

S O P D



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Contents

2 ARTICLE SUMMARIES

- Beyond the Cloister by *David Petraeus* and
Learning to Lose by *Ralph Peters*
- 3 The Power Equation by *Morgan Mann*
- 4 The Myth of the Invincible Terrorist by
Christopher Harmon
- 5 Focused Operations Against Organized Crime by
Oliver Mintz and Tory House
- 6 Strategic Consequences of Radical Islamic
Neofundamentalism by *David Westbrook*
- 7 Nuclear Enlightenment and
Counterenlightenment by *William Walker*
- 8 The Muslim Middle East by *Thomas McCabe*
- 9 Climate Change and Security in Southern Asia
by *Brahma Chellaney*
- 10 Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth
Emerges by *T.X. Hammes*
- 11 China's ASEAN Invasion by *John Lee*

FROM THE VAULT

- 12 Man—The Vital Weapon by *Matthew Ridgway*.
This article was first published in the *Australian
Army Journal* in December 1955.

NEW PUBLICATION

- 13 *The Making and Breaking of the Post-
Federation Australian Army, 1901–09*

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MESSAGE FROM THE EDITORS

This month the editors of the Senior Officer Professional Digest recommend ten articles drawn from professional and academic journals on the subjects of civilian education, counterinsurgency, terrorism, organised crime, the global nuclear order, the Middle East, climate change, 'fifth generation' warfare and Chinese diplomacy.

General David Petraeus and retired Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters argue the case for and against postgraduate education of military officers in the pages of *The American Interest* in this edition's most noteworthy article. Their debate centres on the utility of non-traditional concepts in an officer's education given the new approaches to warfighting that recent campaigns have necessitated.

Morgan Mann, Chris Harmon, Oliver Mintz and Tory House all offer their opinions on how to conduct such new-style campaigns, with Mann writing on the utility of tribal politics in Iraq, Harmon decrying the image of terrorists as 'invincible', and Mintz and House writing on their experiences fighting organised crime in Kosovo. David Westbrook argues for a significant shift in the United States' strategy that is guiding the Long War.

William Walker presents an imaginative article on the global nuclear order, likening global efforts through history to control nuclear weapons to a grand 'enlightenment project', while Thomas McCabe presents a decidedly less optimistic article about the Middle East, arguing that opposition and hostility to the West in the Middle East is far more widespread than first thought.

Brahma Chellaney presents a balanced analysis of the potential impact of climate change in South Asia, and Thomas X. Hammes builds upon his fourth generation war thesis, arguing that new technologies, tactics and strategies have given rise to a fifth generation of war. John Lee rounds out the collection of article within this edition of the SOPD with an analysis of Chinese diplomacy within ASEAN.

Enjoy
The Editors

David Petraeus, 'Beyond the Cloister' and Ralph Peters, 'Learning to Lose', *The American Interest*, Vol. 2, No. 6, July/August 2007, pp. 16–28.

These two articles constitute opposing sides to a single argument. As such, they are presented together.

In these twin articles, General David Petraeus argues cogently for the continuation of postgraduate civilian education of uniformed personnel, while Ralph Peters, a retired Lieutenant Colonel, takes the opposite position, with most of his contribution consisting of several (meritorious) points unfortunately obscured by copious invective.

Petraeus forms his article into six distinct sections, arguing that the postgraduate education of military personnel—in civilian schools or otherwise—is crucial to mission success, especially today when more than firepower and brute strength is required. Petraeus makes the point that civilian schools help soldiers by taking them out of their intellectual comfort zone, and increases their awareness of the diversity of thought and opinion that exists outside of the military. He further argues that soldiers receive skills and develop concepts in civilian educational institutions that they would not otherwise have experienced in military education—skills which can later be used on operations. Petraeus also suggests that a postgraduate civilian education can also give successful soldiers a degree of intellectual humility, a fact that Petraeus learned through personal experience.

'The benefits of civilian education are substantial, and I have been and remain a strong proponent of such opportunities for officers.'

In contrast to Petraeus' positive stance, Peters is highly negative. He offers a blistering critique of civilian education, arguing that it stunts the development of effective officers. His argument, whilst at times impolitic, does have merit. Peters recounts an episode where a US Army colonel, writing

'Ill-equipped to navigate the murky waters of theory ... [officers] jettison their common sense ... to doggy-paddle behind professors who couldn't swim in real world currents without dragging down every lifeguard in sight.'

counterinsurgency doctrine, had omitted to mention incidents of successful (but unsavoury) tactics from his recent tour in Iraq. Peters attributes this to the colonel's obsession with theory; the omitted successes had not been consistent with his theory, and were thus excluded from the doctrine. Peters argues that this was the direct result of an overly theoretical postgraduate civilian education, and that it is indicative of wider trends. Peters is little kinder

to military education, which he claims is useless, but he does admit that such courses at least give officers an opportunity to network. While he does strongly support the civilian teaching of history and languages, Peters argues that it is in the field and in barracks that officers are best educated.

The two diametrically opposed views that Petraeus and Peters put forward are equally thought provoking, and are equally valid. As the Australian Army moves towards becoming a more knowledge-intensive organisation, the education of officers is, and will continue to be, a critical issue.

These two articles deal directly with philosophical arguments relevant to the Army's current education efforts, and should therefore be read closely.

General David Petraeus (US Army) is currently commander of the Multi National Force – Iraq. Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters (retired), left the US Army in 1998, his last appointment being in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

Morgan Mann, 'The Power Equation: Using Tribal Politics in Counterinsurgency', *Military Review*, Vol. 87, No. 3, May/June 2007, pp. 104–108, <<http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/MayJun07/mann.pdf>> .

In this succinct article, Major Morgan Mann uses his personal experiences in Iraq to explore the two sides of a successful counterinsurgency strategy: the 'carrot and stick'. While regarding the use of force as a crucial element in dealing with insurgents, Mann also underlines the importance of using inducements. He makes the important point that to do this properly in Iraq there needs to be an understanding of local tribal organisation and the importance of local leadership structures, especially in rural areas.

Mann relates how Coalition forces use various means to shape events to their benefit. The author describes this as an 'ability to exercise power across a continuum', with that power including not only military force but also commitment and political resources. The point he makes is that forces must be willing to use all available means to disrupt insurgent activity. In the example given, the author states that the tribe he dealt with realised that it was more beneficial to work with the Coalition than against it after he had used both carrots and sticks.

Mann suggests that Coalition forces must work to understand the tribal alignment of each area in which they work. One of the tools he suggests is to develop a tribal/ethnic map overlay of the region, similar to the combined obstacle overlay that Coalition forces use for analysing terrain. This process would help not only with understanding the tribal relationships in an area, but would also facilitate information management and pattern analysis. He also advocates that decision making, and the choice to punish or reward, should be located as far down the chain of command as possible, since company commanders will have the best knowledge of what will work in their area of responsibility.

'[W]e must understand how Iraqi tribes think about the use of power and be willing to use whatever power is at our disposal so long as we do not cross the legal and ethical lines we set for ourselves.'

Throughout the article, the author continually reinforces the idea of a 'power continuum' and highlights that cultural understanding does not negate the need to use deadly force (where justified) to achieve ends. He reminds the reader that there needs to be a combination of political, economic and military power if victory is to be achieved in the counterinsurgency fight.

Major Morgan Mann is the operations officer of 2 Battalion, 24 Marine Regiment. He holds a B.S. from the University of California, Los Angeles, and an MBA from Northwestern University. A graduate of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Warfare School and the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, he served in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom II from September 2004 to March 2005.

Christopher C. Harmon, 'The Myth of the Invincible Terrorist', *Policy Review*, Vol. 142, April/May 2007, pp. 57–74, <<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/6848137.html>>.

In this article Christopher Harmon reminds us of two salient points—that counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are not new phenomena, and that we can learn from the past how to identify and exploit the vulnerabilities of terrorist and insurgent organisations. As with any organisation, these groups have weaknesses, and Harmon draws upon historical examples to identify these shortcomings.

The first section of the article deals with human factors, and includes some relevant examples of how terrorist groups have imploded in the past due to their reliance on a single individual as leader. That said, Harmon acknowledges that the organisational structure of al-Qaeda means

'Terrorists are living, breathing men and women using vile but calculated means to make political gains, and it is vital that politicians and academics and police chiefs continue pointing that out.'

that it is not reliant on one leader, and killing bin Laden and al Zawahiri would probably not result in organisational collapse. There are other human factors such as fatigue, conscience and a change of attitudes that are relevant to all terrorist groups. Another powerful consideration is internal strife, which if it can be manipulated by counterterrorist organisations, allows for organisations to destroy

themselves from within. Harmon argues that history shows that a combination of these factors results in pressure points that can be used to bring groups undone, or at least weaken them.

Other areas where terrorist groups can be vulnerable are tactics and technology. Again Harmon uses historical examples to show how technology can work against terrorists and insurgents, even using simple tactics such as sabotaging arms, which not only leads to fewer available tools but also casts doubt on the reliability of future arms or equipment. As technology evolves, so too do the challenges to terrorist and insurgency organisations. For example, while they can use the development of video technology and the Internet to disseminate footage of their attacks in Iraq, insurgents open themselves up to being captured or killed while making the recordings; and such material can later be used to analyse the attack to the benefit of counterinsurgent forces. As information continues to be used and stored in electronic formats, this means that if counterterrorist forces find the right storage device, the intelligence gain could be enormous. While the theorists focus on how technology enables terrorist groups, it can also be their undoing.

The last two sections of the article look at strategy and political ideology. Harmon points to the fact that while terrorism can be used to cause fear, it often causes fear in the wrong people, thereby reducing popular support. Strict ideologies, in conjunction with excessive violence, can isolate the support base of these groups. Harmon maintains that while the actions and enthusiasm of a small minority of violent 'Islamofacists' may seem important to the West, their popularity and power can wane, just as happened to terrorist groups in the past. If history is to teach us anything, according to Harmon, it is that the terrorist groups of today are not invincible, and that with informed strategy they will become historical footnotes like the organisations that came before them.

Christopher C. Harmon holds the Kim T. Adamson Chair of Insurgency and Terrorism at Marine Corps University. He is author of Terrorism Today.

Oliver Mintz and Tory House, 'Focused Operations Against Organized Crime in a Mature Peace Operations Environment', *Infantry*, Vol. 96, Iss. 1, pp. 38–44.

Major Oliver Mintz and Second Lieutenant Tory House examine a topic that will be of considerable interest to Australian officers and policy-makers, given the variety of crime and crime-related issues in places such as Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and East Timor.

Mintz and House begin by establishing that Organised Crime (OC) forms a 'vicious circle' inside a state. Organised crime, like any business, only thrives where there is demand. This demand is usually created by a dysfunctional state: one that cannot provide food, shelter or security to its people. Criminal groups fill this vacuum, providing the goods and/or services that the people demand. Given the absence of laws governing competition, organised crime is free to use violence, intimidation, bribery and extortion to continue and expand their activities. As these groups slowly usurp from the state the right to use violence, the government's institutions are further weakened, creating greater opportunities for organised criminality.

'Organized crime constitutes nothing less than a guerrilla war against society.'

To combat such deleterious forces, Mintz and House stress that, in a permissive environment such as in Kosovo, where forces have the ability to move around unthreatened by attack, the population is the key. The locals provide intelligence on criminal elements, and ultimately are the ones who keep organised crime in (or out) of business. Mintz and House further maintain that combating OC must always be done with an eye towards strengthening the capacity of the local authority to do so. Operations, they argue, must be conducted in such a way that they culminate in the local authorities conducting arrests and prosecutions. If the local authorities cannot do this for whatever reason (corruption, intimidation, etc.), the peacekeeping force must shape the environment and indirectly weaken organised criminals until the local forces gain the necessary skills to openly and directly challenge them. This, Mintz and House insist, is crucial to mission success; when the peacekeeping forces eventually leaves, the populace must be confident that their local authorities can maintain law and order.

The similarity between the approach outlined in this article, and those advocated for combating counterinsurgency, indicate that such issues are interrelated. Organised crime lies at one end of a spectrum and insurgency at the other. Those who have been advocating a more police-like approach to combating insurgency will find these similarities particularly telling, whilst those who have not will find this article stimulating and challenging.

Major Oliver Mintz graduated from the United States Military Academy, and has served in Kosovo as the Brigade battle captain for 1 Battalion, 141 Infantry Regiment. Second Lieutenant Tory House is a graduate of St. Edwards University, and served as tactical intelligence officer also for 1 Battalion, 141 Infantry Regiment.

David Westbrook, 'Strategic Consequences of Radical Islamic Neofundamentalism', *Orbis*, Vol. 51, No. 3, Summer 2007, pp. 461–77.

In this article David Westbrook makes the case for a major change to the underlying grand strategy of the 'Global War on Terror', arguing it should shift from a primarily military campaign to a political and diplomatic mission.

Westbrook begins by defining radical Islamic neo-fundamentalism—it is the unvarnished, bare core of Islam. It is a creed so simple that anyone can follow it, anywhere, regardless of their own personal context, such as where they live, what governmental system they live under, mainstream attitudes towards Islam in their society, and so on. Westbrook maintains that radical neo-fundamental Islam has become the primary type of Islam amongst extremists and, accordingly, these movements are not vulnerable to military countermeasures that require a clearly defined, easily visible target.

Due to the highly individualistic, powerful and simple nature of the radical Islamic neo-fundamentalist's tenets, they transmit exceedingly well in a globalised world via the Internet and modern telecommunications. Islamic neo-fundamentalists can link and form communities without submitting to the control of states and bureaucracies. Westbrook argues that such ideologues are the Muslims ideally situated for the globalised world: completely independent of governments, secure in their personal identity and able to seek out and contact like-minded people without any regard to personal surroundings. The fundamental nature of this stripe of Islam, Westbrook maintains, ensures its adherents view their entire world through one lens: Islam is what mediates between the radical Islamic neo-fundamentalist and reality.

'Militarized Islamic neofundamentalism ... cannot be killed, but instead must be supplanted.'

Westbrook explains how, in viewing the world, the radical Islamic neo-fundamentalist sees great injustices being constantly perpetrated against Islam. They believe they can do little against such monolithic opposition; however, Westbrook argues, they feel compelled to struggle regardless—it is a divinely ordained duty. Violence, therefore, becomes an end in itself. This somewhat Marxist mentality of struggle is, for Westbrook, what motivates the suicide bombings, indiscriminate targetting of civilians and mass destruction with which we are all familiar.

Westbrook concludes by arguing that, faced with such opponents, military operations will achieve little—such people only desire violence, and thus war plays into their hands. They reject politics, too: it is not that they should not be negotiated with, rather they themselves have no interest in negotiating. Accordingly, their ideology should be countered long-term, via a political strategy. Westbrook advocates achieving this by supplanting radical Islamic neo-fundamentalism with a more moderate Islamic ideology. Because of the suspicion with which the West is held, every effort should be made to ensure this ideology is borne of, and spread by, Muslim groups and states.

This can best be achieved, Westbrook suggests, by forging closer political bonds with Muslim countries, demonstrating commitment through 'boots on the ground', leading by example, and patience—which includes perseverance in the face of casualties. These more measured approaches, sitting subordinate to an overarching political and diplomatic campaign to supplant radical Islamic neo-fundamentalism, Westbrook argues, will deliver us greater success in the long term than high-intensity conventional combat against 'terrorists' ever could.

Professor of Law David Westbrook is the Floyd H. and Hilda L. Hurst Faculty Scholar at the University at Buffalo, State University of New York. He presented the contents of this article to Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in November 2006.

William Walker, 'Nuclear enlightenment and counter-enlightenment', *International Affairs*, Vol. 83, Iss. 3, May 2007, pp. 431–53.

This article forms the basis of the current edition of International Affairs. For further examination of Walker's thesis, the LWSC recommends that readers review the other articles therein.

'Nuclear weapons were an unintended consequence of the scientific enlightenment. As if in recompense ... the attempt ... to create an international order which would limit their dangers ... itself came to possess hallmarks of a grand enlightenment project.'

In this thoughtful article, William Walker draws on the concept of enlightenment and counter-enlightenment to frame his arguments on the international nuclear order. Walker outlines how initial efforts towards establishing a nuclear order internationally bore a great resemblance to an archetypal enlightenment project: they assumed the basic rationality of the party states, and attempted to give states greater mastery over those military and political forces that would otherwise have created a dangerous nuclear anarchy. Walker

outlines how these initial efforts consisted of first halting the arms race, then reducing nuclear arms, before aiming at abolishing nuclear arms entirely. Such goals formed the basis of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other major arms control agreements of the Cold War period.

Walker argues how, following the ending of the Cold War, theorists believed that a golden age in nuclear disarmament had arrived. The United States and former Soviet republics undertook mutual disarmament projects and Iraq was disarmed under United Nations auspices. These steps, it was hoped, were a precursor to a collective agreement on how such action was to be carried out in the future. The fourteen former USSR member states all gave up the nuclear weapons that were based on their territory, and the Non Proliferation Treaty was voted into perpetuity.

Walker argues that pessimism in the United States about the NPT regime, primarily regarding international adherence to it, served to weaken this enlightenment project. Walker claims that a counter-enlightenment in the United States was thus born. This counter-enlightenment was the primary factor in the current poor state of the NPT. Proponents of the counter-enlightenment rejected agreements that they believed bound the United States from exercising its new-found dominance.

