



## **Senior Officer Professional Digest**

**Selected Readings from the World's Military Journals**

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### **The CA's Introduction**

**Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.**

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "A. H. H." followed by a long, sweeping underline.

### **Editor's Note**

**Please note that the next issue of the SOPD will be published in May 2003.**

<b>Article Title</b>	'Bush's Middle East Vision'
<b>Author</b>	Philip H. Gordon
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Survival: The IISS Quarterly</i> , Spring 2003, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 155-65

### Synopsis

The author, a Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC, outlines the parameters of the Bush Administration's Middle East policy. Although the article was written before the fall of Baghdad, it remains extremely valuable in that it places the invasion of Iraq into the broader context of American Middle East policy.

In essence, the Bush strategy is aimed at reshaping the Middle East by a mixture of force and diplomacy. The aim is to remove Saddam Hussein, promote political reform among Arab moderates and support Israel until the Palestinians renounce terrorism. There are four main assumptions driving US strategy in the Middle East:

- *The status quo is unacceptable in that it produced Osama bin Laden and September 11.* It was not lost on US policy-makers that most of the al Qaeda hijackers were from Saudi Arabia and Egypt, both US allies, but both repressive régimes that have used anti-American rhetoric to disguise their own unpopularity. The status quo also tied America into a regional guardian role against Saddam which fuels more anti-Americanism. *'Thus, European critics of régime change need to recognise that the alternative means leaving in place a status quo that itself creates a serious threat to the West.'*
- *Iraq's quest for WMD poses an unacceptable threat to long-term peace in the region.* The American calculation is that if Saddam is not removed and his régime destroyed, then he would, in time, develop nuclear weapons. Unlike the Europeans, the US does not believe a nuclear-armed Iraq could be deterred from regional aggression. Related to this, is the question of terrorists gaining WMD from Iraq. After September 11, neither of these are risks worth enduring.

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- *Peace is not possible between Israelis and Palestinians under the status quo.* The Bush Administration believes talks accompanied by terrorism will not work. The 2000 offer of a Palestinian state by Israel was rejected by the Palestinians and responded to with more terrorism. US envoys such as Colin Powell and Anthony Zinni met only violence when on Middle East peacemaking. There must be a viable Palestinian leadership willing to negotiate a 'land for peace' deal.
- *In the long-run, peace, stability and an end to anti-Western terrorism requires democracy.* This is a long term-goal of the Bush Administration based on a belief that if Japan and Germany could be rehabilitated and Soviet communism defeated, so too can the Middle East be changed for the better. Just as democracy was spread to Eastern Europe and Russia, so too can the process begin in the Middle East even if it takes 70 years.

Implementing this sweeping grand strategy will not be easy. The first step is, however, régime change in Iraq, not an Israel-Palestine peace. This would allow the US to withdraw from Saudi Arabia, permit the rehabilitation of Iraq and send a powerful message to other régimes in the Middle East: *'threaten the United States and its friends in the region and you will pay a terrible price'*.

Only after Saddam's removal would an Arab-Israel peace be sought, and then only if the Palestinians renounce terrorism. The choice for them as outlined by Bush is simple: fight and face US-backed Israeli strength, or negotiate recognition of statehood. The final steps involve a long-term commitment to promoting democracy and freedom in the region that will be expected to bear fruit over time. No aspect of the Bush strategy is without risk of failure, but it is a strategy of vision driven by much more than domestic politics and oil. The questions are the right ones: the hard issues require tackling and something must be done to alter a regional status quo that is contrary to the long-term interests of the West.

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**Article Title** 'After Saddam'

**Author** Charles Tripp

**Publication Details** *Survival: The IISS Quarterly*, Winter 2002-03, vol. 44, no. 4, pp. 23-48

### Synopsis

This article by Charles Tripp represents the views of the leading Western historian of modern Iraq. Written before the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, the article is a valuable assessment of the dynamics of régime change and state reconstruction. The author identifies four major challenges to successful state reconstruction: the presence of a shadow state, the character of Iraqi community politics, the structure of the security forces and the power of oil.

- *The shadow state*: like many Third World authoritarian states, Iraq is a 'dual state', with both public and 'shadow' forms. The public state is the visible administrative apparatus, but the real power lies in the shadow state of invisible networks of patronage and clan loyalty. This entire system would need to be removed in any true reconstruction of Iraq. To accomplish this requires local knowledge and staying power, both of which the US may lack.
- *Iraqi community politics*: Iraqi politics rest on 'communities' of ethnicity, sect and identity. This is a system an occupying force will have to manage. Despite the recognition that this system may perpetuate the ways of the old régime, seeking to dismantle it in favour of a federal state might only alienate forces that are essential for the creation of stability.
- *The security forces*: since indigenous forces will be required to restore civil order, the US will have to look to Iraqis with security experience. Such officers can only come from the security forces of the Baath régime. Here again, short-term needs might have long-term effects on reconstruction.
- *The power of oil*: Iraq's massive oil revenue encourages centralisation of financial power, a central feature of Saddam's rule. During occupation it will be important to avoid distribution of funds into organs of the shadow state which do not serve the civic good.

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Tripp points out that reconstruction will be complex and difficult. Despite Saddam's personal rule, the Iraqi system of politics predates his assumption of power in 1979 and will likely survive his removal in 2003. In addition, there are regional dynamics to contend with since Iran, Syria and Turkey will fear any new political order that affects the balance of power in the Gulf.

The author concludes that the Iraqi political system is, however, reformable, but only over time and with intimate knowledge of Iraqi society. Reconstruction requires a stamina that may run counter to American political inclinations for a protracted occupation that risks alienating the bulk of the Iraqi population.

### **Article Title**

*Post-War Iraq: Are We Ready?*

### **Author**

Bathsheba N. Crocker, Frederick D. Barton

### **Publication Details**

Report of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Center for International and Strategic Studies,  
<http://www.csis.org>, 25 March 2003

### **Synopsis**

Primarily written by Bathsheba Crocker, a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow who is a resident in the CSIS International security program, this report represents a 'scorecard' of US preparations for post-conflict reconstruction so far. Though recently completed, the report has clearly been overtaken by events. Nonetheless, the issues and concerns raised by the authors of this document will become increasingly relevant as the US struggles with the critical post-war phase of pacification and reconstruction in Iraq.

The report raises three distinct concerns before addressing specific reconstruction tasks:

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- First, it points out that the US Government's secrecy and lack of public discussion of its post-war plans may indicate a troubling level of under-preparedness for the task. More importantly, the failure to consult and coordinate these plans with humanitarian relief and UN organisations means that the necessary coordination for the involvement of these bodies has not occurred. Although at the time of the publication of this digest a significant humanitarian crisis had not occurred, the coalition was subject to criticism for not having sufficient resources on hand to restore order, to maintain medical services and to deliver food and clean water to urban areas.
- Second, the authors criticise the US failure to enlist international support for reconstruction prior to launching the conflict. It suggests that this diplomatic failure is likely to derogate from the military success of the invasion.
- Third, the authors suggest that the administration has set unrealistic timelines for the reconstruction process, and that rather than rapidly disengaging, the US should demonstrate its commitment to remain until all its promises are met.

The paper raises a number of reconstruction issues including:

- the role of the Iraqi military and police force in post-conflict stabilisation;
- the role of expatriate Iraqis in the post-war civil administration;
- the reform of Iraq's internal systems of governance and justice;
- the prosecution of régime members for crimes against humanity; and
- the resolution of Iraq's foreign debt. Iraq's international financial burden is an estimated US\$383 billion, which includes over \$200 billion in unsettled or unpaid claims from the 1991 Gulf War. Rapid resolution of these liabilities is necessary if Iraq is to make a break with its past.

The authors demonstrate that problems of post-war reconstruction have become the critical element of this conflict. Quite apart from the significance of these issues for regional and global security, the legitimacy and advisability of future international military interventions

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will be shaped by the success of military and civil activities taking place in Iraq today.

**Article Title** *Understanding the New 'Effects-based' Air War in Iraq*

**Author** Anthony H. Cordesman

**Publication Details** Center for International and Strategic Studies, <http://www.csis.org>, 15 March 2003

### **Synopsis**

In this article, Professor Cordesman, who holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for International and Strategic Studies in Washington DC, demonstrates why he is considered one of the leading strategic commentators alive today. Written before the air campaign in Iraq, he presents an accurate ten-point analysis of the course and objectives of the air war. He argues that what we have witnessed is a new kind of air campaign— 'designed to paralyze enemy forces, rather than destroy them. It will seek to bypass or avoid all targets that are not time-sensitive military assets to a regime that will be gone in days or weeks.'

Cordesman points out that, despite the ability to apply significant discrimination in selecting and striking targets, there are limits to what the allies can do. Precision targeting and the delivery of high explosives are 'an art form and not a science'. He argues that the bombing plan would evolve very rapidly and become fluid by day two and that pre-war reporting of the effectiveness of 'shock and awe' in the opening phases would be very much over-rated. Importantly, he also suggests that force protection would generally override targeting constraints—the US, Britain and Australia would not allow their troops to be killed in close-in fighting if stand-off munitions can clear the way.

Cordesman also suggests that the use of WMD or missiles by the Iraqis constitutes a wild card, but that the use of such weapons would lead to a massive change in targeting and in the allocation of strike assets. He

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indicates that possession of this knowledge probably limits the use of such weapons by states. Finally, in a war such as this, he suggests that the propaganda campaign is of equal significance to the kinetic effects of munitions. Iraqi efforts, he suggested, would be aimed at suborning the legitimacy of Allied military action by exaggerating *'military and civilian casualties, religious and cultural destruction, and economic and infrastructure destruction for political purposes'*.

Cordesman's analysis has been substantially borne out by events, something that cannot be said of the work of many other commentators. In particular, his ten-point consideration of the future nature of 'effects-based' air war is likely to have continued relevance for strategic thought, particularly as events have demonstrated the efficacy of precision strike coupled with rapid and incisive action by land forces.

<b>Article Title</b>	'Transforming How we Fight; A Conceptual Approach'
<b>Author</b>	Major Christopher D. Kolenda, US Army
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Naval War College Review</i> , Spring 2003, vol. LVI, no. 2, pp. 100-21

### Synopsis

In this article, Major Kolenda, an Armor officer, and co-author of *Leadership: The Warrior's Art* (2001), argues that *'by continuing to focus almost exclusively on technology, the U.S. armed forces risk developing strategies, force structures, and warfighting concepts that are at odds with the nature of war'*. He suggests that the US military must pay more attention to the cultural and intellectual elements of transformation or risk being doomed to *'expensive irrelevance and inconsequential lethality'*.

Major Kolenda suggests that the following concepts will best enhance US military effectiveness:

- decentralisation: create and exploit a knowledge advantage by empowering troops and leaders at the appropriate levels;

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- complexity: create an advantage by maximising the number of problems with which the enemy must cope at the one time;
- resilience: sustain balance and equilibrium in our own force while creating and exploiting instability and disorder in the enemy; and
- tempo: sustain an intensity of operations over time with which the enemy cannot cope.

Major Kolenda's argument provides a valuable warning against complacency in the aftermath of the victory against Iraq. The US and its allies cannot always expect to fight an adversary possessing poor situational awareness and committed to industrial age solutions. He suggests that the *'notion that standoff precision munitions alone can generate the same effects and produce the psychological collapse of the enemy is at odds with the idea of adaptive complexity. A thinking enemy who is determined to win will find ways to mitigate the effects of standoff precision munitions.'*

Written before the invasion of Iraq, he paints a word picture of a strategic-operational concept designed to integrate military and non-military capabilities and aerial firepower with ground forces. He proposes:

*The simultaneous, integrated employment of precision-strike and ground maneuver forces on enemy formations and critical vulnerabilities, coupled with operational fires on second-echelon or reserve forces; special operations forces operations on strategic targets; strikes against the enemy's communications, economy, and infrastructure, public and private diplomacy aimed at coalition partners and third parties; and the use of economic instruments of power to generate complexity at the operational and strategic levels of war.*

While none of this might appear especially innovative, the question of balancing ground forces and lethal fires is likely to emerge as the critical question for operations conducted in the aftermath of the extraordinarily successful missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

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<b>Article Title</b>	‘Reserve Forces—The Nation’s Insurance Policy: How the Conservatives Should Repair the Damage’
<b>Author</b>	Peter Viggers, MP
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>RUSI Journal</i> , February 2003, vol. 148, no. 1, pp. 68-75

### **Synopsis**

This article reflects on the impact of Britain’s 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) on the Reserve Force’s ability to augment and round-out ongoing operations. The author, who is Vice-Chairman of the House of Commons Defence Select Committee, points out that there is a size below which Reserve Forces prove incapable of meeting the personnel requirements of an increasingly over-stretched Regular Army. His key point is that it is dangerous to plan on the basis that the warning time for unforeseen contingencies will enable the Regular Army to expand as required. He uses the example of the war in Kosovo in 1999 when, as a result of the SDR, the Territorial Army was being drawn down from an establishment of 59 000 to 41 200. The crisis in the Balkans led the Ministry of Defence to consider ordering the compulsory mobilisation of 14 000 reservists for service.

Most importantly, the author points out that Reserve Forces cannot be handled like a ‘temp’ typing pool. He argues that stable, formed units are the essential requirement for a healthy reserve army. He concludes that a *‘framework of formed units facilitates the bonds of comradeship, group or regimental loyalty that generate the interest and enthusiasm to aid recruitment, improve training standards at all levels and instil the understanding and experience of the military art and ethos’*.

Viggers demonstrates that reserve forces need to retain excess capability and personnel if they are to be able to sustain current operations, much less be capable of providing round-out capacities for crisis contingencies. In the British context this will approximately double the current cost of the reserves, however given current operational demands he argues that this is the most cost-effective use of resources.

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**Article Title** 'The Proper Role of Professional Military Advice in Contemporary Uses of Force'

**Author** Martin L. Cook

**Publication Details** *Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly*, Winter 2002-03, vol. XXXII, no. 4, pp. 21-33

### Synopsis

This article examines, from an American perspective, the role of professional military advice in an age of limited conflict in which precision technology allows politicians to consider the use of force with accuracy and near-impunity. There are troubling moral questions that arise from political ease in the use of force. These include:

- the question of using overwhelming force in asymmetric conflict;
- the possibility that force protection concerns may undermine the professional military ethic;
- the likelihood that ease in the use of force may lower the moral standard for recourse to the use of force itself; and
- the fact that long-range strike may allow military punishment to occur without political solution – 'precision without decision'.

Examining the role of military force in humanitarian operations, the article argues that it is the obligation of military officers to ensure that their professional military advice is clearly articulated to politicians and, to the extent they can control events, heard and followed. The military may be a tool, but it is not a mindless tool. Even the most judicious use of force will cause death and destruction; one moral test of the use of force must be proportionality and reasonable hope of success.

Professional military officers have clear expertise in 'centers of gravity' and in judging the capabilities of weapons systems. They cannot, however, guarantee that destruction of certain targets will bring about a desired political result. Intelligence and diplomacy are factors here, as much as military force. In humanitarian operations, the use of force is always problematical. These operations are not 'pure' military

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campaigns. For example, the Kosovo campaign was casualty-averse for largely political reasons and was far from being an ideal strategic air campaign. Humanitarian operations involve inter-agency operations and imply civilian involvement in operational questions. Military autonomy may simply not be an option. There are, nonetheless some basic guidelines for military officers to follow:

- The professional military should always set the baseline for any proposed military intervention, estimating options, effects and consequences in using force.
- Military advice is critical in shaping the way political leaders decide on the use of force. Military professionalism should insist on prudence, ethics and appropriate means. In a very real way, the military's expert advice is very different from an obedient bureaucracy which merely implements political decisions.
- The military plays an important role in correcting the idea of 'riskless war'. Officers should be alert to the escalation of the use of force beyond the bounds of ethics and prudence.

Moreover, the author warns of the danger of politically-driven casualty-aversion:

*For the military itself, if a culture is allowed to grow up that makes prevention of friendly casualties a central priority or even a sine qua non expectation, there will be quite serious ethical and political potential risks. Ethically, the drive to protect one's own forces at all costs can lead military commanders to disregard entirely the ethical requirement to show due regard to the lives of the adversary, both military and civilian.*

As 'managers of violence', the professional military must realise the complexity of the conflict environment and its ethical, moral, political and diplomatic constraints. Military operations may never be defined in a simple way that allows the autonomous use of overwhelming force by uniformed officers. Judgment and knowledge will always have to be applied in the operational use of the military instrument.

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**Article Title** 'Prevention, Not Preemption'

**Author** Lawrence Freedman

**Publication Details** *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2003,  
vol. 26, no. 2, Spring 2003, pp. 105-114

### Synopsis

Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies at King's College, London, argues that it is difficult to disagree with the principle that one should deal with threats as they develop rather than after they are realised. This is particularly so when one is faced with threats that originate '*at the crossroads of radicalism and technology*'. Nonetheless, despite the rise of pre-emption, deterrence is unlikely to simply disappear. Both deterrence and pre-emption are required, but neither on its own can form the basis of a new strategy.

Freedman provides a useful analysis of the differences between pre-emption and prevention. Both are 'controlling strategies' in that they do not rely on adversaries' cautious decision-making. In contrast, 'coercive strategies' such as deterrence, assume an adversary can be influenced. Prevention is cold-blooded; it intends to deal with a problem before it becomes a crisis. The new international environment has demonstrated the limits of a conceptual framework in which most essentials were drawn from the 1950s and 1960s during a time of superpower rivalry and the predominance of nation-states. This age has now passed into history.

Since the end of the Cold War, symmetry in strategic affairs has disappeared and asymmetrical conflict haunts policy makers. In the new world of rogue WMD and terrorists, however, it is not so much pre-emption that is the issue, but prevention. Freedman notes, '*prevention is the more applicable term in this context rather than preemption – acting early rather than late, while a problem gestates but before it erupts, using all available means*'. The enthusiasm for pre-emption reflects an American yearning to eliminate problems by bold, timely and decisive strokes. On the other hand, '*an updated notion of prevention, by contrast, might encourage recognition that the world in which we live is one in which the best results are likely to come from a readiness to engage difficult problems over an extended period of time*'.

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**Article Title** 'Force, Pre-emption and Legitimacy'

**Author** Walter B. Slocombe

**Publication Details** *Survival: The IISS Quarterly*, Spring 2003, vol. 45, no. 1, pp. 117-30

### Synopsis

This article, by a former Undersecretary of Defense in the Clinton Administration, is a meditation on the meaning of pre-emption in international relations. Two questions are posed in the light of fundamental security changes since the end of the Cold War: when is use of force justified to forestall, rather than respond to an attack; and who can legitimately decide on the use of military force? These two questions contain within them the two issues of pre-emption and unilateralism.

The author argues that, in international law, all decisions on the use of force are unilateral, in the sense they are made by states. After all, 'cannon are the last argument of kings'. American opinion takes the view that military action should be: *'unilateral if necessary, but multilateral if possible – and multilateral should almost always be possible'*. The reservation of the right of unilateral action when direct interests are threatened is not new and was contained in the Clinton Administration's National Security Strategy. Seeking UN support for military action really means seeking the support of the Permanent Five (US, Russia, China, Britain, France) on the Security Council, irrespective of how broadly an issue may be supported in the international community. This was why NATO avoided a UN mandate over Kosovo because a Russian veto would almost certainly have prevented action to save the Kosovars from Serbian ethnic cleansing.

On the issue of pre-emption, the author argues that, as far as striking at terrorists is concerned, the issue for the United States is hardly one of pre-emption. Destroying threats before they reach America's borders is now part of a war already declared. Critics argue that what the Bush Doctrine espouses is not so much pre-emption based on the danger of imminent attack, but 'preventive war' which is contrary to international law. However, the United States is using the concept of 'anticipatory self-defence' drawn from the Webster formulation of the late 1830s and so far, the Bush Administration 'has the better of the legal argument'. Slocombe points out:

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*The right of anticipatory self-defence by definition still presupposes a right to act while action is still possible. If waiting for 'imminence' means waiting until it is no longer possible to act effectively, the victim is left no alternative to suffering the first blow. So interpreted, the 'right' would be illusory. The administration is accurate when it points out that once a rogue state has achieved a serious WMD capability, effective action to eliminate the capability may well have become impossible.*

The main problem with pre-emption is not legal, but practical. *'Too much attention to action movies and too little to the realities of intelligence collection have tended to obscure the difficulty of knowing enough about a nation's WMD programmers to have much confidence in eliminating them by preemption'*. An attack on North Korea's nuclear reactor would slow, but not eliminate, that country's nuclear program. The case for acting against Iraq was to stop it reaching the stage of North Korea. Ultimately, replacing a régime is the only real way of eliminating a dangerous WMD program. The contrasting cases of North Korea and Iraq illustrate the conceptual strength of the US doctrine of pre-emption against rogue state WMD, but also demonstrate its weaknesses in practice.