



# **Senior Officer Professional Digest**

**Selected readings from the world's military journals**

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## **The Introduction of the SOPD**

My predecessor launched this digest in the belief that, 'Apart from practical operational experience...no other information source can compare with the material to be found in books and professional journals.' Since it was first published, the Senior Officer Professional Digest (SOPD) has proven to be very popular, which suggests it is indeed meeting a vital requirement of Army's senior officers.

It is my intent that the SOPD continue to serve the officer corps by providing accurate summaries of articles that deal with issues of contemporary relevance. I commend it to you as a very useful professional tool.



**P.F. Leahy**  
Lieutenant General  
Chief of Army

<b>Article Title</b>	Is Southeast Asia the Second Front?
<b>Author</b>	John Gershman
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Foreign Affairs</i> , July/August 2002, Vol. 81, No.4, pp. 60–74

### Synopsis

This important article by Asia-Pacific analyst, John Gershman, examines the proposition that South East Asia is the ‘second front’ in Washington’s war on terrorism. The article characterises the current debate over South-East Asia in Washington as being between two schools of thought, the *law-enforcement school* (led by US Deputy Secretary of Defence and former Ambassador to Indonesia, Paul Wolfowitz) and *a school of thought favouring improved military ties* (led by Defence Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld). The author is critical of both approaches and suggests that US policy in South East Asia requires a much broader socio-economic focus.

Gershman warns that the idea of South East Asia becoming a ‘second front’ for the US war on terrorism may be based on superficial analysis and an ill-informed understanding of the dynamics of a complex region. Despite the arrest of alleged al Qaeda operatives in Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines; the sending of 660 US troops to the Philippines; and the presence of radical Islamic groups in the region – notably the (Jemaah Islamiah (JI), Abu Sayyaf and the Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM) – Gershman believes threat posed by radical Islam in South East Asia is exaggerated. He points to the following realities:

- At present, there is no risk of state-sponsored terrorism in the region.
- The ethnic and religious diversity of the region militates against fundamentalist hegemony by any one group.
- All the major Southeast Asian countries tolerate degrees of dissent making radical Islam less attractive as a vehicle for violent opposition.
- The only terrorist groups in the region that have demonstrated a capacity for large-scale attacks are the ‘middle class’ JI and KMM who possess little broad-based support.

The article warns that a military-oriented approach would be misguided because, *although Southeast Asia may represent a security threat, it is not a military threat*. Terrorist groups such as JI and KMM do exist but so also do many broader movements such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Free Aceh movement along with Islamic paramilitaries such as Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and Laskar Jihad in Indonesia. Framing Southeast Asia as the military ‘second front’ is simplistic and flawed on four main counts:

- Such a position conflates different forms of political Islam.

- It fails to recognise that the emergence of terrorist groups is caused by the socio-economic problems of weak states.
- It would condemn the US to rely too much on cooperation with militaries that remain unaccountable—such as the Philippines and Indonesia—and which have poor human rights records.

In particular, the article warns against seeing South East Asia through the experience of operations in South Asia and of developing a preference for military-style solutions. Gershman notes:

*Looking at Southeast Asia through the lens of Afghanistan will lead US policymakers to the wrong conclusions and the wrong policy. The analogy will cause Washington to overestimate the threat of al Qaeda and push it into an over-militarised response to the problems that do exist—a response that will be at best ineffective and at worst counterproductive.*

The article concludes by arguing that US military assistance in Southeast Asia should be confined to such areas as the coast guard and naval facilities, and be part of a broad and multi-pronged South East Asian policy. The latter should aim to support civil society, encourage legitimate dissent, promote better government and attempt to improve living conditions through foreign economic aid and debt reduction.

**Article Title**                      President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point: Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise at the United States Military Academy (1 June 2002)

**Author**                                The White House (President George W. Bush)

**Publications Details:**        <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/>

### Synopsis

This speech by President Bush to the ‘heartland’ of the US Army officer corps at West Point in the USMA’s bicentennial year gives a useful insight into the current mood of American unilateralism and the evolution of new US defence thinking. The President argues that it is America’s duty to fight for international peace and liberty since the American cause has always been larger than America’s defence: *‘America has no empire to extend or utopia to establish. We wish for others only what we wish for ourselves—safety from violence, the rewards of liberty, and the hope of a better life’*.

Identifying the gravest danger to universal freedom as lying at *‘the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology’*, President Bush warns that new threats, involving weak states and new groups, empowered by weapons of mass destruction require new strategic thinking. Cold War style deterrence and containment have become irrelevant against

networks of terrorists or dictators armed with ballistic weapons. The war on terror must involve an offensive since *'in the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act'*. The future US military must be ready for preemptive action *'in any dark corner of the world'* whenever and wherever necessary

All national tools will be employed in preemption from finance and intelligence to diplomacy and military force. The President's speech also rejects the notion of a 'clash of civilisations' noting that by defending universal peace, the US has the opportunity to unite former enemy states—notably Russia and possibly even China—in a common struggle against the forces of chaos and violence.

**Article Title** Challenges to US National Security: Crusader Essential in High-Intensity Combat

**Author** General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA Ret

**Publication Details** *Armed Forces Journal International*, June 2002, pp. 6–7

### Synopsis

The author, a well-known American Army general, passionately attacks the recent Pentagon decision to abandon the Crusader artillery project arguing that it will degrade the US Army's future battle force in high-intensity combat. Rejecting the idea that Crusader is 'a Cold War relic that will hardly intimidate Middle East terrorists', General McCaffrey suggests that the cancellation reflects an emerging and misguided Pentagon view of future war based around *'digits, information, broadband, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and JDAM precision weapons'*.

The General argues that it is a mistake to extrapolate operations in Afghanistan or the Balkans to the full universe of national security threats. Since air power cannot kill targets in all-weather conditions in close proximity to ground forces, Crusader remains vital in air-ground warfare. For McCaffrey the outcome is clear: *'the [US] Army will lose the next war if we try to substitute \$100 million strike aircraft for Crusader artillery in the violence of the tactical battle'*. Artillery remains vital in high-intensity combat and has the capacity to *'freeze maneuver forces in place'*. Crusader should have been developed for the following reasons:

- In some scenarios, Crusader has 30 times the rate of kill of existing US artillery.
- Crusader is the only artillery system in the world that allows a crew to fight on a CBRNE environment.
- The Crusader system is three times more effective than current artillery and has a smaller logistical-personnel footprint.
- Crusader represents a revolutionary improvement in US Army indirect fire capability to fight with both heavy and light forces.

General McCaffrey concludes that Crusader is an integral part of the US Army's vision of future high-intensity war and for this reason during the 1990s, three Chiefs of Staff supported its development. The loss of the system represents a victory for the bureaucratic belief that air power alone could substitute for joint battle capability.

**Article Title** Coalition Warfare and Expeditionary Operations

**Author** General Sir Jack Deverell, KCB OBE, C-in-C,  
Allied Forces, North Europe

**Publication Details** *RUSI Journal*, February 2002, Vol. 147, No. 1,  
pp. 18–21.

### Synopsis

General Deverell examines the factors that make or break coalitions. He begins by reflecting on the pervasiveness of coalition and expeditionary operations in recent times. He then introduces some critical factors in coalition warfare, with reference to historical examples. Compromise is an important and he also suggests that fear is the factor that ultimately binds coalitions together, while success keeps them going. What fractures a coalition is failure. The first principle then, is maintenance of the coalition.

Despite the attraction of the idea that a coalition can easily be maintained between nations with similar political and social ideas, this idea is rejected because of the success of the coalition with the USSR in the Second World War. The critical point in the maintenance of a coalition is, the author says, *consensus*. Other important factors discussed include, *consistency of political aims* and how *obligation and choice influence the way in which coalition partners view the same event*. These issues are then discussed in the light of the author's practical experience. The discussion illustrates how legal issues, Rules of Engagement, differences in military culture and command style complicate the problems of translating strategic aims into military operations.

The relationship between coalitions and expeditionary operations is also complex. The most important complicating factor is *distance* which logistic support must travel, making sustainment of the force a critical issue. The author says that future expeditionary forces will be based on existing forces, not special initial entry forces. One of the difficulties with this situation is that crucial logistics and other capabilities have been degraded by long-term cuts in defence spending since the end of the Cold War. Another issue is the multifaceted nature of such operations, which frequently combine the features of warlike operations with those of humanitarian ones.

The article also poses several difficult questions about public support, the problems of drawing together diverse lines of operation – political, legal, military, security, etc – in an expeditionary coalition. The author also poses a question about the sustainability of the

technologically complex 'American Way in Warfare', especially relevant to issues of interoperability.

The article concludes on a point relevant to the current war on terrorism. If the main players in coalitions are large and unwieldy governments or supranational bodies such as the EU, NATO or UN, how can such complex organisations respond to actions by terrorist groups or even anti-globalism activists (e.g. at Seattle and Genoa), who are unrestrained by bureaucracy, laws or technology?

<b>Article Title</b>	Observations on the Use of Force in Complex Operations
<b>Author</b>	Brigadier R. A. D. Applegate OBE, Director Equipment Capability, MOD, UK
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>RUSI Journal</i> , February 2002, Vol. 147, No. 1, pp. 22–27.

### Synopsis

These observations begin by stating that, since the end of the Cold War, there has been a lack of consensus regarding the optimum use of force in international crises. The author gives a definition of 'complex emergencies' and then proceeds with his analysis using three elements:

- ends,
- ways, and
- means.

The crises that Western armies now deal with do not involve the life and death of the nations contributing intervention forces. *Under such conditions, the need to defeat a clearly definable enemy is absent, but the need to avoid failure is not.* The most important factor in determining success will therefore be a clear and agreed concept of the political end-state. The role of military forces in this process is to create a situation in which other agencies can then begin to build a stable society.

The use of force in these situations must be credible to all the belligerents. Without a clear sense of purpose, military force appears hesitant. Posturing or involvement in humanitarian tasks, which are better undertaken by civil agencies, all detract from the ability of intervention forces to achieve their role. In coalitions, the number of participating nations complicates the ability to achieve unity of purpose and effort. The competing interests of coalition partners, further complicate the development of a coherent campaign plan. Frequently, such operations require subtlety and patience that military organisations do not possess. There is no single 'way' to approach these crisis situations. The use of force must be unique and attuned to each operation.

The military means for achieving success in these operations are also difficult to bring to bear. The use of high technology solutions, such as air power, to avoid casualties in these operations may create significant hazards to the overall success of the operation. While air power may permit early intervention, the results achieved have often shown that initial assessments of what could be achieved were over-optimistic. The use of air power has also been interpreted as an unwillingness to commit fully to resolving the situation. The limitations of any military means employed must be fully recognised before any forces are employed. Similarly, all military personnel need to be trained in various roles to meet the complexities they will face – warfighters, politically astute humanitarians or consummate media performers.

The very ad hoc nature of intervention creates a reluctance to commit too many resources to these situations. However, when considering means, no single, preferred solution exists. As the author points out, such operations are the very embodiment of Clausewitzian friction, the province of the military and political arts, not science and humanitarian altruism. Under these conditions, success is a blend of ends, ways and means in which military force is used *'to do what we can, rather than what we would wish to do.'*

**Article Title**                      Rethinking Sovereignty: American Strategy in the Age of Terrorism

**Author**                                Audrey Kurth Cronin

**Publication Details**            *Survival*, Summer 2002, Vol. 44, No. 2, pp. 119–39

### Synopsis

This article suggests that the West has entered a new era – the Age of Terrorism – in which the traditional tools of power politics will be less important than in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The new form of mass-casualty terrorism *'has the means to carry out massively destructive acts unbridled by the interests, form and structure of a state'*. This kind of terrorism implies an attempt to de-legitimise the concept of state sovereignty. As the author puts it:

*International terrorism is not dangerous because it can defeat us [the US and the West] in a war, but because it can potentially destroy the domestic contract of the state by further undermining its ability to protect its citizens from direct attack. The United States and its allies must win in the conventional ways but the greatest danger is not defeat on the battlefield but damage to the integrity and value of the state.*

The guiding principle of the emerging international system is not military power per se, but the need to defend the stability of the state system itself against a new and dangerous foe. The author suggests that the struggle against terrorism is similar to a hostage-taking situation in which the victims are US and Western civilians. RMA-style military capabilities need to be



supplemented by human intelligence, cooperation with allies, better special forces, psychological operations. In particular, it was important to concentrate on the following:

- Better military capability for urban operations and complex terrain.
- Treat Saddam Hussein's Iraq as a distraction not as a principal in the war on terrorism.
- Disable the operating environment of terrorism by use of a varied set of policy instruments from technical assistance to law enforcement training and military support.

Above all, however, US strategy has to adapt a problem-solving American materialistic culture towards a new and unfamiliar approach that emphasises '*patience, a phlegmatic attitude, a long attention span, consistency and a more realistic assessment of risks*'.

**Article Title** Clash of Globalizations

**Author** Stanley Hoffman

**Publication Details** *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2002, Vol. 81, No. 4, pp. 104–15

### Synopsis

The author, a distinguished commentator on international relations, attempts to explain the conceptual link between globalisation and international violence. Globalisation has three forms:

- *economic globalisation* based on revolutions in technology, information and international business.
- *cultural globalisation* in which the choice is between uniformity (Americanisation) or diversity.
- *Political globalisation* marked by American power and preponderance and by a vast array of international and transgovernment networks.

While the dominant tension of the 1990s was the clash between the fragmentation of states and the progress of globalisation, in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century a new form of terrorism has emerged as '*the bloody link between interstate relations and global society*'. The process of globalisation, then, far from spreading universal peace appears to foster conflict, resentment and violence based on anti-Western ideology.

The September 11 attacks demonstrated that the new form of mass-casualty transnational terrorism is a product of a reaction against globalisation aimed at subverting the power of dominant states, notably the world's 'hyperpower', the United States. Hoffman concludes, '*global terrorism is not the simple extension of war among states to nonstates. It is the subversion of traditional ways of war because it does not care about the sovereignty of either its enemies or its allies who shelter them*'.



**Title** *Facing the Hydra: Maintaining Strategic Balance while Pursuing a Global War against Terrorism.*

**Author** Conrad C. Crane

**Publication Details** Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle PA, May 2002.  
<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usassi/ssipubs/pubs2002/hydra/hydra.pdf>

### Synopsis

In this short monograph, Conrad Crane examines the impact of the war of terrorism on the force structure of the US Army. He concludes that the US Army must not allow the demands of homeland security, force protection and the war on terrorism to detract from its ability to project its forces globally to deter attack as well as to respond when deterrence fails. The author suggests that the rapid escalation of contingencies calling for the involvement of land forces requires that the US Army continue its process of transformation with the objective of building lighter, smarter and more agile forces.

In the US context, Crane advocates expanding the regular army to accept responsibility for global commitments, while the Reserve component and National Guard refocus on homeland security and service support functions. The author warns against escalating the spread of the war on terrorism to avoid over-commitment, particularly as post-conflict responsibilities can represent a hidden drain on manpower resources. As he points out, the US Army has already exhausted its available supply of Special Forces troops for the conduct of operations in Afghanistan. Future missions will require more extensive forces. *'Wherever the next operations are conducted, they are certain to place a heavy load on the Army, if not for significant combat operations, then certainly for peace operations, assurance and deterrence.'*

**Article Title** Britain's New Anti-Terrorist Legal Framework

**Author** Sebastian Payne, Lecturer in Constitutional and Administrative Law, University of Kent

**Publication Details** *RUSI Journal*, June 2002, Vol. 147, No. 3, pp. 44–51.

### Synopsis

This article is a critique of the UK's Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which represents Britain's legislative response to the September 11 attacks in the US. Rather

than amend existing laws, the Blair Government chose to draft new laws dealing with the detention of terrorist suspects, trial processes for terrorists and the powers of public authorities to use information sources to suppress existing terrorist organisations and prevent new ones from being formed. The resulting act runs to 14 parts, 129 sections and 7 schedules. The author is concerned with the sufficiency and the appropriateness of the act as a response to international terrorism. He points out that this legislation is also subject to supranational legal conventions, of both the EU and the UN.

The detailed discussion of the act is divided into five parts:

- *Immigration and Asylum*  
The legislation has given the government wide powers to detain, deport and deny asylum to persons suspected of links with terrorist groups. Certification of a suspect is done by the secretary of State, without recourse to judicial review. Such powers clash with international human rights conventions, which Britain has acceded to.
- *Derogation (diminishing the power of international conventions)*  
The provisions of the act dealing with detention of a foreign national without trial run foul of Article 5 of the European Human Rights Conventions. Derogation is permitted, but usually only in war or acute civil emergencies. Moreover, a suspect could not be deported to countries where they might be harmed. Nor could they be detained in Britain without trial. Complex legal machinery has been put in place to overcome these contradictions, but this part of the act is still open to appeal in the EU Court of Human Rights.
- *Disclosure of Information*  
The Act allows public authorities to disclose information for the purpose of any criminal investigation whatever and any criminal proceedings whatever and for the initiation or ending of such investigations or proceedings. The framing of these provisions is not even aimed specifically at terrorism or security issues, giving the Government wide powers it can use against to intrude into the lives of its own citizens.
- *Retention of Communication Data*  
This part of the act gives the police and intelligence services powers to track the source, location and destination of electronic and wireless communications and store them for future use. Regulation of these powers is to be by a voluntary code of practice, creating significant threats to the privacy of innocent individuals.
- *'Third Pillar' EU secondary legislation*  
This gives government the power to add key measures to UK law by ministerial order, bypassing normal parliamentary processes.

The author concludes by saying that there has been much criticism of the Act, because of the speed and wide-ranging nature of some of the provisions. Criticisms of the Act range from:

- doubts about its effectiveness,
- the harm done by pushing through this complex legislation in such haste,
- breaches of constitutional principles,



- concerns over violation of civil liberties by government agencies, and
- human rights violations in relation to due process of the law.
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Summing up the author says: *'The creation of the all-seeing, all-watching, all-listening state has moved from the realms of George Orwell's fiction to reality'*.

**Article Title** Intervention and State Failure

**Author** Michael Ignatieff

**Publication Details** *Dissent*, Winter 2002, pp. 115–23.

### Synopsis

In this article Michael Ignatieff, Director of the Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard University, analyses the problem of crafting successful strategies of intervention. He advocates a form of robust interventionism that has significant implications for forces deployed into failed or failing states. The author points out that in failed states such as Bosnia, Rwanda or Somalia 'neutrality can become discreditable as well as counterproductive'. The provision of humanitarian aid to all parties, supported by the presence of peacekeepers may prolong a civil war, but international forces are loath to make the difficult decisions as to who is entitled to receive aid.

Ignatieff argues that while peacekeeping forces need to accept limitations on their ability to shape post-conflict societies, they must also recognise the need to make a long-term commitment to enforcing peace. As soon as possible, responsibility for administration, economic development and basic security need to be thrown back to local elites. However, external forces need to remain engaged over longer time frames, not least because: *'controlling the culture of vengeance usually takes longer than the time frame dictated by most modern exit strategies'*.

**Article Title** "Beyond the Mogadishu Line":  
Some Australian Lessons for Managing Intra-State  
Conflicts

**Author** Robert G. Patman

**Publication Details** *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 12, No. 1  
(Spring 2001), pp. 59–75.

### Synopsis

This article by Robert Patman of the University of Otago in New Zealand contrasts the US failure in Somalia with the more successful approach adopted by Australian troops in Baidoa.

He concludes that the Australians demonstrated that *'a new concept of conflict management that goes beyond traditional peacekeeping, but falls short of Rambo-style peace enforcement will have to be developed'*. He characterises the Australian strategy as an effective peace enhancement strategy based on civil reconstruction, engagement with the community and an active presence on the ground combined with a *'measured willingness to use force to obtain compliance with UN demands'*.

The author contrasts Australian methods with the US approach that initially resiled from disarming the warring clans, then agreed on disarmament, but failed to enforce it. By seeking to bargain with the differing factions the US bestowed legitimacy on its chosen warlords, then alienated itself from the local population by declaring war on Mohammed Farah Aideed and his Habr Gidr clan. Ultimately, the US approach culminated in the disastrous street battle in Mogadishu in October 1993 which caused hundreds of Somali deaths, heralded rapid US withdrawal and resulted in the failure of the international effort. The US forces are criticised for their lack of local knowledge and the 'mutant ninja turtle' syndrome that saw them place force protection as a higher priority than mission success.

<b>Article Title</b>	The Blind Men and the Elephant
<b>Author</b>	LTCOL Tim Reese, US Army War College
<b>Publication Details</b>	<i>Armor</i> , May-June, 2002, Vol. CXI, No. 3., pp. 7–11 & 15.

### **Synopsis**

The author argues that personnel turbulence is crippling the readiness of the US Army. The multiplicity of demands in continuing professional education, for both enlisted personnel and officers, creates turmoil in units, with key personnel frequently absent on career courses. Training at the individual level also conflicts with collective training programs. This results in a situation that leaves the majority of units unready for combat without significant additional training. In addition, the posting cycle may mean that between 5% and 10% of personnel will leave a unit every year, but this number may be as much as 33%.

The author's thesis is that the individual training system is in conflict with the unit training system. Indeed, he believes that priority has been given to the professional development of individuals at the cost of unit effectiveness. To remedy this problem he proposes a system that ensures at any point in time a proportion of the army would be fully trained and deployable, without detriment to the career progression of individuals. While he admits that his solution is not perfect, he believes that it is better than the current situation. Units have adapted to the problem and are able to work around it. In other words, they treat it as if it were an administrative problem and not one of serious operational importance.