



Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected readings from the world's military journals

Issue No. 25
September–October 2004

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Compiled by:



The CA's Introduction

Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.



Article	'Preface to a Theory of Strategic Intelligence'
Author	<i>Dr Loch K. Johnson</i>
Publication Details	<i>International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence</i> , 2003, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 638–63

SYNOPSIS

Johnson's article examines an important question in relation to national defence: How much intelligence is enough? The author argues that the answer depends on the scope of a nation's foreign-policy objectives, its sense of danger at home and abroad, and its affluence. Important also is the degree of risk tolerance displayed by a nation's leaders, as well as how proficiently secret agencies respond to information needs in a manner that policy-makers find relevant, timely and unbiased.

To clarify what must be taken into account in answering this question, the author explores at length the key dimensional components of intelligence:

- foreign-policy goals and threat perception;
- missions, targeting (based on 'threat assessment') and intelligence infrastructure;
- consumers or customers; and
- marketing or 'matching' of information with the needs of policy-makers.

The pivotal problem in the world of intelligence remains the distribution of assets between targeting and resources. Using the United States as his primary example, the author believes that success in more clearly defining national foreign-policy objectives and threats would require a fundamental and historic debate not seen since the passage of the National Security Act in 1947.

Beyond the basics, the author believes that any theory will have to take into account the inadequacies of intelligence, such as its periodic lack of timeliness, a frequent unwillingness of policy-makers to accept reliable information, and the risk posed to democracy by the politicisation of information. The article concludes by stressing the importance of procedural safeguards designed to maintain accountability, which will be one of the most important considerations in any theoretical construct attempting to address the question of strategic intelligence.

Article	'The Difficulties and Dilemmas of International Intelligence Cooperation'
Author	<i>Stéphane Lefebvre</i>
Publication Details	<i>International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence</i> , October–December 2003, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 527–42

SYNOPSIS

This article focuses on international cooperation between civilian security and intelligence agencies responsible for fighting terrorism. The author—a former Strategic Analyst at the Canadian Department of National Defence—argues that, while multilateral arrangements have contributed to the global war on terrorism, their impact has been minimal and the future of international intelligence cooperation will be principally characterised through the development of bilateral liaison arrangements.

The article opens with a discussion of the impact of the events of 11 September 2001 on the reinvigoration of international security cooperation, stressing that the transnational nature of security threats has made isolation an impossible option. The author believes that most intelligence agencies have come to the realisation that no one intelligence body can do everything. They have recognised that gaps in their own coverage or access will periodically compel them to rely on allied agencies to fill the void.

There are several multilateral intelligence exchange arrangements, including the UKUSA Agreement, NATO Special Committee and The Club of Berne. In examining the dynamics of such key arrangements, the author highlights that the depth of these exchanges relies greatly on sharing a common threat perception or set of interests. The extent of the arrangements also rests on the level of mutual trust between partners. These multilateral exchanges notwithstanding, the author notes that much importance is placed on bilateral relationships, primarily for security reasons, and that this will continue to be the case.

The author also discusses the restraints on cooperation. The nature and extent of both bilateral and multilateral intelligence relationships are affected by several factors: differences in threat perception and foreign policy objectives, the distribution of power within the relationship, human rights records of liaising partners, legal issues, and the unintended use of the intelligence exchanged. These variables must be weighed up when considering entry into any liaison arrangement with a foreign intelligence agency.

Lefebvre concludes by stressing the fact that ultimately intelligence agencies act in the national self-interest, with cooperation between them only occurring when the potential benefits are evident and the risks of such cooperation well understood.

Article	<i>'The Wartime Utility of Precision Versus Brute Force in Weaponry'</i>
Author	<i>Robert Mandel, Chair and Professor of International Affairs at Lewis and Clark College</i>
Publication Details	<i>Armed Forces & Society, Winter 2004, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 171–201</i>

SYNOPSIS

Robert Mandel examines the contemporary debate over precision weaponry. He feels that, within the United States, some commentators have become mesmerised by the recent success of precision weaponry in Afghanistan and Iraq. This group now say that accurate weapons have changed the basic nature of warfare. Some go so far as to suggest that US armed forces should be restructured to provide overwhelming emphasis on precision-guided munitions (PGMs).

The author begins by establishing that precision is just one of a number of key characteristics of weapon systems, noting that over time both precision and destructiveness have increased. Even so, precision remains but one of the ingredients contributing to a weapon's potential. He then identifies a number of historical examples, highlighting that, although precision is important, it has not always been the most important criterion when it comes to assessing the coercive potential of a weapon system. He elaborates his argument by exploring the trade-off between accuracy and destructiveness, identifying the relationship between these two and contrasting their characteristics and the types of objectives or effects to be achieved on an enemy. In particular, he highlights the important interrelationship between selective and massive destruction when attempting to influence an opponent in contemporary operations.

Mandel also looks at the underlying motivations for increasing weapon accuracy and limiting destructiveness. He notes that in some circles humanitarian considerations are spurring the development of precision weaponry. He provides an analysis of recent conflicts where precision weaponry has played a significant role and uses this analysis to highlight the special characteristics that have underscored the successful exploitation of precision weaponry by the United States in these cases. In each of the examples the author observes that none of the acknowledged military victories have succeeded in achieving the long-term goals of these campaigns. Hence, in his view, the utility of precision weaponry must remain conditional and the United States should be wary of the dangers of an overreliance on PGMs.

The article concludes by warning that '[w]ithout further systematic and rigorous exploration of PGMs' wartime utility limits, the seduction of advanced technology could eventually lead to realisation of the dangers of inadvertent diffusion, erosion of military image, unrealistic expectations about the absence of carnage, elimination of a prudent sense of diplomatic restraint, and the emergence of unending "bloodless" conflicts'.

Article	‘Maritime Power in a Global Context’
Author	<i>Admiral Sir Alan West, First Sea Lord and Chief of the Naval Staff</i>
Publication Details	<i>RUSI Journal</i> , vol. 149, no. 3, June 2004, pp. 8–13

SYNOPSIS

Admiral West’s article aims to present a coherent strategic vision for the Royal Navy’s (RN) role in the contemporary strategic context. His argument begins with a brief introduction that highlights the importance of the sea in economic, diplomatic and military terms, both globally and for Britain in particular.

Historically, naval forces have been the bulwark of Britain’s defence from the 8th century AD to World War II and beyond. The importance of naval air power, learnt in World War II, was reinforced in the Korean War and also the Falkland Islands War. However, the Falklands War was a case of negative reinforcement, because the forces sent to recover the islands were woefully short of organic air cover due to a series of defence cuts. While the end of the Cold War signalled the need for a significant change in defence thinking, the nature of the problems faced in the new strategic environment were not well understood. Initial talk of peace dividends and reductions in defence budgets faded with the realisation that the world had become far more unstable without the Cold War balance of power. Since the early 1990s, a succession of crises around the world have seen the RN’s operational tempo increase, rather than decrease. When the Blair Government came to power in 1997, its policy-led Strategic Defence Review (SDR) responded to the new global security environment by creating a more expeditionary defence strategy for the United Kingdom. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the UK Government has added a new chapter to the SDR to ensure that the United Kingdom’s forces had the right capabilities and structures to respond to terrorism and a range of emerging asymmetric threats.

As West points out, diplomatically the United Kingdom has a prominent position in world affairs and in the future will seek to maintain its influence in global security matters to protect its own interests worldwide. The implications of all these circumstances for the RN are that future maritime operations will be joint, often multinational and combined. Moreover, these operations will involve a range of contingencies conducted across the full breadth of military tasks from goodwill visits to conventional warfighting and everything in between. Current strategic thinking is that all of these tasks can be achieved by focusing on the required effect. With 120 ships and submarines and 290 aircraft, the RN is broadly capable of delivering the required range of effects, according to West.

A review of some recent RN operations supports this claim. Since the early 1990s the RN has deployed frigates and destroyers on embargo operations in the Persian Gulf and the Adriatic; deployed aircraft to the former Yugoslavia and southern Iraq; RN submarines fired cruise missiles in the Kosovo campaign; Royal Marines patrolled the streets of Pristina, Kosovo; HMS *Glasgow* deployed to East Timor; an amphibious task group deployed to Sierra Leone; and RN task groups deployed to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Future development of the RN will build on these successes with the aim of continuing to produce capabilities that provide sustained reach, forward presence, mobility and leverage. The key policy guidance for the RN's future development are: operations will be joint, multinational and involve both small- and medium-scale contingencies across a broad range of military tasks; and the navy will operate in an unpredictable strategic global environment against multifaceted symmetric and asymmetric threats. Versatility and readiness will be the keys to the provision of this force, which will also evolve over time as new technologies and techniques become available.

West summarises his argument by restating the historical importance of naval power to Britain in economic, diplomatic and military affairs. The RN of the future must build on those strengths to provide the UK Government and taxpayer with maritime power that is optimised to reach its full potential.

Article	'Career Development, Job Rotation, and Professional Performance'
Author	<i>Nicholas Jans and Judy Frazer-Jans</i>
Publication Details	<i>Armed Forces & Society</i> , Winter 2004, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 255–77

SYNOPSIS

This article explores the relationship between job rotation and organisational behaviour. In particular, it examines how tenure of appointment affects satisfaction and job performance and the extent to which any effects are moderated by the kind of job being performed. The authors, who specialise in strategic human resource management and organisational capability, suggest that the findings of their research point to a number of significant implications for personnel policy and practice in the Australian military.

The paper begins with an examination of the traditional career development model employed by most Western military forces. This model is based on phased progression by periodically moving individuals between different assignments as a means of creating a generalist skill set and developing individuals for future senior-officer appointments.

The authors then draw on data collected in a wide range of recent military social-science surveys. In summary, their research establishes a relationship between tenure, performance and satisfaction for a range of military-career categories, including enlisted and commissioned personnel. These findings suggest that, when personnel have had adequate preparation for a specific job, their performance is unlikely to improve over time. It is only when personnel lack appropriate preparation that longer exposure results in better performance. On the other hand, job satisfaction is more a function of performance rather than tenure. This, it is suggested, points to the need for a different approach to personnel management.

The authors conclude that traditional career development practices are still viable for core-business employment but suggest that the current practice of coupling frequent job rotation with little continuity of specialisation for middle-level staff is not conducive to effectiveness, cohesion, retention and adaptability. The authors believe that the Australian military is using employment policies that are out of step with 21st-century practice and demands.

Article	'The Need to Increase the Size of the Deployable Army'
Author	Michael O'Hanlon
Publication Details	<i>Parameters</i> , Autumn 2004, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 4–17, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04atumn/contents.htm

SYNOPSIS

O'Hanlon's article explores the issue of 'ends and means' discussed in James Fallows' article, 'The Hollow Army' (*The Atlantic Monthly*, March 2004), which appeared in last months' SOPD. However, O'Hanlon provides a more detailed analysis of the size and structure of the US Army, its worldwide commitments and the difficulties it faces in meeting these commitments within its current manpower ceiling. The author suggests that, given the repeated deployment of active-duty personnel and the high proportion of Army Reserves and National Guardsmen who are being activated for overseas deployments, the current all-volunteer structure is in danger of collapsing. The author believes that the only feasible option is to increase the size of the active-duty force.

While recommending an increase in the size of the Army, O'Hanlon also addresses other options that are either being actively pursued by the current administration or those that have been suggested as alternatives. The most important and ambitious of these initiatives is the restructuring and rebalancing of the US Army, reassigning some personnel to more high-demand tasks. This initiative will reduce the numbers of some units that have proven to be of less utility in recent operations, while increasing those capabilities where there is a recognised shortfall. Transformation will allow the

creation of a larger number of deployable combat brigades, which, while smaller, will be more capable with greater firepower and organic support.

Despite the active measures that the United States is undertaking to improve the versatility and sustainability of its army, the author believes that these measures will still leave the force with too few troops in the immediate future to meet the many demands being made on the all-volunteer service. Based on his calculations, even with a recently announced increase of 20 000 active troops, there will still be a significant shortfall. Although other options to bridge the capability gap include raising dedicated peacekeeping units or the more radical option of reintroducing the draft, the author argues that both of these suggestions have significant limitations that will not address the immediate difficulties that face the Army. The author concludes that the US Army requires an additional 40 000 troops over the next several years. While he acknowledges the high cost that this option entails, O'Hanlon believes that this is the only way to maintain the current all-volunteer system, meet the Army's commitments and avoid a return to the draft.

Article	'Mapping the route of Leadership Education: Caution Ahead'
Author	<i>George Reed, Craig Bullis, Ruth Collins and Christopher Paparone</i>
Publication Details	<i>Parameters</i> , Autumn 2004, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 46–60, http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04atumn/contents.htm

SYNOPSIS

Although focused specifically on the development of US strategic leaders, this article has much broader implications for the current debate over training versus education in military forces. The authors—all current or recent US Army War College faculty members in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management—explore the challenge of strategic leadership education for the 21st-century US Army. They begin by suggesting that much of the program of planning and curriculum development in US professional military training and education has in the past been via a systems analysis approach. This type of systematic training model has been applied to training from basic soldier skills right through to leader education. They suggest that this might not be the best option for leader development, especially in the areas of joint and strategic leadership for military operations in the information age.

The article describes how the current effort in the US military involves a debate over a 'Joint Competencies Leader Development Framework' proposed by Joint Forces Command. This proposal uses a process known as competency mapping, which has widespread appeal throughout sections of the armed forces. Although competency mapping may take a variety of forms, and there is no one correct way of depicting

them, they can be generally described as a formal, top-down effort to identify, list, label, track and measure competency descriptors.

The authors explore in some detail the attraction of this type of list-based approach for military organisations. They acknowledge that there are strong cultural drivers and favoured paradigms that help to explain the dominant role of this approach as a tool for curriculum development. On the other hand, they assert that the education of strategic leaders is not an endeavour suited to an assembly line approach. The authors assert that an overly detailed, list-based approach could result in professional military education that is the opposite to that which is actually needed. A central reason behind their belief is the danger of prescriptive lists creating the impression that success can be assured by mastering specific competencies. Furthermore they assert that this approach contains fundamental flaws to the extent that it should not be relied on as the preferred means of driving leadership education, especially that of strategic leaders.

The authors conclude by recommending an organisational learning-based process, with vastly expanded assessment and educational network components. Their alternative framework uses context-relevant study to justify continuous curriculum adjustment facilitated by a network of the various elements of the professional military education system. They conclude that a networked approach to joint development can lead to multiple perspectives of leadership more appropriate to a rapidly changing environment and one that is more worthy of the military profession.

Article	'A Different Course? America and Europe in the 21st century'
Author	<i>Alan W. Dowd</i>
Publication Details	<i>Parameters</i> , Autumn 2004, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 61–74, accessed from http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04atumn/contents.htm

SYNOPSIS

Dowd suggests that, although there are many obstacles to achieving a solid transatlantic alliance, European and American geostrategic goals are not so dissimilar. He suggests that minor flexibility on issues by both America and Europe will provide an opportunity for the transatlantic community to renew itself.

The author begins his article by observing recent disruptions in the transatlantic community. The differences between the goals of the European Union and those of the United States are more pronounced, and common interests are less obvious. Furthermore, the ever-present difficulty in defining Europe is further exacerbated by the problem that, until Europe 'finds itself' within the context of international relations, it will continue to fail to be an enduring security partner for the United

States in the 21st century. Dowd identifies two main groups that encourage intra-European cooperation: a group that speaks of Europe primarily in terms of economics; and the second, and more intrusive, is the group that aims to promote a deeper union conceived from the notion of amalgamated foreign policies, currency and governance. In view of these problems, Dowd then uses a number of examples highlighting the difficulty that Europe has had in achieving communal goals. He suggests that this inability indicates the European decision making process is flawed.

The subsequent section is dedicated to the strained alliance between the United States and the European Union. According to Dowd, even during the Cold War the transatlantic alliance has been strained. The ‘hour of Europe’ during the Yugoslavian conflict proved how unable the Europeans were to ‘act collectively and (they) refused to act individually’. As it happened, the Bosnian war only ended after the United States reasserted itself. Dowd highlights Europe’s lack of enthusiasm towards United States ‘interference’, which is a failure to accept the reality that the United States is the world’s only superpower. As Gerard Baker stated:

The most powerful illusion under which many Europeans seem to be labouring is the idea that if only President Bush would go away, the world would revert to the status quo ante, a mythical world of brotherly love and UN-mandated multiculturalism.

Next, there is a change of focus from the negative aspects of the alliance towards a more hopeful outlook on transatlantic cooperation. Dowd maintains that although there are divergences in European and US military and defence policy, there does seem to be common ground. America and Europe may indeed be taking different courses, in the words of President Washington, but these paths often overlap—for example, issues such as the war on terror, border security and WMD.

Dowd concludes by suggesting that the transatlantic community, while not always operating in parallel, does have scope to grow and develop in a mutually beneficial fashion. In order for these mutually beneficial areas to develop, he believes that several ideological adjustments need to be made. Cross-cultural communications, need to be tailored to the specific audience, which for the US means less blunt ‘good and evil’ propaganda; and for the European Union, an attempt to rectify weaknesses in internal cooperation.

Article	‘Discourse of action: Command, Control, Conflict and the Effects Based Approach’
Author	<i>Robert Grossman-Vermaas</i>
Publication Details	Paper presented to the 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (CCRTS), San Diego, California, 15–17 June 2004, http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2004/CCRTS_San_Diego/CD/papers/015.pdf

The author of this article is a defence analyst with the Department of National Defence in Canada. Grossman-Vermaas suggests that the ongoing issues being experienced in Iraq have resulted from a poor appreciation of the diverse and complex consequences that the coalition would face in overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime, instituting a program of reconstruction and ensuring the transition to a new Iraq government. He believes that the problem stems from the adoption of a traditional 'military' approach to such a complex range of issues—an approach that he suggests is incapable of accurately perceiving, or forecasting, the results of the chosen strategy. Furthermore, it is an approach that is incapable of delivering strategic end-states, or, 'effects', on the targeted political, military, economic, social and developmental systems.

What the author proposes is that it has become clear in the months since the invasion that there was little, if any, predetermined strategic course of action that recognised the complexity of modern conflict. There was also no attempt to mitigate potential post-traditional combat threats through the inclusion of non-military members in the operational decision-making structure. He suggests that, in modern conflicts of the type being experienced in Iraq, a broad range of communities have to be engaged in response to such complex emergencies if there is to be any hope of success. While the armed forces continue to be a crucial element in any response, in the future planning will also have to include groups from donor governments, multilateral agencies, non-government organisations, private industry, academia, and national and international intelligence agencies.

The author argues that only an effects-based approach provides the right conceptual framework for planning and executing future multinational operational missions. To achieve this framework, there must first be in place a holistic, and integrated, command and control structure that is capable of reacting to the conflict environment as a complex system of systems. This structure will be composed both of military and non-military organisation components.

Article	'Suicide Bombers: Are Psychological Profiles Possible?'
Author	<i>Dr David Lester, Centre for the Study of Suicide, New Jersey; Dr Bijou Yang, Drexel University, Pennsylvania; and Mark Lindsay, Maryland.</i>
Publication Details	<i>Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, July–August 2004, vol. 27, issue 4, pp. 283–95</i>

SYNOPSIS

Contrary to the findings of previous studies of suicide bombers, the authors claim that suicide bombers may, after all, share personality traits; that psychological profiles of

suicide bombers might be feasible; and that the suicide bombers may be characterised by the risk factors that increase the probability of suicide.

The article begins with a review and critique of previous essays on suicide bombers. The authors argue that the conclusions reached by previous analysts (who reject the feasibility of psychological profiling and claim an inability to characterise suicide bombers by the risk factors that generally predict suicidal behaviour) are premature and generally incorrect because of insufficient evidence and data collection. All previous studies were conducted without the collection and use of detailed case histories of individual suicide bombers or, failing that, without performing a psychological autopsy. These two factors are necessary for the identification of suicide risk factors and psychological profiling. While recognising that, to date, biographical data for suicide bombers has not been collected, the article uses the example of the detailed biography of Timothy McVeigh as an indication that psychological profiling and typologies of terrorists and suicide bombers might be possible.

The paper goes on to discuss whether suicide bombers can be characterised as 'typical' suicides through the identification of typical risk factors (e.g. an affective disorder, alcohol and drug abuse, childhood loss or recent stress). The authors point out that, for cultural reasons, suicide has rarely been studied in the Middle East. However, examples, including the detailed story of Arien Ahmed (a 20-year-old Palestinian student caught wearing an explosive backpack as she entered an Israeli town in 2002), suggest that many suicide bombers may indeed have these risk factors for conventional suicide previously disregarded by commentators. A further discussion of 'personality traits' leads the authors to suggest that the 'authoritarian personality' might provide a good fit for the personality and psychodynamics of terrorists and suicide bombers.

The article concludes with a caution that only in time, when detailed biographies of suicide bombers become available, can scholars hope to gain an understanding of the psychodynamics involved. From these detailed studies it will be possible to construct accurate typologies into which suicide bombers can be classified.