Greece February to April 1941
Greece presented singular geographic difficulties for the defending forces, its mountainous defiles dictating the distribution of ports, road and rail routes. The primitive state of the national infrastructure did little to help a long-term defensive posture. Operations in Greece proved to be a nightmare, particularly for logistics units, which struggled with primitive communication systems in rugged terrain over which the enemy enjoyed total air superiority.
Poor liaison between the Greek and Commonwealth forces did not help matters, nor was the force deployed adequate for its task. The allies never enjoyed air superiority, nor could they consolidate any in-depth defence in time to be effective. The official British history of the campaign stated that the ‘British campaign on the mainland of Greece was from start to finish a withdrawal’.
Greece: February to April 1941 explores these complexities, and mistakes.
25 July 2017Chief of Army History Conference 19-20 Oct 12 July 2017Talisman Saber 17 exercises Allies' capabilities 3 July 2017Plan Beersheba sees Army Reservists supporting 3 Bde 27 June 2017ADFHQ standing up 01 July 25 June 2017CA interviewed about domestic violence in Army