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The **Senior Officer Professional Digest** is a publication of the Land Warfare Studies Centre. Feedback regarding this publication is welcome and should be addressed to the Director.



Land Warfare Studies Centre

Ian Campbell Road
Duntroon ACT 2600
Australia
+61 2 6265 9624

lwsc.publications@defence.gov.au

MESSAGE FROM THE EDITORS

This month the Editors of the *Senior Officer Professional Digest* recommend ten articles drawn from professional and academic journals on the subjects of counterinsurgency, Iraq, counterterrorism, Russia, the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' and undersea warfare.

This month, the recent successes in al-Anbar province, Iraq have been singled out for attention. Based on tribal alliances, the 'Anbar awakening' has transformed that region from one of Iraq's most violent to one of its more peaceful. Stephen Biddle examines the possibility of creating similar tribal agreements across Iraq as a prelude to reducing US troop numbers. Austin Long opposes such a plan, arguing that tribal alliances are detrimental to the stability of a central Iraqi Government.

Julian Lewis suggests another strategic path, insisting that negotiation should now be added to the familiar counterinsurgency (COIN) practices of identify, isolate and neutralise. While Lewis is sceptical of the use of airpower in COIN operations, James S Corum examines its application, concluding that while airpower cannot be dominant in COIN, it is not redundant either.

Linda J Bilmes examines the financial cost of the campaign underway in Iraq, while Daniel Byman's focus turns to possible future campaigns, defining the nature of a 'proto-insurgency' in an effort to help strategists recognise those groups on the cusp of transformation from terrorist to insurgent. Reul Marc Gerecht and Gary J Schmitt examine the counterterrorist practices of France, which they argue is one country that is already adept at identifying and destroying terrorists.

To conventional military matters, Zoltan Barany studies Russia in his article and concludes that it is strategically paralysed and incapable of effective military action. Dima P Adamsky harks back to the days when Russian military theory led the world, examining the Soviet 'Military-Technical Revolution'. Finally, Karl M Hasslinger reviews another arena in which the Soviet Union excelled—undersea warfare. His analysis, however, focuses not on the capabilities of state-based navies, but rather those of non-state entities.

Enjoy
The Editors

Stephen Biddle, 'Patient Stabilized? (Situation Critical)', *The National Interest*, Iss. 94, March/April 2008, pp. 35–42, <<http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=17326>>.

The 'Anbar awakening' of late 2007 is now seen as a model for future operations in Iraq. While Austin Long argues elsewhere in this edition of the *SOPD* that this model is counterproductive in the long-term, Stephen Biddle disagrees, arguing that tribal alliances offer the best opportunity for ultimate success in Iraq.

Biddle's enthusiasm for a tribal-alliance model stems from the belief that the next US administration is likely to pull significant numbers of troops out of Iraq. In this instance, a different model of operations to that in place today must be adopted. Biddle is under no illusion that monitoring hundreds of agreements with various tribal groupings will be easy, and advocates that the United States develop expertise on this problem. Nor does he believe that keeping the peace, once established, will be simple—Biddle points to opportunistic 'spoilers' and elements with nothing to lose, such as al-Qaeda, who will seek to overturn the delicate network of tribal agreements that he argues will bring security to most of Iraq.

'A stable Iraq would probably look more like Bosnia or Kosovo than Japan or Germany. This is because the likeliest route to stability in Iraq is not by winning hearts and minds or reaching a grand political bargain in Baghdad. It is by building on a rapidly expanding system of "bottom up" local cease-fires...'

The approach Biddle articulates, while risky, represents one of the better attempts to compensate for the likely reduction in US troop numbers. Critically, Biddle links this strategy to a further plan to draw other nations into peacekeeping roles once the advocated tribal agreements have generated basic security. As Biddle states, 'if two to three years of apparent stability make it clear that the Iraq mission really has become peacekeeping rather than war fighting, then it is entirely plausible that others may be willing to step in and lighten the American load'. By relieving the United States of the entire

peacekeeping burden, US forces could potentially stay longer, and the longer international forces remain to prevent 'spoiling' violence, the more chance there is that 'bottom-up' ceasefires can transform into lasting peace agreements.

Dr Stephen Biddle is a Senior Fellow of the Council for Foreign Relations.

Austin Long, 'The Anbar Awakening', *Survival*, Vol. 50, No. 2, April/May 2008, pp. 67–94.

The 'Anbar Awakening' is now widely viewed as a significant victory for Coalition forces in Iraq and as a model for future operations in that country. However, while such feats are rightly lauded as successes, Austin Long examines the longer-term ramifications of such tribal engagement.

Long first analyses Saddam Hussein's manipulation of tribal politics, showing how Saddam first actively sought to destroy tribal groupings prior to the Iran-Iraq War. However, as a result of that conflict, Saddam came to rely more and more on loyal tribes to secure his rear-areas, thus freeing up paramilitary forces for action at the front. Finally, Long details how Saddam came to entrust tribal leaders with greater security responsibilities until, just before the 2003 invasion, he had become almost entirely dependent on certain tribes for his regime's survival.

'In 2007, the United States military began... making Anbar the model for the provision of internal security... The tribal strategy is a means to achieve one strategic end, fighting al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, but is antithetical to another, the creation of a stable, unified and democratic Iraq.'

Long examines how Saddam's reliance on the manipulation of tribal politics in order to maintain security led to the weakening of the central Iraqi Government. Long concludes that, just as Saddam's experience demonstrates, Coalition efforts to promote short-term security through harnessing tribal politics will most likely undermine the central Iraqi Government that the Coalition is working to establish. Accordingly, Long's cautionary article is necessary reading for senior officers and strategists alike.

Austin Long is an Associate Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation.

Julian Lewis, 'Double-I, Double-N: A Framework for Counter-Insurgency', *RUSI Journal*, Vol. 153, No. 1, February 2008, pp. 36-40.

There have been many articles written about the war on terror, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, treating each as an isolated topic. Julian Lewis, the UK Shadow Defence Minister, takes a different tack in his article, treating them all as a whole.

'Our enemies are best described as 'un-Islamic extremists' – a description from which they cannot draw legitimacy, status or satisfaction.'

In response to Islamist terrorism, insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan and the threat of domestic terrorism throughout the West, Lewis advocates a simple strategy that he characterises as 'Double-I, Double-N', or Identify, Isolate, Neutralise and Negotiate. While Australian officers will be thoroughly familiar with the tasks of identifying,

isolating and neutralising terrorists and insurgents, the addition of 'negotiation' to the strategic tool-kit is perhaps something new. Until recently, negotiating with terrorists or insurgents was thought to be useless as they appeared to be irrational, ideological actors. However, as the resources and skills of the Western strategic community have been brought to bear against the relatively new threat of Islamic extremism, a rationale to their actions has slowly been identified.

Lewis draws on this new understanding to support the addition of negotiation to his COIN strategy. Throughout the article, he demonstrates the very rational calculus behind the many brutal acts of al-Qaeda and insurgent groups, and suggests possible ways that Western forces can

position themselves to neutralise these strategies and manoeuvre to a position of strength. From such a position of strength, negotiations can then commence which, Lewis predicts, will result in favourable outcomes for Western nations.

Dr Julian Lewis is the Shadow Defence Minister of the United Kingdom. Dr. Lewis has won the Trench Gascoigne Strategy Essay Prize twice, including in 2007 with this article.

James S Corum, 'On Airpower, Land Power, and Counterinsurgency: Getting Doctrine Right', *Joint Force Quarterly*, Iss. 49, Second Quarter 2008, pp. 93–7, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Press/jfq_pages/editions/i49/25.pdf>.

While the release of the US Army and Marine Corps's new counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine has been met with great scrutiny by the strategy community, the United States Air Force's (USAF) new COIN doctrine, *AFDD 2–3 Irregular Warfare* has escaped equal attention. James S Corum believes that this is regrettable—such attention may help improve it from its present problematic state.

Corum argues that, because of the population-centric nature of a COIN campaign, high-tech airpower can play, at most, a supporting role. Corum attacks airpower theorists and practitioners in the United States who fail to realise this and who insist that precision airpower offers a way to avoid having large numbers of 'boots on the ground'. The author goes on to suggest that the USAF should focus its contribution to the COIN fight on two tasks. First, Corum believes the USAF should help train indigenous air forces, citing the training of the Laotian Air Force during the Vietnam War as a major success in COIN efforts during that conflict. Second, Corum argues that the USAF should support simpler aviation technologies that are more suitable for the air forces that the United States may one day help to fight insurgencies.

'In fighting insurgents, a competent specialist intelligence officer is far more useful than a B-2 bomber. The good news is that a human intelligence specialist is a lot cheaper than a B-2 bomber. The bad news is that it takes about as long to develop a competent... expert as it does the B-2 bomber.'

'A population cannot be secured; its political, social and economic concerns cannot be addressed; its forces or its personnel cannot be developed, advised or trained, from 30,000 feet.'

While the RAAF's approach to COIN is more collegial than the USAF's more service-centric, high-tech approach, Corum's points do warrant careful consideration in Australia. Not only does the article help senior Australian officers understand the internal US Army/US Air Force debate about COIN, but highlights that often, COIN will require a truly joint approach by all the services.

*Lieutenant Colonel James S Corum is a retired US Army Reservist, and is an Associate Professor in the Department of Multinational Operations at the US Army Command and General Staff College. His most recent publication is *Fighting the War on Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy*.*

Linda J Bilmes, 'Iraq's 100-Year Mortgage', *Foreign Policy*, Iss. 165, March/April 2008, pp. 84–5.

'Far more soldiers are surviving even grievous injuries than in previous conflicts. The ratio of wounded in combat to killed in Iraq is 7 to 1 ... in World War II, 2 to 1.'

A recent report by Linda J Bilmes and Joseph E Stiglitz, stating that the cost of the Iraq conflict is on the order of USD 3 trillion, has received worldwide press attention and sparked debate over the 'true' cost of the Global War on Terror. With this article Bilmes discusses one of the often overlooked costs of modern conflict—medical care and financial compensation for injuries that occur due to military

service. As the war in Iraq has shown, these costs can be staggering, with Bilmes providing an estimate of USD 500 billion to provide for US veterans if the troops are withdrawn by the end of 2009. Once this amount is added to the social and economic costs of lost productive workers the toll from this conflict is enormous.

The ongoing cost of caring for veterans is both a moral and financial consideration that all military organisations must include in planning for future operations. As advances in battlefield and medical technology increase, so too will the number of soldiers surviving grievous injuries that require long-term ongoing care. These are issues that will continue to be important to ADF members both now with our current commitments and with planning for future challenges.

Linda J Bilmes, a lecturer at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, is co-author with Joseph E Stiglitz of The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict.

Daniel Byman, 'Understanding Proto-Insurgencies', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 2, April 2008, pp. 165–200.

Daniel Byman has written an interesting article that considers a factor that is often overlooked in counterinsurgency strategy—prevention. Byman calls groups of terrorists and guerrillas that are yet to become full-blown insurgency movements 'proto-insurgencies'. In this article he examines the features that lead to the success or failure of these groups. He uses various well documented examples, including Hezbollah and Egypt's Al-Jihad group, to explore how the actions of governments can both hinder and support the aims and actions of proto-insurgent movements.

This article underscores the complexity in dealing with modern insurgencies, and the difficulties states face developing strategies to counter incipient threats. While Byman frames his discussion in a US context, his warning that defeating a proto-insurgency may lead to it spreading globally and that strong police forces are often more important than the military are equally applicable to Australia's domestic and international interests. While attempting to identify the existence of proto-insurgencies is a difficult task, this is one case where prevention is far and away cheaper than cure.

Daniel Byman is the Director of Georgetown's Security Studies Program and the Center for Peace and Security Studies. He is also an Associate Professor in the School of Foreign Service, as well as a Senior Fellow with the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. His latest work is Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from the Iraqi Civil War.

Reul Marc Gerecht and Gary J Schmitt, 'What France Does Best', *The American*, March/April 2008, <<http://www.american.com/archive/2008/march-april-magazine-contents/what-france-does-best>>.

With this article, Reul Marc Gerecht and Gary J Schmitt make a convincing argument that France is the 'most accomplished counterterrorist practitioner in Europe'. France has been dealing with terrorist attacks since the mid-1980s and therefore has experience to build upon when developing responses to Islamic extremist threats. Added to this is a strong scholarly community of academics and journalists who have been analysing the response of European Muslims to militant messages, and are willing to work with officials in adapting their research for practical use. Another factor that the authors identify is the ability of France's internal security service and judicial system to develop strong measures to combat terrorism, including investigative magistrates and a security service with the rights to carry out highly invasive and intrusive inquiries.

'Counterterrorism, like espionage and covert action, isn't a spectator sport. The more a country practices, the better it gets. France has become the most accomplished counterterrorist practitioner in Europe.'

As Australia and other countries continue to shape their response to terrorist threats, there are advantages to be gained from examining the experiences of other countries which have grappled with similar problems. While there are many critics of the enormous power wielded by the French state, there are particular aspects of their system that could possibly be adopted. By convening a special parliamentary commission to examine its counterterrorist capacities, France was able to take

stock not only of the resources available to it, but also what developments were required within the judicial system to best utilise the tools available.

Reul Marc Gerecht is a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Gary J Schmitt is a Resident Scholar at the AEI and Director of the Institute's Program on Advanced Strategic Studies.

Zoltan Barany, 'Russia Resurgent? A Still-Faltering Military', *Policy Review*, Iss. 147, February/March 2008, pp. 39–51, <<http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/14830596.html>>.

The rhetoric surrounding 'Russia's rise' is significant, and many commentators have entered the debate on one side or another. This is unsurprising given the potentially lethal cocktail that Russia's substantial military capabilities and distinctly anti-Western foreign policy represents. However, Zoltan Barany finds that the bear's bark may be worse than its bite.

'Full colonels are paid less than bus drivers, and tens of thousands of officers are without proper dwellings.'

Attentive readers of the *SOPD* may remember that in Issue 54, the Editors recommended an article entitled 'Russia Resurgent' by Peter Brookes, which unambiguously declared 'the Bear is back'. While Brookes examined the substance of Russia's foreign policy ambitions, Barany examines its

ability to put that agenda into action. For those who fear Russian belligerence, Barany's article will come as welcome relief: he concludes that Russia is, at least for now, far from capable of any significant military action.

But it is not a lack of funding or political will that Barany finds to be the main reason behind Russia's 'still-faltering military'. Instead, it is a failure of strategic leadership. Russia's armed forces, dominated by the army, cannot decide between two simple options. First is a professional, all-volunteer force equipped and trained to modern, Western standards and applicable to a broad range of contingencies. Second is a Soviet-style mass conscript force that relies on brute force and firepower to confront symmetrical threats. Barany's analysis of the whole range of factors bearing upon this central ambivalence in Russian strategy is clear, concise and well informed. For the Australian officer, understanding where Russia's military-industrial complex is heading is crucial, as it is the primary source of weapons for many regional armed forces. Any shift in Russia's strategic situation will assuredly affect its arms sale policy, and determining Russia's strategic trajectory thus becomes a task of paramount importance. Barany's article helps the senior officer immensely in this regard.

'[D]espite the recent infusions of resources, Russia's army remains a pale shadow of its former self.'

Zoltan Barany is Frank C Erwin Jr Professor of Government at the University of Texas. He also holds the W Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellowship at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. His latest publication is Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military.

Dima P Adamsky, 'Through the Looking Glass: The Soviet Military-Technical Revolution and the American Revolution in Military Affairs', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 2, April 2008, pp. 257-94.

The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is well known today among soldiers and scholars. However, while most are aware that the RMA was originally a Soviet concept, their knowledge of the RMA's intellectual heritage ends there. Dima P Adamsky sets out to rectify this gap in understanding with his article.

Adamsky's article first examines the quantum leaps that the United States made in the development of the technologies critical to the RMA, such as precision deep-strike weapons and long-range airborne sensors. However, it was the Soviet leadership who developed the concept of the Military-Technical Revolution (MTR). Clearly stated, Soviet theorists envisioned an automated and computerised 'reconnaissance-strike complex' that would use seamless, precise and highly-lethal fires to destroy the enemy throughout their entire depth. While the fact that the origins of 'deep battle' and the RMA more generally lie in the Soviet MTR is no revelation to the Australian officer, the factors bearing on the internal Soviet debate that gave rise to them most likely are. Adamsky's article delves deeply into this topic and thus is of particular interest to the senior officer.

This article is based on a thorough examination of the original Soviet literature in which these ideas were debated and developed, and the quality of Adamsky's article reflects this effort. Australia's modernising land forces today reflect the principles of the MTR/RMA developed decades ago during the Cold War. For example, Project Land 17 aims to implement a semi-automated and computerised fire-control solution for the artillery, just as Soviet MTR theorists envisioned. Adamsky's exploration of the intellectual heritage of this important phenomenon can therefore help Australian officers to better understand their own concepts of operations and doctrine, and thus better implement them should the need arise.

'Soviet ideas regarding the MTR had stirred enough interest among observers of Russia in the West, to reduce it to the official Pentagon acronym: 'A higher form of praise of Pentagon officials does not exist'.'

Dima P Adamsky works for the Arnold A Salzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, United States and also for the School of Political Sciences at the University of Haifa, Israel.

Karl M Hasslinger, 'Undersea warfare: The hidden threat', *Armed Forces Journal*, March 2008, <<http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/03/3463927/>>.

Undersea warfare is most often seen as a high-tech, high-cost activity that only the most advanced state-based military forces can perform. However, Karl M Hasslinger argues that this is not necessarily the case.

The author shows that small, deep-diving and quite sophisticated submarines are commercially available for under half a million dollars, making the entry-costs for a terrorist group quite low. Hasslinger points to the now-famous incidences of drug cartels using submarines to smuggle drugs into the United States as proof that covert operations in an underwater environment are not beyond the capabilities of non-state actors. Hasslinger also points to other undersea capabilities that smaller states may seek to develop as an asymmetric hedge against Western countries. For example, he discusses the threat of encapsulated missiles dropped close to cities and ports from merchant ships with false-bottoms. These can be deposited over months or years, and then lay dormant for long periods, remaining practically undetectable until the command to fire is given. Such systems would negate much of the infrastructure for missile defence either in place now or planned for deployment in the future because of the short flight-times of missiles launched so close to their targets.

Hasslinger identifies some of the major vulnerabilities that the United States has to asymmetric undersea attacks, and makes some recommendations that may help alleviate this threat. While the United States' maritime situation is different from Australia's, the two countries share many vulnerabilities: submarine telecommunications cables, gas pipelines, offshore drilling platforms, and large coastal population concentrations. Hasslinger's brief article, therefore, is of considerable value to the Australian officer as a basis for thought on Australia's unique undersea situation, and its vulnerability to asymmetric undersea operations.

Karl M Hasslinger is a retired US Navy captain. He formerly served as a submarine commander and as a strategic planner on the Chief of Naval Operations Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. He now works for General Dynamics Electric Boat where he is Director of Washington Operations.

'Reflections' has been designed by the Editors of the SOPD to showcase the most influential texts from history regarding operations, strategy and politics. This month the Editors of the SOPD recommend:

Seymour M Hersh, 'Lieutenant Accused of Murdering 109 Civilians', *St Louis Post-Dispatch*, 13 November 1969; Seymour M Hersh, 'Hamlet Attack Called "Point-Blank Murder"', *St Louis Post-Dispatch*, 20 November 1969; and Seymour M Hersh, 'Ex-GI Tells of Killing Civilians at Pinkville', *St Louis Post-Dispatch*, 25 November 1969, <<http://www.pierretristam.com/Bobst/library/wf-200.htm>>.

The power of the media to affect the outcome of operations and even entire wars is well understood by Australian officers today, but it was not always so. Many point to the Vietnam War as the war during which Western nations learned of the ability of the media to influence public opinion. Of the countless news reports on Vietnam, one was arguably the most influential.

Seymour Hersh, now an internationally known and respected journalist, was originally catapulted into the spotlight for the three reports he sent to the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* detailing the My Lai massacre. Convicted by a court-martial of murder in 1971, Lieutenant William L Calley Jr led dozens of soldiers of Charlie Company, 1 Battalion, Americal Division in the murder of 109 civilians on 16 March 1968 at My Lai, South Vietnam. Hersh's reports on the massacre are surprisingly brief and matter of fact for such influential documents. Their unassuming nature, and the rather humble newspaper in which they appeared, shows just how influential even the most minor news report can become.

While some believe Calley was a scapegoat, others a liar, and yet others still a loyal subordinate simply carrying out orders, the fact remains that the massacre he was convicted of committing was an important event in the Vietnam War, and helped to harden public opinion in the United States and the West against the war. It also set new standards for the extent to which soldiers in the field would be held accountable for their actions. This is a fact that today is often overshadowed by the more obvious 'public relations' lessons that My Lai teaches. The speed and force with which these articles affected public opinion is an object lesson of the intrusive power of the media, and the peril of ignoring it in any strategic, operational or even tactical consideration.

Seymour M Hersh today regularly contributes to the New Yorker magazine. He won the Pulitzer Prize for excellence in journalism in 1970 for the three articles recommended here.

Working Paper Series

The Land Warfare Studies Centre is pleased to announce the release of the first foreign translation of its Working Paper Series: Colonel John Blaxland's *Revisiting Counterinsurgency: A Manoeuvrist Response to the 'War on Terror' for the Australian Army*.

At the time of its original publication in 2006, the paper addressed an emerging awareness of counterinsurgency in the Australian context. The work was also cautionary; arguing that the Army and the wider Australian Defence Force (ADF) needed more careful thought on doctrine, appropriate training and associated operational ability. Reflecting on the Australian Army's heritage in the realm of counterinsurgency, it looked at emerging trends in the public discourse on the 'war on terror' and examined how Australia's traditional allies were developing doctrine in reaction to those trends. With this understanding, recommendations were made for a response by the Australian Army.

The proposed response involved a concept of manoeuvre to address an information-era insurgency that is complex and global, with common threads, but distinctive local determinants.

The argument made here was that the Australian Army was presented with a unique challenge best managed in a whole-of-government context and in a way that was culturally attuned, responsive to local nuances that motivate insurgents and terrorists, and designed to generate lasting effects. That response also presented considerable challenges for Australia's combat-arms focused land force, but capitalised on the Army's manoeuvrist disposition.

Colonel Blaxland's paper has now been translated into Thai and will be distributed to Thai staff college students and senior officers of the Royal Thai Armed Forces. The Thai language translation of *Revisiting Counterinsurgency: A Manoeuvrist Response to the 'War on Terror' for the Australian Army* is available from the LWSC website at http://www.defence.gov.au/Army/lwsc/docs/WP_131T.pdf

