

S O P D



Senior Officer Professional Digest

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MESSAGE FROM THE EDITORS

This month the Editors of the *Senior Officer Professional Digest* recommend ten articles drawn from professional and academic journals on the subjects of China, Pakistan, nation-building, medicine, civilian contractors, non-lethal weapons, 'influence psychology', the 'surge' and terrorism alerts.

China has long pursued an aircraft carrier fleet, but Andrew Erickson and Andrew Wilson argue that China is far from achieving a useful capability in this regard. In her article, June Teufel Dreyer outlines how China's economy is the real focus of Chinese strategy—not aircraft carriers. In contrast to China's booming economy, Feisal Khan writes of Pakistan's economic failure, and the influence of corruption on its downward spiral.

Morton Abramowitz and Heather Hurlburt provide the first of a series of articles in this month's SOPD on reconstruction efforts with their piece that questions if nation-building is really achievable. Rebuilding a nation's medical system is one crucial part of this agenda, and Jay B. Baker argues that military medical teams are counterproductive in this effort. Marc Lindemann, Chris Mayer and David P. Coughran Jr. write about civilian battlefield contractors, non-lethal weapons and influence psychology respectively, each closely examining these individual details of any post-conflict reconstruction effort.

Finally, Ralph Peters presents his analysis of the recent US surge in Iraq, commenting on many of the elements of reconstruction that the previous authors have examined, while Jacob N. Shapiro and Dara Kay Cohen present an article of interest to policymakers, examining the failure of the US Homeland Security Advisory System, and how such failures might be avoided in the future.

Enjoy
The Editors

Andrew S. Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson, 'China's Aircraft Carrier Dilemma', *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 59, No. 4, Autumn 2006, pp. 13–45.

Andrew S. Erickson and Andrew R. Wilson of the US Naval War College present a detailed and thorough examination of what 'China watchers' have agreed is the single biggest strategic decision facing the People's Liberation Army-Navy, or PLAN—the choice between a navy based on submarines or aircraft carriers.

'[D]ismissing China's carrier aspirations could be myopic, given its rapid development of all other major aspects of its navy over the past few years. Submarines currently dominate China's naval development, but they might not do so indefinitely.'

Erickson and Wilson conclude—rather surprisingly—that China faces no such choice. Essentially, the authors believe that China has not yet reached the decision point. At this time, the PLAN is simply too small and too primitive to seriously contemplate either path. Erickson and Wilson go on to say that, even if China decided today to build a fleet based on aircraft carriers, it would not have a useful capability for at least a decade or even longer.

The Australian Defence Force will soon replace many of the critical platforms in its arsenal, such as the F/A-18 Hornet and the *Adelaide*-class frigates. Other platforms also require modernisation or replacement in the foreseeable future. In the seamless joint force that the ADF hopes to become, these new platforms will have effects well beyond the service to which they belong. Accordingly, it is important that all Australian officers are aware of equivalent major strategic developments in the region—no matter the environment in which they occur—and how they may affect ADF options in the event of conflict. China's development of naval aviation is one such critical strategic event. Erickson and Wilson's treatment of the subject is excellent, and is easily accessible to a non-specialist audience.

Andrew S. Erickson is an Assistant Professor at the US Naval War College's Strategic Research Department. Andrew R. Wilson is a Professor at the US Naval War College. Both scholars have published works widely on China's military and the Chinese Navy.

June Teufel Dreyer, 'China's Power and Will: The PRC's Military Strength and Grand Strategy', *Orbis*, Vol. 51, Iss. 4, Fall 2007, pp. 651–64.

It was Cicero who said that 'Endless money forms the sinews of war', and June Teufel Dreyer's article shows that there is still truth in this statement today.

Dreyer demonstrates that, while expenditure and capabilities are rising dramatically, the main focus of China's grand strategy is on generating the economic strength to establish and sustain its military presence in Asia. To this end, China has embarked on a global pursuit of raw materials

and markets. It has utilised its unique position as a non-Western power to integrate economically with countries reluctant to embrace Western democratic values. Dreyer deftly outlines the tensions inherent to this approach, showing how Chinese self-interest often clashes with the necessities of keeping its clients in the post-colonial world contented.

Australia, like China, is in a unique regional economic and strategic position. While Australia is a close ally of the United States, it is also a friend and economic partner of China. China provides a ready market for Australia's exports, and China in turn exports many products to Australia. If the regional security situation deteriorated to the point where hostility between China and the United States became possible, Australia would face a difficult economic and strategic choice. Faced with this unpalatable prospect, ADF officers and policymakers should keep abreast of the motivating factors behind China's economic development and its strategic policies. Dreyer's article provides this necessary insight into these aspects of China's grand strategy.

June Teufel Dreyer is Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami (Florida). She has written numerous journal articles about Chinese military and foreign policy. Her latest book is China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition.

Feisal Khan, 'Corruption and the Decline of the State in Pakistan', *Asian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 15, No. 2, August 2007, pp. 219–47.

This timely article discusses the factors behind the disintegration of state control in Pakistan. Khan argues that many commentators have identified the wrong factor when they blame Islamic militancy for the failure of the state in Pakistan; rather, Islamic militancy is a result of state failure and systemic corruption. Khan makes a strong argument that rampant corruption, evident in Pakistan since its independence in 1947, has resulted in an inability of the state to provide services to its population across a broad range of sectors—public services, finances, security and judiciary. This has resulted in a dysfunctional state that has not only created a low quality of life for most of its citizens, but also given Islamist parties an opportunity to advance themselves as a viable alternative.

This article's value, however, is not only as an explanation of the cause of the collapse of the state in Pakistan. The factors outlined by Khan also apply to many countries in our immediate region, and the outcomes he describes—non-functioning states with dissatisfied populations who turn to non-state actors for services and control—could easily become a problem on Australia's doorstep.

'We cannot be sure whether to take Beijing's words about its peaceful intentions at face value, or whether to interpret its actions as indicative of a coordinated military and economic strategy for world domination.'

'It is not that the Islamist forces are too strong to be countered by the state but that the Pakistani state, its strength sapped by decades of systemic corruption, is too weak and apathetic to counter them.'

It is in the interest of Australia's policymakers and security community to learn from the mistakes of Pakistan and take seriously the threat of systemic corruption.

Feisal Khan is Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, New York.

Morton Abramowitz & Heather Hurlburt, 'Appetite for Construction', *The National Interest*, September/October 2007, pp. 27–32,

<<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ietcop/documents/TNI%20-%20Appetite%20for%20Construction%20SEP%20OCT%2007.pdf>>.

With this article, Morton Abramowitz and Heather Hurlburt question an assumption underlying much US strategic decision-making: that 'nation-building' is a task for Western powers in this modern age. They claim that such assumptions are usually mistaken, and many attempts fail due to approaching a long-term ideal with short-term fixes. The authors also suggest it is a lack of understanding of the target societies that leads to many of the failures of nation-building projects. While Iraq and Afghanistan are the latest examples of how nation-building can end up with less than desired results, the article points out that Western efforts in Timor-Leste and the former Yugoslavia have also not been fully successful—factors in these cases include short-sightedness and a lack of cultural understanding.

'Nation-building is not for wimps. It's time we ask ourselves whether it is for modern democracies.'

Military organisations around the world are coming to understand the importance of culture when waging war and building peace. While written from a US perspective, this article has much of value for Australian strategists and planners. Combined with the authors' call to involve more international

organisations in these activities, such as the United Nations, this article is an interesting critique of a phenomenon that is unlikely to go away in a globalised post-Cold War world.

Morton Abramowitz is a senior fellow at The Century Foundation and former President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Heather Hurlburt is the senior advisor to the New American Foundation's US in the World project.

Jay B. Baker, 'Medical Diplomacy in Full-Spectrum Operations', *Military Review*, Vol. 87, Iss. 5, September/October 2007, pp. 67–73,

<<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview/English/SepOct07/bakerengseptoct07.pdf>>.

Western medicine has now reached heights of sophistication and effectiveness that would have amazed citizens of the First World even fifty years ago. It is not surprising, therefore, that many Iraqis and Afghans prefer to make use of military and non-government organisation-provided medical

'[T]ailgate medicine ... is not an effective tool for commanders conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.'

care, rather than seek the services of indigenous medical institutions. While quality medical services would at first examination appear to be a powerful counterinsurgency instrument that is ideal for winning 'hearts and minds', Jay B. Baker conclusively argues that it is not.

Baker shows how, even as far back as the Vietnam War, 'medical diplomacy' actually proved counterproductive in the long run. This is primarily because it undermines the local population's confidence in their own government and the medical care that it provides. With his simple yet powerful argument against medical diplomacy, Baker does not discount the efforts of military doctors and aid agencies altogether. Rather, he outlines alternative ways in which they can be better put to use.

These ideas are of particular import to every current Australian military commitment. Baker shows how this vital humanitarian necessity can, with some imagination, actually be transformed into a sophisticated and effective adjunct to counterinsurgency efforts.

Major Jay B. Baker of the US Army served as Regimental Surgeon with the 3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment during its deployment to Tal Afar, Iraq, between 2004 and 2006.

Marc Lindemann, 'Civilian Contractors under Military Law', *Parameters*, Vol. XXXVII, No. 3, Autumn 2007, pp. 83–94,
<<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/07autumn/lindeman.pdf>>.

As military equipment becomes more and more complex and expensive, simple budgetary logic dictates that either fewer systems can be purchased or that some capabilities must be dispensed with. In many Western military organisations, logistics and support capabilities have been 'downsized' and outsourced as senior commanders strive to maintain front-line forces at appropriate levels.

Marc Lindemann's article examines the legal implications of civilian contractors on the battlefield. It is extremely topical with several recent high-profile cases of contractor-committed battlefield crimes sparking intense debate in the United States. The problem of contractor accountability stems from the legal 'limbo' in which they currently reside, with no legal system clearly applicable. Lindemann examines how recent efforts of the US Congress may once again place contractors under military law.

The Australian Government's involvement with private contractors is small compared to the massive and comprehensive contracts entered into by the United States and United Kingdom, yet it is nonetheless a crucial topic for ADF officers and defence civilians. As Australia seeks greater interoperability with US forces, it is likely that an increasing amount of its combat service support will come from contractors. This will mean greater battlefield interaction with US-controlled contractors. Understanding the unique legal and jurisdictional environment in which these US contractors operate will greatly assist the ADF. Lindemann's article provides valuable direction on where contractor integration and management currently stands, and where it may lead in the future.

Captain Marc Lindemann of the US Army served as a Personal Security Platoon Commander in Iraq in 2005–06. Prior to entering the US Army, he worked as an attorney in New York City. He currently serves in the 1st Battalion, 258th Field Artillery of the New York Army National Guard.

Chris Mayer, 'Nonlethal Weapons and Noncombatant Immunity: Is it Permissible to Target Noncombatants?', *Journal of Military Ethics*, Vol. 6, Iss. 3, pp. 221–31.

Non-lethal weapons seemingly offer the promise of more effective action against guerrillas, insurgents and terrorists who deliberately shield themselves from lethal attack by hiding among innocent civilians. However, as Chris Mayer writes, these weapons may face tough legal challenges to their use.

Mayer argues that the principle of non-combatant immunity means that non-combatants may not be deliberately targeted by any weapons—even those that are non-lethal. Accordingly, non-lethal weapons that indiscriminately target both non-combatants and combatants are illegal under the principle of non-combatant immunity. This remains the case even if such non-lethal weapons might end up saving more civilian lives than would otherwise have been the case had lethal weapons been used.

The argument sounds counterintuitive, but Mayer convincingly demonstrates how it fits within the existing legal principles of war. For Australian officers who may have reason to use non-lethal weapons, this article highlights several flaws in the general reasoning that surrounds this capability. With the critical importance of legality in maintaining public support for operations, this article is essential reading for officers and policymakers alike.

'With the increased availability of (non-lethal weapons) on the battlefield, it will be tempting to use them against noncombatants to secure military objectives and in situations where the use of military force has previously been prohibited.'

Major Chris Mayer is currently serving as a Force Development Officer for the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq.

David P. Coughran Jr., 'SF and the Art of Influence', *Special Warfare*, Vol. 20, Iss. 5, September/October 2007, pp. 15–19.

David Coughran's article on 'the art of influence' is of considerable value to senior officers as a training aid that they may wish to share with the junior leaders under their command.

'No military operation ... is performed without some level of planning. Why should interactions with people encountered during a mission be any different?'

It is commonly said that counterinsurgency is 'graduate level warfare', and that the degree of complexity to which it can subject soldiers is daunting. However, put simply, counterinsurgency can be said to be a campaign for the support of the people. A critical weapon in this battle is the ability to gain influence over key individuals and groups in the contested battlespace. Such tactics are a skill

often left to specialist soldiers, such as 'Psyops' personnel. However, in the 'three block' wars being fought today, 'strategic corporals' may be called upon, with little warning, to influence

critical members of the contested populace. In these situations, it may be difficult or impossible to deploy or consult such specialists. The success of the mission may depend upon a junior leader's ability to achieve the necessary influence immediately.

With the current high operational tempo, precious training time is focused on more concrete outcomes, for example close combat proficiency. However, this article—which is brief, easy to read and moves straight to the point—provides useful material for commanders to disseminate to their junior leaders. For a small investment, Coughran's article offers junior leaders a disproportionate payoff that could be of benefit if they find themselves in a tense situation and are without higher command or specialist guidance. In this circumstance, junior leaders must act on their own initiative, and this article may help to better inform their judgment.

Captain David P. Coughran Jr. graduated from the US Military Academy in 2002 and was commissioned as an Engineer Officer. He served in Iraq with 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division and is now a student in the US Special Forces Qualification Course.

Ralph Peters, 'Assessing the Surge', *Armed Forces Journal*, October 2007, <<http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/10/3026423/>>.

The war in Iraq has been characterised thus far by the Coalition's attempts to come to grips with the insurgency by denying them their base of support—the population. Improvements in communications and cultural awareness amongst Coalition forces have opened new avenues of interaction with the Iraqi people, and Ralph Peters writes about one exemplary incidence of this—the unlikely truce struck by Coalition forces and Sunni-Arabs in Anbar province.

'U.S. commanders with whom I spoke in Anbar province last August were worried—worried that their Marines would get bored in the absence of combat action.'

Such is the efficacy of this new relationship between Sunni-Arabs and Coalition forces that, according to Peters, US Marine commanders have begun to worry that their troops will become bored from lack of combat. In this article, Peters examines how this 'flip' was essentially brought about by savvy Coalition commanders who were able to exploit the information operations (IO) value of the recent US

surge in Baghdad. He then assesses the potential longevity of this alliance of convenience, and how the factors that underpinned it may be utilised to bring about additional successes.

Peters, however, is an experienced soldier with great practical experience and time as an observer 'at the front' in the War on Terror. His conclusions and analysis are highly pragmatic. The clear focus Peters brings as an independent, but not unbiased, observer of current events in Iraq means that this article offers interesting and unique insights for senior Australian officers and policymakers. This article's greatest value, however, lies in the fact that it represents a middle ground in the current debate that is underway in US political, academic and military circles on the value of the surge.

Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Peters (retired), left the US Army in 1998, his last appointment being in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

Jacob N. Shapiro and Dara Kay Cohen, 'Color Bind: Lessons from the Failed Homeland Security Advisory System', *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 2, Fall 2007, pp. 121–54, <<http://www.stanford.edu/~dkcohen/Color%20Bind%20Shapiro-Cohen.pdf>>.

From its instigation in 2002, the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) has failed to live up to the purpose envisaged for it by the US Government. According to this article's authors, Jacob N. Shapiro and Dara Kay Cohen, the HSAS should be able to 'motivate actors to take costly protective measures'. Rather than achieving this goal, the system has remained ineffective, to the point of sliding beyond obsolescence into comedy. Citizens, the media and opposition politicians have come to see terror alerts as politically motivated rather than a genuine indicator of threat.

'The HSAS does not provide enough information for the actors involved and contained no mechanisms to generate confidence in the system over time. Consequently, it came to be deeply mistrusted.'

Shapiro and Cohen analyse why the HSAS was doomed to failure, as well as providing an explanation of the logic and purposes of terror alerts. The authors also give brief summaries of the warning systems of other countries, including Australia. While much of the writing is dry and academic, it is a good attempt at trying to quantify and explain why something that appears so simple—alerting the populace about a threat to their

wellbeing—is actually quite complicated, and hence can easily be misconstrued or manipulated. The most helpful part of the article for policymakers will be the section that discusses alternatives to the HSAS. The measures outlined for use in the United States would be applicable to Australia, as they would be an improvement on the current situation, which the authors acknowledge is 'contributing more to public anxiety than to counterterrorism'.

Jacob N. Shapiro is a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University. Dara Kay Cohn is a PhD candidate in political science at Stanford University.

FROM THE VAULT

This month the LWSC recommends:

R. S. N. Mans, 'The New Conflict', *Australian Army Journal*, No. 238, March 1969, pp. 35–42.

Mans' article is remarkably prescient. Within, he predicted that in the decades that followed the Second World War, the nations of the world would eschew similarly open and cataclysmic struggles in favour of indirect, psychological conflict. Mans predicted that terrorism, insurgency and the surreptitious support of such activities by states would be the hallmarks of future conflicts, while conventional battles would largely disappear under the shadow of nuclear war.

**'For both sides the prize is the same —
the mind of a human being.'**

While Mans' points regarding the irrelevance of conventional war were *de rigueur* for the time, what was to replace it was still an issue of some contention. The author's prediction that a global struggle for 'hearts and minds' would emerge as the dominant

form of conflict shows that Mans was clearly cognisant of the human-centric nature of war.

Operational experience in Somalia, Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands, Afghanistan and Iraq, shows that humans, and not weapons, remain at the heart of conflict—as its source, its agent, and its objective. Mans' article has been written along an axis emanating straight from this realisation, and it is accordingly excellent. The time spent reading this article will be a superb investment for any officer.

Colonel R. S. N. Mans served on the staff of Far East Forces, Singapore in 1966–67. He retired from the British Army with the rank of Major General, and died in 2002.

NEW PUBLICATIONS


Chief of Army's Reading List

The Land Warfare Studies Centre is pleased to announce the release of the *Chief of Army's Reading List*.

The Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Peter Leahy, launched the reading list at the annual Chief of Army's Military History Conference on November 1 2007.

As the Chief of Army has written, reading is a critical part of any soldier's professional education and development. The *Chief of Army's Reading List* has been designed to present a selection of the best texts available, so that soldiers and officers alike can quickly and easily identify the most pertinent reading material available for their personal studies.

The recommendations contained within this list are arranged by appropriate rank for ease of reference. However, the list has also been shaped in a linear fashion. Accordingly, all ranks should strive to read the works recommended for those junior to them to provide a solid basis of knowledge on which they can build a greater understanding of the more advanced texts listed.



The *Chief of Army's Reading List* is available from the Land Warfare Studies Centre at http://www.defence.gov.au/Army/lwsc/Publications/SP/SP_313.pdf

Study Paper Series

The Land Warfare Studies Centre is also pleased to announce the release of the latest volume in its Study Paper Series: Major Gavin Keating's *A Tale of Three Battalions: Combat morale and battle fatigue in the 7th Australian Infantry Brigade, Bougainville, 1944–45*.

The Anzac tradition does not talk much about what happens when combat morale falters and battle fatigue undermines military effectiveness. Yet, despite the Australian Army's proud history, it has not been immune from such problems. Evidence of this is not, however, likely to be found in any official history or unit report. Fortunately, the 7th Australian Infantry Brigade's campaign on Bougainville, 1944–45, allows these issues to be studied in detail. The existence of candid personal diaries and memoirs from 7th Brigade offer a rare glimpse into the realities of life on combat operations.

This paper traces the fortunes of the brigade's battalions and assesses their relative war experience. In this tale of three battalions, the fate of each unit offers important insights into the nature of combat and the maintenance of morale and fighting effectiveness when soldiers are engaged in combat. It offers much that remains relevant for the Australian Army's current leaders today.

A Tale of Three Battalions: Combat morale and battle fatigue in the 7th Australian Infantry Brigade, Bougainville, 1944–45 is available from the LWSC at http://www.defence.gov.au/Army/lwsc/Publications/SP/SP_312.pdf

