

S O P D



Senior Officer Professional Digest

June 2007, Issue 50

Contents

2 ARTICLE SUMMARIES

- Staying the Course *by Simon Murden*
- Strengthening Security in Contemporary Afghanistan *by Hekmat Karzai*
- 3 HUMINT-Centric Operations *by Ralph Baker*
- 4 Preparing the US Marine Corps for Future Warfare *by Terry Terriff*
- 5 Losing the Propaganda Wars *by Melik Kaylan*
- 6 Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet) *by Llewelyn Hughes*
- 7 The Climate Engineers *by James R. Fleming*
- The Defence Debate in Australia and New Zealand *by David McCraw*
- 8 Prime Time for Strategic Culture *by Colin S. Gray*
- 9 China: Security cooperation with reservations *by Liselotte Oddgard*

FROM THE VAULT

- 10 Boldness or Rashness—Security or Timidity *by H. L. Bell*. This article was first published in the *Australian Army Journal*, February 1965.

NEW PUBLICATION

- 11 *Square Pegs for Round Holes? Current Approaches to Future Warfare and the need to Adapt*

The **Senior Officer Professional Digest** is a publication of the Land Warfare Studies Centre. Feedback regarding this publication is welcome and should be addressed to the Director.



Land Warfare Studies Centre
Ian Campbell Road
Duntroon ACT 2600
Australia
+61 2 6265 9624
lwsc.publications@defence.gov.au

MESSAGE FROM THE EDITORS

This month the editors of the *Senior Officer Professional Digest* recommend ten articles drawn from professional and academic journals on the subjects of Fourth-Generation Warfare, operations in Afghanistan, HUMINT-centric operations, lessons from the US Marine Corps' modernisation efforts, public diplomacy and the Global War on Terror, Japanese nuclear plans, climate engineering, trans-Tasman defence debates, strategic culture in general, and China's strategic culture more specifically.

The topics covered this month are as diverse as they are interesting. Simon Murden's article on Fourth-Generation Warfare analyses how the perceived legitimacy of interventions will be crucial to sustaining commitment amongst civilians for operations during the 'Long War'. As for the conduct of such operations, Hekmat Karzai argues the importance of humanitarian and political efforts in Afghanistan, while Colonel Ralph Baker of the US Army scrutinises HUMINT and its critical role in counterinsurgency operations. Terry Terriff continues Baker's theme of the importance of people over technology when examining the US Marine Corps' transformation efforts.

Melik Kaylan looks at the problematic and troubled conduct of public diplomacy by the United States today in the Global War on Terror, while Llewelyn Hughes looks at the largely successful diplomacy of Japan regarding nuclear weapons.

James Fleming reviews historical efforts to enact climate change through artificial processes, and the potentially drastic effect such efforts may have in the future. David McCraw studies the state of the strategic debates in both Australia and New Zealand, examining how the strategic culture of both affects their respective policies. On the same general theme, the distinguished scholar and strategist, Colin S. Gray, analyses the trajectory of strategic culture in contemporary strategic scholarship, and explains where he sees its value and future. Finally, Liselotte Oddgard's article examines China's responses to its security environment, and how its history and strategic culture shapes the way it perceives that environment.

Enjoy
The Editors

Simon Murden, 'Staying the Course in 'Fourth-Generation Warfare': Persuasion and Perseverance in the Era of Asymmetric Bargaining War', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 197–211.

Fourth-Generation Warfare is a familiar concept to any Australian officer, but Simon Murden offers some new perspectives on this major theoretical construct.

Murden begins by outlining the proposition that perseverance is crucial in Fourth-Generation Warfare. This is because fourth-generation wars will necessarily be longer than the quick wars, such as the 1991 Gulf War, which Westerners are becoming used to. Unlike the generations of warfare that have preceded it, attrition in fourth-generation warfare is likely to be low, and spaced over a relatively long time, due to the inability of the fourth-generation opponent to mobilise sufficient capacity to meet a conventional force in open battle.

Rather, Murden maintains that fourth-generation opponents will attempt to target the will of enemy decision-makers directly through unconventional operations, to convince them that the war is not worth the price. With the supposed casualty-averse mindset of Western civilian populations, attacking the will to persevere of the intervening force's parent population is the surest route to success for fourth-generation opponents. The way to counter this, and to thus ensure that civilian populations maintain the will to persevere, Murden argues, is legitimacy.

Murden maintains that a critical factor in establishing legitimacy is multilateralism. The success of a multilateral approach to the new generation of conflicts, such as in Kosovo, is proof of the concept. This is because the plurality of participants shows that a significant proportion of responsible states' interests are engaged, and not just the narrow interests of one or two states. Further, the strong commitment of all participants is practically guaranteed because their forces are working toward international goals, and not just the goals of one nation. This is why US unilateral interventions have failed—and will fail in the future—Murden argues. He concludes, therefore, that, while there is some semblance of true multilateralism in Iraq now, it is simply too little, too late.

'In the light of US failures on the fourth-generation battlefield in Iraq, it is perhaps time to take stock of other approaches.'

Simon Murden is a Senior Lecturer at Britannia Royal Naval College Dartmouth in the United Kingdom.

Hekmat Karzai, 'Strengthening Security in Contemporary Afghanistan: Coping with the Taliban' in *Building a New Afghanistan*, Robert Rotberg (ed.), World Peace Foundation, Cambridge, MA, 2007, pp. 56–81.

Hekmat Karzai's chapter, one of nine included in a new book outlining the challenges facing the rebuilding of Afghanistan, is a well-written introduction to the problems facing Afghanistan today. It reminds readers that not only has the Taliban not gone away, but that they have

improved their strategy and tactics and remain a danger to the development of a free and functioning modern Afghan state.

As Karzai points out, to understand Afghanistan you must begin to understand the violent history of the country, including the fact that the *talibs* have been involved in repelling foreigners from Afghanistan for more than a century. After a succinct and clear outline of the history and structure of the Taliban, the author explains the development of a new and more lethal Taliban since the 2001 invasion, including the claim that al-Qaeda is now passing on techniques learned in Iraq to Taliban units.

Karzai also writes about other factors that are influencing the growth of support (or at the very least, opportunities) for the Taliban, which include the lack of cultural understanding by foreign troops, the role of Pakistan, and the disappointment of Afghans with the slow pace of change and development. Karzai insists that these factors must be addressed by anyone involved in Afghanistan. The chapter concludes

'Clearly, establishing security throughout Afghanistan is the job of the Afghans, but they will need the financial assistance and political support of the international community.'

with sensible, coherent and straight-forward recommendations. Any reader requiring an introduction to the Afghan situation should most assuredly read this article.

Hekmat Karzai is currently the Director of the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (CAPS) in Kabul, Afghanistan.

Ralph Baker, 'HUMINT-Centric Operations: Developing Actionable Intelligence in the Urban Counterinsurgency Environment', *Military Review*, Vol. 87, No. 2, March/April 2007, pp. 12–21,
< <http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MarApr07/Baker.pdf> >.

Colonel Ralph Baker of the US Army argues that it is not the type or composition of a force, but rather its mode of operation, that makes for effective counterinsurgency operations. Baker draws on his experience in Iraq as Commander of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armoured Division, to establish this point.

While in Iraq, Baker realised that no matter how sensitive his troops were, and how much they tried, they simply were not structured to integrate readily into the Iraqi environment. Instead, his formation's primary function was to annihilate enemy units through shock and firepower. It lacked the training and doctrine to identify and remove individual insurgents from amongst the civilian population. What Baker had to do was shift the focus of his force from conventional 'search and destroy' operations to those centred on human intelligence, or HUMINT.

Baker outlines the numerous initiatives he implemented, ranging from the simple, such as weekly meetings of key intelligence figures in the Brigade team, to the complex, like vetting potential informants and equipping them with GPS locators and other sophisticated technology.

Baker's key reform, however, was to re-organise and re-focus his intelligence unit on HUMINT. Furthermore, he trained his formation in police techniques, including how to collect evidence and statements for use in criminal prosecutions, how to manage informants and contacts, and how to assist in the prosecution of insurgents in court.

'[O]ur dependency on conventional intelligence collection methods and our failure to understand the negative perceptions our actions were generating among Iraqi citizens threatened to doom our mission.'

These reforms resulted in several important successes. Low-key operations, acting on HUMINT acquired through Baker's reforms, netted dozens of insurgents, and the prosecution rate of his force rose strongly. These tangible successes prove Baker's approach is effective, and suggests that this article is a definite 'must-read' for all senior officers.

Colonel Ralph Baker, US Army, currently serves as Assistant Deputy Director of Politico-Military Affairs, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate – Middle East, under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Terry Terriff, 'Of Romans and Dragons: Preparing the US Marine Corps for Future Warfare', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 143–62.

The Australian Army and the United States Marine Corps share many similarities. As such, the USMC's efforts to prepare for future wars are of particular relevance to the Australian Army and its senior officers.

Terry Terriff focuses on the establishment of the United States Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory by the former Marine Corps Commandant, General Charles C. Krulak. Krulak established the Laboratory in order to explore the challenges that may face the Marines Corps in the future. Krulak's initiative was sound; however, after he resigned, other and more immediate priorities took over. Important equipment acquisitions that demanded immediate attention, such as new landing craft, helicopters and amphibious ships, resulted in Krulak's Laboratory being left to languish. Accordingly, when the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq began, the Marine Corps was unprepared.

The now-familiar model of small special forces teams directing massive air power to support Northern Alliance attacks in Afghanistan is a particularly telling example of the price the Marine Corps paid for its loss of focus on preparing for the future. The concept was originally developed at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory as part of its 'Hunter Warrior' initiative. It envisaged small, dispersed groups of Marines operating across a theatre to identify enemy formations, who would then call in massed, precision fire to destroy those enemies. Under the more immediate pressures of equipment acquisition and inter-Service budget battles, the Marine Corps did not adopt the

'Five years after 11 September ... the Marine Corps, like the other US military services, is still concentrating on developing appropriate concepts and training to meet the security environment in which it has to operate. The question of why the Corps has found itself in this position despite Krulak's efforts is a particularly poignant one.'

'Hunter Warrior' concept. Consequently, when the war in Afghanistan began, it was the special forces who received the mission. This example is not isolated—Terriff lists several examples of missed opportunities stemming from the Marine Corps' failure to change for the future.

The parallels between the Marine Corps and Australian Army are obvious: with the Australian Army currently receiving into service a series of new weapons systems, raising new battalions and planning to receive much new equipment in the future, it will be easy to lose sight, as the USMC did, of what all the new kit is for—to fight the next type of war, not the last.

Terry Terriff is a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham. He is also an Executive Editor of the journal in which this article appeared—Contemporary Security Policy.

Melik Kaylan, 'Losing the Propaganda Wars', *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 4, Winter 2006/2007, pp. 19–26.

Melik Kaylan's piece strikes to the heart of an issue that receives much focus in academic and professional literature, but little actual attention in practice—public diplomacy, or, to use its older name, propaganda. Kaylan argues that, given its previous Cold War expertise in the matter, the United States should take the lead in developing a propaganda campaign as part of its Global War on Terror. As he demonstrates in his article, however, thus far it has not.

Kaylan shows that, unlike the well-conceived and directed efforts of the Cold War, current propaganda from the United States is inconsistent and inadequate. Much of the blame for the shortfall in propaganda infrastructure, he argues, falls on Clinton's post-Cold War cutbacks. Despite the decline in funding and organisation, however, the current Bush Administration must also share the blame—its efforts have lacked a thorough 'message' and centralised coordination.

"How could a mass murderer who publicly praised the terrorists of September 11 be winning the hearts and minds of anyone? How could a man in a cave outcommunicate the world's leading communications society?"

While some figures in President Bush's propaganda team have made notable successes in reaching large Middle Eastern populations, the content of their broadcasting was, according to Cold War practitioners, not useful. While a pro-US line was important, it had to be intellectually rigorous, thoroughly researched and appropriately resourced. In a war primarily of ideas, propaganda is crucial to success. Kaylan demonstrates that, in

the United States at least, this vital element of contemporary operations is not being pursued with the focus, vision or dedication necessary to prevail.

Melik Kaylan is a journalist and regular contributor to the Wall Street Journal.

Llewelyn Hughes, 'Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet)', *International Security*, Vol. 31, No. 4, Spring 2007, pp. 69–96.

With the test of a nuclear device and several missiles by North Korea late last year, and Chinese nuclear modernisation efforts underway, many speculate that Japan may acquire a nuclear deterrent of its own. Llewelyn Hughes attempts to explain why, given these seemingly powerful reasons, Japan will not make the choice to 'go nuclear'.

Hughes notes that Japan is eminently placed to equip itself with nuclear weapons. Japan possesses more than adequate technical capacity to produce the necessary fissionable material—it has fifty-four reactors, a large industrial capacity for fuel reprocessing, and will soon open a fast-breeder reactor. Furthermore, despite what many may think, there is no serious constitutional impediment to Japan acquiring nuclear weapons. Whilst there are Cabinet and Diet resolutions, constitutional articles and institutional mechanisms preventing nuclear acquisition, Hughes demonstrates that these are all easily overcome. The key element missing in any bid for a Japanese bomb, according to Hughes, is will.

**'For some, Japanese nuclearisation is a question not of whether, but of when ...
[f]or others, Japan's reticence ...
demonstrates the power of normative variables in determining policy outcomes.'**

The lack of political will for an independent nuclear deterrent in Japan is clear. Most parliamentarians, bureaucrats and soldiers oppose the acquisition of nuclear weapons on the grounds that such a move will destabilise the international environment. For a nation as dependent upon trade as Japan, upsetting delicate markets reliant on global stability is not in the national interest. Even in the currently tense strategic circumstances, Japanese policymakers and the Japanese public continue to oppose nuclear armament.

While the will for nuclear arms is low, the support to protect Japan from them is strong. Japan maintains that its traditional diplomatic approach remains its best security policy. It operates on two fronts, mixing strong support for disarmament—centred around Japan's championing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty—with the US–Japan alliance and the US 'nuclear umbrella'. Hughes shows how much Japanese diplomacy over the years has affected US nuclear policy, and how US responsiveness to Japanese wishes has assured Japan of the efficacy of extended deterrence. This reassurance, he argues, has been a primary determinant in Japan remaining a non-nuclear power.

Hughes' case is clear and compelling. In an era where nuclear terrorism is possible, and where rogue states actively seek nuclear weapons, understanding the diplomatic approach Japan takes to the crucial issue of nuclear defence is vital to continued and deeper engagement with this key ally.

Llewelyn Hughes is a doctoral candidate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

James R. Fleming, 'The Climate Engineers', *The Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 31, No. 2, Spring 2007, pp. 46–60.

Deliberately changing the climate is not a new idea; neither is manipulating climate to further military strategy a novel concept. In this article, James R. Fleming provides examples of past attempts to intentionally tamper with the climate for military aims. Without exception, these efforts have failed, but this does not mean that future attempts will also fall short. The author examines the potential effects of climate changing powers, and the possibilities that may arise should these efforts not go according to plan. If these theories are ever to move beyond that—theories—such planning will be a requirement.

The effects of climate change loom large as a consideration for military forces across the globe, and the Australian Defence Force is not exempt—the recently released *Joint Operations for the 21st*

'... it is virtually impossible to imagine governments resisting the temptation to explore military uses of any potentially climate-altering technology.'

Century acknowledges that climate change could affect Australia's security. While most strategic considerations of climate change revolve around how governments may choose to use military force to deal with its outcomes, it is inevitable that some strategists may shift their focus from considering how to mitigate the effects of climate change towards how to harness it. Fleming's timely article reminds

readers that climate manipulation, thus far an expensive folly, may not always be so.

James R. Fleming is a public policy scholar at the Wilson Centre and is the holder of the American Association for the Advancement of Science's Roger Revelle Fellowship in Global Environmental Stewardship.

David McCraw, 'The Defence Debate in Australia and New Zealand', *Defence Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 90–110.

With the heightened operational tempo of the Australian Defence Force, senior officers and policy-makers may be pressed for time to keep abreast of the broader debate surrounding defence policy in Australia and New Zealand. Fortunately, David McCraw's article draws the salient issues of this debate together in a succinct review.

Characterising the debate in both Australia and New Zealand as a clash between 'traditionalists' and 'revisionists', McCraw places Australia firmly in the 'traditionalist camp'—those who predict uncertainty in the future and who would consequently form their forces to fight both conventional and unconventional conflicts. McCraw argues that, given Australia's adherence to the Defence of Australia policy over the last several decades, Australian policymakers favour the notion of 'preparing for the worst' by continuing to focus major capital purchases and training activities on high-end conventional warfighting.

New Zealand, on the other hand, is firmly in the grip of revisionist policies, argues McCraw. He defines revisionists as those who maintain that ‘fourth-generation warfare’ is the future, and who would configure their forces to fight such low-intensity conflicts. Citing the benign nature of their strategic environment, and the prohibitive costs associated with high-tech weapons systems, New Zealand governments have opted for a lighter, less combat-capable force focused on peacekeeping, regional

policing and nation-building. McCraw argues that New Zealand’s focus on motorised land forces, and the cessation of their fast-jet capability, is firm evidence of this shift to revisionist policies.

‘The world had not changed fundamentally, and New Zealand’s experience was that its interests could best be defended in partnership with others. The country therefore needed to maintain forces that could offer something to coalitions ...’

‘In East Timor, where Australia struggled to assemble an intervention force, the country reaped the consequences of a defence force structure which prioritised the Air Force and the Navy at the expense of the Army.’

McCraw maps the major parties and points in each nation’s respective debate, and how each nation’s strategic culture influences these positions. While McCraw notes similarities between the positions of both countries’ revisionists and traditionalists, he points out that their motivations differ. This article covers these debates sufficiently in general terms, but it is not definitive. Instead, it serves as a starting point for further reading.

David McCraw is with the Department of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of Waikato in New Zealand.

Colin S. Gray, ‘Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture’, *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 1–20.

In this article, Gray outlines the basis for the importance of considering culture when studying and implementing strategy. As well as describing what culture actually is, and, more specifically, what strategic culture is, Gray examines some of the benefits and pitfalls of cultural enquiry in a strategic setting.

While serving as an introduction to the subject, Gray also places the subject of strategic culture within the context of the continual rise and fall of competing strategic theories. In particular, he notes that the US defence community is often subject to fads or ‘the big idea of the moment’. While

championing his cause—the importance of strategic culture—Gray admits that such study can not be the basis of all strategic decision-making, and is not the ‘silver bullet’ that can solve the strategic dilemmas facing contemporary policymakers. Australian strategists would do well to heed the dual themes of this article: that strategic culture deserves more attention, but with that

‘Today it seems, at long last, culture either is, or is in serious danger of becoming, the big idea of the moment.’

attention should come the recognition that strategic culture is a difficult subject that demands more than a passing glance before moving on to the next fashionable trend. As governments reshape strategies to face threats such as asymmetrical warfare, those in positions of influence would be well-advised to consider the points expounded by Gray.

Colin S.Gray is a leading scholar of Strategic Studies. His many publications include Modern Strategy and Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare, and he has held numerous chairs and professorships at universities around the world. He currently works for the National Institute for Public Policy in Virginia, USA.

Liselotte Oddgard, 'China: security cooperation with reservations' in Emil Kirchner and James Sperling (eds), *Global Security Governance*, Routledge, New York, 2007, pp. 199–218.

Oddgard's work forms a chapter of the book *Global Security Governance*, which contains sections on nine different countries, examining their individual perceptions of threat. Each chapter follows a consistent format to facilitate comparisons of the ways in which different countries perceive their security environment and shape their response.

'Chinese security culture ... suggests no viable alternative to the Cold War structure of international relations based on absolute sovereignty ... and traditional power balancing.'

In this era of globalisation, it is often claimed that the probability of major conventional war is low. Some argue that our military forces should be structured to meet more immediate security threats such as terrorism. While such views receive wide currency in the West, Liselotte Oddgard argues that in China, the focus is still squarely on state-based threats and major war. The question then becomes not whether we should reform our

forces for fighting terrorism, but rather, given that China is still preoccupied with—and equipping itself for—major conventional war, can we really afford to?

Oddgard examines the perceptions of threat in China from the point of view of major groups in Chinese society, namely academia, the government, parliament, and the public at large. What she finds is that there exists a general consensus amongst these groups that Japan and the United States, two key allies of Australia, are perceived as China's greatest threat. While Oddgard finds that other threats, such as terrorism and separatism, are thought of in China to be important for different reasons, traditional state/military threats are felt deepest of all. Accordingly, China's security effort has been overwhelmingly military in nature, with massive and ever-growing expenditure on modern aircraft, warships and land force weaponry.

While China's substantial diplomatic initiatives may seem inconsistent with its focus on state/military threats, Oddgard argues that these efforts merely aim to legitimise its military rise, reassuring others of its peaceful nature. She shows that underneath this diplomatic veneer, Chinese elites still maintain that 'hard' military power remains the primary determinant in international relations.

Liselotte Oddgard is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Aarhus, in Denmark. Her books include The Balance of Power in Asia-Pacific Security and Maritime Security between China and Southeast Asia: Conflict and cooperation in the making of regional order.

This month the LWSC recommends:

Major H. L. Bell, 'Boldness or Rashness—Security or Timidity? The Need for Audacity in Battle', *Australian Army Journal*, No. 189, February 1965, pp. 17–43.

Bell's article could just as easily have been written today as over forty years ago. Military academies and commanders today continue to espouse the necessity of what Bell called boldness in battle. However, as in Bell's day, boldness is hard to put in practice, especially when one considers the price of failure.

Bell draws upon numerous historical examples to illustrate the benefits of audacity and the consequences of timidity. Perhaps the most telling example presented is the cautious advance on Rome of Major General John Lucas during the Second World War. After the US landing at Anzio achieved complete surprise, and in the face of minimal opposition, Lucas failed to act decisively. By the time he was ready to move, the Germans had positioned two elite divisions in his path.

Bell then discusses multiple examples of successes achieved by virtue of a commander's audacity. For example, he draws upon the series of hasty attacks conducted by Israeli parachute units during the Sinai campaign of 1956. These bold attacks allowed the Israelis to seize the important Mitla Pass, thus preventing Egyptian forces moving to reinforce their comrades in the Sinai. This successful attack was instrumental to Israeli victory. Indeed, so bold was this attack that Bell argues any staff cadet suggesting such an approach during training would have been 'failed'.

'I have found again and again that in encounter actions the day goes to the side that is the first to plaster its opponents with fire. The man who lies low and awaits developments usually comes off second best.'


This is precisely the point that Bell sets out to make in his entire article: that audacity and 'outside the box' thinking were insufficiently encouraged during his day. Whilst the same may not be entirely true today, there is surely always room for improvement. The modern Army is serious about learning the lessons of history; Bell's article provides a powerful reminder of why audacity, both in battle and in training, must be one of those lessons.

Working Paper Series

The Land Warfare Studies Centre is pleased to announce the release of the latest volume in its Working Paper Series: Brigadier Michael Krause's *Square Pegs for Round Holes? Current Approaches to Future Warfare and the Need to Adapt*.

Brigadier Krause's work centres on the proposition that Western militaries are adapting too slowly to the needs of future warfighting. He argues that training for high-intensity conventional war, and then adapting troops and units at the last minute for lower-intensity contingencies, is not an efficient use of our armed forces. Rather, Krause advocates a stronger, more complete adoption of interagency practice to meet the operational demands of complex irregular wars. He argues that such changes will help to deliver greater success in the future.

With US strategic pre-eminence only growing, and with the well-understood limiting effects of nuclear weapons constraining great powers from major wars, enemies have little choice but irregular war if they choose to confront the United States and the Western world. Krause argues that, given this reality, we too must change.



Square Pegs for Round Holes? Current Approaches to Future Warfare and the Need to Adapt is available from the LWSC at http://www.defence.gov.au/army/lwsc/Publications/WP/WP_132.pdf.