

# S O P D



Senior Officer Professional Digest

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## MESSAGE FROM THE EDITORS

This month the Editors of the Senior Officer Professional Digest recommend ten articles drawn from professional and academic journals on the subjects of 'North/South' relations, the War in Iraq, Iran, women in the military, intelligence reform, terrorism, China's space strategy, the future of artillery and military adaptation.

In this month's opening article, Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber write of a 'world without the West'—an alternative world trade and security order created by states opposed to Western liberal democratic ideas. Barma *et al* call for tough measures to combat this order, while Peter Galbraith calls for equally hard-nosed measures in Iraq, where he insists the United States must withdraw and do what it can 'from the sidelines'. Galbraith's grim assessment is mirrored by the opinions of Buddhika Jayamaha, Wesley D. Smith, Jeremy Roebuck, Omar Mora, Edward Sandmeier, Yance T. Gray and Jeremy A. Murphy—US NCOs who have written about their latest tour-of-duty in Iraq.

Matthew Brummer writes about Iran's possible membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and the implications for the West. Moving from diplomacy to the frontlines, Holly Yeager offers an interesting and surprising piece about women in the military.

Calvert Jones argues in her article that increased intelligence sharing may, in fact, not lead to greater situational awareness. The implications of Jones' conclusion for Network-centric warfare are clear. Elena Pavlova presents a thorough analysis of *Jemaah Islamiyah's* key organisational document, known as 'PUPJI', while Ashley Tellis covers asymmetric warfare of a different kind—China's emerging space warfare strategy.

Exploring the theme of conventional warfighting, Jonathan Bailey examines the past and future of artillery. Finally, Jim Lacey and Kevin Woods write of the need for militaries to institutionalise adaptation, not innovation, in the final article that the Editors recommend this month.

Enjoy  
The Editors

**Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber, 'A World Without the West',**  
*The National Interest*, No. 90, July/August 2007, pp. 23–30.

Naazneen Barma, Ely Ratner and Steven Weber make a compelling case for the emergence of a new type of world order—the 'world without the West'. The authors argue that while globalisation has increased connectivity between states, it has done so in an increasingly lopsided fashion. Western countries are now heavily integrated, but other countries, particularly developing authoritarian countries, are less so. These states are instead turning to each other to form trade, security and diplomatic links.

The US policy of fostering democracy and economic liberalism in countries seeking access to Western markets and political networks conflicts with many developing nations' preference for political and economic authoritarianism. Since these states cannot re-shape the Western order to their benefit through military means, they are developing an alternate system in which they can remain within their existing economic and political structures.

Barma, Ratner and Weber describe this alternative system as 'the world without the West'. It is a 'society' in which a strict, neo-Westphalian model of sovereignty is paramount, where governmental cooperation only covers trade—not values, norms or domestic governance. The authors cite the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, with its focus on trade and external security, as the most significant representation of this new 'world without the West'.

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**'Doing nothing—or pretending that there is nothing other than inevitable conflict or assimilation for which we need to prepare—is simply no longer a responsible foreign-policy agenda.'**

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The authors' unique examination of international political developments of the past decade places other events of interest to the senior officer into a different light. Seen through Barma, Ratner and Weber's lens, the oft-assumed notions surrounding globalisation suddenly appear more problematic and less 'securitising' than many in the West would believe.

*Naazneen Barma and Ely Ratner are PhD candidates at the University of California, Berkeley. Steven Weber is a Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of International Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.*

**Peter W. Galbraith, 'Iraq: The Way to Go',** *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. 54, No. 13, 16 August 2007, <<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/20470>>.

This article by Peter Galbraith highlights the problem of measuring success in Iraq by parliamentary progress. While the West may trumpet the occasional good news story about democracy in Iraq, the fact is that there is no real political representation that encompasses an 'Iraqi' ideal—the nation of Iraq has shattered into a collection of factions, each playing a zero-

sum game where their gains mean a loss for others. A common vision for Iraq does not yet exist, and every attempt by the United States to further the case of democratic reform in Iraq simply underlines this fact.

Galbraith has written a convincing summary of how the reception of the war's failure is affecting the US political scene. He concludes that the only viable option remaining for the United States is to save what can still be saved. Therefore, he recommends that the United States withdraw from the parts of Iraq where nothing can be achieved and to focus on Kurdistan, where it may still be able to further its interests.

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**'Iraq after an American defeat will look very much like Iraq today—a land divided along ethnic lines into Arab and Kurdish states with a civil war being fought within its Arab part.'**

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*Peter W. Galbraith, a former US Ambassador to Croatia, is Senior Diplomatic Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and a principal at the Windham Resources Group, a firm that negotiates on behalf of its clients in post-conflict societies, including Iraq. His book, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End came out in paperback this year.*

**Buddhika Jayamaha, Wesley D. Smith, Jeremy Roebuck, Omar Mora, Edward Sandmeier, Yance T. Gray and Jeremy A. Murphy, 'The War as We Saw It', *The New York Times*, 19 August 2007, <[http://www.truthout.org/docs\\_2006/081907A.shtml](http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/081907A.shtml)>.**

*As befitting its mandate, material from newspapers is rarely included in the SOPD. However, this op-ed piece represents the uncensored views of some US non-commissioned officers who are fighting in Iraq, giving senior officers and policy-makers a valuable insight into the views and opinions of key personnel.*

The soldiers who penned this article represent the foundations of any modern professional army—its non-commissioned officers (NCOs). Their views, therefore, are crucial for the senior officer, as they directly influence the level of dedication and drive that 'diggers' exhibit in the field. The specialist, sergeants and staff sergeants who wrote this piece admit that they have little to draw on in the War in Iraq with which to effect such motivation.

The authors argue that the Iraqi Army has failed to live up to expectations—its battalion commanders have little to no authority over their troops, who are loyal only to their factions. These troops cooperate daily with insurgents and militias to plant IEDs and hamper Coalition efforts to foster peace and security. The NCOs further contend that the Coalition has failed in its attempt to provide security and basic services to the Iraqi populace. They rightly characterise these goals as the conflict's most critical, but conclude that the objective is far from being achieved.

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**'As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division ... we are sceptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting ... unrest we see every day.'**

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The soldiers object to the US Government's attempts to impose political goals and deadlines on the Iraqi people and Government, insisting that the Shiite majority will not yield any of its newly gained power. The best that can be hoped for, these soldiers maintain, is that the Shia peacefully consolidate their hold over Iraq, yet they fear that a Sunni genocide is more likely.

In closing, the NCOs maintain that the morale of their squads and sections is high, and that they will, like any professional soldier, see the mission through. However, they offer these insights 'from the front lines' in order to change some elements of Coalition strategy so that they may better meet objectives.

*Specialist Buddhika Jayamaha, Sergeants Wesley D. Smith, Jeremy Roebuck, Omar Mora, Edward Sandmeier, and Staff Sergeants Yance T. Gray and Jeremy A. Murphy all serve with 82 Airborne Division, US Army.*

**Matthew Brummer, 'The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and Iran: A Power-Full Union', *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 2, Spring/Summer 2007, pp. 185–98.**

Tehran's influence in the Middle East is already high, but Matthew Brummer argues that it will rise further if Iran joins the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, or SCO.

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**'As ... Iran's bid for membership in the organization advances, the SCO is poised to emerge as an intergovernmental coalition to rival all others. Regional expert Professor David Wall puts it quite succinctly: "It would essentially be an OPEC with [nuclear] bombs."'**

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Iran has large reserves of both oil and natural gas, which it uses to both generate much needed wealth for its ambitious nuclear and military programs, and to wield influence over countries that seek to oppose its policies. However, its ability to act is constrained by the tough sanctions imposed by the United States and other concerned members of the international community. Brummer maintains that this 'containment' would fail if Iran joins Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in the SCO.

Expansion of the SCO to the Persian Gulf would be a disaster for Western countries. With Iran, the SCO would control 50 per cent of world proven gas reserves and 18 per cent of world proven oil reserves. Brummer explains how coordinated energy policies between Russia, China and Iran would result in significantly unfavourable outcomes for Australia, the United States and Europe.

This potential threat to energy resources demonstrates the wisdom of recent US Government measures to reduce its armed forces' reliance on imported oil and petroleum products. While Australia is one of the few OECD countries that maintains a net energy export profile, this is mainly due to exports of coal and natural gas and Australia faces a growing reliance on petroleum imports. Brummer's article outlines the difficulties in energy supply that would arise for Western nations should Iran enter the SCO. If a Coalition failure in Iraq resulted in the delivery of that nation—and its substantial oil reserves—into Iranian influence, the situation would be much worse than what even Brummer posits. Understanding how Iran's membership

would integrate Middle Eastern energy into Chinese and Russian foreign policy agendas is thus a critical issue for Australian strategists.

*Matthew Brummer won the 2007 Andrew Wellington Cordier Essay prize for this article. The prize is awarded by the School of International Affairs, Columbia University.*

**Holly Yeager, 'Soldiering Ahead', *The Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 31, Iss. 3, Summer 2007, pp. 54–62,**

**[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=wq.essay&essay\\_id=261679](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=wq.essay&essay_id=261679)**>.

In this article Holly Yeager points out that while the past thirty years has seen a rise in the number of women in leadership roles in the US military, it is unclear if this development occurred because of, or despite, an increase in female participation. While it is often stated that the military implemented a 'softening' of many techniques and methods, the author contends

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**'An increase in their combat role would improve women's opportunities at the top of the command structure, where their numbers are small today in part because of their lack of combat experience.'**

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that these could simply be a result of changes in society, technology, and the attitudes of senior leaders. More succinctly—correlation is not causation. While champions of female inclusion may be tempted to anticipate further improvements in female status in the military, the findings of this article suggest that a more realistic deduction would be that the presence of women in military leadership positions results in little difference.

The Iraq War has underlined the fact that women now serve, and die violently, in tasks that require involvement in combat operations. But the psychological hurdle of accepting women in close combat roles is one that both US and Australian defence organisations, Governments and societies are yet to overcome. As the female casualty list continues to rise, the justification for a separation of roles lessens. As Yeager's article shows, the distinction is mainly one of the military's own making.

*Holly Yeager, a Washington journalist, was until recently the US politics correspondent for The Financial Times. She previously covered the Pentagon for the Hearst newspaper group and Defense Daily and now writes frequently about women's issues.*

**Calvert Jones, 'Intelligence Reform: The Logic of Information Sharing', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 22, No. 3, June 2007, pp. 384–401.**

Calvert Jones' article addresses the business of state intelligence bodies and has particular relevance to the Australian Army and its future operational concept, Network-centric warfare (NCW).

Jones presents what is essentially a critique of the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States—the '9/11 Commission Report'. She specifically takes exception to the Commission's recommendation that greater intelligence-sharing should take

place in the future, and she disputes its claims that such sharing will result in improved intelligence outcomes.

The author demonstrates that almost the entirety of the Commission's recommendations for increased intelligence sharing promotes the uniformity, volume and flow of information over quality, tradecraft and context. She insists that these factors will lead to 'information overload' for analysts, poor security outcomes, and a severely reduced ability to determine intelligence quality and accuracy through the loss of source material context.

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**'[P]roblematic assumptions about 'information' and the advantages of its free flow through network infrastructures ... are not ... developed.'**

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Jones maintains that a better quality of analysis will produce more comprehensive intelligence products. She argues that this can be achieved through constant cross-postings of analysts between different intelligence bodies to ensure their exposure to different analytical techniques, different expertise and different agendas. To

illustrate her point, Jones recalls that the only two intelligence analysts who sounded any significant warning about the 11 September plot were themselves cross-posted. A CIA agent working in the FBI received critical information and, realising its potential significance, handed it off to an FBI agent seconded to the CIA.

The implications for Network-centric warfighting are clear. Jones points out the folly of simply increasing the volume of information to individuals. If NCW is to deliver on the promises of its advocates, the information flowing through the network must be filtered through strict quality assurance mechanisms, and backed up by solid analysis.

*Calvert Jones is a Gates Scholar in International Relations at the University of Cambridge. She has conducted research at the Markle Foundation on American intelligence reorganization and with faculty at Stanford University's Hoover Institution on international cooperation against transnational threats.*

### **Elena Pavlova, 'From a Counter-Society to a Counter-State Movement: Jemaah Islamiyah according to PUPJI', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 30, Iss. 9, pp. 777–800.**

Elena Pavlova provides an insightful analysis of the central document of *Jemaah Islamiyah* (JI)—*Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyah*, or The General Guide for the Struggle of *Jamaah Islamiyah* (PUPJI).

The PUPJI is quite brief, spanning only forty-four pages. Pavlova contends that it was written by a committee of religious scholars and intended only for JI's senior leadership cadre. Within it, she identifies four distinct sections: The Principles for the Methodology to Establish the Religion, the Methodology to Establish the Religion, the Methodology for Operations and *Jemaah Islamiyah's* constitution.

PUPJI's first section outlines the religious underpinnings of JI, and how it validates the movement's actions and goals. Pavlova identifies many citations from the Koran, as well as references to other religious texts to illustrate the Islamic context within which JI's goals fit.

The second section identifies the broad path JI must follow to achieve its ultimate goal of a global Islamic Caliphate. PUPJI advocates the establishment of a base-area whose resources JI will use to develop its military strength. JI's strategy displays clear links to Maoist principles of insurgency.

While the first and second sections of PUPJI are of interest to anyone studying the motivations of JI, for the senior officer, it is sections three and four that will be the most important. Section three details how JI is to conduct its military operations. In addition to a holistic focus on the raising, training and sustaining of forces, JI's leaders also emphasise command, control and communications, as well as thorough leadership and oversight at all levels. This information, provided within the context of JI's motivations, is invaluable for those currently engaged in the Global War on Terror. The constitution of JI, which forms the fourth section of PUPJI, outlines the group's administrative arrangements, hierarchy and organisation.

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**'PUPJI is the normative template from which the institutional entity of Jemaah Islamiyah emerges and subsequently develops.'**

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Parallel to Pavlova's analysis of each of these four sections, she examines an apparent contradiction—JI's premature launch of violent operations. PUPJI explicitly calls for a secure base-area before operations are to be conducted. At the time the Bali bombings occurred in October 2002, JI had no such sanctuary. Pavlova believes that this early attack was a result of an internal split within JI, between those who are influenced by al-Qaeda and those with a more regional focus. Osama bin Laden's call for 'global jihad' may have been answered by JI, but Pavlova insists that the response from within *Jemaah Islamiyah* is by no means consistent.

*Elena Pavlova is an Associate Research Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.*

**Ashley Tellis, 'China's Military Space Strategy', *Survival*, Vol. 49, Iss. 3, Autumn 2007, pp. 41–72, <[http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/tellis\\_china\\_space1.pdf](http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/tellis_china_space1.pdf)>.**

Space is the 'ultimate high ground' in modern, high-intensity conventional wars. Therefore, understanding China's emergent space strategy is crucial for Australia's security. Ashley Tellis' article provides a detailed overview of this strategy, its foundations, the technology with which China hopes to achieve it, and the implications for other countries.

Tellis first addresses the claim that it was only rogue elements in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) that were pursuing space warfare capabilities. He dismisses this suggestion, insisting that, if Western sources knew of anti-satellite (ASAT) tests prior to January, then the Chinese leadership certainly knew of them. Accordingly, Tellis concludes that the ASAT test was part of a broader Chinese program of space warfare testing.

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**'China's recent anti-satellite test is ... an exemplar of a wide-ranging endeavour to develop multiple warfighting instruments to constrain America's ability to ... produce a rapid and decisive ... military victory over China.'**

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The PLA's space strategy is aimed at controlling the maritime area surrounding China in order to prevent standoff attacks by the United States should war break out. The United States relies

heavily upon space technologies to guide, command and coordinate its strike assets. China's leaders realise, Tellis argues, that the satellite constellations that the United States currently operates are highly vulnerable to attack, and their loss would cripple US combat capabilities. Accordingly, the United States should focus on 'hardening' their existing space capabilities, and ensure that future constellations are more numerous and diverse, with multiple redundancies built into their networks to ensure at least vital communications survive attacks.

While the ADF is relatively powerless to counter any of these threats, Australia also relies heavily on US satellite communications and other space capabilities for much of its defence and other government activities. Accordingly, Tellis' article is of critical importance for the ADF to consider in any future conflict. So long as Australia depends upon US systems, the Commonwealth cannot alleviate this threat by itself. For the Australian officer, little can be done except to be aware of the threat, and this article serves this purpose admirably.

*Ashley Tellis is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. He is co-author of Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future, and co-editor of Strategic Asia 2006–07: Trade, Interdependence, and Security.*

**Jonathan Bailey, 'Artillery in Decline? The Future of Field Artillery', *The Journal of the Royal Artillery*, Vol. CXXXIV, Iss. 1, Spring 2007, pp. 18–20.**

Major General Jonathan Bailey of the British Army stoutly defends the role of the artillery in his brief yet forceful article. He explores the future role of the guns by first placing their current dilemma—perceived irrelevance—in historical context.

He argues that nineteenth-century advances in small-arms technology forced the artillery from the battlefield. Yet as artillery range increased, its fire became so inaccurate as to be irrelevant. During the First World War advances in scientific gunnery restored artillery's utility, and by 1918 indirect fire had reached a high degree of sophistication. Over the second half of the twentieth century the pendulum swung against the gunners again, and the familiar problem of range versus accuracy arose once more.

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**'[Artillery systems] of the British 1st Armoured Division were seen to be battle-winners.'**

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Bailey, however, is an optimist. He believes that new artillery precision-guidance technologies will overcome the problem of range and accuracy and usher in a renaissance in gunnery. He insists that emerging technologies will open up new horizons for the artillery. For example, the vastly increased range

and precision of artillery will allow it to act, in effect, as precision support for ground forces, relieving air forces of that expensive burden. Artillery, Bailey anticipates, will soon be able to execute effects in three dimensions, giving gunners the ability to strike at helicopters and UAVs. As Australia's artillery replacement nears, this is an article that all officers would do well to read, given the doctrinal and operational implications for the Army and ADF.

*Major General (ret'd) Jonathan Bailey served as Director Royal Artillery of the British Army until 2003. He was then made Director General of Doctrine and Training, before he retired from the British Army in 2005. He is*

currently the Director of the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies in the United Kingdom. His latest book is *Great Power Strategy in Asia: Empire Culture and Trade 1905–2005*.

**Jim Lacey and Kevin Woods, 'Adapt or Die', *Proceedings*, Vol. 133, Iss. 8, 2007, pp. 16–21.**

In this article, Jim Lacey and Kevin Woods question the adaptability of the US military. They present an alternative view of current perceptions of adaptability, and suggest how the United States and other Western military forces can field a truly adaptable military force.

Lacey and Woods assert that military organisations are similar to organic entities: they must change to suit their environment. The author's goal is to remind defence thinkers that in the long term it is not the strongest who will survive, but the most adaptable.

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**'While Counterinsurgency (COIN) is all the rage today ... there is virtually no chance that COIN 2007 will be appropriate for the challenges of 2020.'**

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The authors maintain that simply implementing a new doctrine will not make the military more adaptable. Rather, the US Department of Defense must recognise the need to institutionalise adaptability, otherwise a problem may be unsolvable when the 'crunch' comes. Moreover, the utility of whole-of-government approaches to warfighting

mandates that all agencies also need to undergo the transformation process. Yet Lacey and Woods are cognisant of the risks. They recognise that the culture of rapid adaptability that they advocate must not blindly assume that every modification is correct—practitioners must be able to identify those adaptations which are useful and those which are not.

Lacey and Woods primary conclusion is that, in order for Western military organisations to have a rapidly adaptable force, they must reduce their cycle of adjustment. They assert that by shortening the cycle, defence and other government agencies will evolve at a rate that is comparable to the pace of technological change. This article provides a unique contribution to the defence debate and should be read by anyone wishing to understand the dynamics and pressures that force military organisations to change.

*Jim Lacey currently works as a defence analyst. Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Woods (ret'd) is a defence analyst and writer in Washington, DC.*

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**FROM THE VAULT**

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*This month the LWSC recommends:*

**Kurt Dittmar, 'Mass, Quantity and Quality', *Australian Army Journal*, No. 36, May 1952, pp. 12–14.**

Lieutenant General Kurt Dittmar of the *Bundeswehr* writes of the interplay in armed forces between quantity and quality. His insights into the matter are drawn from his experience as a Corps Commander in the *Wehrmacht*, fighting Soviet forces during the Second World War.

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**‘Today, especially, the tendency, so desirable and so necessary, towards the achievement of the highest possible technical development and equipment can all too easily be advocated ... at the expense of a sufficiently broad manpower [sic] basis.’**

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Dittmar observed that those who would favour either mass or quality above the other missed the lesson that the Second World War gave us—that both are crucial. Dittmar argued that a qualitatively superior army will be worn down by a mass that is too numerically superior, while a numerically superior army can always be outmanoeuvred by another of greater professionalism. The Eastern Front of the Second World War is a particularly telling example of both of these points.

The author argued that armies must strive to develop a ‘happy medium’ between mass and quantity. Dittmar warned Western military organisations specifically against their natural desire to move entirely in the direction of qualitative superiority, since pursuing perfection at the expense of mass ensured that the army’s human resource base would shrink to the point where it was incapable of providing a sufficient leadership pool.

Today’s operational environments often call for more ‘people skills’ from ADF personnel than skill at arms. Dittmar insists that human factors must not be ignored in the pursuit of technical perfection. Therefore, as the ‘network centric’ and ‘knowledge intensive’ ADF of tomorrow is formed, and such technical skills become even more central to the everyday business of the ADF, Dittmar’s timeless argument about the ‘quality of quantity’ and the importance of people must not be forgotten.

*Lieutenant General Kurt Dittmar was commander of engineers during the German First Army’s attack on the Maginot Line in 1940. He went on to command the 169 Infantry Division in an unsuccessful attack on Soviet Union through Finland in 1941. Invalided due to illness he spent the rest of the war as the official radio commentator for the German High Command. He surrendered to US troops in April 1945, was released in May 1948, and took up the rank of Lieutenant General in the new Bundeswehr, during which time he wrote this article.*

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## UPCOMING CONFERENCE

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### *Chief of Army’s Military History Conference 2007*

The Chief of Army and the Australian Army History Unit will host the 2007 Chief of Army’s Military History Conference 2007 at the National Convention Centre in Canberra on November 1 and 2.

The conference topic this year is ‘1917: Tactics, Training and Technology’, and will offer a range of speakers from the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, the United States and Australia. The presenters will address a wide variety of topics that provide a holistic picture of tactics, training and technology in 1917, focusing not only on the Western Allies, but the German Army as well. Many of the basic tactics that the Australian Army utilises today were originally developed during the First World War, and this conference gives attendees the opportunity to understand the historical context in which they were formulated.

For information on the conference, and a detailed program, visit the ‘Army History Events’ page of the Army History Unit’s website: <http://www.defence.gov.au/Army/AHU/EVENTS/events-index.htm>