc Loi. Res: Nil fri cas, 1 suspect apprehended.

*Comment:* Detainee appears to be ARVN Deserter, possibly coincidentally in the area. No wpn found. As the rd fell some 200 metres from the rd where Fd Sqn were working there is some doubt as to whether VC fired an RPG; possibly M57 rd from RF accidental.

(f) Omitted.

#### **4. Enemy Personnel and Equipment Losses.**

##### *a. Total KIA Occurring During the Reporting Period.*

(1) Omitted.

(2) Aust inflicted - 10 VC.

(3) Omitted.

b. Omitted.

##### *c. Detainees.*

(1) PW - 1.

(2) Innocent civilians - Nil.

(3) Civil Defendents - Nil.

(4) Hoi Chanh - 1.

(5) Still Undergoing Interrogation - Nil.

(6) VCI Suspects - Nil.

d. Omitted.

##### *e. Enemy Weapons and Material Captured or Destroyed.*

(1) *Captured Weapons:*

(a) Individual - 10.

(b) Crew Served - Nil.

(c) Breakdown - 2xAK47, 3xSKS, 2xPistols, 1xM1 Carbine, 2xold rifles.

(2) *Captured of Destroyed Material.*

(a) *Captured:*

(1) 6xAK47 Mags. 80 Rds M1 ammo.

(2) 1xM1 Mag.

(3) 32 x 82 Mortar Rds.

(4) 1xWP Gren.

(5) 1xChicom Gren.

(6) 3xRifle Gren.

(7) 17xLocal Patt Gren.

(8) 2xDH8 Claymores.

(b) *Destroyed:*

(1) Gun Powder.

(2) Safety Fuzes.

(3) Graphite.

(4) Set scales and weights.

(5) 1 Cast Iron Forge.

(6) 1x10" Circular Claymore.

(7) 1x8lb Rectangular Claymore.

(8) 4 lbs, Explosive.

(9) 1x44 Gal drum half filled with petrol.

(10) 2xFlags (SVN Youth Movt).

(11) 1 x US blanket.

(12) 4xPacks.

(13) 1xHammock.

(14) 1xDiary.

(15) 1xNotebook.

(16) 3xTransistor Radios.

- (17) 1xUS Compass.
- (18) 1xTorch.
- (19) Qty Soap.
- (20) Qty Webbing.
- (21) Parts demolished truck.
- (22) Yokes for oxen.
- (3) Omitted.

f. *Cumulative Totals for Month:*

- (1) KIA - 32 VC.
- (2) PW - 4.
- (3) Hoi Chanh - 6.
- (4) VCI - Nil.
- (5) Individual Weapons - 28.
- (6) Crew Served Weapons - 1.
- (7) Rice Captured - 69 tons.

**5. New Obstacles, Barriers and Fortifications.**

- a. Omitted.
- b. *Enemy Emplaced Mines and Booby Traps.*

(1) *Destroyed by Friendly Forces:*

AT MINES	AP MINES	BOOBY TRAPS
		1 at YS683869 (at least 2yrs old)

(2) *Resulting in Friendly Losses:*

DTG	CO-ORD	TYPE	RESULTS
141050H	YS282571	Comd Det	3 Aust WIA
141355H	YS428557	M14	1 Grader slightly damaged

- 6. Omitted.
- 7. Omitted.

8. **Capabilities and Vulnerabilities.** No change to 1 ATF SUPINTREP 15/70 dated 14 Apr 70.

9. Omitted.

10. Omitted.

11. a-e Omitted.

f. *Other Items of Reporting Interest.*

(1) (131630) at YS241662 787 RF Coy, 611 RF Coy and D Coy 1/27 US Inf loc med instl believed to have housed 2 doctors and 12 VC. Recovered were a qty of docus and 100 lbs of rice.

*Comment:* Probably med dispensary of SR4.

(2) (131000H) at YS477796 sector ptl loc 1xM1 Carbine and 80 rds of ammo.

(3) (131515H) at YS838441 Bushrangers engaged 2 structures made of bamboo and grass. Res: 1 structure destroyed.

(4) (121325H) Bushrangers engaged VC in open. Res: 1 VC KBA (Poss).

**Attachments:**

ANNEX A - Interrogation Reports.

ANNEX B - Captured Documents.

ANNEX E - Aerial Reconnaissance.

**Distribution:**

List A: IIFForce V; MACV - J2; MACV - CICV; TTAVF; 18 ARVN Div; 3 TAC Fighter Wing; 12 Cbt Avn Gp; Bien Hoa TAC; Advisory Team 48; Sector S2.

**ANNEX A (Interrogation Report) TO  
1 ATF INTSUM No. 104/70  
DATED 14 APR 70**

**1. Initial Interrogation Report:**

a. Biographical Data:

Name: Tran Thi Sinh alias Sinh (female)

DOB/POB: 1954 Ap Dong, Hoa Long.

Address: Ap Dong, Hoa Long.

Rank: Soldier

Unit: Chau Duc Workshop

Occupation: Cook

Status: Hoi Chanh

At 131200H the Hoi Chanh left her base camp at YS368657 with the remaining 10 people of her group. They headed for Hoa Long moving from their camp to the foothills at YS377655 here they met a larger group which they joined and moved to the Sai River at YS394656 arriving at 131800H. The groups then divided into smaller units to enter Hoa Long for a resupply. The subject's group of 3 others went to Go Sung village at YS414634 and then to Ap Bac, Hoa Long. The group went inside the wire at 132300H. The subject hid in the darkness and let her group go into the Ap Bac and Hoa Dong villages of Hoa Long for supply. She heard sounds of explosions and small arms fire. This morning (14 Apr 70) she returned home to Ap Dong where her mother persuaded her to rally. She did so at 140900H.

*Comment:* Subject requires further interrogation which will be reported separately.

**ANNEX B (Captured Documents) TO  
1 ATF INTSUM No. 104/70  
DATED 14 APR 70**

1. Documents captured by C/8 RAR at 132400H Apr 70 at YS403631 included the following:
  - a. A large number of personal letters unopened generally from persons belonging to elements of Ba Long Province HQ and the Province Unit, to persons in Chau Duc, Baria and Long Dat District Units.
  - b. Propaganda booklets.
  - c. Award certificates and promotion decisions for VO VAN TAI (aka Nguyen VAN TAI).
  - d. Award certificates and a book of poems belonging to NAM THANH (Youth Proselyting Section of Ba Long Province HQ).
  - e. A rice and foodstuffs receipt belonging to THANH DUNG of Baria City Unit, dated 6 Apr 70.
  - f. A receipt for food money received by the Youth Proselyting Section of Ba Long Prov HQ dated 4 Dec 69.
  - g. A training programme addressed to NAM THANH.
  - h. A letter from NAM THANH to PHONG of the Youth Proselyting Section dated 19 Mar 70 stating that because of enemy operations in the Phouc Buu and Long Dat areas they would remain in Area 1 until D1 (D445) returns.

*Comment:* One of the two VC KIA in this contact has been identified from documents found on the body and confirmed by a Bushman Scout as NGUYEN VAN THANH of C41. The Bushman Scout identified the other as VO VAN TAI a Coy 2IC of C41 but documents indicate that he is possibly NGUYEN NAM THANH a member of the Youth Proselyting Section of Ba Long Prov HQ. Efforts will be made to verify the identification.

2. Documents captured by D/8 RAR at 140015H Apr 70 at YS401640 on the bodies of two males and a female included the following:
  - a. On a male body:
    - (1) A secret paper implementing COSVN resolution No. 9 mentioning several villages - each in code - signed by TRAN VAN LUONG (Assist Secretary of Chau Duc Party Chapter) dated 9 Mar 70.
    - (2) Projected plans for the first quarter of 1970 signed by LUONG.
    - (3) Draft copies of (1). A promotion decision and personal history of Luong.
    - (4) An envelope addressed from TU HIEU to LUONG dated 5 Apr 70.
    - (5) Reports on allied operations in 1969.

*Comment:* The documents indicate that the KIA is possibly TRAN VAN LUONG; this maybe verified by a photo taken of the subject.

b. On a male body:

- (1) Two copies of a plan for Apr-Jun 70 from HQ Ba Long Prov Womens Assoc.
- (2) A report on the PHOENIX programme.
- (3) Reports on the en (allied) situation from the Security Section of Chau Duc to Security Section of Ba Long Prov Unit.
- (4) A directive concerning the release of American and ARVN/GVN prisoners.
- (5) Two papers from the Ba Long Security Section to the District Security Sections.
- (6) A large number of unopened personal letters from Ba Long Units to persons in Chau Duc and Baria Units.

*Comment:* No identification possible.

c. On a female body:

- (1) A medical certificate and photograph belonging to VO THI PHUONG.
- (2) Personal letters belonging to PHUONG.
- (3) Receipts made out to PHUONG for the Baria Civil Health Section dated Jun 69.
- (4) A number of treatment forms for unidentified personnel.
- (5) A personal history statement for VO THI LOC aka VO THI PHUONG now a member of the Organisation Section of Ba Long Prov HQ. Subject is a Party Member.
- (6) A decision for PHUONG to go to the Party Chapter Branch of Chau Duc District dated 4 Apr 70 and signed by PHAM HUU PHUONG.
- (7) An exercise book containing medical notes.

*Comment:* Female KIA was probably VO THI LOC aka VO THI PHUONG of the Organisation Section of Ba Long Prov HQ. As Phuong was to go to the Party Chapter of Chau Duc it is likely that LUONG was one of the two males KIA in this action.

**ANNEX E (Aerial Reconnaissance) TO  
1 ATF INTSUM No. 104/70  
DATED 14 APR 70**

1. Omitted.

**2. Red Haze Activity.**

<b>DTG</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Readout</b>
140310H- 140430H	YS598895	12 emissions in brushwood and forest.
130300H- 130340H	YS623831	2 emissions in jungle.
130300H- 130340H	YS721945	2 hot emissions near road.

3. Omitted.

**4. APD (Sniffer)**

<b>DTG</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Readout</b>
141030H- 141130H	YS548690	Max.
	YS587675	Max.
	YS588765	Strong.
	YS586676	Strong.
	YS560693	Min.
	YS560691	Min.
	YS575691	Min.
	YS589688	Min.
	YS546687	Min.
3 readings from	YS579676 to YS586676	Min.

## **Annex I. 1 ATF SUPINTREP 13 - 70 Period 24 - 30 MAR 70**

### **III CTZ**

1. **En Activity.** The low level of enemy initiated activity in III CTZ during the period was interrupted by one heavy attack by fire and ground attack on a US FSB in NW WAR ZONE 'C' on 29th March by elms of 271 and 272 VC Regts. Both in this attack and in a friendly initiated contact in the same area on 26th March the enemy suffered heavy casualties. The discovery of numerous large munitions and food caches plus heavy casualties inflicted on the divisional forces have undoubtedly hampered enemy planned offensive ops.

### **En Locs**

2. a. 9 VC Div - WAR ZONE 'C' - with the main concentrations now in NW WAR ZONE 'C' along the Cambodian border.
- b. 7 NV Div - No change. NW BINH LONG Prov.
- c. 5 VC Div - No change - NE & NW PHOUC LONG Prov.
- d. 33 Regt - in west central BINH TUY Prov.
- e. 274 Regt - No change - HQ eastern BINH SON Rubber, 1 Bn SW of BINH SON Rubber, 2 Bn Resupply War Zone 'D', 3 Bn SW of BINH SON Rubber.

### **Assessment**

3. There are indications that the enemy has planned an increase in activity possibly to commence from the night 31st March - 1st April; it seems unlikely that the en has a capability to engage in any large scale operations and should it eventuate any highpoint is likely to be poorly co-ordinated and consist of light to moderate attacks by fire, limited sapper actions against allied installations and harassment of the GVN pacification programme. The situation in Cambodia also will tend to affect offensive activity by divisional elements in the border areas.

### **1 ATF TAOR**

4. General VC activity remained low for the week with four en initiated incidents against GVN forces. Contact with 1 ATF also remained low with 11 contacts resulting in 6 VC KIA BC.

### **AO TULIP**

5. There were two contacts in AO TULIP probably with resupply gps, resulting in 2 VC KIA.

### **AO AUCKLAND**

6. There was only one contact in AO AUCKLAND, probably with a food foraging gp. A number of bkr systems and some sign of recent activity were found by there has been no evidence of any large force.

### **AO KURRAJONG**

7. 7 RAR ptls continued to find scattered signs of en mov, with one contact with a LF VC but no evidence of other small local forces in the area.

8. Elsewhere, B/8 RAR located a cache of 770 lbs of rice just west of DUC MY. This find was in an area consistently used by both D440 and CHAU DUC to penetrate DUC MY, BINH BA and SUOI NGHE. Continuous ambushing along the tracks in that area should seriously hurt local force VC.

## ***Annex J. Not Present in source document***

### **Annex K. Summary of Weather Conditions III CTZ - Month of April**

#### **General**

April is part of the spring transition season (mid March to mid May) between the NE monsoon and the SW monsoon. Thunderstorms and showers become prominent features in all areas.

#### **Temperature**

April is considered one of the warmest months in the year in all portions of III CTZ except the coastal area where temperatures are still increasing. Mean daily temperatures reach as high as 95 degrees in the areas north of Saigon. However, the varied topography and ground cover in the Corps area cause large microclimatic variations of temperature over short distances; thus the leaf canopy such as that encountered in tropical rain forest could alter the surface temperature considerably from that observed over open ground. Maximum temperatures below vegetation canopies are lower and minimum temperatures are higher than those observed in open areas.

#### **Relative Humidity**

Relative humidity is generally high throughout III Corps resulting in conditions favourable for mildew, corrosion and decay of susceptible items. High humidity tends to make high temperatures seem even higher.

#### **Precipitation**

Rainfall will increase throughout III Corps. However, there is considerable variation in April rainfall from year to year. Most local rainfall is produced by afternoon and evening rain showers or thunderstorms, however precipitation amounts are generally light. A daily rainfall in excess of 2" is rare. Precipitation occurs on 2-5 days along the coast and on 6-10 days over most of the interior.

#### **Thunderstorms**

In April thunderstorm activity increases rapidly and becomes a prominent climatic feature. During the spring transition season, low level winds carry warm moist air far in and are further heated as they flow over the warm land. Cold air over-rides the warm air causing extreme instability which results in violent afternoon and evening thunderstorms.

#### **Cloudiness**

There is an increase in cloudiness in III Corps; however, again the terrain causes large variations in cloudiness and ceilings. The highest increase in cloudiness occurs in the three northern provinces.

#### **Visibility**

Visibility improves considerably as April progresses. Visibility aloft is occasionally reduced to less than 3 miles by smoke and haze from grass, brush and forest fires but the occurrence of these restrictions decreases with the increasing rainfall.

## **Surface Winds**

Because this is a transitional month between NE and SW monsoon seasons, wind directions are variable and may differ considerably from the average. Wind speeds are generally lt.

### **Distribution:**

1 ATF units on INTSUM distribution.