

S O P D



Senior Officer Professional Digest

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The **Senior Officer Professional Digest** is a publication of the Land Warfare Studies Centre. Feedback regarding this publication is welcome and should be addressed to the Director.



Land Warfare Studies Centre

Ian Campbell Road
Duntroon ACT 2600
Australia
+61 2 6265 9624

lWSC.publications@defence.gov.au

MESSAGE FROM THE EDITORS

The Editors of the *Senior Officer Professional Digest* welcome back our readers for the new year, the *SOPD's* fifth. We will continue to review and report on the current literature of interest to serving members and civilian policy-makers and academics.

The higher the office or pay grade, the less time the member has to read widely, deeply and thoughtfully. This often occurs right at the time when the member needs to do so the most. The *SOPD* aids you in selecting readings that inform and challenge your personal opinions and professional understandings.

This edition of the *SOPD* continues its coverage of the plethora of articles on counterinsurgency with insightful contributions by John Nagl (the practitioner) and Nora Bensahel (the academic). Further, John Kiszely examines how Western militaries learned, forgot and then re-learned the lessons of the counterinsurgency fight—and why.

On a broader front, the *SOPD* looks at an article on post-traumatic stress disorder, including practical suggestions for company commanders to manage the risks to the mental health of their troops.

We also look at an issue for the deep futures thinker—the demographic youth bulge being experienced across the Third World. The implications for future national security strategies and deployments are immense.

Dipping into Army's intellectual heritage, 'From the Vault' revisits the Millar Report from 1975, which looked at the social factors underpinning the Citizens Military Forces. This report led to the creation of the Army Reserve.

All articles reviewed in the *SOPD* are available through your local branch of the Defence Library Service; their friendly staff can quickly provide these and other relevant articles straight to your desk.

Enjoy.
The Editors

Lt. Col. John A. Nagl and Lt. Col. Paul L. Yingling, 'New Rules for New Enemies',
Armed Forces Journal, October 2006, pp. 25–31, 52–56,
<http://live.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/10/2088425/>.

John Nagl is the author of *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* and currently serves as Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Paul Yingling is deputy commander of the 3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment.

This is a sweeping and far-reaching article that calls for major changes in both the US Army's organisation for war and in its concepts for warfighting. Of even greater interest are the silences, what the authors do not say. Unlike the Pentagon's emphasis on the Revolution in Military Affairs and Transformation under the former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, the authors make no mention of enhancing warfighting capabilities through the acquisition of high-technology weapons or networking systems. Instead, the authors focus on changing and improving the preparation and training of personnel, encouraging the intellectual development of individuals, and adapting force structures to create an army that is more capable of waging COIN operations.

Nagl and Yingling advance a number of practical recommendations in their call to refocus the US Army on its new enemies. They insist that the Army's leaders must foster a culture that demands and rewards adaptation. To accomplish this will be challenging; it requires the US Army to de-emphasise conventional war planning and embrace full-spectrum planning. The US Army will also have to create new pathways for promotion that break down the existing advancement dynamic. In addition, the Army will need to make time in its training cycle for the development of language and cultural skills.

With Nagl as one of the authors, it is not surprising that the article defines the foreseeable threat environment in terms of unconventional warfare, particularly the need to counter insurgencies. In making this assertion, however, Nagl and Yingling go further. Traditionally, military organisations claim that they should focus on conventional operations because intensive warfighting is more complex—and harder to prepare for—than the other levels of the military art. Conventional thinking declares that military forces which are skilled for conventional warfighting are able to 'step down' to complete lesser tasks. By contrast, Nagl and Yingling argue that it makes more sense to prepare for the war a military organisation is most likely to wage, not the type of conflict that its leaders would prefer. Further, COIN operations are in themselves extremely complex and require a military organisation's full attention if they are to be waged successfully. COIN operations, the authors conclude, are no longer a secondary responsibility for the US Army—they are its primary task.

John Kiszely, 'Learning About Counter-Insurgency,' *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 151, No. 6, December 2006, pp. 16–21.

Lieutenant General Sir John Kiszely, the Director of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, considers in this brief article three questions regarding the ability of military organisations to learn about counterinsurgency. They are:

- 1) How well, in general, do military organisations learn the lessons of counterinsurgency?
- 2) What factors affect the learning process?
- 3) How should military organisations approach the subject of learning in the future?

Kiszely is deliberately provocative in addressing these questions, and some of the answers he provides will come up against considerable institutional and cultural resistance. In effect, he wants military organisations to re-think their traditional approaches to learning. For example, Kiszely identifies the deliberately cultivated 'warrior spirit' of military organisations as a liability in the learning about counterinsurgency operations. He believes that for an army to be effective in peacekeeping and counterinsurgency roles, soldiers need to develop a different and less threatening image. Without a softer cultural self-image, soldiers will always be likely to apply the warrior approach, even when they should be adopting less confrontational styles. If Kiszely is correct in the need to curtail the warrior spirit, then he poses a serious question about the appropriateness of armies placing their special forces at the forefront of counterinsurgency operations. After all, members of the special forces are the embodiment of the warrior ethos.

Kiszely also warns commanders against relying too heavily on their own experiences in shaping their counterinsurgency tactics. A commander's personal experience is frequently too narrow to cover the range of counterinsurgency missions. He suggests instead that commanders spend more time in the study of military history and theory.

... it is easy to see the solution to improved learning about counter-insurgency purely in terms of improved training, this study concludes that this would be fallacious ...

Military organisations do learn the lessons of counterinsurgency, but one of Kiszely's questions is why they do not learn them more often and more quickly. In part, he believes that this resistance to learning derives from an over-reliance on doctrine for guidance. The consequence is a tendency by leaders to force the conflict into the structure of extant doctrine rather than understanding the nature of the conflict on its own terms.

Kiszely ends his essay by insisting that more doctrine and training is not the answer for the better preparation of officers and soldiers for counterinsurgency operations. Instead, he insists that armies must broaden the opportunity for leader education and include training time opportunity for the study of subjects such as politics, economics, anthropology, sociology and psychology. In addition, and above all, officers must study history.

Nora Bensahel, 'Preventing Insurgencies after Major Combat Operations', *Defence Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 3, September 2006, pp. 278–91.

Nora Bensahel, a Senior Political Scientist with the RAND Corporation, argues that it is far better to prevent the emergence of an insurgency than to defeat one after it becomes entrenched. While she admits that the rising of the Iraqi insurgency was always likely, the United States could have prevented the intensity and scope. Moreover, she expects that future US military operations are likely to generate insurgent reactions to American intervention.

Bensahel divides her article into two parts. First, she explains what the United States did wrong in Iraq that enabled the insurgents to emerge and become established. In the second half, she shifts her focus to the steps an occupying power must implement to deter an insurgency from developing. Bensahel does not pose any new explanations for the Iraqi insurgency. In common with other analysts, she blames poor policy assumptions by the Bush Administration. These included that the campaign would have a clear and decisive end, that US forces would be greeted as liberators, and that Iraqi Government ministries would continue to function.

The article's main strength lies in Bensahel's discussion of how to deter or limit the emergency of insurgencies. She advocates three preventive steps:

- 1) The occupying force should obtain an official statement of surrender from the defeated nation. An official surrender would de-legitimise a potential insurgency and make it less likely that loyalists of the defeated regime will continue to fight.
- 2) The occupying force must maintain public order after combat comes to an end. Insurgents, Bensahel points out, thrive in environments in which law and order has broken down.
- 3) The occupying force must, as rapidly as possible, reconstruct the defeated nation's indigenous security forces. It is critical to prevent local police forces from disintegrating.

Although written with the United States in mind, Bensahel's essay has direct relevance for the Australian Defence Force and the Commonwealth's policy of regional engagement. In recent years, Australia has conducted several interventions in neighbouring states. Future operations, in which sections of the local population object to the Australian presence, must be considered likely and may lead to the outbreak of regional insurgencies.

Peter R. Neumann, 'Negotiating with Terrorists', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 1, January-February 2007, pp. 128–38.

For a democracy, the question of whether or not to negotiate with a terrorist organisation is a complex one that is usual met with protestations or outright refusal. The arguments put forward against negotiations are that democracies should neither give in to violence nor legitimate the sponsors of terrorism. However, Peter R. Neumann, the Director of the Center for Defence

Studies at King's College, London, points out that in reality there are numerous precedents of governments engagement of terrorist groups.

According to Neumann, democratic governments need to recognise negotiations as a valid means to solve some terrorist conflicts. He identifies the conditions in which it is valid and useful for a state to commence negotiations with a terrorist organisation. He divides his observations into three questions: Who? When? and How?

- Who?: It is essential for a democratic government to first determine if a terrorist group would make a suitable partner for negotiations. Essential preconditions are the terrorist's renunciation of violence and a willingness to engage in the political process. The terrorist organisation must also be internally cohesive and have an enforceable chain of command.
- When?: Neumann believes that the most fruitful point for a government to commence negotiations is when a terrorist group faces defeat. This assertion may seem counterintuitive, but the point is that, as defeat nears, the danger of the terrorists resorting to a final act of destruction is at its highest. A defeated terrorist is dangerous because they may no longer have anything to lose and negotiation must be seen as preferable to, for example, self-immolation with a WMD.
- How?: Neumann believes that is essential to have the terrorist organisation engage in the democratic process. In doing so, it exposes the terrorists to the principles of democracy while also involving all interest groups in the negotiations.

Neumann accepts that not all terrorist organisations are valid targets for negotiation. For example, even if al-Qaeda was to renounce violence, its structure makes it an unpromising subject for a negotiated settlement. Al-Qaeda's configuration is too decentralised and its numerous splinter groups are not subject to the dictates of a central authority. However, for other terrorist organisations—for example ETA in Spain—negotiations may prove a useful method for a democratic government to peacefully resolve long-standing disputes.

Jerry Moon, 'Force Protection for the "Hidden Wounds" of War', *Army*, Vol. 57, No. 1, January 2007, pp. 51–53, http://www.ansa.org/pdffdocs/ArmyMag/Jan07/CC_Jan07.pdf.

Jerry Moon is a Captain in the US Army and has completed two tours of duty in Iraq, most recently with the 101st Airborne Division. This article was originally published by *Company Commanders*, an online forum of current- and post-company commanders that is sponsored by the US Army.

As a front-line officer, one of Moon's primary concerns is for the health and wellbeing of the men under his command. In this article, Moon argues for more attention to the toll that combat exacts upon a soldier's mental health. Having witnessed his men suffering from the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), Moon does not recognise a distinction between physical and mental trauma.

Moon's experiences in Iraq suggest that the US Army's current policies for the treatment of PTSD need strengthening. In particular, he calls for the open discussion of killing—and the possibility of being killed—both prior to and after deployment. This encourages troops to discuss the traumatic situations to which they have been exposed. He is also concerned with the lack of Combat Mental Health personnel at the battalion level—they exist in-theatre, but are too far back in the line of communication to be of any use to combat troops in a timely manner. Moon also advocates additional steps to ease soldiers back into their communities at the end of a deployment.

Moon's concerns may not be a major issue for the Australian Army thus far, given its small toll of casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, such good fortune may not last. Caution suggests that now is the time to prepare for the eventuality of major casualties in order to safeguard not only deployed personnel's physical health but also their mental well-being.

Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon, 'Why Hawks Win', *Foreign Policy*, January/February 2007, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3660.

Daniel Kahneman is a Noble laureate in Economics and is the Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Jonathan Renshon is a doctoral candidate at Harvard University and author of *Why Leaders Choose War: the Psychology of Prevention* (2006).

The terms 'hawk' and 'dove' are commonly used to identify those who are either favourable to or sceptical of the use of force in resolving international disputes. To date, these terms have been treated as having equal weight. Research by social and cognitive psychologists now shows, however, that the assumption of equality has been overstated. Instead, the authors argue that the results of psychological studies show that the human mind has an inherent tendency to favour 'hawkish' interpretations of facts and situations, and, as a result, is far more susceptible to recommendations of military solutions to 'wicked' problems.

The authors' conclusions have important implications for government leaders and their national security advisors. Usually optimists, 'hawks' tend to provide overly rosy advice and exaggerate the amount of control they have over outcomes. A standard 'hawk' refrain is that victory will be easy and swift, or in the case of the Iraq War, a 'cakewalk'. In addition, the authors highlight the aversion of 'hawks' to admitting defeat or to cutting losses and walking away. Instead, when faced with a deteriorating situation, 'hawks' tend to recommend escalation, a strategic form of 'double or nothing'.

The authors advise that their research does not mean that the 'hawks' are necessarily wrong. There will be situations in which force, or the threat of force, will be the best course of action. However, what they do believe is that decision-makers need to be aware of this latent 'hawkish' bias if they are to be in a position to make the best possible choices.

Richard Curtin, 'For Poor Countries' Youth, Dashed Hopes Signal Danger Ahead', *Current History*, December 2006, pp. 435–40.

Richard Curtin, a public-policy consultant based in Melbourne, outlines an emerging international security crisis. He points out that one of the characteristics of the Third World is a rapidly expanding pool of poor yet educated young people. These youth face dire economic prospects as employment opportunities lag well behind both birth and literacy rates. In addition, they live in a globalisation-driven environment of increased expectation and First World awareness that is barely constrained by weakening indigenous social and cultural restraints.

Curtin defines the youth cohort as between 12 to 24 years of age. He estimates that the world's poorest countries now contain more than 1.3 billion youth. Moreover, demographic projections indicate that this and subsequent cohorts will continue to expand and will not peak, in most countries, until 2035, and in Africa not until 2050.

Curtin only indirectly addresses the international security aspects of the global youth problem he identifies. Military action is not his primary interest. However, for the Commonwealth's national security agencies and organisations, Curtin's message has troubling implications for Australia's region. The island nations to Australia's north and east are growing rapidly and are also experiencing the youth population bulge. If the energy of these populations is not shaped in directions that are beneficial—or at least benign—to Australia, the consequences for the Commonwealth may be significant, both economically and militarily. This article is an early-warning alarm whose concerns need to be considered by long-looking strategic policy-makers. It is a preventive security issue that will not go away on its own.

Prisco R. Hernandez, 'Developing Cultural Understanding in Stability Operations: A Three Step Process', *Field Artillery Journal*, Vol. XII, No. 1, January-February 2007, pp. 5–10, http://sill-www.army.mil/famag/2007/JAN_FEB_2007/JAN_FEB_2007_PAGES_5_10.pdf.

Lieutenant Colonel Prisco R. Hernandez is a full-time officer in the Army National Guard. He serves as Director of Reserve Component Tactics at the Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He also holds a PhD from the University of Wisconsin.

While the US Army has accepted the need to instil in its deployed personnel a degree of cultural awareness, Hernandez argues that the present system provides deployed personnel with a too shallow and insufficient level of knowledge to allow them to operate effectively in stability operations. Cultural awareness indoctrination enables deployed personnel to avoid causing offence, but not to be an active and independent participant in the local culture. Instead, what invariably result from the present limits of cultural awareness education is that field operators become dependent on local experts and translators for the management of the most sensitive and crucial aspects of their jobs—interaction with the local population. What Hernandez advocates is for operators to have the capability to function independently of contracted personnel. Hernandez is aware that it would be impossible and impractical for deployed officers to have an academic-level knowledge base of the local culture. Instead, he seeks a middle ground that he terms 'cultural understanding'.

Hernandez outlines a three-step approach for the attainment of the deep-level cultural understanding. He suggests study in three areas:

- 1) History and Culture;
- 2) Language skills; and
- 3) Practical application.

Hernandez estimates that the attainment of cultural understanding will require between one and three years of study. He does not come to grips with the problem of personnel finding time within their current taskings or the posting cycle. Instead, he insists that the US Army must accept cultural awareness training as part of its core business and recognise that this knowledge is a force multiplier for troops in the field.

FROM THE VAULT

This month the LWSC recommends:

'Citizen Military Forces: Social Considerations', published by the *Australian Army Journal* in Issue No. 312, May 1975, pp. 16–27.

This month's 'From the Vault' addresses the development of the Australian Army's reserve forces. In 1974, Dr TB Millar, of the Australian National University, presented to the Minister of Defence a commissioned report titled the *Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces*. The Millar Report, as the committee's work became known, was one of the most far-reaching reports that Defence has ever published. This article was drawn the report's examination of the societal considerations that shaped the Army's recruitment and retention of reservist personnel.

Defence implementation of the Millar Report's recommendations was a traumatic experience for the Army's part-time soldier organisation, then known as the Citizen Military Forces. It resulted in a massive reduction in the CMF's order of battle, the elimination of numerous command appointments, the dramatic reduction in establishment, and culminated in the replacement of the organisation's traditional title of 'CMF' with that of 'Army Reserve'.


The Millar Report was published as the *Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces Report*, Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service, 1974. It is available through the Defence Library Service.

Yet, what were often overlooked in the Millar Report are its cogent arguments on and practical suggestions for the improvement of reservist recruitment and retention. The societal forces that adversely effect recruitment today are not new. Rather, they were first examined by Millar in the early 1970s. Recruitment issues, such as acceleration of technology take-up, an increasingly affluent population, expanding educational opportunities, domineering mass media, evolving

social values and a distinctive youth culture would be as recognisable to today's force recruitment managers as they were to their predecessors.

Even from the distance of more than 30 years, the Millar Report's recommendations on how to manage society's complexities to the benefit of the Reserve Forces remain pertinent. Those individuals tasked with the development of the Army's second line would do well to examine this report in its entirety. If this is not practical then this article would serve as a useful starting point in any discussion of how to improve the Army reserve.

BOOK LAUNCH



In January the Army History Unit released *An Art in Itself: The Theory and Conduct of Small Wars and Insurgencies*. Edited by Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, the volume contains the proceedings of the 2006 Chief of Army Military History Conference.

The conference brought together a panel of internationally recognised scholars in the fields of terrorism, counterinsurgency and small wars. Participants included: Professor Keith Jeffrey of Queen's University, Belfast; Professor David Charters of the University of New Brunswick's Center for Conflict Studies; Professor John P. Cann from the Marine Corps University, Quantico; Associate Professor Iain Spence of the University of New England, and Brigadier McGill Alexander of the SANDF. The keynote speaker was Professor Brian McAllister Linn of Texas A&M University, an award-winning author and expert on the Philippines War of 1899–1902. The title of his address was 'The US Army and Small Wars: An Uncomfortable Reality'.

Topics addressed by the conference's speakers included: 'Small Wars and Insurgencies in the Ancient World'; 'The Irish Experience of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Since 1919'; 'The British Experience in Mesopotamia and Iraq, 1918–1932'; 'The Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa: Airborne Tactics in an Insurgency War' and 'Phase IV Operations in Iraq: A Perspective by an Australian'.

Request for copies of *An Art in Itself* should be directed to the Army History Unit.

THE CHAUVEL ESSAY PRIZE—2006

The *Australian Army Journal* (AAJ), in association with the Land Warfare Studies Centre (LWSC), awards the Chauvel Essay Prize to the most outstanding contribution published each year in the AAJ.

Selected by members of the Editorial Advisory Board, the author of the winning essay is presented with a medallion and a \$500 cheque by the Chief of Army. The Chauvel Essay Prize aims to raise the intellectual profile and professionalism of the Army and rewards discussion of important issues.

The winner of the 2006 Chauvel Essay Prize is Brigadier Michael Krause, Head Recruitment and Retention Implementation Staff.

In an article titled 'The Case for Minimum-mass Tactics in the Australian Army', then-Colonel Krause wrote:

... the land force cannot afford to retain an organisational structure that is designed for 20th-century, industrial-style armed conflict. Without significant and wide-ranging organisational reform, the emerging 21st-century Australian Army risks being squeezed into roles and situations for which it is neither designed nor suited.

The full text of Brigadier Krause's article is available from the LWSC web site: http://www.defence.gov.au/army/LWSC/Publications/journal/AAJ_Autumn05/AAJ_Autumn05_krause_9.pdf.

Congratulates to Brigadier Krause and thanks all those who continue to write for and support the AAJ.

For further information about contributing to the AAJ, contact the Director Land Warfare Studies Centre:

LTCOL Malcolm McGregor
Telephone: +61 2 6265 9890
Facsimile: +61 2 6265 9888
Email: malcolm.mcgregor@defence.gov.au



The Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, AO, awards the 2006 Chauvel Essay Prize to Brigadier Michael Krause.



Brigadier Krause accepts his certificate, medallion and cheque.