The Fall of Singapore

At 8.30 p.m. on Sunday 15th February 1942, the British Army suffered its single greatest ever defeat when Lieutenant General A.E. Percival surrendered Singapore Island to the invading Japanese forces under General Tomoyuki Yamashita. The cost to the British was enormous, with total casualties numbering 138,708 of whom over 130,000 were taken prison of war. (Over one third later died in the appalling conditions in the PoW camps.)

Almost before the guns fell silent, the recriminations began. General Percival, the AOC Far Eastern Command of the Royal Air Force, Air Vice Marshal C.W. Pulford, the British civilian Governor of Singapore, Sir Shenton Thomas, and the Australian Divisional Commander LTGEN H. Gordon Bennett were all criticised for their conduct during the defence of the Island. The debate has raged since then and even today is a source of some tension.

A recent book by a British Military Historian has resurrected the claim that it was ill discipline in Australian soldier ranks that led to the fall – a self-serving claim made by an inquiry at the time. More famously, a recent Australian Prime Minister blamed the British completely for the disaster, claiming Australia had been deliberately misled about the truth of the protection offered to South East Asia and Australia by the Singapore Strategy. As in the war itself, truth has been the first casualty in this exchange of blame. The ongoing recrimination has also served to detract from the genuine sacrifice of those who fought to defend the Island.

Brief Strategic Background

The Singapore Strategy, as it had become known before the War, was as much a product of Britain’s history as a maritime power as it was a carefully considered strategy of empire defence. The popular image of Singapore as an impregnable fortress was due largely to desperate British propaganda in the last years of the 1930s.

The Strategy was firmly rooted in Britain’s mastery of the sea lines of communication. Singapore was to be a base capable of supporting naval strength sufficient to dominate the region. As a theory, this Strategy was sound, as naval power was essential to the conduct of any war of aggression in South East Asia. Unfortunately, the reality of British naval strength, even when the strategy was first espoused was such that the Royal Navy could not guarantee that sufficient naval power would be available.

The post World War One Naval Agreements reduced Britain from being the one true global naval superpower on which the Singapore Strategy depended. The Royal Navy simply no longer had the capacity to dispatch the required strength to Singapore to make the Strategy work, particularly if Britain was threatened from Europe. Unfortunately, any alternative strategy would have been extremely costly in military manpower and infrastructure. When, during the 1930s, doubts were raised about both the Strategy itself and the assumptions underlying it, too many vested political and military (especially naval) interests were associated with it to enable any objective evaluation to be undertaken. However, the myth of the impregnable fortress continued to grow!

Strategic Background to the Battle

In reality, Singapore was lost on 8 December 1941, when the Japanese invaded northern Malaya. Poor and hesitant command, muddled strategic thinking, ill equipped and ill trained troops and inadequate air and naval support ensured the Japanese would experience little difficulty in advancing down the Peninsular and invading the Island.

Naval intervention was tried and cost the British their only two capital ships in the theatre of operations – HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales. On land, defence operations were not helped by frequent changes of command at almost every level, errors in the retreat such as leaving intact useful equipment such as barges and motor transport and the growing tendency to prematurely evacuate strong defensive positions when threatened with encirclement. While individual troops fought well on occasion, some inflicting heavy casualties on the Japanese, the defenders were always at a disadvantage, reacting to the enemy’s moves.

The Japanese forces, including tanks, were not overwhelmingly superior in numbers but were well trained and, in many cases, battle-hardened in China. They advanced more than 1000 kilometres in 70 days, destroying several major British troop formations in the process. By 31 January 1942, the last of the defenders had withdrawn across the Causeway onto Singapore Island. Worse still, if that were possible, strong Japanese naval forces (those that bombed Darwin 4 days after the fall of Singapore) were present to the south and could be brought into the operation if required.

Defence of Singapore

Surprisingly, the British authorities had done nothing to improve the landward defences of the Island. While the claim that the guns could not be turned to face the landward approaches is a myth, both the trajectory and the ammunition type for weapons intended to engage ships limited their value. While Percival had relatively plenty of troops available, Singapore was still a large Island to defend and he did not have sufficient numbers to be strong everywhere. He split the island up into areas, assigning specific formations to the defence of each. Defying what even then was conventional military doctrine, he deployed the majority of his strength in forward areas rather than adopting a screen of troops with a strong defence in depth.

The Japanese could attack from the north east, the north or the north west. Percival predicted that the attack would come from the north east, and positioned his best force, the new and fresh British 18th Division in this sector. The north west area was held by the Australian 8th Division, now severely depleted in numbers and equipment and very tired after the intensive fighting on the mainland. The Johore Strait was at its narrowest opposite the Australian positions. The northern corridor between these two formations was held by the 11th Indian Division. Percival guessed wrong, and the Japanese assault fell on the 22nd Australian Brigade.

The 22nd Brigade was defending the extreme north west corner of Singapore Island. With manning levels at almost half strength, it was expected to hold a 15 kilometre frontage, composed of mangrove swamp, creeks and tidal inlets. Consequently, no reserve could be maintained. The Japanese, who had carefully observed the defensive positions, were well aware of the available entry points between the defenders’ positions. At 10.30 p.m., on the 8th of February, preceded by a heavy bombardment, the Japanese 5th and 18th Divisions launched the attack. The Australians put up a stiff resistance, causing many casualties, but limited numbers and the lack of a reserve enabled the Japanese to infiltrate through their forward positions and forced them to pull back towards the airfield at Tengah.

The next night, the Japanese Imperial Guards Division attacked the 11th Indian Division in the causeway area and, despite a gallant defence forced them to withdraw from the coastal defensive line. Percival’s failure to keep strong reserves available meant he had no forces available to recover from these setbacks. Defending units were defeated piecemeal while others were left unengaged. (The 18th Division remained uncommitted throughout the first, critical 48 hours.)

Behind the defensive crust, preparations were even worse. While commanders created defensive lines on paper, they were seldom properly prepared with barbed wire or minefields. Confusion in the high command compounded the problems. General Bennett prematurely issued an order to withdraw from the Jurong Line, one of the established defensive lines on the western side of the island. The civil leadership also made basic errors. The growing numbers of refugees caught in the shrinking perimeter added to pressures on medical facilities, clogged roads and put additional pressure on food and water resources. The Governor could have evacuated many of these in the ships bringing in reinforcements but failed to do so.

As the advancing Japanese captured all the airfields but for Kallang and all the water storage reservoirs, the problems compounded for the defenders. By the 11th, when the supreme Allied commander in the theatre, General Wavell, left Singapore, there was no hope. The defenders had mostly continued to resist bravely, some such as the 1st Malaya Brigade had made heroic stands, but continual withdrawals left other defensive positions exposed which in turn were evacuated. The Japanese began to overrun more vital points and infrastructure, including ammunition depots. Ammunition, especially artillery and anti-aircraft artillery ammunition, began to run out. Japanese aircraft attacked defensive positions at will.

Despite Churchill’s instructions to ‘fight on among the ruins of Singapore City’, the leadership became concerned over the potential for huge loss of civilian life if the fighting entered the city proper. As it was, artillery and air bombardment were causing horrific casualties among the trapped civil population. By the 14th, the failure of the water supply had the high command considering escape. By early the next morning, Percival was planning a deputation to talk terms with the enemy. The Japanese were in no mood to compromise and demanded unconditional surrender. With no alternative, it was accepted and at 10.30 that night, the fighting stopped. For many, the real suffering was just beginning.

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