

S O P D



Senior Officer Professional Digest

September 2009, Issue 75

Contents

2 ARTICLE SUMMARIES

- Reframing the Historical Problematic of Insurgency *by Jonathan E Gumz*
- Force Protection and the Death of Common Sense *by Michael D Grice*
- 3 Afghanistan's Nangarhar Inc *by David K Spencer*
- 4 To Kill a Mockingbird *by Randolph Rosin*
The Israeli Defense Forces Response to the 2006 War with Hezbollah *by Matt M Matthews*
- 5 Caught in the Net *by Gautam Mukunda and William J Troy*
- 6 Cyber-Scare *by Evgeny Morozov*
Terrorists: Neither Soldiers nor Criminals *by Amitai Etzioni*
- 7 Future Strategic Environment in an Era of Persistent Conflict *by Paul S Oh*
- 8 The region within *by Shahar Hameiri*
- ### UPCOMING SEMINAR
- 9 LWSC/ADFA Changing Character of War Seminar Series — Professor Ian Beckett

The **Senior Officer Professional Digest** is a publication of the Land Warfare Studies Centre. Feedback regarding this publication is welcome and should be addressed to the Director.



Land Warfare Studies Centre
Ian Campbell Road
Duntroon ACT 2600
Australia
+61 2 6265 9624
lwsc.publications@defence.gov.au

MESSAGE FROM THE EDITORS

This month the Editors of the *Senior Officer Professional Digest* recommend ten articles drawn from professional and academic journals on the subjects of military history, force protection, counterinsurgency (COIN), information operations (IO), the 2009 War in Gaza, network-centric warfare (NCW), cyber war, international law, the future strategic environment and Australian diplomacy.

Since the commitment of Western forces to Afghanistan and Iraq, scholars and soldiers alike have been struggling to come to grips with the myriad of challenges facing modern Western armies. Many of the responses to the changing character of warfare have centred on either a classical approach, advocating that Western armies 'go back to basics', or a more *avant garde* approach, calling for a radical 're-think' of war.

As is often the case, wisdom is evident in both groups' arguments, and so the Editors bring the best of both of these approaches to you this month. Jonathan E Gumz's article opens our recommendations with a pointed critique of contemporary COIN theory. He examines the historical arguments that underpin much of the prominent COIN literature being discussed today and concludes—rather alarmingly—that most of the historical foundations of current theory are flawed, thereby skewing contemporary COIN debate. Gumz advocates a return to proper scholarly standards for historical study to prevent such mistakes from occurring in future. Michael D Grice, David K Spencer, Randolph Rosin and Matt M Matthews all argue for similarly 'timeless' approaches to the issues of force protection, reconstruction, IO and urban combined-arms operations respectively.

Gautam Mukunda and William J Troy's article, while equally as compelling as the preceding authors', argue for *new* approaches to contemporary issues, arguing that NCW must be implemented with an eye to the problems of Wall Street, from whence many NCW concepts originated. In a similar vein, Evgeny Morozov, Amitai Etzioni, Paul S Oh and Shahar Hameiri examine cyber war, international law, the future strategic environment and Australian diplomacy respectively, with each advocating new solutions or unique interpretations.

Enjoy
The Editors

Jonathan E Gumz, 'Reframing the Historical Problematic of Insurgency: How the Professional Military Literature Created a New History and Missed the Past', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 4, August 2009, pp 553–88.

Nowhere this month is the clarion call for a return to basic precepts more clearly sounded than in Jonathan Gumz's article for the *Journal of Strategic Studies*. The modern preoccupation of military scholarship with insurgency and small wars is based upon historical falsehoods, miscomprehensions and selective memory—at least that is the view of Jonathan E Gumz. In what constitutes a direct challenge to the so-called small wars 'experts' and their analytical methodology, Gumz takes aim at what he views to be a present-day military fad—counterinsurgency. In recent months, the Editors have recommended articles heavily influenced by counterinsurgency literature. These have included works by soldiers and academics who have advocated for military organisations to apply 'lessons learnt' from the history of COIN, as well as articles by those who foresee small wars and insurgency as *the* paradigm of future military engagements. In this highly recommended article, Gumz presents a counter to these works that is likely to trigger vigorous debate.

According to Gumz, without considering wider historical contexts, the majority of counterinsurgency literature is guilty of plucking examples of success from the past and deploying those lessons in the present. As a result, it is posited that this co-called 'cherry-picking' approach results in policy decisions being influenced by the successes of yesteryear, without due consideration of the political and historical realities that led to those successes in the first place. For example, as Gumz puts forth, one cannot simply point to development-centered COIN approaches during the Vietnam War without accepting that those policies were adopted within a distinctly Keynesian context of government-led economics. It is legitimate to ask, therefore, if these successes apply today. 'Reframing the Historic Problematic of Insurgency' points to the rewriting of history, analytical inconsistencies and unworkable inclusions within the majority of COIN literature. As such, senior officers are strongly encouraged to read this article for its contribution to military debate and for its rather controversial implication that everything we think we know about insurgency and how to counter it is probably wrong.

Jonathan E Gumz is an Assistant Professor of History at the United States Military Academy at West Point.

Michael D Grice, 'Force Protection and the Death of Common Sense', *Marine Corps Gazette*, August 2009, pp. 8–12.

In the July 2009 edition of the *SOPD*, the Editors recommended 'Tactical Generals', by Peter W Singer, who posited that emerging robotic technologies were dramatically blurring the line that otherwise exists between the tactician in the field and the general afar. In a similar vein, in this month's issue of the *Marine Corps Gazette*, Michael D Grice explores centralised authority in

'If [junior officers] can be trusted to put a bullet through the heart of an insurgent, then they should be trusted to make the simple decisions that can directly affect their ability to accomplish their mission.'

the US Marine Corps and the implications that such decision-making has for effectiveness on operations. In this brief yet highly informative article—awarded an Honorable Mention in the 2008 Chase Prize Essay Contest—Grice presents some compelling arguments which highlight inconsistencies between micro-level regulations promulgated by higher authority and the need for junior officers to demonstrate initiative in a ‘strategic private’s’ war.

Arguably, in counterinsurgency campaigns such as those being currently conducted, it is required that junior officers demonstrate initiative and display autonomous action in the field. At the same time, senior leaders must reconcile this requirement with their responsibility to maintain overall oversight of operational conduct and manage risks accordingly. Yet, as Grice argues, there may be times when the junior leader might be restricted from achieving operational success as a result of such centralised authority. The Editors recommend this article for its illustration of the difficulties inherent to counterinsurgency and also for its analysis of leadership in complex environments. Of considerable importance to senior officers, ‘Force Protection and the Death of Common Sense’ touches upon a number of concepts pertinent to senior leaders, such as responsibility, trust, confidence and consequences in battle. The Editors trust that readers will find this article both an engaging and stimulating discussion point.

Lieutenant Colonel Grice has completed two tours of Iraq and one of Afghanistan. He is currently the Commanding Officer of 1 Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company.

David K Spencer, ‘ “Afghanistan’s Nangarhar Inc”: A Model for Interagency Success’, *Military Review*, Vol. 89, Iss. 4, July/August 2009, pp. 34–40,
<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2009_0831_art008.pdf>.

How does one define ‘interagency success’? Literature concerning counterinsurgency is so tied to broad concepts such as ‘comprehensive approaches’, ‘partnership’, and the need for an overall ‘unity of effort’—to name a few—that one must question how they translate to success. For David K Spencer, the US 173 Airborne Brigade Combat Team’s (BCT) experience operating in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar Province offers a glimpse of what is possible. Instigated from a necessity to synchronise development efforts and realign mission priorities, the efforts of the 173 BCT during Task Force Bayonet is offered as an illustration of how the military can facilitate effective interagency cooperation in the field. Of considerable use to policy-makers, this straightforward and engaging article examines the realities for those attempting to deliver on development promises in an operational environment susceptible to ‘project fratricide’. Task Force Bayonet’s answer: create a unifying incorporation which not only links provincial development projects to long-term economic success, but which also acts as a binding agent for the various civil, military and Afghan agencies’ efforts. Thus, Nangarhar Inc. was born.

This article is recommended to senior officers for its outline of a successful case study of interagency leadership in the field. Many of its ‘lessons’ will immediately appear rather obvious, yet saying that, it provides a sombre reminder that what is advocated and what is actually delivered in counterinsurgency and nation-building are often different. With the ongoing debate

between policy-makers and academia regarding the merit of various measures in COIN, David Spencer's article presents a microcosm for success.

Major David K Spencer is currently a student at the United States Naval Postgraduate School. He has served two tours in Iraq and one tour in Afghanistan.

Randolph Rosin, 'To Kill a Mockingbird: The Deconstruction of Information Operations', *Small Wars Journal*, 17 August 2009,
<<http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/283-rosin.pdf>>.

Over the last few years, Information Operations (IO) has emerged as one of the most important features of counterinsurgency campaigns waged in the modern, media-saturated operating environment. Many prominent US officers, like Generals David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno, have made the case for IO, arguing that it is the key to leveraging actions for the purposes of influencing uncommitted populations.

'With the introduction of the tank during WWI, the Army glimpsed ... the future of mechanised warfare. After the war, however; the Army closed its eyes to the potential of armored warfare and ... [d]evelopment of mobile armoured warfare was stifled ... Today, we face a similar situation with respect to ... the potential of the combined effects achieved through ... the IO paradigm.'

The retired Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege has been a prolific writer and theoriser on this topic, and the Editors of the *SOPD* have recommended several of his articles on IO in the past. Randolph Rosin offers a much-needed operational perspective on IO, which, quite interestingly, stands in direct contrast to Wass de Czege's ideas. Essentially, Rosin focuses on the discrepancies between Wass de Czege's logically deduced ideas and the experience-based practice of IO operators in Iraq and Afghanistan. These officers, the author argues, are performing well despite not fully following the new US IO doctrine shaped by Wass de Czege.

Adaptive Campaigning clearly spells out the importance of Information Operations, and senior officers will no doubt find Rosin's critique of Wass de Czege extremely interesting. This article is engaging, brief and to-the-point and brings to senior officers the benefit of the wisdom of an experienced IO practitioner.

Colonel Randolph Rosin, US Army, is currently serving as the MNC-I Information Operations Chief. He also served as PSYOP Officer/Deputy IO Chief in US Central Command between 2000 and 2003.

Matt M Matthews, 'The Israeli Defense Forces Response to the 2006 War with Hezbollah', *Military Review*, Vol. 89, Iss. 4, July/August 2009, pp. 41–51,
<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20090831_art009.pdf>.

The Israeli Defense Force's (IDF) experience in the preparation and execution of its Gaza campaign, Operation CAST LEAD, offers valuable lessons for the Australian Army. Despite the

obvious differences between the strategic environments, Israel's conduct of recent conflicts provides excellent case studies from which to observe a number of truths about modern warfighting. In particular, the IDF's failures in its 2006 war against the Hezbollah and its subsequent success in Gaza in 2008–09 provides a number of useful examples on how to adapt from past mistakes in a short amount of time.

Matt M Matthew's article emphasises the errors in Israel's approach to the 2006 war with Hezbollah and outlines the range of measures that the IDF employed to ensure that it did not repeat the same mistakes in Gaza. Specifically, he identifies the return to traditional doctrine after a disastrous experiment with an 'alternative conceptual framework' known as Systematic Operational Design (SOD). In addition, the IDF went back to basics with a renewed emphasis on conventional warfighting skills. By revisiting the fundamentals of modern warfare the IDF acknowledged that if air power and precision fires were to be decisive they must be informed by well-trained troops on the ground.

The IDF's experiences in the lead-up to and prosecution of the war against Hamas in Gaza should reinforce the importance of the Chief of Army's renewed focus on conventional warfighting. Nevertheless, this article also reminds us that a resourceful and imaginative enemy can catch even a historically successful army unprepared and serves as a warning against complacency even within the more benign environment of our own region.

Matt M Matthews is currently employed by the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Gautam Mukunda and William J Troy, 'Caught in the Net: Lessons from the Financial Crisis for a Networked Future', *Parameters*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, Summer 2009, pp. 63–76, <<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/09summer/mukunda%20and%20troy.pdf>>.

Network-centric warfare (NCW) is the proverbial opened-Pandora's box, and just as Pandora's box released evils—but also hope—into the world, so too has the concept of NCW released a whole series of 'double-edged' instruments into the hands of warfighters. Gautam Mukunda and William J Troy's excellent article for *Parameters* explores one of the key hopes of an NCW-enabled commander: the abolition of uncertainty on the battlefield.

Examining the potential for NCW to enable powerful predictive simulations, Mukunda and Troy argue that future commanders may be seduced by Alfred North Whitehead's 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness'—essentially mistaking the 'map for the territory'. While such highly detailed simulations may be accurate most of the time, allowing a commander's forces to practice many hundreds of variations of an operation until the commander is satisfied they have eliminated all flaws from their plan, the model is only a model—it can never accurately predict a situation 100 percent of the time. Moreover, such models are inherently weak in predicting large variations from the norm—precisely when a commander needs their predictive power the most. As Mukunda and Troy show, similar models failed catastrophically during the financial crisis, prompting one market analyst to state that they were 'like an air bag that works all the time, except when you have a car accident'.

For senior officers, the value of Mukunda and Troy's article is patently clear. Fortunately, the authors have presented their arguments in a compelling and easily read format. Accordingly, this article comes highly recommended by the Editors.

Gautam Mukunda is a PhD candidate in political science studying at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Major General William J Troy, US Army, is Vice Director, J8, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment Directorate, US Joint Staff. He has served as Chief of Staff, Multi National Command – Iraq.

Evgeny Morozov, 'Cyber-Scare', *Boston Review*, July/August 2009, pp. 17–20.

As 'Web 2.0' continues to encroach upon our daily lives, it is common for security analysts and strategists to attach the word 'cyber' to any number of natural disasters or human catastrophes—such as 'cyber-Katrina', 'cyber-9/11' and 'cyber-Armageddon'—to illustrate worst-case scenarios posed by the Internet in the twenty-first century. According to Evgeny Morozov, this not only leads to irrational policy responses but also overestimates the utility of information technology as a weapon in war. In previous issues of the *SOPD*, the Editors have recommended a number of articles that have focussed on the potential for state and non-state actors to use the Internet as a means of inflicting damage on economic, military and political targets. Articles concerning hybrid war are just one example. As somewhat of a critique of this literature, 'Cyber-Scare' is recommended for offering a balanced analysis of cyber-security concerns at present.

Of considerable interest to senior officers, this article explores a number of issues related to our definition of armed force, the principles of *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* as well as touching on deterrence theory in relation to cyber-threats. Arguably, this somewhat technically lightweight piece lacks sufficient detail to adequately explore some of the issues it highlights; nonetheless, it is useful in providing the reader with a broad overview of the cyber-security debate by addressing both the utility and limitations inherent with information technology. For those who have kept abreast of recent stories of cyber-warfare—such as those concerning Estonia and Georgia—'Cyber-Scare' is likely to present a fresh perspective.

'It is alarming that so many people have accepted assertions about cyber-security as a national security problem without demanding further evidence.'

Evgeny Morozov is a researcher and blogger whose work focuses on the political effects of the Internet. In addition to the Boston Review, his writing has appeared in the International Herald Tribune, Slate and Foreign Policy, among others.

Amitai Etzioni, 'Terrorists: Neither Soldiers nor Criminals', *Military Review*, Vol. 89, Iss. 4, July/August 2009, pp. 108–18,

<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20090831_art018.pdf>.

As Amitai Etzioni sees it, conventional armies that seek to adhere to the accepted rules of war are coming under increasing pressure to circumvent these rules. The prevalence of non-state

actors in theatres such as Afghanistan requires modification in the interpretation, if not the substantive texts of the rules of war. While Etzioni's article focuses on the implications of this development for the United States, it is no less pertinent to Australia, particularly in light of the recent threat to Holsworthy Army Base and our ongoing involvement in the war in Afghanistan.

The core of Etzioni's argument is that it is wrong to treat terrorists as either soldiers or criminals. Characterising terrorists as soldiers disadvantages our forces when we attempt to apply the rules of war and delegitimises our efforts if we do not. Conversely, treating terrorists as criminals is a mistake for a variety of reasons not least of which is the enormous repercussions of such attacks and the unique nature of investigating and prosecuting terrorist plots. Instead, the author attempts to define a third way that more adequately reflects the distinct legal and normative precepts that are necessary in terrorism cases. To this end, he advocates for a special detention authority and a separate judicial body who would deal specifically with terrorist matters. At the same time, those accused would be afforded more basic rights than have existed under the current system in the United States.

Perhaps Etzioni's most relevant recommendation for military organisations engaged in counter-terrorist operations is the proposed introduction of 'Armed Conflict Zones'. Such zones would be declared by the United States or any other nation attempting to avoid a terrorist attack and would involve the exclusion of all arms within the area and the targeting of any individual deemed to be conducting a combat-like mission. The aim of this policy would be to delineate between 'combatant' and 'non-combatant' civilians, the terms Etzioni prefers to use instead of 'terrorist'.

While much of this article relates to the domestic situation in the United States, it is recommended due to its potential use in redefining the relationship between state and non-state actors in today's ever-increasingly complex battlespace.

Amitai Etzioni is Professor of International Relations at George Washington University.

Paul S Oh, 'Future Strategic Environment in an Era of Persistent Conflict', *Military Review*, Vol. 89, Iss. 4, July/August 2009, pp. 68–79,

<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20090831_art012.pdf>.

Paul S Oh's article offers senior officers a rather sobering look at the future of human civilisation. Increasing social and economic stratification; youth bulges; infectious disease; rogue states and belligerent rising powers; water and energy scarcity—the increasing prominence of none of these things is surprising to Australian officers. Nor is it surprising that many of these problems are unfolding on Australia's doorstep in the poorer nations of South Eastern and Southern Asia.

'The challenges of the next 20 years are immense and diverse.'

Paul S Oh's article offers senior officers a clear and concise examination of what all of these problems are likely to mean—the 'so what'—for a first-world country like Australia. In a phrase, these problems mean 'expeditionary operations'. Oh's conclusions point inexorably towards a future where Western nations, like Australia, will need to mount strong, expeditionary operations into the 'arc of instability', which, in Australia's neighbourhood is characterised by a maritime, archipelagic environment. This highlights the importance of the successful introduction into service of the new Amphibious Deployment and Sustainment Capability (ADAS). This will require a concerted effort by Army to ensure that its forces are trained, equipped and—most importantly—conceptually and intellectually conditioned for maritime manoeuvre operations. Only after the Army has adapted in this manner can it consider itself truly ready for military operations in the kind of future that Oh's article illustrates.

Major Paul S Oh, US Army, is an Assistant Professor of Social Science at the United States Military Academy. He has served on operations in Iraq and at posts throughout the United States as an intelligence officer.

Shahar Hameiri, 'The region within: RAMSI, the Pacific Plan and new modes of governance in the Southwest Pacific', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 3, September 2009, pp 348–60.

Strengthening the territorial integrity and stability of our neighbours is often accepted as one of Australia's enduring strategic objectives. Towards these ends, assistance missions for our Pacific neighbours are not only viewed by the Australian Government as improving the security of regional nations but are also seen to reinforce the long-term security of Australia. In the *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Shahar Hameiri analyses Australia's recent activities in the South-West Pacific, illuminating what the author considers to be a broad strategy of 'new regionalism', which 'work[s] to selectively dislodge the linkages between territory and political authority, building transnational forms of regulation and surveillance into the state.' Directly related to how Australia views itself and is regarded by others in our nearer region, Hameiri points to an exportation of Australian *governance* in the Pacific—an assertion that will likely invite criticism and which will hopefully stimulate debate.

Over the past decade the ADF, and in particular the Army, has played a major role in responding to regional instability by providing the security necessary for other government agencies to build the governance capacity, and the social development of our neighbours. Rather than viewing 'The region within' as a reproach to these efforts, this article is recommended for offering a unique interpretation of Australia's engagement in the Pacific, providing valuable food for thought on an issue that is both timely and arguably persistent in Australian policy debates. Senior officers with an interest in Australian policy responses in the Pacific will likely find this article valuable regardless of whether they necessarily agree with its premises or its overall conclusions. 'The region within' therefore comes highly recommended.

Shahar Hameiri is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Asia Research Centre, Murdoch University. His main research interests include international state building, new modes of governance, and Australian security and development policy.

LWSC/ADFA Changing Character of War Seminar Series

The Land Warfare Studies Centre in conjunction with the Australian Defence Force Academy will deliver the second in its Changing Character of War Seminar Series in October.

The seminar will be delivered by Professor Ian F Beckett, Honorary Professor of Military History at the University of Kent, at Badcoe Hall, RMC Duntroon, 1500 on 7 October 2009.

A Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, Professor Beckett is Chairman of the Council of the Army Records Society. He has previously held chairs at the universities of Luton and Northampton, as well as having been Major General Matthew C Horner Professor of Military Theory at the US Marine Corps University and Visiting Professor of Strategy at the US Naval War College.

His many publications include *The Great War, 1914-1918* (2nd ed. 2007), *The First World War: The Essential Guide to Sources in the UK National Archives* (2002) and *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies* (2001).



For any enquiries relating to the Changing Character of War seminar series, please contact Mr Campbell Micallef at campbell.micallef1@defence.gov.au