



Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected Readings from the World's Military Journals

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Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "A. Lee", written in a cursive style.

Editor's Note

This delayed double edition of the SOPD is the result of a busy September at the LWSC in the lead up to the 2003 Chief of Army's Land Warfare Conference. Readers should also note that the last edition of the SOPD for 2003 will be sent out in late November.

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Title 'SOTACC: Training SF Soldiers in Close Air Support and Terminal Air Control'

Authors Lieutenant Colonel S. Mulholland,
Lieutenant Colonel M. A. Singleton,
USMC and Major S. Boehm

Publication Details *Special Warfare: The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Centre and School*, Vol. 16, No. 1, April 2003.

Synopsis

This brief article contains details on the SOTACC or Special Operations Terminal Air Controller's Course which was created by the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Centre and School to provide US SF soldiers with standardised training in terminal-air-control operations. The course was established in response to problems noted by US Forces in Afghanistan with the execution of terminal-air-control operations and because of a shortage of US Air Force terminal-air-control operators.

Beginning in December 2002 the 17-day course started training SF students in two modules comprising theory, simulations and live fire training. The content of the modules is listed in chart form in the article. The article concludes by noting that the course is a work in progress that will be adjusted based on feedback from students in the field.

Title 'Combined Arms Training for MOUT'

Author Colonel J. J. Carroll, USMC (Ret)

Publication Details *Marine Corps Gazette*, September 2003, pp. 58–59

Synopsis

The article begins with five observations:

- existing MOUT doctrine and historical principles (except perhaps in joint operations) remain valid,
- historical examples provide valuable insights, but more recent examples (ie Chechnya) warrant most attention and study,
- The quality of the commander and his troops are paramount to success in MOUT,

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- A range of factors (political, technological, social, etc) have, in recent years, significantly changed the nature and character of combat,
- USMC infantry units involved in MOUT will be part of a combined arms team that is probably operating under a joint umbrella.

Having noted these points, the author states his belief that there is a deficiency in combined arms training for MOUT. He cites the findings of a US Army Human Engineering Laboratory study of the battles of Jerusalem (1967) and Suez (1973) conducted by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF). He also recognises that these battles have added significance for the US given its current involvement in the Middle East.

The IDF's MOUT techniques consisted of small combined arms teams of mounted infantry, engineers and other combat support troops (eg medical) deployed in armoured columns composed of alternating tanks and armoured personnel carriers. These teams would attack key objectives (radio stations, government buildings or high rise buildings that dominated surrounding areas) and seize major intersections to control traffic routes. While the IDF took Suez in 1973, its casualties were extremely high because the units making up the combined arms teams had not fought or trained together before the operation. Although not a template for success, the IDF's techniques have merit and along with other more recent examples of urban operations (Somalia and Chechnya) reinforce the need for combined arms training in preparation for MOUT.

While infantry and armoured units need to focus on their individual and collective skills, other resources will be required. The IDF have used hardened bulldozers and other heavy engineering equipment. Close Air Support (especially air delivered precision munitions) has been a feature of MOUT in recent times and junior commanders need to know how to control both fixed-wing and rotary assets. Artillery units need to practice the delivery of smoke and tear gas. The perennial shortage of engineers means that infantry will need to train in techniques for breaching, demolitions and other skills that also require the ability to use specialist equipment. One of the major C3 issues cited by Carroll is the need to develop increased trust and confidence in subordinate commanders due to the decentralised nature of the MOUT battle: *'MOUT will not be a place for timid or set piece commanders.'*

The article concludes by suggesting that a way forward to improve combined arms training must include construction of a live fire state-of-the-art MOUT training complex and the development of a well-trained,

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self-contained combined arms team (air and ground) following a common doctrine. The author believes that so long as the US remains engaged in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, there will always be a need for the USMC to be able to deploy a well-trained, flexible combined arms team.

Title 'From Revolution to Transformation: The State of the Field'

Author Ian Roxborough, Professor of History and Sociology at the State University of New York.

Publication Details *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Autumn 2003, pp. 68–75.

Synopsis

This is a useful review article that traces the intellectual origins of transformation from the Soviet *military-technical revolution* of the 1980s to *the revolution in military affairs* in the US and the development of the concept of network centric warfare (NCW) in the mid-1990s. The article also incorporates the criticism of these concepts by the scholars Williamson Murray and Macgregor Knox. These two men have analysed the use made of such ideas by a group, which they style 'the utopians' (to signify what they believe to be the over optimistic assumptions on the application of high technology to the problems of warfare). Two useful charts help to summarise the historical developments characterised as Revolutions in Military Affairs.

By the mid to late 1990s RMA concepts had been accepted by the US Defense Department and incorporated into official documents such as *Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010)* and its successor document *JV2020*. In 1997 the *Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)* and a report entitled *Transforming Defense* both indicated the US Forces were focused on the use of improved information and command capabilities to significantly enhance joint operations.

The emphasis on joint operations was further developed when the concept of NCW, adopted from the US Navy, was used to describe the ability to link dispersed sensors and weapons systems in order to provide massed precision effects on hostile targets – the so called system of systems. The author believes that it is the NCW concept at the strategic, operational and tactical levels which represents an epochal change in the nature of

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warfare. Information age warfare based on NCW aims at rapid deployment and precision strike to quickly bring about the collapse of an enemy before they can mobilise their forces. Another important aspect of NCW and its joint focus is the creation of information systems that will provide a common operating picture.

The necessary reorientation to this style of warfare has seen each of the US services adopt an expeditionary outlook based on rapid insertion of highly manoeuvrable forces. To support these doctrinal and conceptual changes there has also been a need to develop new capabilities:

- For the Army new light brigade structures,
- For the Navy a littoral focus,
- For the Air Force stealth and surveillance capabilities, and
- For the Marines new ship to shore manoeuvre capabilities.

The author concludes with an assessment that, since the mid-1990s the US Defence Department has focused on six key goals addressed in the QDR. Despite some internal differences of opinion, this has allowed the process of transformation to make progress. However, there is concern over the extent to which each of the Services is committed to the process and how they will react when it begins to threaten their current platforms and weapons systems. Inevitably, new external challenges will also arise to counter these developments and further innovation will require honest experimentation and a mindset that nurtures original thinking. To keep the transformation process on track there is a need for strong oversight of the type that can only be provided by a joint organisation. In the end, only history will be able to judge the success of America's transformation.

Title	'Readiness at a Price' – Country Briefing: Canada
Author	Sharon Hobson, JDW Correspondent, Ottawa
Publication Details	<i>Jane's Defence Weekly</i> , Vol. 40, Issue No. 11, 17 September 2003, pp. 21–26

Synopsis

This article details how chronic under-funding and neglect is damaging

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the Canadian Forces (CF). Currently, the CF receives 1.1% of GDP (the non-NATO average is 1.9%) and one Canadian defence analyst believes that if things continue this way for the next six to ten years the CF will be reduced to a small stay-at-home constabulary force. High operational tempo in several international peacekeeping missions and lack of capital investment are at the root of the problem. Meanwhile, the Services have begun fighting amongst themselves for a greater share of the small defence budget, to ensure that their particular acquisition projects are funded. The government recognises the problems, but seems reluctant to rectify them.

The Army is insolvent and over stretched. The operating budget alone is \$500 million short of requirements and collective skills have eroded significantly. After a decade of almost continuous operations, the force is 1,900 below establishment and although recruiting is good, training recruits has become a major challenge. Lack of capital expenditure is hampering the Army's ability to transform itself, requiring C\$10 billion for new C2 systems, armour, fire support systems, logistic and training support systems.

In the Cold War era, the Canadian Air Force was larger than the Army, but a decade of cuts have left it struggling to reinvent itself. Air Force's transformation plans are based around a three-phase program that focuses on maintaining its current operations and ensuring its future relevance to national security, while at the same time permitting the force to modernise. The C-18 fighter will undergo necessary upgrades, but strategic airlift, maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, tankers, helicopters and other assets important in peace support and constabulary operations will also feature heavily. Several projects aimed at modernising the force have had to be phased over extended periods of time, resulting in declining serviceability.

In the past 21 months, 15 of the Navy's 18 major surface combatants have been in the Persian Gulf. Unlike the other two services, the Navy adapted quickly to the austerity of the 1990s and made plans to ensure its relevance in the 21st century. However, the Navy too is experiencing problems with equipment purchases and modernisation of its platforms. The high operational tempo has also had an impact on its readiness. There have been fewer major fleet exercises and for various reasons Canada has not had a ship in the NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic since October 2001, with no plans to resume contributing until 2004.

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- Title** 'The Battle of An Nasiriyah'
- Author** The Company Commanders of the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment
- Publication Details** *Marine Corps Gazette*, September 2003, pp. 40–46

Synopsis

This article is a brief narrative of combined arms action to seize the bridges at An Nasiriyah and the ensuing fighting in urban areas against a mixed force of Iraqi troops and Fedayeen Saddam. The authors provide a useful overview of this key action on the road to Baghdad, involving mechanised companies operating with tank, artillery and air support.

- Title** The Future of Land Warfare
- Author** General Sir Michael Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, British Army
- Publication Details** *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 148, No. 4, August 2003, pp. 55–57

Synopsis

This article is based on the author's opening address at a conference on the future of land warfare held in London from 25/26 June 2003. The article begins by stating that the future British Army will be built around the concept of a rapid effects system. Jackson then proceeds to summarise the British perspective on land warfare in the future based on a number of historical trends and events. Sierra Leone aside, the author believes that future British operations will 'almost never' be exclusively national or land-based. The implication that warfare will increasingly be coalition/multi-national and joint frames the remainder of the article (although he is careful to write about the land component, rather than the Army).

Jackson believes that the land component will be the main player in future conflicts. However, the roles of land, sea and air components will shift between the concepts of *supported* and *supporting* with the denouement of most conflicts involving the land component being the supported force. He then discusses UK operations in Iraq, noting that it is only possible to talk of UK operations in the context of an overall

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coalition campaign. The main points in this discussion involve the speed of the operations, the use of new technologies and equipment and the greater flexibility of the forces employed by the UK.

Jackson's initial assessment is that the key lessons of Iraq for future conflicts will probably revolve around such aspects as effects based operations, rapid deployment (the related area of readiness), and coalition operations. Here he makes the important point that the UK should be able to fight *with* its allies, but not necessarily *as* they fight. Elaborating further on this point he observes that the UK is seeking its own technological solutions to the problems and opportunities of information warfare. He acknowledges that US technological ability is so unique that it is potentially a problem in coalition operations. His final point is about the media and the strategic effect that it can have on the conduct of military operations. The article concludes with the thought that the greatest future challenge is that war will most likely become increasingly complex.

Title	'Close Air support in the US Marine Corps: A FAC's Perspective'
Author	Major D. Hawkins, USMCR
Publication Details	<i>Marine Corps Gazette</i> , September 2003, pp.48–52.

Synopsis

This article is an analysis of the USMC's air support operations at An Nasiriyah in late March. The author is critical of the current doctrine on the grounds that it is an inefficient use of resources, largely suited to the 'ideal' conditions of peacetime training. He urges a review of current procedures based on his recent experience in combat. Essentially, the problem is that coordination of CAS and fire support generally has become too centralised.

The article is a plea for decentralisation of fire support coordination to ensure that the company commanders and the platoons get the support they need. The author puts forward seven proposals for discussion relating to procedures, training, equipment and communications. While he maintains that the USMC is still the premier Service in terms of integrating CAS into direct fires and ground manoeuvre, the article suggests that there is room for improvement if the Marines want to maintain that edge.

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Title 'Military and the Media'

Author Richard Sambrook, Director of News and Current Affairs, BBC

Publication Details *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 148, No. 4, August 2003, pp. 40–45

Synopsis

This article reflects on the relationship between the military and the media in the wake of the recent war in Iraq. An important aspect of modern war, which is noted in the introduction, is the role played by the media in shaping perceptions in democratic societies, or as Lord Hurd put it in 1993 'the public debate is not run by events but by the coverage of events.' This leads into a discussion of the embedding of journalists in Iraq.

Sambrook notes how the technology now available made it possible to provide viewers with real-time coverage of the battlefield. However, from a news editor's perspective, it left television networks with little opportunity to check facts and reach judgements about the accuracy of the coverage. In addition, embedded journalists identified heavily with the units from which they operated. This situation meant that, the perspective they provided was a very narrow one, and easily censored by the military.

Unilateral reporters, who were unaccredited and worked independently, suffered the highest casualty rates during the war. The message that some senior journalists have taken from this is that this type of reporting is becoming so dangerous that the independent correspondent may become a thing of the past. In a similar way, covering the war from behind the lines is not only dangerous but places in question the independence and impartiality of the broadcaster. Meanwhile, central briefings, such as those provided by Centcom, were inadequate in the face of the stories coming in from embedded and independent journalists, or other sources, such as the Arab language Al Jazeera network. Twenty-four hour news channels and changes in technology mean that, with a mobile phone, digital camera or Internet access, anyone can report on events. High volumes of this type of material are produced on an hourly basis, making any idea of controlling a mass and fragmented media impossible.

There was also a problem with the tenor of much of the media coverage, which governments and the military found to be too negative. While

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there is a case that some media analysts were inexperienced or wanted to play the devil's advocate, Sambrook argues that the military's use of the media in pre-war propaganda had raised expectations that the operation would be a 'cakewalk'. Journalists had to cut through the spin and manipulation to try to get to 'the truth'. Instead, he believes that the military must counter the flood of information available with openness, strong argument, consistency and integrity of the messages they wish to get across to the media and the public.

Title	'Transformation'
Author	GEN Frederick J. Kroesen, US Army (Ret.) former commander in chief of U.S. Army Europe and a senior fellow of AUSA's Institute of Land Warfare
Publication Details	<i>Army Magazine</i> , August 2003, Vol. 53, No. 8

Synopsis

General Kroesen presents a conservative perspective on the US Defense Department's Transformation process, particularly as it will influence the structure of the US Army. He explores the tensions between creating a slimmer, more devastating Army whilst 'maintaining the battlefield prowess of today's forces.'

The US Army has been transforming itself for 228 years, through the Pentomic and Volar failures to the successes of Just Cause and Desert Storm. Given the technological change of the 20th century, every military unit has transformed the way it works and the outcomes it achieves. 'Today's technology means that every unit commands a broader, deeper, more encompassing battlefield role. It also means that smaller units *or* fewer units are needed to accomplish missions.' Mass remains an important principle of warfare, and 'numbers of soldiers on the ground still matter for concluding a campaign in which the defeat of an enemy still entails the control of geography and population.'

Kroesen refines his examination to the utility of the division as the basic building block of the US Army, and places the current division shape with the historical forms it has taken in the US Army. He highlights that the division is the smallest unit capable of projecting and sustaining

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combat force, the necessary components of which are: aviation, artillery, engineers, transport and logistics, medical and administrative functions. A brigade can be shaped for sustainment, but it would be, in effect, a small division, which would have two brigade elements for offensive operations plus streamlined, just in time, support elements.

Finally, he explores what is the best size for the US Army. Given the frequent claims of 'overstretch' in current operations, including the heavy reliance on reserves, he asserts that 'the Army is too small for its mission load, and actions to guarantee its continued effectiveness either have not been initiated or are insufficient.' This effectiveness is derived from the quality of infantry, and debates about transformation can obscure that fact: 'the infantryman is the absolutely essential element for fighting the war on terror and winning, finally, the war with Iraq.' The need to occupy and dominate geography cannot be escaped as the final indicator of the success of military operations. Kroesen alludes to the miss-focus of transformation efforts, often too narrowly focused on high-tech platforms:

The primacy of the infantry on the battlefield has been a contentious question for centuries. On occasion, the horse, the elephant, the machine gun, the tank, the airplane, the atomic bomb and maybe a few other items have heralded the demise or at least the diminishment of the infantry's battlefield prowess. I have no trouble giving credit to the impact of all those weapons on today's battlefield, but none has yet supplanted the soldier on the ground as the culminating factor in winning wars. Physical control of terrain and dominance of an enemy population is still the only way to win a war.