



Senior Officer Professional Digest

Selected readings from the world's military journals

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Compiled by:





The CA's Introduction

Professional reading is a commitment to our Army's future. The Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has been designed to assist you to learn more about the issues that will shape the future of warfare. I commend the SOPD to you and ask that you make the time to read the articles and to reflect on their content.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'P.F. Leahy', with a long, sweeping flourish extending downwards and to the right.

P.F. LEAHY
Lieutenant General
Chief of Army



Article	'The Platoon Raid: High-Intensity Urban Operations Changing to Precision Urban Operations'
Author	Captain Gregory Lee, US Army
Publication Details	<i>Armor</i> , vol. 115, no. 1, January–February 2006, pp. 26–34

SYNOPSIS

This article details the changes to tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) in the US Army's urban operations raid doctrine that have been made in light of experience gained in Iraq. As the author notes, there was a pressing need to adjust the doctrine, from high-intensity style raids to a more precise mission, in order to avoid causing collateral damage to property and harm to innocent bystanders that would only undermine Iraqi support for Coalition Forces. There was also a requirement to change the doctrine because Iraqi dwellings are significantly different from western houses—a factor that presents a new set of tactical problems.

There are two main types of dwellings in the Baghdad area: family homes and apartment buildings. Family homes tend to be multi-story and, unlike western houses, rooms are not constructed with doors leading onto a hallway. Instead, a room may have several doors that lead to other adjoining rooms. This method of construction creates significant problems for units conducting house clearances. Dwellings are usually occupied by an extended family, which means that houses are crowded and several people may sleep in one room, normally on the floor. Stairways have at least one change of direction, with a landing at the top overlooking the stairs. Homes generally have a flat roof, with access from inside the house. The roof is used as a storage place and somewhere to sleep in hot weather. Houses are built very close together, making the rooves of adjoining houses excellent escape routes. A wall, between 2 and 2.5 metres high, usually surrounds houses. These construction methods create conditions that are maze-like, making it difficult to quickly secure access to a building. Apartment buildings are constructed in the same manner as family dwellings, with rooms leading to other rooms. There is normally a central stairwell leading to the roof, which can



be used to speed building clearance by sending the assault team to the roof before beginning top-down clearance of the apartment complex. In raids, apartment buildings are treated as a series of single-family dwellings.

Having described the tactical problems presented by Iraqi dwellings, the author explains how platoons are organised for precision raid missions. A raiding team comprises five elements, with specialised support provided by the parent company or task force. The raiding force elements are:

- **Outer cordon:** 3–5 vehicles with crew-served weapons to secure the outer cordon and act as support if the building needs to be assaulted.
- **Inner cordon/yard team:** 4–6 personnel to secure the outside areas of the target building and provide support if breaching of gates, etc, is needed. They assist with prisoner handling and fire-support as required.
- **Clearing team:** a 4-person assault element to clear the building and neutralise threats before handing over to the Breach/EPW team.
- **Breach/enemy prisoner of war (EPW) team:** 4–8 personnel who breach all internal obstacles, assist the clearing team, and take charge of EPWs and friendly casualties. In conjunction with the clearing team, they search for items of intelligence value.
- **Command and control (C2) team:** a support element comprising the platoon commander and sergeant with their vehicle crews, an interpreter, and a medic. This team, under the command of the platoon leader, coordinates and controls the raid. Their tasks include initial on-site interrogations and collection of intelligence items.

The author next details the type of support that may be requested from other units, before providing a sequence of events for a typical raid. The article also contains explanations of the type of equipment necessary for conducting successful raids, and suggests procedures for building and room clearance. Communications kit has a high priority, as does the necessary equipment for breaching internal obstacles and restraining captured suspects. A pre-combat inspection checklist is also provided. The article concludes by stressing the need for training and rehearsals.



Article	'No Silver Bullet'
Author	Ralph Peters, Lieutenant Colonel US Army, Retd
Publication Details	<i>Armed Forces Journal</i> , vol. 143, no. 6, January 2006, pp. 36–39, < http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/story.php?F=1380018_0106 >

SYNOPSIS

In this article, the American military commentator Ralph Peters assesses the state of Coalition counterinsurgency operations in Iraq. He begins by noting that two national characteristics of the United States—impatience and the belief that every problem has a straightforward solution—will make it difficult for the Americans to resolve the complex political and religious issues that confront them in Iraq.

Providing an example of the complexity of counterinsurgency operations, Peters gives his opinion of the British operations in the Shia area of southern Iraq. While the south has generally been quieter than the Sunni triangle, where the American forces are, Peters believes that the techniques used by the British Army in Northern Ireland have not worked in southern Iraq. His assessment is that the British have limited their own casualties and kept the peace, but essentially these methods have also allowed reactionary Shia groups, backed by Iran, to take control of the political process in the south. In essence, Peters says, the 'light touch' of the British has failed because Basra is not Belfast.

For Peters, the lesson that history teaches regarding counterinsurgency operations is that the main variable is commitment—in this case, the time that America is willing to devote to outlasting its opponents in Iraq. The natural impatience of the Americans, exacerbated by what Peters calls the 'poisonous and irresponsible media', erodes the possibility of a long-term American commitment to defeating the insurgency in Iraq.

Part of the answer to these problems is for the US Forces to adopt what Peters sees as a less naïve approach to their dealings with the media. This is important because of the pervasive influence the media has on American public opinion. Indeed, Peters states that 'the media can now have a decisive influence in overturning the verdict of the battlefield.'



Answering the broader question of what the US should do to win in Iraq, Peters says ‘Whatever works.’ In this context, he looks forward to the emergence of a counterinsurgency doctrine that is adapted to the specific conditions of Iraq. This doctrine will be the product of thinking by officers who can move beyond the textbook; people who thrive in the absence of rules.

Article	‘21st Century Rules of Engagement’
Author	Captain Louis Netherland, US Army
Publication Details	<i>Armor</i> , vol. 115, no. 1, January–February 2006, pp. 23–26

SYNOPSIS

This article considers the contemporary operating environment of the US Army in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly those aspects of military operations that are beginning to resemble the problems encountered in conventional, civilian law-enforcement situations.

The article begins by recounting a checkpoint scenario from a training exercise conducted at Fort Knox. The author notes that the soldiers involved were genuinely concerned to do the right thing, but equally anxious about getting themselves into trouble. The problem with this state of affairs is that, on operations, the hesitation that resulted from these conflicting concerns would be enough to get the soldiers killed or seriously wounded.

This discussion is followed with details of a report on a Tactical Training Seminar on Rules of Engagement and Rules of Force (ROE/RUF) held at Fort Knox and attended by personnel from the US Army and Air Force Judge Advocate Staff and Federal law enforcement officers. The seminar considered the lessons learnt by the US Department of Justice and civilian law enforcement agencies on the application of force, especially deadly force.

The seminar discussed the problems facing troops on the ground, particularly when confronted by ROE instructions framed by lawyers. How does a soldier know what constitutes ‘imminent danger’? Moreover,



when commanders add control measures to manage the ROE/RUF—in an attempt to mitigate almost any threat of impropriety—the result is often only more confusion. Most of the legal precedents in the United States governing the use of lethal force are based on civilian, not military, cases. However, while legal precedence generally supports the idea that the reasonableness of a response to a threat should be based on an assessment of the particular circumstances, in the military context the wide variety of situations in which lethal force may be needed makes this assessment extremely difficult. The author believes that, before drafting ROE/RUF for an operational area, policy makers need to have a very clear understanding of the intricacies of the tactical situation. In the context of 21st century operations, this requirement means that policy makers and commanders will need to find a new formula that encompasses all the challenges presented by the current global security environment.

Article	‘QDR’s Crucial Question’
Author	Tom Donnelly, Editor of <i>Armed Forces Journal</i>
Publication Details	<i>Armed Forces Journal</i> , January 2006, < http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/story.php?F=1403016_0106 >

SYNOPSIS

On the eve of the QDR’s release, the editor of *Armed Forces Journal* assesses the policies of the Bush administration. In particular, Donnelly believes that the articulation of a ‘Bush Doctrine’ is a departure in substance—if not form—from the policies of the Clinton years. Moreover, he feels that the articulation of this doctrine only serves to sharpen the aggressive tendencies of those for whom *Pax Americana* is a threat. Donnelly highlights three categories of international actors that fit the profile of ‘enemy’ or ‘potential enemy’. Firstly, the rise of China is, he argues, the greatest challenge to preserving the *Pax Americana* in the coming years. The second threat comes from al-Qa’ida and the network of Islamic radical terror organisations, whose means to power remain limited but whose will to power and aggression are very great indeed. Containing such a problem is, for Donnelly, ‘simply too risky’. Thirdly, there are the handful of otherwise weak and derelict states whose possession or imminent possession of nuclear weapons makes them rising



powers in the narrow military sense—namely Iran, North Korea and Pakistan. Donnelly states that, as far as Iran is concerned, the United States is better served by continuing to stabilise and democratise Iraq and Afghanistan, thus surrounding Iran.

Regarding force transformation, Donnelly argues that military missions for dealing with this range of aggressors and potential aggressors will be driven by political realities more than technological or tactical capability. The prime military directive is to continue to project reassuring military power to the edges of the expanding American security perimeter. Commenting on Iraq, Donnelly asserts that no serious strategist, whatever the rotational force in Iraq at any particular moment, believes that the larger war in this region will be won quickly, or from a distance. Therefore, the need to patrol, control and police such an extensive perimeter ought to suggest a new approach to ‘jointness’, wherein American armed services divide the strategic labour more clearly. This approach would see the Army bearing the primary load in the Middle East, while the sea services re-posture themselves to operate along the East Asian littoral, in the Pacific and Indian oceans. The RAND Corporation has dubbed this operational division of labour ‘horizontal jointness’, to distinguish it from the current style of ‘vertical jointness’.

Article	‘Much Ado about the QDR: Quadrennial Defense Review triggers great anxiety, little change’
Author	William Matthews
Publication Details	<i>Armed Forces Journal</i> , vol. 143, no. 6, January 2006, < http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/story.php?F=1412540_0106 >

SYNOPSIS

Matthews observes in his opening that defence program ‘guardians’, who had been acting like condemned men for months, are suddenly smiling, energetic and ebullient because Defense Secretary Rumsfeld has endorsed most of the programs that were under threat. While a formal review such as the QDR can spark ideas for change, it also inevitably triggers defensive reactions from program managers and service chiefs whose cherished programs may be cut. Further, much of what needs changing is not within the Defense Department’s power to change: it is up to



Congress. After all, cancelling or curtailing weapons purchases eliminates jobs at defence plants. That is reason enough for Congress to worry about a QDR that initially appeared to down-play the traditional threats, which have long sustained conventional air, sea and land forces. As Matthews notes, ‘Congress has been fairly explicit that they’re interested in protecting existing programs.’

Consequently, he suggests, the QDR will contain language that endorses a shift in focus from traditional threats to ‘irregular’ threats and unconventional warfare. However, any changes will be mostly philosophical. The QDR will rely on existing weapons to confront the new challenges. ‘You’re not going to see cuts in hardware or in terms of what the military does day in and day out.’ So while the QDR may do little more than endorse the status quo, it provides an opportunity for debate to go on within the Pentagon, and an opportunity for Congress and the public to engage in the debate.

Article	‘Japan’s Defence Policy: Basic Principles and New Initiatives’
Author	His Excellency Mr Fukushima Nukaga, Japanese Defence Minister
Publication Details	<i>RUSI Journal</i> , vol. 151, no. 1, February 2006, pp. 16–19, < http://www.rusi.org/downloads/pub_j/nugaka.pdf >

SYNOPSIS

This article is based on an address given by His Excellency, Mr Fukushima Nukaga, to the RUSI Institute on 11 January 2006. The article begins with a brief history of four centuries of Japan–UK relations. Mr Nukaga notes that, while traditionally defence relations between the two countries has been limited, in the post–11 September 2001 security environment, Japan and the UK share common views on the security challenges. These shared views present the opportunity for increased cooperation between the two nations. Mr Nukaga neatly summarises the factors influencing the evolution of Japan’s defence policy. He begins by examining the changes and events in the global strategic environment. He then focuses on the destabilising impact of these events on Japan’s



immediate region, before dealing with the flow-on effects that these events have on the defence debate within Japan.

The second half of the article outlines Japan's response to the changed global security environment, as expressed in the National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG) that were adopted by the government in December 2004. The guidelines define the Japan's future defence force and defence posture for the next decade. Mr Nukaga emphasises four points:

- The NPDG focuses on the uncertainty and unpredictability in East Asia, in particular the Korean Peninsular, cross-Taiwan Strait relations, and the modernisation of China's armed forces.
- To cope with the new threats, Japan must move to a 'multi-functional, flexible and effective defence force'. This will require a transformation from a 'deterrence-orientated' to a 'response-orientated' force.
- Japan recognises the indispensability of the Japan–US alliance for not only Japan but also the Asia-Pacific region.
- Japan is seeking to become more pro-actively engaged in the international community by undertaking tasks that 'enhance the international security environment'; consideration is now being given to making these tasks a primary mission.

Mr Nukaga concludes the article by emphasising that the Japan Defence Agency and the Self-Defence Forces are ready to participate 'pro-actively in peace cooperation activities'.



Article	'Fact versus Fiction: A Report from the Front in Iraq'
Author	Karl Zinsmeister
Publication Details	<i>The American Enterprise: Politics, Business and Culture</i> , March 2006, pp. 21–27, < http://www.taemag.com/issues/articleID.18977/article_detail.asp >

SYNOPSIS

Returning from one month in Iraq, the editor of *The American Enterprise* captures his observations as 'common queries about how the war is faring'. Below are selected observations on the progress of the war from this article:

Has the Iraq war been too costly?

'...judged fairly, Iraq has been much less costly and debacle-ridden than the Civil War, World War II, Korea, and the Cold War—each considered in retrospect to have been noble successes.'

But aren't our losses mounting?

'In the last ten months of 2003, Iraq hostilities claimed 324 U.S. service members. In 2004, 710 were lost. In 2005, total fatalities were 712. Troops wounded in action are down from 7,920 in 2004 to 5,961 in 2005...Meanwhile, the estimated number of terrorists killed or detained in Iraq was 24,470 in 2004, and 26,500 in 2005.'

How is the morale of our soldiers holding up?

'It's easy to overlook the reality that 800 public safety officers have been killed in the line of duty right here on our own home shores since the beginning of the Iraq war. This summer, the U.S. general in charge of our National Guard put his Iraq casualties in some perspective: "I lose, unfortunately, more people through private automobile accidents and motorcycle accidents over the same period of time." While always wrenching, the risks in Iraq have been overblown.'

'Today's supposed haemorrhaging in military manpower is mostly a fiction manufactured by the media. Moderate shortfalls in recruiting new bodies have hit reserve and National Guard units. The latest Army



Reserve recruiting class, for instance, totalled only 96 percent of the goal.’

“The idea that we’re going to win the war in Iraq is an idea which is just plain wrong,” opined Democratic chairman Howard Dean in December. Who agrees with him?

In September and October 2005, Princeton Survey Research asked various American leadership groups whether they believe the U.S. will succeed or fail in establishing a stable democratic government in Iraq. Most academics agree with Howard Dean: only a quarter say we will “succeed.” Most journalists agree with Dean: Only one third answer “succeed.” Among military officers, however, two-thirds say the U.S. will succeed in Iraq.

Progress does seem dreadfully slow.

‘Interestingly, our soldiers appear to better understand the incremental nature of this war than many reporters, pundits, and politicians. “Americans seem to kind of want this McDonald’s war, where you drive up, you order it, you pay for it, you go to the next window and get a democracy. That’s not the way it works,” cautioned Army reservist Scott Southworth recently. “It takes a lot of effort; it takes a lot of time.”’

Where is some evidence that we’re making headway?

‘In December, Iraqis filed a record number of tips informing on insurgents. That shows growing political and social cooperation.’

‘Iraq is also beginning to recover economically.’

‘The World Bank and International Monetary Fund estimate that Iraqi national income per capita exceeded \$1,050 in 2005—up more than 30 percent from the year before the war began (\$802 in 2002).’

‘After two decades of classroom deterioration, Iraqi children are now flooding back to school. Making this possible is a jump in teacher salaries from just a few dollars per month under Saddam to an average of \$100 per month today. Parents are delighted: the proportion saying their local schools are good has risen to 74 percent. By 3:1 they say local education is better than before the war.’



Article	'In their own words: reading the Iraqi insurgency'
Author	International Crisis Group
Publication Details	<i>Middle East Report no. 50</i> , International Crisis Group, 15 February 2006, < http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/getfile.cfm?id=2209&tid=3953&type=pdf&l=1 >

SYNOPSIS

This report is based on a textual analysis of the insurgent's own words. While the limitations of textual analysis are acknowledged, the authors believe that the analysis offers a 'window into the insurgency'.

The reports draws the following conclusions:

- Increasingly, the insurgency is dominated by a few large groups with sophisticated communications.
- There has been gradual convergence around more unified practices and discourse, leading to a predominantly Sunni Arab identity.
- Despite recurring contrary reports, there is little sign of willingness by any significant insurgent element to join the political process or negotiate with the U.S.
- The groups appear acutely aware of public opinion and increasingly mindful of their image.
- The insurgents have yet to put forward a clear political program or long-term vision for Iraq.
- The insurgency is increasingly optimistic about victory.

On the basis of this analysis, the authors make three recommendations for the United States and its Coalition and Iraqi allies:

- Closely monitor, control and, if necessary, punish the behaviour of security forces.
- Halt recourse to the most questionable types of practices, including torture and extraordinary methods of interrogation and confinement, collective punishment and extrajudicial killings.



- End the use of sectarian militias as a complement to, or substitute for, regular armed forces and begin a serious process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of militia fighters.

A further three recommendations are specifically for the United States:

- Hold the new government accountable and make clear that longer-term relations, economic assistance and future military cooperation will depend on the steps it takes to rein-in and ultimately disband militias, halt politically motivated killings, and respect human rights and the rule of law.
- Make clear its willingness, while it remains in Iraq, to negotiate openly the terms of its presence and its rules of engagement.
- Make clear repeatedly and at the highest level that it accepts that the oil resources of the country belong to the Iraqi people and no one else, and will withdraw from Iraq as soon as the newly elected government so requests.

Article	'Measuring Success'
Author	Frederick W. Kagan
Publication Details	<i>Armed Forces Journal</i> , January 2006, < http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/story.php?F=1397777_0106 >

SYNOPSIS

Kagan observes that none of the numbers given so far provide any clear notion of whether the American experiment in Iraq is succeeding or failing. For instance, the media are counting U.S. casualties. The military counts Iraqi soldiers. Both are measures of convenience. Neither tells whether the United States is winning or losing. The fundamental problem with the numbers is that they represent things that are easy to count, rather than phenomena that actually indicate the progress of the war. To address the more fundamental problem, we must return to the definition and basic nature of an insurgency and re-consider what we really need to be measuring in the first place.



In revolutionary struggles or insurgencies, two (or more) sides compete to gain the support of the mass of the population. The real battle is, therefore, within the hearts and minds of the people. The situation is no less true or important in Iraq, where the most fundamental problem is that a significant percentage of the Arab Sunni population remains unwilling to accept a subordinate role in governing a country it dominated for centuries. Clearly, controlling Sunni Arab rejectionism would go a long way toward reducing violence against the Coalition. It would also lead to a much greater role for Sunni Arabs in the Iraqi political process.

The insurgents have not been able to set themselves up in clear control of any single area for a long time, except in short-lived enclaves. Consequently, coalition and Iraqi Security Forces retain access to the greater part of the population. Firstly, this situation means careful intelligence collection should yield part of a picture of the state of the Sunni Arab mindset that is at issue in this conflict. Secondly, this focus on the Sunnis means traditional polling is possible. These two facts offer the hope of establishing an intelligence team tasked with tracking the feelings of at least Sunni Arabs, if not all Iraq. Such an effort would provide a more meaningful series of measures of effectiveness for the coalition.

Kagan outlines five major potential sources of information about attitudes in the Sunni Triangle: polling; crowd observation; coalition forces; contractors, non-government organisation and other civilian entities in Iraq; and the Iraqi Security forces and police forces. Each has the potential to paint part of the picture of Sunni Arab attitudes needed to understand the state of progress in the counterinsurgency.

Sadly, Kagan contends it does not appear that US Central Command has been taking this approach. It is true that numbers have limited significance in measuring American success, but in the absence of any other metric, the administration has gained little traction in undermining the sense of impending doom created by these inherently depressing statistics. However, without measuring changes in Sunni Arab attitudes, it is simply impossible to know whether the United States is winning or losing at the theatre level. Without knowing that, it is impossible to know whether to pursue current policies or to change them. In all previous wars save one, the American public has been able to track military success.



The only major war that did not provide such measures was Vietnam, and the absence of such measures played no small role in the collapse of American will that led to defeat. Kagan believes that Central Command must stop unwittingly repeating the critical mistakes of Vietnam and find a way to track and present its progress in this war that is meaningful.

Article	‘Contemporary Counterinsurgency Operations: History as a Guide to Assist in the Development of the Joint Interagency Task Force’
Author	Eric M. McFadden, Marine Corps University
Publication Details	<i>Comparative Strategy</i> , vol. 24, no. 4, October–November 2005, pp. 361–78

SYNOPSIS

The author contends that to successfully engage and destroy the contemporary insurgent threat, the United States must develop standing, multi-functional, capabilities-based joint inter-agency task forces primarily focused on counterinsurgency operations. His research examines critical elements of the British counterinsurgency campaign during the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), deriving salient observations relevant to current challenges.

McFadden indicates that it was not merely military cooperation, but also the application of military assets to support police operations, that led to success in Malaya. The emphasis focussed on creating a small, elite, highly disciplined, lightly equipped, mobile and aggressive army that could fulfil its proper military role in support of the civil government. In addition, intelligence drove the use of information warfare and psychological warfare at all levels. He argues that the Malayan Communist Party’s centre of gravity was the guerilla army itself and the support of the local population, while the British centre of gravity was their will to remain in Malaya and provide on their own terms Malayan independence.

Analysis of this campaign provides a starting point for annotation of critical capabilities required for the future conduct of counterinsurgency operations. The success of the Malayan campaign, McFadden argues, was



based on both a solid organisational structure and strategic direction, provided through the Briggs Plan. In applying the lessons of Malaya, the author argues the goal of counterinsurgency must be to defeat the enemy's centre of gravity. The British followed a strategic plan that successfully created synergy between civil and military elements and leveraged asymmetrical actions to gain the advantage, using a combination of direct and indirect approaches to defeat the enemy. He deduces that, in addition to requiring a comprehensive plan, the established organisation must be joint in nature, with assets capable of leveraging the nation's diplomatic, military and economic resources.

McFadden argues the contemporary insurgent threat is fundamentally different, as the insurgencies are linked to a wider global conflict facilitated by technology, with the capacity for strategic power projection. Consequently, the capabilities required today far exceed the organic competencies of the military; therefore, a successful counterinsurgency team must leverage the entire spectrum of national assets. Indeed, their success rests upon combining multi-functional assets from coalition nations, joint military and inter-agency communities, because today's more complex counterinsurgency operations require the skills and resources of many organisations, albeit with strategic direction and unity of effort. McFadden's solution is a joint inter-agency task force for counterinsurgency (JIATF-COIN) that is tailored to the situation and flexible enough for employment as the initial entry force, or upon identification of the insurgency, as the follow-on forces. The most imperative criterion in deploying the JIATF-COIN is a true identification of the nature of the conflict.



Article	'Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq'
Author	Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army
Publication Details	<i>Military Review</i> , vol. LXXXVI, no. 1, January–February 2006, pp. 2–12, < http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/JanFeb06/Petraeus1.pdf >

SYNOPSIS

The author begins by stating that the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan are the wars that the United States is fighting and hence they are the kind of wars its armed forces must master. It is imperative, therefore, that America continue to learn from its experiences in those countries. The remainder of the article is a distillation of fourteen observations on soldiering in Iraq, which also address the broader challenge of counterinsurgency operations in a vastly different culture than America's own.

1. **'Do not try to do too much with your own hands'** (T.E. Lawrence citation). Empowering Iraqis to do the job themselves has become the essence of our strategy. After all, the Iraqis know the situation and people far better than we ever can, and unleashing their productivity is essential.
2. **Act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half-life** beyond which it turns into an army of occupation. This race against the clock has been complicated by the extremely high expectations of the Iraqi people.
3. **Money is ammunition.** Once money is available, the challenge is to spend it effectively and quickly to achieve measurable results. Organisations with the capacity and capability to put it to use also need flexibility to address emerging needs.
4. **Increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success.** Not to downplay the importance of hearts and minds, but more important is the idea of Iraqis wanting the new Iraq to succeed.
5. **Analyse 'costs and benefits' before each operation.** The key question is 'will this operation take more bad guys away than it creates by the way it is conducted?'



6. **Intelligence is the key to success.** That is, actionable intelligence is required, enabling ‘cordon and knock’ operations rather than large, counterproductive sweeps.
7. **Everyone must do nation building.** When undertaking industrial-strength reconstruction on the scale of Iraq, Civil Affairs alone will not suffice; every unit must be involved.
8. **Help build institutions, not just units.** That is, institutions that support the units and police in the field—the ministries, the administration, the logistical units, the professional military education systems, administrative policies, procedures and training organisations.
9. **Cultural awareness is a force multiplier.** Recognise that the ‘cultural terrain’ can be as important as knowledge of the geographic terrain. Those who learned the quickest—and who mastered some ‘survival Arabic’—are the most effective.
10. **Success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations.** Strategies must include efforts to establish a political environment that reduces support for the insurgents and the ideology they espouse.
11. **Ultimate success depends on local leaders.** This includes honest, efficient and transparent indigenous leaders in the ministries, avoiding a winner-takes-all approach at the province level, and apolitical leaders in the security forces.
12. **Remember the strategic corporals and lieutenants.** Train them well and try to minimise cases where they have to make important decisions quickly.
13. **There is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders.**
14. **A leader’s most important task is to set the right tone.** If, for example, a commander clearly emphasises so-called kinetic operations over non-kinetic operations, his subordinates will do likewise.

The article concludes with a final observation: Conducting counterinsurgency operations in a vastly different culture is exceedingly complex.



Article	'The Future of Afghanistan'
Author	Ali A. Jalali, former Interior Minister of Afghanistan
Publication Details	<i>Parameters</i> , US Army War College Quarterly, vol. XXXVI, no. 1, Spring 2006, pp. 4–19, < http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06spring/jalali.pdf >

SYNOPSIS

This article looks at the challenges and opportunities that face Afghanistan in the light of the meeting of Afghan leaders held in Bonn on 21 November 2001. Specifically it focuses on ways of fostering the long-term development of governance, security and economic growth in the country.

On governance: Jalali argues that the government needs to strengthen its control of rural areas and deliver services. To date, the Afghan leadership and donor countries have found it convenient to integrate the demobilised militia leaders and former warlords into the government. However, failure to hold these leaders to account undermines the establishment of the rule of law. Democracy can't develop in a weak state.

On security: Security continues to be a prerequisite for political development and economic growth. An international focus on fighting terrorism should not overshadow the threats emanating from militia commanders, drug traffickers, corrupt provincial and district administrators, and government incompetence. Such threats are often more damaging to the population than terrorist violence.

On security threats: The Taliban-led insurgency, the presence of illegal armed groups, and the illicit drug trade are the main security threats. The Taliban and their allies lack a unified leadership, popular ideology, and a sustainable logistics support network inside the country. Indeed, the escalated level of militant violence in 2005 is more indicative of a change in tactics than capability. Closer cooperation between the militants and drug traffickers, and more vigorous Coalition actions against the insurgents, contributed to the escalation. In many places, the resurgence of Taliban violence is caused more by the lack of government presence than the inherent ability of the insurgents. Afghanistan needs a holistic



approach to security: integrating law enforcement, good governance, economic opportunity, and firm diplomacy with residual combat operations.

On Security Sector Reform: Each of the five pillars (army; police; counter-narcotics; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; and justice) is supported by a lead donor nation. Not surprisingly, therefore, security sector reform has developed unevenly. Progress in building the US-supported Afghan National Army has been remarkable. However, until recently, little international attention has been paid to the Afghan National Police, which is at the forefront of fighting terrorism, illegal border incursions, the illicit drug trade, warlords, and organised crime.

On Coalition Forces and ISAF: Afghanistan continues to need an international military presence for fighting insurgency and protecting the reconstruction effort until its own security institutions can become effective and sustainable. However, there is little cooperative planning between the US-led Coalition, ISAF, and the Afghan security forces. A joint command and control centre is needed.

On counter-narcotics: Fighting narcotics trafficking requires a joint national and international effort. Elimination of the narcotics trade entails the development of security and firm establishment of the rule of law. Eradication of drug crops without providing for meaningful alternative livelihoods is not a sustainable solution. Indeed, destroying one third of Afghanistan's economy without undermining stability requires enormous resources, administrative capacity and time. Only a comprehensive approach will succeed.

On development: Recovery hinges on the establishment of the rule of law and effective governance. Corruption remains a major obstacle.

Jalali concludes by stating that Afghanistan will require continued international military support and economic assistance for at least ten more years. The Bonn Process was dominated by an international agenda for security. The post-Bonn process needs to be based on an Afghan agenda for long-term development and a key to sustained peace and stability.