**SERVING VITAL INTERESTS:**
**AUSTRALIA’S STRATEGIC PLANNING IN PEACE AND WAR**

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INTRODUCTION
Lieutenant-General John Sanderson

The subject of this year's history conference—strategic planning—should quite rightly reside in the province of Headquarters ADF and the Department of Defence. Indeed it is the subject of much contemporary study and activity in Australian defence circles as we struggle to come to terms with our changing strategic outlook and the varying expectations which our society has of its defence forces.

It is always possible, of course, that the services' view of the strategic imperatives at any point in time, and those of the Australian people, could diverge significantly. Such an occurrence would not be without historical precedent. But, as we all know, any successful engine of war must be fuelled continuously by the spiritual and material resources of the community whose interests it represents. This applies in peace and war, but there can be little doubt that the way you go to war, and indeed, the nature of the war itself, will be determined in large part by the relationship which exists between the Parliament and the Defence Force, in peace, and the mechanisms which are put in place to give expression to this. How these have been shaped in the past, and what effect they have had on Australian strategic planning, is of great interest to us. Their effectiveness in the transition from peace to conflict should inform our judgements about what is their most suitable form. Indeed, a study of these matters should help to reveal to us some idea about the optimum relationship between national security policy and force structure, while recognising that economic factors may throw this out of kilter at any point in time.

Recently we have been through a paradoxical period of strategic planning in which, on the one hand, the Government has resisted vociferous claims that Defence should sustain large cuts in order to share the burden of reductions in public sector spending more fully, while on the other hand defence spending has been reduced below two per cent of GNP for the first time in close to half a century. To this sort of audience the paradox will be obvious. There is a sense that the Australian people are sufficiently uneasy about the emerging strategic environment to want to keep a viable, modern defence force, but not so uneasy as to want to do so at too much expense to other areas of public outlay. There is generally bipartisan support for this view, which means that it is probably about right. These perceptions are the foundation.

At every point in history people have looked forward with some expectation of uncertainty about the rate of change, and it is generally agreed that from the position which Australia currently occupies things will change profoundly in the coming decades.
Assuming that history can provide adequate guideposts for those negotiating the byways of the 'real world', what might we include in a historical casebook, course syllabus, or reading list on joint/combined strategic planning? Some obvious items from the ancient and mediaeval worlds were once well known to school children, from Homer's depictions of Bronze Age war councils, and Herodotus' description of the Persians generating schemes whilst drunk and reviewing them hung over, to Themistocles' analyses of Athenian strategy, and Cato's relentless thunderings against Carthage in the Senate. Those would, of course, have to be placed in perspective with the work of modern historians, as would such cases as the Crusades; Lepanto; the Spanish Armada; the Seven Years' War, including Wolfe's journal; the American Revolution; and the Napoleonic Wars. American Civil War strategy is well known, far more than that of the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and Latin America's international wars of the last two centuries as well as the Wars of Liberation.

Other likely candidates for inclusion are inter-allied dynamics in the Crimean War and the Boxer Expedition, and war plans and planning structures before and during the World Wars. Gallipoli remains a salient case, although its having become the iconic bad example of amphibious tactics has tended to overshadow its sophisticated planning and preparations. An extract from the Gallipoli Committee report might serve as an antidote to that. Something on the combatants' high commands and Supreme War Council might also be presented, as well as glimpses, at least, of Franco-Spanish planning of the Alhucemas operation, the structure and workings of the British Committee of Imperial Defence, American Joint Board, the Reichswehr's Truppenamt, the French, Japanese and Soviet High Commands, OKW, British Combined Operations, the American Joint Chiefs and British Chiefs of Staff, and that most forlorn of hopes, ABDACOM.

More recent instances include NATO, the USSR and Warsaw Pact, SEATO, CENTO, MACV and the United Nations; inclusion would also be warranted of Suez, Korea, Viet Nam, the Falklands War, the Gulf War, modern programme budgeting and strategic planning, and the evolving of various nations' Cold War strategic planning systems and strategies, conventional and nuclear.

Beyond those are linked aspects of 'jointness' and 'combinedness', including command and staff processes, 'coalition warfare', 'strategy' and 'grand strategy', as well as 'jointness', and 'combinedness' themselves, which have been dealt with in official circles in various nations, from terse definitions in armed forces' lexicons, to abstruse discussions of elements of strategy relevant to 'jointness' and 'combinedness', like theory, and style. A survey of contemporary military professionals on any of those would very likely produce a wide diversity of approximations, a good many of them based on the official definitions, and others more idiosyncratic or custom built, derived from personal experiences with jointness.

While 'jointness' and 'combinedness' are not synonymous, they have often been closely linked, especially in military operations in the twentieth century, as forces have been increasingly 'packaged' both within individual nations' armed forces, and within alliances to deal with various contingencies. Beyond that, both of those topics are subsets of the broad realm of organisational fusion, in the military branches of which logistics, command-and-control, intelligence, strategy, operational art and tactics blend, each with its own subset of complexities and idiosyncrasies, including specific terms and ways of doing things. Some of that reflects functional and structural differentiation, and some of it conveys a chronic deep...
seated parochialism. Arguably, ‘combinedness’ is more convoluted than ‘jointness’, since it often includes the latter, but also encompasses both the blending of differing cultures, subcultures, languages, and the ‘tribalism’ of cooperating armed forces, in an overlap of diplomacy, anthropology and public relations—and that vast and tangled domain of national interest.

However helpful examining any of those military phenomena may or may not be in framing specific doctrines, methods or firm definitions, it does provide a perspective on the complexities of ‘jointness’ and ‘combinedness’, and their frequent overlapping, and the many paradoxes and quandaries that flow from them. In both ‘jointness’ and ‘combinedness’, for example, boundaries between allies and comrades have often been much higher and thicker in peace than in war, reflecting both military insularity and nationalism in a larger sense. Extremes in the range of that tide can be seen in the massive support for the use of United Nations armed force by the American public in World War II, Korea, and the early Cold War, and for multinational command in various regions, and finally the Gulf War, in contrast with the hostility to such policies in the 1930s and 1990s.

Somewhat more theoretically, both ‘jointness’ and ‘combinedness’ demonstrate the physicists’ ‘law of location’ and a chaos-complexity theory precept: you cannot understand a system unless you get outside it. Gaining such detachment, of course, is very difficult, as is using history to find out just how things actually got done in a particular planning process. That is always an elaborate aggregate of human interactions, with a substantial informal dimension that goes unrecorded. Only the stark anatomy of planning is visible in official documents, and little of the metaphorical physiology—or perhaps the microbiology of command and staff. While the details of that process also tend to be out of view or focus in militarily-related social science studies and history, the relative sparsity and impressionism of depictions of ‘jointness’ and ‘combinedness’ do provide enough to swamp the perceptual capacity of historians and military professionals alike. A casual glance at ancient and classical history reveals many examples of the collaboration of land and sea forces, including port-to-port, port-to-beach, and beach-to-port transporting of ground troops, equipment, supplies, horses and slaves. While Herodotus and Thucydides provided tracings of the complex alliances and faint glimpses of both Greek and Persian ‘jointness’ and ‘combinedness’, the descriptions of ‘jointness’ are somewhat sharper. Cases of combat at sea involving land forces engaged aboard ships can be found from Salamis and the Roman corvus to the ordeal of Major Harvey at Jutland. Although a host of sieges, opposed and unopposed landings, raids, occupations, and the sustaining and defence of outposts and colonies are described, with many references to naval-maritime fusion in ancient/classical warfare, few specific details, specifications and graphics of ship designs, or of how operations were actually planned, have survived—but that is also true of many modern military and naval operations.

Again, clear glimpses of planning, joint or combined, are rare since that dynamic encompasses individual thought, impulse, vision, inspiration, and the other ‘fuzzy sets’ that make up a ‘commander’s intention’. In any particular case, the crucial shaping forces in planning may be a creative chief of staff, an energetic staff, political pressures, or what Dickens called a bit of undigested mustard. Some bits of the ‘human factor’ are visible in memoirs and diaries, like those of Generals Henry Arnold, Sir Ian Hamilton, Sir Leslie Hollis, Sir John Kennedy, Sir Frederick Morgan, and Raymond Lee, Admiral Lewis Strauss, and in Stephen Roskill’s biography of Lord Hankey. Those have sometimes been visible, as they were during World War II, in the vodka-drinking contests with the Russians, and Churchill’s chronic imbibing, and a number of personality clashes and friendships. Far more, however, lay—and lie—out of view. Who, for example, would try to describe or read the full details of the ‘field of the cloth of gold’ meeting on Sicily in 1943, when dozens of junior Allied flag-rank officers gathered to work out the intricate working of the plans that preceded Operation HUSKY? Such a depiction could only be an impressionistic, selective summary, along the lines of official accounts of the major World War II superconferences, or the Supreme War Council’s workings in 1917-18.
Perhaps much of what happened in respect to 'jointness' and 'combinedness' has not found its way into history books, like Walt Whitman's 'real war,' or lies closer to the realm of Tolstoy or Herman Wouk than 'serious' history. In any case, most military professionals lack the time and opportunity to immerse themselves in archival materials or secondary sources, and gain a sense of what even the paper trail of such intricate processes looks like. Perhaps administrative versions of 'staff rides' might be structured, using archivists, historians and veteran staff officers to provide a clearer sense of planning and bureaucratic processes, and throw light on problems presented by security classification, obviously or apparently missing documents, jargon, anecdotes, allusions, and what's behind those little scribblings in the margins of source documents that may or may not get into 'finished' history. Indeed, the dictum that 'planning is vital, but plans are irrelevant' presents a very deep difficulty, since most evidence of strategic planning is the plans themselves, and linked well-vetted documents. Those are only mountain tops above the mist; or to risk a more bucolic metaphor, administrative equivalents of ruminants' cud as heavily-edited bureaucratic memoranda, minutes of meetings, and substantive summaries routed to all participants to reflect consensus and sweet harmony. The raw material that lies beneath the shaping of narrative history, however exhaustive and carefully crafted it may be. Of course, other forces may squeeze the life and colour out of what was in fact dramatic and fascinating, including self-censorship and final editing by interested parties.

There are many other forces at work in that vortex. Keeping diaries has often been forbidden in wartime for security reasons. Roosevelt allowed no shorthand notes taken in the meetings where he was present, and MacArthur and his lieutenants worked energetically at sanitising and aligning documents. Despite that, some vitality and flavour shine through in Harry Butcher's My Three Years With Eisenhower (which made Eisenhower furious). Lord Alanbrooke's diary, albeit well-edited by Sir Arthur Bryant, and Elliott Roosevelt's very controversial As He Saw It. We do, nevertheless, seem to know quite a bit, or rather, lots of little bits, about 'jointness' and combinedness'. In the realm of 'jointness', we have such ancient and classical cases as the invasion of Egypt by the nine-bow barbarians, or sea peoples; the heyday of Crete; the Persians' amphibious landing at Marathon; and slightly sharper tracings of the many battles and expeditions that marked the history of the sea empires of the Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans and Carthaginians. Further from sight in the West, at least, are the naval histories of China, India and Arabia, and the peoples of southeast Asia, but that is also true of the very complex histories of Byzantium, the Ottoman Turks, the mediaeval military orders, the Italian maritime powers, especially Venice and Genoa, and the Barbary states. Naturally, Americans and British Commonwealth members have a slightly clearer sense of Portugal, Spain and the Dutch as great maritime and naval empires, but also in very broad terms.

Some general patterns of 'jointness' and 'combinedness' are visible across that rich tapestry, including arraying, phasing, articulation, orchestration, and decision sequence in the matrix of distance, context and resources, including:

- whether to try, at the strategic level;
- if so, where and when, within a date range, then a specific time and place;
- decisions re deceptions/feints;
- 'go/no-go' decision, during approach, on arrival, or if an enemy naval force is encountered;
- and, after commitment of the first echelon, whether to stay and hold, try to advance, withdraw slightly or wholly, commit; or
- to withhold reserve, to commit reserves elsewhere, or abandon committed elements.

'Jointness', as we think of it today, existed long before it was worked, in stages, into what looks like a 'modern' rationalised form during the early modern era. Thomas Molyneux's treatise Conjunct Expeditions still offers interesting insights, and an enviable coherence, but applying systematic thought to warfare and 'jointness' long predated the Renaissance, as did 'combinedness'. Although Sir John Dill's statue stands in Arlington National Cemetery, Washington, and Franklin Roosevelt's in Grosvenor Square, London, even in that most ardent of alliances, between Britain and the United States during World War II, hearts rarely beat in
waltz-time. The Crusaders regularly fell out, Marlborough bickered with the Dutch Electors, and Rhode Islanders attacked French Navy Jesuit chaplains on the street in 1779. American relations with a vast nexus of allies oscillated, and sometimes wildly, throughout the Cold War, and the flames of Anglo-French 'combinedness' flickered as low on Carlton Terrace in the summer of 1944 as they had during the Suez Crisis of 1956 and before the meeting at Doullens in 1918.

Some similar patterns can be seen in both the domains of 'jointness' and 'combinedness', despite the unevenness of evidence, and strong emotional loading. First, the history of both 'jointness' and 'combinedness' abound with accounts of military and naval institutions and leaders struggling tenaciously to maintain personal control and organisational boundaries, sometimes at the expense of effectiveness, mission and national security. Strong motives are always involved, if not easily visible. A special paradox is the pervasiveness of indiscipline, despite stereotypes of military institutions being tightly controlled, and emphasis on rigid compliance in rites-of-passage, military and naval law, and traditions. Forms of dissent range from passive non-compliance and avoidance, to incivility and insubordination, and can be found up, down, and across the chain-of-command in military and naval history, often working against the latter and the spirit of 'jointness' and 'combinedness', and sometimes crudely. The density and intensity of personality clashes in democratic armed forces' command hierarchies seem all the more bewildering in view of the fading away of many authoritarian aspects in society in general, although that may represent a social variant of Newton's Third Law. Such pervasive and often much-admired feistiness has, of course, often been roughly balanced by cooperation, accord and the tact that Clausewitz saw as a major antidote to friction in war.

Despite many attempts to trace their workings, it is often not clear in histories of 'jointness' and 'combinedness' just how friction or rapport really worked in specific cases. Although military professionals, historians and analysts often steer past the deep and massive forces, including emotions and motives, which are at work in military organisations in war and peace, or treat them as a given, like background noise, those aspects are especially important in 'jointness' and 'combinedness'. The impulse to draw boundaries and defend them is raised to a pitch in war and, like a gigantic power surge, is very hard to measure, fine-tune or vector. In that sense, structuring both 'jointness' and 'combinedness' resembles artful antenna design, but are very old problems. Until the early nineteenth century, friction was virtually institutionalised in joint and combined operations by the Council-of-War system, under which the commanders of land and sea forces who were sent together on expeditions—men assumed to be mature gentlemen, and who sometimes were—were expected to agree on whether, and if so, when, where and how 'conjunct operations' should be carried out. That practice left the 'higher direction of war' in 'conjunct operations' and allied efforts formally at the mercy of the quality of interpersonal relations. That was dramatised sharply in the mid-eighteenth century by the contrast between the lack of effective rapport between British land and sea commanders at Rochefort in 1757, and the close bond between them in the Quebec campaign of 1759.

Historians have often portrayed personal relationships as vital, both collectively, as in the cases of Nelson's captains and Napoleon's marshals, and at the individual level, as with Wolfe and Craufurd at Quebec, Scott and Conner at Vera Cruz in 1847, Hamilton and de Robeck at Gallipoli in 1915, and Turner and Smith in the Central and North Pacific between 1943 and 1945. Nevertheless, the purity of such alloys was sometimes strained. At a time when many saw Grant and Foote as getting along very well during the riverine war in the West in 1862-63, Foote was advising his superiors that he gave the Army the minimum required, and protected Navy interests. Hostility was far more blatant in British Army and Royal Navy attempts to smother the RAF in its cradle in the 1920s, in the 'Battle of the Smiths' on Saipan in World War II, and in the American interservice rivalry that peaked in open clashes in the late 1940s. Just as Chester Wilmot's The Struggle for Europe opened up historiographical skirmishing on inter-Allied friction in World War II, several studies have probed what was really going on in the higher echelons during DESERT STORM. Putative causes of the frictions visible there include the range of endemic interservice frictions, personalities, structure, doctrine, and personnel policies of the kind that produced a dearth of effective jointness in the United States' armed forces from World War II until it was curtailed if not wholly brought under control by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.
Despite the myriad internecine boundaries and profound differences between situations, military historians and professionals alike have tended to view warfare as broadly generic as they sought to draw analogies, and 'lessons'. While the differentiation in modes of combat seems to have increased sharply over the last two centuries, that was visible also in ancient warfare. Students of Caesar will remember the Roman legion's *triplex acies*—triple battle-lines—*auxilii* of Cretan dart-throwers, Balearic island slingers, Numidian archers, and Gallic cavalry. Nevertheless, since the mid-1700s, the mechanisation of war has generated increases in the scale and diversity of functions, equipment, and format, and a resultant blurring of interservice, international and intercultural boundaries. If Victor Thompson's argument that hierarchy in organisation is mythical and task specialisation is functional reality, then service parochialism can be seen as a kind of blood clot or tourniquet in the anatomy of military organisation.

Despite denigration of the World War II and Gulf War frictions, and other negative cases, it is not wholly clear that the oft-cited functional differences between armed services in themselves explain operational failure in all cases, or that service parochialism is a universal evil. 'Tribal' and psychosocial aspects aside, much of the distinction between services and nations has stemmed from functional differences arising from adaptations to specific environments and milieux. In both 'jointness' and 'combinedness', the lines of particularity have been increasingly brought into tension with broader and very powerful trends, including the evolution of weaponry, communications technology, and air power, all of which forced armies and navies increasingly to disperse and disguise themselves from the eighteenth century onward. At the same time, individual services and nations have been operating less and less autonomously, even on the high seas. Very few wars since 1914 have seen 'pure' clashes of fleets or armies, or nations. While on the surface of it the Falklands campaign looked somewhat atavistic in respect to 'combinedness', it was not a 'pure' model, considering the support each side received from other nations. Recent funding declines have highlighted the difficulties of armed forces' leaders trying to sort out the duplication of some capacities and absence of others, and balance those against the persistent dilemma of redundancies which are unique in war. The latter dilemma is linked to seemingly ephemeral but often crucial differences arising from insight and motivation. Both negative and positive examples of these can be presented. What, for example, if the Royal Navy and British Army's attempts to dismantle the RAF in the 1920s had been successful? Would the traditional services' air arms have been able—or inclined—to deploy forces even roughly equivalent to Fighter Command to defend Britain against the Luftwaffe's onslaught in 1940? Partisans of each service could array instances from history here.

The picture becomes murkier here, when considered in light of PMS Blackett's assertion that the outcomes of modern military operations are usually the aggregate of the results of many dispersed, unlinked individual combats. That pattern is not a modern one. A general pattern of dispersion was visible in the Mediterranean during the Greek-Persian and Punic wars, and throughout the history of privateering at sea, and of guerrilla war on land. Although, as suggested earlier, 'jointness' and 'combinedness' are essentially individual human interactions at all levels of the chain-of-command, it is hardest to trace such patterns at the lowest echelons, other than in the form of anecdotes. A rough index of the intricacy of 'joint' and 'combined' operations is provided by the distribution list of the OVERLORD operations order, which included some 50 nonmilitary or paramilitary intelligence and bureaucratic entities. In another, at one point in mid-1943, an American subchaser carried indigenous Fijian and Solomon Island scouts, Chinese nationals, Australian and New Zealand Army and naval officers, and Coastwatchers while engaging in a range of special missions.

Such examples underline how major historical 'movements', 'events', 'cases' and 'incidents' are gross sums of vast numbers of people doing all kinds of things with and to other people. Considering the 'micro' and informal aspects of both 'jointness' and 'combinedness' opens up a wide fan of nuances and uncertainties. Since perceiving and describing such complexity exceeds individual human beings' coping capacity, neither commanders and staffs, nor historians or journalists can monitor all the cross-threads of 'jointness' and 'combinedness'. That intricacy and ambiguity led Isaiah Berlin to see history as lying very close to metaphysics. When 'jointness' and 'combinedness' are placed on that plane, they can be
envisioned as rare, unstable transitory alloys, heated in the fires of necessity and pounded out on the anvil of war, or as drifting gases that concentrate and disperse as a function of temperature, pressure or friction. Like tactical skills, and diplomatic alliances, both usually degrade quickly during lulls in wartime, or in peacetime.

What would be more useful to military professionals or analysts? A casebook of famous 'joint operations' and structures, or A History of Anti-Jointness, in keeping with Liddell Hart's views on the relative influence of negative examples. Sources for the latter could be the personal correspondence and diaries of many who were involved in joint activities that went awry, official records, media accounts, hearings before representative bodies, and trials reflecting friction from the report of the Dardanelles Commission through the Riom trials in France in 1942 to the so-called 'Battle of the Potomac' in the late 1940s. Of course, analysing the history of 'jointness' and 'combinedness' encounters the inadequacies of all media in depicting complex human activities, including military operations and politics. Neither film, drama, novels nor memoirs, official accounts, nor the most carefully crafted history can present absolutely true depictions of the workings of staffs and military bureaucratic process, nor of the grisly horrors, unique tensions and boredom of war, although many have felt that fiction and poetry have tended to come closer to capturing its essence than operational narratives and 'serious' history. In any case, it is impossible to capture mood exactly, or such ephemeral dimensions of war as the sense of frustration and urgency, especially during the early phases of war, akin to the feeling of walking in deep mud or molasses. That was very visible and powerful in the months following America's entry into the Second World War, and labelled 'too little, too late'. Before Pearl Harbor, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark, had warned Congress that, if war came, dollars would not be able to buy time. Awareness of the growing threat and money did not allow Americans more than a marginal chance to become familiar with the cultural complexities of their imminent allies, or their politics and military practices, or the very expensive and complex steps required for US forces to get ready, let alone 'groove in' operationally in combat.

While historical ignorance is common enough in public affairs, it also often has 'real world' effects, and highlights a special paradox in respect to 'jointness' and 'combinedness', since military planners have often been unaware of models and precedents, even those of very recent vintage. In both 'jointness' and 'combinedness', identifying and passing on 'lessons learned' has often been, in Gershwinian terms, a 'sometime thing'. Part of that can be attributed to a strong impulse on the part of commanders and staffs in battle to orient to their front and to their hierarchy, and, under stress, to fixate on certain things at the expense of others. Armies, navies and air forces, and all their sub-elements, after all, are 'top down' organisations, with a highly developed sense of rivalry. Their basic reflex is not to share information and resources but to hoard them. Not only does that work against the lateral transfer of data, but functional secrecy has tended to suppress or delay information transfer, and has often been harnessed to personal or parochial defensiveness. Some 'lessons' have been rejected because they were seen as trivial, or irrelevant, or because they conflicted with desires, expectations or norms. Such insularity offers some perspective on the unevenness of exchanges between the Allied theatres of operations during World War II. US Marine Corps Major General Julian Smith's claim that the vital 'lessons' of Tarawa could only have been learned in the crucible of war probably reflected things as he saw them, but most items he listed had appeared in after-action reports of US Navy-Marine Corps (and sometimes Army) amphibious FLEXes—fleet exercises—in the 1920s and 1930s, several of them repeatedly, and some in the Dardanelles Commission's report in 1917.

The relatively tangible dimensions of armed services' rivalry, like doctrine and competing for resources, tend to obscure other forces, sometimes amorphous but also sometimes significant, that bear on 'joint' and 'combined' command and staff processes, such as personality, 'national characteristics', 'tribalism' and rivalry within and between services, vendor and political pressures, and what the Russians call shtabnava kultura—staff culture. All that constitutes a perplexingly intricate Venn diagram in which politics, large and small 'p', overlap with economics, sociology, history, anthropology—and even medicine and psychiatry, of which more later. That complexity is compounded by the ambiguities and intricacy arising from planning methods and procedures, and the turbulence of operations, again, the sum totals of individuals' actions. And again, such bewildering swirls cannot be depicted in their full...
detail, but only impressionistically. Many historians recognise the limits of evidence and that
their accounts of the past are imperfect, although most proceed under the assumption that
rational thoughts and decisions shape the course of events. That is a dubious enough
assumption in economics and politics, but even more so in the province of war, where
powerful emotions and forces, including reflex, impulse and intuition play major roles amid the
overloading of senses in combat. ‘Mindset’ is also at work in ‘jointness’ and ‘combinedness’,
as it is in all other aspects of military operations. That included cultural values and attitudes,
as Ken Booth suggested in *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, and led JFC Fuller to point out that
the symbol of war in the Occident is a sword, but a bow and arrow in the Orient. Although
Westerners have shown skill at guile and deviousness in statecraft, war and espionage, the
traditional Western warrior ethic was visible in the Romans' *miles gloriosus*, the Viking
berserkers, Shakespeare’s soldier, ‘bearded like the [leo]pard and swearing strange oaths’,
and Cyrano—all bent on personal combat one on one with a valiant foe. Just as Eskimos
have dozens of words for slight variations in the states of ice and snow, there are many
perjorative slighting terms in American military semantics for passive, devious and subtle
behaviour,57 as well as for cerebration.58 Many of those are identified with feminine behaviour,
a special problem in a subculture where gender distinctions are the source of identity and
major anxieties, especially in *corps d’élite*, but also in inter-service relations.59

As primitive and trivial as such attitudes may seem to the causal observer, they have often
had a profound effect on cohesion in both ‘jointness’ and ‘combinedness’. Military and naval
history show a persistent pattern of deeply engrained internecine suspicions and hostilities,
and a strong correlation between defeat and frustration on the one hand and victory and
cooperation in wartime on the other. It remains to be seen whether the Goldwater-Nichols Act
or British reforms since the 1980s will, at long last, remedy that millenia-old tradition.60 The
odds seem against it, although not every attempt to force new concepts and formats on
reluctant soldiers, sailors and airmen has failed. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was promulgated
as the Reagan defence boom crested in 1986—the peak of the heaviest flow of resources
into the armed forces in peacetime in American history. Some perspective may be gained
from looking further back, and considering the fate of some defence related concepts that
were popular in the United States from halfway through World War II to the Korean War—the
Armed Forces of the United States (AFUS) unification scheme, Universal Military Training,
and standing United Nations armed forces, of which the US planned to provide the air
component. The first two are dormant if not dead, and the latter faltering following a brief,
vague resurgence in the Gulf War. While growing interservice tension may arise from the
decade-long decline in defence funding, and consequent increases in interservice competition
for scarce resources, the growing chasm is reflected in the contrast between the roseate view
of the state of ‘jointness’ in official pronouncements and *Joint Forces Quarterly*, versus recent
issues of the *US. Naval Institute Proceedings*.

However understandable it may be when people long for ‘the good old days’, and seek to hold
on to or return to old ways, the risks of trying to do so in the military realm are very high.
Taking a broader view, trends toward the interweaving and overlapping of systems and
methods have been blurring and collapsing service boundaries in peace and war, generation
after generation since the Renaissance. Those turbulent collisions of complex systems
were—and are—driven by rolling waves of technical innovation that repeatedly confounded
expectations. One general result of that was the erosion of the role of senior leaders as the
immediate overseers of battle, because of the shunting of control in combat to lower echelon
leaders as mechanisation and electrification of war increased the premium on high reaction
speed, adaptability and agility. It also had a major reshaping effect on the nature of technique,
both of staff work and the exercise of command. Nevertheless, many old forms have
remained with us, and frictions are visible throughout the range of histories and memoirs
relevant to ‘jointness’ and ‘combinedness’, including chauvinism, cultural antipathy,
parochialism and primitive interpersonal hostility, all variants of what Elting Morison more
elegantly labelled ‘limited parochial identification’. Continuing emphasis on linearity and
control in military and naval elites’ training and socialisation has long served to offset that, as
have mimicry and conformity in systems in which suitability for promotion is judged only by
immediate superiors. Beyond that are the proverbial but not actually universal conservatism of
military professionals, the mystique of operational experience, and a tendency to
institutionalise obsolescence, especially among victors in war. Those forces and the sense of
warfare being generic obscure the dilemma that there is no way to know if one case is really relevant to another. That can render strategic planning a process closely akin to faith, and a tenaciously held faith at that. Not only is judging effectiveness in hindsight impressionistic at best, but there are no precise indices or coefficients of performance in organisations, military or otherwise, apart from crude bottom lines, and victory-and-defeat. Up to this point, the Prussians' 'Law of the Situation' stands firm.

Throughout the modern era, military officers have found themselves pulled between the roles of warrior and administrator, while specialisation and bureaucratisation increased organisational compartmentalisation. Those fault-lines have impaired mobilisation and peace-to-war transition as well as wartime operations by implanting habits, attitudes and reflexes that lack function, or work against it. The hardy persistence of literally feudal forms, including structure, terms and certain values and attitudes, seems all the more remarkable in view of all that has gone on in society and in science and technology. Eisenhower learned that just after World War II when he proposed making the freshman year at the service academies a uniform one without service distinction, as did those members of Congress between the world wars who proposed a Department of National Defense, again and again, to no avail. Many remedies have been proposed for such parochialism, but the basic human impulses to define and hold territory are honed to a fine edge in military socialisation. If 'jointness' and 'combinedness' can only really flourish as a function of frustration, stress and defeat in war, is there really a reasonable prospect of overcoming 'limited parochial identification' in peacetime? Does budgetary competition assure a permanent nemesis to effective jointness in peacetime and a hindrance to it in war? Would it all fade away if funds were apportioned as a fixed share over time? Or would 'service unspecific' entry level training, random assignments across services, or assignment of officers—or even NCOS—to another service every second or third promotion step move us any closer to 'jointness' than linking incentives and penalties to career progression, or exhortations to do the right thing, or showing examples of what happened when things went wrong have in the past? Correspondingly, in the domain of combinedness, is too much familiarity as threatening to national interests as accord is to service interests in the realm of jointness? Is some irreducible degree of internecine and international hostility and pride always going to work against effective rapport in both realms? Are the both still dependent, as at Quebec, Fort Donelson and Kwajalein, on rapport between a few individuals?

If anti-'jointedness' and combinedness' are really products of elemental territoriality, that may seem to offer an excuse to do nothing. It does not get past the dilemma that differences in socialisation, habit and expectation, however functional or inadvertent, offer vulnerabilities for a clever foe to exploit. Obviously, developing interservice, interethnic, political, social and international empathy, and instilling tolerance, let alone a working familiarity with other services' functions, are not now part of basic military socialisation and training. Interestingly, 'combinedness' has tended to be more a product of experience than 'jointness', and has tended to flourish more at higher echelons. Again and again, experiences of various nations' forces abroad since 1940 have been that implanting attitudes conducive to 'combinedness' effectively in any nation's armed forces is a daunting task, one not to be done by edicts and quickly, but steadily, and over time. The EAGLE CLAW fiasco in 1980 dramatised how the failure of operational elements to rehearse together could produce a negative sum. The vast array of historical cases of both 'jointness' and 'combinedness' suggests how critical a lack of awareness and of effective bridging mechanisms may be in the turbulence of war, as in such disparate cases as the spring of 1918 on the Western front, the Anglo-French pseudo-alliance of 1939-40, ABDA and Vietnam.

If history shows anything in all this, it is that ignoring such dissonance, and failing to expect it and deal with it steadily and carefully, increases the risk that crucial reflexes and sensitivities needed to manage it will not be there when the proverbial balloon goes up. Beyond that, if history is used as a guide, it must be used in large enough doses to prevent too close a focus on a single or few instances, or relying on specific models and methods—or interpretations. The wide splay in judgements among historians regarding such subjects as the importance of air power in maintaining imperialism between the world wars, the military prowess of the Wehrmacht, the utility of strategic bombing, including the atomic bombings of Japan, the state of American coastal defences in 1941-42, and a literal host of personalities underlines how far
history, like the art of war, is from being a science. Most important, it is neither experimentally
verifiable, nor replicable, and lies closer to both literature and the drafting of legal briefs. Just
as many forces shaped what became 'history' in the modern world—the invention of the
printing press, the rise in literacy, mass marketed books and periodicals, a massive
expansion of higher education—so other influences are now at work. As Carl Becker noted in
the late 1930s, in his seminal essay 'Everyman His Own Historian', popular culture, in such
diverse forms as historical fiction, film and more recently television, has been displacing
academic 'professional' history as the basis of individuals' historical sense, not only of
masses, but of elites as well. The looming imponderable is what computerisation of research
gathering and analysis will do to the shape of military history, especially in allowing the
framing of more complex data arrays and objective analysis, including dynamic modelling,
that moves closer to science, and farther away from the tendentious and Macaulayesque
lyricism and advocacy that has passed for serious history—including or rather, especially,
military history—over the last two centuries.

At the same time, the resistance of many historians—and military professionals—to the
implications of social science research is also being undermined, although with relatively
slight effect so far. Indeed, little contemporary military historiography resembles the
quantitative approach of Livermore, Lewis Richardson or the Carnegie-sponsored studies of
World War I. Much of that ground has been abandoned to social scientists interested in
conflict dynamics. As provocative and indeed outrageous as some of their hypotheses and
findings may be to historians and military professionals, they may yet find richer ores in
respect to 'jointness' and 'combinedness' in anthropology and the behavioural sciences, since
there are enough fragments of tribalism and psychopathology in the record of 'jointness',
'combinedness' and strategic planning to allow future generations to rework the tailings of
old proverbial mines, as Herbert Hoover did in Australia in his youth—and became wealthy.

In the meantime, those searching for guideposts in history should proceed warily, restraining
their hunger for clear, simple models, and simple solutions to intricate problems. They may
wish to keep in mind the warning of Konrad Lorenz and others who have wandered the
eldritch landscape of complexity, that the realm of theory tends to make 'black and white'
distinctions, while shades of grey predominate in the 'real world'.

Endnotes

1. Joint Military Operations: A Short History (Westport, 1994). While many of the citations below are
from that study, they are illustrative, and do not exhaust its references or the full bibliographies of cases
cited, or the broader subject of 'jointness' and 'combinedness'.

2. For example, The Cambridge Ancient History, Donald Kagan's series on the Athenian Empire, esp
The Archidamian War (Thacca, 1974); FE Adcock, The Greek and Macedonian Art of War (Berkeley,
1937); Steven Runciman, Byzantine Civilization (London, 1959); and Hans Delbrück, History of the Art

3. For example, Garrett Mattingly, The Armada (Boston, 1950), and John Knox Laughton (ed), State

4. For example, Gertrude Selwyn Kimball (ed), Correspondence of William Pitt When Secretary of State
With Colonial Governors and Military and Naval Commissioners, 2 vols (New York, 1969), and Basil

5. For example, J Christopher Herold, Bonaparte in Egypt (New York, 1962), Michael Duffy, 'A Particular
Service: The British Government and the Dunkirk Expedition of 1793', English Historical Review 91 (July
1976); 529-54; and Brian Lavery, Nelson's Navy: The Ships, Men and Organization, 1795-1815
(Annapolis, 1989), esp 310-16.

6. A survey related to jointness is Rowena Reed, Combined Operations in the Civil War (Annapolis,
1978).

7. The most useful recent account is K Jack Bauer's Surfboats and Horse Marines: US Naval

8. A succinct account is John Sweetman, 'British Invasion of the Crimea', 79-87, in Merrill Bartlett (ed),

9. For example, John Gooch, The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c 1900-

21. Details are scattered throughout the official histories of all major Allied nations in World War II, especially the British official histories on *Grand Strategy* (ed JRM Butler; London, 1956-76), H Hall Duncan's *North American Supply* (London, 1955), MM Postan, *British War Production* (London, 1950), several volumes of *The United States Army in World War II* (the ‘green books’), such as Forrest C Pogue’s *The Supreme Command* (Washington, DC, 1954), which deals with strategic planning; Frank Wesley Craven and James Lea Cate's *The United States Army Air Forces in World War II* (Chicago, 1947-62), and many hundreds of unofficial studies of wartime diplomacy and planning, such as Chester Wilmot's *The Struggle for Europe* (London, 1952), and of the individual armed services, as well as biographies and memoirs, such as General Sir Frederick Morgan's *Overture to Overlord* (London, 1950).
27. Several DESSERT STORM post-mortems have offered views of planning, some hagiographic, some tendentious. That, too, may become clearer in the fullness of time. While much operational documentation was in the form of highly perishable computer data, considerable detailing on planning is visible in Edward C Mann III, *Thunder and Lightning: Desert Storm and the Airpower Debates* (Montgomery, 1995).


32. Details of command structure and process are rarely as coherently presented as in James D Hittle's *The Military Staff: Its History and Development* (Harrisburg, 1961); these are often found in the flow of larger works, such as the description of staff organisation and battle plot system in John Jellicoe (Admiral of the Fleet Lord), *The Grand Fleet* (New York, 1919), 40-5.

33. For a variety, see Keith Neilson and Roy A Prete (eds), *Coalition Warfare* (Waterloo, Ont, 1983).


37. For American definitions, see the most recent edition of Joint Chiefs of Staff *Official Dictionary of Military Terms* and appropriate sections in the *Federal Register*; and JCS publications in the 'joint' series—*JCS Pubs*.

38. An early attempt, of some value although shaped in the shadow of his failure as the ground commander at Gallipoli, was General Sir Ian Hamilton's *The Soul and Body of an Army* (New York, 1921), esp 247-57.


40. For a description of American tri-service squabbling over Congressional cuts in the airborne boost intercept programme, see 'Jointness Be Damned', *Aviation Week and Space Technology* 141:15 (10 October 1994), 21.

41. Cases include the Boxer Rebellion relief expedition, units of the American Expeditionary Force in France in World War I, and elements serving under foreign command in Russia during that conflict and afterward. In the Sicilian, Italian and Normandy campaigns, US ground, air and sea forces served under British commanders and, after the forming of NATO, under German command.


43. For example, those of the US Navy's Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet Admiral Ernest J King, with most of his British counterparts during World War II.

44. For example, that of US Army Chief of Staff George Marshall and Field Marshal Sir John Dill, head of the British military mission in Washington.

45. Notable exceptions are the bold and feisty correspondences of Admiral Lord Fisher and Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris.


48. Harold Winton, for example, saw it as a 'partnership severely strained' and a 'dialogue of the deaf': 'Partnership and Tensions, the Army and Air Force Between Vietnam and DESERT SHIELD', *Parameters* 26:1 (Spring 1996), 100-19.

49. For example, the French-Spanish scheme to land in Britain during the American Revolution described in A Temple Patterson's *The Other Armada: The Franco-Spanish Attempt to invade Britain in 1779* (Manchester, 1960); the American campaign in Cuba, 1898, depicted caustically by Walter Mills in *The Martial Spirit* (New York, 1931), 245 ff, the rejection of an American College of National Defense by the Joint Board at three separate points during the 1930s, noted by Louis Morton, 'Inter-Service

50. For a recent perspective, see William J Toti [Cmdr, USN], ‘It’s Broken! Fix It!: Why the Joint Staffs JWCA Doesn’t Work’, *Armed Forces Journal International* (April, 1966), 28, 30, 32 and 34.


54. Including Marathon, Sphacteria, Vera Cruz, US Civil War, Gallipoli, Alhucemas, and such structures as ISTDC, Combined Operations and Amphibious Command.

55. For example, Gibraltar, 1703, New Providence, 1776, Tanga, 1914, New Orleans, 1815, Cuba, 1698, the 'Battle of the Smiths' in 1944, and the Vietnam War.

56. Such an anti-history might also include such tracts and briefs as the treatises of Mahan, Douhet and Maxwell Taylor, and Alexander P DeSeversky’s *Victory Through Air Power* (New York, 1942), Marshall Andrews’ *Disaster Through Air Power* (New York, 1950), and William Bradford Huie's *The Case Against the Admirals* (New York, 1946).

57. For example, wimping, wussing, finking, or selling out, knuckling under, and caving in.

58. For example, wise guy, wise ass, smart ass, know-it-all, walking encyclopedia, educated idiot.

59. A prime example is General of the Army Omar Bradley's 'Fancy Dans' jibe at the US Navy's sartorial vanity when testifying as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before Congress during the 'Battle of the Potomac' in 1949, in *US Congress: House Committee on Armed Services Hearings*, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 7 October 1949.

60. For evidence of valiant efforts, see Jim Velezis and Jim Toth, 'The Color Purple', *Parameters* 19: 4 (December 1989), 110-11.

61. A recent instance is Daniel A Baugh, *Confusions and Constraints: The Navy and British Defence Planning, 1919-1939*, in NAM Rodger (ed), *Naval Power in the Twentieth Century* (Annapolis, 1996), 109-15, which attributes weak interwar interservice collaboration in Britain to the air force's indifference to, sometimes wariness of, combined-arms operations, due to doctrines designed 'to insure independence of their service', and which certainly contributed greatly to ... the sudden collapse of the defences of Norway, France, and Singapore' (p 115).

62. As a teacher of cadets at Texas A&M and the Naval Academy in the late 1980s, the author witnessed the effect on recruiting/self-recruiting of the films 'Top Gun' and 'The Hunt for Red October'.

In the 50 years since the end of World War II, the nature of warfare and the missions of the United States Army have been transformed by developing technology and the changing political environment in ways only dimly foreseen in 1945. One salient fact that has emerged from the last half century of change is the degree to which logistical considerations have come to dominate strategic planning and military operations of all types, thereby confirming the 1948 prediction of the authors of *Logistics in World War II*:

> Warfare will become more mobile, more mechanical, more destructive, more dependent upon science and technology. War will tend to involve more and more of the world's population and to spread to every corner of the globe ... It is inescapable that logistics will play a predominant role in any future conflict.^{1}

Despite general acknowledgment of the importance of logistics in modern war, many post-World War II US commanders and planners have nevertheless displayed a tendency to indulge their flights of operational fancy in seeming ignorance of the constraints imposed by basic logistical considerations of time, space, and mass. In part, this fault can be attributed to the prevalence of hasty as opposed to deliberate planning arising from the brevity of the decision-execution cycle and to the brief duration of most US Army deployments since 1945. Consequently, US Army strategic planning since World War II has been characterised by the failure to give proper weight to logistical considerations, the failure to integrate logisticians in the strategic planning process, and an overemphasis on combat forces as opposed to support forces in determining the force structure for operations. Some commanders and planners have avoided such shortcomings, but far too many continue to perpetuate errors first recognised over a century ago.

### The Changing Nature of Warfare

Since 1945, the US Army has fought three major wars and participated in a large number of overseas deployments, many of which involved armed conflict. Certain fundamental conditions affecting the relationship of logistics and strategic planning have changed in this time. The most prominent of these changes have to do with the reduction in time available for thorough systematic planning, the growing prevalence of non-combat deployments, and the critical importance of transportation.

#### Reduced Planning Time

World War II strategic planners were generally permitted the luxury of deliberate strategic planning in which time was available for full consideration of logistical matters. After an initial period of hasty response, the planning for the major American combat operations in Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf also became a deliberate exercise. However, the most common scenario for the employment of US military forces since 1945 has been the contingency operation—with or without actual engagement in combat.^{2} The chief characteristic of these operations, as far as strategic planning is concerned, has been the short decision-execution cycle and the consequent tendency to ignore all but the most basic logistical considerations in the planning process.^{3} In most cases, the consequences of this tendency have been mitigated by the short duration and low intensity of combat, if any, in such operations. For the most part they have been 'come-as-you-are' operations, and what we have had on our back has been sufficient. As one of the Army's senior logisticians of the World War II era, General Carter B Magruder, has noted:
for a small war against an unsophisticated enemy the United States can provide most of the logistic requirements from such resources as it has kept available against the possibility of a major war.4

The Growing Prevalence of Non-Combat Deployments

Most of the US contingency operations since 1945 have not involved active combat operations. Those that did—for example, Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada in 1983, and Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989-90—justified in part the focus of the strategic planners on the operational aspects of the event. The first priorities were to seize and hold a lodgment in the target area and to protect the force. In such cases, the relegation of logistical considerations to a secondary place is both understandable and correct. That does not mean, however, that the tactical and operational plans can be developed without any consideration of the extant logistical constraints. On the contrary, to be successful the operational plan must always take into account the limits imposed by supply, maintenance, transportation, medical evacuation and treatment, and other logistical factors.

The deployment of US forces on operations in which active combat is not anticipated and which have as their major mission factor some other type of activity, such as peacekeeping or humanitarian relief, has become the norm rather than the exception.5 Such operations share most of the characteristics of combat-oriented contingency operations (short decision-execution cycle, lack of mission clarity, limited duration, limited force structure, primitive area of operations, etc), but they also differ in several significant ways. One of the chief characteristics of such operations is that their logistical component—deployment and redeployment aside—is often at the centre of the assigned mission. Such operations are also unlikely to be undertaken unilaterally by the US Army, but will be conducted in cooperation with other services, the armed forces of other nations, the United Nations (UN), and, particularly in humanitarian relief situations, a multitude of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Accordingly, command and control will be much more complicated than in a straightforward wartime situation. Political considerations may limit the type and number of units and personnel deployed. Under such conditions, the normal 'teeth-to-tail' ratios may not apply, particularly if the mission is focused on providing relief to the local population or support for allies. Finally, the physical security of the deployed force is usually a major consideration, but the usual emphasis on operational security may be less critical than in a combat operation since the mission, size and composition of the forces, locations, and other data may be announced publicly even before the operation begins.

Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the US military component of the humanitarian relief effort in Rwanda and Zaire from July to October 1995, was typical of the new type of non-combat contingency operation. SUPPORT HOPE involved a small task force which never exceeded 3600 military personnel in the area of operations.6 Commanded by Lieutenant General Daniel R Schroeder, the US joint task force had the mission of providing humanitarian assistance, and as General Schroeder points out, the operation was important in that it demonstrated the value of military forces as enablers, not as replacements, for other relief agencies of the US government, the United Nations, and nongovernmental organisations. The principles followed in mobilisation, staging, deployment, employment, and redeployment of the task force were all 'standard', but the composition of the force, the engagement criteria, and the desired end state were much different from traditional combat operations. The short notice and consequent compressed planning and preparation time made deliberate planning almost impossible and adversely affected the ability of the task force to build the necessary connections with UN agencies and NGOs. As is noted in the Executive Summary, the participants 'met on the dance floor', even though the need to integrate US, UN and NGO activities was second in priority only to the security of the task force itself.7
The Critical Importance of Transportation

In the Korean War, the absolute lack of materiel was a major problem. The numerous and vast assembly lines of World War II were long since shut down, and the US Army encountered significant difficulties in producing the required munitions and other equipment needed to fight the war in Korea. By 1965, however, the perpetual mobilisation prompted by the Cold War made the logistical shortages of the Korean War a thing of the past. To be sure, there were times in the Vietnam War when certain critical items were in short supply, but distribution, rather than supply, emerged during the Vietnam War as the governing logistical factor in strategic planning and operations. The great distances and resulting long shipment time for materiel from the United States to Vietnam demonstrated clearly that transportation was the critical factor. The subsequent prevalence of short-notice contingency deployments has only served to increase the importance of adequate sealift, airlift, and movement control. And, as General Magruder has noted: if the transportation system will support, or can be developed in time to support, the forces necessary to carry out the operational plan, the rest of the logistics can usually be brought into line within a reasonable time.'

The degree to which transportation has become the critical logistical factor was evident in the Gulf War of 1990-91. President George Bush ordered the first deployment of US troops to the Gulf on 7 August 1990. By 1 March 1991, coalition forces in the Gulf region included over 539,000 US and 270,000 coalition military personnel as well as over 12,400 tracked and 117,000 wheeled vehicles, 1800 helicopters, and a naval force of over 210 ships, including two battleships and six aircraft carriers with 360 combat aircraft. For the most part, these forces were moved to the Gulf from the United States and Europe in a period of just over 160 days. It took one full year to move 184,000 soldiers to Vietnam; that many moved to Saudi Arabia in just 88 days.

The United States Transportation Command coordinated some 576 ship voyages and 10,002 aircraft sorties to move over half a million troops and 5.7 million metric tons of equipment and supplies over the long supply lines from the United States, Europe, and elsewhere. The first of 13 Maritime Prepositioning Ships began unloading supplies to support the Marines in Saudi Arabia just nine days after notification, and 79 merchant ships of the Ready Reserve Fleet were activated to augment US and foreign charters. Over 15,400 air transport missions were flown, ferrying 524,000 tons of cargo and 484,000 passengers. The Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) was activated for the first time, and over 100 CRAF planes flew the equivalent of two and one-half Berlin Airlifts in just 16 weeks. In theatre, an additional 9500 air missions moved over 100,000 tons of cargo and 75,000 passengers, and US transporters drove over 35 million miles. When the war was over, some 1.7 million tons of ammunition, equipment, and spare parts were shipped back to the United States or to other locations outside the Persian Gulf.

The most spectacular logistical feat of the war was General Norman H Schwarzkopf's sweeping left-hook deep into Iraq. The key to this spectacular movement was effective coordination of transportation. In the first phase, two large forward logistical bases were established and 150,000 men of the US VII and XVIII Airborne Corps with all their armour, artillery, and vehicles and 60 days of ammunition and other supplies were shifted 150 miles to the west over rudimentary desert roads. The time available for this massive undertaking was limited, and Lieutenant General William G Pagonis, the Army's chief logistician in the theatre, had to pledge that the troops and their equipment would be in position by the 21 February deadline. They were. The entire movement was accomplished in only 21 days. In the second phase of the operation, which began with the opening of the allied ground offensive on 24 February, logistical bases were set up in advance of ground troops who required some 14,000 tons of ammunition and 4.5 million gallons of fuel per day, a large proportion of which was moved into position by air.

Undoubtedly, the war in the Gulf was extraordinarily successful from both the operational and logistical point of view, in large part because of the careful integration of logistical considerations in the operational planning. Nevertheless, wondrous technology and the dynamic story of a fast-moving and ultimately successful campaign masked the recurrence of
a number of very hoary problems, some of them going back nearly a century to the United
States' first major overseas deployment to Cuba in the Spanish-American War. Deploying
units did not know what their transportation requirements were and consistently sought to
move to the Gulf considerable amounts of extra materiel. Transportation managers faced
serious shortages of ocean shipping, and much of what was available was unsuitable to the
task or required time-consuming repairs and modifications which significantly delayed the
deployment. The efficient use of the scarce ocean shipping was further complicated by
problems in calling forward units and cargo to the ports of embarkation and confusion
regarding the assignment of transports. The conscious decision to defer the deployment of
logistical troops in order to increase the flow of combat forces into the theatre of operations
seriously complicated the provision of adequate logistical support. At the far end of the line of
communication, serious shortages in logistical personnel led to backlogs in port clearance.
Identification of cargo was just as serious a problem in 1990 as it had been in 1898.
Containers on the pier in Saudi Arabia in 1990, like the railroad cars outside Tampa in 1898,
were inadequately marked as to contents and had to be opened one-by-one to determine
their contents thus hindering offloading operations and adding to the delays in port clearance.
Eventual victory was not compromised by such logistical shortcomings, which were ultimately
overcome in the Gulf just as they had been overcome in 1898, but it was clear that we had
not solved some of the most fundamental problems of overseas deployment.

The Lessons of Vietnam

The Vietnam War of 1965-73 has proven to be the defining experience of the US Army in the
second half of the twentieth century. The failure of the Army and the nation to achieve their
goals in Vietnam prompted a decade of intense self-examination. For almost the first time in
its history, the US Army not only systematically studied the causes of its failures, but acted in
an aggressive and sustained manner to repair the defects discovered and consequently
produced not only repair of the Army's psyche and a restoration of the Army's confidence, but
new doctrine, new organisation, new equipment, and new training methods as well.

After 30 years, the lessons of the Vietnam War remain pertinent to the interests and concerns
of Army planners. In part, this relevance is due to the fact that the conditions pertaining in
Vietnam, although of course unique, have been shown to bear a remarkable resemblance to
those encountered in subsequent operations involving the support of rapid deployment to
undeveloped areas. Initially, US forces were committed to Vietnam without a long lead time
for deliberate planning or preparations. Subsequently, US military power was applied
incrementally with continual changes in logistical requirements furnishing little opportunity for
coherent long-range planning. The Vietnam War was also conducted without mobilising
Reserve forces and civilian industry, and the logistical operations of the military departments
were subjected to a degree of control at the Department of Defense (DOD) level that required
the referral of many logistical decisions to higher levels for resolution.

The 'lessons' of the Vietnam War are developed in detail in the 1970 report of the United
States Joint Logistics Review Board (JLRB), which outlines a standard against which
subsequent operations can be measured. The report consists of three massive volumes and
18 separate monographs, and Volume I contains an executive summary, presents 15 major
findings, and highlights 46 of the 265 recommendations of the Board.10 The major findings—
or 'lessons learned'—most pertinent to the interaction of logistics and strategic planning since
the Vietnam War can profitably be grouped into two main categories for our present
discussion: Integration and Force Structure.
Integration

Effective operational planning requires careful consideration of the logistical constraints that may apply as well as full integration of logisticians in the planning process. As a recent US Army doctrinal publication notes:

Tactical and operational success depends on fully integrated concepts of logistics and operations. Integration during planning ensures support of operations during execution. Logistics capabilities often affect the feasibility of a concept of operations. Based on the operational concept, logisticians develop a logistics concept which gives commanders the greatest possible freedom of action and enhances the agility and versatility of an operation.\textsuperscript{11}

Consideration of Logistical Constraints

One key lesson of World War II was that strategic plans depended on logistical factors, the best known example being the schedule for the production of landing craft which determined the date of most World War II amphibious operations. In Vietnam, this and many similar lessons had to be learned all over again. As the JLRB observed:

The planning system of the Department of Defense must provide for (1) a realistic appraisal of logistic resources to achieve balance between operational concepts and logistic capabilities; (2) the establishment of credible requirements for critical logistic resources; and (3) recognition ... of the impact of inadequate logistic resources on operational capabilities.\textsuperscript{12}

To be sure, the training and indoctrination of a lifetime are hard to overcome. American military officers are raised in an environment focused on command in combat—be it on land, at sea, or in the air—rather than on staff work, the preparation for war, or the support of war-fighting forces. This long-standing command-combat bias—found even among logisticians—is completely understandable given the central focus of military affairs on war-fighting earlier in this century. However, the noncombat roles of military forces have now become much more important, just as they were for most of the nineteenth century when America's military forces fought few wars but expended a great deal of effort in assisting the growth of the American nation. The command-combat bias shared by many American military officers manifests itself in the attitudes of commanders and operational planners toward logistics. At best, logistical constraints are tolerated as necessary evils; at worst, they are overlooked or even overruled in the rush to combat.

Even when they deigned to consult the logisticians, the strategic planners in Vietnam paid little heed to the logisticians’ warnings and often acted as if logistics were not a consideration at all. Consequently, planning for Vietnam did not properly anticipate the magnitude of the support operations required, and even when the planners understood the logistical implications of their strategic plans, the decision was to let logistical capacity not affect the deployment of combat forces. Failure to correct the critical logistical shortfalls identified in strategic planning before the substantial deployment of forces—or at least to give them a high priority—contributed to inadequate port throughput capacity, sea and aerial port congestion, inadequate storage facilities, and loss of identity of material, all of which adversely affected combat operations.

The rush of US forces to Saudi Arabia in the summer of 1990 to form a hasty defensive line against the expected advance of Iraqi forces from Kuwait into Saudi Arabia allowed little time for the careful integration of logistical considerations into the strategic planning process. However, the subsequent deliberate strategic and operational planning which led to the spectacular Allied air and ground offensive against the minions of Saddam Hussein involved careful consideration of the relevant logistical issues. Indeed, the operational plans were significantly constrained, particularly as to timing, by the need to transport massive amounts of men, equipment, and supplies the great distance to the Gulf. The operational plans, and in
particular the astounding 'Hail Mary' end run which opened the ground war against Iraqi
forces in February 1991, quite properly took into account the logistical realities, and as a
result the offensive operation achieved a striking victory.\textsuperscript{13}

The Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations points out that
operations and logistics are inseparable.\textsuperscript{14} Of course, that is true in any type of operation, but
it is also true that in many, if not most, non-combat operations the central mission focus may
be essentially logistical in nature—for example, to provide relief supplies, medical care, and
other services—rather than to conduct combat operations. Unless commanders and staff at
every level understand the distinction, there will be problems. Lieutenant Colonel Christopher
R Paparone has argued that in operations other than war a mismatch between the assigned
mission and the commander's concept of the operation frequently results from the failure of
combat-oriented planners to recognise that 'the operational main effort' may be logistical
rather than operational.\textsuperscript{15} This failure to understand the centrality of logistics in most
operations other than war can impair mission accomplishment, and Paparone has noted that:

\begin{quotation}
We must recognize that command logistics may sometimes override the traditional
combat orientation of commanders and staffs ... understanding the capabilities of
reverse osmosis water purification units ... and mortuary affairs thus may be more
important than directing the operations of a light infantry battalion.\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quotation}

\textit{Integration of Logisticians in the Planning Process}

It is axiomatic in the US Army that 'Logisticians Don't Get No Respect', but lack of respect for
logisticians and failure to include them in all aspects of strategic planning can have tragic
consequences. There is no room for exclusivity in the strategic planning process, but all too
often the logisticians is either not invited to the party or is ignored. For example, in Vietnam an
experienced senior logisticians was not assigned until 1 January 1966, when Major General
Charles W Eifler took command of the 1st Logistical Command.\textsuperscript{17} A number of problems could
have been avoided, or at least reduced, if a senior logisticians had been integrated into the
command structure early on, especially since the Army's logistical problems were greater
than that of other services by virtue of having more common items to manage, a larger force,
and a larger operational area. This failure to include a senior logisticians prompted the JLRB to
observe that:

\begin{quotation}
A component commander required to furnish major logistic support to ground forces
in a contingency operation must be provided with a logistic management capability,
vested in an officer whose rank and logistic experience are appropriate to the ultimate
scope of the logistic operation. This senior logisticians and his staff must participate in
prior planning for contingency operations and be deployed to the area concurrently
with the forward echelon of the headquarters of the combat forces.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quotation}

The stringent operational security and compartmentalisation which usually characterise most
strategic planning can also serve to exclude logisticians from the planning process. It is not
uncommon to find that operational planners tend to focus almost exclusively on the combat
arms units involved in any deployment and display a condescending attitude toward the
supporting units which are frequently viewed—incorrectly, of course—as not being central to
the mission and thus unworthy of the considerable effort needed to keep them properly
informed about every aspect of the operation. This attitude is of long-standing in the US
armed forces and is a potentially mission-defeating factor, as Lieutenant Colonel Gary H
Wade noted in his study of Operation BLUE BAT, the US intervention in Lebanon in 1958.\textsuperscript{19}
The confusion of the logistical effort connected with Operation BLUE BAT was due in no small
part to the fact that 'no one, except a small cell of select planners, knew what was supposed
to happen, and of course, no one knew when it would happen'.\textsuperscript{20} Indeed, Wade goes on to
argue that:
at the unit level, the commander and staff officers involved in a deployment will inevitably encounter varying degrees of confusion and poor coordination ...

Overclassification and rigid planning compartmentalization breed confusion. Therefore, the planner must balance security requirements with the units' need to know. Improperly disseminated plans not only promote confusion, but also occasion slovenly appearance and poor performance. The most important planning lesson from the Lebanese experience is that planners must use a classification commensurate with security requirements and not create a smug in-the-know elite. If security restrictions prevent units from learning their assigned roles in a mission, it is self-defeating.21

**Force Structure**

World War II offered the lesson that 'combat power' cannot be measured simply in terms of the numbers of weapons and combat troops available. However, the senior leaders of the US Army—focused on keeping the Army 'lean and mean'—have often ignored the fact that in a modern high-technology global coalition war large numbers of men are required to accomplish the essential logistical tasks of producing, assembling and transporting the men and materiel of war to where they can be effectively brought to bear on the enemy.22 The impact of this fact on the force structure of the US Army in the twentieth century can be seen readily in Figure 1 which portrays the changing proportion of combat to support troops in various conflicts.

**FIGURE 1**
**US Army 'Teeth-to-Tail' Ratio, 1917-1991**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>% Combat Troops</th>
<th>% Support Troops</th>
<th>Cbt-Spt Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World War I (1917)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War I (1918)a</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II (1942)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II (1945)a</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean War (1950)b</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean War (1953)b</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam War (1965)b</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam War (1971)b,c</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War (1990-91)b</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opn PROVIDE COMFORTb,d</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes

a World-wide, Army Air Forces, students and replacements excluded.

b Rough estimate, in-theatre only.

c Same as on 31 December 1942.

d All services.

Good strategic planning will balance carefully the need for both combat and support troops. Nevertheless, combat commanders and strategic planners have often failed to understand the critical importance of logistical troops, especially in the early phases of an operation. As General Magruder has noted:

Well-trained logistic troops are a critical requirement in war at the opening of a theater of operations. Without them, even if there is not fighting, unloading of shipping will be delayed and supplies will accumulate unsorted and unidentified and therefore unusable.24
United States forces deployed overseas in World War II were chronically short of logistical personnel to operate the ports and lines of communications, handle the supplies, and provide the necessary logistical support to the troops in the field. The commander of Army Service Forces, General Brehon B Somervell, consistently and forcefully argued for the provision of larger proportions of service troops in every theatre, but the theatre commanders seldom acknowledged the critical importance of logistical personnel until the operation actually began. They then screamed for logistical support troops. The failure to assign logistical troops a sufficiently high deployment priority resulted in a reduction in combat effectiveness. General Magruder, a key participant in the World War II struggle between the strategists and the logisticians, observed:

Logistic troop requirements usually are, and I believe always should be, under attack. This is for the simple reason that more personnel in logistic units means less personnel in combat units. However, after a critical review has been made and logistic troop requirements for an operation adequately justified, then those logistic troops should be considered just as essential to the success of the operations as the combat troops. Although most commanders would probably agree to such a statement, it just never seems to be handled that way. Rather, it is handled as a logistician in the North African Theater of Operations described a troop basis meeting in early 1943. He said new troop units were asked for on the basis of parity; one tactical unit and then, in turn, one logistic unit—except that the approved list came out in the ratio of one infantry division to one heavy maintenance company.25

The basic lesson is that 'the need for logistic troops precedes the need for combat troops in war'.26 But in Vietnam, just as in World War II, the strategic planners tended to relegate logistical forces to low priority in the planned deployment, thereby depriving the commander of support forces at the critical early stages of deployment when they were most needed in order to avoid logistical confusion and wasted effort. The assignment of a fullblown Army logistical command was first requested in 1962, but the 1st Logistical Command was not established until April 1965.27 Consequently, once the build-up began in earnest the inadequate logistical force structure was soon overwhelmed, and requirements exceeded logistical capacity throughout the build-up period. On 31 December 1965, there was a 122-ship backlog and unidentified cargo was stored everywhere.28 Only then was the decision made to bring in sufficient logistical troops to sort it out.

The need for adequate logistical forces in a theatre of operations extends to the staff necessary to control and administer those forces properly, particularly at the unified command level. With respect to the situation in Vietnam, the JLRB noted that:

Although the basic responsibility for the support and maintenance of forces must remain with the Services, unified commands must plan for and be staffed for active involvement, when required, in the multiservice aspects of transportation and movement control, construction, ammunition and POL resupply, communications, medical evacuation and hospitalization, and control of critical items.29

In general, US doctrine assigns responsibility for logistical support to the individual services, but in Vietnam unified commanders soon found themselves immersed in detailed logistical problems without the staffing to handle such problems. For example, both the Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) and the Commander, US Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (COMUSMACV), became involved in the operational details of allocating transportation resources among the services and matching shipments with capacities, the control of certain critical supply items (M-16 rifles, and cluster bomb units, for example), the coordination of medical treatment and evacuation, and the development of massive construction projects, POL systems, and communications long-lines systems.

Another significant lesson regarding logistical force structure that strategic planners must bear in mind is that, if possible, the wartime organisation of logistical forces should be the same as the peacetime organisation. This argues for the retention in the peacetime structure of sufficient logistical forces to provide the initial response in any conflict. But logistics troops in
the peacetime forces are apt to be cut in the name of ‘economy’ and elimination of ‘fat’. The solution adopted by the US Army has been to locate the major portion of the logistical troop strength needed for contingency operations in the Reserve components and to call them up as necessary. But the call-up and preparation for deployment of even the best Reserve unit takes considerable time, perhaps as much as three months. Moreover, there is no assurance that the political situation will favor a Reserve call-up. Consequently, as the JLRB noted,

when contingency operations are undertaken and the Reserves are not called up, serious deficiencies in logistic units and trained logistic personnel may be expected. There is a need, therefore, to enhance readiness to respond promptly to limited war of scope comparable to the Vietnam conflict without reliance on national mobilization or callup of Reserves to conduct logistic operations.

All of the services faced the dilemma of limits on overall personnel strength and the increases in requirements for combat troops in Vietnam, which created new logistical demands without time for organisation and training of individuals and units. Plans in 1964 and early 1965 were based on the assumption that a major contingency action would be accompanied by mobilisation of appropriate Reserve forces. However, for political reasons the reserve forces were never called up except in very selective cases. Moreover, the Army's base in the continental United States was overly civilianised. The extensive use of civilian contractors to perform essential logistical tasks in the theatre of operations proved feasible, but even so there were never enough trained military specialist personnel for theatre operations.

It should also be noted that since World War II, US Army forces have seldom operated alone. The participation of the other Services is a given, and often the US Army must operate with the armed services of allies as well as a broad range of other governmental and non-governmental organisations. Inasmuch as the United States is often in the best position to supply and coordinate the operation, US strategic and logistical planners must not neglect the logistical needs and capabilities of all participants. The presence of civilian agencies in the theatre of operations—increasingly common in all operations—demands special attention. As the JLRB noted:

During the planning process, it is especially important to define clearly the responsibilities for and the relationships between military and civilian activities.

The lessons of World War II and Vietnam with respect to the importance of a balanced force structure and the need for logistical personnel in the theatre of operations have never been absorbed thoroughly. The tendency of US civilian and military leaders to undervalue the role of logistics and to emphasise combat forces at the expense of logistical forces, which are often ‘the limiting factor of American strategy’ continued to plague the US Army in the otherwise successful Gulf War. The examination of the timephased force deployment list for any recent contingency operation will also attest to the continued focus of commanders and strategic planners on combat forces and the consequent relegation of logistical forces to a low deployment priority. For example, in Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda, ‘the requirement for tailored capabilities that seems to be increasingly a feature of today's deployments’ required 'deep tailoring' which in turn depended on the ability to control the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) in ways which the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) was not entirely able to do satisfactorily, thereby adversely affecting the ability of the commander to exercise responsive command and control and to influence the type and sequence of capabilities arriving in the operational area.
Conclusion

The experience of World War II established the salient importance of logistics in modern warfare and demonstrated the degree to which strategic planning must often be constrained by logistical considerations. Since World War II the missions which the US Army has been called upon to perform as well as the organisation, equipment, and doctrine of Army forces have changed in many fundamental ways, but the basic primacy of logistical considerations in strategic planning has become even more prominent. Even so, Army strategic planners still display a disconcerting tendency to refuse to allow the dreary facts of logistics to dictate the shape of their strategic plans, especially when planning time is short and the duration of the operation is expected to be relatively short, as it almost always is. The focus continues to be on the intricacies of the operational plan, even when the essence of the assigned mission is primarily logistical in nature. This unwarranted focus on operations to the neglect of the logistical realities is most clearly seen in the continuing over-emphasis on combat forces in the deployment plan, the chronic under-manning and low priority of support forces in the time-phased force deployment plans, even for peacekeeping forces in situations where no significant combat is expected to occur. In part, this emphasis on operational matters to the neglect of logistics is a function of the short planning-execution time cycle characteristic of US Army operations since 1945. When time is short, logistics is left to last, and the logisticians are often not invited to the planning party. This tendency is exacerbated by the degree to which strategic planning, particularly its logistical components, has become dependent on automated planning systems such as JOPES and computer-generated time-phased force deployment plans which all too often have as a basic premise the need to deploy maximum combat power and leave the supporting forces to follow slowly if at all. This is seen even when the essence of the mission assigned is logistical rather than operational in nature, such as in a disaster relief operation.

If the military forces of the United States are to succeed in performing the many non-combat missions which are sure to come our way in the coming years, we must change our thinking as well as our doctrine and force structure. Success will hinge on the degree to which the institutional biases of the past century are overcome. As the Joint Logistics Review Board acknowledged a quarter-century ago:

> It is certain that some future emergencies will develop logistic problems that did not surface in the Vietnam era. On the other hand, each of the Board’s findings and many of its recommendations are related to basic principles of logistics and management. An intensity of warfare higher than that in Vietnam will accentuate the need to adhere to these fundamentals. The details of some of the recommendations may alter with new techniques and capabilities, but the underlying principles are enduring.
## APPENDIX 1

### Selected US Contingency Operations, 1958–95

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon (BLUE BAT)</td>
<td>16 Jul-14 Nov 1958</td>
<td>2 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic (POWER PACK)</td>
<td>30 Apr 1965-27 Sep 1966</td>
<td>17 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama (JUST CAUSE)</td>
<td>20 Dec 1989-31 Jan 1990</td>
<td>6 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada (URGENT FURY)</td>
<td>24 Oct-3 Nov 1983</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurdish Refugee Relief (PROVIDE COMFORT)</td>
<td>Mar-Jul 1991</td>
<td>5 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti (UPHOLD DEMOCRACY)</td>
<td>Oct 1994-Mar 1995</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia (RESTORE/CONTINUE HOPE)</td>
<td>3 Dec 1992-25 Mar 1995</td>
<td>28 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda (SUPPORT HOPE)</td>
<td>17 Jul-6 Oct 1994</td>
<td>3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia (JOINT ENDEAVOUR)</td>
<td>Dec 1995-*</td>
<td>ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As at time of publication of original book in 1996.
Endnotes

1. Logistics in World War II: Final Report of the Army Service Forces—A Report to the Undersecretary of War and the Chief of Staff by the Director of the Service, Supply, and Procurement Division, War Department General Staff (facsimile reprint of the 1948 edition, Washington, DC, 1993), 251. The terms ‘strategic planning’ and ‘operational planning’ are used interchangeably throughout this paper, although strictly speaking the US Army makes a clear distinction between ‘strategy’ (the use of campaigns to achieve policy objectives) and the operational art (the achievement of military objectives in a theatre of operations). For the most part, we are concerned here with ‘operational’ rather than ‘strategic’ planning.

2. A few of the most prominent US contingency operations since World War II are listed in Appendix 1.


5. The US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 was the harbinger of this new type of operation. Deployed US forces did see limited combat, but by and large the operation was political in its objectives and became in large part a humanitarian relief effort. As a multi-national operation, it shared many of the characteristics of more recent non-combat operations. The operation is discussed in some detail in Lawrence A. Yates, Mounting an Intervention: The Dominican Republic, 1965, Military Review 69: 3 (March 1989), 50-62, and in Lawrence M. Greenberg, United States Army Unilateral and Coalition Operations in the 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention (Washington, DC, 1997).

6. The operation is described in Headquarters, United States European Command, After Action Review: Operation SUPPORT HOPE (Stuttgart, 1994).


8. Magruder, Recurring Logistic Problems, 42.


10. Joint Logistics Review Board, Logistic Support in the Vietnam Era (Washington, DC, 1970). The 15 key ‘lessons learned’ are summarised in Volume I: A Summary Assessment with Major Findings and Recommendations, under the headings: Responsive Logistic Planning; Early Management Capability; Force Structure; Ammunition; Transportation; Joint Logistics Responsibilities; Foreign Assistance; Construction; Support in the Combat Area; Communications; Common Supply; POL; Excesses; Containerisation; and Concepts for Future Logistic Support in the Combat Area.


13. The degree to which the allied air campaign and the logistical preparations for the famous ‘Hail Mary’ end-run were integrated in the operational planning is clearly established by the chief US Army logistician in the Gulf, Lieutenant General William G. Pagonis, and his chief logistical planner, Colonel Michael D. Krause, in Operational Logistics and the Gulf War (The Land Warfare Papers No 13; Arlington, October 1992). Pagonis and Krause point out that the need to cripple Iraqi observation—a feat accomplished by the allied air campaign—was a necessary precondition for beginning the repositioning of men and materiel for the ground attack in the west. They also note that the air campaign was extended for an additional week in order to facilitate the building of the necessary logistical bases and the repositioning of the two corps.


16. Ibid.


21. Ibid, 82.
23. Compiled from various sources. Unless otherwise noted, this chart provides an estimate of the world-wide US Army ratios.
27. *Logistic Support in the Vietnam Era*, I, 6. On 15 January 1965, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended approval of a 2100-man logistic force and immediate deployment of a 230-man advance party, but the Office of the Secretary of Defense delayed final approval, and only a small planning staff had arrived in Vietnam by March 1965.
28. Ibid, 10.
29. Ibid, 12.
30. Magruder, *Recurring Logistic Problems*, 26-27. General Magruder notes that at the beginning of World War II, the active Army had only 11 per cent of the logistics troops necessary to support overseas the available combat units.
31. Ibid, 27.
33. Ibid, 7. Nor were there ever enough qualified personnel in the services to supervise the civilian contractors properly.
34. Ibid, 43. The lack of visibility of civilian programmes, which competed for scarce logistical resources, was a major problem for the US forces in Vietnam. For example, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) alone accounted for 40 per cent of all cargo entering Vietnam in 1966 (see ibid, 12).
The National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) expresses a two-dimensional strategy which is intended to provide for the common defence of the United States and promote its general welfare. It calls for the defence of US interests, at home and abroad, as well as the active promotion of US policies in the international arena through exploiting unique American assets to pursue unprecedented opportunities. Emphasising the two dimensions of the NSS, US President Bill Clinton observed: 'Never has American leadership been more essential—to navigate the shoals of the world's new dangers and to capitalise on its opportunities'.

The current NSS is well-suited to the post-Cold War era, given its generally favourable security outlook for Western interests and values. However, being dual-focused, that is, stressing traditional defence, as well as exploiting opportunities, has proven difficult to implement. This difficulty has been particularly manifest in the case of defence planning. The reason why the actual implementation of the NSS has not been easily effected is due in large measure to the nature of the current international security environment. The epoch of definable and quantifiable threats has disappeared, at least for the moment, thereby perplexing Western defence planners with the challenge: firstly, to plan for present and future missions, and secondly to present convincing rationales to sceptical politicians for the need to spend scarce resources on defence. In short, the predictable threats associated with a half century of the Cold War have yielded to diverse and uncertain threats to US interests. At the same time, however, opportunities continue to arise in increasing number which, if exploited, could further US objectives significantly. This new environment of threats and opportunities has been recognised by the nation's political leadership, but has yet to evoke an adequate response from the US armed forces.

In short, joint strategic planning within the US military establishment remains focused on the defence of US interests and not on their active promotion. More specifically, the greatest difficulty encountered by US defence planners has been their inability to discard threat-based planning habits accrued over the past 50 years and adopt new planning methodologies that would facilitate the implementation of an NSS developed for the post-Cold War strategic environment. This failing has not gone unnoticed.

Consequently, serious lacunae in the current US joint strategic planning system have recently received high level attention in the US defence community and the US Congress. The Congress directed in its Fiscal Year 1997 Defence Authorization Act that a force structure review process be established to conduct 'an independent, non-partisan review of the force structure that is more comprehensive than prior assessments'. Concomitantly, the Secretary of Defense, acting upon the recommendations of the Commission on Roles and Missions and responding to congressional concern, will initiate in 1997 the first Quadrennial Defense Review. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will participate in these processes. His Joint Strategy Review, which is guided by his Joint Vision 2010, will help to focus and rationalise the future modernisation programmes of the individual services. While congressional, executive and military leadership find themselves in agreement that reform of the US armed forces is needed, it is critical that these efforts produce a joint strategic planning process and product that implement both the protection and promotion dimension of the NSS.
The purpose of this essay is threefold. First, a brief analysis of the weaknesses in the current Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) will be presented. Inadequacies within current strategic planning processes which inhibit their utility in assisting the Chairman in providing integrated strategic advice to the National Command Authorities will be identified and assessed. It will be argued that these deficiencies are the result of an absence of a comprehensive National Military Strategic Plan. Second, a review of recent initiatives to address this planning deficiency will be presented, as well as assessments of their likelihood to effect positive change. Third, and finally, a reform of the JSPS, the adoption of a proposed Joint Strategic Engagement Plan, will be described as a means of moving US joint planning from its reactive character to one capable of capitalising upon opportunities to promote US interests in addition to defending them.

**Joint Strategic Planning System**

During the period beginning with the passage of Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 to the end of superpower confrontation in the early 1990s, a series of events combined to limit the effectiveness of the strategic planning conducted at the level of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Notwithstanding the effort of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to improve strategic planning by 1990, formal strategic planning at the Chairman’s level fell short of that required by statute.

The three principal strategic direction and planning responsibilities assigned to the Chairman by the Goldwater-Nichols Act (codified in 10 USC) are to:

- “[assist] the President and the Secretary of Defense in providing for the strategic direction of the armed forces’; 
- [prepare] strategic plans, including plans which conform to the resource levels projected to be available for the period of time for which the plans are to be effective’ and to [prepare] joint logistics and mobility plans to support those strategic plans and [recommend] the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those logistics and mobility plans”; and,
- “[conduct] net assessments to determine the capabilities of the armed forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of potential adversaries”⁴.

Nominally, strategic planning at the Chairman’s level is conducted principally within the JSPS.

The JSPS is the formal process established to assist the Chairman in strategic planning. At the time of passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the JSPS was defined by JCS Memorandum of Policy 84 (JCS MOP 84). This MOP, first published in 1952, survived until 1990 when it was replaced by CJCS MOP 7.⁵ The MOP 84 version of the JSPS was unwieldy, complex, and bureaucratic and produced no fewer than ten major documents every two-year planning cycle.⁶ It was roundly criticised by Congress and others.⁷ Nevertheless, planning under the provisions of MOP 84 produced the National Military Strategy Document (NMSD) and the Base Case Global Family of Operation Plans, which collectively approached a strategic plan.⁸

Although the 1990 version of the JSPS (CJCS MOP 7) sought to streamline the JSPS in order to make it more responsive in a rapidly changing national security environment’, it did not survive a single planning cycle.⁹ This streamlined JSPS envisaged one strategic planning process and three primary products:

- Joint Strategy Review (JSR) process;
- NMSD;
- Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP); and,
- Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA).
That new Memorandum of Policy described a system that began with the Joint Strategy Review. The objective of the review was to determine whether the NMS should be changed. The NMSD was to include the NMS, written and published by the Chairman, but approved by the President. Additionally, the NMSD was to contain the following recommendations:

- national military objectives;
- fiscally constrained force levels;
- military strategy and force options; and,
- a risk assessment of the recommended strategy, forces and military options.

The NMSD was also to feature functional annexes to supplement the base document. The annexes were to provide concise military taskings, priorities, requirements and additional guidance. The NMSD was to serve as the Chairman's advice to the Secretary of Defense with respect to the development of the Defense Planning Guidance. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), retained in CJCS MOP 7 as a key product of the JSPS, continued to serve as the principal vehicle by which the Combatant Commanders (CINC) were given the task of developing global and regional operation plans.

The final document prescribed by 1990 CJCS MOP 7 was the Chairman's Program Assessment (CPA). It provides the Chairman's assessment of the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) forces proposed by the Services. The CPA assists the Secretary of Defense in making decisions on the defence programme subsequent to receipt of the POMs from the military departments and other DOD components. It accomplished this in two ways. First, it contains the Chairman's assessment of the extent to which the various service POMs conformed to the priorities established in strategic plans and the priorities established for the CINC's requirements. Second, the CPA was to contain alternative programme recommendations to achieve greater programme conformance to established priorities. The 1990 version of the JSPS was aborted before completion of the JSR, which led to yet another revision of the strategic planning process.

In mid-1992, the Joint Staff began revising CJCS MOP 7 to make it reflect more accurately the manner in which joint strategic planning had been conducted during 1990 and 1991. The intent was to make it a less precise, more open-ended process that reflected the Chairman's more flexible approach in forging the NMS. Feeling somewhat disenfranchised from the process that produced the 1992 version of that document, the Services and many of the CINCs resisted the Joint Staff's efforts to dismantle the formal system. The compromise that emerged retained many of the original CJCS MOP 7 provisions, but also featured several important changes. The most significant change was elimination of the NMSD in favour of an unclassified, generalised NMS. This, combined with the abandonment of the Base Case Global Family of OPLANs, effectively eliminated the elements that collectively served as a national military strategic plan. To date, nothing has filled this planning void.

The new NMS took a form radically different from that envisioned by the original CJCS MOP 7. Whereas the classified NMSD provided national military objectives, policy, strategy, force planning options and assessments, and risk evaluations, the NMS, in its new form, did not address national military objectives, but merely reiterated national interests and objectives from the 1991 NSS. While the national military strategy contained within the National Military Strategy Document published in 1989 consisted of some 50 pages of text specifying strategic objectives, assumptions and priorities; the 1992 NMS provided a ten-page discussion of what appeared to be national military doctrine, devoid of any specific strategic objectives and priorities. It is interesting to note that although the NMS, in its new form, lacked the specificity of the strategy set forth in the NMSD, detailed operation planning guidance and tasks continued to be given to the CINCs via the JSCP. Hence, one might ask what is the basis for translating the NMS into the specific tasks and guidance contained in the JSCP?

The Joint Staff began implementation of CJCS MOP 7 (Revision 1), even before the revision was officially approved. A concerted effort was made to adhere to the established procedures and time-lines as closely as possible. The JSR was initiated in the autumn of 1992. By mid-summer 1993 a JSR report was provided to the Chairman and work subsequently began on a new NMS. However, a number of factors delayed publication of the new NMS until February 1995. Although featuring a new lexicon, the 1995 NMS is of the same form and not substantially different from its predecessor.
A National Joint Strategic Plan Defined

While not disparaging these potentially worthwhile internal Joint Staff initiatives, all of them potentially address only individual aspects, as opposed to the entirety, of the problem. Significantly, none of the above reforms addresses the fundamental requirement for creating strategic plans as stipulated in Goldwater-Nichols Act. The law is not clear on what constitutes a strategic plan; however, from the intent of the legislation and a review of congressional action leading up to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act one can determine what was envisaged. Strategic plans should enumerate specific strategic objectives, identify fiscal and other constraints, offer strategy for securing objectives, and play a key role in determining force capability requirements.  

An amalgamation of the various specific references to strategic plans within 10 USC provides a more comprehensive definition. These plans:

- are to be prepared by the Chairman and should conform to the resource levels projected by the Secretary of Defense to be available for the periods during which the plans are to be effective;
- should be useful for assessing the capabilities of US and allied armed forces versus potential adversaries;
- are differentiated from, and are a level above, contingency plans prepared by the CINCs;  
- should serve as a standard against which force capability strengths and deficiencies are measured;  
- should contain strategic priorities that can be used to assess contributions of service programmes; and,
- should integrate the theatre strategies and plans of the CINCs to ensure conformance to national military and security objectives.

From the above, one can distil a succinct definition of a strategic plan that is appropriate for the strategic planning requirements specified in 10 USC. It is a plan that specifies, in military terms, the national strategic objectives for the defence planning period under consideration (the Future Years Defence Program—FYDP period) and describes a strategy that rationalises the resources expected to be available during the FYDP with the strategic objectives described in the plan. To support further the intent of 10 USC, a strategic plan must be based on a global perspective and should also provide:

- a definitive statement of strategic priorities;
- a means of providing unified, strategic direction for the combatant commands;
- a template for formulating and assessing changes in the assignment of service functions; and
- a basis for strategic concepts upon which joint doctrine should be based.

During the Cold War the United States possessed strategic plans that rationalised resources, established priorities, and which acted as a conduit through which US national strategy was implemented globally. Since the end of the Cold War and the US administration's adoption of a two-dimensional strategy, the current JSPS has proven to be inadequate. It should come as no surprise then that the US Congress would become dissatisfied with the inability of the Department of Defense to articulate in a convincing manner how it translates the administration's strategy into force structure. Perhaps sharing Congressional concern, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has initiated a process by which he intends to influence the future development of the US armed forces. And it is to the disparate and somewhat confusing efforts to reform the JSPS and reorganise the US armed forces that we must turn.
Reform Initiatives

Clearly, there is dissatisfaction both within the US Congress, as well as the Department of Defense, with contemporary strategic planning. Current measures to address this problem include the Joint Strategy Review, the Chairman's Joint Vision 2010, the Quadrennial Defence Review, and the Armed Forces Force Structure Review Act of 1996.\textsuperscript{29} If their efforts are harmonised, they could produce military strategies which implement the policies set forth by the president in the NSS. Given the high level political attention directed at the Department of Defense, its planning processes and the structure of the US armed forces, it is likely that the initiatives will have some impact, either positive or negative. Whether they will produce processes and conditions that hedge against serious, but unlikely, threats to US vital interests, while at the same time shaping constructively the international security environment the better to facilitate the promotion US interests, remains to be seen.

Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR)

The concept of a quadrennial strategy review was endorsed by the Secretary of Defense as one of the many recommendations of the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM), which issued its final report in 1995. The CORM suggested that the Department of Defense should review strategy and force structure in a systematic and ‘expansive’ manner every four years following a presidential election.\textsuperscript{30} The Chairman's initial influence on the QDR will be through his Joint Strategy Review report produced by the Joint Strategic Planning System. The current force will be used as a benchmark for comparative purposes.

Joint Strategy Review

A key product of the JSPS is the Joint Strategy Review Annual Report (JSRAR). This document, the result of a comprehensive Joint Staff review of the international security environment, may fall short of recommending any changes to the NMS.\textsuperscript{31} Indeed, the Chairman may merely provide his views concerning the issues which should be considered during the QDR to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary will consider those views among others as input to the QDR.\textsuperscript{32}

Joint Vision 2010

The current Chairman recognises that technological advancements, domestic pressures, and changes in the international security environment make possible and necessitate a new vision for the US armed forces. In consequence, in summer 1996, General Shalikashvili published Joint Vision 2010.\textsuperscript{33} In it, he describes what he feels are the necessary capabilities the armed forces will need over the next 15 years and outlines how information and other technologies may be applied to extant forces to fulfill the vision. By publishing Joint Vision 2010, the Chairman has already indicated the substance of the advice he will offer the Secretary of Defense for the QDR.\textsuperscript{34} It is not anticipated that the JSRAR will contradict in any important way the thrust of Joint Vision 2010.

Armed Forces Force Structure Review Act of 1996

Culminating several years of congressional frustration over the inability of the Department of Defense to identify a force structure appropriate for the post-Cold War era, the US Congress passed, as part of the fiscal year 1997 Defense Authorisation Act, legislation to establish a non-partisan National Defence Panel whose mission is to assess the QDR and provide recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on its improvement.\textsuperscript{35} This review, along with an assessment of the QDR by the Chairman, will be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for his submission to the Congress, no later than 15 May 1997. The National Defense Panel will also conduct an independent Alternative Force Structure Assessment to be submitted to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary is required to report to Congress the findings of these panels no later than 15 December 1997.\textsuperscript{36}
Hedging and Shaping

Hedging

The significance of these four efforts occurring within a relatively short period of time suggests that the approach taken to date towards a post-Cold War NMS and accompanying force structures to execute the NSS will no longer suffice. Those infrequent occurrences in the nation's history where there is agreement for reform amongst the military, legislative and executive branches of government, makes fundamental change possible. Thus, the stage is set for a new NMS that includes strategic concepts for defending US interests, as well as emphasising the international security environment to promote US interests.

The nation will demand that its armed forces be capable of protecting vital US interests at home and abroad at acceptable levels of risk. But beyond that traditional expectation comes a post-Cold War consensus that the US military must be able to combine with the other instruments of national power to shape the international security environment to bring about ever decreasing threats to US interests. This is the guidance set forth in the NSS. Thus far, however, the US military has only partially responded to the NSS, by focusing on 'fighting and winning the nation's wars'.

Surprisingly, the US defence community and Congress have taken the initial steps towards achieving the objective of implementing a balanced NSS. The Chairman's Joint Vision 2010 accomplishes a key task of providing a future hedge against threats to US vital national interests. In effect, the document takes select Cold War weapon systems and integrates new information technologies to make them even more lethal and effective against potential aggressors. Additionally, according to one press report, part of the objective of the Joint Vision 2010 is the Chairman's desire to effect greater control over the modernisation programmes of the services to ensure that they support his envisaged structural plans. If the Chairman is successful in this regard, he will have accomplished an important aspect of his strategic planning responsibilities by ensuring that the US armed forces are prepared to hedge against future threats.

Shaping

That which remains to be addressed relates to the NSS requirement to capitalise on opportunities as they present themselves in the international environment. The QDR and the National Defense Panel should recommend changes in the JSPS processes that will enable the US armed forces to be applied agilely where opportunities present themselves. In other words, the more specific question these reviews should address is what proportion of the defence budget should be devoted to capabilities which are not necessarily optimised for war-fighting, but rather would support the US armed forces in exploiting opportunities in furtherance of the NSS.

One way the QDR and National Defence Panel could accomplish this objective is through a recommendation to create a joint strategic engagement plan (JSEP). This document's objective would be to fill the void between the war-fighting oriented Joint Vision 2010 and JSCP and the NSS. While the implementation of Joint Vision 2010 can result in the creation of priorities and other resource guidance to the services for war-fighting, the JSEP could provide needed strategy and resource guidance for the most beneficial applications of the US armed forces in non-war-fighting roles. Moreover, the three documents, combined, would effect the joint strategic plans requirement established in the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

The JSEP would guide the overall planning for the peacetime application of US forces worldwide. The plan should be created with a view toward shaping the international security environment and defining how the US armed forces should be employed in the pursuit of US national security objectives. Importantly, the JSEP would specify the joint priorities to be used in force development, which would enable the US armed forces better to meet the objectives of the NSS. The plan would also specify force priorities for the JSCP for both the active
pursuit of NSS objectives and the planning for defending US interests, if necessary. This would better enable the JSCP to serve its true purpose, that is, a transition to war planning document which directs the creation of operation plans by the Combatant Commanders.

One example of how the JSEP would affect joint strategic planning is in the area of personnel. Following the end of the Cold War and the reduction in the force structure of the US armed forces, there has been a great need for officers and enlisted personnel with foreign language and regional expertise to capitalise upon opportunities. This has been most noticeable in staffing new embassies and military liaison team offices in the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. In the case of US military liaison teams, these are located in 14 ministries of defence in Central and Eastern Europe. However, the services, for a variety of reasons, have been unable consistently to provide well-qualified personnel with this expertise. As a result, officers and enlisted personnel (active and reserve), some of whom possess no foreign language or regional expertise, have been used to staff these offices on short term bases. While not disparaging the constructive efforts of these individuals, untold opportunities and delays in achieving greater levels of success may have been missed by the war-fighting oriented personnel management policies of the services which have been out of balance with the dual requirements of the NSS. A JSEP would illuminate the requirement to provide officers and enlisted personnel with these types of expertise, to exploit opportunities to shape the future international environment. The JSEP would provide, therefore, the guidance needed by the services to meet this requirement.

In short, the JSEP would:

- allow for a better implementation of NSS;
- orchestrate the CINCs theatre strategies;
- recast the JSCP (short range) as a transition to war document; and
- provide a contextual springboard for the development of operation plans.

In sum, if the various review processes recommend the creation of a JSEP, the JSPS would become a more effective planning system that would be more capable of implementing the missions indicated by the NSS.

Conclusion

To quote the sagacious Sir Michael Howard, 'let us be clear: the West won the Cold War'. Notwithstanding the writings of some, the Western Alliance triumphed over the forces of Soviet communism. Yet, one must be careful in assigning to whom the spoils of victory fully belong. It is a bit superficial to argue that the United States and its allies 'defeated' in a political sense the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Rather, at a deeper level, it was Western norms of law and the West's adherence to the fundamental concept of the inherent dignity of man which triumphed over the Soviet concept of 'scientific man'. In its most basic form, Roman law and Greek philosophy, those fundamental manifestations of the Occident, were in the end victorious over communist despotism.

Yet, if the West is to remain cognisant of the lessons of history, then we cannot rest upon our victorious laurels. At the level of 'defence', we must be prepared to defend Western norms when challenged. As vividly demonstrated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, challenges and threats to Western norms continue to exist and they are unlikely to abate. Prudence dictates, therefore, that Western defence officials continue to make provisions in their planning to hedge against such threats as they emerge. In this respect, aspects of the current JSPS remain quite valid for designing strategy and suggesting forces required to hedge against these challenges to US interests in the years ahead.

Yet, at the 'philosophical' level, the JSPS in its current form does not sufficiently encourage the propagation of Western norms in the international security environment. Innovative strategic planning has proven difficult since the end of the Cold War for a variety of reasons. Not the least of these impediments has been the choices presented to senior military
leadership. The US armed forces, particularly the US Army, were rebuilt in the 1970s, inter alia, on the foundations of readiness and modernisation for large-scale warfare. No one should question the relevance, in principle, of adhering to that objective in future.

However, the question of the degree to which future joint strategic planning should be beholden solely to that principle is another matter. The new strategic environment requires that the United States direct fewer resources and attention to the force structure determinants associated with global and multi-regional conventional war. In consequence, greater resources, and certainly in a more organised and systematic fashion, should be directed to those capabilities and missions one normally does not automatically connote with 'war-fighting'.

These 'non-war-fighting' capabilities and missions could have a significant impact upon the US armed forces' future ability to shape the world by being better prepared to exploit opportunities in the international environment as they present themselves. For, without reforming the JSPS to include something akin to a joint strategic engagement plan, the Department of Defense will continue to be vulnerable to the charge that it is not fully implementing the NSS. Indeed, not only will it be exposed to such charges, but it will also abjure the opportunity of systematically 'shaping' the international environment, thereby lessening the likelihood of having to use the capabilities it has developed as a 'hedge' against untoward eventualities.

Endnotes

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the US government.

2. In the words of Andrew Krepinevich, 'Now, we don't know who the next competitor is, when they are going to show up, or how they are going to compete'. See Chicago Tribune, 22 September 1996.
4. Title 10, United States Code, Armed Forces, section 153(a) (1), (2). (3).
7. The Senate Armed Services Committee identified the inability of the JSPS to provide useful strategic planning advice and to formulate military strategy as one of the causes of ineffective strategic planning within the DOD. Admiral Zumwalt, a former Chief of Naval Operations, commenting on a key JCS MOP 84 JSPS document remarked: 'I found this particular document to be almost as valueless to read as it was fatiguing to write. Some of its prescriptions always were in the process of being falsified by events. Others were so tortured a synthesis of mutually contradictory positions that the guidance they gave was minimal'. See US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Defense Organization and the Need for Change, 495-6.
8. Memorandum of Policy No 84, Joint Strategic Planning System, 30, 35. The Base Case Family of Operation Plans was a grouping of OPLANs prepared individually by the CINCs in accordance with the strategy and guidance presented in the National Military Strategy Document and the specific tasks assigned in the JSCP. Collectively, they served as the 'Base Case' for Chairman- level force capability determinations and assessments as well as for identifying risks associated with implementing national security policy and achieving national security objectives. Each plan within the grouping related to others with respect to force apportionments, assumptions, timing and objectives.
9. Memorandum of Policy No 7 (issued 30 January 1990), Joint Strategic Planning System, 1. Based on one author's notes and experience as a member of the Joint Staff and the Joint Strategy Review (JSR) Working Group from 1990 to 1993. Although detailed JSR Administrative Instructions were published, they were never implemented. The conduct of the JSR was deferred until after the annual CINCs' Conference. See also Harry Rothman, Forging a New National Military Strategy in a Post-Cold War World: A Perspective from the Joint Staff (Carlisle barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, February 1992), 12-15. During the 1990 conference, the Chairman achieved consensus on a broad outline for a national military strategy for the post-Cold War period. Therefore, in consultation with the Service Chiefs and CINCs, the Chairman decided that the minutes of the conference, or more specifically the message that
summaries conference and resulting taskings, would suffice as Chairman's Guidance and no JSR was required. This is the point at which the formal JSPS began to fall apart.

11. Ibid, 24-5.
13. Ibid, 40.

14. Each military department transmits its proposals for resource allocations, in accordance with its interpretation of the Defense Planning Guidance, to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the form of a document called the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). It is the Secretary of Defense's responsibility, in consultation with the CJCS, CINCs, and secretaries of the military departments, to rationalise and integrate the POMs into a coherent defence programme.

16. Based on one of the author's experiences as a member of the Joint Staff working group formed to revise the JSPS. The Joint Staff office of primary responsibility, J-5, initially attempted to remove almost all of the structure from the process and eliminate the regular publication of documents such as the Chairman's Guidance, NMS, and JSCP. The Services and several of the CINCs resisted this since they believed regular document publication would bring them into the process because of standard Joint Staff coordination requirements for joint documents.

18. Although an NMS was not published under either CJCS MOP 7 or CJCS MOP 7 (Revision 1), NMS FY 92-97 was published in 1989 (JSSM-162-89, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Subject: National Military Strategy Document FY 92-97, 21 September 1989) in anticipation of revision of the JSPS.
21. While the Joint Staff was involved in the JSR the new Secretary of Defense initiated the now well-documented 'Bottom-Up Review (BUR)'. The BUR, intentionally conducted outside the JSPS, served to delay publication of the new NMS. Additionally, although his predecessor had given guidance for the development of a new NMS, General Shalikashvili wanted the Joint Staff to have the benefit of his guidance before proceeding. Another factor is the delay by the new administration in publishing a new National Security Strategy. It would have been poor form to publish the new NMS before the new NSS.
22. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC, February 1995), passim. We make this statement cognisant of a subtle difference between the NMS published by General Powell and the current NMS published by General Shalikashvili. In his letter transmitting the 1992 NMS, General Powell states: 'This strategy provides a rationale for ... a capability which will serve the nation well throughout the remainder of the 1990s'. The 1992 NMS was matched to the FY 94-99 FYDP. The comparable section of General Shalikashvili's letter transmitting the 1995 NMS says: 'This new national military strategy describes the objectives, concepts, tasks, and capabilities necessary in the near term'. This NMS is matched to the FY 96-01 FYDP. The JSPS still describes the NMS as a mid-range product. It is not completely clear why the current Chairman infers his NMS is a near-term document. However, this could be additional evidence of the need for stability in strategic planning that could be brought about by strategic plans.
24. Title 10, US Code, Armed Forces, sections 153 (a) (1), (2), (3)
25. Ibid, section 153 (a) (3) (C).
26. Ibid, section 153 (a) (4) (B), (C), & (E)
27. US Department of Defense, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC, 9 September 1993, III-l.
28. The Future Years Defence Program (FYDP) focuses on the period from 2-8 years into the future. For example, the FY 98-99 Department of Defense budget would normally be submitted, as part of the Presidents Budget, to Congress by February 1997. This DOD budget would represent the first two years of the FY 98-03 FYDP. The FY 98-03 would be built largely during 1996, based on Defense Planning Guidance nominally published in 1995. Thus, work on the FYDP during late 1995 and 1996 would focus on the FY 98-03 time period.
29. Recognising that Joint Vision 2010 describes operational concepts for war in the 21st century, the document's strategic impact cannot be denied. It is the template for joint and service capabilities programming for the foreseeable future.
31. CJCS MOP 7 describes the purpose of the JSRAR to recommend changes to the National Military Strategy resulting from the JSR.
34. See *Chicago Tribune*, 11 September 1996.
38. A number of visits to military liaison teams by one of the authors has confirmed this fact.
40. See, for example, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, *We All Lost the Cold War* (Princeton, 1993).
At 11 am on Thursday 22 January 1920 the Australian Minister for Defence, Senator Sir George Pearce, stepped into the conference room at Victoria Barracks in Melbourne to address the assembled group of senior Australian Army officers. Heading the group was Lieutenant General Sir Harry Chauvel, the recently appointed Inspector-General of the Army. Having commanded the famous Desert Mounted Corps in Palestine and Syria in 1917 and 1918, Chauvel was Australia's senior regular soldier. The Chief of the General Staff, Major General Gordon Legge, who had commanded the 2nd Australian Division at Gallipoli and in France in 1916, was absent on duty in Queensland. He was soon to be succeeded as CGS by another officer present in the group—Major General Sir Brudenell White, who during the Great War had been chief of staff of the 1st Division, the 1st Anzac Corps, the Australian Corps and finally the Fifth Army. The group also included Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, the famous commander of the Australian Corps in 1918 and now back in civilian life as an engineer; Major General Sir James McCay, a Melbourne lawyer and the commander of the 5th Division in 1916; and Major General Sir Talbot Hobbs, a Perth architect and the commander of the 5th Division in 1917 and 1918.

This conference of senior officers, which would include Legge once he returned from Queensland, brought together the six most senior generals in the Australian Army. Senator Pearce, a long-serving and experienced Minister for Defence, gave the conference the task of formulating proposals for the military defence of Australia. It was to take into account the international situation following the recent creation of the League of Nations and Australia's new responsibilities in the Pacific, but since finances were limited any such scheme had to be 'within reason'.

Of course the conference did not start with a clean sheet of paper. Firstly, it had to consider the structure of the Army which had been in existence for almost 20 years. The broad parameters had been set by the 1903 Defence Act which stated that Australian defence would rely on the part-time militia. There would be no permanent army except for the small numbers of officers and NCOs who would be required to train the militia, and the equally small numbers of permanent gunners, plus a few engineers, needed to man the coastal fortresses. There was to be no permanent field force, and the part-time field force was not permitted to serve overseas. Then in 1911 a new defence scheme had been introduced under which all young men were required to undergo compulsory military training on a part-time basis, with the purpose of forming a militia force of some 80,000 men by 1919.

The Great War threw this plan into disarray. A huge force of eventually over 300,000 men, the Australian Imperial Force (AIF), was raised by voluntary enlistment for service overseas. Meanwhile, the part-time militia for the defence of Australia was given little priority for resources. Following the war, in June 1919 a committee headed by George Swinburne, of the Defence Business Board of Administration, recommended certain measures to produce a more effective citizen force. But more direction was needed.

The second matter to be considered by the conference of senior officers was the new strategic situation. As early as 1895, when Japan had defeated China in a short war, the former had been identified as a potential threat. The magnitude of that threat had become more obvious following Japan's success against Russia in 1904-05. But during and following the Great War Japan had gained in strength. Its industries had grown as they provided munitions for the Allies, and they had been awarded mandated territories which extended to about 1000 kilometres north of the Australian territory of New Guinea. The Japanese threat
had been confirmed by Admiral of the Fleet Lord Jellicoe when he visited Australia in 1919 to report on naval defence. Jellicoe concluded that when Britain was involved in conflict in Europe, Japan might invade Australia and seize the Netherlands East Indies and New Guinea. Jellicoe recommended close collaboration between the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy.

The report delivered by the conference of senior officers in February 1920 became the Army's most important strategic planning document for the next two decades. It determined the threat, assessed the strategic situation and set out the force structure to deal with it. While governments changed and the defence policy was refined the Army hierarchy hung on dogmatically to the report as accepted wisdom, even when the government had a different view.

In the report the senior officers concluded that the safety of Australia rested on two factors: the first was its membership of the British Empire, and the second was 'Australia's own ability to prevent an invading enemy from obtaining decisive victories pending the arrival of help from other parts of the Empire'. While it was obvious that Japan posed the greatest threat, the conference had to rely, to a large extent, on British intelligence. At this time Australia had no Department of Foreign Affairs, but during the Great War the Australian Director of Military Intelligence, Major EL Piesse, had concluded that Japan posed a greater threat than that suggested by the War Office. In 1919 Piesse became Director of the Pacific Branch of the Prime Minister's Department, with the task of studying developments in the Far East, particularly Japan. But for specific information about Japanese military capabilities Australia relied on British advice. Using this advice, the Australian senior officers assessed that Japan could, without difficulty, place in the field an army of 600,000 men. In peace the Japanese field army comprised 25 divisions, but in war it could expand to 42 divisions. Japan had sufficient mercantile shipping to transport an army of 100,000 fully-equipped men in one convoy. Like Jellicoe, the senior officers believed that Japan would strike when Britain was involved in Europe. With that threat assessment in mind, the senior officers concluded that while Australia might rely on the Royal Navy for protection, Australia would also need to 'maintain an Army capable of preventing an enemy from attaining a decision ashore'. The report continued:

Because of the extent of Australia's coast-line, the absence of sufficient railway facilities to move troops to meet requirements, and other certain disabilities, a considerable dispersion of troops is inevitable, and it is essential that the Military Force, like the Naval Force, be the maximum obtainable.

During the Great War Australia had maintained five infantry and almost two light horse divisions, so it was not surprising that the conference assessed that Australia could maintain a field force of two cavalry divisions and four infantry divisions, with the necessary army, corps and auxiliary troops making, upon war establishment, a total of about 180,000 all ranks. Before the war the Australian Army had had no formations larger than a brigade, but the experience of the war showed the necessity to train commanders and staffs at divisional and corps levels. The conference recommended that officers and NCOs from the AIF be used to staff the new militia formations and units.

The organisation proposed by the conference almost exactly paralleled that of the AIF in the last year of the war, and the report recommended that one cavalry division be organised in New South Wales and Queensland and the other in Victoria and South Australia. Since the area of strategic importance was southeast Australia, two infantry divisions were to be formed in New South Wales, supplemented from Queensland, and another two in Victoria, supplemented from South Australia. Three mixed brigades would be located in each of Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia, and these could form a fifth division if necessary.

The conference recognised that the need for coast defences and garrisons would be largely determined by naval considerations, which had yet to be discussed by the Committee of Imperial Defence in London. However, the conference accepted that the Army would probably
have to defend Sydney, Cockburn Sound in Western Australia, Newcastle, Melbourne and Hobart against attack by unarmoured surface vessels, submarines, aircraft and enemy landings. The coast defence equipment at Thursday Island, Townsville, Brisbane, Adelaide and Albany thus should be maintained until the views of the Committee of Imperial Defence were known.

The conference had based its proposals on the existing Defence Act, but it could not avoid commenting on it:

the advantages, moral and material, of fighting in the enemy's country are so enormous that it is folly to await the enemy's attack on our own soil, if there is any possibility of going to meet him and so of keeping him out of our own land ... The AIF had an opportunity to fight abroad and defend Australia so effectively that Australia hardly realized that it was defence and not offence, her troops had undertaken ... The community must, therefore, make up its mind, however unwillingly, that all preparations for the defence of Australia, thorough and complete as they may be, may break down absolutely if, at a final and decisive moment, the weapon of defence cannot be transferred beyond our territorial waters.

Faced with financial constraints, the government failed to approve any of the proposals for new equipment or for an arsenal to provide the necessary munitions. Nor did it take up the conference's implied request to change the Defence Act. Nonetheless, the government accepted the proposed structure and on 1 May 1921 the Army introduced its new divisional system by an administrative act. As the Inspector-General, Lieutenant General Sir Harry Chauvel, put it, the divisional organisation marked 'the highest stage of development of the Forces'.6 Home training of the Citizen Forces, which had been suspended with broken periods since 1 November 1915, recommenced on 1 July 1921. The militia numbered 127,000 with a permanent cadre of 3500. Much of the first year was spent in the re-organisation of units under the divisional scheme and in the issuing of clothing and equipment. The government's response to the recommendations of the conference of senior officers was disappointing, but worse was to come.

Towards the end of 1921 representatives of Britain, France, Italy, the United States and Japan met for a disarmament conference in Washington where they agreed to reduce the numbers of their battleships and restrict the size of new vessels. Believing that Australia's security was now assured, in mid-1922 the government drastically reduced the defence vote from £8 million in 1921/22 to £5.2 million in 1923/24. Nearly half the ships of the Royal Australian Navy were decommissioned. In his Inspector-General's report for 1923 General Chauvel attributed the complacency with which the Australian people had accepted 'the denuding of their Defences' to a number of factors. These included geographical isolation and the fact that Australia had never been even threatened with invasion; a sublime faith in the power of the Royal Navy; an impression, for which the traditions established by the AIF in the war were responsible, that Australian men could be transformed into efficient soldiers in a few weeks; and the universal feeling that 'the war was a "war to end wars" and, as it was won, there is nothing further to fear'.7

The army was cut savagely. Although the seven militia divisions were retained, the overall strength of the militia was reduced to 31,000 men—only 25 per cent of its war establishment. Training was reduced to six days in camp and four days in local centres a year, and was confined to youths of 18 and 19 (that is, two annual quotas instead of the normal seven). The permanent army was reduced to 1600 while 72 permanent officers were retired. As AJ Hill has written: 'Thus the best hopes and the best advice of the Conference of Senior Officers were jettisoned. Economy was elevated to the prime aim and Defence lay defenceless before the political onslaught'.8 The senior officers had hoped to have an army that could repel a possible invader. All that was left was a skeleton force which, with ten days' training per year, could hardly be described as a real army.
It was soon obvious that the Washington Treaty was no guarantee of long term peace, and the Australian government thought that security might be provided by the naval base which the British government had recently decided to construct at Singapore. Under the so-called Singapore strategy, Britain undertook to send its main fleet to Singapore in time of threat from Japan. In turn, Australia accepted responsibility for the protection of maritime trade in the Australia Station, and agreed to contribute towards a naval force based at Singapore and to maintain a secondary base at Darwin. The Army was to have the capacity to expand to provide an expeditionary force as well as to defend the Australian continent.

The Singapore strategy was discussed at a meeting of the Council of Defence, chaired by the Prime Minister, Stanley Bruce, in Melbourne on 30 August 1923. Generals White, Monash and Chauvel, who was now CGS as well as Inspector-General, all agreed with the views of the Chief of Naval Staff that ‘if Singapore were made impregnable as a base for all types of ships including capital ships, Australia would be reasonably safe’. Next day, Chauvel wrote to Brigadier General Blamey, the Army representative in London who was to act as Bruce’s military adviser at the forthcoming Imperial Conference, to prepare him for his task. He told Blamey that ‘the Singapore Base, lying as it will on the flank of an enemy moving to attack Australia, will be of inestimable value to Australia and will in fact be the pivot of Australian defence’.

From the Army’s perspective, the key issue would be the defence of Singapore. Chauvel informed Blamey that plans had been prepared to send a force overseas if the government wished, but only so long as a separate force was raised. By this, Chauvel was referring to Plan 401 which had been prepared in 1922 when it looked as though Australia might be required to send an expeditionary force to Turkey during the so-called Chanak crisis. Plan 401 provided for different expeditionary forces ranging from an infantry or cavalry brigade group through to a complete division.). Chauvel continued that if the militia were mobilised, equipment would not be available for an overseas force. Anticipating that Blamey might ‘be questioned as to the capacity of Australia to supply a portion of the Garrison for Singapore in time of war’, Chauvel advised that this could be achieved by voluntary enlistment, if the government agreed, but added that the ‘suitability of our troops for the purpose would further have to be considered’. The troops would be ‘largely untrained and would require intensive training after arrival at Singapore’.

In view of Australia’s efforts to reinforce Singapore in the Second World War and the fate of the untrained troops sent there in January 1942, these comments made in 1923 are of particular interest. The details of this policy were discussed by Bruce at the Imperial Conference in London later in 1923, and the resolutions of the conference became the basic principles of Australian defence policy and for cooperation with Britain on defence matters between the wars.

At this stage the Army had not determined how it was going to defend Australia. Indeed, the concept of militia divisions was relatively new, and the focus was primarily on the training of units rather than on preparing for higher level operations. Faced with financial restrictions, the best that the Army could do was concentrate on the training of commanders and staff, the purchase of essential equipment and the training of rank and file, in that order of priority.

Already the Army had doubts about the efficacy of the Singapore strategy. In 1924 the British government suspended construction of the naval base, and the Australian government responded by increasing expenditure on the Royal Australian Navy. The Australian Army’s criticism of the Singapore strategy was put eloquently in an address to the United Service Institution of Victoria in 1926 by the Director of Mobilisation, Lieutenant Colonel HD Wynter. He argued that Australia had to establish a ‘first class naval base’ of its own; Australia should be self-reliant and not rely on imperial defence. In his annual reports during the 1920s the Inspector-General, Chauvel, also argued for the defence of Australia, pointing out that Japan would strike only when Britain was pre-occupied in Europe and thus would not be able to send a fleet to the Pacific. Chauvel insisted that there was a need to provide adequate protection for the major ports, but the government failed to provide the funds. For its part, the Navy claimed that the worst that could be expected was enemy raids rather than the invasion envisaged by the Army.
Eventually, in 1928 Chauvel persuaded the Defence Committee to prepare an appreciation of the threat to Australia under the conditions then existing; that is, without the Singapore base being completed. Australia still did not have its own capacity to gather intelligence and, as with the early studies, the Australian planners had to rely on British advice. Nonetheless, they tended to put greater emphasis on Japanese capabilities than their British counterparts. This appreciation, dated 9 August 1928, reaffirmed the view of the 1920 senior officers conference that Japan might make demands 'such, for example, as the abrogation of the "White Australia" policy ... when the British Empire is engaged in European complications'. The appreciation noted that Japan's traditional policy was 'to commence hostilities without warning and to attack the foundations of her opponent's sea power at the start'. After examining Lloyd's Register to determine Japan's merchant navy capacity, the appreciation concluded that Japan could embark and maintain a maximum of three divisions. The appreciation concluded further that in time of war there would be extensive raiding of trade routes. Furthermore, raids on important centres such as Darwin, Sydney, Newcastle and possibly Fremantle and Albany were 'to be expected and must be provided against'. An attack on Singapore, if the British Fleet was delayed, was a possibility but not until after Hong Kong had been effectively disposed of. An invasion of Australia, 'but only on a limited scale', was 'within the bounds of possibility and not so improbable as to allow of it being definitely ruled out'.

The Defence Committee endorsed this appreciation and the CGS, Chauvel, directed his small staff to begin preparing plans to deal with a possible Japanese landing. The officer responsible for these plans was the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, Colonel John Lavarack, who had attended the Imperial Defence College in 1928. He was an outstanding officer who was to be CGS in the late 1930s. In the Second World War he commanded both the 1st Australian Corps and the 1st Australian Army and ended his career as the Governor of Queensland.

Lavarack and his staff began work on two papers. The first was an examination of the Defence Committee's appreciation, which Lavarack thought did not give enough emphasis to the likelihood of a Japanese invasion. He wanted to make it quite clear that there was a case for the retention in Australia of mobile land forces'. However he acknowledged that it would be dangerous to suggest a review of the official appreciation since it did 'not finally exclude the possibility of invasion, and we could not be sure of a majority in any Committee appointed'.

The Army's appreciation of the threat was progressively up-dated as the strategic situation deteriorated. For example, in 1932 the appreciation stated:

it is considered that recent events in Manchuria and Shanghai point to the fact that Japan is perfectly ready to take aggressive action in defiance of covenants and pacts... Given a favourable opportunity, she would lose no chance of extending Southward her influence in the Western Pacific.

The second paper prepared by Lavarack and his staff was the so-called 'Plan of Concentration', the first draft of which was circulated in September 1929. Not surprisingly, it was based on the contention that Japan would bide its time until Britain was involved in Europe. Japan might seek a rapid decision by landing at one of three locations that were vital to Australia; that is, Sydney, Newcastle or Melbourne. The probable strength of the invading force would be about three divisions, and it was thought that this force would receive substantial reinforcements in about two months from its initial landing. The Japanese would be 'fanatics who like dying in battle, whilst our troops would consist mainly of civilians hastily thrown together on mobilisation with very little training, short of artillery and possibly of gun ammunition'. The first aim of the Australian war plans was to defend the Sydney-Newcastle area which would be treated as one defended locality (see map below). Newcastle would be defended by the 1st Corps, which would consist of the 1st Cavalry Division and the 1st and 4th Infantry Divisions. Sydney would be defended by the 2nd Corps, comprising the 2nd Cavalry Division and the 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions. Local forces would be required to defend Melbourne, Fremantle, Brisbane, Darwin, Hobart and Adelaide. Victoria would be the principal source of supply and maintenance, with the main base at Albury. Reconnaissances and studies were carried out secretly by permanent staff officers to see whether the concentration areas could support the formations to be deployed there.
This map was attached to the Army’s inter-war concentration plan and shows the divisional and brigade concentration areas in the Sydney and Newcastle areas. It has been slightly re-drawn as the original showed the cavalry formation areas in green and the infantry areas in red. The original map is in AWM 54, item 243/6/6.

The secrecy surrounding the plan of concentration was illustrated by the opening comments made by the new Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel Vernon Sturdee, when he described it to the senior officers’ course in 1933. He began:

I desire to impress on each and every one of you the necessity for absolute secrecy regarding what I am about to say concerning the Plan of Concentration. As the exercise is based on that plan it is essential that its contents be treated in a similar manner. Any leakage of information about the exercise which might reach the press may be sufficient to produce the most wonderful scare headlines such as ‘Military chiefs consider invasion imminent. Staff are now concentrated in Sydney to make full preparations to repel Japanese attack before Christmas’. Just imagine the political and diplomatic repercussions—so please watch your step.”
This plan continued in existence throughout the 1930s, was the basis of several senior officers' exercises, and was the reason for the 1st Infantry Division's exercise in the Port Stephens area, north of Newcastle, in October 1938. There were, of course, many weaknesses in this plan. There was no guarantee that the Japanese would land in the Sydney-Newcastle area. No corps headquarters were formed and until 1938 the divisions had had no opportunity to exercise as formations. Indeed without the necessary resources the plans were quite unrealistic.

The plan of concentration was considered by the Army to be the second stage of a three-stage planning process, even though it was the first element to be completed. The first stage was to be the preparation of mobilisation plans and the third was to be the preparation of a plan of operation.21 Towards the end of the 1930s the mobilisation plan was subsumed in work on the Commonwealth War Book, which set out the actions to be taken by various government agencies on the outbreak of war, and was detailed in the more specific Army War Book.

In 1929, when the first plan of concentration was prepared, all this was in the future. Towards the end of that year the change of government and the onset of the Depression made it even more unlikely that the resources necessary to support such a plan would be provided for many years. Immediately, without consulting the Department of Defence, the new Labor Government suspended compulsory service and soon after introduced a voluntary scheme. Within a few months the economic situation had deteriorated, and in 1930 the government undertook more drastic cuts. The defence vote was reduced, ships were paid off and Army officers and men were required to take up to eight weeks' annual leave without pay. By 1932 the Citizen Forces were down to 28,000 volunteers, from 47,000 (of whom 7000 had been volunteers) in the late 1920s, and the permanent army numbered 1536.

These pressures heightened the arguments between the services as each sought to maintain its share of the defence vote. The Army's case, that preparations had to be made to forestall a possible invasion, was argued strongly by Colonel Lavarack, supported by the CGS, Chauvel. The Navy was capable of arguing its own case, but it was supported by the new secretary of the Defence Committee, FG Shedden. Like Lavarack, Shedden had attended the Imperial Defence College in 1928, but had stayed in London for most of 1929. There Shedden had written a paper arguing that Australia's defence was best assured within the framework of imperial defence. When this paper was circulated in Australia it was keenly criticised in an Army report prepared by Lavarack. The report stated:

Mr Shedden has taken an immense deal of trouble and is to be congratulated on his work which is ably compiled. I am afraid, however, that nothing new is disclosed. The facts arrayed and the conclusions arrived at, which are all based upon undisputed command of all the seas, have been put forward time and again but have never been accepted by Australia.

Paragraph by paragraph Lavarack pulled Shedden's arguments to pieces, and concluded that there was no substitute for a trained army.22

With his own reputation at stake, Shedden replied by questioning Lavarack's knowledge of naval matters and then homed in on the 'raids versus invasion' issue;

No one said that Australia was immune from attacks on territory. The whole question is 'Invasion'. The writer [Lavarack] does not appear to understand the difference - between Raids and Invasion.23

Lavarack had made an enemy of Shedden, who by 1937 was Secretary of the Department of Defence, and this was to have unfortunate consequences. Writing in the 1960s, Shedden claimed that during the Second World War Chauvel told him that, 'having seen the course of the war, he now knew that the Naval view that the security of Australia ultimately depended
on the command of sea communications, had been correct, but it had been necessary for the Army to maintain "the bogey of invasion and seven divisions for local defence", in order to resist any attempt by the Government to reduce the Army organization and its Vote.\textsuperscript{24}

In 1931 the new United Australia Party government came to power led by Joseph Lyons, and the following year confirmed that its policy was that it would be better to provide efficient protection against raids rather than inefficient measures against invasion'.\textsuperscript{25} The new CGS, Major General Julius Bruche, would not let the matter rest and continued to question the policy. For a while in mid-1934 it looked as though Bruche was making headway against the Minister for Defence, Sir George Pearce, when he received a favourable response to a well-argued letter. Bruche had written:

As you are no doubt aware our plans for mobilization and concentration, and in fact all our plans, which have taken years of preparation to reach their present state of completion, are based on defence against invasion, and I feel that this work should not be scrapped but should be proceeded with as a measure of precaution in case the international situation should deteriorate.\textsuperscript{26}

However, towards the end of 1934 the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, Sir Maurice Hankey, visited Australia and persuaded the government that it should continue to rely on the Singapore strategy. In April 1935 Lavarack was appointed CCS and he continued the argument with the government. Hankey thought that Lavarack was 'a bit of an invasionist', although not as bad as Wynter.\textsuperscript{27} Lavarack wrote that his motto was 'Trust in the Navy but keep your powder dry'. He added that the problem was that the RAN did not think 'it necessary to have any powder of their own, much less keep it dry'.\textsuperscript{28}

The 1933/34 budget showed a slight increase in the defence vote and thereafter it increased each year; in 1932-33 it had been a little over £3 million, in 1933-34 it was a little over £4 million and by 1935-36 it was £7 million. But initially this increase had little effect other than to revive an almost moribund force. As usual, the majority of the money went to the Navy. For example, the sum allocated to the Army in 1935-6 was £1.8 million; but at least some new equipment such as heavy guns, anti-aircraft guns and vehicles could be purchased.

In overseeing this re-armament Lavarack's priorities were: firstly, to train commanders and staff; secondly, to purchase equipment; and thirdly, to begin training the militia. These were similar priorities to those determined in 1924. Lavarack and the Military Board wanted to build up the field army, but the Minister for Defence, advised by the Navy, was adamant that priority had to be given to coast defences. Lavarack pointed out that anti-aircraft defences and mobile land forces would be needed to prevent raids on the guns, but the Minister's view prevailed.

On 25 September 1933 the Minister for Defence, Senator Pearce, announced a major programme to install two 9.2-inch guns at each of North Head (Sydney), Cape Banks (entrance to Botany Bay, Sydney) and Rottnest Island (off Fremantle), and 6-inch gun batteries at Cowan Cowan (Brisbane), Rottnest, South Head (Sydney) and Henry Head (entrance to Botany Bay, Sydney).\textsuperscript{29}

The Government's programme was the result of months of discussion in the Defence Committee in which the CGS, General Bruche, had proposed a more ambitious three-year programme for the purchase of new equipment.\textsuperscript{30} His proposals were not supported by the Navy, which relied on the view of the Committee of Imperial Defence that the Japanese would not attempt an invasion of Australia.\textsuperscript{31} With the threat of Singapore in their rear the Japanese would not send their battleships or aircraft carriers south to Australia, and they would only attack with cruisers, armed merchant vessels, submarines and aircraft carried on these vessels. So it was decided to install only 9.2-inch guns, rather than larger calibre guns.

Fortunately, unlike Britain, in the early 1930s Australia did not appear to face the prospect of large-scale raids from land-based aircraft, nor was it expected that there would be organised attacks from carrier-borne aircraft. However, if the 9.2-inch guns deterred an enemy from
attacking with gun-fire, then the enemy might be forced to use aircraft located on cruisers or raiders.\textsuperscript{32} It was not long before this idea had to be reviewed for, with the rapid expansion of the Japanese Naval Air Force, the chances that the Japanese might use carrier-borne aircraft increased, and it became more urgent to provide adequate air defences at each major port.

However important these developments might have been, Lavarack was still convinced that Australia needed to prepare the field force so that it could deal with an invasion, and before long the government was accusing Lavarack of disloyalty. The Director of Military Training, Colonel Wynter, who had written about the weakness of the Singapore strategy in the 1920s, continued the argument with an address to the United Service Institution in 1935. The Opposition used the article to criticise the Government's defence policy. On several occasions the Minister for Defence, Sir Archdale Parkhill, accused the Military Board of leaking information to the press, and Parkhill criticised Lavarack for permitting Wynter to address the United Service Institution. Wynter lost his temporary rank of colonel and was sent to a less important posting. Encouraged by Shedden, Parkhill withdrew his recommendation for Lavarack to be awarded a CB.\textsuperscript{33}

The last years of peace were marked by a steadily accelerating defence vote. However, in the Army much of this additional money was absorbed by coast defences. Initially there was little effect on the field army, which increased it size only marginally; by July 1936 the Citizen Forces had an authorised strength of 36,000 (it was actually 26,637). It was not until 20 October 1938, following the Munich crisis, that the Minister for Defence announced additional measures. The militia was permitted to expand to a strength of 70,000. The permanent forces were to be ready at two hours' notice to man fixed and anti-aircraft defences, and were also to expand in numbers. The Army budget was increased from £11.6 to £19.7 million and the acquisition of arms, ammunition and war equipment was accelerated.\textsuperscript{34}

In early 1938 Shedden, who had become Secretary of the Department of Defence the previous November, persuaded the government that the only solution to resolving the problems concerning the Army was to appoint a British officer as Inspector-General. As a result, in June 1938 Lieutenant General EK Squires took up the appointment as Inspector-General and submitted his first, and only, report in December 1938. Like Lavarack, Squires recommended that the Army be organised in peacetime so that once it was mobilised it could deal not only with raids but with an invasion, although he was less direct in his language than Lavarack had been. Squires wrote:

> [The Army] must be able first, to defend certain vital and vulnerable areas and localities against attacks on a relatively small scale, which may take place, with little or no warning, immediately on the outbreak of war or even in anticipation of a formal declaration of war.

> Secondly, they must be able to expand, after their initial mobilisation, into an army strong enough to resist aggression or any larger scale likely to be developed against Australia.\textsuperscript{35}

Squires acknowledged that the government's policy was defence against raids and recalled that for some years the government had fixed the strength of the militia at 35,000 men. This was considered necessary to enable the Army to mobilise its First Line Component; that is, two divisions, three cavalry brigades, four mixed brigades and the necessary fortress and ancillary troops. However, Squires then added a twist to the story:

> By their recent decision to increase the Militia the Government have demonstrated their acceptance of their military advisers' view that a peace strength of 35,000 was an inadequate nucleus for expansion, first, into an effective First Line Component, and, secondly—perhaps after a short interval only—into a considerably larger force.

In other words, there was a tacit acceptance by the government that the Army was preparing to resist an invasion, even if it formally rejected this notion.
Squires' two main proposals impacted on the Army's strategic planning. The first was a proposal to raise two regular brigades with a peace establishment of some 7500 men. These troops would assist the militia with training, would afford the officers of the Staff Corps much needed command experience, and on the outbreak of war would be available for such necessary tasks as the protection of vital points. This force would require an amendment to the Defence Act, and the only part of the force actually raised was the Darwin Mobile Force of some 245 men, all wearing gunner badges to meet the requirements of the unamended Defence Act. Squires' second proposal concerned the overall army organisation. At that time the six military districts, six militia divisions and various independent brigades were all commanded directly from Army Headquarters in Melbourne.

Squires proposed to reorganise the Army into four commands based in Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne and Perth, with an independent garrison in Darwin. The commands, named Northern, Eastern, Southern and Western, would be responsible for all units in their areas, with the exception of some training establishments. Southern Command would include South Australia and Tasmania. This structure was not implemented until October 1939, one month after the outbreak of war. However, as early as the Munich crisis in September 1938 Squires had discussed his proposal with Lavarack in the light of the Army's concentration plan. It will be recalled that when threatened by invasion the Army planned to deploy a corps to Newcastle and another to Sydney, but there were no corps headquarters in existence. The new command arrangements would mean that the GOC Eastern Command would, in effect, become a corps commander responsible for the defence of New South Wales. On 28 September 1938 Lavarack and Squires jointly recommended to the government that in the event of mobilisation of the 'first line component', Major General Sir Thomas Blamey, a militia officer on the unattached list, should be given command of the New South Wales District. Major General Sir Carl Jess, the Adjutant-General, would command the Victorian District, and Major General Henry Gordon Bennett, the most senior militia officer, also on the unattached list, would command the Newcastle Fortress area. Squires and Lavarack also suggested that either of themselves could be appointed commander-in-chief of the army to direct the defence of Australia. The Cabinet hesitated to act, the Munich crisis passed, and the proposals were not implemented. Nonetheless, the incident gives some idea of army thinking at the time.

The official policy that the Army had to be prepared to deal with raids rather than an invasion persisted until the outbreak of war. In February 1939 the Committee of Imperial Defence in London admitted that the fleet it might send to oppose the Japanese Navy in the Far East could be inferior to it, raising further questions as to the likelihood of an attack on Australia. In the face of the deteriorating strategic situation, in May 1939 the Chiefs of Staff agreed that while preparations to meet an invasion need not be pursued, Australia should prepare to meet a medium scale of attack, that is major landings, rather than only the minor scale of attack, that is minor landings. However, the Chiefs could not maintain their unanimous approach at the Council of Defence in July, and the old planning base remained.

On the outbreak of war the first elements of the Army's strategic plans, as set out in the Army War Book, were implemented immediately. The permanent gunners manned the fortresses and were soon relieved by the militia fortress artillery. The government reintroduced universal training to ensure that the militia was maintained at a strength of not less than 75,000. Meanwhile the Second Australian Imperial Force (AIF) was raised using the old Plan 401 for an expeditionary force. Since the permanent force envisaged by Squires had not been formed, the Army was desperately short of the trained and experienced personnel that were necessary both to train the militia and the AIF.

In retrospect, it is easy to criticise the Army's strategic planning between the wars, but in many ways it faced an insoluble problem. As mentioned earlier, the Army was hamstrung by the Defence Act, which restricted the recruitment of permanent forces. With a small population and a limited economy, Australia would have been hard-pressed to build credible defence forces even if times had been good; but economically it was the worst of times. There were severe weaknesses in both the Singapore strategy and also in the alternative strategy of
building a large army to resist invasion. Perhaps the Army could have seized on possibilities
offered by the Singapore strategy to argue that such a strategy required a smaller, capable,
hard-hitting field force. But there was no guarantee that funds would have been found to
provide such a field force. Within the framework of the policy of relying on Singapore and
protecting Australia from raids, money was spent on installing guns at the main ports. There
was some justification for these installations, but the money would have been better spent on
building a balanced field force with modern field and anti-tank guns, armoured vehicles,
including tanks, soft-skinned vehicles and communications. Against his wishes, Lavarack was
directed by the government to spend the Army’s funds on coastal defence, rather than on the
field force.

The most remarkable aspect of the Army's strategic planning between the wars was its
consistency. Despite the government's policy of preparing to deal with raids, from 1920
onwards the Army prepared to counter an invasion. By the late 1920s this strategy was being
turned into an operational concept which in turn dominated the development of the Army in
the 1930s. The arguments in the Defence Committee and in the Council of Defence about
raids versus invasion were extremely important when it came to the allocation of funds. But
when it came to planning, the Army still worked on the basis of defeating an invasion.

The Army's experience between the war's also focuses attention on the strategic decision-
making process. There was rarely any agreement or cooperation between the Navy and
Army, and generally the RAAF was more concerned with ensuring its own survival as a
separate force. There was no joint service organisation, and until the mid-1930s little
guidance was provided by the civilian staff in the Department of Defence. Faced with
conflicting advice, the Australian Government looked to Britain for direction. There were few
avenues by which the public could be exposed to the various arguments. Lavarack might
have been better off pursuing a cooperative rather than confrontationist approach. But with
the forces arrayed against him perhaps he would have achieved no more than he did.

Of course not all Army officers embraced the invasion theory with the same dedication as
Lavarack and his senior staff. One exception was Major General Sir Thomas Blamey, who as
an unallotted militia officer attended meetings of the Council of Defence in the late 1930s. For
example, on 17 December 1937 the Council considered the questions raised by the
Australian delegation at the recent Imperial Conference in London, particularly Australia's
acceptance of the view that its defence rested on Britain's intention to send a fleet to
Singapore in time of threat. This plan was supported by the Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral
Sir Ragnar Colvin, but both the CGS, Lavarack, and the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice
Marshal R Williams, were concerned to build up the defences in Australia. Blamey 'expressed
his gratification with the very clear and definite statement which had been presented'. He
thought that 'the Australian authorities responsible for the preparation of the defence scheme
were to be congratulated on the efficacy of their plans ... The whole fabric of the scheme on
which the statement was based appeared to hinge around Singapore, and so long as
Singapore could hold out' many of the difficulties could be overcome. However, the Minister
for External Affairs, WM Hughes, the former Prime Minister who had for many years warned
against the Japanese threat, 'raised the question of the impregnability of Singapore. He asked
whether anyone could show that Singapore was impregnable or could be made so. If it
proved to be vulnerable, and we were relying on Singapore to keep the enemy at a distance,
we were certainly living in a fool's paradise'. Colvin assured him that 'the Empire Defence
Scheme as prepared by the British Naval Authorities was based on the undoubted
impregnability of Singapore, and that the British strategy was based on the fact that
Singapore can hold out during the 70 days period, while awaiting the co-operation of the
British Fleet'.

Similar arguments surfaced at the Council meeting on 24 February 1938, and an interesting
aspect of the meeting was Blamey's views on the likelihood of invasion. According to the
minutes of the meeting, Blamey:
felt that it was reasonable for the Council to assume that invasion was unlikely and he felt that our efforts should be directed towards the provision of adequate defence against raids on a scale outlined in the Agenda.

Lavarack replied that Japan was ready to take risks to undertake an invasion, but Blamey agreed with Admiral Colvin that Japan would have to deal with Singapore first. However, he did add that if Japan were at war with Australia, then Australia 'could not dream of sending men abroad unless the Japanese Fleet with its menace to Australia were first dealt with and overcome'.

It is not known what Shedden thought of Blamey's views, but he certainly would have found them more acceptable than those of Lavarack. However, at the next meeting on 18 March Lavarack put aside his reservations about preparing just to defend against raids, and stated that 'even with the present low scale of efficiency of the Militia Forces, it should be sufficient to meet the scale of attack for defence against raids on the minimum scale'. Blamey retorted that in his view the militia 'in its present state of efficiency would be of little use against a raid of any size'. Lavarack quickly explained that 'the raid contemplated consisted of 200 men, and on that scale the force we have should be in sufficient numbers'. While that might have been correct, Blamey still thought that 'the militia Forces as at present constituted were practically useless as an army'.

During these years Blamey delivered a series of broadcasts on international affairs. In a special broadcast on the services on 9 November 1938 he explained that Australia's vital area was in the triangle formed by Newcastle, Wollongong and Canberra, with Melbourne, Adelaide, Brisbane and Darwin also being important. The first line of defence lay with the Navy:

While there is a battle fleet at sea based upon Singapore, and until it has been signally defeated in naval battle a large scale invasion of Australia would be so hazardous as to be unlikely to be attempted. But it would be very unwise to assume that no conditions can arrive in which the battle fleet available, whatever it may be, cannot possibly be defeated. So no nation can take the risk of remaining unprepared to meet invasion. Our defence requires therefore that adequate military forces be available on land to meet any possible invasion. No Army can be made in a day or even in a year.

So in his public statements Blamey was careful not to enter too deeply into the argument between the Navy and the Army, but by late 1938 action was well underway to expand the militia.

As war approached, Blamey's views about the possibility of invasion were not so dogmatic as Lavarack's, even though he expressed deep concern about the Army's readiness for war. It was not surprising, then, that the influential Shedden did all that he could to side-line Lavarack and to ensure that Blamey rather than Lavarack received command of the AIF when it was formed in October 1939.

It was a salutary reminder that strategic planning is ultimately a political issue. In the inter-war period the Army had failed to persuade its political masters to adopt what it perceived to be the correct strategy. In trying to pursue that strategy without political endorsement the Army's leaders paid a considerable price. No doubt they still felt it was a price worth paying.
Endnotes

1. Report on the Military Defence of Australia, 6 February 1920, AWM1, item 20/7, Australian War Memorial, Canberra.
4. Report on the Military Defence of Australia, 6 February 1920, AWM1, item 20/7.
8. AJ Hill, Chauvel of the Light Horse (Melbourne, 1978), 203.
15. Memorandum by the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, 5 May 1931, AWM 54, item 910/2/4.
18. Lecture on the Plan of Concentration, 1933, AWM 54, item 243/6/150.
19. The studies are in AWM 54, item 243/6/159.
23. Annotations on ibid.
24. Shedden manuscript, ch 71, p 10, CRS A5954, item 1294/2.
28. Lavarack to Lt Gen Sir John Dill, 9 June 1936, Lavarack Papers, in the possession of Dr JO Lavarack.
29. ‘Australian Defence Policy Outstanding Questions and Their Background’, 8 February 1935, CRS A5954, item 841/3.
30. CGS to Secretary, Defence Committee, 30 November 1933, CRS A2031, item vol 2.
31. Defence Committee Agenda No 7/1934, 2 March 1934, CRS A2302, item 1934.
32. Secretary, Department of Defence to Secretary, Prime Minister's Department, 30 July 1936, CRS A1608, item B15/1/9.
33. Shedden to Shepherd, 18 January 1937, CRS A5954, box 886.
34. Acceleration of Defence Programme’, CRS A5954, item 789/1.
35. Squires report, AWM 54, item 243/6/58.
36. The idea of using the term 'Commands' came from Lavarack, not Squires. See Lavarack's comments on the report in AWM 54, item 243/6/58.
37. Shedden to Minister for Defence, 28, 29 September 1939, CRS A5954, item 890/3.
40. Ibid.
42. The script is in AWM, PF 85/3555, item 8.
Two basic points need to be made at the outset concerning Australian strategic planning in the Vietnam War. The simple fact is that Australian strategic planning during the Vietnam War was almost non-existent. The Australian Government had a policy, generally summarised as 'forward defence'. This was based on the assumption that Australian security could best be ensured by military involvement in Southeast Asia. It relied heavily on close association with the countries that the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies, liked to call our ‘great and powerful friends’, the United States and Britain. Australian actions were therefore highly dependent on the strategic plans that were developed in London and Washington. The emphasis in this paper, therefore, will be not so much on Australian strategic planning as on Australian strategic decision-making, the taking of decisions which were often reactions to events and situations that reflected American and/or British strategic planning.

The second initial point concerns the way in which we use the word 'strategy'. It comes from a Greek word for 'generalship', and its dictionary definition is 'the art of projecting and directing the larger military movements and operations of a campaign'. But a 'strategos' in ancient Greece could be either a general or a chief magistrate, and the word has come to imply the interaction of the higher levels of political and military thinking, the levels where generals and political leaders share the decision-making. This paper will look at the ways in which political and military considerations interacted in some of the principal strategic decisions of Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War. Its theme is that, in most cases, political imperatives outweighed military objectives and desiderata, no matter how powerful those military factors might have been. For military officers the lesson of this episode is that we live in a liberal democracy and that the political factors that influence the people's elected representatives are always likely to overrule even the most powerful and cogently argued military considerations.

Three episodes in Australia's Vietnam involvement illustrate this theme—the commitment of the first battalion of ground troops in 1965; the process by which the Army commitment was raised to its highest level, a three-battalion task force, in 1967; and the decisions concerning the way in which the Australian troops were withdrawn in the early 1970s. In each case this paper relies heavily on what I have written for two volumes of the *Official History of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1975*. The first episode was discussed in *Crises and Commitments*, a volume of the Official History that was published in 1992. The other two episodes are discussed in *A Nation at War*, which may be seen as a sequel to *Crises and Commitments* and which is scheduled to be published in early 1997.

**The Commitment of the First Battalion**

The first approaches from the United States to suggest that Australia might send units of ground troops to Vietnam (as distinct from the instructors in the Australian Army Training Team which had first been committed in 1962) came in December 1964. These early approaches, however, did not make clear exactly what was sought, or likely to be sought, from Australia. At this time Australia's principal concern in regional policy was to ensure that the United States remained strongly committed to the defence of Southeast Asia, at a time when many observers believed that Washington might decide that it could no longer prevent the overthrow of the anti-communist government of the Republic of Vietnam, or South Vietnam, by its communist opponents.
The papers discussed by Australian Cabinet ministers and military chiefs at this time were notable for their lack of any clear planning. In the absence of knowledge about American policies and intentions, Australian policy-makers did not know for what eventualities they should make plans. Instead the Australian approach was to give strong rhetorical support for the current American commitment in Vietnam, partly to encourage Washington not to turn away from that commitment. At the same time, Australian officials devoted their efforts towards discovering what the United States intended to do in Vietnam—that is, would it introduce large numbers of ground forces into the South or would it withdraw its forces, most probably as far as Thailand. Eventually it was agreed that at the end of March 1965 staff talks would be held between the military representatives of Australia, New Zealand and the United States at Honolulu, the headquarters of the United States Pacific Command. The Australian delegation was to be led by Air Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger who, as Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, was Australia’s highest ranking military officer. (The position of Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee was the forerunner of what is today known as the Chief of the Defence Force, but with rather less direct authority over the Chiefs of the three services.) The question of Australia’s military involvement in Vietnam would clearly be affected greatly by the way in which Scherger conducted his mission to these military staff talks.

Throughout the preceding months, the briefs provided to Ministers by military and civilian officials had been pessimistic about the situation in Vietnam and uncertain about American intentions. The brief prepared for Scherger and the delegation to the talks in Honolulu, although prepared by senior civilian officials as well as military officers and endorsed by the Ministers in the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of Cabinet, nevertheless raised the questions uppermost in the minds of the military who were wondering whether Australian forces might be sent to Vietnam. It noted that the idea of committing ground forces had been raised, but the statements of American officials on the purpose of this commitment had been vague and contradictory. The brief therefore said that, above all, Scherger should get detailed information on the Americans’ military objectives and their concept of operations. It went on to raise many of what would later come to be regarded as some of the key questions that bedevilled the whole Vietnam commitment. Scherger was instructed, for example, to find out how the United States authorities proposed to cope with the problems of ‘foreign troops operating in a civil war in which they will have great difficulty in distinguishing friend from foe’; how they would cope with the anti-American and anti-foreign propaganda that the communists would inevitably use as soon as American and other foreign troops, including Australian, were sent; and how they would deal with the possibility that the forces of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) would simply draw aside and let the Americans and their allies do the fighting for them.

These issues were not solely military, but political as well. Nevertheless they were fundamental to any decisions on a commitment of Australian troops to Vietnam. Although the idea of sending an Australian battalion had been mooted in discussions among defence officials, the brief scarcely mentioned the idea. It noted that the Americans might indicate a requirement for ground, air or naval forces, or any combination of those forces, but did not give any suggestion that any particular commitment was expected or favoured.

Yet the way in which Scherger handled his task was quite different from that implied by the brief. The initial discussions in Honolulu made it clear that the Americans were highly uncertain as to the strategy that they intended to pursue in Vietnam. Three quite different approaches were being actively considered. One involved the development of a series of enclaves along the Vietnamese coast; another proposed placing two or three divisions in Laos in order to cut off the infiltration from North to South Vietnam along the famous Ho Chi Minn trail; while a third proposed the placing of major units in the northern provinces of South Vietnam and Thailand, to deny strategically important areas to the enemy. The use to be made of any Australian troops would be quite different, according to which of these plans was adopted. Yet the attitude taken by Scherger at the staff talks did not reflect either the uncertainty of the American position or the cautious and highly non-committal approach of the brief he had been given for the talks. Instead Scherger seemed more anxious than the Americans to have Australia commit troops. He did not press the questions that he had been instructed to ask, but simply let it be known that he would recommend that Australia should send a battalion and that he expected that the Cabinet would agree to this recommendation.
And so it transpired. I will not here traverse the actual decision-making by the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of Cabinet, the six key ministers who eventually decided in late April that Australia would commit a battalion. The details of the decision-making are given in Crises and Commitments. What I wish to note here is that much of the ministerial decision-making was pre-empted by the attitude taken by Scherger at the military staff talks at Honolulu. His actions there and his subsequent report to Cabinet ministers made it highly likely that the Government would take the decision that he had confidently predicted.

Instead let us look at some aspects of this episode, in terms of the distinction that I have been drawing between the political and the military. At first sight, one might say that this was a case of the military dominating the political. Here we have the highest ranking member of the uniformed services, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, behaving in a way which virtually preordained a major political decision to be made by Cabinet Ministers. But I suggest that that would be a misleading interpretation. It should be seen more accurately as the domination of the political over the military, although at all times political and military considerations were closely intertwined and civilian and military officers were acting jointly. In essence, the brief prepared by the Defence Committee for the military staff talks covered the issues of greatest concern to the military: what were the Americans’ military objectives, what was their concept of operations, how would they deal with some of the predictable problems of ground operations in Vietnam? Scherger in effect disregarded these concerns and acted in a way that virtually ensured that Australia would take the decision to send a battalion, in order to reinforce the American willingness to stand firm in Vietnam. This was certainly consistent with the Australian policy of forward defence, but it was a political decision for ministers to take. Scherger was acting as ‘a politician in uniform’ (as John Gorton would later describe him) and some observers speculated that his actions was based on his close relationship with the Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies. Many of the military aspects of the commitment of the battalion were less well planned than they should have been, because too many of the basic questions had not been addressed.

Raising the Commitment to its Peak

Let us now turn to 1967, to look at the process by which the Australian Government raised the commitment to its highest level, when the task force was raised from two battalions to three. In early 1966 the Government had replaced the single battalion with a two-battalion task force, but before long there was pressure to add a third. In a two-battalion force, one battalion was required to defend the base while the other was on operations. With three battalions, two could be on operations while the third defended the base, thus doubling the task force’s operational capacity and creating what the Army felt to be a balanced force. It was therefore a concept popular in Army circles, provided that the third battalion could be raised without undue strains on financial and personnel resources.

But the question of a third battalion was not to be decided by consideration of its military effectiveness in Phuoc Tuy province, the task force’s location. Instead it had much more to do with considerations of diplomacy and the domestic economy. In December 1966, immediately after winning what was at that time the greatest electoral victory in Australian political history on the issues of Vietnam and conscription, the Prime Minister, Harold Holt, apparently wanted to send a third battalion at a time when the American authorities were not specifically requesting it but were strongly hinting that such a move would be highly welcome. The enthusiastic Holt had to be persuaded, with great reluctance, that Australia could not make such a commitment because of its implications for the commitment of defence personnel and funds. Instead the Cabinet agreed to send a number of other units from all three services.

In the middle of the year Australia’s international outlook changed markedly. In July the British government announced that it was accelerating the withdrawal of its forces from Southeast Asia, adopting a faster rate than it had decided on only a year previously. This was a major concern for Australia, which based its foreign and defence policies on close association with both Britain and the United States in Southeast Asia. Australia’s regional allies, Malaysia and Singapore, were also deeply worried about this withdrawal. One implication was that Australia might face increasing pressure to raise its existing troop commitments in the Malaysia-
Singapore area. But at precisely this time the United States increased the pressure to send a third battalion for the Australian task force in Vietnam. Within days of the British announcement of their accelerated withdrawal, President Johnson told Holt that he was sending two of his most senior advisers, Clark Clifford and General Maxwell Taylor, to the capitals of the countries contributing troops to Vietnam. Clifford and Taylor spent seven hours with the Australian Cabinet, and it was clear that their principal aim was to encourage the Australians to send more troops. This was not sought for military reasons arising from the position in Phuoc Tuy province, but primarily for political reasons within the United States. Clifford explained that the President wanted to send more American troops, but faced the difficult task of asking Congress to raise taxes to cover the war-related budget deficit. Australia’s attitude would have a great deal of impact in Washington, for if allies like Australia and New Zealand were to commit a small number of soldiers, it would enable the President to send many more American troops. As Clifford put it two days later in Wellington, ‘one additional New Zealand soldier might produce fifty Americans’.

Holt by this time was far less enthusiastic about sending a third battalion than he had been only eight months earlier. He pointed to the strategic difficulties created by the new British policy and its effects on Malaysia, Singapore and Papua New Guinea; but he spoke more emphatically of economic concerns, noting that the marked growth in Australian defence expenditure had placed burdens on the balance of payments; that a recent drought had been costly, and that Australia’s immigration and foreign aid programmes imposed heavy costs. The Cabinet thus gave no assurances of additional support to the President’s special representatives. Indeed, their attitude was so negative that it achieved precisely the opposite effect to that which had been intended. The Australians had wanted to encourage the United States administration to stay the course in Vietnam, despite the rapidly rising financial and political costs of the war, but Clifford was more impressed by the Australian reluctance to take any stronger military measures. He later wrote that it had been a major factor in convincing him that the United States should begin to withdraw from Vietnam, a policy he initiated when he became Secretary for Defense in 1968.

In addition to their diplomatic and economic concerns, the Australian ministers had more immediate political factors on their minds. After suffering a large swing to the Opposition in a by-election in July, the Government was worried by its prospects in another by-election in September as well as a half-Senate election in November. The eventual decision to send the third battalion was taken in early September, but not announced until early October, after the second by-election. Even then, the Government decided initially that it would not immediately inform the Americans of the decision, hoping to use it as a bargaining counter for improved terms for the purchase of the new F-111 aircraft for the RAAF as well as stronger American support for Australian involvement in Malaysia and Singapore. Only after the President had personally subjected the Australian Treasurer, who was visiting the United States, to extraordinarily strong pressure did the Government decide to tell the Americans of the commitment of the third battalion. At the same time Prime Minister Holt indicated that this was as far as Australia could go in supplying forces for Vietnam.

What, then, does this episode tell us about Australian strategic planning and the interaction of political and military elements?

You may remember the Sherlock Holmes story in which the significant point was the dog that did not bark. Similarly, it is the omissions in the above story that are relevant to our theme. The commitment of a third battalion for the Australian Task Force was not to any significant degree a response to military considerations in the field in Phuoc Tuy province, which showed that a three-battalion task force was better balanced and more effective in operations than a two-battalion task force. Nor was it the outcome of a carefully considered strategic plan, which allocated Australia’s limited military resources to the locations in which they could achieve the best results for the nation’s security. Instead, it was the outcome of a combination of quite separate pressures, of which the most important was President Johnson’s need for an additional weapon in his battle with Congress over raising taxes to pay for the war. After agonising months for the Australian ministers, this pressure outweighed the costs to the Australian economy, the expected electoral damage, and the implications of the accelerated British military withdrawal from the region.
The Withdrawal of Australian Troops from Vietnam

Perhaps the clearest illustration of the dominance of political over military considerations is the process by which Australian troops were withdrawn from Vietnam. In January 1969 Richard Nixon became President of the United States and almost immediately began what his Defense Secretary called the 'Vietnamisation' of the war effort. Declaring that the South Vietnamese forces were now better able to sustain the war effort themselves, the Americans began reductions to their huge commitment of about half a million personnel in Vietnam. In June Nixon announced the withdrawal of 25,000 troops from Vietnam and in September he followed this by announcing the withdrawal of a further 35,000. At the same time American officials let it be known that they wanted the governments of the other five troop-contributing countries—Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines and Thailand—to maintain their forces in Vietnam (which were far smaller than the American commitment) at full strength.

Nevertheless the initial announcements of American troop withdrawals inevitably created pressures for a similar partial withdrawal of Australian troops. Officials in Defence, External Affairs and the service departments began discussing the possibility of Australian troop withdrawals. In these discussions Army representatives argued strongly that the task force, which now comprised three battalions and supporting forces, was a balanced unit. They believed that to withdraw one battalion would be dangerous and pressed the view that if one battalion were to be withdrawn, all should be withdrawn. This view was supported by all services at the highest level and was strongly endorsed by General Sir John Wilton, who had succeeded Air Marshal Scherger as the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Daly, the Chief of the General Staff. The phrase that became popular as the summary of this approach was 'one out, all out'. It was a view that was generally accepted by John Gorton, who had become Prime Minister in January 1968, and several other ministers. They publicly endorsed the arguments that the three-battalion task force was well balanced, that partial withdrawals would be dangerous, and that any withdrawal must therefore be on the basis of 'one out, all out'.

Gorton and other ministers generally maintained this approach for the next six months, the second half of 1969, which included the general election in October. In a television interview during the campaign Gorton repeated that when Australia's three battalions were withdrawn from Vietnam, they would come home together, because a gradual withdrawal, one battalion at a time, would only endanger the force. Nevertheless he was forced to make some concessions to the rising pressure for a programme of withdrawal created by the continuing American policy of troop reductions. In his policy speech for the election, Gorton emphasised that Australia would not withdraw unilaterally, but he also said: 'Should there be developments which result in plans for continuing reduction of United States forces over a period then we would expect to be phased in to that programme and we would see that we are'. Despite his public insistence on the 'one out, all out' approach, this left the way open for some form of graduated withdrawal.

The Gorton Government was returned at the October election, but with a much reduced majority. The Nixon administration continued to indicate that, while it was reducing the American contingent, it wanted Australia and the other troop-contributing countries to maintain their existing forces at full strength. The Australian Embassy in Washington noted that policy on Vietnam was under the President's personal control, with even the Secretaries of State and Defense exercising less influence than their predecessors in the Johnson administration. Nixon was reported to have a timetable for withdrawal in his mind, but few people in Washington, let alone Canberra, knew what it was.

After the October election Malcolm Fraser joined the Australian Cabinet as Minister for Defence. A young and forceful minister, he had previously served as Minister for the Army and knew the defence machinery well. In late 1969 he began to press his military advisers to abandon their opposition to a graduated withdrawal. He pointed out that the task force had previously operated with two battalions and could surely do so again, given the supposed improvement in the security situation in Puoc Tuy province. The Chiefs of Staff Committee,
with Generals Wilton and Daly in the lead, remained opposed to any reduction in the Australian commitment. They said that the United States might withdraw many thousands of troops before giving serious attention to the Vietnamisation of Phuoc Tuy province. As so often during the Vietnam War, Australian policy-makers were uncertain about American policies and plans, and reiterated the need to seek further information from Washington. In response to the pressure from Fraser and other ministers, the Defence Committee conceded that the task force might be reduced from three to two battalions, but only if an American battalion were available to reinforce it when required. The Chiefs would not accept an ARVN battalion in that role, as they assessed the combat effectiveness of the South Vietnamese battalions as being less than half that of an Australian battalion.

Cabinet's reaction was that the Government should seek more information from the Americans about their plans. Gorton sent a personal message to Nixon, asking for information about his 'long-term thinking', so that Australian troop withdrawals could be based on joint Australian-American planning 'rather than be decided by us at short notice in response to specific announcements on your part'. Gorton therefore asked for high-level discussions between the two countries, strongly hinting that he would welcome a personal meeting with Nixon. The response was less positive than the Australians had hoped. Nixon nominated some Pentagon officials to conduct discussions with Australian representatives. He did not insist absolutely that the Australians should maintain their force at full strength and even hinted that greater economic assistance, such as the provision of better housing for the South Vietnamese forces, might offset a reduction in troop strength. The Australian ministers did not pick up this hint and, in effect, abandoned their hope for a coordinated programme of troop withdrawals. They saw no alternative but to continue with the pattern of ad hoc responses to American announcements, of which they were given only a little prior notice.

A few days later, on 15 December, Nixon announced a further reduction of 50,000 American troops. Gorton issued a press statement saying that, when the next substantial withdrawal took place, some Australian units would be included. Later that day he made a further statement, stressing that he knew of no timetable for the American reductions; that there was no fixed timetable for Australian reductions; and that there had been no decision on how large any Australian reduction might be. Reporters noted that Gorton looked ill-tempered and uncomfortable as he announced the beginning of the end of Australia's war in Vietnam. All too obviously, it was an immediate reaction to an American announcement, not the first phase of a carefully considered defence strategy. It also signalled that Gorton and his colleagues were abandoning the military preference for the 'one out, all out' approach, in favour of a gradual withdrawal of the Australian force.

In the early months of 1970 attempts were made to bring some more planning and coordination into the Australian approach to troop withdrawal, but these efforts were bedevilled by the rivalries and tensions between the three key ministers, Gorton, Fraser and William McMahon at External Affairs. In March, at Fraser's instigation, Cabinet agreed that the Government would announce, probably in April, that the battalion that was scheduled to be withdrawn in November would not be replaced. Nevertheless Australian Ministers, like many people in Washington and around the world, were shocked when Nixon announced in April that the United States would withdraw a further 150,000 troops, a far larger reduction than anyone had anticipated. As foreshadowed, Gorton now announced that Australia would make its first withdrawal in November, by not replacing the battalion that would end its tour of duty then, but the way in which this announcement was handled brought no credit to the Government. It was all too apparent that the Government had been forced to abandon the preference of its military advisers for the 'one out, all out' approach and that it had had to resort to short-term reactions to American policy announcements rather than to develop and sustain a clearly defined strategy for Australian withdrawal from Vietnam.
Conclusion

What do these episodes tell us about Australian strategy in the Vietnam War? First, they underline my initial point, that there was no effective Australian strategic planning. Under the forward defence policy Australian decisions were linked so closely to British and American policies that they were dependent on plans developed in London and Washington, not in Canberra. When those plans changed, as for example when Britain accelerated its withdrawal from Southeast Asia or when the United States began to reduce its troop commitment in Vietnam, Australian policies were forced to change. Moreover, Australia was all too often in the position of knowing too little about the plans and intentions of its major allies. That uncomfortable ignorance applied when the plans were being discussed quite broadly within a government, as was the case with the British plans to withdraw from east of Suez, and when they were tightly held to the highest levels, as with Nixon's ideas of troop withdrawals.

But even in the decisions that Australia did take within the framework of the strategic plans of its allies, political considerations were always likely to outweigh military factors. In the case of troop withdrawal, the political pressure for a graduated withdrawal generated by the American reductions proved more powerful than the strong military preference for the 'one out, all out' approach. The decision to send the third battalion had been determined more by the balance of diplomatic pressure, itself reflecting the domestic political balance within the United States, and Australian economic and electoral considerations than by the desire of the military to have a well balanced task force operating in Vietnam. This dominance of political considerations over military concerns applied even when the central figure wore a uniform, as was the case with Scherger at Honolulu.

We should conclude, therefore, as we began, by recalling that a 'strategos’ could be a civil or a military leader. In a democracy, the generalship of politicians is always likely to prevail over the politics of generals.

Endnotes

In the 1990s Australian defence planners are faced with a situation of reduced strategic threat but increased strategic uncertainty. In times of uncertainty there is often a tendency to invoke what are sometimes viewed as the 'lessons of the past' and to argue about their relevance to the present and future. In the 1990s, some old ghosts of Australian strategic planning have returned to haunt contemporary thinking. Once again geography and history appear to complicate military planning by presenting policy-makers with competing demands. In addition, old tensions between the notions of continental defence and forward defence have resurfaced in the guise of modern ideas of defence self-reliance and regional-engagement.

The post-Cold War era shows indications of a revived Australian defence debate in which the modern concepts of self-reliance, defence of Australia, credible contingencies and regional engagement are contested. There are those who favour a kind of armed neutrality free of the Americans; there are those who incline towards a notion of restrictive security, or even isolationism, through variations emphasising primary concern for defence of Australia based on geography; and there are those who are internationalists and believe that Australia must develop a broad view of security as opposed to a narrow view of defence. Advocates of these positions—neutralists, restrictives, isolationists and internationalists and those who straddle these threads of strategic thought—tend to have one thing in common—they justify their intellectual stance by appealing to the relevance or irrelevance of history.

Representative of the neutralist position is the recent work of John Hirst on the relationship between defence policy and conscription. In 1992 Hirst, one of Australia's best known historians, examined why Australian nationalism had not produced a tradition of independent defence based on armed neutrality. He was highly sceptical of the idea of strategic planning based on the present notion of defence self-reliance, and he argued that 'when Liberals warn of the dangers of relying on alliances and when Labor people urge the necessity of conscription, then I'll know that the era of our [defence] independence has dawned'. Hirst concluded that since defence self-reliance was novel, the prior history of Australian defence planning was irrelevant to its subsequent evolution. He was not the first person to advance the notion of the essential irrelevance of Australian military history to contemporary defence questions. In 1976, Sir Arthur Tange, one of the major figures in the modernisation of Australian defence policymaking, expressed similar reservations. He suggested that, when it came to the future of Australia's strategic policy and planning process, Australian military history 'may be a distraction rather than—as history often is in other matters—a signpost to the future'.

Yet other critics, from what might be termed the restrictive-isolationist strand of Australian strategic thought, such as Alan Thompson and Graeme Cheeseman, argue that Australia is presently engaged not in abandoning its past but in embracing it anew. Thompson has written of the rise of 'neo-forward defence', allegedly driven by the diplomatic imperatives of regional engagement and of the development of an intellectual constituency favouring strategic planning more attuned to actual commitments rather than credible contingencies. He inclines towards a restrictive concept of defence policy in order to try to preserve the fundamentals of planning for a self-reliant defence of Australia—a process which he views as incomplete. Graeme Cheeseman, whose embrace of European ideas of non-offensive defence has overtones of isolationism, shares Thompson's concerns. In Cheeseman's view, Australian defence planning in the 1990s is in the grip of a kind of historical reflex, which is dragging it back towards forward defence through Asian engagement. He argues that this process is conditioned by a peculiar Australian strategic culture based on a history of alliances, ANZAC mystique, task forces and martial proficiency.
Two other writers, Robyn Lim and AD McLennan, have developed a powerful critique of Australian defence and strategic planning from an internationalist perspective. For them, the new and uncertain balance of power emerging in East Asia in the 1990s means that Australia has a clear choice between passive and positive policies. A passive policy is to concentrate on self-reliance and defence of Australia—which they consider to be a variant of continental defence. In contrast, a positive policy involves making a contribution to the evolving strategic balance of power in Asia by emphasising the enduring importance of Australian interests.

Lim and McLellan dismiss the concept of 'self-reliance inside a framework of alliances' as being a political construct of the Hawke-Keating Labor Governments, 'a policy of conscious ambiguity', designed to satisfy the contending factions inside the Australian Labor Party—especially the Left which has traditionally been isolationist. The legacy of 'conscious ambiguity' is, they assert, undefined strategic guidance and inadequate strategic planning. This has resulted in an Australian Army force structure designed for unrealistic 'low level contingencies' on Australian soil and unable to project power beyond the shoreline.

Like Hirst, Thompson and Cheeseman, Lim and McLennan enlist the force of history to justify their argument. They observe:

History's lesson for Australia, because of its remoteness from the centres of international tension and its surrounding seas, is that major strategic threats may develop as a result of distant disruption of the balance of power, as occurred in both World Wars and during the Cold War. Australia could have sought to avoid the consequences of such threats by averting its gaze and not fighting 'other people's wars'. Instead, it chose, responsibly, to intervene. By adding its weight to the efforts of the compatible side it helped ensure a favourable outcome; and by taking the fight to the enemy, Australia reduced the risk of war on its own territory. This policy recognised that Australia would find life very difficult in an international order dominated by hostile powers, even if Australia itself were not invaded.

Historically, in international crises, Australia's interests have always been secured by timely military intervention to ensure that a satisfactory power equilibrium would be struck at a distance, not on home shores. For Lim and McLellan, this policy has now become difficult because self-reliance, narrowly defined through direct defence of Australia planning, encourages the strategic illusion that threats diminish with distance. This then is the internationalist critique—a critique which has resurfaced as a Coalition Government takes office for the first time in 13 years.

All the participants in the post Cold War debate over Australia's defence planning have justified their arguments on the altar of continuity or change in historical experience. Here the past weighs heavily on the present and the danger of distortion is very real. But, as the American historian, John Lewis Gaddis, has pointed out, if professional historians ignore contemporary security concerns, they risk leaving an understanding of how the past has shaped the present to political scientists, journalists and novelists. They also risk condemning themselves to irrelevance as far as the world of policy-making is concerned. While being aware of the dangers of presentism, historians should try to use their discipline as a rigorous tool of forensic analysis in order to illuminate current issues and to take into account an understanding of sequence.

Accordingly, this paper attempts to provide a brief conceptual overview of the history of Australian defence planning employing three perspectives. First, it argues that the concept of defence self-reliance as a historical idea in twentieth century Australian strategic planning has always been controversial, largely because Australian security has been determined not by the constants of geographical position but by the variables of international relations. In this context, Australian strategic planning has been as much about diplomacy as it has been about the application of military force. Second, and related to the above, this essay postulates that the conceptual foundations of Australia's current strategic planning system based on ideas of self-reliance from the 1970s and 1980s may not be intellectually secure as we approach the end of the twentieth century. Third, it suggests that the major intellectual problem in Australian defence planning since the 1980s has been a failure to understand, and
to adopt, the modern concept of national security planning in which defence—that is the actual conditions under which force is applied—becomes part of a coordinated national machinery of decision-making based on an understanding of interlocking domestic and international interests. It is arguable that uncoordinated foreign, defence and trade policies are as anachronistic as single service planning.

**Self-Reliance as an Idea in Australian Strategic Planning, 1901-1973**

The enduring dilemma of Australian strategic planning has been tension between geography and history. Geography is a *constant* but history is a *variable*. The very methods needed to bring about an independent and national defence policy based on Asian geopolitics have often been prevented by Eurocentric historical attachments that have reinforced dependency. Because of this dichotomy, the idea of developing an independent national defence strategy seemed, for much of the twentieth century, a course designed to diminish rather than enhance Australia's security. Thus to some observers, Australia had, until recently, no real tradition of national self-defence. In their 1991 book *Australia's Foreign Relations*, Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant encapsulate this view by observing that 'one of the curiosities of Australian history is that we developed a martial tradition without contemplating the essential art of self-defence'.

Yet from the very beginning of Federation, viewing 'the essential art of self-defence' as an autonomous concept was contentious because of the contradictory tensions caused by Eastern geography and Western history. There were persistent questions. First, should there, and could there, be a predominantly national defence plan? Or should Australian forces be designed primarily in a British imperial context to reinforce the Royal Navy and to support the British Army? Second, how was it possible to proceed with national defence planning to meet the Asian context with its great power threat from Japan when this was contradicted by the international pull of British race nationalism? And third, how could the legacy of bitter domestic politics over conscription for overseas Imperial defence in 1916-17 be reconciled with Prime Minister Alfred Deakin's 1907 vision of a national defence effort 'of the people, for the people and by the people'?

Such questions ensured that Australian strategic planning could never be purely a defence matter nor confined to national geography. Australia's membership of the British Empire ensured that defence preparations would always have to be placed in a diplomatic and international context. As Prime Minister Joseph Cook put it in early 1914, the resolution of Australia's defence planning was 'the art and the problem of highest statesmanship'.

It is in the attempts to resolve the defence conundrum that one finds the origin of the division between what the first General Officer Commanding in Australia, Major General Sir Edward Hutton, described in the early years of the twentieth century as the narrow' (meaning primarily national) and the 'broad' (meaning primarily international) policy of Australian defence planning; between the 'Australia First' school and the 'Empire First' school—later simplified as continental defence and forward defence. It is really variations on Hutton's narrow and broad differentiation which endure today through such modern concepts as self-reliance and regional engagement.

The Federation generation led by Alfred Deakin, Andrew Fisher and Joseph Cook favoured a narrow or 'Australia First' approach as a primary concern but not as an exclusive concept. While they laid down comprehensive plans for an Australian Navy and a Swiss-style national militia, they remained conscious of imperial commitments. They were colonial not independent nationalists; sceptics of, rather than separationists from, Empire. They recognised international obligations because they knew that in any crisis Australia could not fight a first-class power alone. Andrew Fisher's 1911 view that a RAN would make Australia 'a great self-depended Naval base for the Empire in the Pacific' neatly sums up the relationship between local and imperial defence.
Thus the early drive for a national defence capacity was conditioned by a desire for balance not independence. But those who favoured an 'Empire First' approach to strategic planning such as Hutton, Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) WT Bridges and Captain (later General) CB Brudenell White saw national defence as an expression of geographical determinism—a dangerous distraction from reality. As Major General Hutton put it in April 1902, Australia, an island nation like Britain itself, could not adopt defence policies of 'a purely passive kind'. Australia had to be prepared to defend not just its own land mass but also 'the vast interests beyond her shores upon the maintenance of which her present existence and her future prosperity must so largely depend'.

The First World War established the supremacy of the broad template of Australian defence planning based on imperial and international commitments. Australia was, as Prime Minister Billy Hughes once put it, defended in France. In 1926 Prime Minister Stanley Bruce stated that the guiding principle on which all our defence preparations are based, whether for the Sea, the Land, or the Air Force, is uniformity in every respect ... with the fighting services of Great Britain in order that in time of emergency we may dovetail with any formation with which our forces may be needed to co-operate. Australia's mistake in the inter-war years was not reliance on Singapore and the Empire, but the disease of national passivity about defence in general. In the Depression years between 1929 and 1932, resources for credible self-reliance were removed by the abolition of compulsory military service and the adoption of the raid theory for national defence planning. Yet even if defence planning had become a priority in the 1930s it is likely this would have been subject to the ebb and flow of international events rather than national policy. Given national polarisation over conscription for overseas service, it seems unlikely that Australian forces could have prevented the fall of Singapore and Japanese hegemony in 1942.

In the Second World War, direct threat and the task of dislodging Japan from New Guinea and the northern islands demonstrated the value of forward deployment inside a powerful coalition as opposed to concentrating on anti-invasion planning. To many of the decision-makers of the 1950s and 1960s, the lesson of the Second World War was that Australia had to avoid the passivity of the 1930s and seek to shape its security environment not merely to react to it. This could best be done through strategic planning based on Hutton's philosophy of broad interests rather than upon narrow defence of geography; by operating in the overall context of a regional-global framework rather than in that of local defence posture. This in turn put a premium on statecraft through the integration of diplomacy with defence; it placed emphasis on alliance planning instead of independent strategic preparation.

Apart from the later 1940s, when the Chifley Labor Government flirted with a narrow notion of Australian national defence based around regional interests—and aroused the charge of 'strategical isolationism' from the then Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Sir Louis Hamilton, Lieutenant General SF Rowell and Air Commodore FRW Scherger—the broad approach prevailed until Australia's withdrawal from Vietnam in the early 1970s. The Coalition Government led by Robert Menzies which came into office in 1949, just as the Cold War was developing, institutionalised a broad approach to strategic planning based on the primacy of interests over geography. Menzies' philosophy was that, since no communist power possessed a maritime capability, direct defence of Australia against invasion, was little more than a form of isolationism 'a sort of Fortress Australia or Maginot Line concept'— a policy which he associated firmly with the Australian Labor Party.

In a memorable phrase on 22 September 1950, Menzies described forces raised for defence of Australia to be 'the equivalent of a wooden gun'. Concentrating on defending Australian territory was, he believed, an isolationist stance, which if followed, would rob the Western democracies of some of the best troops in the world' in the struggle against international communism. For reasons of Western security, Menzies was favourably disposed towards Australian planning to support Britain in the Middle East and subsequently he built Australian strategic planning around Anglo-American power and a triangle of alliances—the Australia, New Zealand and British forces in Malaya arrangement (ANZAM), the Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). By 1957, forward defence based on defence-in-depth through alliances was the mode of planning. Forward defence, as a mode of strategic thinking, is probably best seen as an Australian variant of Western containment.
It is now well known that the Menzies Cabinet ignored strategic advice from the Defence Committee in 1959, which proposed that Australian forces should be designed primarily with the capability to act independently, rather than in concert, with allies. It is sometimes claimed that this decision retarded the development of an autonomous conceptual framework for defence planning and crippled the evolution of an appropriate force structure for twenty years. There may be truth in this assertion, but historians have to remember that politicians and public officials must deal with actualities they find, not the potentialities later commentators discover. As the Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey, observed in 1954, “the time has gone by when Australia could rest securely within its own borders. Instead of living in a tranquil corner of the globe, we are now on the verge of the most unsettled region of the world.”

In such an atmosphere, the strategic planning context was defined by alliances, not by notions of autonomy. In following the policy of forward defence Australia was not unique. It is sometimes forgotten that other British Commonwealth settler states in the 1950s, such as the Union of South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, practised variations of forward defence, and in this respect it was an international phenomenon. Australian forward defence seemed appropriate for the times. It fused strategy with diplomacy; it integrated threat perception, defence in depth, collective security and alliance politics into a matrix for planning. It made defence planning an expression of policy—and as the Prussian military philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz, reminds us, war may have its own grammar but it has no logic without policy.

Can one say then that Australia lacked in what Evans and Grant call ‘the essential art of self-defence’ between 1901 and 1973? If one thinks in terms of planning to defend physical geography then clearly this is so. Because of international factors, Australia has always found great difficulty in seeing defence as an autonomous national concept. But if one conceives of self-defence as planning to protect vital interests, then clearly Australia was highly successful in preventing war on its own soil because actual commitments determined its military capabilities. Overall, region and world were seen as too dangerous to allow a narrow, geographically fixed approach to defence to prevail. The broad Hutton-like approach, with its fusion of defence with diplomacy, expressed Frederick the Great’s famous maxim that the sword is fashioned to serve the state and, that diplomacy without arms is like an orchestra without instruments.

The Relevance of the Current Australian Strategic Planning System

In the 1970s and 1980s, for possibly the first time in the twentieth century, Australia was the beneficiary of a benign regional environment free of fears of Japanese militarism and perceptions of Chinese expansionism. These conditions permitted the development of a more autonomous strategic perspective reminiscent of the spirit, if not the content, of the Federation generation’s national defence ideas prior to 1914 and the views of some strategic planners in the late 1950s.

Between 1973 and 1987, there was a conceptual revolution in Australian defence in which ‘self-reliance within a framework of alliances’ and, for the first time, defence of Australia and its maritime approaches (the sea-air gap) became the determinants for Australia’s strategic planning and force structure development. The key planning concepts are well known and include warning time, credible contingencies based on capability planning for low-level conflicts, the force-in-being and the expansion base. Australia has never in its history possessed a defence planning edifice of this level of intellectual sophistication and designed to meet the needs of its own strategic geography. But increasingly the question in the mid-1990s, in the wake of the Cold War, must be: are the defence concepts developed for another era still relevant to Australia’s changing security requirements?

This essay argues that in the 1990s, three weaknesses have developed in the edifice of defence of Australia/self-reliance policy—all of which impact on strategic planning as a process. The first weakness concerns the primacy of untested theory in defence thinking; the second weakness resides in the problem of structural restriction in operational planning; and the third flaw is the lack of political instrumentality in defence planning.
The Primacy of Untested Theory in Australian Defence Thinking

The mode of Australian strategic planning since the 1970s has, as Sir Arthur Tange accurately predicted, little connection with the Australian historical experience of warfare. This has created an intellectual vacuum for the intrusion of elegant and imaginative but largely untested ideas. Thus defence of Australia/self-reliance ideology contains a set of inner contradictions and inconsistencies which have not been tested against the realities of military experience. Taken together, these contradictions and inconsistencies tend to fulfil Lim and McLellan's charge of a defence policy built on the politics of 'conscious ambiguity', which in turn has resulted in strategic guidance which lacks clarity. For instance, strategic guidance elevates strategic geography and defence-in-depth but does not supply the necessary financial and human resources to exploit them; it posits self-reliance but not self-sufficiency which is the essence of independent capability; guidance also implies a narrow continental focus in defence planning but maintains a broad alliance context and peacekeeping obligations; and it seems to some critics, notably Air Marshal David Evans, that current defence planning and policy is reactive rather than proactive.

While the relatively predictable East-West balance of the Cold War lasted, such contradictions could be camouflaged by rhetoric or safely ignored. But the fluidity of post-Cold War international relations is now exposing them to greater scrutiny and criticism. In the 1990s, as in the past, the power of international variables again suggest that Australian Defence Force (ADF) deployment is far more likely in forward operations than in direct defence of Australia. This reality challenges current planning assumptions based on geographic constancy and applies an inexorable pressure for matching capabilities with commitments in Australian strategic planning.

The Problem of Structural Restriction in Australian Operational Planning

The second weakness in contemporary Australian defence planning is the structural assumption that military difficulties will be tactical and operational rather than strategic in nature. This is because credible contingencies, in their current form of short-warning conflicts, are, it is believed, most likely to be found at those levels. Short-warning conflicts are low-level threats proclaimed to be confined to Australian soil, but like the 'mere raid' theories of the 1930s, which they seem to resemble, they are probably unlikely. As an operational planning tool, short-warning conflict is structurally restrictive. It limits options in pursuing wider deployment for national objectives not defined by geography. This means that inflexibility at the operational level has the potential to impact on Australia's strategic versatility and broader security planning. The risk with short-warning conflict is that it will produce an Australian Army employable only in Northern Australia. In other words it may be a variation of Menzies' 'wooden gun', or—to use another metaphor—short-warning conflict planning might come to resemble a sword, meticulously honed, but forever confined to its scabbard.

There is also an intellectual price to be paid for concentrating on conflict at the lower level of the military spectrum. Since low-level contingencies are manpower intensive, questions of the expansion base, reserve forces and surge capacity consume much of the ADF's intellectual attention into low-level planning. Escalation to more substantial conflict; possible force structure variations to meet regional developments in coalition operations, issues of higher doctrine (for instance compatibility with the America-Britain-Canada-Australia Armies Standardisation Programme or ABCA doctrine) and organisation—from deploying from international niche capabilities up to brigade group—receive, in comparison, inadequate amounts of intellectual attention. Indeed, in the 1994 Defence White Paper, the process of expansion to major conflict is rather ill-defined, stating blandly that 'while Australia maintains the ability to adapt and expand our forces quickly enough to meet any development by others of forces for major attack on our continent, we do not need to maintain the actual force structure for such operations now. The danger is that the sword may only leave the scabbard as a rapier when a sabre may be required.
In 1989, Defence Minister Kim Beazley, the political architect of defence self-reliance, proclaimed that the ADF was a balanced force. He stated 'the old dichotomy between forward defence and continental defence has no analytical force today, because we can, in a sense, do both'. Australia could meet self-reliance on the one hand and alliance commitments on the other. But in force structure and resource terms, such a 'dual capability' is not evident across all three services—at least not in the Army. Balancing lower level contingency planning for defence of Australia with the higher level possibilities of more substantial conflict—probably in a fluid region—remains the central intellectual issue in Australian strategic planning into the next century.

**Lack of Instrumentality in Australian Defence Planning**

The idea of focusing on narrow, geo-strategic planning for defence of Australia encourages thinking about defence in autonomous and abstract terms, in a strategic discourse which lacks political context. This is the third weakness in current policy and, to use the analogy of fencing, it resembles the approach of the technical duellist not of the military swordsman. From 1983-96, the Hawke-Keating Government's preference was that foreign policy should not drive defence policy; rather defence should concern itself with what it called 'the enduring features of Australia's geography'. Yet it is arguable that in strategic formulation, geography determines how to fight, not necessarily where to fight. In the 1980s, it was proclaimed that the politics of alliances should not interfere with the intellectual basis of defence policy. Yet it is arguable that such a separation is neither realistic nor desirable. It is, after all, in the nexus of diplomacy and defence that credible contingencies are most likely to arise. A major weakness of self-reliance is, therefore, its lack of instrumentality in addressing a broader range of security interests and scenarios which are not defined by geography. At its core, self-reliance lacks real political instrumentality.

The difficulty for defence planning in the 1990s is that foreign policy and trade considerations have driven regional engagement with Asia through the December 1989 doctrine of multidimensional security. The foundations of defence self-reliance have been under pressure from the concept of defence cooperation developed in accordance with a regional security doctrine which embraces much more than physical integrity. Thus the 'sword in the scabbard' syndrome of structuring military forces for the narrow defence of Australia based on strategic geography is contradicted by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's broad search for regional security.

In the 1990s Australian regional engagement is occurring at a time when Asian defence spending is averaging five per cent of gross domestic product (GDP)—thrice that of the Middle East—against two per cent for Australia. Asian defence spending by 2000 will eclipse that of Western Europe. Australia's approach to East and Southeast Asia in the 1990s has some parallels with the policy of the French Third Republic towards Central and Eastern Europe in the 1930s. The French approach to Central and Eastern Europe was one of deep diplomatic engagement, but strategic planning was restricted to the defence of France along the national frontier. A military force structure and strategic doctrine of impressive conceptual elegance—described by one historian as 'a masterpiece of Cartesian logic and bureaucratic compromise'—was built for the defence of a continuous front. Yet when French interests came under pressure in Central and Eastern Europe there was no supple military capacity to support France's regional alliance and security framework. The sword was restricted to the scabbard and when drawn in 1940 it failed the state. The lesson is that strategic planning should be closely aligned with a nation's diplomatic activity, while the management of alliances is usually essential to national security.

The three weaknesses identified in the edifice of self-reliance/defence of Australia planning have the potential to undermine the credibility of Australian security. The primacy of untested theory, which has created strategic guidance replete with inconsistency and contradiction, is the mark of a lack of historical education in strategic thinking. The second problem of structural restriction, caused by short-warning planning, has the capacity to impact on
strategic versatility and encourages what has been referred to in this essay as the 'sword in
the scabbard syndrome'. The third problem of a lack of political instrumentality is symptomatic
of the poor co-ordination which exists between Australian diplomacy, defence planning and
alliance management. This raises the final perspective of this paper—the need for Australia to
adopt the notion of national security planning.

The Need for a Concept of National Security in the 1990s

The predictable international system which allowed Australian defence planners to
concentrate on the constant of strategic geography in the 1970s and 1980s no longer exists.
It has been replaced by the familiar variable of international uncertainty—this time emanating
from a changing balance of power in East Asia.

International uncertainty combined with the forces of regional engagement based on active
diplomacy symbolised by involvement in the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC)
initiative, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) process and the December 1995 security treaty
with Indonesia are injecting centrifugal pressures for a more broad approach to Australian
defence planning. Although the 1994 White Paper recognised these trends, it provided no
clear rationale on how to balance self-reliance with regional engagement. It is therefore best
seen as a transitional document, produced in the confusion of moving from Cold War to post-
Cold War strategic thinking.

Regional engagement does not, necessarily imply a return to forward defence planning. But it
may mean a greater emphasis on developing dual capabilities through preparing for forward
deployment in coalition operations, in order to meet Australian strategic interests which
transcend geography. International obligations mean that Australia must move towards the
concept of national security planning in order to synchronise defence of geography with
defence of interests. Some thorny conceptual difficulties are likely to be encountered if such a
transition occurs. For instance, defence planning is a narrow concept, concentrating on the
basis of military capability through force structure. Security planning is, in contrast, a broad
concept, focusing on the actual use of military capability in the context of national policy.
Ultimately, the concept of national security is about policy freedom and room for strategic
manoeuvre. It is about deterring threats from whatever source they emanate—near or far. 15

For these reasons, and given finite resources, defence planning will probably have to be
integrated with diplomacy and trade to create a national strategy compatible with Australia’s
multidimensional security needs. The need is for a national security system, designed to
reconcile the growing tensions between Australia’s core security policies of recent years:
defence self-reliance and regional engagement. 16 Without such guidance, Australian defence
planning risks developing in a vacuum with a serious imbalance in its essential assumptions.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to illuminate some of the historical ideas being used in the debate
in Australian strategic circles concerning the viability of, and balance between, the present
policies of self-reliance and regional engagement in the 1990s. It has sought to do this by
developing a conceptual overview of the history of Australian strategic planning in the
twentieth century employing three perspectives.

First, it has assessed the role of a geographically-defined defence of Australia based on
military self-reliance as an historical idea in Australian strategic thought. Although aspects of
such a policy were favoured during the first decade following Federation, these did not survive
the pressures of international relations and the outbreak of the First World War. It has been
argued that, from 1914 onwards, Australia’s security interests have transcended geography.
Consequently, a policy of self-reliance has always been less important than a policy based on
achieving security through alliances. For most of the twentieth century, then, Australian
defence planning has been driven largely by the variables of international diplomacy rather
than by the constants of geography. Australia has always responded to the pressure of a
major international crisis by adopting a broad, rather than a narrow, approach to strategic
planning and this has allowed it to avoid the ravages of modern warfare on its own territory.
This represents a considerable achievement by Australian diplomacy and Australian arms. The pale battalions of Australian headstones in overseas cemeteries are symbols, not of participation in ‘other people’s wars’, but of the successful defence of the homeland.

Second, this essay has questioned the continuing relevance of the current Australian defence planning system, based on self-reliance ideology, under the impact of new international conditions. A viable self-reliance/defence of Australia policy was only developed conceptually in the late Cold War era of the 1970s and 1980s under both Coalition and Labor governments. From a historical perspective, it is arguable that the essential condition for such a policy was a relatively predictable international security system. In the 1990s, such international predictability no longer exists and, consequently, the policy of defence self-reliance—which began as a powerful form of conceptual and intellectual balance—should not, under different conditions, be allowed to harden into an orthodoxy, complete with its own lexicon and priesthood. It must be remembered that strategic planning is, above all, a process of dynamic interaction; it is about connecting policy purpose to operational capability and logistical feasibility. It was not for nothing that Napoleon, that most exacting of the Great Captains, once compared the concentrated analysis involved in strategic planning to the effort and unpredictability of childbirth.\textsuperscript{56}

Third, this essay has suggested that the rise of new strategic conditions in Asia requires that Australia consider developing defence planning inside a broad framework of national security. Such an approach would have the effect of synchronising and balancing diplomatic requirements with defence capabilities. Under the rubric of self-reliance, defence planning has diverged from diplomacy in recent years and has tended to be developed in terms of geographic imperatives rather than in accordance with the needs of political instrumentality. Yet for most of Australia’s history, policy-makers and military planners have considered diplomatic variables to be a crucial factor in maintaining Australian security.

Finally, it is worth noting that Australian defence planning has always been Janus-faced—looking to both East and West. As Australia approaches the millennium, it is caught between the worlds of Western military alliance and Eastern economic prosperity; between the comfortable certainties of twentieth century Western strategic ideas and twenty first century change, in which Asian ideas of security may come to predominance in strategic discourse. All of this demonstrates that strategic planning can never be an abstract or clinical process; rather it is conditioned by memories of the past, conditions of the present and images of the future. It is in the balance of these factors that a nation finds not merely its physical defence but its lasting security and this, as Joseph Cook observed over 80 years ago, remains, as always, ‘the art and the problem of highest statesmanship’.
Endnotes

1. The terms continental defence and forward defence have a long and complex history. In this essay I employ the term continental defence to imply a primary focus on the protection of Australia’s land mass and its maritime approaches. In contrast, forward defence emphasises the defence of Australia by engaging an adversary at a distance from home soil.


4. Ibid.


7. Thompson, Minute upon the Defence Policy, 10-15. On p 10, Thompson justifies a restrictive view of defence planning by separating defence policy from diplomacy. He states; ‘foreign policy and defence policy are not the same ... the basic purpose of the Australian Defence Force is not for it to be used as an agent to improve international relations’.

8. For Cheeseman’s advocacy of non-offensive defence, see The Search for Self-Reliance, chapter 7.


12. Ibid, 267, 269-70.


16. For a discussion see TB Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External Relations since 1788 (Canberra, second edn 1991), chapter 21.

17. Gareth Evans and Bruce Grant, Australia’s Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s (Melbourne, second edn, 1995), 22. Other writers who are inclined to emphasise this theme include Ross Babbage, A Coast Too Long: Defending Australia Beyond the 1990s (Sydney, 1990) and Alan K Wrigley, The Defence Force and the Community: A Partnership in Australia’s Defence (Canberra, 1990).

18. These issues have been analysed by several authors. See especially, Neville Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14 (Sydney, 1976); John Mordike, An Army For A Nation: A history of Australian military developments, 1880-1914 (Sydney, 1992) and John Hirst, ‘Australian Defence and Conscription: A Re-assessment’, Parts 1 and 2; Deakin in Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 1907-8 (House of Representatives), XLII, 13 December 1907, 7534-35.


21. Hutton’s views on a ‘broad’ versus a ‘narrow’ defence policy are expressed in his correspondence between 1902 and 1904. See the detailed discussion on Australian defence policy in Meaney, The Search for Security, 58-75. Hutton’s April 1902 Defence Minute does not employ this specific terminology of ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ approaches to defence but it does develop, in detail, his view of the need for the paramountcy of a ‘broad’ policy. See Commonwealth of Australia, ‘Military Forces of the Commonwealth: Minute upon the Defence of Australia by Major-General Hutton, Commandant, 7 April 1902’, Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives, 1901-2 Session, vol 11,1-3.

22. For a view of Australian defence history as an ideological contest between imperialism and nationalism and an unflattering view of Hutton see Mordike, An Army For A Nation. For a view which reconciles imperial and national concerns see Craig Wilcox, ‘Relinquishing the Past: John Mordike’s An Army for a Nation’, The Australian Journal of Politics and History XL (1993): 1, 52-65.


32. The most accessible evidence can be found in Commonwealth of Australia, *Key Elements in the Triennial Reviews of Strategic Guidance Since 1945* (Department of Defence Submission to the Inquiry of the Joint Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade into the Management of Australia's Defence, Submissions and Incorporated Documents Volume II, Official Hansard Report, 17 February 1987), S306-307. The Defence Committee consisted of the Chiefs of Staff and representatives from the Department of Defence.
33. See the Hon Kim C Beazley, MP, Minister for Defence, Thinking Defence: Key Concepts in Australian Defence Planning', Roy Milne Memorial Lecture, Perth, 6 November 1987, 7. See also Beazley, *The Importance of Strategic Thinking*, 6.
35. A South African Air Force squadron served in Korea and the South African Army was required to plan to provide an armoured division for service in the Middle East, while the South African Navy was locked into the defence of the South Atlantic under the 1955 Simonstown Agreement with Britain. Rhodesian infantry battalions served in Malaya during the Emergency, along with a Special Air Service Squadron, which was later deployed to Aden. Elements of the Royal Rhodesian Air Force served in the Middle East until the early 1960s.
41. Since the end of the Cold War in 1989, Australian service personnel have served in the Gulf, in Somalia, Cambodia and Rwanda.
42. The concept of short warning conflict was first introduced in *Strategic Review* 1993 (Canberra, 1993), to assist in capability development. It was refined in *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994* as a prime focus for ADF planning. See *Strategic Review* 1993, 43, and *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*, 24; 32, para 4.44.
45. Dual capability may be easier for the Royal Australian Air Force and Royal Australian Navy, but the Army is hampered by logistics and the vexed question of reserves. Without ground forces capable of significant force projection, no defence force can claim to be balanced.
46. See for instance *Strategic Review* 1993, 42.
47. Beazley, 'The Importance of Strategic Thinking', 8.
48. A cynic might argue that self-reliance has instrumentality in that it is a politically palatable way of justifying defence expenditure. But such a justification is not necessarily related to real security issues.
53. See Robert J Young, *In Command of France: French Foreign Policy and Military Planning, 1933-1940* (Cambridge, MA, 1978), especially chapters 1, 3 and 5. On p 63, Young points out that French diplomacy required 'increased [military] mobility within an offensive context' but this was prevented by the military's defensive planning. I am not suggesting that contemporary Australian defence planning is in the grip of a kind of French-style 'Maginot mindedness'. I am merely trying to illustrate the vital relationship which exists between diplomacy and defence planning.

54. Some of these issues are assessed in Michael Evans, 'Strategic Manoeuvre: A Study in Military Method and Policy Technique' (Sydney, Headquarters Training Command, 1996 forthcoming).


SERVING VITAL INTERESTS: AUSTRALIA’S STRATEGIC PLANNING IN PEACE AND WAR

ARMY’S FUTURE PLANS/STRATEGY
Major General John Hartley

Introduction

It may seem somewhat incongruous that the last speaker at a military history conference should so clearly be discussing the future. Well, let me say that what I have to describe will be seen as a major turning point in the Army’s development and future historians will make much of it.

The Australian Army has undergone considerable change this century, shaped by four major conflicts and numerous smaller engagements, euphemistically referred to as peacekeeping. Our present doctrine and structures are a product of this process. We have seen strategic guidance vary from forward defence to the defence of Australia to a concept today which embodies both strategies. Arguably, the most dramatic change in international affairs in the last 50 years has been the end of the Cold War.

Clearly, such a change in strategic outlook and the resulting guidance requires us to review the role of the Army and how we might meet the challenges of the next century. To do this we embarked on a study called ‘Army 21’.

While the review process has been agreed in principle by the Minister, there are areas of detail which have yet to be resolved, and comment on specific outcomes is therefore premature. Nevertheless four broad areas deserve examination:

a. the changes in the environment which have led us to review Army’s structure;
b. the vision that we have developed for the future Army;
c. the process which has been employed to achieve that vision; and
d. some indication of the sort of outcomes you might expect to see emerge in the coming years.

An Environment for Change

At the outset, we were confronted not by a strategic environment with identifiable threats, but with the post-Cold War strategic environment which has been described as a volatile era of uncertainty. In the Army, we can no longer plan against the certainty of a specific threat. Indeed, it is many years since we did. But we simply cannot reduce the Army and hope that strategic warning will give us sufficient time to rearm and be ready for the conflict. I think there are two reasons for this:

a. Firstly, the record of correct strategic assessment is abysmal. I know of no major conflict this century where one side was not fundamentally surprised.
b. Secondly, an Army cannot be created overnight. And this issue is more relevant today, than at any time in the past.

The reduction of Cold War tensions has resulted in an increasingly uncertain strategic environment. Patterns of relations between states are less defined and more difficult to define. Within our region, for example, some countries have questioned the long-term military
commitment of the United States. Others have seen the United States embarked on a policy of containment. We, of course, wish to see the United States remain regionally engaged. The uncertainty of this process, however, does not make the task of force structuring any easier.

Strategic change apart, we also face a further major challenge. We are in the grip of a surge in technological development. While those of us who are professional soldiers, and who have made it our business to keep abreast of evolving technologies, may disparage such vague terms as the 'Age of Information Warfare' and the 'Revolution in Military Affairs', there is little doubt that technology is changing the shape of the battlefield and has the ability to do so in a way few of us can imagine. The paradox is that we still expect an infantryman to close and kill his adversary. But he must also be capable of doing much more.

The Gulf War brought several new dimensions to warfare. I wonder, of course, what our perceptions of war might have been if the conflict had been fought on the Korean Peninsula. The flat, highly manoeuvrable, open spaces of the Kuwaiti desert certainly presented an opportunity for the concept of the Air-Land Battle to be exercised. But I can assure you that in the few years since DESERT STORM, the developments in command and control, target acquisition, lethality of weapons, and so on have significantly raised the capability of forces. In many ways, DESERT STORM has been used as a giant test bed for further development. And this process will not only continue but increase.

It took 400 years for weapons based on gun-powder to be perfected. It has taken less than 20 years for the micro-processor to change the way we do all forms of business drastically. Commanders now have access to information of an unprecedented magnitude. Indeed, unless commanders take steps to articulate clearly their information requirements, and to control the flow of information, they will be swamped.

For the Army, like the other services, an understanding of the future battlefield is vital. In the past, we frequently took many years to develop a major capability. Nowadays, major capabilities, particularly those which have a significant software component, can change almost overnight. Our doctrine, to say nothing of our acquisition processes, cannot come to terms with this reality. At least, not yet.

Inevitably, therefore, technology will change the shape of the future battlefield. This century we saw the trenches of the First World War created, some would argue, by the machine-gun and artillery. I suspect the inability of commanders to control the battle, lacking as they did the means to communicate and process the large volumes of information they needed, had as much to do with the establishment of the linear battlefield as did firepower.

Therefore, while I personally do not like the term, to say we are in the grip of a revolution may not be to oversell the issue. Clearly, our doctrine and organisation must exploit the new tools, all of which are based on the micro-processor.

What, therefore, does all this mean for the Australian Army? In very crude terms, we need four outcomes from technology:

a. We need to own the night.

b. We need to know where we are and where the enemy is.

c. We need to be able to exchange and process this information rapidly, securely and accurately.

d. We need to be able to move rapidly and sustain ourselves over large distances.

Let me elaborate briefly on these issues.
We have always operated at night. We have patrolled and ambushed, moved into forming up places, breached minefields and even attacked at night. But we are on the verge of being able to operate at night as if it were day. We will be able to defeat and engage targets at great distances.

We now have the means of accurately identifying our position. Given the lethality and precision of weapons, and the speed with which operations will be mounted, this is of vital importance. Equally, an array of sensors will now detect movement, variations in heat and exploit the electro-magnetic spectrum. Envisage a situation where a surveillance device will detect the movement of an armoured vehicle and relay that information immediately to a gun which fires a precision guided missile and hits the armoured vehicle within seconds. Of course, the gun must immediately move or have such counter-measures so that it, in turn, will not become a target. All this leads to an increasingly lethal battlefield with a rising spiral of complexities as counter-measures are developed and counter-counter-measures and so on. And yet the same technologically capable Army floundered in the stress of downtown Mogadishu.

Managing the information process has become critical. The increasingly dispersed battlefield, the upward change in the tempo of operations and the volume of information available from the increasing array of sensors now means that a commander needs automated information systems, requiring wide band widths. After a very slow start, AUSTACCS—the Australian Army Command Support System—is starting to show considerable promise with the trials of equipment begun recently.

The distances over which we operate are unique. No other army considers tactical manoeuvre over half the continental distance of Europe or an area larger than the mid-west states of the United States. And this is conducted in harsh terrain with a paucity of infrastructure. A range of vehicles and aircraft is under active consideration. Infantry will have to be motorised, mechanised or delivered by air.

What then are the relevant 'conclusions' which we in the Australian Army can draw about the nature of warfare in the early part of the 21st century:

a. Firstly/that threats of armed conflict will remain. Even the most optimistic analyst would acknowledge that while the threat of superpower conflict has receded, many sources of potential instability remain. The early years of the next century will be characterised by greater strategic uncertainty. Therefore, Australia will still require a capable army. Our challenge today is to ensure that the army of tomorrow is equipped, trained and ready to meet and defeat any threats to the security of our nation.

b. Secondly, the Army will have to be more efficient in its use of resources. This trend is already evident, particularly amongst the armies of the major powers, as a result of the demands of reducing budgets coupled with the benefits of new technologies. Capabilities will be more tightly integrated: mobility, precision and the ability to closely operate in a joint environment will become force structure benchmarks. However, the single services are likely still to exist as individual entities. The Australian Defence Force will still need experts in land, maritime and air warfare. Overlaid on all three will be a requirement for expertise in information warfare operations.

c. Thirdly, the future battlefield will be non-linear and deep. The lethality and precision of modern weapon systems demand dispersion, with manoeuvre to concentrate firepower rather than mass. This trend is likely to continue, particularly with the development of space-based weapon systems.

d. Finally, while the future soldier will likely retain the ethos and values of today's Australian soldier, the knowledge and training requirements will be very different. Leaders and soldiers of the future must have the knowledge and training to understand and utilise emerging technologies in chemistry and physics, engineering, electronics, air and space, and
information technology. The future demands a new breed of professional soldier. Our soldiers must be trained in new and intellectually stimulating ways. We must create an Army which encourages them to think, rewards knowledge and utilises their expertise. The Australian Army of the future will have an important place for part-time soldiers. But it will require a professional to continue to master the increasing complexities of war and to translate this mastery into doctrinal and capability outcomes.

The Need for Change

The proposed restructuring of the Army is a response to these factors. The present structure of the Army does not reflect current strategic guidance. It still has many of the features of the core force which saw an Army structured to be massively reinforced through widespread enlistment or conscription. There is a disconnect between the structure and the doctrine we are teaching. Many units are not prepared for combat. The Army does not have sufficient mobility to disperse forces quickly over the vast distances of Australia and the region. Nor does it have the combat power for the quick resolution of conflict on terms favourable to Australia.

While we have two divisions and numerous brigades on paper, we should not derive a false sense of security from our present structure as some units do not provide any true capability. Our administrative overheads are too high. Deficiencies which have developed over many years undermine Army's capacity for defending Australian territory, for cooperating with Allies and friends in the region and for making substantive commitments to meet our alliance obligations.

Although some effort has been made in breaking down the structures of earlier eras, the Australian Army remains top-heavy, hollow and inflexible. Our structure is not capable of absorbing rapid advances in command and control, target acquisition, mobility and nightfighting technologies. It is cumbersome in its demand for logistic support and is not readily adaptable to operate in a joint warfare environment.

The Planning Problems

The need for a review was obvious. However, having determined that we needed a major review, we were immediately confronted with several problems.

First, there is no manual for force structuring. The arithmetic of operations research, though important, should not be allowed to obscure the fact that strategy is an art rather than a science. We were confronted with the task of designing an Army for the next century in the absence of an agreed force structuring methodology and relevant force development experience.

We also have deficiencies in strategic guidance. Any review of the Army should be undertaken within the framework of a fully developed national military strategy; such a strategy does not currently exist. This is a significant deficiency.

Furthermore, while most comparable countries are dealing with similar force structuring problems in the aftermath of the Cold War, nobody has established an unbeatable lead in their approach to force structuring. However, there are lessons to be learnt from the way the US and British Armies have approached the problem and I would like to spend a few moments on the vision of each.

Force XXI

Force XXI is the US Army force structure review which is designed to lead the US Army from a threat-based to a capability-based army, concentrated on power-projection with a global focus to address the proliferation of new threats and the requirement to adapt to new missions and new coalition partners.
The five key objectives of the process coincided with the US Army's force modernisation objectives:

- dominate the manoeuvre battle;
- precision strike;
- protect the force;
- project and sustain the force; and
- win the information war.

Planned operational capabilities, to be enabled by emerging technologies, are:

- operational agility;
- tailorability and modularity;
- full-dimensional operations;
- doctrinal flexibility; and
- joint, multinational and interagency.

The US Army views Force XXI as a natural progression from today's CONUS-based, power-projection army to one capable of a more flexible engagement strategy, using 21st-century technology with improved lethality, survivability, operational tempo and sustainment.

BA2000

Similarly, BA2000 is the British Army's response to the changing world situation and what they assess to be the expeditionary nature of their future operations. The British Army considers that the biggest challenge they face is to strike the right balance between the ability to mobilise a large organisation and holding formations at high readiness.

This balance is to be achieved by utilising versatility and adaptability in equipment and organisations. The intention is to structure an Army capable of operating across the full spectrum of conflict against forces with widely differing capabilities and in a variety of different circumstances. This is to be achieved by maintaining a core capability for a credible warfighting response should their national interests be threatened, coupled with a foundation on which to build should they face again a major external security threat.

In both the US and British response, the emphasis in restructuring has been placed on providing well-equipped land forces, able to exploit emerging technologies and with the flexibility to be utilised in a variety of operations. This is an emphasis which mirrors our vision of a 21st century Army, a vision which requires fundamental change before it can be realised.

The Vision

The key defence aim remains the development of military forces sufficient to defeat any attack against Australia, particularly along our northern approaches. But Australia cannot be defended by simply guarding our territory. We need a force which is more mobile, better trained, better equipped and reshaped to fight on the modern battlefield—wherever that battlefield may be.

The Army of the future must be capable of performing a more diverse range of missions, with the firepower, mobility and instantaneous access to information required on the modern battlefield. The Army must be interoperable with the Navy, the Air Force, and our Allies and be more capable of deploying forces to meet our broader security interests.

The vision for modernisation relies on enhancing the combat power of a relatively small, but highly professional Army. This will be achieved through the redirection of spending to the combat area and the adoption of new military concepts and emerging technologies.
What Has Been Done

The Army has already begun to restructure. The decision to end the Ready Reserve Scheme and to increase General Reserve capabilities are an integral part of these changes. Much of the Government Directed Savings of $125m per annum over the next three years will be used to enhance capabilities including night vision equipment, radios, satellite navigation equipment, laser rangefinders and simulators.

But reviews within Defence, including a review of Army's structure beyond 2000, suggest that more needs to be done. The Army must become an organisation in which structural and technological adaptation is regarded as normal and desirable. These dynamics for adjustment are being built into an evolutionary development process, the first part of which will test and evaluate new concepts.

The review process has produced an analysis of Army's core tasks from which we have derived a number of concepts and principles for developing the future structure of the Army. That analysis identified, as key issues to be addressed, the Army's low readiness for operations, an inability to train and retain people in the Reserves, insufficient air and ground mobility, weakness in our command and control arrangements, shortages of Special Forces and the need to take advantage of new and evolving technologies.

What We Will Do

Most of the structural changes will occur over the next three to five years. Implementation planning has been designed to ensure that the Army's force structure remains:

- appropriate to strategic circumstances;
- balanced and capable; and
- affordable.

The first step will be to develop provisional doctrine drawing from the operational concepts of the review process. Selected elements will then be consolidated to test and evaluate command and control arrangements and other new concepts.

Confirmation of operational requirements for equipment, doctrine and training will also emerge from these trials. As concepts are validated, the outcomes will be applied.

We foresee wide Defence and industry involvement in confirming Army's needs for procurement of major capital equipment and further modification of the structure. Full modernisation of the Army will occur from about the year 2000, including the introduction of a new range of high technology equipments.

To increase overall readiness, it will be necessary to raise personnel numbers in the combat force. This will be achieved by shifting troops from base support areas into the combat force and by integrating Regular and Reserve units.

We will revitalise the Reserve by increasing the relevance and attractiveness of Reserve service. Reserves will be trained to a higher standard and incentives provided to keep them serving longer.

The Army's mobility will be increased by the acquisition of more armoured fighting vehicles, new armoured infantry vehicles and helicopters for troop lift. The major combat elements of the Army will be motorised or air-mobile.

We will shift from the traditional divisional structure towards more dynamic, responsive and flatter task organised structures. These will be self-contained, capable of a range of independent operations and better able to operate in concert with the Navy and the Air Force.
The Army's command and control arrangements will be modernised. Army commanders will be assisted by automated command support systems, enhanced data management systems and modern electronic warfare capabilities. These improvements will allow operations to be conducted at the tempo demanded by modern combat.

We will establish a Regular commando unit to increase our options for counter terrorism and strategic strike. An existing infantry battalion will be re-equipped and retrained to enable it to perform these Special Forces tasks. These highly skilled soldiers will play a key part in all types of ground operations, both in Australia and offshore.

**Conclusion**

That then is our vision for a restructured Army of the future. As we stand on the edge of a new century, we face the challenge of providing Australia with an army which is capable of defeating any attack, meeting any threat and with the adaptability and versatility to undertake successfully any mission required.

The Australian Army is to be restructured in a manner which will ensure that it remains appropriate to changes in the strategic environment throughout an evolutionary development period. The changes will be affordable within the portfolio.

The Army will not be reduced, but will be reshaped into a more modern combat ready force. It will be an Army of mobility, firepower and high technology, with an appropriate mix of Regular and Reserve personnel. The Army will be better trained and equipped and able to deploy wherever our national interests are best served. It will be capable of operating more effectively with the Navy and Air Force, as a joint force and as part of an international coalition.

The proposed changes will lead to an Army which is responsive to change and ready to meet the uncertainty of a new strategic era. Preserving the status quo is not an option. To do so would be to condemn the Army to further decline at a time of significant strategic and technological change.