

# S O P D



Senior Officer Professional Digest

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### Land Warfare Studies Centre

Ian Campbell Road  
Duntroun ACT 2600  
Australia  
+61 2 6265 9624

[lwsc.publications@defence.gov.au](mailto:lwsc.publications@defence.gov.au)

## MESSAGE FROM THE EDITORS

This month the Editors of the *Senior Officer Professional Digest* recommend ten articles drawn from professional and academic journals on the subjects of Iraq, UAVs, computerised command and control, cruise missiles, simulation, human intelligence, cyber attack, grand strategy, Melanesia and the Solomon Islands.

This month, the editors recommend an excellent article by the distinguished strategic analysts Stephen Biddle, Michael E O'Hanlon and Kenneth M Pollack. Writing about the War in Iraq, these three authors paint a hopeful picture and believe that substantial success can be achieved in this theatre.

The heavy US focus on Iraq has ensured that many developmental military technologies have been deployed there, including UAVs. Norman Friedman examines these rapidly advancing aircraft and concludes that they are superior to inhabited aircraft in many respects. Richard Leino takes a contrary position to Friedman's pro-technology stance, arguing that officers need to be careful of relying on their rapidly expanding command and control computer systems. Dennis M Gormley also warns against the unchecked spread of military technologies—in this case cruise missiles.

Rhett Gilman stands clearly on the other side of the mil-tech argument, making the case for a (limited) return to 'old-fashioned' hands-on training as a means for improving the relationship between leaders and led. Similarly, Stephen V Hoyt proves the efficacy of the distinctly low-tech occupation of human intelligence, while Mark Herman argues that simple, dialectical war-games hold the key to success when fighting one of the most high-tech of wars: cyber-war.

David Malet focuses on the more theoretical issues pertaining to grand strategies for the fight against terror. Narrowing geographical focus, Scott Flower and Clive Moore offer articles on the Muslim populations of Melanesia and the cultural and social environment of the Solomon Islands respectively.

Enjoy  
The Editors

Stephen Biddle, Michael E O'Hanlon and Kenneth M Pollack, 'How to Leave a Stable Iraq', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, Iss. 5, September/October 2008, pp. 40–58 <<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080901faessay87503/stephen-biddle-michael-e-o-hanlon-kenneth-m-pollack/how-to-leave-a-stable-iraq.html>>.

Stephen Biddle, Michael E O'Hanlon and Kenneth M Pollack are all distinguished commentators in their own right. Accordingly, their writings are of innate interest to senior ADF officers regardless of the topic. However, these three authors have cooperated to write an article on what they see as the potential for a moderately successful conclusion to the American involvement in Iraq. This makes their piece extremely relevant to Australian officers and policymakers, and is therefore well worth their time.

Biddle and his fellow authors argue that Iraqi elections will be critical to US success. If the national and provincial governments that are elected between now and 2010 are reasonably coherent and able to achieve some degree of progress, then they will be critical in cementing the many advances that the United States and its allies have recently achieved in Iraq. In this climate, Biddle, O'Hanlon and Pollack maintain that the United States could draw down its deployed force by half while still maintaining stability. The authors note that many challenges stand in the way of this optimistic state, and point out that should Iraq again descend into serious violence the only feasible policy for the United States would be withdrawal and containment.

Australia still maintains a significant military presence in the MEAO. Accordingly, the conclusion of the War in Iraq on terms favourable to the Coalition would do much to improve the situation in Afghanistan. Not only would a reasonably democratic Iraq free up US forces for tasks elsewhere, it would, more importantly, be a decisive blow to Islamic extremists globally—decisive, that is, only if the drawdown is carefully coordinated with Coalition information operations and public diplomacy practitioners. By examining Biddle, O'Hanlon and Pollack's arguments, senior Australian officers, strategists and policymakers can begin to determine what a future US presence in Iraq might look like. With this forewarning, they can begin to piece together their campaign to exploit this potential coup in the Global War on Terror, and determine how it will 'play' both in Afghanistan and closer to home.

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**'[T]oday, there is a real chance that U.S. persistence in the short term can secure a stable Iraq and enable major withdrawals in 2010 and 2011 without undermining that stability ... the United States ... could yet emerge from Mesopotamia with something that may still fall well short of Eden on the Euphrates but that ... yields a stability that endures as Americans come home.'**

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*Stephen Biddle is a Senior Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations. Michael E O'Hanlon and Kenneth M Pollack are both Senior Fellows of the Brookings Institution. This article is based on their research trip to Iraq in May and June of 2008.*

**Norman Friedman, 'Who Needs Pilots?', *Proceedings*, Vol. 134, Iss. 8, August 2008, pp. 90–1.**

Norman Friedman's article centres on the introduction of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) into the US Armed Forces. It focuses on the potential benefits of UAVs, but also describes some of the resistance to their acceptance. The article was prompted by suggestions that senior military and civilian figures were fired for failing to integrate UAVs into US Air Force operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, although officially their sackings were for gross mishandling of nuclear weapons.

In contemporary warfare, especially in asymmetric conflicts, enemy forces are likely to be dispersed, unlike the mass formations of conventional opponents. However, air force structures are highly centralized, creating problems when they support ground forces. For example, pilots are having great difficulty in correctly identifying and striking dispersed enemy forces, as recent incidents of friendly fire indicates. Friedman describes several advantages that UAVs possess over manned aircraft when operating in these scenarios. He also extends this comparison to examine the benefits of UAVs in general operations.

Unwarranted resistance to new technology in a military environment leads to unnecessary casualties and failures to meet mission objectives. Friedman suggests that the US Air Force is institutionally against UAVs. While not greatly elaborating on US Air Force resistance, Friedman, unsurprisingly perhaps, observes that the US Navy has been much quicker and more willing to integrate UAVs within its organisation. Analysis of the US Armed Forces' resistance and acceptance of UAVs is critically important to non-US observers, as America's new technology today tends to be others' new technology tomorrow. It is likely that the current UAV debate within the American military establishment will be replicated in many other countries, including Australia. Debate aside, Minister Fitzgibbon's recent decision to discontinue Project JP129 proves that a UAV capability is still difficult to develop and manage, further adding to the complexity of the ADF's adoption of this new capability.

*Norman Friedman is a prominent American naval analyst working at the United States Naval Institute. His latest book is The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapon Systems, Fifth Edition.*

**Richard Leino, 'MAGTF C2 and the Deus Ex Machina', *Marine Corps Gazette*, Vol. 92, Iss. 8, August 2008, pp. 24–6.**

Computerised command and control (C2) is an important element of Network Centric Warfare (NCW). Accordingly, the Army is preparing to field systems such as the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System and Project LAND 125s Battle Command Support System and Battle Management System. These projects, once completed, will allow the Army to achieve a greater shared understanding of the battlespace, thereby facilitating decision superiority and precision manoeuvre. However, Richard Leino, writing about the Marine Air Ground Task Force C2 System, argues that many officers are missing the point of these tools.

Leino laments the common perception among staff officers and commanders that this system, and others like it, will be a *Deus Ex Machina*, or 'god in the machine' for C2, that will somehow make command and control 'happen' on the battlefield. Leino argues that these same officers grow

accordingly complacent—a liberty they ultimately regret when they deploy into a combat zone and find that the human inputs that make the system work have not been adequately practised in training. An over-dependence on any technology—especially one that is as ill-understood by its users as computer software—renders Western forces unable to make the greatest use of their human ingenuity because that ingenuity has not been exercised in training. Leino insists that officers should see the reality of these systems and realise that they are tools to *support* human decision making, not replace it.

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**‘[B]eware when a program manager states, “Technology will get us there.” The proper way to translate that phrase is “this system is going to fail.” Unfortunately, technical systems are a black art to the masses who are content to use a system but don’t really care how they’re designed (and they shouldn’t have to).’**

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Leino’s argument serves as a timely reminder that the maturation of computerised command and control will not change the fundamentals of war. While NCW and computerised C2 will revolutionise the conduct of command and control, it will not replace human decision making. For the Army, the centrality of humans is especially relevant—computers do not have the ‘command presence’ required to lead soldiers into combat, nor can they raise flagging morale or encourage men and women to sacrifice all. Leino’s article is

important, therefore, as it provides the intellectual justification to an argument that many Army officers have always simply felt to be true.

*Lieutenant Colonel Richard Leino is the Assistant Chief of Staff, Communications for the Third Marine Logistics Group based in Okinawa, Japan. This article, for which he received an honourable mention, was his entry in the Chase Prize Essay Contest.*

### **Dennis M Gormley, ‘Missile Contagion’, *Survival*, Vol. 50, Iss. 4, pp. 137–54.**

In the public eye, ballistic missiles are synonymous with nuclear weapons, and accordingly arouse much fear. However, while the threat from ballistic missiles today is still significant, Dennis M Gormley believes that it is actually cruise missiles that are the true threat to peace and stability.

Gormley argues that it is these missiles which are sparking an arms race in Asia because of their relatively low-cost and substantial capacity to penetrate even sophisticated defences. Cruise missiles are difficult to detect with current sensor technologies because of their low flight profile and small radar cross-sections. This makes them

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**‘LACMs, alongside existing ballistic-missile arsenals, will make defending against all types of missile threats an increasingly ... costly challenge.’**

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exceedingly difficult to destroy. In addition, their long ranges, pinpoint accuracy and large warheads make cruise missiles highly lethal—and destabilising—weapons. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, because the public’s attention has been captured by ballistic missiles, cruise missiles proliferate far more easily and with much less scrutiny. Thankfully, only a few countries can manufacture effective cruise missiles, and Gormley believes that the best way to limit the threat that these missiles represent is to prevent that number of countries from growing.

For senior staff of the ADO, the growing arsenal of cruise missiles deployed by the countries of the Asia Pacific region must be the cause of some unease. Gormley's article is a timely contribution, therefore, and offers potential strategies for diplomats and policy makers in their fight to limit the spread of these weapons.

*Dennis M Gormley is a Senior Fellow of the Monterey Institute's James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. He is also a faculty member of the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. This article is drawn from his latest book, entitled Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security.*

**Rhett Gilman, 'Simulating the Heat of Battle', *Proceedings*, Vol. 134, Iss. 8, August 2008, pp. 64–6.**

Computers have revolutionised military training. In the Army, simulators are used to train personnel on many weapons systems, from the Abrams MBT to the Austeyr rifle. Moreover, the ADFs civilian colleagues also increasingly receive education and training via computerised means. However, Rhett Gilman insists that while simulation and training using computers is important, it lacks several critical elements that contribute directly to combat effectiveness.

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**'The greatest detriment of the shift from hands-on training to [computer based training] ... however, is the leadership vacuum that will inevitably result.'**

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Essentially, Gilman argues that while computerised means of training can teach theory and practice, they cannot give trainees confidence in their leaders nor can they teach trainees leadership of their subordinates. According to Gilman, only 'hands on' experience can achieve this, and this vital component of training, while

expensive, must not be allowed to shrink in the face of technophilia and efficiency measures. For an Army that prides itself on its ability to prosecute close-combat against any foe, Gilman's argument will make sense. Senior officers are therefore well advised to read this brief article for the important points it contains.

*Ensign Rhett Gilman is currently serving aboard the USS Halsley. He is due to report to US Navy Nuclear Power School upon completion of this, his first tour.*

**Stephen V Hoyt, 'Cold War Pioneers in Combined Intelligence and Analysis', *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 23, Iss. 4, pp. 463–87.**

Human Intelligence, or HUMINT, is arguably the most important tool for fighting the War on Terror. However, while advances in technology have greatly eased the task of collecting many other types of intelligence, HUMINT still remains extremely difficult to produce. Moreover, verifying the raw intelligence and delivering it to users in a timely fashion complicates the process further. Stephen V Hoyt examines both a unique US HUMINT organisation—US Military Liaison Mission (USMLM)—as well as their methods for collecting and processing intelligence.

This group, formed at the start of the Cold War, was ostensibly designed to ease communications between US and Soviet military authorities occupying Germany after the Second World War. However, the USMLM performed far more daring tasks as the Cold War unfolded. Hoyt's focus is drawn to this organisation in particular because of its revolutionary approach to HUMINT. It was the first organisation to merge collection and analysis in the one coherent unit. To help make this rather demanding arrangement work, the commander of the USMLM was given the pick of military personnel, and great latitude in assignments, resources and policy. A deliberate lack of close bureaucratic oversight also helped USMLM maintain the flexibility that allowed it to achieve many of its intelligence coups.

Hoyt's analysis of the USMLM, its methods, organisation and successes makes for excellent reading. It is well-structured and cuts straight to the heart of the reasons for the USMLM's effectiveness. For Australian officers engaged in the fight against the Taliban and other terrorists across the globe, Hoyt's article on the USMLM's innovative HUMINT practitioners is exceedingly relevant.

*Stephen V Hoyt served two tours with the USMLM as an enlisted intelligence analyst and later as an attached civilian analyst. He currently lectures in English at Eastern Washington University.*

**Mark Herman, 'Playing for keeps', *Armed Forces Journal*, August 2008,**  
<<http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2008/08/3534079/>>.

Cyber-attack is a form of asymmetric offensive with which many in the ADF are no doubt familiar. Mark Herman goes beyond those authors who simply discuss the theory of this issue, and examines what can actually be done to prepare for this threat today.

Specifically, Herman argues that 'war-gaming' a cyber-attack is the most critical step in preparedness for this threat. While such a low-tech approach to such a high-tech problem seemingly defies reason, Herman's point makes perfect sense. While it is computers and computer applications that constitute the 'weapons' in cyber-war, it is the imaginative humans behind those computers and applications that constitute the real threat. Herman argues that only in the competitive environment of a dialectical war-game, where human is pitted against human, can potential future techniques for cyber-attack be discovered and countermeasures developed. In this way, military organisations can begin to develop active defensive—and even offensive—techniques to complement today's well developed methods of passive computer defence.

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**'The military is the offensive team for cyber warfare, and it's important to have both a good offense and defense.'**

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Regular readers of the *SOPD* may recall that in Issue 61 the editors recommended Charles W Williamson III's article, 'Carpet bombing in cyberspace'. Within this article, Williamson examined the potential *equipment* requirements of an offensive cyber-war capability. Herman's article complements Williamson's, focusing on the potential *human* requirements for such a capability. For Army officers, Herman's insistence that it is humans who are at the centre of war will ring true.

*Mark Herman is Vice President of Modelling, Simulation and War-Gaming at Booz Allen Hamilton. He is also a lecturer at the US Naval War College.*

**David Malet, 'Faith in the System: Conceptualising Grand Strategy in the Post 9/11 World Order', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 31, Iss. 8, pp. 723–35.**

Terrorism, as a tactic, is exceedingly difficult to counter in Western countries where many would rather see their government simply abandon national interests rather than pursue them at the risk of further terrorist violence. Terrorists, on the other hand, would rather die than surrender their political and ideological agendas. Accordingly, there exists a large differential between the will of the West and that of adversaries such as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

David Malet's article, therefore, is timely in that it offers a fresh perspective on how to combat this important enemy advantage and, ultimately, defeat such foes. Drawing on a number of theoretical and conceptual constructs, Malet argues that terrorist groups are fighting to cut the links that increasingly bind the world together in the age of globalisation. These links spread Western ideas and influence and sometimes undermines the power-bases of traditional groups. Some of these traditional authorities, like religious scholars and tribal elders, pursue terrorism as a means to force Western retreat, thereby restoring their historical status.

Fighting these figures, Malet argues, only benefits their cause as they use the inevitable mistakes committed in war as evidence for their claims of Western arrogance. Malet maintains that, rather than fight terrorists, the West should be 'fighting' to spread its culture, ideas and thus influence. In this way, Western countries will simply make terrorists

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**'Expressing the conflict in terms of relative influence permits a definition of the issue of contention that is currently lacking.'**

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and insurgents irrelevant to their 'constituents'. Should force still be necessary at some stage, these 'fringe dwellers' would be isolated from their fellow citizens and thus easily found. While Malet's arguments are not particularly new, his assemblage of theoretical and conceptual devices adds intellectual rigour to the many less-structured but essentially similar arguments that have gone before. In this sense then, Malet's article is of considerable interest to senior Army officers.

*David Malet is a faculty member of the Department of Political Science, George Washington University.*

**Scott Flower, 'Muslims in Melanesia: putting security issues in perspective', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 62, Iss. 3, pp. 408–29.**

Government policy often warns of the dangers of failed and failing states in Australia's region. Such states may fall prey to terrorist and extremist groups who could use such lawless areas as launching platforms for terrorist attacks on Australia and its allies. However, as the ADF has learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, these groups can only achieve such a foothold with the support of the local populace. Without that assistance, terrorists and insurgents are isolated and extremely vulnerable to the military and security forces of their opponents.

Scott Flower, therefore, believes that there is cause for some optimism in our region. He argues that the Muslim populations in Melanesian countries are, on average, small and somewhat impermanent. While there are core groups of dedicated believers throughout Melanesia, they are so small that they would not be able to provide terrorists and insurgents with the critical

support base that they require. Accordingly, Flower believes that the threat from terrorists in the event of state failure in the region is somewhat overstated.

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**‘The hype about the potential for terrorism in Melanesia due to the region’s weak and failing states has obscured some of the less noteworthy but equally important developments.’**

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Flower is not without caution, however, and he maintains that the combination of state failure and Melanesian Muslim populations could result in other unforeseen problems, which he details throughout his article. Senior officers of the ADF who must consider the possibility of regional chaos would do well to examine Flower’s article and consider the many interesting points that he covers.

Reading this article may help them illuminate the many possible causes of strife that the region is liable to experience aside from terrorism or insurgency.

*Scott Flower is a PhD candidate at the Crawford School of Economics, Australian National University. He has previously worked as a consultant advising the Australian Government on international development and security issues.*

**Clive Moore, ‘Pacific view: the meaning of governance and politics in the Solomon Islands’, *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 62, Iss. 3, pp. 386–407.**

Australian peacekeepers have been deployed in the Solomon Islands for over five years, and have made great strides towards ensuring a sustainable and prosperous future for the country. However, a niggling degree of corruption and instability remains—a problem which Clive Moore argues will be an ongoing challenge.

Moore’s grasp of Solomon Islands politics, culture and society is thorough, and he puts his knowledge to excellent use in this interesting article. He points out that the corruption that is often witnessed by RAMSI personnel is a cultural phenomenon that has existed for many years and one that is central to the lives of the indigenous people. He believes that RAMSI’s insistence on trying to stamp out low-level corruption is counterproductive, and risks alienating the people it is trying to help. He also examines the centrality of religion and spirituality in the lives of Solomon Islanders and their society more broadly, demonstrating that many of the seemingly incongruous acts of the nation’s politicians are logical if one considers their religious beliefs and their societal positions.

The intense insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq have reminded the ADF of the criticality of cultural awareness to operations. Moore’s article offers senior officers an excellent opportunity to re-examine the Solomon Island’s unique cultural and social environment in the context of the ADF’s lengthy intervention in that country.

*Clive Moore is a Professor at the Department of Political History, University of Queensland. His latest research project was a history of the Malaita Province of the Solomon Islands.*

*'Reflections' has been designed by the Editors of the SOPD to showcase the most influential texts from history regarding operations, strategy and politics. This month the Editors of the SOPD recommend:*

**T E Lawrence, 'The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence', *The Arab Bulletin*, 20 August 1917, <<http://www.dami.army.pentagon.mil/offices/dami-zxg/The%2027%20Articles%20of%20T.E.Lawrence-20AUG1917.pdf>>.**

T E Lawrence's 27 Articles is a landmark work in military literature. Many officers have used it as a starting point for their preparations for service alongside Arab forces. Even today, over 90 years after publication, many of the matters Lawrence raised are still debated. Lawrence's authority to write on this matter is undisputed—his immense success leading Bedouin nomads against the troops of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War proves it.

Australian forces will soon be deployed in significant training and advisory roles in Afghanistan, and have recently completed deployments in similar roles in Iraq. Lawrence's 27 Articles are each important for these forces today, but not in their original roles. They should not serve as a direct guide to behaviour—for example they give advice on the best types of servants to retain. Nor will their focus be relevant—Afghanis, of course, are not Arabs. Rather, the 27 Articles offer a guide to thinking about ways to assist an Army's interaction with any foreign culture. Lawrence highlights many of the areas where Western culture differs from almost all other cultures—religion, secularism, individuality, social mores and norms and prevailing attitudes to different groups. The Centre for Army Lessons offers excellent guides on these issues to deploying forces but, like any training or doctrinal material, this information must be shrewdly interpreted. Lawrence's 27 Articles offers ADF personnel the opportunity to easily identify the points of divergence between Australian and foreign cultures, helping them to convert the 'black-and-white' facts of pre-deployment briefs into effective 'shades-of-grey'.

*Thomas Edward Lawrence was born 16 August 1888 in Tremadog, North Wales. After both undergraduate and postgraduate studies at Oxford University, Lawrence travelled to the Middle East where he worked as an archaeologist and researcher. Upon the outbreak of the First World War, Lawrence joined the Army where he put to work his extensive knowledge of the language, terrain and infrastructure of the Ottoman Empire's Arabian possessions. In 1916, Lawrence was assigned as an advisor to Emir Faisal's Arab revolt forces. In this role he proved instrumental in a number of daring guerrilla attacks on Turkish positions, culminating in the seizure of Damascus on 1 October 1918. Lawrence was made a Companion of the Order of Bath and admitted to the Distinguished Service Order for his efforts during the war. He wrote of his experiences in the book *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* and also in *Revolt in the Desert*, both of which were published in 1926. Lawrence died 19 May 1935.*