



Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected Readings from the World's Military Journals

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The CA's Introduction

Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'R. Lee', with a long, sweeping underline that extends to the right.

Editor's Note

This is the final SOPD for 2003.

The first 2004 issue of the SOPD will be published in February.

Title 'The View From My Windshield: Just-in-Time Logistics Just Isn't Working'

Author Captain Jason Miseli, US Army, 2nd Bn, 69th Armour

Publication Details *Armor*, vol. CXII, no. 5, September–October 2003, pp.11–19

Synopsis

This article is a detailed analysis of faults in the US Army's logistic system during *Operation Iraqi Freedom*. It was written from the first-hand experience of an administrative officer in a US tank battalion headquarters company. After giving an overview of the major problems and deficiencies in Combat Service Support (CSS), the author provides a comprehensive analysis of the problems experienced with each major class of supplies. These sections contain observations in the style of an After Action Review, with discussion of the problem and recommended solutions. Each section contains a series of observations, and the material is presented in an easy-to-read format, with good use of dot points. The final section on CSS Operations addresses the problems faced by CSS units, including the resupply of these units, actions on the convoys coming under attack, communications and the type of personal weapons best suited to CSS personnel.

Title 'The Army and Land Warfare: Transforming the Legions'

Author Andrew Krepinevich, Executive Director of the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments

Publication Details *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 32, Autumn 2002, pp. 76–82

Synopsis

After noting the previous adaptations made by the US Army to changes in the strategic environment, the author points out that the force is now pursuing a three-tiered approach to transformation. These tiers are:

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- sustaining and modernising a significant proportion of the legacy force;
- fielding an expeditionary army based on Stryker brigade combat teams (SBCTs); and
- developing the mobility, deployability, sustainability and lethality of SBCTs.

However, the environment in which transformation is taking place is one of great uncertainty, particularly over changes in the nature of warfare and how new technologies will influence the transformation process.

The Army's view of transformation is based on three main assumptions about the future of land warfare:

- missile technology will continue to favour the offence, making the deployment and sustainment of forces through major ports and air bases more risky;
- complex terrain, such as cities, will become sanctuaries for forces wanting to avoid the superior battlefield and aerospace power of the US;
- highly distributed, networked operations are possible.

Under these circumstances, the particular strategy adopted to achieve transformation is vital to its ultimate success. Vision statements such as *Joint Vision 2020* are, however, not very compelling. The US Army is the most enthusiastic of the services when it comes to implementing transformation. The Army has published a series of documents outlining its own strategy for achieving transformation of the current force into an objective force. This involves aspects such as superior information and engagement of targets at extended ranges based on forces skilled at locating the enemy, as opposed to units trained to close with and destroy opponents — the traditional methodology of land forces.

SBCTs are an important part of this strategy. Light, mobile and with excellent reconnaissance and firepower capabilities, the SBCTs are an interim step towards a future combat system that the Army hopes to field by 2010. There is risk in this approach, as many of the ancillary technologies such as Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles, robotic and rotary-wing support remain troubled or unproven. Other key barriers to transformation are problems with deployment timelines, strategic air transport assets and the closely related question of optimal vehicle weight for the future combat system. The increasing importance of urban terrain

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in warfare will also be a significant factor in determining the configuration of the ultimate objective force, with serious questions over the suitability of SBCTs for Manoeuvre Operations in Urban Terrain.

Human factors also come into play, with key individuals becoming wedded to particular solutions in what is essentially a long-term, evolutionary process. Locking in too many factors now may mean a serious detriment to the development of the objective force, because so many of the technologies that transformation draws on are still emerging.

To avoid false starts and dead ends, the Army must not commit to a single-point solution that eventually turns out to be wrong. Experimental field exercises and the use of facilities such as the National Training Centre are just two ways in which these problems can be avoided. A joint urban warfare training centre may be another way to rigorously test concepts before investing in expensive, but ultimately ineffectual, technologies. The article concludes by suggesting that in this difficult process the Army must adjust its strategy for transformation to enhance prospects for success and mitigate the consequences of any potential shortcomings.

Title 'Case Closed: The US Government's Secret Memo Detailing Cooperation Between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden'

Author Stephen F. Hayes

Publication Details *The Weekly Standard*, 11/24/2003, vol. 009, issue 11

Synopsis

This short article reproduces what is claimed to be the contents of a top-secret US government memorandum demonstrating an operational relationship between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden, reaching back to the 1990s.

In a series of quotes from the top-secret memorandum, the article builds a case for a link between Hussein and bin Laden. Through the use of Sudanese and Egyptian intermediaries in the early 1990s, this substantive

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interaction culminated in personal meetings between bin Laden and high ranking members of the Iraqi Intelligence agencies in the late 1990s.

The article admits that evidence supporting the relationship in the period from mid-1999 to 2003 is sketchy and conflicting. Still, the author presses the case for the involvement of an Iraqi agent in the planning and execution of the 1993 World Trade Center bombings, as well as the attack on USS *Cole* and the 11 September hijackings.

Title	‘Strategy Revisited’
Author	Major Isaiah Wilson III, US Army
Publication Details	<i>Military Review</i> , vol. LXXXIII, no. 1, January–February 2003, pp. 42–9

Synopsis

This article poses the question ‘Has the United States abandoned the broader, traditional notion of strategy and the strategic security planning process out of short-term, domestic concerns over scarce resources and/or short-sighted assessments of the threat environment facing the country?’.

The paper goes on to argue that the most recent rounds of security and military strategy development in the United States have centred on how the means might modify the ends. The paper supports this thesis by comparing and contrasting the planning approaches under the Clinton and Bush administrations. According to the author, neither the threat-based approach of the Clinton administration nor the capability-based approach of the Bush administration conforms to traditional notions of strategy formulation.

The paper concludes that only a comprehensive, policy-based force-structuring strategy will produce a paradigm suitable for use by a global hegemonic power such as the United States. It incorporates the advantages of threat- and capability-based approaches, which model, shape and size military forces (as well as other instruments of power) in the light of national values, goals, interests and obligations.

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Title	‘The Compulsive Empire’
Article	Robert Jervis
Publication Details	<i>Foreign Policy</i> , July–August 2003, issue 137, pp. 82–7

Synopsis

This article, written by the Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University, provides telling insights into the nature of hegemonic power and consequences for the United States and the rest of the world. Jervis opens by declaring that the United States currently ‘*controls a greater share of world power than any country since the emergence of the nation-state system*’. As the power of an empire grows, he asserts, it uses broader and more encompassing definitions of its interests and security concerns.

The Bush administration’s policy of pre-emption seeks to universalise US values and establish hegemonic supremacy. Traditional US behaviour cultivates allies; the recent policy shift is a fundamental new direction, globalising the Monroe Doctrine. Jervis points to George W. Bush’s religious conversion as a metaphor to the redirection of US foreign policy after 11 September 2001, making the War on Terror ‘his sacred mission.’

The real strength of Jervis’s analysis is the depth and insight he brings to the machinations of power: ‘a state that is not subject to severe external pressures tends to feel few restraints at all.’ Further, the United States is not constrained in exercising pre-emptive war by the idea that it is setting a precedent for other nations. The rules for the rest of the world do not apply to the hegemon; it must provide realistic leadership.

The author identifies three major implications for the United States:

1. Given the US military hyperpower, ‘Europe faces obvious incentives to free ride in such situations’.
2. Large European states fear US hegemony, where ‘their values and interests are served only at Washington’s sufferance,’ and will act to constrain it.
3. US rivals will continue to promote power-emasculating bodies such as the UN Security Council, where countries (e.g., France and China) are artificially raised to equal status.

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Traditional power considerations also explain why many smaller European countries chose to support the United States on Iraq despite hostile public opinion. The dominance these nations fear most is not American but Franco-German.

Why did the United States overthrow Saddam Hussein? ‘The war is hard to understand if its only purpose was to disarm Saddam or to remove him from power—the danger was simply too remote to justify the effort.’ The United States seeks to promote democracy in the Middle East in order to ‘discourage tyrants and energise reformers ... and to demonstrate the willingness of the United States to ensure a good dose of what the Bush administration considers world order.’

Bush’s worldview offers little place for other states—even democracies—beyond membership in a supporting cast. Conflating broad interests with narrow ones and believing one has a monopoly on wisdom is an obvious way for a hegemon to become widely regarded as a tyrant.

Title	‘Redefine Cooperative Security, Not Pre-emption’
Author	Gu Guoliang
Publication Details	<i>The Washington Quarterly</i> , vol. 26, no. 2, Spring 2003, pp. 135–45.

Synopsis

This article draws heavily from US primary sources such as the 2002 US *National Security Strategy* and speeches made by President George W. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney. Distinctive rhetoric reinforces perceptions of an increasing US unilateralism. The US administration has used both its security strategy and speeches to ‘sell’ its doctrine of pre-emption, missile defence and military transformation. The author prefaces his remarks with the recognition that this is a doctrine that is neither ‘new’ nor helpful in combating asymmetrical forms of warfare such as transnational terrorism.

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A central assertion of the article is that the United States has demonstrated scant regard for multilateral mechanisms designed to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This attitude is clearly evinced in the United States withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, delay in ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and refusal to comply with the Biological Weapons Convention. The clear message to the world is that no-one except the United States is permitted such weapons, engendering a sense of pending and overwhelming threat that encourages smaller nations to develop WMD.

The pre-emption doctrine poses a direct threat to existing tenets of international law and the United Nations framework, which clearly spells out the 'self-defensive' nature of pre-emptive war. The institutional definition (established by US Secretary of State Daniel Webster in 1837) looks to an instant and overwhelming threat that leaves no time for deliberation. The author argues strongly that this precludes a legitimate attack by the United States on Iraq. That single nations (or small coalitions of the willing) can assume the roles of judge and jury in international law would be disastrous.

The article concludes with suggestions on ways to reinvigorate and reinforce existing non-proliferation regimes, given the threat of transnational terrorism, such as the Australia Group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The author notes that the effectiveness of such measures is diminished by limited membership of such programs. 'Universal participation ... is essential so that those countries that violate the norms of the regime can be punished effectively'. He emphasises that 'without the base and backing of a state, non-state terrorist organisations will find it difficult to get the materials or technologies needed to develop WMD'.

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Title	‘Engaging Failed States’
Author	Chester A. Crocker
Publication Details	<i>Foreign Affairs</i> , vol. 82, issue 5, September–October 2003, pp. 32–45.

Synopsis

As Australia engages a failing state in our region, this article is timely. The author served Ronald Reagan as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and is currently the Distinguished Professor of Diplomacy at the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. In this article, he takes aim at the limited and dangerous conception of ‘security’ being displayed by the Bush administration (military confrontation, rogues, and terrorists). Terrorists use failing and failed states as secure bases of operation, and the War on Terror needs broader parameters to be truly effective. The onset of the War on Terror ‘spurred Washington to action and offered an opportunity for fresh thinking in foreign policy’.

This opportunity, according to Crocker, is slipping away unrecognised: ‘by concentrating on worst-case scenarios’, President Bush ‘overlooks the failed-state crucible in which many threats to U.S. interests are forged’. The steps taken to overthrow the odious regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq are but the first required to build global security.

Crocker points to the gradual nature of state failure. He locates the actions of elites and subsequent interplay between criminal or criminalised groups as major factors in failing states. Burma and Papua New Guinea reflect the corruption of the central organs of government by rulers guided by self-interest. Similarly, Liberia and the Solomon Islands show how corrupt rulers can meld with criminal elements in order to undermine and replace state authority. Afghanistan and Iraq are more damning instances of these processes.

The author identifies thirty three societies recovering from recent wars and twenty five countries engaged in ongoing violence over control of government, people or resources. Wars in central and western Africa have seen millions die in the last decade. ‘Much of the contemporary international state system is crumbling beneath the burdens of warfare, stagnant or declining per capita growth, pandemic disease, rampant

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official corruption, and autocracy.’ The security of the global system is brought low by such conflicts.

The way out, according to Crocker, is for Western countries to invest their comparative advantage in states that lack ‘the legitimacy and authority to manage their own affairs’. He calls for the formalisation of mechanisms to authorise and conduct trusteeships, under United Nations auspices and accessing UN organs. The knowledge edge of Western democracies—earned after millennia of debate, struggle and war—is composed of law, order, justice, accountability, public services, and investor confidence. ‘In the end, the war on terrorism requires many of the same tools and techniques needed to battle the forces causing and thriving off state failure’.

Title

‘Stumbling Into War’

Author

James P. Rubin, Visiting Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics

Publication Details

Foreign Affairs, vol. 82, issue 5, September–October 2003, pp. 46–66

Synopsis

James P. Rubin served as Senior Advisor to Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and as Assistant Secretary of State in the Clinton administration. His premise is the question: *Why, when the leader of the free world went to war with a brutal and hated dictator, did so many countries refuse to take America’s side?*

Rubin categorises the Bush administration’s failure to muster international support for military action against Iraq as ‘a stunning diplomatic defeat’ that ‘will more generally damage U.S. foreign policy for years to come’. The coalition of the willing did carry the war and oust Saddam Hussein. The peace is yet to be decided, and lessons are already emerging on how not to operate as the world hyperpower.

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Specifically, Rubin points to:

- Washington's *casus belli* shifted according to the occasion.
- Washington failed to synchronise military and diplomatic efforts.
- Washington failed to prepare a contingency for Saddam's partial compliance to Resolution 1441.
- Washington's refusal to delay military operations killed efforts to achieve an authoritative resolution from the Security Council.
- Bush's administration put out rhetoric that alienated rather than persuaded.

Of particular note were statements made by Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Both disparaged the UN inspection process, downplayed the hope of peaceful settlement via the Security Council and pressed the military build-up in the Gulf. Further, Prime Minister Blair 'strongly pressed' for a pause to allow diplomatic efforts to bear fruit prior to conflict, only to be brushed aside by the Bush team. '[T]he administration would not make even modest adjustments to its military plans, although doing so could have dramatically increased diplomatic support for the war'.

The perception that the White House threatened 'to undermine international order' was widespread in the international community, and this caused resistance and resentment amongst members of the Security Council, who are charged with upholding international order.

The truth, however, is that the UN system worked. The nonpermanent council members took positions that did...reflect the views of their regional groups. The lack of support in the council for the American and British position, therefore, was not a systemic failure but a reflection of international reality.

The real test, of course, comes when next Washington seeks to prosecute a dangerous regime that proliferates WMD. How much has the Iraqi intelligence debacle damaged the monitoring and controlling system established by the international community? How discredited is the notion of coercive disarmament? Who will believe that the next American cause is just?