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
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The **Senior Officer Professional Digest** is a publication of the Land Warfare Studies Centre. Feedback regarding this publication is welcome and should be directed to the Director.



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With this issue, the Senior Officer Professional Digest introduces several new features.

The SOPD is pleased to announce the addition of a Letter to the Editor column. The Land Warfare Studies Centre encourages SOPD readers to comment on the articles that we have recommended. The LWSC editorial goal is to make the exchange of ideas a regular feature of the SOPD. While the editors cannot guarantee that the SOPD will publish all letters, we hope to make available those that are pertinent, insightful and which will engage the rest of our readership. All Letters to the Editor should contain the author's name, title and position, although anonymous publication is available upon request.

From the Vault is a new section that will regularly appear in the SOPD. The Australian Army possesses a vast backlist of publications that contain a rich legacy of experience and knowledge. Despite their age, many of the lessons found in these articles remain relevant to today's challenges. This month, From the Vault presents an essay by Lieutenant General Sir Kenneth Darling that was published by the *Australian Army Journal* in 1965. When 'British Counter-Insurgency Experience' appeared, it was at the forefront of counterinsurgency thinking. The passage of time may have changed the context of Darling's ideas, but his central thesis and observations remain valid. The SOPD will continue to delve into the Army's publication backlist in order to make our intellectual heritage available to a new generation of readers.

On 7 November 2006, the LWSC hosted the launch of an important new book by Colonel John C. Blaxland, *Strategic Cousins*. This work examines the strategic relationship that Australia and Canada have shared with Britain and America. Readers concerned with the development of Australia's strategic policy will find this work of considerable interest. Future issues of the SOPD will continue to bring attention to the launch of major publications that are written by members of the Australian Army.

This month the SOPD also recognises a major initiative by the Australian Army History Unit. Chief of Army Lieutenant General Peter Leahy launched two new volumes in the Australian Army Campaigns Series at this year's Chief of Army's History Conference. Glenn Wahlert's *The Western Desert Campaign 1940-41* and Albert Palazzo's *Australian Military Operations in Vietnam* are now available without cost from the Army History Unit for Army personnel. The SOPD will continue to announce future volumes in this series as they become available.

The Editors

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

A quick note to acknowledge the single best article I have read regarding the Iraq War since it began. Ralph Peters' article, 'The hearts-and-minds myth: sorry, but winning means killing' [SOPD Issue 43], asserts that countering a religious and ethnic insurgency has nothing to do with 'reason'; it is all about policies to provide incentive for the adherence to the rule of law. As the author identifies, this boils down to 'carrot and stick' policies to protect the majority who will always prefer to live a peaceful life if protected from the violent minority.

Over the last few years, I have been perplexed to see TV images that show armed militias wandering freely around without any apparent effort being made to kill—or capture and then imprison—them for very lengthy periods. I don't understand how foreigners are being allowed into the country without being captured and imprisoned or killed. Human behaviour is basically very straightforward, as most people do not want to die or go to prison for any length of time. Laws need to be communicated and rigorously enforced with severe penalties for any behaviour that leads to or supports violence. The majority who abide by these laws should then be rewarded.

One of the biggest mistakes the United States appears to have made, even before the war began, is to try and be liked. It is a pointless exercise as envy and jealousy will always create resentment against the United States. What America should be trying to achieve is the respect of the Iraqi people by ensuring that they can live free from violence: respect for having the strength to enforce the rule of law through rules of engagement, and laws that target (and severely deal with) any behaviours that support or lead to violence (this could potentially include shoot on sight, summary and public executions, lengthy prison sentences, etc.).

I was reminded recently that Justinian, one of the great Roman Emperors, annihilated the Circus Mob (two enormous armed gangs) at home, killing 40 000 of his subjects. The point here is that despite political correctness and a moral idealism that refuses to confront evil with justice and punishment, a government must exercise lethal force as, and to the extent, required to ensure law and order. That is a government's first duty, and I would think the basic principle in fighting a violent religious/ethnic insurgency, particularly in a culture that respects strength and does not have any ingrained sense of democracy, is the rule of law.

In sum, it appears to me that Ralph Peters is right in recognising that the lack of clarity and resolve about the necessity to use lethal force has undermined the counterinsurgency effort in Iraq. Unfortunately, this has caused unnecessary loss of innocent coalition and Iraqi lives.

Some of the causes of this lack of clarity include a therapeutic ethos in the West, and a moral confusion that cannot distinguish between innocence and guilt. In the battle of ideas, and in order to support soldiers morally and psychologically who are doing a very difficult job, there are numerous thinkers and writers who have reflected on the use of lethal force by governments, including Reinhold Niebuhr, Jean Bethke Elshtain and Paul Tillich.

Mr Chris Hilder
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Contracting Operations Electronic and Weapon Systems Division
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ARTICLE SUMMARIES

Hew Strachan, 'Making Strategy: Civil-Military Relations after Iraq,' *Survival*, Vol. 48, No. 3, Autumn 2006, pp. 58–82.

Hew Strachan is the Chichele Professor of War and Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford University. Better known for his history of the First World War, Strachan also directs the Leverhulme Programme on the Changing Character of War. This essay arose from a series of seminars hosted by the Leverhulme Programme.

For Strachan, the situation in Iraq shows the failure of the machinery for strategy-making in both the United States and the United Kingdom. In the two countries, institutions for the creation of strategy do exist, but in the case of the Gulf Wars they did not function properly. In the United States, instead of the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staffs fulfilling their proper role, strategic direction was usurped by bureaucrats in the Department of Defense and ignored by planners in the operational commands. General Tommy Franks at CENTCOM planned two wars without recourse to strategic direction. The case in the United Kingdom was evening more alarming—abdication of strategy to an ally.

The key to effective strategy-making is through effective dialogue between the government and the military ...

Strachan believes that one of the causes of this unlinking of strategy from war planning is a result of the triumph of the level of war called the operational art. The pursuit of the operational art allows key players, such as Donald Rumsfeld and Franks himself, to avoid the harder issue of strategy-making.

At its heart, Strachan believes that the failure to develop sound and effective strategy for the war in Iraq lies in an institutional failure to understand the correct nature of civil-military relations. All too often governments define civil-military relations as the means by which governments exercise control over their armed forces in order to prevent coups. For soldiers, it allows them to focus on their craft and thereby avoid questions of a political nature. As Strachan points out, this is a mistake because the odds of military take-overs in Washington or London are so remote as to not warrant concern. Instead, Strachan views civil-military relations in a more pro-active light that seeks harmonisation rather than subordination between politicians and soldiers. The key to effective strategy-making is through effective dialogue between the government and the military, which had it occurred in the lead up to the Iraq War, might have avoided the quagmire the conflict has become.

Christopher Coker, 'Between Iraq and a Hard Place', *RUSI*, Vol. 151, No. 5, October 2006, pp. 14–19.

Christopher Coker is Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics. In August, 2006, he visited the UK Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (COMISAF) in Afghanistan. This article is from a paper prepared after this visit.

Coker's central theme concerns the institutional failings that consistently 'dog' multinational security operations. These failings, he argues, arise from differences between allies in their strategic culture. He defines strategic culture as 'a way of thinking and acting' and is especially interested in how it shapes a state's willingness to employ force. Not only does strategic culture result in different practices, but different military cultures also 'breed different habits of work including different operational tempi.' Differences in strategic and military cultures, therefore,

can create 'friction' when countries come together in an alliance. The challenge for organisations like the ISAF is how to mitigate this friction.

Using the experience of both British and US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, Coker argues that differences in approach to peace support, peacekeeping, policing, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations represent a 'collision of military cultures'. The US approach, he argues, is more confrontational than the British, favouring raids, cordons, sweeps and direct engagements with insurgent forces. The British, on the other hand, prefer a softer approach, engaging the local population with foot patrols and face-to-face encounters.

The British approach, which expects soldiers to employ minimal force, conforms to an 'emerging European discourse of war', especially with regard to humanitarian interventions, peace support operations and military operations other than war. The British have engaged in all of these types of operations since 1990 and also have their experience from Northern Ireland. Soldiers are also accountable for collateral damage among the civilian population. As such, the British view peace support operations and military operations other than war more as a 'police actions' where the rules of engagement are strictly enforced. Coker argues that the United States, on the other hand, still sees war as a continuation of politics by other means.

Coker's arguments are convincing. Multinational alliances exist in order to amplify the power of individual states. However, differences in the strategic and military culture of alliance states can seriously impede the ability of staff to process large amounts of information quickly, as well as leading to differences in the understanding of mission outcomes. To provide solutions to these potential problems, Coker devotes considerable time in assessing the experience and success of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) whose ethos is the 'nearest the alliance has come to producing a corporate culture.'

Coker concludes that, given that the nation-state remains a primary reference for identity and allegiance, it would be unreasonable to expect any multilateral alliance will ever develop a transnational strategic culture. However, friction between strategic cultures can be mitigated by cooperation, face-to-face collaboration and commitment to the achievement of long-term security goals.

Marcus Fielding, 'Regime Change: Planning and Managing Military-Led Interventions as Projects,' *RUSI*, Vol. 151, No. 5, October 2006, pp. 20–9.

Marcus Fielding is a lieutenant colonel in the Australian Army. He currently serves as the Australian exchange instructor at the US Army Command and Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Fielding's article provides a template for planning and managing a military-led intervention. He accepts that the strategic objective of the removal of the unsatisfactory government of a sovereign nation imposes the responsibility of shaping an appropriate successor government upon the state or states undertaking the action. Fielding believes that this process of successor state creation is best handled by the principles of project management.

While the initial removal of the unsatisfactory state is almost always achieved through military force, the development of the replacement government is a multi-dimensional operation requiring the coordination of a number of organisations. To facilitate this coordination, Fielding proposes four key planning areas. They are:

1. Identification of the strategic objective.

2. Breakdown of the reconstruction into manageable societal sectors.
3. Establishment of a management team with authority to oversee reforms.
4. Development of an institutional capability to adapt to the changing environment.

Of the planning areas, Fielding gives the most attention to reconstruction. He examines a number of existing models that have been developed by the United Nations, military organisations, and think tanks. From these examples he synthesises five broad requirements for successful reconstruction. They are the provision of:

1. Governance
2. Security
3. Infrastructure
4. Commerce
5. Social Reform

While military force is essential for the initial removal of the unsatisfactory state, Fielding stresses that the military must, as soon as practical, move into the background in order to allow the program manager to develop the successor government.

Colonel Howard D. Belote, USAF, 'Counterinsurgency Airpower: Air-Ground Integration for the Long War,' *Air & Space Power Journal*, Vol. XX, No. 3, Fall 2006, pp. 55–8.

www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/fal06/belote.html

Air-ground coordination and the control of airpower have been contentious issues since the advent of air forces. Colonel Howard D. Belote's article covers joint air operations from the Battle of Fallujah in November 2004 to the Iraqi election of January 2005. It illustrates the benefits achieved, but also the ongoing institutional impediments in reaching the goal of seamless interoperability.

Marine, Army, Air Force and Navy ground and air forces achieved a sophisticated level of coordination in Iraq and Belote ably outlines the steps taken to bring this about. While not overtly stated, the key element was personality: the recognition by senior commanders of the need to improve air-ground coordination and the willingness of more junior officers to come to terms with what was required. One of the key issues that Belote highlights is the failure of the Services to integrate their practises before the onset of the war. Perhaps an initial lack of interoperability is always inevitable, but Belote's message to the Services—to train as they will fight and to develop joint doctrine—is timely.

Belote's article also highlights new missions for airpower in counterinsurgency operations. Although not yet fully validated, the use of airpower as an overhead presence to cower insurgents and provide security is encouraging, and investigation into these missions should continue.

This article was recommended by
Major Brad 'Myrtle' Beach, Aide-de-
Camp to the Commanding General,
III MEF, US Marine Corps

Martin van Creveld, 'Israel's Lebanese War: A Preliminary Assessment', *RUSI*, Vol. 151, No. 5, October 2006, pp. 40–3.

Martin van Creveld is a Professor of History at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and is a world-recognised military historian and strategic thinker. This brief article is an assessment of Israel's waging of the 2006 war in Lebanon against the Hezbollah terrorist organisation. The conflict was the result of a Hezbollah raid into Israel that resulted in the death of several Israeli soldiers and the kidnapping of two others. Hezbollah followed up the raid with a missile offensive targeting Israeli villages along the border with Lebanon.

Van Creveld's overall assessment was that, after years of counterinsurgency warfare, the Israeli Defense Forces were generally neither well-prepared to launch an invasion of its neighbour nor ready to wage a largely conventional warfare campaign against Hezbollah fighters. The course of the war revealed a number of IDF deficiencies and changes in the tactical situation, including:

- the ability of Lebanese forces to successfully target and strike a modern IDF warship with an Iranian built surface-to-surface missile;
- the inability of the Israeli Air Force to halt Hezbollah's missile offensive;
- the provision of inadequate stockpiles of basic equipment, as well as a logistic system that was unable to respond in a timely manner; and
- a pre-war failure of Israeli intelligence to note location and extent of Hezbollah fortifications.

However, van Creveld's assessment is not entirely negative. He does point out that Israeli did rapidly mobilise a large part of its reserves and that its forces inflicted a high level of damage on Hezbollah fighters and facilities. Van Creveld also observes that Hezbollah has not violated the ceasefire in South Lebanon, which suggests that Israel may have won a moral victory in the campaign.

Christopher F. Chyba, 'Biotechnology and the Challenge of Arms Control', *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 36, No. 8, October 2006, pp. 11–17.

http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_10/BioTechFeature.asp

In an era where concerns of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are everyday news, Christopher F. Chyba's article on biotechnology arms control is important. Chyba points out that bio-manipulation innovation is advancing rapidly and that equipment and machines are becoming cheaper, more efficient and easier to utilise, even by unskilled labour. He also makes a convincing argument that more work is urgently needed by state actors to close a growing gap between biotechnology capability and existing international agreements and protocols.

Moreover, unlike nuclear weaponry, biotechnology devices will soon be well within the reach of small groups, even individuals. Chyba is not a science-fiction alarmist. Rather, he methodically and rationally explains that the consequence of outdated controls is that a terrorist group may soon have the capability to manipulate the DNA of existing pathogens in order to enhance their virulence, to undermine vaccine defences against controlled diseases, or even to create an entirely new and lethal organism.

Chyba does not propose a single countermeasure, but instead outlines a number of options to implement in order to contain the bio-terror threat. In addition, he insists that any response must be global.

Kumar Ramakrishna, 'It's the Story, Stupid: Neutralizing Radical Islamism in the Southeast Asia Theatre', in Anne Aldis and Graeme P. Herd (eds), *The Ideological War on Terror: Worldwide Strategies for Counter-Terrorism*, Routledge, London, 2006, pp. 128–42.

Dr Kumar Ramakrishna is a graduate of Singapore's National University and also holds a Master's in Defence Studies from the University of New South Wales. He completed a PhD in history at the University of London in 1999. He currently serves as an Associate Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at Nanyang Technological University.

Kumar Ramakrishna convincingly argues that counterterrorism strategists must broaden their approach from the current focus on military and rule of law-based tactics to a more culturally attuned dynamic if they are to achieve long-term success. Ramakrishna believes that the neutralisation of terrorists through violent means offers only a short-term benefit because it often results in the creation of fresh recruits for the radical movement.

Ramakrishna insists that terrorism is form of political communication, and he identifies terrorist acts as 'propaganda of the deed'. Therefore, counterterrorism strategies must also target the message—'the story', to use his expression.

Ramakrishna has identified the need for a concerted and focused strategic-level information and psywar campaign that targets Islamic terrorist organisations. To defeat radical Islamism in Southeast Asia, Ramakrishna concludes that counterterrorist forces must first understand the message that the jihadist are promoting. They then must cultivate a counter-story that undercuts and delegitimises the terrorist's 'story'. Lastly, they must shape a narrative that pushes Islamism in a more liberal and moderate direction.

Seymour M. Hersh, 'Annals of National Security: Is a damaged Administration less likely to attack Iran, or more?', *The New Yorker*, 20 November 2006.

http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/061127fa_fact

Seymour Hersh is one of America's foremost investigative reporters, who is best known for writing the first account of the My Lai Massacre in South Vietnam in 1969. Since then, Hersh has been awarded the Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting as well as four George Polk Awards (one of America's most coveted journalism honours). In this thought-provoking article, Hersh discusses the larger implications resulting from the Democrat win at November's Congressional elections in the United States. Aside from the fact that the Democrats now control both houses of Congress, the other important consequence of the Republican defeat was the resignation of Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld.

Rumsfeld was the driving force behind the Bush Administration's invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the domestic and international campaigns to use military force against Iran, which are designed to persuade Iranian leaders not to pursue its nuclear program. His replacement is former director of the Central Intelligence Agency Robert Gates. Rumour imputes that this appointment was orchestrated by George Bush senior and two of his former aides. Some Republicans view Gates' nomination 'as a clear sign that the Vice-President's [Dick Cheney] influence in the White House could be challenged.' Cheney, who was the other driving force behind the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and the current hostile campaign against Iran, does not share the view that view, reportedly saying that 'whatever [the] Democratic Congress might do next year to limit the President's authority, the Administration would find a way to work around it.'

Gates favours diplomacy—demonstrated by his membership of the pro-multilateral Iraq Study Group—yet Joseph Cirincione of the Center for American Progress warns that the 'danger is that

Gates could be the new Colin Powell—the one who opposes the policy but ends up briefing the Congress and publicly supporting it.’ Too much can go wrong in these situations, and the support of the US public has already waned. Hersh contends that although Gates’ appointment is a ‘conciliatory gesture’, it would not be followed by a significant change in policy. He says that ‘Instead, the White House saw Gates as someone who would have the credibility to help it stay the course on Iran and Iraq’. What is at stake here is the Republican agenda and the 2008 Presidential election.

The article addresses four critical issues that Gates will have to confront as the Bush Administration’s new Secretary of Defense. These are White House politics, the Pentagon’s efforts to expand its clandestine and covert intelligence missions abroad, how much progress Iran has made on its nuclear program (as well as how best to address the issue), and Israel’s role and actions in approaching the Iran nuclear issue. Hersh concludes that it is still not clear how Gates will respond to these issues, or what action President Bush and the White House will take before 2008. Dick Cheney continues to hold formidable authority, as do the ‘Old Guards’ of the Republican Party, including Bush senior, James Baker, Brent Scowcroft and Richard Armitage. Iran, however, will prove to be the deciding issue. The enormity of these concerns is evident by a quote Hersh uses from an article written by a prominent neoconservative in the current edition of *Foreign Policy*: ‘Make no mistake: President Bush will need to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities before leaving office ...’

FROM THE VAULT

This month the LWSC recommends:

Lieutenant General Sir Kenneth Darling, KCB, CBE, DSO [British Army], ‘British Counter-Insurgency Experience’

This article was first published by the *Military Review* in January 1965. The *Australian Army Journal* re-published it in June 1965, No. 193.

Kenneth Darling highlights the enduring nature of counterinsurgency operations. Although writing more than 40 years ago, he demonstrates how little the essence of waging ‘small wars’ has changed.

Darling covers the main points with which today’s strategists would be familiar: the importance of political-military coordination, the primacy of intelligence, as well as the standard admonition of the need to win the people’s hearts and minds. However, Darling also makes some lesser observations that are worthy of reflection. For example, he asserts that commanders need to focus on the centre, not the extremes, when attempting to garner public opinion.

Parts of ‘British Counter-Insurgency Experience’ will appear dated. Darling’s lengthy section on the problems of media management in the 1960s might appear trivial, especially from the perspective of present day instantaneous multimedia communication, but it should still be read. Darling emphasis on the media’s presence as an opportunity to be exploited is a useful reminder that perception is a key component of an insurgency struggle.

While Darling’s essay is not a checklist on how to wage a counterinsurgency, he does identify a few things that are critical not to do. Again, these may appear obvious, but admonitions such as the importance of ‘controlled robustness’ and the need to ‘identify the problem’ always bear repeating.

BOOK LAUNCH

On 7 November 2006, the LWSC hosted the launch of Colonel John Blaxland's new book, *Strategic Cousins: Australian and Canadian Expeditionary Forces and the British and American Empires*, at the Officers' Mess, Duntroon House. The book was officially launched by Mr Bob Carr, former premier of New South Wales, and guests included the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy and the Canadian High Commissioner, His Excellency Mr Michael Leir.




From Left to Right: Mr Michael Leir, Colonel John Blaxland, and Mr Bob Carr

In *Strategic Cousins*, John Blaxland traces the shift from ties with the British Empire, which led Canadian and Australian forces to fight in the Boer War, the two World Wars, and Korea, to connections with the United States, which led to their participation in Afghanistan. Looking at the concepts of policy, military strategy, operations, and tactics, he reveals that Canada and Australia have had remarkably similar experiences in supporting their key allies. Although the two nations have sometimes chosen divergent courses, their paths since the end of the Cold War have largely converged. Blaxland argues that even closer collaboration could increase their influence and effectiveness and also benefit their allies.



From Left to Right: Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, Colonel Blaxland and his son Finley, Colonel Blaxland's wife Judith, and to the far right Major David Doust

Australia and Canada have different security strategies, reflecting contrasting domestic circumstances, but Blaxland shows that common interests have led their focus to work together for over a century. *Strategic Cousins* is the first study of Canadian and Australian military policy and activity that compares their historical experiences with expeditionary land forces.



NEW PUBLICATIONS

The Army History Unit has released two new volumes in the Australian Army Campaigns Series. Both are available from the AHU.

Volume 2 – Glenn Wahlert, *The Western Desert Campaign: 1940–41*

While the North African campaign has been studied in detail over the years, much of this study has been dedicated to the battles between the British 8th Army and Rommel's *Afrika Korps*. There has been little serious study of Wavell's campaign against Italian forces in 1940–41, nor of the role played by the Australian 6th Division in the eventual Italian defeat. Part of this can be attributed to wartime propaganda that labelled the Italian Army dilettantes and mocked their courage. The truth is much different. Many Italian units showed incredible bravery, and the Australian assaults on fortress towns such as Bardia were far from a walkover. Today's aspiring military commanders need look no further than the early Western Desert campaign for examples of brilliant leadership, detailed planning, deception, surprise, manoeuvre warfare and relentless pursuit, all against overwhelming odds.

Volume 2 – Albert Palazzo, *Australian Military Operations in Vietnam*

From 1962 to 1972, Australia joined the United States in fighting a communist-inspired insurgency in the jungles of South Vietnam against infiltrators who sought to overthrow the local government. Over 50 000 Australians served in Vietnam, 519 lost their lives, and the conflict ended ignominiously with the insurgent's victory.

Over 30 years later, Australia again finds itself joined with the United States in a struggle against an insurgency, this time in the deserts of Iraq and Afghanistan. Although now in the past, the Vietnam War resonates with lessons for the Australian Army as it strives to defeat not communism but terrorism. *Australian Military Operations in Vietnam* highlights some of the successes and failures of an early generation of officers for the benefit of today's leaders.