THE SECOND FIFTY YEARS:
THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY 1947-1997

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INTRODUCTION
Lieutenant-General John Sanderson
Chief of Army

Benjamin Disraeli once remarked that 'change is inevitable in a progressive country; change is constant'. And change has indeed been the constant factor in the experience of the Australian Army since its formation in 1901.

The impetus for change has been both external and internal: the strategic environment in which the Army has had to operate has been dynamic since the first day, and has included the character forming experiences of two of the bloodiest wars in history. Equally, the internal structure and organisation of the Army has changed to accommodate factors as diverse as financial uncertainty and depression, technological change and the evolving expectations of Australian society.

Change is not necessarily always considered to be good: Henry George once observed that 'there is danger in reckless change; but even greater danger in blind conservatism'. The challenge is to determine at the point of decision whether the planned change is indeed reckless or simply long overdue.

A key to successful decision making is an appreciation of the hard won experience derived from past events. Military decision makers have long recognised the importance of understanding the past when planning for the future. It was the patriarch of military thinkers, General Carl von Clausewitz, who said: 'Only the study of military history is capable of giving those who have no experience of their own a clear picture of the friction of the whole'. If the examination of the experience of the past is accompanied by sound and critical analysis, a useful, quantifiable example of the consequences of decision making can be produced.

It is perhaps for this reason that the more successful commanders in history have made the study of military history a key part of their professional development. It is history which prompts the imagination: allowing cause and effect to be visualised. And even though it is difficult to foresee the true consequence of applied high-technology weapon systems for the future, the reaction of human beings to battlefield stress is a constant.

Perhaps it is also for this reason that military history conferences have become so popular and that modern military history studies now embrace a broader spectrum of human behaviour than in the past.

This year’s Army History Conference has been scheduled for this month to mark the 50th anniversary of a major change in the organisation and structure of the Australian Army. On 13 September 1947, the Minister for the Army, the Honourable C Chambers, MP, approved a military board minute stating that the permanent military forces should be known as the 'Australian Regular Army'. Prior to 1947 successive Australian governments had resisted the creation of a regular army, comprising all arms and services, in peacetime. Under the terms of the Defence Act of 1903, peacetime permanent forces were restricted to administrative and instructional staffs together with small numbers in certain specialist corps such as artillery and engineers. Indeed, the Army's first permanent peacetime Manoeuvre Unit, the Darwin Mobile Force, raised in 1938, was raised under this restrictive regime.
The experience of the Second World War radically changed the government's perceptions of the national defence task. It was recognised that the development of the international system of collective security, together with the needs of British Commonwealth defence, required a new approach to Australian defence planning. In June 1947 this recognition was given expression in cabinet's approval of an ambitious postwar defence policy.

From the Army's perspective, the key element of this policy was best expressed by the Minister for Defence, John Dedman, when he said: 'While the control of sea communications and air superiority are essential foundations, comprehensive land operations, in which land and air forces must be combined against a resolute and well armed enemy, are the means by which victory is ultimately won'. Was this a prescient view of the future air-land battle philosophies of the latter part of the 20th century?

The role of the postwar army hinged on a new requirement to provide immediately available, limited capability land forces for commitment to United Nations operations and Commonwealth defence tasks, in addition to providing the traditional base for expansion in time of major crisis. It was this need for immediate availability that underpinned the decision to establish a permanent or standing component of Army, in addition to the traditional reserve forces or the militia with their focus on the defence of Australia.

It is worth noting that this plan to make fundamental changes to defence was not greeted with total approval. The reaction of the parliamentary opposition to the new policy was less than enthusiastic, with one opposition member stating: 'Our future Navy, apparently, will consist of two cruisers and a few light craft which would possibly be a fleet suitable for Albania; whilst the Army and Air Force proposed for our future requirements would be more appropriate to a country like Patagonia'—which was a little bit unfair to the Air Force at the time, as it was one of the larger air forces in the world in 1947.

It is important that the significance of what happened 50 years ago this month be fully appreciated. The developments of those years provide the theme of this Army History Conference.
Armies have been made and re-made many hundreds of times. Oliver Cromwell wrote, at an early stage in his military career, that their essential element was:

Such men as had the fear of God before them and as made some conscience of what they did ... the plain russet-coated captain that knows what he fights for and loves what he knows.

In this current era of making and re-making we need to keep that figure in our minds. Armies are capable of much good and equally of much evil. The historical record is abundantly clear. But if soldiers are motivated by some high cause, which they recognise to be worth the sacrifice of their own lives, they will serve well the societies in whose name they march, and whose vital interests they defend. Soldiering continues to need a moral foundation, and therefore a moral society with a moral leadership, else it is a vain enterprise. The soldiers in Napoleon’s Grande Armée believed they were fighting in defence of the values of the Revolution, but they were ultimately deceived and were brought to nought by others who saw their Emperor as a ruthless oppressor.

The same can be said for the millions who served in the armies of Germany in the two World Wars, Japan in the Second, and the states of the Warsaw Pact in the Cold War. Our own experience, by contrast, has been in defence of a high moral purpose and we fortunately lack the tensions within the Australian Army and between it and the nation at large which characterise so many other armies. We do not have to live with the legacy of a notably vain and grossly immoral use of military force. We have a whole relationship that even the stresses of Vietnam were unable to damage permanently.

At the current time we do not know whether we are at the end of an age as far as the use of force is concerned or simply in a temporary trough between two tumultuous periods. The policy debate literature is replete with controversy on whether or not major wars between states are a thing of the past. At the same time we hear very clearly the call to remake our armies and armed forces, and we cannot ignore it. The electorates of the democratic states have spoken their wishes and their representatives in government are demanding action to reorient the functions and structures in accord with changes in the international context and, in doing so, to reduce expenditure.

**The Australian Regular Army 50 Years On**

These calls come early in the life of the Australian Regular Army. It is hard to think that our Army is only 50 years old. When I joined the ARA it was only eight years of age. It certainly did not seem like that. The Australian Army, for anyone whose forebears had fought in both world wars, seemed to have been there forever. It was a major part of society, whose members had had a profound influence on the shaping of our society in the 20th century and whose veterans have had no small influence on the course of national politics.

But of course the First and Second AIF had a minuscule regular component. And outside the years of the world wars, Australia's military capacity had rested really in the hands of a few hundred professionals, who were poorly recognised for their service. Until the ARA was founded there could be no guarantee that we would not revert to that obsolete tradition which would have made impossible a timely response in any of the smaller wars of the past 50 years. So we look to 1947 as the time when the Australian government recognised that the nation needed a new foundation for its Army. At the same time we know full well that the ARA
had deep foundations in its predecessor, the Permanent Military Forces, and in the two Australian Imperial Forces. Its roots extended even into the British Army of the 19th century, and that Army, more than any other, has shaped the structure, the operational methods and equipment, the culture and norms of the ARA. Without the foundation of a regular army, Australia's defence development would have remained stunted, with an organisation rooted entirely in the past and unable to contribute to the kinds of commitment which arose so frequently during the Cold War. Generals Sturdee and Rowell, and their contemporaries, worked hard to establish the ARA. They would be pleased to see what has resulted from their creation. Whether they would think much of the successor term for the ARA, the 'full time army', I would not care to say.

But for the past 50 years the ARA has been on its own—not without friends both inside Australia and abroad—but it has learned to survive by its own efforts in the many currents and rapids in which it has been immersed from the Korean War to UNTAC, through two national service schemes, four wars, several reviews and reorganisations, and 33 peace-keeping operations. We are here today to celebrate the fact that it passed all those many tests with distinction, despite their variety and severity, and to honour the efforts of those men and women who made the ARA a highly professional force with an outstanding reputation around the world.

We are also here to think about how we might build on what has been achieved in the past 50 years in order to face the probably very different requirements of the decades immediately ahead. In the course of preparing this occasion I inspected the home page of the Australian Army on the Internet and found that I really did not need to write the paper at all. The arguments of 'An Australian Army for the 21st Century' are full, wide-ranging, cogent and convincing. So I am not about to discuss the Australian Army in any detail. Rather let me comment on some of the issues raised in the Army 21 review on the basis of the current debates on the development of armies on the other side of the world. If the cap fits you will know how to wear it.

The Remaking of Modern Armies

The challenges of this era are very like those confronting armies in the 1920s, as they groped their way forward in the context of huge technological changes such as the tank, the aircraft, the truck, massed artillery, and wireless communications. Many of them did not know it but they were in the midst of their own revolution in military affairs. The situation was compounded by the revolution in international affairs which led to the foundation of the League of Nations, and serious attempts to outlaw war and impose for the first time a global authority with both the legal status and military might to preserve peace forever. Of all the major armies of the world only the German performed really well in re-shaping itself in the 1920s and 1930s, and it did so with far fewer resources than the others, until late in the day. The Reichswehr's ability to learn from defeat was remarkable.

The British Army, with a much better resource base, and free of the political and social disapproval that the Reichswehr had to face, found many reasons for not changing much at all. As Alex Danchev has written in his soon to be published biographical study of Sir Basil Liddell Hart, the British Army was then divided into four factions: the realists who felt that they alone knew what war was about and would tolerate no change that they had not thought of themselves; the rationalists who could see a need for change but recognised that they could not move too far ahead of the political context; the revolutionaries who believed that only through radical change could the Army save itself; and the reactionaries who believed that the prime need of all cavalry officers was to be issued with two horses each. It would be inappropriate of me today to attempt any such analysis of the Australian Army, but I am sure you all would have some candidates for each of these four schools of thought if you were asked to name them. I do not need to remind this group that the process of change in any army, or indeed in any human organisation, is fraught with its own internal politics. Armies respond to orders when purposes are clear, when commanders' minds are made up, and when the situation permits no back-chat. That is not the context of 'Army 21'. You therefore have to persist with a process of debate and analysis, of trial and error, in which there will
inevitably be divisions and schools of opinion. All good armies have to endure this factionalisation at times of re-formation. It is usually creative. Just work, hope and pray that the right faction or the right combination will win the day because the consequences of making the wrong choices can be very painful, bloody and long lasting. The British Army took little notice of Liddell Hart when he published *The Re-making of Modern Armies* in 1927. The Army, not to mention the British nation, paid a terrible price for its own backwardness in the first three years of the Second World War. The French and Russians suffered even more acutely, yet they all could have been ahead of the Germans had they thought hard enough about their own profession.

**The Issues**

General Sanderson has asked me to reflect on the debates currently taking place in the armies of the principal NATO states and to offer some thoughts on what it might all mean for the future of the ARA. It is a broad spectrum of issues. I shall group them into four clusters: first, the new strategic context; second, personnel matters; third, the political-military relationship; and fourth, the implications of technological change.

1. **The New Strategic Context**

In the post-Cold War era the most basic question that arises for any army is 'what is the mission?' Lying beneath the issue of whether or not Russia might return to become a military threat to NATO is the deeper question of whether any major government is likely to go to war with any other in order to advance its own interests. Realists will say that one or more major states will always retain the potential to go to war, and therefore all likely target states or their allies must be prepared to go to war in their own defence. Political leaders in Europe do not dismiss this line of argument but they have not been funding the consequences of believing it. Political opinion tends to a consensus that Russia might still be a military problem, but only after a considerable warning period. And then it would be more of a local danger than a grave threat to the future of NATO members (unless of course Russia resorted to nuclear weapons, in which dimension the United States has more than parity). Western governments therefore will not fund the kind of military establishments that would be necessary to check a major drive from the East by an army a few million strong.

Consensus has formed about a much lower level of contingency: aggression by a regional strongman outside Europe requiring a force of several divisions to check, most of which would be provided by the United States. In other words America's major allies think much more in terms of providing forces of brigade and division level than of anything higher. In the current reorganisation of the French Army, divisions and corps are to be abolished. The French Army is now focussed on producing several brigade groups for long range intervention and power projection. The British and German Armies have retained the division, although Britain has only two of them in an operational sense and both are in Germany. The brigade is much more the unit of currency of the British and German Armies as it is of the French. The German Army, still conscript-based and therefore much larger, has retained the corps. How much longer it does so will depend on the future of conscription, an internal issue of some sensitivity given the popular unease about a fully professional military.

Gone are the days when NATO armies could plan around a single mission. Today the catch-cry is 'capability availability'. In other words the range of contingencies to be prepared for is so wide that the sheer availability of a capability is an important goal, quite apart from the degree to which that capability has been developed. The most likely contingencies stem from the collapse of states, hence state-rebuilding becomes an important military requirement because nobody else can be relied upon to do it. ‘Operations other than war’ have become a major theme in planning, force structure, equipment and training. It has been said recently that the US Army has changed its business from life insurance to health care.

The range of contingencies that armies have to be ready to face seems likely to broaden as more thought is given to the security consequences of environmental disasters and population growth. In all these new tasks the element of danger remains present but not to
the degree where the main task of most of the troops committed is fighting. They still have to be able to fight, of course, but they have to be able to do many other things as well, from rebuilding shattered cities to supervising elections. Forces are almost invariably multinational in composition, making interoperability increasingly important across the spectrum of units and formations. Battalions of one country must be able to work, with battalions of another in international brigades. Standard NATO agreements on interoperability of equipment and communications systems and procedures are becoming ever more important. Armies that lack interoperability will be consigned to irrelevance in the new military environment controlled by the United Nations and led in the field by the United States.

As part of the readjustment to face these new tasks, NATO armies recognise that their inherited Cold War skills, structures and approaches can sometimes be irrelevant or even counterproductive. Future development has to address responsibilities that will be much more intrinsically political in nature, such as the promotion of democratisation, support for human rights, policing of international law and the apprehension of war criminals. Where combat is envisaged the key elements are not so much mass and breadth but timeliness and precision. At the same time major armies cannot entirely ignore the deterrent function of being seen to be capable of defeating major rivals in the field.

In parallel with this re-definition of roles and missions, Western governments have evinced an increased desire to reduce defence expenditure. Here we see a consequential coincidence, between the rise of political philosophies that emphasise reduction of the tax burden and the disappearance of the one major contingency on which NATO defence expenditure was justified for 45 years. This coincidence has created a formidable problem for armies struggling to remain competent and powerful. In Europe these financial trends are reinforced by the criteria for entry into the European Monetary Union. Armies have to be able to show substantial savings over their Cold War costs and if they will not do this co-operatively they will be taken by the scruff of the neck and made to comply. The new strategic context is thus extremely demanding for NATO armies. They are all in the process of making major changes to fit new financial constraints while broadening their range of capabilities except in the field of combat on the grand scale. New organisations, new weapons, new computers and new approaches to command and control are all being developed and pressed into service.

2. Personnel Matters

I began this presentation by referring to people and their motivation. The new strategic context is compelling radical changes in the field of personnel policy and administration. Most European armies have relied on conscription from feudal times. During the past two centuries, including the Cold War, the system has been a key element of the social fabric of most European states. Compulsory military service has been accepted not only as the best way to obtain raw manpower cheaply and plentifully but also as a national institution, part of the growing up process, a national educator, integrator and leveller. It has served to reassure citizens in democratic states that they would not be dictated to by a professional military caste who could act as a law and a force unto themselves.

But other needs are beginning to make themselves felt. As armies had to transform themselves from massive deterrent forces against the invasion of their home or neighbouring territories into smaller, highly mobile, superbly equipped and trained forces capable of meeting a wide range of problems, conscription has been called increasingly into question. Britain, of course, gave it up in the early 1960s, but for an island power that was only to be expected! The United States moved to an all volunteer army in the mid-1970s as the draft system of the Vietnam War was staggering on the edge of incredibility. More recently Belgium abandoned the tradition, and has been followed recently by France. President Chirac's policy has engendered intense controversy but it is going clearly into effect, with the loyal compliance of the professional military, if not their warm support. The future of conscription is under debate in virtually all European countries, including Russia. They will adapt at very different speeds because of the different natures of their domestic political situations, but the writing does seem to be on the wall for this means of raising soldiery in the developed states. This is not true for east and southeast Asia, where conscript armies are the norm, at least for the present and the near future.
The end of the Cold War is also fostering repatriation of forces, albeit slowly. Germany, the common basing area in Central Europe for both sides, is now an increasingly crowded and expensive deployment area for foreign governments. Also the patience of the German citizenry with exercises and the bad behaviour of some allied soldiers has worn too thin to be ignored by Chancellor Kohl. Once governments bring their divisions of soldiers home they find that they no longer need most of them.

So, increasingly, NATO governments are forced to seek that most expensive recruit, the volunteer, the well educated and talented young person who is willing to serve as a professional for enough years to justify the training effort which has to be applied. The competition for enough recruits to man even the modest establishments of today is formidably keen. It may be regarded soon in some countries as too unproductive in terms of money spent on advertising and bonuses, compelling governments to lower their sights in terms of the size of forces and range of capabilities that they wish to keep. Let me quote some statistics from the British case.

The trained soldier strength of the Army is 97,902, 5.1 per cent in deficit. The infantry and artillery are 8.5 per cent undermanned. The Royal Armoured Corps and Household Cavalry are 1.4 per cent under strength. The whole of the Army save the Royal Engineers is short of personnel. The situation is worse than these figures suggest when one goes to a unit and speaks to the commanding officer. He usually has to detach personnel for training and other tasks such as Keeping the Army in the Public Eye and Regimental Information Teams. The actual situation may be a further 10 per cent worse than I have indicated. And this is at a time when unemployment among young people is high, and service pay and conditions relatively are very good.

Recruiting budgets are a heavy charge on the Army's income as top line PR firms such as Saatchis have to be engaged to carry the message to the public in terms which will penetrate. Physical, intellectual and medical requirements have been relaxed, but given the complexity of modern equipment and the subtlety of the new tasks which armies have to perform, such policies may prove counter-productive. Military trainers complain that they have to make silk purses out of sows' ears. What they really want are silk pigs.

Such animals are not only hard to come by but also difficult to retain. Huge sums of money now have to be devoted to soldier support, in the form of housing, education, health care, and employment for the partners of soldiers. Transition assistance becomes increasingly important as the term of service nears completion. The old policy of leaving the soldier to fend for himself or herself on re-entry into civilian life is counter-productive today.

Societal change also affects the nature of the discipline that can be applied and the training imparted. Again the British Army has just announced major reforms in these areas to try to stem the loss of both recruits and trained personnel. All armies will have to continue these adjustments, but it remains a formidable challenge to decide how fast to move and in what areas.

The virtues of unit and regimental cohesion are being rediscovered as the retention problem becomes more severe. Soldiers respond well to the sense of family that a good regiment imparts. The British regimental system consumes great efforts but the Army's predicament would be far more severe without good regiments which attract and hold their soldiers.

The pressures on regular manpower have sharpened incentives for admitting more women and for greater dependence on reserves. Incorporation of women into NATO armies is taking place unevenly. In the US Army women currently comprise 13.5 per cent. In the French Army they number some eight per cent. The proportion of women is bound to increase everywhere as armies move towards an all-volunteer composition, and as women become more assertive in the job market. At the same time the problems of sex and romance have dashed many a promising military career on both sides of the gender line. Maybe we will learn to manage these things better with time, but the experience of the US Army, which began integrating women seriously in the mid 1970s, is not reassuring. Difficult times lie ahead for all armies as they try to make better use of the female half of their national populations.
Reserve forces are being reformed to make them better suppliers of trained personnel to serve with the regulars on distant, complex missions. Regulars simply cannot provide the full range of skills required, and sometimes not even the full numbers of combat personnel needed. Reservists’ conditions of service have to change in accord with this need, complicating relations with their employers, not to mention their families. The reservists need help on both counts. Reserve training has to become more attractive if it is to capture and retain the interest of young people with many other things to do. Reserve officers have to be incorporated into the Army’s command structure at senior levels as well as in units. The British Army still has only three positions for Territorial Army brigadiers, and none beyond that level.

Reserve forces also help to strengthen the vital links between armies and the societies from which they come. Reservists are immersed in their own communities for most of the time. They can be highly visible when they are on duty, and they are well suited to conducting a special representational role for their army at large. Good armies build on this strength. Others ignore it. The reserves have a much more important role to play in the current context than during the Cold War.

3. The Political-Military Relationship

As the purposes for which armies are used become less clearly identified with national security in the direct sense of the term, and more focused on broader security objectives such as strengthening respect for international law, so the quality of the political-military relationship becomes even more important. Political leaders need to have a very clear understanding of what armies can and cannot do, of what they require for particular missions in terms of combat strength and logistics, and of the consequences of a particular commitment proving to be protracted. Politicians must develop clear objectives for their force commanders, consider before the event their own reactions should new contingencies arise, and agree on what their exit strategy will be. This all has to be done in close co-operation with the force commanders who have to undertake responsibility for operations and their heads of service. During the course of a commitment, leaders on both sides of the political-military divide have to stay in close contact. Soldiers do not always understand the thinness of the ice on which politicians skate, especially in terms of their popularity with their own electorate. Politicians, who now come from an age group that has had little or no direct experience of war, do not always know the questions to ask their military advisers or even the issues on which to focus.

Western armies did not have to worry so much about the political-military interface during the Cold War because NATO took care of it. The newer type of commitment tends to be more of an ad hoc nature, and is geared to national as well as to global interests. NATO is of less direct use as a planning and command agency for these reasons. This is not to say that it is irrelevant, and recent events in Bosnia have shown that NATO remains vital in acute crises. But individual nations now require enhanced force planning, deployment and command facilities of their own. Hence the growth of joint force headquarters in individual NATO states. Because of the sudden nature of calls for peace-keeping or peace enforcement forces, these joint force headquarters have to be in permanent session, virtually full manned and ready to take charge of a major operation within days if not hours. The old system whereby a force commander was designated, and then put together a staff by raiding other parts of his army, will no longer suffice. Command and control has to take much higher priority as a standing national commitment.

On the political side of the line similar policy-shaping bodies have to be kept in action, such as National Security Councils or special committees of the Cabinet. Domestic politics, foreign policies, resource requirements and media policies all have to be integrated so that sophisticated political guidance for military operations is available at short notice. The intelligence requirements on both the political and military sides are more complex than in the days where the enemy was known and under close study the whole time. In short, armies have to think much harder about the upper levels of the command chain than was the case during the Cold War. And politicians have to understand more about what their armed forces can and cannot do in a wide variety of situations.
Handling the media has never been an easy task for armies in the field, and particularly so since the advent of television journalists in combat zones. As the capability of the media increases, and the hold of television on the public mind, and indeed the thinking of politicians, strengthens, the potential of the media for both help and harm has grown exponentially. We can all think of episodes in recent years where reporters, often acting perfectly correctly, have changed the way in which their home audiences view a particular commitment. The effectiveness of armies is now significantly dependent on their skills in relating to and helping the media representatives. And often those same media people will give soldiers a direct link to the home viewers that can strengthen their hands. The converse is also true. There is no choice but for soldiers to learn to become articulate spokespersons while taking part in demanding missions. At the same time soldiers also have to know more about when to keep the media at arm's length and how to do this without such action becoming in itself counterproductive.

The third aspect of political military relations worth mentioning is the growing need for armies to acquire political visibility, in other words to attract the attention of individual politicians, despite all the counter-attractions. This of course does not imply any direct involvement in the political process, other than to make sure that extremely busy political leaders are as aware of their soldiers' needs as they are of the requirements and activities of their other key servants of state. Politicians, with few exceptions, will not take an active interest in their army unless they are invited to do so and find it interesting. They need to be brought in to exercises, discussions, actual operations (where, as Michael Heseltine and Paddy Ashdown have shown, there can be useful photo opportunities), training and personnel administration. Relevant constituency MPs, members of parliamentary committees, and senior office holders in all of the political parties in the Parliament have to be invited in and then handled effectively. This duty belongs not only to Chiefs of Staff and force commanders: it also rests with unit and sub-unit commanders. At least a substantial proportion of politicians seems ready to find the services interesting and engaging, once they can be prised away from other commitments. But armies now have to compete keenly and effectively with other causes when it comes to gaining the attention, understanding and help of key legislators. Soldiers must hone their skills or become marginalised.

4. The Implications of Technological Change

The impact of these changes in strategic context, personnel availability and the political-military relationship is compounded by rapid change in military technology. To an audience such as this I do not have to list the major elements of the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs. Rather let me focus on some of the recent discussion which has ensued in Europe and the United States on what conclusions should be drawn from our rapidly changing technological context.

One of the most provocative and best thought through of works recently published is Douglas Macgregor's *Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century*. His essential thesis is that the old pattern of massed armies, in which the separate arms and services co-existed with a substantial degree of independence, needs to be replaced by a more closely integrated formation, the Joint Task Force. Where is the originality in this idea, you may ask, as we have all heard about joint warfare and joint task forces for some time now? Macgregor, a cavalry Colonel in his mid-forties, has taken this idea further than most of its exponents in terms of thinking through the consequences of moving, or of failing to move, towards a new model for armies of the 21st century. The analysis is done very much from a United States' point of view. The key questions of the book, in Macgregor's words, are these:

Is landpower essential to American strategic dominance? Can the Army's elected and appointed leaders shape warfighting organizations that are skilled enough, smart enough, and enduring enough to manoeuvre within a joint framework through the treacherous environment of contemporary and future conflict? How do political and military leaders ensure crisp execution of complex operations and winning performance in battle without restricting human potential and the American soldier's individual brains and initiative?"
The debate in the United States, probably the most advanced in the world in terms of grappling with the implications of new technology, is focussed on the development of an army whose purpose is much more ambitious than that of any allied army. Indeed the issues of digitisation and battle space dominance have become so salient for the future of combat power that one wonders whether any other force would be remotely capable of standing up to the US Army as it might be structured and equipped under the Force XXI concept. But let us not forget how, in the Korean and Vietnamese wars, determined enemies simply transformed the nature of each conflict in ways in which the superior combat power of the United States Army was frustrated. The Chinese threatened an escalation in manpower terms which would have tipped the United States into a global war that it did not want. The Vietnamese accepted continuing inability to win on the battlefield in return for undercutting the essential basis of political support for America’s war effort at home and abroad by making the war look unwinnable.

In the age of MRA, thinkers such as Macgregor would contend, such an enemy strategy would not work. A US Army structured, equipped and trained to fight as he prescribes, would make the price of opposition so terrible for any enemy that the longer term options of escalation or of a decisive political counteroffensive would no longer exist. And he may be right. Equally a major enemy might prove capable of bearing a huge cost and outlasting the staying power of the American public. However it is beside my purpose in this analysis to pursue those questions in the context of the US Army. Like America’s European allies, the Australian Army has to grapple with some more modest issues.

Will the Australian Army be able to play its expected part in allied operations designed to strengthen international order, or to save a failing state from the consequences of its internal divisions? Will the Army as an integral part of the Australian Defence Force, be able in the worst case to defend Australia’s national interests against an aggressor without substantial allied help? How much new technology will be needed to enable the Army to meet these objectives? How should the Army be structured? How should it be trained? These issues are all faced squarely in the Army 21 debate and I do not need to go over them again here.

But from the perspective of coalition operations, given that the US Army is moving ahead rapidly on the technology front, its allies in Europe and the Pacific do not have much option. If they fail to develop compatibility with the new American systems, they will be relegated to a flag-showing role at most. Interoperability demands that there should be a substantial commonality not only in procedures and operational methods but also in capabilities. We do not have the option of remaining undigitised. We may have to leave the provision of theatre command and control systems to the Americans but we must all be able to connect with theirs, take in the huge flow of information that will be provided through it, and contribute in turn much as if we were a comparably sized part of the US Army. To do less is to guarantee relegation to an utterly inconsequential role. In terms of national defence, failure to utilise the information revolution could well be equivalent to giving the game away if an aggressor had already moved to exploit it for himself. Australia already has a useful lead in this field in regional terms. We can continue to make it very difficult for anyone else to use force directly against Australian interests if we stay intelligently ahead of the field in east and southeast Asia.

Many of the characteristics of the Information Age Army can be of great assistance in offsetting the traditional disadvantages of Australia’s geo-strategic situation. The potential battle space is huge. The numbers of men and women who can be committed to its defence are very small. The needs for intelligence, strategic and tactical, and mobility are paramount. Weapons systems have to be highly accurate and powerful because for political and economic reasons we cannot carry out the saturation operations which the old technology requires to be effective. The only issues really for debate are the fields in which we wish to develop competence, the speed with which we move and the degree to which we will be dependent on the United States for any particular operational capability.
On the first two of these, the fields and the speed of development, it will not hurt to follow the US at some distance because it is bound to make some errors, expensive ones, in the process of developing new technology for operational purposes. It is in the process of equipping the 'land warriors' of the 4th Division with a suite of sensor, communications and computing equipment likely to cost over $US250 million per divisional set. The first fit, tried in August 1997 in a brigade exercise, proved cumbersome in the extreme, with man loads of up to 100lbs, battery lives of the order of two hours, and connecting cables trailing everywhere. One of the platoon commanders described the kit as 'like wearing an octopus'. But when it worked it was wonderful. Troops had excellent vision by night and by day. They could detect others at considerable distances by radiation and movement. They could assemble and report a vast amount of information through their laptops. They could manoeuvre independently over great distance, swiftly, and stay ahead of their less well-equipped enemy's capacity to respond and retaliate. Despite all the initial problems of digitising an infantry division there is no doubt that the US Army will press ahead, in company with the other three American armed services, and embark on the development of a force which is considerably smaller than that of the Cold War, but with much greater combat power.

The question of dependence on the United States is essentially a political one, but it also has military aspects which will be familiar enough to anyone with experience in Korea or Vietnam. We are bound to differ in some points of operational doctrine, and in what we expect of our soldiers. We have to experiment and think hard about where the trade-off points are, and where our political preferences in extreme circumstances are likely to lie. Again, Australia faces problems similar in many ways to those to the European allies of the United States, and has much to gain by closely studying their approaches and progress.

Conclusions

In conclusion let me return to my opening concern: the man in uniform, or in the 21st century context, the person in uniform. The effectiveness of military forces the world over is still determined largely by the skills and bravery of their soldiers. Admittedly the equipment, the organisations, the doctrines and the political-military interface are all extremely important, but the central element remains the thinking human being, often tired, cold, frightened, hungry, alone and confused. People are still the most vital components of modern armies. Individual forces are rooted deeply in their national societies and produce their soldiers in different ways. Much of the technological development of the era ahead will have to be left to the Americans, but they do not have any necessary advantage in developing superior people for military service. All of us as allies and partners in helping the US to maintain respect for international law contribute on much more level terms when it comes to developing soldiers and commanders. We can do this more effectively as part of a team effort, in close contact and dialogue with each other.

The Australian Regular Army has enhanced Australia's reputation. Small, thinly stretched and starved of funds as it has been in the past, it has none the less gone ahead and won confidence at home and abroad. It would be nice to think that in 50 years time, when the centenary of the ARA is being marked, Australia will still be one of the small group of preferred partners that other states want alongside them when trouble threatens. The key element will remain those plain, russet-coated captains who know what they fight for and love what they know.

Endnotes

The Official Historian of the Second World War, Gavin Long, made the following assessment of the Australian Army—an Army of 59 infantry battalions—in 1944:

The army which had now entered upon its final campaigns, and whose leadership and equipment were the subject of such keen debate at home, was at this time, in many respects, at the peak of its efficiency. More than two years earlier, it had established a tactical superiority over the Japanese, and since then it had gained in skill and confidence, and in particular, in the art of living healthily and cheerfully in tropical bush. Its experience included warfare in many kinds of terrain and climate, and in Africa, Europe and the South Seas. Its system of training and schools was comprehensive and their methods severe.  

The Official Historian of the Korean War, Robert O'Neill, wrote of our forces in Korea:

They fought hard, in appalling climatic conditions, against a determined enemy who showed that he could sometimes get the upper hand. Yet the Australians proved that man for man and unit for unit they could acquit themselves on the battlefield better than most and they earned unstinted praise from their allies. Their record of bravery, of consideration for their wounded mates when in danger, of dash in the offensive and dogged persistence in the defence—such as that displayed at Kapyong, on Maryang San and in countless small patrol actions on the Jamestown Line—and their quickwitted aggressive and subtle tactics set the new post-1939-45 War Army off to an excellent start.
In describing how we developed a regular army in 1947 and after, and in explaining why it was in the form that developed, four themes emerge:

1. the legal background in which the senior soldiers and policy makers had to operate;
2. the policy commitments of the 1940s;
3. the new thinking that had to occur on conditions of service—if there was to be a volunteer regular army, then there had to be recruitment, and decent conditions of service; and
4. the very real links between the wartime Army, and the Army that fought in Korea.

There have been several strands in the military forces raised by Australia this century—permanent, Militia and AIF. The Australian Imperial Force has been the predominant wartime image—whether from Gallipoli, Tobruk or Borneo in 1945. Yet the two AIFs, all-volunteer forces, were composed of a mixture of permanent soldiers, of Militia soldiers, and of civilians with no military experience. Of course, in the Second World War, the Militia formations, consisting of both conscripts and volunteers also fought in their own right.

It was no accident that the AIF was raised for each of the World Wars. The policy and legislative framework established in the first decade of Federation predicated that this would be so. Laws should reflect government policy, but sometimes, laws develop an inertia all of their own.

In the Australian Army that was formed on 1 March 1901, there were permanent soldiers, Militia and volunteers. In relation to the permanent forces, the new Defence Act as amended laid out three themes that remained in force up until about 1950. The first was that the Army developed as a militia force, with permanent soldiers providing the administrative and instructional staff necessary to make it work. In wartime, a special force of volunteers was raised—the AIF—to augment the King's Regular Forces. Historians such as John Mordike and Craig Wilcox have discussed the policy and financial reasons that led us to adopt such a structure. Nationalism, fear for trade union freedom, or simply an affirmation of the historic traditions of the English (and colonial) militia may have been at work here.

By the time of the postwar Army of the 1940s, this limitation on the permanent forces arising from section 31(2) of the Defence Act was interpreted as limiting the PMF to raising only the following corps in peacetime: the Staff Corps, the Australian Instructional Corps, Aviation, Survey, Service Corps, Medical, Veterinary, Ordnance, Artillery, and Engineers. One senior officer described this section of the Act as 'an embarrassment'.

The second legal limitation was upon overseas service. From 1903 to 1964, section 49 of the Act stated that members of the Military Forces should not be required to serve beyond the limits of Australia and its territories unless they voluntarily agreed to do so. For example, the members of 3RAR in 1950 had volunteered to serve in Japan, not Korea, so they had to be re-attested for the Korean War.

The third legal limitation was upon the officering of the permanent forces, and this was reflected in section 148. The premise was that no one should be appointed a PMF officer who was not a graduate of the Military College. There were exceptions for time of war, for non-combatant corps and for QMs. Even if a particular corps could be raised under the Act in peacetime, it was very difficult to find enough RMC graduates as officers.

A fourth limitation was the pegging of the establishment of the PMF. For example, from 1939 on, the size of the PMF was arbitrarily set at 4873, which were the numbers set out in the 1939/40 Financial Estimates. There were about 450 officers in the pre-war PMF.

There had been suggestions that a regular army be formed before 1947. (The term 'regular army' is used here in the sense of a permanent force consisting of all arms and services.) In the late 1930s, it had been suggested by the Leader of the Opposition, John Curtin, by the Inspector-General, Lieutenant-General Squires, and by Joseph Lyons. In the end, the only portion raised was the Darwin Mobile Force, which because of the Defence Act limitations had to be raised as an artillery unit. Nonetheless, the DMF provided regimental experience for young officers and NCOs. Prior to this time, the only regimental training available was service in British units in India for some RMC graduates.
After 1939, many PMF officers and men were seconded to the AIF and served in the Middle East. With the return of the AIF and the crisis of 1942, virtually all members of the PMF were seconded to either the AIF or to the Militia, and there was an attempt to introduce uniform conditions of service within the obvious confines of the 'two army policy'. It was possible that PMF interests might be submerged in the massive wartime Army of 400,000, which had about 20,000 officers. Therefore a cell within the Directorate of Organisation ensured that nominal promotions were made for PMF members against the 1939/40 establishment for superannuation purposes.

Three events in 1944 were important for the postwar Army: Government planning, Army planning, and the Vasey Report. In January 1944, the Prime Minister and Minister of Defence had issued a standing instruction to the Defence Committee to keep in mind the question of the nature, strength and organisation of the postwar forces. In October 1944, a Post War Army Planning Committee was set up and the Vasey Report was commissioned. The Post War Army Planning Committee was chaired by Brigadier WJM Locke, and it established sub-committees to examine training, manning and conditions of service issues. After Lieutenant-General Wynter became ill, the Committee reported to the DCGS, Major-General Chapman.

One of the main assumptions of the Vasey Report into RMC was that there would be a postwar regular army of 20,000 men, based on the General Staff estimate. The Report was commissioned by General Blamey, and the Committee members were Major-Generals Vasey and Robertson and Brigadier Coombes. The Report stressed the need for regimental service for regular officers in permanent units. The Committee stated that soldiering was one of the most human of all the professions, that regular army officers had to understand the men they led, and that regular officers should no longer be separated from soldiers by long periods on the Staff. The Committee recommended that RMC graduates serve in permanent units for at least four years before any staff appointment, and that officers of Lieutenant-Colonel rank and below periodically return to regimental duty.

Without reading too much into the Report, perhaps there was a realisation that regular officers would continue to be subsidiary to Militia officers until the regulars could demonstrate expertise in command. The precondition for regimental and command experience was, of course, the existence of permanent units in peacetime.

By June 1945 the Army was basing planning on a permanent division, within a permanent army of 26,775 men. In the same month, the Defence Committee was looking at postwar forces within the context of a Treasury forecast that only about £60m would be available annually for defence. The Services, however, were told to plan first, and were advised that financial limits would be discussed later. It was also understood that some kind of interim force would be necessary during the demobilisation period.

At the end of the war, the surviving regular soldiers had some experience of senior command. Lieutenant-Generals Berryman and Rowell had served as corps commanders. Major-General Milford had served as a divisional commander in New Guinea and Borneo, and Major-General Bridgeford had commanded 3rd Division in the Bougainville campaign. Major-General Robertson had commanded a division briefly in New Britain and at Wewak. The proportions were less at brigade and battalion level, and of the 59 infantry battalions, only two were commanded by regulars in 1945. In addition, a number of RMC graduates saw service in infantry battalions and other units in the final campaigns of the war.

At the end of hostilities on 15 August 1945, the Army had a strength of about 383,000, with some 177,000 troops outside mainland Australia. There were two divisions on Borneo, a division and a brigade in the Aitape-Wewak area, a division on New Britain, and a division and two brigades on Bougainville. In addition, there were large logistics and headquarters elements in the Islands and in New Guinea, including concentrations at Morotai and Lae. There were also about 20,000 prisoners of war, mainly of the 8th Division.
The size and form of the postwar army was going to depend upon the type of defence and foreign policy commitments made by the Government in the transition from war to peace. The most pressing issue for the Government was demobilisation and postwar reconstruction, particularly since an election was due in 1946. Fortunately for those in favour of a postwar regular army, the Chifley Government had entered into a number of postwar commitments in August-September 1945.

In the first place, there was the occupation of Japan, which was going to require the basing of 10,000 Australian troops in Japan. Secondly, there was the supervision of the surrender of several hundred thousand Japanese troops in the Australian territories and in the Dutch East Indies, and consequent actions to prosecute or repatriate the surrendered Japanese. In addition, Borneo and the Dutch East Indies had to be garrisoned until the Australians could hand over to Dutch or British troops (which occurred in February-March 1946). Thirdly, the Army had responsibilities for guarding prisoners of war and internees in Australia, and supervising their repatriation. Fourthly, the Army had to recover back to Australia large quantities of wartime equipment, and store it or hand it over to civil industry. Fifthly, and most importantly for the Government, the Army itself had to demobilise.

The Army therefore had to balance the demands of the Government for rapid demobilisation, together with meeting the foreign commitments entered into by that Government. All these tasks had to be accomplished over thousands of miles, and with very limited shipping.

Unlike the situation at the end of the First World War, in 1945 a formation of the wartime Army continued on full time duty, and for so long as 34th Brigade was in Japan, there was the possibility that it could become the basis for a postwar regular army. The Brigade Group had been established using the equipment and personnel available in Borneo, New Guinea and Morotai. Its structure followed the conventions of the time, with three infantry battalions, an armoured car squadron, a field battery, an engineer squadron, and the other arms and services.

The Force arrived in Japan in February 1946, and commenced duties in the Prefecture of Hiroshima. These duties included creating a presence amongst the Japanese and securing caches of weapons. The majority of the soldiers and officers had seen wartime service. For example, 65th Battalion was recruited from the 7th Division, and the CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Marson, had served in the pre-war Militia, and had commanded the 2/25th Battalion from 1942 to 1945, concluding with the Balikpapan landings. There were thus real links between the wartime Army and the units of BCOF. Even in law, the members of BCOF were members of the AIF until they were later transferred to the Interim Army. The links between the wartime Army and the battalions that eventually served in Korea remained strong.

At about the time that 34th Brigade was sailing to Japan in February 1946, the Government was implementing changes to the system of controlling and administering the Army. On 28 February 1946, the Military Board held its first (postwar) meeting. This reflected a major change from the wartime arrangements. The post of Commander-in-Chief was abolished, and the Military Board, as a corporate body, was to control and administer the Army. The first postwar members of the Board were: the Minister, Lieutenant-General Sturdee as CGS, Lieutenant-General Rowell as VCGS, Major-General Clowes as Adjutant-General, Major-General Bridgeford as QMG, Major-General Beavis as MGO, Mr Fitzgerald as the Financial Member, and Mr Kemsley as Business Member.

The Minister laid down policy, but would not attend the ordinary meetings of the Board, which were chaired by the CCS. The Secretary, Frank Sinclair, was permitted to attend, but was not permitted to vote nor to undertake Board duties. The Secretary was to be responsible to the Minister for financial administration and was naturally an influential figure, but the statutory responsibility for controlling and administering the Army rested with the Military Board as a body. In addition, each member of the Board had individual responsibility for the normal duties of his appointment. Outside Army Headquarters, the system of commands begun by Lieutenant-General Squires in 1939 was reintroduced, with Northern, Eastern, Southern and Western Commands.
With the emergence of Sturdee and Rowell as the leaders of the postwar Army there remained a large number of general officers for whom it was difficult to find positions in the reduced establishment. Sturdee was keen to ensure that the reintroduced Military Board adopted a team approach with compatible personalities. Before the reintroduction of the Board, the Government had agreed to an Interim Retirement Scheme for those Staff Corps officers deemed unable to undertake active employment. Amongst other objects, this allowed some senior officers to receive their pensions immediately. Of the wartime group of principal staff officers, Lieutenant-General Northcott went to BCOF, Lieutenant-General Wynter had died, Major-General Chapman went to Washington, Major-General Lloyd retired, and Major-General Cannan returned to civilian life. Only Major-General Beavis remained to serve on the new Military Board.

While these changes to the legal and administrative framework of the Army occurred, work was continuing on the possible shape of the postwar Army. In March 1946, General Rowell circulated an internal policy paper which surveyed the threat and Australia’s strategic interests, and suggested a force structure. The USSR was identified as the most likely future threat to security, particularly if it was able to influence or control China or Japan. Rowell cited the Squires Report of December 1938, and suggested that, given reduced readiness times and probable commitments, Australia needed a permanent force of all arms. Given his view of the strategic situation, and the decrease in time available for mobilisation, Rowell believed that the Army should maintain in peacetime a force of three divisions, one permanent division, and two further divisions ‘in second echelon’. The permanent division was to be available for immediate deployment, and the other two divisions were to be deployable within three months.

The final Army plan was submitted to Cabinet in December 1946. The plan envisaged national service and an Army of 33,461 regulars and 42,421 in the CMF. This would have required an Army budget of about £20m. The Government, however, was seeking to reduce defence expenditure to an absolute minimum.

The plans for the Services were finally considered at a Council of Defence meeting, chaired by the Prime Minister, on 12 March 1947. The Defence Committee estimated the cost of Service plans at £90m annually. Chifley stated that such a sum was 25 per cent of government income and was excessive. He limited the Defence vote to £50m, and told the Services to shape their organisations based on that figure. The British emphasis on defence science and research and development was noted, as was Australia’s extensive commitments to the guided missiles project. The Defence budget was to provide for research and development first, and then provide the balance to the Forces. Concerning strengths, Chifley noted that there was a large body of trained men in Australia from the war, and that the emphasis should be on research and development, and upon small and highly efficient armed services. The Services, he insisted, should be able to get their numbers by voluntary enlistment.

The final allocation to the Army was £12.5m, and the Army was allowed to raise a force of 19,000 permanent soldiers, with 50,000 in the CMF. Cabinet approved this in June 1947. The scheme was known as the five-year plan since the Government proposed to spend an average of £12.5m on the Army over five years. The Field Force was to consist of one permanent brigade group (4470), which would be based on 34th Brigade in Japan, and two CMF divisions. About one third of the permanent strength was to be in the Field Force, when cadre staff for the CMF divisions were included. The remaining 13,000 or so permanent soldiers were base and administrative troops, and personnel on fixed defences and in training establishments.

The Army (PMF and CMF) was to provide forces for four roles: for UNO tasks, including regional commitments; for British Commonwealth defence; for an expansion base; and finally for the local defence of mainland Australia. The CMF (with the PMF) was still envisaged as the main striking force, but the PMF Field Force was to be deployable for short term UN and Commonwealth commitments.

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The Chifley Government was not prepared to change the liability of soldiers for overseas service. Regular soldiers could not be sent abroad unless they voluntarily agreed to do so. The Army had sought to change this, particularly with the PMF, but it was opposed by the Minister for the Army, Cyril Chambers, and the Government.\textsuperscript{47}

Given that it was the dawn of the nuclear age, one might question why the postwar Army developed in the way that it did. The structures appeared conventional, and to be a continuation of Second World War formations, units and equipment. The reasons for this probably lay in the intersection of the issues of finance, foreign commitments, and the influence of the professional soldiers.

In the first place, the Chifley Government had higher priorities than defence. It was the era of postwar reconstruction, and the financial effort that had been devoted to six years of war had to be redirected. The Treasury forecast, in 1945, of £60m per year as the postwar allocation to defence was remarkably accurate given the 1947 allocation of £50m. Secondly, in the process of allocating funds, the Government was prepared to give some weight to defence science and technology, before allocating the residue to the Services. The Minister stated that the Army would also study scientific developments, but the practicalities were that the Army would use equipment from the Second World War.\textsuperscript{48}

The commitments entered into by the Chifley Government in 1945, such as the occupation force in Japan, made it necessary to maintain a quasi-permanent field force after the end of the war. In addition, it was becoming clear by 1946 that international tension would continue, and the Government's professional military advisers were arguing that Australian prestige depended upon the maintenance of some forces in peacetime. In the light of the crisis of 1942, they were also arguing that developments in warfare made concepts such as local defence, strategic isolation and long mobilisation periods obsolete. There had to be forces in being that were capable of deployment.\textsuperscript{49}

Finally, and understandably, the influence of the professional soldiers can be seen in the structures adopted in 1947. There was no conference of senior officers, as in 1920, where the wartime commanders and Militia officers could put their imprint on the postwar forces. Indeed, the wartime commander, Sir Thomas Blamey, had been asked to resign in a peremptory fashion, and his suggestions for postwar control of the Army were rejected by the Government.\textsuperscript{50} In the period from 1945 to 1948, the Militia was in 'suspended animation', and from the retirement of Major-General Cannan in 1945, until 1948, when Major-General Wootton was appointed, there were no CMF generals serving as principal staff officers or on the Military Board.\textsuperscript{51}

The events of 1945-47 should also be understood in the context of the parsimonious treatment of regular soldiers between the wars, and the recognition by the regulars that there had to be a mechanism for regular officers to obtain regimental and command experience. The Vasey Report reflected these concerns, and if one accepted the requirement for regimental experience, then there had to be permanent battalions and regiments in which that experience could be obtained. In addition, there was sufficient anecdotal evidence that influential regular soldiers were determined that their experiences from 1919 to 1939 would not be repeated.\textsuperscript{52}

Once the decision had been taken to create the postwar Permanent Military Forces, the Army was able implement recruiting and conditions of service plans. One could not have a volunteer force of long service regulars if men refused to join. Recruiting for the AIF had been suspended in August 1945, and the Army had also stopped accepting intakes of conscripted militiamen. The political pressure for rapid demobilisation combined with the tasks given to the Army in the Islands and in Japan had caused great manpower problems.\textsuperscript{53} Therefore, in February 1946, recruiting began for the 'interim forces', on two-year voluntary enlistments.\textsuperscript{54}

By this stage, the Army had personnel on a myriad of types of engagement. In addition to those in the new interim forces, there were members of the AIF and CMF, including members of the Permanent Military Forces seconded to the AIF or CMF. In the CMF there were both
conscripts and volunteers. Those soldiers who had volunteered to serve in BCOF were required either to be in the AIF, or transfer to it. In addition, there were those known euphemistically as 'non-volunteers for further service', that is, wartime soldiers who were keen to be demobilised as soon as possible. Lacking a Government decision on the shape of the postwar Army, the solution to this problem had been to raise a force known as the Interim Army, and to transfer into it all those still serving on fulltime duty.

The Interim Army was created in May 1946, but with retrospective application to 1 October 1945. Personnel were progressively enlisted or transferred into it, and by 1 February 1947 all 'non-volunteers for further service' had been discharged from the Army. The AIF was disbanded on 30 June 1947, and anyone still on full-time duty, and who had somehow been missed out, was transferred to the Interim Army with effect 1 July 1947. After the decision of June 1947 to raise a postwar PMF of 19,000 soldiers, the intention was to operate the postwar PMF and the Interim Army in tandem, and to persuade as many members of the Interim Army as possible to transfer to the postwar PMF.

By June 1947 the strength of the Army was reduced from its 1945 strength of 383,000 to 29,336. The 29,336 soldiers on full-time duty consisted of 19,488 wartime enlistees and 9848 who had enlisted after February 1946. The labour market was buoyant and many of these could take discharge. The Permanent Military Forces had to establish itself as an attractive career in order to be able to recruit. The Army could foresee that its strength might fall below the authorised establishment of 19,000. This did in fact occur, and by June 1950 the number of soldiers on full-time duty was 14,651. Even then, only about half of that 14,000 were enlisted on ARA conditions of service.

The Military Board had warned of these recruiting and conditions of service problems since 1946. The lack of certainty over conditions of service had adversely affected recruiting. Finally, a new pay code was introduced on 1 July 1947, and recruiting began for the postwar PMF on 1 August. The initial term of enlistment was for six years.

The pay code applied to both members of the new postwar PMF and to members continuing in the Interim Army. A recruit was to receive 10 shillings per day, and clothing was at the Army's expense. Rations and quarters were free for single members, and for married members on duty. Married men received marriage allowance, and a provision allowance when they were not consuming Army rations. The bad news was that, from 1 July 1947, all members of the armed services became liable for income tax. Prior to this date, soldiers serving in Japan, in the Islands and in certain other areas had been exempt from tax.

Based upon the pay code, a new superannuation scheme was introduced for the three Services. Prior to 1948, permanent members of the Army had been required to join the Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme, that is the scheme designed for public servants. The Government had accepted, from the hard experience of the recent war, from the Squires Report of 1938, and from the recommendations of Generals Blamey and Sturdee, that there had to be lower retiring ages in the Army than applied in civil life. Consequently, the armed services had to have a separate and different superannuation scheme from that which applied to the public service. Also, in relation to superannuation, the Minister believed that the Services had to offer a financial incentive in order to attract good people.

As part of the changes, the retiring age for officers of the rank of Major and below, which had been set at 55, was cut to 47 years. Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels, who had previously retired at 60, were now to retire at 55 and 50 years respectively. Officers' pensions were to be based on retiring age for rank, and those of the other ranks were based on 20 years' service.

In order to assist recruiting, a name change was suggested for the Permanent Military Forces. In August 1947, the Military Board recommended that the Defence Act should be amended so that the Permanent Military Forces, would become known as the 'Regular Army'. The Minister agreed to this on 13 September 1947, although the amendment was not legislated until several years later. In November 1947, the Board directed that the term 'Australian Regular Army' should be used from then on, except for certain legal purposes.
The Adjutant-General suggested that the introduction of initial enlistments of six years made the term 'Permanent Military Forces' a misnomer. In addition, the Military Board believed that the average citizen had a better idea of what the term 'Regular Army' meant, compared to the term 'Permanent Military Forces'. Also the Board felt that the new title would bring the Australian Military Forces into line with the British and New Zealand armies, both of which used the term 'Regular Army' or 'Regular Force'.

When the Defence Act was amended in 1950, both terms were retained, with the 'Australian Regular Army' becoming a 'sub-set' of the 'Permanent Military Forces'. Another 'sub-set' of the PMF was the Regular Army Special Reserve (RASK) for those who were unable to meet the ARA conditions of service. The RASR had lower medical requirements and a three-year engagement period.

One might ask how the Government could have maintained permanent infantry and armoured units after 1945, given that the Defence Act was not amended until 1950. Legal coverage was provided under the 'time of war' provisions in the Act. The Government did not advise the Governor-General to revoke the 'time of war' proclamation until May 1952. As the end of the decade approached, Army Headquarters became increasingly concerned that the Government had not yet legislated for the changes to the Defence Act. If the 'time of war' ended before the Act was amended, then the new units of the Regular Army would have been illegal.

A regular army required a far more extensive training system than the pre-war PMF. Many of the wartime corps schools were retained, albeit on different sites, and the functions of the Staff School (Australia) were eventually transferred to the Staff College, Queenscliff. The shortage of officers and the legal requirement that most officers be RMC graduates was solved by the creation of 'RMC Wings' offering short courses in Australia and Japan. The eventual solution was the amendment of section 148, and, in 1952, the creation of the Officer Cadet School.

The commitments of the Army began to change during 1948 when the Government ordered the withdrawal all but one battalion (67th Battalion) from Japan. During this period it was decided that the regular infantry battalions of the Australian Army should have a unique designation, and, in November 1948, 65th, 66th and 67th Battalions became the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Australian Regiment. In March 1949, the Regiment was granted the prefix 'Royal'. One of the reasons for seeking this title was the belief that it would make it harder for a government to disband the permanent infantry force.

Upon its return to Australia, 34th Brigade was renamed 1st Brigade, and its units were dispersed throughout New South Wales and Victoria. Units of the Brigade were understrength during this period. The numbers on full-time duty fell, and the reraising of the CMF in 1948 required about 1000 ARA cadre staff. By October 1949, the Minister was forced to admit that there were only 1000 infantrymen in the entire Army.

During the Korean War, the size of the full-time Army doubled from 14,651 to 29,104. The Army supported a large number of commitments entered into by the Menzies Government, including maintaining two infantry battalions in a war, training 29,250 National Servicemen per year, and providing the cadre for the CMF.

In an atmosphere where Australia was preparing for a war, the issue of liability for overseas service arose again. The Menzies Government announced in September 1950 that all future enlistees into the ARA and CMF would be required to serve anywhere. Subsequently, all members were invited to sign an undertaking to that effect.
On 14 August 1952, the Interim Army was disbanded, and all its personnel (4168) were transferred to either the Australian Regular Army or to the Regular Army Special Reserve. By 1952, the Regular Army had come of age both administratively and operationally. The fighting in Korea had demonstrated the fighting efficiency and bravery of the new Regular Army, and a new generation of junior leaders had proved their worth in battle.

But the links between the Army of the Korean War and the Army of the Second World War were strong. Both shared much of the same personnel, ethos, equipment and training. The stationing of 34th Brigade in Japan had caused the continued service of a large number of wartime soldiers, at least until 1947. Whatever the motives of those Second World War men who had sought to serve on in Japan after the War, they had a professional knowledge based on years of hard operational service. In 1950-51, over 1000 civilians, who had been soldiers in the Second World War, volunteered to serve in the battalions in Korea. This enabled the Army to deploy 3RAR quickly from Japan to Korea, and to man the other battalions. In addition, many other Regular Army officers and men had served in the wartime AIF or Militia. Some, like Colonel Green, had served in all three forces: Militia, AIF and Regular Army.

These, then, were the circumstances surrounding the development and birth of the Australian Regular Army in 1947. It was a time complicated by a Federation-era legal environment, a time of new policy commitments, and a time when the foundations for a Regular Army, including conditions of service, were laid.

The year 1947 did mark a change in our Army that is worth celebrating 50 years on. Whatever the planners of that time envisaged in terms of forces for defence of Australia or forces for other tasks, the formation of the Australian Regular Army was an acknowledgment by governments that land operations could no longer be solely conducted by a Militia, or by specially enlisted expeditionary forces. There would be roles for both regulars and citizen soldiers, but the mobilisation and deployment times of modern warfare made it essential to maintain a balanced regular force in peacetime, consisting of all the arms and services.

But from 1947, we also celebrate the generation of men who carried the great traditions of the wartime Army into the Regular Army that fought in Korea and after. That wartime Army had three strands—permanent, Militia and AIF—and we are indeed fortunate that all three became part of the Regular Army that developed after 1947.
Endnotes

1. See GC Sligo, 'A Birthday for the Australian Regular Army?', Research and Analysis [newsletter of the Directorate of Army Research and Analysis], June 1996. The article was based on discussions with Dr David Horner.


3. Australian Archives, Melbourne, MP742/1, item 240/1/2785, Military Board Minute (meeting 27 August 1947) approved by Minister, 13 September 1947. (All sequences cited as beginning MP are held by the Australian Archives, Melbourne); MP742/1, item 273/1/381 Adjutant-General 27377 of 28 July 1947; MP742/1, item 240/1/2798, Proposed Post War Army Organisation—Brief for the Minister dated 1 October 1947, 'A Matters, p B-1.


7. Defence Act 1903-81, s 117. Section 117 was repealed by Act No 153 of 1982.


9. Defence Act 1903-48, s 31(2). The section was amended on 1 January 1950. MP742/1, item 4/2360, Adjutant-General to Secretary, 18 May 1949, 'Appendix 1: Schedule of Proposed Amendments to the Defence Act...', p 16.

10. Defence Act 1903-56, s 50C. The section was amended by Act No 71 of 1949, and repealed by Act No 51 of 1965.


12. For example, there was an attempt to raise a permanent corps of AEME in 1944, but since it could not be categorised as a non-combatant corps, s 148 required that it be officered with RMC graduates. The attempt failed, due to the combined effect of sections 31(2) and 148 (Military Board Proceedings 1944, vol 5, M296). See also MP742/1, item 5/1490, 'Agendum 543/45: Enlistment for the Permanent Military Forces', p 3, attached to War Cabinet Minute dated 18 December 1945. Section 148 was amended by Act No 71 of 1949, and repealed by Act No 51 of 1965.

13. MP742/1, item 248/1/111, Gavin Long, To Benghazi (Australia in the War of 1939-45, Army Series, vol 1) (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1952), p 74.

14. Long, To Benghazi, pp 29, 29n, mentioned Curtin's idea of a standing army of 10,000 men. See also Curtin, 7 December 1938, CPD, vol 158, p 2810, who saw a larger permanent army as a force to which the training of the Militia could be related. Squires recommended a force of 7500 men. The Lyons Government authorised the raising of part of the permanent field force (two infantry battalions and a field artillery unit: 1571 men) in March 1939, but in August 1939 the Menzies Government reversed that decision.

15. One of the arguments used for sending PMF officers to BCOF units was the loss of regimental training in India: MP742/1, item 251/24/3, Military Board Agendum 89/1946 for meeting 21 October 1946.

16. MP742/1, item 248/1/44, Adjutant-General to MS, 6 September 1944, citing War Cabinet Agendum 7/1942 of 19 March 1942.

17. MP742/1, 240/1/2322, DAGC (PS) to AG, 1 May 1946.


19. MP742/1, item 251/24/3, Military Board Agendum 89/1946 for meeting 21 October 1946.


21. MP742/1, item 323/1/1479, The Post War Army-Training Requirement', 7 June 1945, para 3.


24. Long, The Final Campaigns, pp 73-4. The two regulars were LTCOL TJ Daly (2/10th Bn) and LTCOL JLA Kelly (31st/51st Bn).
25. Ibid, p 581. The figures given elsewhere are often higher (eg MP742/1, item 240/1/3118, 'Post War Army Organisation: Demobilisation 1939-45 War', dated 25 March 1954, stated that the Army was 398,594 strong as at 15 August 1945, with over 200,000 personnel overseas).
27. MP742/1, item 240/1/2274, Chifley to Francis Forde, Minister for the Army, 15 February 1946; Murphy, 'History of the Post War Army' (manuscript held by the Australian Archives, Melbourne), pp 17, 22-23.
28. Ibid. At the end of hostilities in 1945, it was estimated that there were 344,038 Japanese personnel in areas administered by Australian troops (Long, The Final Campaigns, p 555). Four Australian brigade groups were being used in 1945-46 in the Dutch East Indies. C M F troops could not be used outside Australian territory (eg as garrisons) after 2 March 1946, due to the provisions of the Defence (CMF) Act 1943.
29. The Army was still involved with this as late as 1947-48.
30. Murphy, History of the Post War Army', p 20.
31. The demobilisation period was from 1 October 1945 to 15 February 1947. In 16 months, 349,964 personnel were demobilised (MP742/1, item 240/1/3118, Post War Army Organisation and Activities: Demobilisation 1939-45 War', dated 25 March 1954, p 1).
32. Shipping was not only crucial for transporting Australian soldiers. The shortage of shipping spaces meant that large numbers of Japanese (and Formosans and Koreans) could not be repatriated. Consequently, the Army had to maintain a large number of troops in New Guinea as garrisons in 1946, and could not demobilise as quickly as the Government wished (MP742/1, item 240/1/2274, Adjutant-General to Forde, 4 March 1946). (Chifley approached MacArthur for increased shipping spaces.) There was constant pressure on senior Army officers during 1946 from the Minister, Forde, insisting that the Army demobilise at a faster rate. A Committee of Review of Interim Army Strengths was appointed under Sinclair in April to hasten the process (MP742/1, item 240/1/2449). Forde was being attacked by his colleagues, the Opposition and the press who perceived that the Army was being extravagant in its use of manpower. From the Army's point of view, it had to retain some skilled men against their wishes to meet Government tasks (MP742/1, item 240/1/2447, Forde to Sinclair, 6 August 1946, Adjutant-General to Secretary, 13 August 1946, and Daily Telegraph, 6 August 1946).
33. MP742/1, item 240/1/1957, Report by Adv HQ AMF - 25 October 1945. 34 Brigade opened its headquarters at Pandansari (Balikpapan) on 8 October 1945. The Brigade and its units later concentrated at Morotai.
35. Sturdee relinquished his appointment as Acting Commander-in-Chief on 28 February 1946, and the new Military Board arrangements applied from 1 March 1946 (Military Board Proceedings 1946, vol 1, M1).
36. MP742/1, Item 5/1/495, Inaugural General Meeting of the Military Board, 28 February 1946, p 8, and attached Press Statement by Mr Forde, Melbourne, 28 February 1946. The Minister attended and chaired several 'general' meetings of the Board where he laid down or discussed policy. In 1954, the Secretary became a full member of the Board.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid. Sturdee's remarks at inaugural meeting of the Military Board, 28 February 1946, and letter by Mr JT Fitzgerald; John Buckley, Recollections of the Roving Staff Officer (Canberra: Department of Defence, 1993), p. 57.
39. MP742/1, 248/1/127, Press Release effected by the Prime Minister in Melbourne at 4 pm on 22nd February, 1946. (The Scheme was based on War Cabinet Agendum No 428/1945.).
40. General Northcott shortly afterwards became Governor of NSW, and General Beavis later accepted a government appointment.
41. CRS A816, 52/301/245, SF Rowell, 'The Post-War Army—Policy Paper No 1', 6 March 1946, paras 36, 38, 48 et al.
42. O'Neill, Strategy and Diplomacy, p 23, citing Defence Committee Minute 460/46, 19 December 1946. By the time these proposals were considered by the Council of Defence in March 1947, the suggested period of national service was four months' continuous training.
43. MP742/1, item 240/1/2447, Acting Minister of Defence (Forde) to Minister for the Army (Forde), 19 July 1946, pp 2-3, including quotations from the Treasurer.
45. CPD, vol 192, 4 June 1947, pp 3340-41; Australian Archives Canberra, A2703/XR2, vol 4, Cabinet Meeting, 3 June 1947. The ARA Field Force could not be raised in Australia until the bulk of BCOF returned (MP742/1, item 240/1/2850).

47. A9787/2, item 111, Council of Defence, 12 March 1947, p 7; O'Neill, *Combat Operations*, pp 6-7. The Government believed that an obligation to serve in any overseas location would reduce the number of recruits for the PMF. It appears that the Army had proceeded on the assumption that enlistment in the PMF/ARA would be for service abroad, since in January 1948, the attestation form had to be changed (MP742/1, item 116/12/2322).


49. Rowell, *Policy Paper No 1*, paras 15-22, 33-35. The effects of the decision to rely on voluntary enlistment meant (in the view of the Army) that the mobilisation times would be slow, and that the only Forces available in the first year of a war would be the permanent forces, and the CMF formations after about nine months: CRS A816, 52/301/245, Army Post War Plan (March 1947), para 3; and Policy Paper No 1, para 36.

50. General Blamey's proposals had been considered by the War Cabinet on 9 November 1945, and were minuted on 13 November 1945. The next day, the Minister wrote to Blamey inviting him to resign at the end of November 1945. Sturdee was appointed Acting Commander-in-Chief from 1 December 1945, although Blamey's wartime service did not officially end until January 1946.

51. There was some hesitancy, based on principle rather than personality, about the appointment of a CMF Member to the Board. The first appointment was Major-General Wootten in 1948.


53. MP742/1, item 5/1/490, 'War Cabinet Agendum 543/43: Enlistment for the Permanent Military Forces', and Minute dated 18 December 1945.

54. MP742/1, item 5/1/490, Adjutant-General 15221 of 15 February 1946, 'Resumption of Recruiting'.

55. MP742/1, item 240/1/1957, Adjutant-General signal of 161030K October 1945 and 5.8265 of 3 October 1945.

56. MP742/1, item 240/1/2317, Military Board Minute of 3 May 1946, based on Agendum dated 2 May 1946. Increasing use was being made of the term 'interim' or 'interim force' by other departments on issues such as income tax exemptions for BCOF. The Military Board decided that the term needed a clear definition.


58. MP742/1, item 240/1/3118, Post War Army Organisation and Activities: Demobilisation 1939-45 War' (26 March 1954), p 3.

59. Murphy, 'History of the Post War Army', p 49.

60. Ibid, pp 46, 49; MP742/1, item 240/1/3118, Post War Army Organisation and Activities', p 3 (1 July 1948: 19,735 serving: 6167 ARA, 2577 RASR, 10,991 Interim Army; 25 June 1950: 14,651 serving; 1952 pre-war PMF, 6953 ARA, 4593 RASR, 1153 Interim Army).

61. The issue had gone to War Cabinet in 1945. The Government would not amend the Defence Act until the shape of the postwar forces had been determined (MP742/1, item 5/1/490, War Cabinet Agendum 543/45 Enlistment for the Permanent Military Forces', and Minute dated 18 December 1945). See also MP742/1, item 240/1/2447, Adjutant-General to Secretary, 13 August 1946, and MP742/1, item 240/1/2274, Clowes to Forde, 8 March 1946: lacking an establishment for the post-war PMF, one expedient suggested by the Army to assist in retaining skilled personnel was to recruit against vacancies in the 1939-40 PMF establishment. This foundered on legal difficulties until September 1946, when Cabinet authorised a larger (temporary) PMF establishment of 17,954 pending a final decision on the structure of the post-war army. Also MP742/1, item 251/1/2441, Military Board Minute, 6 December 1946, and Agendum 104/1946.

62. MP742/1, item 240/1/2798, MBI No 114/47 (13 June 1947). The next day, the Minister wrote to Blamey inviting him to resign at the end of November 1945. Sturdee was appointed Acting Commander-in-Chief from 1 December 1945, although Blamey's wartime service did not officially end until January 1946.

63. CPD, vol 197, pp 1424-7, Mr Dedman, House of Representatives, 5 May 1948. Officers with high wartime ranks but lowly substantive ranks were still paid out on the basis of their substantive rank under the new scheme: CPD, vol 197, pp 1620-1, 1627-8, Mr White, 3 June 1948.

64. MP742/1, 248/1/127, Press Release effected by the Prime Minister in Melbourne, 22 February 1946.

65. MP742/1, item 240/1/2785, Military Board Minute (meeting 27 August 1947), the amending act was Act No 71 of 1949, which took effect on 1 January 1950; MBI 191/1947, 7 November 1947.

66. MP742/1, item 240/1/2785, Military Board Agendum 141/1947 dated 26 August 1947, and Military Board Minute (meeting 27 August 1947).


68. Defence Act 1903-48, ss 31(2) and 31(3); Army Office Secretariat, Commonwealth of Australia Gazette No 36 of 15 May 1952, reprinted in *Australian Army Orders, Supplements, Amendments and
69. MP742/1, item 4/2/360, Draft Minute XA.1622, Adjutant-General to Secretary, March 1949, para 5; MP742/1, item 4/2/360, Adjutant-General to Secretary 18 May 49, enclosing Appendix 1. The Peace Treaty with Japan was signed in 1951.

70. MP742/1, item 323/4/421, Northcott to Secretary, 29 November 1945, on retaining the Staff College (Staff School). As early as 20 January 1944, DMT was considering which training schools should be retained in the postwar army (MP742, item 323/1/1479).

71. MP742/1, item 248/1/172, Military Board Agendum 182/1947 dated 27 October 1947, for meeting 29 October 1947; Murphy, "History of the Post War Army", p 39.


73. Murphy, 'History of the Post War Army', p. 77.

74. Wayne Klintworth, 'Formation of The Royal Australian Regiment', in David Horner (ed), Duty First, pp 54-5.

75. CPD, vol 192, 4 June 1947, p 3340 (on cadre numbers).


77. Murphy, History of the Post War Army', p 49; MF742/1, item 240/1/3118, 'Post War Army Organisation and Activities', dated 25 March 1954, pp 6-8. The Army had to train 29,250 national servicemen per year, beginning in August 1951. In 1951-52, there were three intakes per year, each of 9750. Each intake conducted 98 days of continuous training, followed by service in CMF units. This placed great pressure on the ARA for staffing the NS training battalions, and for accommodating the trainees (MP742/1, item 240/1/3118, 'Post War Army Organisation and Activities', dated 25 March 1954, pp 13-16).

78. Given the international situation, Menzies announced on 22 September 1950 that Australia had to be prepared for a possible war in three years. The Cabinet decision that the PMF and CMF should, in future, be enlisted for service anywhere was made on 11 October 1950. In the case of the CMF, the undertaking was only to be enforced in the event of a major war (MP742/1, item 240/1/3118, 'Post War Army Organisation and Activities', dated 25 March 1954, pp 6,17). Subsequently, all serving PMF and CMF members were invited to sign the undertaking. Section 49 was not revised until 1964.


(a) 1939-30 September 1945. In terms of the Defence Act, the Military Forces (AMF) consisted of the PMF and the CMF. The PMF consisted of the Pre-War PMF members, those (few) appointed to the PMF during the war, and a new legal entity, the AIF. In 1939, s 31(4) was added to the Act to prevent members of the AIF from being covered by the PMF superannuation arrangements. In practice, most Pre War PMF members were seconded or transferred for service in either the AIF or CMF. The AIF were volunteers enlisted for service anywhere, whereas the CMF could only be sent to a restricted zone in the South West Pacific. The CMF contained conscripts (and volunteers).

(b) 1 October 1945-30 June 1947. The AMF consisted of the PMF and the CMF. The PMF, however, consisted of several legal entities, including: the PMF, the AIF, and, after 1 October 45, the Interim Army. The AIF was disbanded on 30 June 1947.

(c) 1 July 1947-31 December 1949. The AMF consisted of the PMF and the CMF. The PMF consisted of the Interim Army, to which all those on full time duty were enlisted or seconded. Within the Interim Army, there were a number of administrative entities, including the ARA (1947-) and the RASR (1948-). Prior to being named the ARA, that force was known as the Post-War PMF. The statistics often also separate out the Pre-War PMF.

(d) 1 January 1950-14 August 1952. The AMF consisted of the PMF and the CMF. The PMF consisted of the Active PMF (the ARA, and a 'time of war' force, the Interim Army), and the Reserve PMF (the Regular Army Reserve and the RASR). Members of the Regular Army Reserve were not on full time duty, but the members of the other three entities were on FTD.

(e) 15 August 1952-. The AMF consisted of the PMF and the CMF. The PMF consisted of the Active PMF (the ARA, and any force that might in future be raised in time of war), and the Reserve PMF (the Regular Army Reserve and the RASR). The Interim Army had been disbanded, and its members remaining on FTD had been transferred to the RASR.

80. MP742/1, item 240/1/3118, 'Post War Army Organisation and Activities', dated 25 March 1954, p 9. They were enlisted on a three-year engagement. The 1951 enlistments were on a two-year engagement.

81. LTCOL Green had commanded the 2/11th and 41st Battalions prior to commanding 3RAR: Klintworth, 'Formation of The Royal Australian Regiment', in Horner (ed), Duty First, pp 66-7.
The period of 15 years from 1950 to 1965 was crucial to the shaping of the Australian Army as we know it today. In 1950 the Army was only in embryonic state. By the beginning of 1965, after a number of changes, a new army was taking shape which was not substantially different in its order of battle from the one still in existence until only a few years ago. Much of the equipment being purchased in 1965 was only replaced in the last few years, and some is still in use. During those 15 years the ethos and traditions of the new regular army were established. And most importantly, the balance between the regular and citizen components of the army was changed, perhaps irrevocably.

The period of 15 years was also a period of consistency and consolidation. Australia not only had the same government throughout the entire period, but even the same Prime Minister—Robert Menzies. In this era of 'forward defence', defence and foreign policy changed only slowly. For most of the time defence expenditure was severely curtailed, with a substantial increase occurring only in 1964. Throughout the entire period Australia had one or more of its regular infantry battalions serving overseas, and for most of the time the Army had only three regular battalions. Throughout the period Australia had only one regular armoured corps regiment.

Our understanding of this period is hampered by a lack of scholarly studies of the Australian Army as an institution. Many people would probably know that from 1950 to 1953 Australian Army units fought in the Korean War. They would probably also know that an Australian infantry battalion served in Malaya, fighting in the emergency and later in confrontation. They probably know that for some years there was an unusual Pentropic organisation, and also that there was some form of National Service. The difficulty is comprehending how these developments and activities fitted together. In this paper I am going to tackle this problem by considering six major topics. These are:

- the effect of the Korean War;
- the role of the Citizen Military Forces and National Service;
- the commitment to Malaya;
- the formation of the Regular brigade group;
- the Pentropic experiment;
- the end of the Pentropic organisation.

The Effect of the Korean War

In the previous paper Graeme Sligo described the formation of the Australian Regular Army and its development up to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. As he wrote, at that time Australia had one regular battalion, 3RAR, in Japan as part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force. That battalion was deployed to Korea in September 1950, and by mid-October as part of the British 27th Brigade was in action north of Seoul. The battalion played a significant part in the advance to the Chinese border and also in the withdrawal and the defence at Kapyong in April 1951.
In April 1952 the Australian Army contribution in Korea was expanded from one to two battalions and 3RAR was joined by 1RAR. Since the Australians now comprised the majority of the troops in the 28th Brigade (the Australians had since moved from the 27th Brigade), command passed to an Australian officer, Brigadier Thomas Daly. A year later he was succeeded by Brigadier John Wilton and 1RAR was replaced by 2RAR.\(^1\)

The Korean War was significant for the development of the Australian Army in a number of ways. It was the first war fought by the Regular Army, even though the Army was short of manpower and volunteers had to be specially enlisted to make up the numbers. Initially most of the officers had considerable operational experience from the Second World War, but soon the new graduates from Duntroon began to join the battalion. The Duntroon classes of 1946, 1947 and 1948 were the first postwar classes after the shorter wartime courses were expanded to a three-year course. In Korea both the officers and soldiers gained valuable experience which was to stand Australia in good stead for the next 20 years.

Maintaining the two battalions imposed a tremendous strain on the Australian Army, particularly in the provision of junior officers, and officers from Armoured, Artillery, Engineers and Signals Corps were posted to battalions for service in the anti-tank, mortar, assault pioneer and signals platoons. Artillery officers also served with British or New Zealand artillery units.

The Korean War caused a rethink in Australian Army doctrine. The Australians who went to Korea were well trained for jungle warfare. In Korea they were involved in a conventional war in mountainous terrain and in a temperate, at times cold, climate. They had to cooperate with US armoured formations, movement was often by motor vehicle, artillery support was provided by divisional artillery and air support was available. Once the war become static in late 1951 it had many of the characteristics of the trench warfare of the First World War. This is not to suggest that the Australians were completely out of their depth in a tactical sense. The skills of patrolling, as shown at both Tobruk and in the Pacific War, were extremely valuable. And the techniques of battalion defensive and offensive operations, developed in the Pacific War, were still relevant. In general, however, Australian Army doctrine in the mid 1950s was based around the expectation that operations would be conventional and on a divisional or brigade scale.\(^2\)

The Korean War established the ethos of the new Regular Army. Since many of the officers and soldiers had come from the AIF of the Second World War they brought with them the AIF traditions. They felt part of the same Army that had begun at Gallipoli, won acclaim in the First World War and had continued that tradition of service in the Second World War at Tobruk, El Alamein, Kokoda, Finschhafen and Borneo. It was a tradition built around the idea that the Army consisted of citizen soldiers in uniform for as long as it took to deal with the nation's enemies.

But most of the officers and many of the men involved in the Occupation Force and in Korea had decided to make the Army their career. They were available for any task which the government of the day decreed, whether it be garrison duties, strike-breaking (however distasteful that might be) or, as in Korea, a full-scale war. They quickly learned that it was a far cry from the world wars when they were supported by almost the entire nation. Now they were largely out of sight and out of mind in a lonely war. As in the AIF, they relied on mateship, but they also learned to draw their strength from professionalism—from a pride in achievement. Their ethos was aptly summed up in the motto of the Royal Australian Regiment—"Duty First". And soon the Regular Army had its own battle honours—Sariwon, Yongyu, Chongui, Pakchon, Uijongbu, Chum-ni, Maewa-San, Kapyong, Kowang-San (which includes Maryang-San) and the Samichon. The new Regular Army had established a reputation for bravery, dash in the offensive, dogged persistence in defence, and consideration for its wounded.

When the armistice was signed in July 1953 the battalions did not return home immediately, and when 3RAR eventually returned home in November 1954 it had had four years' continuous service in Korea. Since the battalion had been formed (as the 67th Battalion in 1945), it had never served in Australia. In April 1954 1RAR relieved 2RAR in Korea, and it did not return to Australia until March 1956.
The Roles of the Citizen Military Forces and National Service

The formation of the Australian Regular Army in 1947 is usually seen as a major turning point in Australian defence policy, but it was not quite the turning point that some people imagined. After all, at the same time the government authorised the formation of the Citizen Military Forces (CMF) with quite an ambitious order of battle. This was, in many respects, a continuation of Australia's approach, entrenched by the 1903 Defence Act, of basing its defence on part-time soldiers. Initially the CMF had considerable advantages. Its senior and middle rank officers had combat experience from the Second World War and many had commanded similar units and formations on operations. They also had considerable political influence, often filling senior civilian positions. There was plentiful equipment left over from the war, and units carried on the traditions of the 2nd and indeed the 1st AIF.

But there were also disadvantages. After six years of war most returned servicemen were interested in re-establishing civilian careers. By 31 December 1948 the CMF strength stood at only 17,025 against its target of 50,000. At the same time the ARA was 4500 men short of its target of 19,000. As each year passed it became less likely that recruits would have war-time experience.

The Liberal-Country Party Coalition, which came to power under Robert Menzies in December 1949, followed through on its promise to introduce National Service. When the Cabinet approved the introduction of a National Service scheme in July 1950 it envisaged an annual intake of 10,000, but later in the year this was increased to 15,000 and later again to 29,250. Trainees received 98 days full-time training and were then posted to CMF units for three years, where they continued to serve for 42 days per year, consisting of a 14-day camp, 14 days compulsory home training and 14 days optional home training.

As the National Servicemen were not required to serve overseas, it is difficult to see how they contributed to the stated defence aim of being able to cooperate with British Commonwealth plans. Nevertheless, it was the government's intention that the CMF should be prepared to become an expeditionary force should war break out. In 1950, shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War, Britain had sought Australian assistance to combat the Communist terrorists in Malaya, and Australia had agreed to send a squadron of Lincolns and another of Dakotas. Although Australia decided not to send combat troops to Malaya, Britain wanted Australia to plan on deploying several divisions to the Middle East in time of war. The CMF field force was to form the basis of this expeditionary force if it became necessary to send one.

The government clearly took the threat of global war seriously. Menzies said in parliament in March 1951 that 'the state of the world is such that we cannot, and must not, give ourselves more than three years in which to get ready to defend ourselves. Indeed, three years is a liberal estimate'. A number of defence initiatives were announced, including the establishment of a National Security and Resources Board, the formation of the Pacific Islands Regiment and plans to purchase equipment for the Navy and Air Force. There was also a plan to increase the Regular Army from one to two brigades, but this never eventuated.

By the end of 1953 the CMF comprised 70,000 national servicemen and 14,000 volunteer enlistees, and this allowed for an increase in the field force order of battle. In each of 1954, 1955 and 1956 the CMF strength was over 80,000. As at 1 April 1953 the organisation of the Australian Army (showing brigadier commands and higher) was as shown on the following page. (An AGRA was an Army Group Royal Artillery, and was a group of artillery regiments.)

It should be noted that there is no Regular Army infantry brigade. When the ARA had been formed in 1947 it was intended to form a brigade and for a while the Director of Infantry was actually nominated as its commander, but the brigade was not formed properly. With the outbreak of the Korean War the ARA was flat out sustaining the force in Korea and it was not possible to continue with plans to form the brigade. Plans to form a second brigade were abandoned. Although the regular forces were limited, there were some 32 CMF battalions, not counting the university regiments. In those days an infantry brigade had three infantry battalions.
Although there were two armoured brigades there was only one under-strength Regular Army armoured regiment. There were four CMF armoured regiments, three armoured car regiments, a cavalry regiment, a reconnaissance regiment, an armoured personnel carrier regiment, a motor regiment and an amphibious assault regiment. Equipment included Centurion tanks for the regular unit plus a CMF squadron, M3 Grant tanks, Staghound and later Saladin armoured cars, Canadian and Ferret scout cars, Saracen and White armoured personnel carriers, and machine-gun carriers.\(^8\)

There was one Regular Army field regiment and also a restricted coast regiment, but there were 27 CMF artillery regiments of all types—ten of these were anti-aircraft regiments. Although the artillery was mainly equipped with Second World War 25 pounders and 3.7 inch and 40 mm Bofors AA guns it received some new equipment. Between 1950 and 1956 the Army took delivery of 170 120-mm anti-tank guns, 12 5.5-inch medium guns, 36 conversion kits for 40-mm LAA guns and 89 4.2-inch mortars.

In general, however, the Army was still relying on much of the equipment left over from the Second World War and new equipment was usually purchased from Britain.

**Army Headquarters**
CGS Lt-Gen Sir Sydney Rowell
RMC Duntroon Maj-Gen RNL Hopkins
Aust Staff College Brig IR Campbell

**Northern Command** Maj-Gen VC Secombe
11 Infantry Brigade Brig JEG Martin
7 Infantry Brigade Brig RF Monaghan
5 AGRA (Field) Brig CH Wilson

**Eastern Command** Lt-Gen Sir Frank Berryman
1 Armoured Brigade Brig D Macarthur-Onslow
2nd Division Maj-Gen Gen IN Dougherty
HQ RAA Brig CE Chapman
1 AGRA (AA) Brig PW Kelso
5 Infantry Brigade Brig JA Bishop
8 Infantry Brigade Brig GS Cox
14 Infantry Brigade Brig JW Main
2 NS Training Brigade Brig TN Gooch

**Southern Command** Lt-Gen Sir Horace Robertson
2 Armoured Brigade Brig HH Hammer
3rd Division Maj-Gen RJH Risson
HQ RAA Brig WH Hall
2 AGRA (Fd) Brig AE Arthur
4 AGRA (AA) Brig RM Ford
4 Infantry Brigade Brig RR Gordon
6 Infantry Brigade Brig NW Simpson

**Central Command** Maj-Gen R King
C Comd Group Brig TC Eastick
9 Infantry Brigade Brig JG McKinna

**Western Command** Maj-Gen R Bierwirth
13 Infantry Brigade Brig AW Buttrose

**Tasmania Command** Brig GEW Hurley

**Northern Territory Command** Lt-Col KE Wheeler

**HQ British Commonwealth Forces, Korea** Lt-Gen H Wells
28 Brit Comm Infantry Brigade Brig JGN Wilton
The Commitment to Malaya

By the mid-1950s the strategic situation, which had driven the idea of a large citizen force ready to defend Australia or, even more improbably, to be deployed to the Middle East, had changed. A global war between the Soviet Bloc and the Western Alliance no longer seemed likely. But the communist victory in North Vietnam in 1954, closely following the armistice in Korea, seemed to offer Communist China the opportunity for further aggression in southeast Asia. As a response, in September 1954 Australia signed the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty, soon to be known by the organisation it set up—SEATO.

Meanwhile, Britain had been exploring the idea of forming a Far East strategic reserve, and in January 1955 the Commonwealth Prime Ministers agreed to form such a reserve. As part of its contribution, the Australian government deployed 2RAR and supporting elements to Malaya in October 1955. Although it was there ostensibly to form part of the reserve if Communist China advanced into Thailand, in reality 2RAR spent almost all of its effort in counter-insurgency tasks against the Communist Terrorists. The Malayan Emergency had been under way since 1948 and by the time 2RAR arrived the British security forces had the situation well under control. The Australian battalion, which was relieved by 3RAR in 1957 and by 1RAR in 1959, could play only a minor role in the overall security campaign.

Like Korea, the Malaya commitment was significant in the Army's development. The first development concerned doctrine. The wartime Jungle Training Centre at Canungra in southern Queensland had closed down, but was reopened early in 1955 to develop jungle training and doctrine. Before deployment to Malaya the companies of 2RAR had to pass through JTC. Once the troops arrived in Malaya they were given further training by British instructors. In addition to jungle training the Australian Army had to learn the particular techniques of counter-insurgency warfare, and their bible became the British manual, *The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya*, commonly referred to as the ATOM pamphlet.

The operations in Malaya demanded a high level of skill in jungle warfare, good leadership from junior commanders and perseverance. The Australians learned much from the British Army and the Australian troops there further developed the professionalism that had started in Korea.

By this time the numbers of former AIF officers had started to decline and there were many more Duntroon graduates in command appointments. Also, by this time a new category of officer had arrived. The Officer Cadet School had been opened at Portsea in January 1952, partly to provide junior officers for the National Service Training Scheme. By the mid 1950s these officers were starting to appear in the regular battalions and other units. They graduated as second lieutenants and had to serve three years before promotion to lieutenant. An example from the first class at Portsea was Second Lieutenant Ian Hands whose first posting was to the 15th National Service Training Battalion but who served with 2RAR in Malaya. He commanded a company of 3RAR in Vietnam in 1968. Of the 61 graduates of mid 1952, 40 went straight to one of the nine National Service Training Battalions or the 1st Recruit Training Battalion.

The battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment were affected by the long commitments to Korea and Malaya more than the other corps, but as it was largely an infantry Army the effect permeated much of the Army. Although battalions were located at Ingelburn and Enoggera, they did not remain there very long. If any of the battalions had been based in one area of Australia for an extended period, especially early in their history, they might have begun to look upon themselves as, say, Victorian or Queensland battalions. The result of this constant movement was, however, that soldiers truly felt themselves to be part of an Australian regiment—representative of the nation as a whole. To the soldiers and their families, the Regiment, or more specifically the battalion, was their home. But there was a down side. The Army needed to establish links with the civilian community, for without a base the troops could become isolated from the Australian people.
The Formation of a Regular Army Brigade Group

While service in Malaya provided useful operational experience, the Army realised that if it were to have forces available for deployment at short notice to southeast Asia as part of a SEATO force it was necessary to review its structure. The National Service scheme had imposed a tremendous strain on the Army. It had been difficult to raise 2RAR to full strength for its commitment to Malaya, and more troops were employed in training National Servicemen that were available for the Australian-based combat force. In 1956 staff studies in Army Headquarters concluded that to meet possible commitments to a SEATO force in the event of communist aggression the minimum requirement would be a 'mobile, hard-hitting' regular brigade group in addition to the battalion group with the Strategic Reserve in Malaya.

On 4 April 1957, in a major review of defence policy, the Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, stated that owing to the nuclear deterrent the threat of global war was now considered unlikely. In view of communist efforts at expansion, however, limited war could occur in the neighbouring region at any time, and Australia shared a responsibility to prevent the occurrence of such outbreaks. 'In the upshot, speed and a capacity to hit [would] determine victory', and it was therefore necessary to have highly trained, effective and compact units available for immediate employment. The National Service scheme was to be modified and the annual intake reduced, thus enabling the Army to raise a Regular field force of a brigade group. In the event of a global war 'it would be manifestly difficult for the United Kingdom to maintain a line of supply to South-East Asia', and hence, as far as possible, Australia should standardise equipment with the Americans.\(^{13}\)

Details of the new infantry brigade were announced by the Minister for the Army, John Cramer, in September, when he said that it was 'designed to produce the best balance [of capabilities] for possible operations in the varied terrain of the South-East Asian area'. The new 1st Infantry Brigade Group was to consist of two infantry battalions (1RAR and 3RAR), the 1st Armoured Regiment, the 1st Field Regiment, a field engineer squadron, a Special Air Service (SAS) company, and elements of signals, supply, transport, medical, ordnance and workshops units.\(^{14}\) With its headquarters at Holsworthy, near Sydney, it was to be commanded by Brigadier John (Hans) Andersen, a former commanding officer of the 1st Field Regiment.

The first brigade exercise, called a brigade concentration, was held in February 1958 at Holsworthy and at Kangaroo Valley, south of Sydney. The 1959 brigade exercise—Exercise GRANDSLAM in the Mackay area of Queensland—was the first major regular brigade exercise conducted in Australia since the Second World War.

A new unit to come out of the formation of the 1st Brigade was the Special Air Service Company, which was located at Swanbourne, near Perth. British experience in Malaya had shown the value of the SAS.

The formation of the brigade had also required the 1st Field Artillery Regiment to be brought to full strength, and an independent LAA battery was formed. With the expansion of the Regular field artillery there was a decrease in CMF artillery units. In 1957 the order of battle was reduced by two AGRAs and by one heavy, one medium, two field, two light, two LAA and four HAA regiments.\(^{15}\) In June 1959, the 1st AGRA (AA) in Eastern Command, was disbanded and the headquarters of RAA 1st Corps was formed to command the New South Wales anti-aircraft units.\(^{16}\) At the same time as the formation of the new brigade, the government announced the purchase of the 105-mm M2A2 howitzer from the United States, eventually to replace the trusty 25-pounder. It was a major step along the way towards providing the Army with US rather than British equipment.

The new brigade still had its limitations. It lacked its third battalion and little provision had been made for logistic support as the planners assumed this would be provided by Australia's allies. In March 1958 the CGS, Lieutenant-General Sir Ragnar Garrett, explained to the government that the brigade could only be deployed at short notice if the CMF were partly mobilised, but the CMF had no obligation to serve overseas.\(^{17}\)
By 1959 there had been a major shift in Australia's approach to defence. For the past decade the CMF had been seen as the backbone of Australian land defence. But with the formation of the 1st Brigade and the reduction of the CMF in 1957 the emphasis had changed to the ARA. This shift in policy was made more explicit in June 1959 when the Chiefs of Staff argued that 'the primary emphasis must henceforth be placed on the Regular Army itself, its secondary task being to train and administer a CMF to support it if necessary'. This was the reverse of what had been the case until 1959 and I consider it to be one of the major turning points in the development of the Australian Army.

These developments were not lost on the CMF which made a last gasp attempt to retain its influence. At the end of Garrett's tenure as CGS the Minister for the Army, Cramer recommended that he be succeeded by Major-General Ivan Dougherty, a distinguished CMF officer then on the Reserve of Officers. Dougherty had served with distinction in Libya, Greece, Crete, New Guinea and Borneo and had commanded the 21st Brigade in three campaigns. Since then he had commanded a CMF brigade and the 2nd Division and had been CMF member of the Military Board from 1954 to 1957. The Minister for Defence, Athol Townley, over-ruled Cramer and a regular officer, Lieutenant-General Reginald Pollard, became CGS in mid 1960.

In its secret strategic review the government considered that Australia should be prepared for involvement in limited war in southeast Asia, and that its forces should have 'as far as possible the necessary organisation and techniques to operate effectively with major allies'. With this assessment in mind, in November 1959 Townley announced the abolition of National Service, a 50 per cent increase in the volunteer strength of the CMF and a 35 per cent increase in the strength of the ARA brigade group. He also foreshadowed the introduction of the Pentropic organisation which army planners were in the process of finalising and preparing for promulgation.

**The Pentropic Experiment**

The introduction of the new Pentropic organisation was formally announced in March 1960. This decision had its origin in a number of factors. Firstly, it was designed to provide a 'lean, powerful, versatile organisation, readily adaptable to any type of operation in which it is likely to be involved in South-East Asia'. Secondly, in the late 1950s Britain was developing the concept of mechanised brigade groups to replace the standard infantry division, while the Americans had turned to a pentagonal structure known as the 'pentomic' organisation. Australia had to decide whether to copy the British or the Americans, or go its own way, and chose an organisation that would be compatible with the Americans. Thirdly, it has been claimed that the new organisation gave the CGS an opportunity to gain more funds for the Army. And finally, many senior CMF officers believed that the new organisation was introduced by senior Regular officers to reduce the capability and influence of the CMF.

Under the Pentropic organisation the Army was to consist of two divisions, the 1st and the 3rd, while the headquarters of the existing 2nd Division was to be converted to the headquarters of the Communications Zone. A standard Pentropic division had no brigades, but was to consist of an armoured regiment, five large infantry battalions, an artillery headquarters with five field artillery regiments, a field engineer regiment, a light aviation company, a signals regiment and support services. The new battalions had an establishment of 1300 men compared with the old battalions of about 800, and each was commanded by a colonel with a lieutenant-colonel executive officer. Within each battalion there were five rifle companies each with four platoons and a weapons platoon. Each platoon had four sections.

The idea was that a field artillery regiment, an engineer squadron and other combat and service elements could be placed in support of an infantry battalion to form a powerful battle group numbering about 1800 men. For higher level operations several battle groups could be placed under the command of a task force headquarters, of which there was only one in the division. The new division, with a strength of 14,000 personnel, had more firepower than the previous jungle division with its 15,000.
To implement this plan, the 1st Brigade was disbanded and the 1st Division was formed with a regular commander—Major-General Ian Murdoch. He was a Duntroon graduate who had had a number of armoured corps and staff appointments during the war. It was Australia’s first Regular Army divisional headquarters. The division had two regular Pentropic battalions, 2RAR at Holsworthy and 3RAR at Enoggera, which had been formed by expanding the old standard battalions. The division’s remaining Pentropic battalions were CMF units—two in Sydney and one in Brisbane. The 3rd Division, based in Victoria, comprised five CMF Pentropic battalions—two in Melbourne and one each in South Australia, Western Australia and Queensland.

This reorganisation had a devastating effect on the CMF infantry battalions: of the 31 standard infantry battalions and nine brigade headquarters only 17 battalions and six brigade headquarters were left intact. Later all the brigade headquarters were disbanded and the remaining battalions were reduced to eight and reconstituted as Pentropic battalions, organised into state regiments bearing the ‘Royal’ prefix. These regiments replaced virtually all the old infantry regiments that had existed since the introduction of the Kitchener scheme in 1911. The CMF battalions lost their battalion numbers, their battle honours and their connection to the old AIF. In South Australia, for example, the 9th Brigade headquarters and the 10th, 27th and 43rd/48th Battalions became the 1st Battalion, The Royal South Australian Regiment. There was a similar effect on the CMF artillery units: of the 17, seven were either disbanded or absorbed into other regiments. As a result of the cessation of National Service and the introduction of the Pentropic establishment the CMF lost 24 brigadier positions. It is true that a number of Regular Army generals were compulsorily retired, but that was to clear blockages for promotion rather than as part of a widespread reduction in senior positions. In some cases the CMF pentropic battalions were commanded by Regular colonels. The order of battle in 1962, showing pentropic battalions, was as following.

**Army Headquarters**
- CGS, Lt-Gen Sir Reginald Pollard
- RMC Duntroon, Maj-Gen CH Finlay
- Australian Staff College, Brig CE Long
- Army Schools

**Northern Command**, Maj-Gen MF Brogan
- 3RAR, Col WJ Morrow
- 1RQR, Col RWB Dodd
- 2RQR, Col IM Hunter

**Eastern Command**, Lt-Gen HG Edgar
- **1st Division**, Maj-Gen IT Murdoch
  - HQ RAA, Brig FR Evans
  - 1RAR, Col CMI Pearson
  - 2RNSWR, Col PH Pike
  - 3RNSWR, Brig JM McCarty
- **Comm Z**, Maj-Gen PA Cullen

**Southern Command**, Maj-Gen LG Canet
- **3 Division**, Maj-Gen RR Gordon
  - HQ RAA, Brig JA North
  - 1RVR, Col GR Warfe
  - 2RVR, Col SH Buckler

**Central Command**, Brig WW Wearne
- 1 RSAR, Brig RL Johnson

**Western Command**, Brig GP Hunt
- 1RWAR, Col JB Roberts

**Tasmania Command**
- 1RTR, Col CAE Fraser
During the early 1960s the new regular battalions conducted a series of major exercises to learn how best to use the Pentropic organisation. These exercises, however, had another benefit. They provided extensive training for junior officers, NCOs and soldiers that would stand the Army in good stead in the Vietnam War. But there was a disconnect between organisation and doctrine. Although the organisation was more suited to conventional open warfare, the training was directed towards counter-insurgency.

Between 1960 and 1964 the Army either received or ordered most of the equipment with which it fought in the Vietnam War and which has only recently been replaced. Indeed some equipment is still in use. For example, the Army received the FN rifle, the M60 GPMG, the 105mm pack howitzer, the 106mm recoilless rifle, the new 81mm mortar, the AN/PRC25 radio and the M113 armoured personnel carrier. The M113 was the first substantial purchase of new armoured vehicles since the Centurion and was designed to give the infantry increased mobility. Also the RAAF began to receive Iroquois utility helicopters. It is noticeable that most of this equipment came from the United States.

The End of the Pentropic Organisation

Throughout the period of the Pentropic experiment the Australian Army maintained an infantry battalion and a field battery with the 28th Commonwealth Brigade at Terendak in Malaya, and these units were organised on the standard British establishment. Each time a battalion was sent to Malaya it had to change from the Pentropic to the tropical establishment, causing unnecessary turmoil and disruption to unit cohesion. In an attempt to alleviate this problem, in early 1964 a new regular battalion, 4RAR, was formed at Woodside in South Australia. It was destined to relieve 3RAR in Malaya in early 1966.

By mid-1964 the strategic environment had changed substantially in the four years since the Pentropic organisation had been introduced. Initially, it was thought that the greatest danger to regional stability would come in Laos, where there was a civil war between Communist and non-Communist forces, but soon this danger was overshadowed by events in Vietnam. In 1962 the Australian Army sent the first members of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam to help train the South Vietnamese Army, then under pressure from Communist guerillas known as the Viet Cong.

Australia acquiesced in Indonesia's take-over of Dutch New Guinea. By 1962 President Sukarno of Indonesia was opposing the plan to form a new state of Malaysia to include Malaya, Singapore and the British possessions in Borneo. At the end of 1962 British troops put down a rebellion in Brunei, and then in 1963 Indonesia began to send so-called volunteers across the border from Kalimantan into Sarawak and Sabah (North Borneo) to stir up trouble. After Malaysia was formed in September 1963, to include all the former British territories except Brunei, Sukarno stepped up his policy of Konfrontasi, or confrontation. Soon the British had deployed seven battalions to Borneo, and in April 1964 the British Prime Minister approached Australia about sending forces to Borneo. This request was resisted, yet the Australian Army faced the prospect of having to send troops to three areas, Vietnam; Borneo and New Guinea—the latter being necessary if Indonesia sent infiltrators into New Guinea.

These pressures came at a time when the Australian Army was having doubts about the utility of the Pentropic organisation. The Americans had already abandoned their pentomic structure, and if Australian units were to be deployed to either Borneo or Vietnam they had to be able to fit into British or American structures. By late 1964 the CGS, Lieutenant-General Wilton, had decided that there were four main factors justifying a reorganisation of the Field Force. Firstly, under the new strategic basis the 1st Division was more likely to operate in separate strategic areas than fight as one cohesive unit. Secondly, the emphasis on cold war tasks implied a need for smaller, lightly supported, infantry battalions. Thirdly, the increasing
availability of tactical air support allowed an overall reduction in road transport. And fourthly, there was the possibility, although no means assured, that the manpower problem might be alleviated by some form of national service. But in the end, perhaps the most significant factor was, as Wilton said, 'it's not the size of the battalions that counts; it's the number'. 27

Responding to these pressures, on 10 November 1964 the Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, presented a major defence statement to Parliament in which he pointed to the possibility of war with Indonesia and announced the largest increase in defence spending since the Second World War. The Army's Pentropic organisation was to be abolished and the battalions were to return to an organisation that would be compatible with British formations. The Army was to double its number of Regular battalions from four to eight; the Pacific Islands Regiment was to be doubled from one to two battalions; and the SAS Company was to expand to form an SAS Regiment. To meet the requirement for more personnel, a selective National Service scheme was to be introduced. Both the navy and the air force were to be increased in size and provided with new equipment over the following three years. 28

Under the Tropical Warfare establishment, which was approved at the end of 1964, the division was to include ten infantry battalions (one for protection tasks), a cavalry regiment, three field artillery regiments, a divisional locating battery, an aviation regiment and an allocation of engineers, signals and other support units. There would be three task force headquarters under which units could be grouped for training and operations.

The reorganisation was given additional impetus by the announcement in April 1965 that the government was to deploy an infantry battalion to Vietnam in June. Furthermore, the CGS, Lieutenant-General Wilton, began preparing to send a task force of two battalions the following year. To meet this requirement, between mid-1965 and mid-1966 the four existing infantry battalions were expanded to eight.

It is not my task to describe how this new organisation was introduced or how it performed. That subject will be covered by Brigadier O’Brien in a later presentation. But I would like to reflect on how far the Army of 1965 had developed since 1950, and also note the legacy from this period. The developments were as follows.

• In 1950 the Army was headed by a Military Board. In 1965 it was still headed by a Military Board although a permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee had been established.
• In 1950 the Army was organised on a geographic command basis. That organisation was still in place in 1965. It no longer exists.
• In 1950 there were plans to establish a regular brigade, but there was little progress. In 1965 a regular division was being formed with three brigades or task forces. Until recently, and to a certain extent, we still have that division, and the battalions still have roughly the same structure as that hurriedly put together in 1965.
• In 1950 the defence of Australia was built around a large CMF. In times of major war this CMF was to be mobilised and deployed to the Middle East. Much of the Regular Army's effort was spent on supporting the CMF. By 1965 the CMF had been reduced considerably. The ARA was now the major part of the Army. Plans to send the CMF overseas had been abandoned. The strategy was forward defence, which required an expanded Regular Army.
• In 1950 a large proportion of the population had some experience of the Army. First and Second World War veterans were numerous, and indeed, it was only 30 years since the end of the First World War. In 1965 there were still many Australians with some recent connection to the Army. In addition to the Second World War veterans, perhaps over 200,000 Australians had served in the CMF and National Service scheme during the 1950s. Now in 1997 it is over 50 years since the end of the Second World War. Fewer Australians have any recent connection with the Army than at any time in the last century.
• In 1950 the Regular Army had units deployed permanently overseas. The British Occupation Force had been deployed to Japan since 1946. This deployment was
followed by Korea, Malaya and Malaysia. Australia has not had units deployed permanently overseas since 1973.

- In 1950 doctrine was directed towards conventional operations in a brigade or divisional setting. In 1965 doctrine was counter-insurgency in a tropical environment.
- In 1950 no units of the Australian Regular Army had fought in combat. By 1965 the Regular Army had already established a proud tradition of its own, building on, but separate from, the traditions of the AIF.
- In 1950 the Army consisted of standard infantry, artillery and armoured units. By 1965 the Army also included a CMF commando regiment and an SAS regiment. There was also the beginnings of an Army aviation corps.
- In 1950 the Army’s equipment was that which was left-over from the Second World War and was mainly British in origin. By 1965 new equipment was arriving that was mainly American in origin; some of that equipment is still in use.
- In 1950 radio and electronic equipment was at an elementary level. By 1965 there had been major developments in the use of radio-relay, man-pack radios, radar and on-line encryption. This would have a major impact on the shape of operations in Vietnam.
- In 1950 the artillery still had a substantial coast arm and numerous anti-aircraft units. By 1965 the coast arm had disappeared and the anti-aircraft units had declined dramatically. The coast arm has never been revived and the Army still has few air defence units.
- In June 1950 the Regular Army had a strength of 14,543. By 1965 it had expanded to 23,534, but in 1996 it was only 2000 more at 25,964.
- In June 1950 the CMF had a strength of 18,236, although it was to climb to 87,291 in 1956. By 1965 it was down to 29,221, and by 1996 it was down to 25,390.

From these snapshots we can go part of the way to understanding the importance of the 1950s and early 1960s in the development of the Australian Army. The task of the historian is to put some shape on the past and in so doing provide insights as to why we are the way we are now. Only then can we make reasoned decisions about which direction to proceed for the future. The Australian Army has undergone many major changes since 1965. Nonetheless, despite the passage of time the Australian Army’s experience between 1950 and 1965 was fundamental in producing the Australian Army as we know it today.


14. 'The Infantry Brigade Group', statement by Minister for the Army, 4 September 1957, Australian Archives: CRS A6059, item 41/441/28.

15. DRA Liaison Letter, October 1957.


18. 'Composition of the Australian Defence Forces', Report by the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to Minister for Defence, June 1959, Australian War Memorial, AWM 121, item 28/A/2.


25. 'List of Existing MF Formations and Arms Units of Regiment and Battalion Status, Showing Changes Resulting From 1960 Reorganisation', 4 March 1960, CRS A6059/2, item 41/441/69 Part 1.


In his letter announcing this conference, the Chief of Army stated that ‘This year marks the fiftieth anniversary of the decision by Government to establish a large, permanent component of the Army, to stand alongside the traditional part-time force’. So, today the spotlight is on the Regular Army and the enviable role of the other speakers is to remind us that we have a fine Regular Army that, for its size, is virtually without peer in the world. It is an Army of which all of us are justifiably proud.

Mine is the unenviable task of commenting on the history during the same period of that traditional part-time force to which the Chief of Army referred. I noted that the title given to me was ‘One Army’. It reminded me of the principle adopted by the Peoples’ Republic of China in its move towards the integration of Hong Kong—‘One Country: Two Systems’. My topic could well be ‘One Army: Two Systems’.

Sadly, in the years since the Second World War, I can only report a continuing saga of lost opportunities and frustration for the Citizen Military Forces and the Army Reserve, despite the efforts of many dedicated Regular and citizen-soldiers, politicians and public servants. To bring out lessons I must unfortunately emphasise the negatives and pass over many outstanding achievements.

Sadly, too, I will say things at times that risk irritating some people present today (something I find personally upsetting because I have many friends in the audience as well as persons for whom I have high regard and respect), but I cannot be hypocritical and can only tell the story as, I believe, the majority of citizen-soldiers see it.

But in tackling this contentious subject, I am encouraged by the very fact that, firstly, I have been asked to speak at this conference at all and, secondly, by further comments by the Chief of Army that we must use the experiences of the past to help us meet the demands of the major restructuring on which the Army is embarking. I believe that there are still many lessons to be learned about part-time forces.

So my presentation is not intended to be destructive, but is made in the hope that, as the Army enters yet another era of restructuring, some lessons from the past can help to ensure that we do not repeat mistakes but, this time, will succeed in creating the very best Total Force of which this country is capable.

To start with, we must not forget that Australian soldiering did not begin in 1947. From as early as 1800 onwards we had a succession of evolving types of forces that saw growth from small groups of local citizen volunteers, through structured colonial volunteer units and then a more formalised militia, until in 1901 defence was centralised under the new Commonwealth Government, thereby creating the Australian Military Forces. It was mainly these Volunteer and Militia units that formed the basis of Australia's expeditionary forces from the mid-1800s until the end of the Second World War.
That these forces were predominantly formed from citizen volunteers was necessarily due to the token strength of our Permanent Forces at the time, for example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Australian Expeditionary Forces</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
<th>Served Overseas</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1869 New Zealand</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885 Sudan</td>
<td>750</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899-1902 South Africa</td>
<td>16,175</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914-1918 First World War</td>
<td>416,809</td>
<td>331,781</td>
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<tr>
<td>1939-1945 Second World War</td>
<td>727,703</td>
<td>396,661</td>
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</table>

Australian Permanent Army Strengths

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Strength</th>
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<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>2989</td>
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<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>2795</td>
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<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>3572</td>
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With these figures freshly in mind, let me up front grasp the nettle on one of the most emotive parts of this study. There has been and, I am sad to say, even today, still is in some circles, much heat generated by the fact that a large number of command and other senior appointments up to and including the Second World War were held by non-Regular officers. Yet this is understandable if looked at objectively, not, in my submission, because of any sinister plot, but because of the following factors:

- the Royal Military College was not established until 1911;
- the relatively small number of Regular soldiers as a percentage of the forces raised;
- the existence of a pool of citizen-soldiers with proven operational experience, from South Africa for the First World War and from the First World War for the Second World War; plus
- the need to use the small number of professionally trained officers with the requisite skills that were available to fill key senior staff appointments.

My understanding from the perspective of a young CMF officer in Victoria has been just the opposite of what appears to be the conventional wisdom on the Regular side of the house. When it appeared post-1947 that the CMF was being downgraded and that perhaps one underlying reason was a desire on the part of some senior Regular officers to lock out non-Regulars from command, our ex-AIF officers had no real argument, in principle, with qualified Regulars being preferred. Most had served with first class Regular soldiers during the war for whom they had a high regard. What worried them was that membership alone would become the criteria of selection. In the traditions of the AIF, they sincerely believed that the Australian soldier deserved the best leaders the country could produce, whatever their background and pedigree. And Army would need a plentiful supply. The argument was that if a Regular was truly professional and capable, what would he have to fear?

Furthermore, one of my old Commanding Officers used military history to highlight that, since we are not an aggressive nation, we will usually be on the back foot in the early stages of a conflict and in such circumstances losses can often be high. So, he would argue, we should not put at risk the bulk of our small professional Army up front.

Finally, there is the danger in today's world that if a Regular Army promotes the belief that it, either wholly or substantially, can provide the country's defence, it will run the risk of isolating itself from the community. People will no doubt be more than willing to say, 'Well, let's leave it to them'.
I believe that these three principles are still generally subscribed to by today's Reserve. It is accepted that in the reality of today's world key appointments will, prima facie, be held by capable Regulars. But there is also a realisation that because of the demographic and economic conditions Australia will face for the foreseeable future, there will never be enough of them. That is why there is a strong belief that as many as possible of the best young men and women in our community, whatever their peace-time origins, must be encouraged to devote part of their time, to the limit of their individual abilities, to learn military skills and so prepare for the defence of the country.

Australia simply cannot afford to ignore and lock out some of the best potential talent it has. So my primary plea to all concerned, in the best interests of the nation, is to adopt an open-minded approach that will give us the best land force that the combined resources of the community can produce. So, against the background of Australia's military evolution, what was the situation as we saw it in 1947?

- Citizen-soldiers had demonstrated for over 150 years a willingness, particularly as volunteers, to defend their country.
- They had served with distinction in two major wars and in other lesser conflicts, as well as keeping alive the skills of soldiering in the difficult years of peace.
- Like today's Regular Army, they were respected around the world for their soldierly qualities—not perhaps for the spit and polish of the parade ground, although they could turn that on too when called upon—but certainly for qualities of courage, resourcefulness and leadership.
- For various cultural and historical reasons, the concept of a volunteer citizen army fitted comfortably into Australian society.

Let us now skim through some of the main events post-1947 as they impacted on the CMF. Many may be perceptions only, but they had a cumulative effect. In the time available I can only list a selection of items and then deal in the most superficial way with them, as some topics in themselves warrant a much fuller debate:

**1946-47**

In response to the uneasiness generated by the Cold War, unofficial 'staff groups' of veterans began to form. They conducted TEWTs, held information and teaching sessions and lobbied government for positive action on defence. As such, they represented community attitudes in a traditional way.

**1948**

The CMF was re-raised on traditional pre-war lines with limited Regular Army support. Training was an extension of the Second World War practice. My first camp as a young officer was a brigade minefield breaching operation at night—but my platoon sergeant had done it for real as a sapper at El Alamein some few years before.

**1950**

The Prime Minister, Robert Menzies, outlined the Government's policy for the Citizen Military Forces:

- to be increased from 18,000 progressively through 30,000 to 50,000;
- service would be anywhere in the world (but call-out still limited to a formal declaration of war);
- to be 'enlisted and trained as a force which, with Regular units fed into it, is itself an expeditionary force'.

3
1951

The first postwar National Service scheme was introduced, but for home defence only, and to bolster the CMF. It obligated 18 year olds to serve 98 days full-time followed by three years part time. With units at full strength and flush with Second World War equipment, some ambitious and worthwhile training resulted.

1959

That National Service scheme ceased. A number of draftees served on for many years, some to high rank.

1960

A Pentropic structure was introduced for the Australian Army. The Pentropic organisation probably marked the low point of the CMF and a level from which it never really recovered. There was an overwhelming feeling of betrayal when it was realised that the traditional units were to be disbanded in favour of a ‘regimental’ system. This was foreign to Australians where traditions from two wars were battalion—and not regimentally—based. The artificial 1 & 2 RQR/RNSWR/RVR/etc structure was resented and seen by many as a deliberate attempt to destroy the long established citizen force traditions. Because these traditions went deep into history, the reorganisation also shut out the civil communities and the AIF Associations who saw their familiar and much-loved titles disappear.

Army paid no regard to local or traditional sensitivities. In 1980 when I was on a recruiting tour of Ballarat, the Mayor took me into the main Council Chamber to proudly show me the 8th Infantry Battalion Colours, on the wall above the Mayoral chair. I said what a pity it was that Ballarat did not then have its own battalion and it was my aim to see the local company built up to that level again. The Mayor said to me, ‘General, we do not understand this 2RVR nonsense. What the Army does not realise is that two generations of men from Ballarat have fought and died in the 8th Battalion. When the Army gives us back our 8th Battalion then Ballarat will give the Army its young men again’. In fact, from the day the 8th Battalion was absorbed into 2RVR, the Ballarat Council would not allow that unit to exercise its inherited Freedom of the City until the title was eventually changed back to 8th/7th Battalion, Royal Victoria Regiment.

Many members resigned in protest, including most of the Second World War officers and NCOs still serving, as well as those for whom no establishment vacancy existed.

From a CMF organisational point of view, the reorganisation was a disaster. Spread of command was too far geographically and too remote personally.

1964

Another National Service scheme was introduced but this time to boost the strength of the Regular Army. There was a CMF option included, in that potential draftees could secure exemption from full-time service by signing on with the CMF for six years. This was counter-productive. It resulted in the CMF in general being classed as ‘draft dodgers’. Also, many good serving soldiers (especially officers and NCOs) enlisted as individuals in the ARA or went on full-time duty. Other young men of good quality who might normally have joined the CMF went instead into the National Service system. Furthermore, with the demands of Vietnam, the CMF was left with minimal Regular Army support and so standards deteriorated even further.

Legislation extended the ability to call out the CMF in time of a declared defence emergency as well as on a declaration of war. But, with nothing tangible flowing from this, it had no effect at unit level.
1965

Regular units were committed to Vietnam and Malaysia. Despite the Regular Army being dramatically overstretched there was no attempt made to use existing CMF units, although, unlike the two world wars, all territorial limits on their employment had by then been removed.

1971

Military Board Minute 40/71 redefined the role of the CMF:

1. to augment the Regular Army in time of defence emergency or time of war;
2. with the Regular Army, to provide the basis for expansion of the whole Army on general mobilisation.

This clearly reversed the policy introduced in 1950 and officially allotted the CMF a minor or supplementary role. I am not necessarily questioning the policy—just drawing attention to what was perceived to be a further downgrading of the citizen force with no compensating factors to make members feel they still had a worthwhile job to do.

1972

National Service Mk II was abolished. Those who had opted for the CMF as an alternative of course left immediately.

1973

As the CMF was showing adverse symptoms, particularly diminished numbers and lack of a clear role, aggravated by the earlier actions we have noted, in May the Government established the Millar Committee to enquire into the CMF.

1974

In March the Millar Committee tabled its very comprehensive Report. Its recommendations included:

- restricted manning (which formalised 'hollowness' for which the Reserve itself is now condemned);
- further amalgamation of units and a consequent reduction in opportunities;
- the change of name from Citizen Military Forces to Army Reserve (a title used since to reinforce in the minds of the public, the politicians, the bureaucracy, the Regular Army and the Reserve itself that it can only ever be a second, third or even fourth eleven);
- that Australia should have one Army (or 'Total Force' as Millar preferred to call it) with two complementary elements, the Regular Army and the Army Reserve.
- improvements in training, administration and conditions of service.

Overall, it was considered to be a good report. But it fell down in its implementation, with the 'nasties' and those parts which had no cost implications being acted on speedily, with other ideas being slow to see daylight or never at all. In general it is seen to have fallen far short of its potential because there was never the will nor the resources given to effectively implement its major reforms.

It is interesting to recall its macro-considerations:
That a Reserve of partly-trained Army units and personnel is an essential component of the defence of Australia.

That such a Reserve is only possible and effectual if the Government of the day, the community, the Regular Army and the Reserve believe it has a role which gives it present significance, which provides for effective action in the future, and which it is known the Government will implement if necessary.

That any Reserve component must be prepared for total integration with the rest of the Army in the event of call-up for full-time duty, and that in peace both Regular and Reserve components should be treated and act as part of a single force.

That the Reserve should be divided into operational units, logistic units and a training organisation, geared to provide both a effective operational force at short notice and also the basis for expansion over a longer term.

That there should be an appropriate professional relationship between the designation and size of Reserve organisations, and between rank and responsibility within them.

I suggest that these principles are still relevant today, especially points two and three.

1976

A Government White Paper confirmed support for Millar and predicted that the ongoing reorganisation would raise the effectiveness of the Reserve. Fine words but again there were no commitments of substance.

1979

The outbreak of hostilities in Afghanistan saw a major expansion of the Reserve announced but, in retrospect, this is now looked on primarily as a political exercise. Much hard work went into expansion and many former members returned. But the momentum was not maintained.

1983

Taxation of Reserve pay was introduced. This had adverse effects on morale out of all proportion to its substance. Firstly, it focussed soldiers’ minds on how much or rather how little they were being compensated for Reserve service, which before had never really been an issue. Secondly, it put most spouses off-side as for them the only compensation for disruption to family life was the occasional bonus which represented a new refrigerator, new school clothes for the kids, and so on. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it carried a not so subtle message to Reservists that neither the politicians nor the Regular military really cared or were prepared to acknowledge in an overt and tangible way that they, the Reservists, were doing a worthwhile job.

1985

The Government appointed Paul Dibb to conduct a review of Australia's defence capabilities. His was a far-ranging and sometimes contentious report. Some comments affecting the Reserves included:

- ‘There is no common understanding between the Government's military and civilian advisers about what the ADF should be structured to do.’
- ‘The Army Reserve has suffered over the years from lack of purpose.’
- ‘The “Total Force” concept advocated by Dr Millar could have remedied this situation but it has been implemented only recently’—ie ten years later.
- Although emphasising the need for Reserve forces, the Review did not address adequately the readiness needed by the Army Reserve nor did it provide impetus for change to reflect the new emphasis that was proposed in Reserve employment.

Dibb did not, as had been hoped, solve the problems.
1986

The Army Reserve Review Committee published a report on the Force Structure and Tasks of the Army Reserve. Some of its main points were:

- the Reserve could be restructured to make a valuable contribution to defence in concert with the Regular Army;
- manning—or rather lack of it—was the key issue;
- a need for a greater commitment from the Regular Army to training the Reserve and the manning of command and administrative appointments where these could not be filled by a suitable Reservist;
- integration was essential and, where not possible, more structured affiliation was required;
- a 26,000 ceiling was sufficient to permit the deployment and sustainment of one Division on low level conflict operations and to secure some vital assets—it would not also permit an expansion base if hostilities were protracted or were to escalate;
- two battalion brigades should be adopted for planning and training;
- a need to increase training days, capital procurement, administrative outlays and additional RAAF air hours.

Negative results were these:

- brigades were reduced to two battalions, further increasing 'hollowness';
- more units were amalgamated over vast distances;
- there were reduced postings available for Reservists and the resultant surplus of personnel was wasted;
- although the need for increased resources was emphasised, these did not flow as a result of the Review.

1987

A White Paper titled the *Defence of Australia 1987* (DOA87) followed the Dibb Review twelve months later. This reflected both the strengths and weaknesses of Paul Dibb's Review. It did, however, state that:

- 'our requirements for land warfare cannot be achieved without extensive Reserve participation'.
- 'Since World War II the Reserve has provided the expansion base for the Army. It will now, in addition, be required to contribute to operations which might arise in the shorter term as part of the Total Army.'
- 'The Government will continue to give priority to our increasingly effective Reserve Forces.' (Many with closer knowledge of the subject would question this wording.)

Also in 1987, Mr RJ Cooksey undertook a report to Government entitled a *Review of Australia's Defence Facilities*. It addressed (amongst other things) Reserve accommodation. It was not acted upon at the time but was seen as another backward step as it advocated a lesser Reserve presence in the community.

1988

Call-out of Reservists short of Declaration of War or Defence Emergency became law, thus removing the final impediment to inclusion of the Reserve in contingency planning. The legislation did not, however, include any protection of Reservists' civilian interests in the event of call-out in situations short of a Defence Emergency. I was the Chief of the Army Reserve at the time. When the then Minister told me that he had won Government support to proceed, I pointed out that call-out per se was only part of the requirement. Complementary provisions were necessary to protect Reservists' civilian interests to make it effective. He acknowledged
this but said he wanted to move as quickly as possible to get the concept of call-out locked in and undertook to follow up with separate protective legislation as soon as possible. I believe the Minister was sincere in what he said. However, he went on to another portfolio and later the Government changed. Still, ten years after that conversation, we seem as far away as ever from seeing protection for Reservists.

What I did find was an almost immediate and unbelievable backlash from sections of the Regular Army and the bureaucracy. Much of it was the 'green eyes' syndrome. I have listened to numerous arguments that 'you cannot give that to Reservists when we Regulars don't get anything like that'; or 'why should Reservists get that when professionals don't'. I have even heard direct boasts that the protective legislation will NEVER see the light of day. Despite strenuous efforts by some people with broader vision and a better understanding of the realities of the situation, it seems to me that this boast may be borne out because there has been ten years without positive results—much of it in the best 'Yes, Minister' tradition. When Reservists and their families see other legislation of a more complex nature on other subjects pushed through in a fraction of the time and assess just how vulnerable enlistment makes them, they feel badly let down.

1989
Reports by Dr Ross Babbage and Dr Nick and Mrs Judy Jans separately examined personnel issues for the ADF.

1990
Dr Alan Wrigley presented a report addressing just how the Australian community could play a greater role in defence. His recommendations centred on making greater use of civil infrastructure and industry for support activities and increasing the Reserves (or 'Militia' as he called it).

1990-91
The Australian National Audit Office undertook an audit of the Army Reserve. Its report was subsequently used to beat the Reserve around the ears once more. It contained 90 recommendations—however, none of the complaints were within the province of the Reserve but were imposed either by Government or by higher defence policy.

1991
An Interdepartmental Committee was established to examine Dr Wrigley's proposals. While favouring a Ready Reserve system (advocated by Babbage and the Jans), the IDC indicated support for the General Reserve if, inter alia:

• changes to the Reserves were linked to an overall upgrading of the importance of the Reserves; and
• Reserves had a clearly defined defence role.

Also in 1991, the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade conducted a far ranging in-depth study of the Australian Defence Force Reserves. The Committee found (what we in the Reserves all knew) that 'when it came to Reserve issues, there was a demonstrable gap between force development rhetoric and action'. It also highlighted many deficiencies of all types and recommended that Army Reserve units be fully equipped for their vital asset protection role as soon as practicable.

The Force Structure Review of 1991 was aimed at producing a more efficient and combat effective force that was affordable on both the short and longer term. It was influenced by the greater use of Reserves, in particular the role of the Ready Reserves. The Ready Reserve
Programme was introduced. In the light of its later demise I shall not spend time on it except to say that I attended a briefing at 6th Brigade where the staff proudly told a gaggle of us 'olds and bolds' what a success it was turning out to be. The officer concerned said, 'Of course, we did have problems at first. However, we learned quickly and these have been overcome'. Then, in a voice which was clearly telling us a trade secret with pride, he went on:

We found that dealing with the Ready Reservists was different from handling normal Regulars. So, what we had to do was, firstly, give each unit a clear role and make sure the soldiers understood it. In other words, we had to give them a purpose for their training. Secondly, we had to give the units training specifically designed to prepare them for that role. Thirdly, we had to give them the equipment necessary to perform that role. Fourthly, we had to increase the number of Regular personnel to guarantee top quality training and administration.

He stood back and beamed triumphantly. I caught the eye of another ex-senior Reservist across the room and we both studied the ceiling for several minutes. What we had been treated to was, in simple terms, what the Reserve had been literally begging for since the early 1950s.

In passing, another matter that always puzzled me about the Ready Reserve was being constantly told by Regulars that they gave an unique opportunity for the Army to have influence back into the community. What had the CMF and Army Reserve been doing during the preceding 50 years? The level of influence of the General Reserve far exceeded any that the younger members of the Ready Reserve, who were in the main students or unemployed, could possibly exert. And, on the same subject, I heard an Army public relations spokesman talking on radio several months ago propounding an 'Adopt a Digger' scheme. He said that 'the Army is an insular community that lives within its own military community because of its operational methods—so it needs to show that the military is human, has feelings and does its job well.' I ask you to consider what an on-side Reserve can do with no extra cost or effort to help in this regard.

Finally in 1991, the 3rd Division was disbanded—on its 75th birthday. This was another retrograde step for the Reserve that was handled with no sensitivity or public relations acumen.

1997

We now arrive at 1997.

- The Ready Reserve programme was terminated.
- The Defence Reform Programme was introduced. I mention it merely because it contained no reference to Reserve Forces. I do not quite know whether to be relieved or worried about that.

Looking back over the period 1947-1997, critics will point to continuing weaknesses in the Reserve. There will be little argument on this. What I think is truly amazing is not what faults exist in the citizen force, but how much it achieved against all odds and, indeed, the very fact that it has survived at all.

So, finally, in 1997 we finish with Restructuring the Army. This document admitted that 'the concept of a Total Force has so far proved difficult to turn into reality'. It also talks about the 'arbitrary distinctions between full-time and part-time service personnel'. So there at least seems common ground in conceding that little appears to have changed in principle in the last half century, despite all the reviews, enquiries and commissions.

I shall not attempt to discuss common principles arising from restructuring the Army, such as those affecting force structure, the concept for land operations, the principle of embedding, etc, although I know there are concerns held by many in both Regular and Reserve camps.
about these. Let me just touch on some matters that are of particular concern to the Reserve. What have we learned in the last 50 years? What can we do to improve on past efforts? I will not try to do so in detail but just comment in the hope that some present today may be prompted to consider the problems more deeply and search for possible solutions.

- I am sure I do not need to comment further on the need for a clear role for the Reserve and realistic tasks for units.
- By further amalgamating and restructuring units, we again risk losing a number of serving officers and other ranks.
- I understand there is already a surplus to proposed new establishments. If we repeat past mistakes we will arbitrarily waste away these members in whom we already have a sizeable investment. Then inevitably we will need to start the expensive business of recruiting and training over again. I would argue that we should find ways to retain any surplus for future use and not become driven by tidy staff tables.
- What about multiple manning to help retain and train personnel and achieve more efficiency in units?
- The need for more thorough induction training has long been acknowledged. However, it is considered that this should be done by offering options that will not deny sizeable and important sections of the community the right to serve. Enlistment of school leavers and students to take advantage of their time availability is supported. However, the Army will be the loser if it adopts this as the only option. It will be denied recruits with trade and other specialist skills, those with experience in management and administration, persons of status and influence in the community and, generally, that constituency that has always made citizen forces so valuable, usable and adaptable.

- I am worried by comments I hear from some Regulars that Reservists must be trained to identical skills and standards as Regulars. If this is achievable on a part-time basis, why do we need a Regular Army at all? We must stop trying to clone a Reservist in the same image as a Regular. We should not be trying to train part-time members for the equivalent of a long term professional career. Reservists are enlisted to do specific jobs in the event of defence emergencies. To ensure that they reach competency in those particular tasks and that scarce resources are used wisely, training should be concentrated on those Reserve-specific skills.
- Some, by option and availability, may be able to reach the same levels as their Regular counterparts and opportunities should be available for them to do so.
- It will, admittedly, mean more work to structure Reserve training for the specific roles and tasks. It will mean producing syllabi that are different from the Regular requirement and sometimes different syllabi within a single Corps for different Reservists. For example, in the Royal Australian Army Medical Corps, should a battalion medical orderly do exactly the same training as an orderly in a hospital? I don’t know—but this sort of question needs to be asked of almost all military skills if we are going to produce achievable objectives without waste of resources. Then, too, if a hospital orderly is reposted to a battalion we will know what additional skills (if any) he will need to acquire.
- Let me assure you that it is not possible simply to transpose Regular course packages to the Reserve by changing the title at the top of page one. I once worked with a fine Regular major on his first posting to the Reserve. He came from the Infantry Centre and immediately produced a new training syllabus for the Battalion. When I read it I saw he had listed on every Tuesday night for six months two periods—the M60 machine gun and voice procedure. When I queried this he replied that it was the exact syllabus used for the ARA course at the Centre and was the only way to cover the subjects to ARA standards. I pointed out that, in theory, this may be so but, before the six months was over, he would be lecturing to empty classrooms. After a short time with us he learned to understand the citizen-soldier better.
- I hope we shall see more use made of correspondence courses, distance and remote learning.
- Something that has always puzzled me about the Army is its reluctance to recognise civilian skills. I once commanded a formation that included Supplementary Reserve units with restricted training obligations. One squadron had a number of soldiers
whose civilian jobs with statutory authorities required them to drive fork lifts and other equipment. Yet the Army would not let them touch equivalent plant unless they first completed a minimum six week full-time course—ie three years of their prescribed Reserve service. I tried to cajole the system into simply trade testing them but, no, they had to do the course. What a waste! There should be a ready recognition of civilian qualifications with only top-up training as necessary.

- I must address the frequently made claim that Reservists cannot cope with the high technology of a modern Army. It seems that many Regulars do not understand that technology in civilian life is just as advanced or often more so than that found in the Australian Army. Conversion is only a matter of training. After all, most complex military equipment is designed, manufactured and serviced by civilians—just like those who join the Army Reserve. Maybe Reservists can even add to Army's technological capabilities.

- Allied to the question of training packages, proper assessments must be made—including, I suggest, for the Regular component too—as to what degrees of readiness are really needed for what elements of the Total Force. From time to time, these will need to be adjusted to meet changing strategic circumstances. I suggest that we do not need the whole of our Army to be ready for high intensity combat tomorrow.

- The question of warning time should influence the degree of availability that is required of individual Reservists in various units from time to time. Instant availability of all members is neither realistic nor necessary. Proper treatment of this aspect will also permit a Reservist to transfer to a lower priority unit in the event that business or family commitments undergo a temporary change so the Army does not lose its investment in him or her altogether.

- Matters such as these will require detailed personnel management.

- There must be genuine career planning for Reservists. If it is perceived that they will be kept down by an artificial glass ceiling then Defence can expect a backlash. This will need the involvement of Reserve planners and counsellors and involve wide consultation.

- What about a 'Stand-by Reserve' or whatever name is preferred to replace the present Regular Army Emergency Reserve and the Inactive Army Reserve with a minimal annual requirement (say, one week-end for updating and kit and medical checks) and with, perhaps, shadow postings to vacant positions? Maybe it should include officers and other ranks. This would be one way of retaining both Regulars and Reservists with temporary problems and provide a worthwhile pool of replacements.

- In recent times I believe a quest for secrecy has needlessly fuelled fears both within and outside the Reserve. Please remember that all concerned are sincere. Just because they do not agree with all aspects of official policy at all times does not mean any lack of bona fides. I remember one wise old CGS who said: 'We Regulars are not very good at managing the CMF. We do not really understand the problems. But we have a good pool of citizen-soldiers who have been doing this for a long time. What we really ought to do is rely on them and then give them all the help and support we can'. There is an immense reservoir of goodwill that can be tapped. There are also formal agencies in every State like the Defence Reserves Support Committee and the Defence Reserves Association.

- Do not underestimate the latent enthusiasm of the average Reservist. He or she will respond and can achieve far more in less time than Army may be accustomed to.

- During the last 50 years the Reserve has functioned almost in isolation. Now, integration in virtually all units is proposed. There are concerns at the proposed levels at which integration may occur. The lower the level that this takes place, the more difficult it will become. There may be substantial differences, too, between integration in specialist and logistic units (especially those that have some civil connection) and combat units. Obviously integration within an infantry battalion will be much more difficult than in, for example, a field hospital. But whatever the Corps and level, the Regular Army at all levels must condition itself to cultural integration. If present prejudices and attitudes prevail then I have grave concerns for the future of integration.
Finally, as we have seen over the last 50 years, all the good intentions will come to nothing unless adequate resources are put into making the part-time component truly effective.

We now seem to have, with the Defence Reform Programme and Restructuring the Army, a circuit breaker. The truth is that the Regular Army needs a strong Reserve and the Reserve needs a strong Regular Army. Australia needs them both.
An Army is an institution not merely conservative but retrogressive in nature. It has such natural resistance to progress that it is always insured against the danger of being pushed ahead too fast. Far worse and more certain, as history abundantly testifies, is the danger of it slipping backward.

Captain Basil Liddell Hart, *Thoughts on War*, 1944

This essay covers the development of the Australian Army from the period of the abandonment of its Pentropic Division structure to the issue of the Dibb Report. A list of the major events during that period is at Appendix 1. A table listing the size of the Army at Appendix 2.

The method that this paper uses to trace developments is to categorise the performance of the Army: whether it was effective and whether it was efficient. While this method may seem less satisfactory to those more chronologically inclined, it has the advantage of appearing more systematic and methodical for a subject so complex. Of course, this analysis suffers from all the prejudices of a serving soldier, and, worse still, the likely to be uninformed views of a relatively junior officer during that period. There are, of course, considerable dangers in examining events so close to the present day: perhaps the most risky element of this is the lack of access to official papers. It is also a disadvantage that little has been written about this period.

At beginning of this period, the Australian Army was one that expected to be deployed into southeast Asia as part of a SEATO force to stem a communist advance. Its counter-insurgency capability was of primary importance, while maintaining a capacity to tackle conventional war. Such operations were the predominant role of Army as a single service. After the 1976 *White Paper on Australian Defence*, Army capabilities were essentially limited to operations seen as more likely in our own neighbourhood as joint operations as part of the Australian Defence Force.

The Australian Army during the period had three components: Regular, Reserve and civilian; it is important not to forget the significant administrative, technical and engineering contribution of this last group.

The taxonomy of categorisation that has been chosen to deal with the performance of the Army in this paper is at best arbitrary and far from orthogonal. It is by no means certain that it is comprehensive, though it is to be hoped that it deals with the most important and relevant facets. It has been decided to leave discussion on the important issue of the performance of Army Reserves to General Cooke's paper. A large number of categories of performance have been chosen: the consequence of this choice is that the opinions offered in each topic are quite abbreviated.
Operational Effectiveness

The most important measure of the effectiveness of an Army is its performance in combat. The Australian Army had an internationally recognised reputation for good performance in combat at unit and sub-unit level in counter-insurgency operations such as in Vietnam and Malaya, though as an Army rather than as part of a joint force. It gained an enviable reputation for the strength of its junior leadership and particularly for the capability of its noncommissioned officers. This reputation was complemented by the respect the Army gained by its involvement in peacekeeping operations, though this performance was often based on an assessment of the performance of individuals.

Training—Battle Discipline—Professionalism

Perhaps in contrast to some of the experiences of the Second World War, the system of training units for operational service used by the Army was very effective. That system, which in brief consisted of close to a year of unit training followed by sub-unit testing under demanding conditions and instructors at the Jungle Training Centre and a Divisional test exercise prior to operational deployment, served the Army very well indeed. To a large extent, this approach had been devised by Brigadier GT Solomon in the Directorate of Military Training in Army Headquarters. It built on the capabilities of the Jungle Training Centre as the main catalyst for the inculcation of battle discipline. Units deployed to Vietnam (for example) were well prepared: there were many individuals who complained that they trained ‘too hard’—all commanders know this is not possible!

At the level of individual training the Army adopted the ‘Systems Approach to Training’ based on US Army experience in the later 1970s. This approach analysed training needs extensively and reduced courses to their bare essentials. The ‘system’ was overdone and tended to neglect the feedback loop of training validation by end users of trained individuals. It also tended to put some ‘essentials’ down to ‘on-the-job’ work at unit level, risking uneven training or, worse, no training at all. An example of this analysis taken to its extreme was the removal of navigation in infantry basic training—a development at odds with the experiences gained in years of counter-insurgency wars. The ‘Systems Approach’ was also applied to collective (or unit) training in too few instances. One isolated example of its success was its effective application to artillery unit training.

Organisation and Structure

It is a principle of a democracy that its armed forces shall be subject to the control of the government as the representatives of the people and the Australian Army has always followed that model. It is debatable, at best, that this principle should be viewed as implemented by civilian control of the military. There were periods, particularly after the implementation of the Tange Report (December 1972), where there was increasing public service control of the services, which were, no doubt, weakened by their own rivalries.

In the latter part of the period under review, in contrast with the RAN and RAAF, Army could be seen as being equipped and structured for lower levels of conflict. While a reflection of a maritime strategy, this situation did not seem to accord with a need to be able to resolve conflict on any land mass, particularly the continent of Australia.

At the organisational level, organisation for units essentially like the Tropical Warfare establishments altered little during the period. There was no real move away from fundamental UK organisational roots for most units and formations but some realignment of corps responsibilities (transport, ordnance and engineers, for example). (Perhaps the most obvious example of this adherence to UK models was the great reluctance to adopt the US staff responsibility system despite the closer alignment with this ally.) The formation of the regional surveillance unit Norforce marked perhaps the first organisation change in this period really adapted to Australian circumstances, and even it was a throw-back to what had worked well in the Second World War.
It could also be claimed that the management methods used by the Army, which can be seen in several dimensions as being ahead of civilian practice, lost this ascendancy during the period. Army, for example, was well aligned with qualities leadership and work study analysis practices, but slow to adopt a functional leadership or output management approach.

**Army Development**

The Army invested a considerable effort in combat development (which includes the shaping of the size of the Army, its structure and primary equipment) during this period. There were two extensive studies which successively produced what were called ‘The Combat Development Guide’ and ‘The Army Development Guide’. In each case the guides produced results that were progressively approved by the higher level of the Army, but which did not receive Defence endorsement. Inevitably these studies were quoted to Defence committees as justification for the types and quantities of equipment to be procured. Almost as inevitably, the assumptions behind the ‘justifications’ were questioned and rejected. Army's efforts to steer future development were hardly likely to succeed unilaterally. Not only did such studies need progressive agreement (which would have caused some fundamental thought to be put into areas where Defence had not yet ventured) but also the active agreement of the other Services would have been needed. Such studies also ignored the relationship between project approval (to undertake an acquisition) and expenditure approval (to allocate funding), processes which were, at least at the time, essentially separate. Much staff effort was wasted on single service approaches when a departmental approach (though much more tedious) could have been more successful.

**Joint and Combined Operations:**

**Tri-Service Relationships**

The culture of inter-service cooperation after the Pentropic Army was uneven but generally poor. After all, Army could undertake relatively independent operations given sufficient air support from the existing fixed wing assets of the Air Force. Both these services were poorly prepared for the catalyst for change: the necessity for close cooperation brought on by the advent of the rotary wing Iroquois. Nevertheless, there was a reservoir of strong goodwill between the services at the 'front line' which overcame many artificial obstacles.

**Relationships with Allies**

The America-Britain-Canada-Australia Armies Agreement (ABCA) established in 1964 provided great value to the Army for relatively little investment. Its outcomes included that Army was ready in interoperability terms for both Malaya and Vietnam. As the period progressed it was clear that the emphasis was altering and that the relationship with the US Army was becoming the more important one, an object well achieved under ABCA without the expense of divergence from British models that were preferred in many instances.

Army-to-Army talks with the United Kingdom and New Zealand were of limited use because, unlike the ABCA scheme, the interface was only at top levels. The strong relationship with the New Zealand Army was maintained throughout. New Zealand's confidence in that relationship reached an apex unlikely to be repeated when New Zealand sub-units were integrated into Australian units in Vietnam.

Throughout the period the strength of allied Army relationships was reinforced by effective exchanges and exercises, though the individual exchanges with the British Army seemed to be too predominant at the expense of exchanges with the US Army and US Marine Corps.
Regional Engagement

In recent years, the importance of maintaining personal and institutional relations with regional nations has been emphasised. It is fair to say that Army's involvement with our region has been generally in advance of the strategic guidance in this area. While this is perhaps more obvious with nations such as Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand in the context of SEATO, there were many examples of cooperation and relationships with other southeast Asian nations such as that of Colonel C East as a student at Indonesian Staff College during Confrontation. The extensive investment in the continuing development of Papua New Guinea's Pacific Islands Regiment up to the transition to independence in 1975 was a further example of the extensive regional links fostered by the Army.

Doctrine and Debate

At the commencement of this period production of the Division in Battle series pamphlets (as well as complementary doctrine for counter-insurgency such as the now classic Patrolling and Tracking and Ambush and Counter Ambush) were produced. Though based on British experience this doctrine was timely and relevant. There was a much greater lag in the development of doctrine for defence of Australia—but that was not only an Army problem.

The demise of the Pentropic organisation led to a healthy discussion conducted in the pages of the (then restricted) Army Journal. Since that time there has been little informed discussion and debate on organisational or doctrinal matters. This contrasts with the continuing and constructive debate in the US Army about its fundamental doctrine. It is perhaps time to encourage such an Army-wide internal discussion and to have the courage for it to be exposed to occasional wider scrutiny. Perhaps a re-born Army Journal is needed.

Expansion Capacity

The National Service scheme could be seen as one below the critical size that could cater for an effective individual and unit reinforcement policy. The Army capacity was over-extended to support three combat battalions when it did not have sufficient strength to maintain a ratio of two full strength out-of-combat units to one deployed unit. It is hoped that this lesson of the size of a force needed to sustain a long combat period will be well remembered.

Organisational Flexibility

In this period (as in almost any other) Army continued to demonstrate its flexibility at the tactical level by grouping and regrouping for particular tasks, and, of course, particularly using this capability during conflict. However, this capacity was frequently overlooked by those seeing Army from 'the outside', who often perceived the Army as being constituted from rigidly structured units.

The adoption of Functional Commands in 1972 was an effective and perhaps overdue restructure that recognised the capability of modern communications to overcome the barriers of distance. Each of the commands was set up as a focussed and output-oriented entity contributing to higher standards of training and readiness.

The decision to move to brigades that had a measure of role specialisation was a further key move during this period. General Dunstan's decision ensured that a wide range of appropriate skills (such as parachute, amphibious, light infantry and mechanised infantry) were retained at both unit and formation level. The decision also aligned Army's capabilities with Defence needs and contingency plans. The major effect, that of bringing the Operational Deployment Force based on the 3rd Brigade to an appropriate degree of readiness, provided a Army-wide focus on the key issues of readiness and sustainability. The role specialisation was also the commencement of the end of Army's adherence to the need for a divisional structure and can be viewed as the beginning of the development of an independent brigade group capability.
Equipment and its Strategic Relevance

Throughout this period Army was served by a good, methodical (if slow) acquisition process, supported by a well trained core of technical staff officers. Acquisition skills improved considerably in later years. However, the defence community continued to express doubts about the strategic relevance of Army's higher capability equipments such as tanks and medium artillery. Arguments in justification seemed to centre on relative parity rather than superior tactical firepower and mobility, perhaps underlying an inability to convince the Defence Department of some of the fundamentals of conflict resolution in the ground environment.

Use of Technology

It may be fair to say that the Army did not exploit technology well during this period and that its performance was substantially worse than the Navy or Air Force, even allowing for the natural difference of technological emphasis. Officers with technological qualifications were generally sent to the materiel areas dealing with the mechanics of procurement: though an appropriate employment, this meant that the overall usefulness of technology was poorly understood throughout the force. The capacity of technological elements of Defence were not harnessed well to Army's aims: both research and development capacities were not exploited to their capabilities. The Operational Research Group deployed to Vietnam was poorly utilised. Successive deployments did not include elements with the capacity to suggest what technology could do to increase combat power. It is to be hoped that Army's future in this area is better handled.

Discipline

The light of retrospect cast on the system of military law prior to the enactment of the Defence Force Discipline Act would show that Army discipline had been governed by an outmoded Defence Act and (while on active service) Army Act for far too long. There were elements of the inequitable that bordered on the unjust in these acts: from the perspective of commanders, they were unable to sustain charges raised against individuals that were 'guilty'; from the perspective of soldiers, they were subject to being underrepresented and more than occasionally over-punished.

History

The appreciation of Australian military history in the Regular Army may well have been less than optimal because that segment of the Army had fewer traditions and links to the past than the reserve.

The need to record this history had been recognised in a succession of Staff Duties pamphlets, making the keeping of war diaries mandatory from the time of warning of a unit for active service. The standard of war diaries has always been uneven and though they were of generally reasonable quality in the Vietnam conflict, some lacked the essential narratives. Few diaries included photographs. The Australian War Memorial has more photographs from Australia's involvement in the Gulf War than for the entire Australian involvement in Vietnam. It was an exceptional unit that recorded its history in peace, however sketchily. Perhaps the example of the RAAF needs to be followed and a rudimentary framework of recording made compulsory, even in peace time.

The postwar Army was not noted for production of books on military history and those few published were not of high scholarly quality. In the period under examination this changed radically. The History Department at RMC and later at ADFA; particularly the notable example by gifted historians such as Alec Hill, nurtured a generation of military historians that have gained international respect. Whether these writers have been in or out of uniform, they have served the cause of Australian military history well.

The Army should consider the collection of military history as part of any of its operational detachments. The remit of such small teams should be broader than the recording of tactical lessons learned.
Officer Education

The Regular Officer Development Committee of 1979 was a watershed in the systematic examination of the careers of Army officers. Though many of its key recommendations were accepted and implemented, many, and particularly those with structural alteration or cost increase implications, were put aside. It has taken many years to catch up on this opportunity for change.

An examination of the tertiary qualifications of senior officers at, for example, the Military Board or CGS Advisory Committee level (with all the imperfections of such a measure) at the beginning and end of this period shows clearly that the academic qualifications of the officer corps had risen considerably and had reached equivalence with civilian senior counterparts in the Defence Department. At other levels, the major changes included the very high proportional increase in tertiary qualifications of all Army officers and the highly desirable trend towards officer education in a joint environment.

Aborigines and Minorities

Though perhaps not generally acknowledged, those soldiers of Aboriginal extraction were generally very well respected and very well integrated into the Army. There were a few Aboriginal soldiers who had served in all conflicts from the Second World War to Vietnam. Of course, it must also be said that their group was under-represented and most particularly so in the commissioned ranks.

The Army became a more representative organisation for other minority communities in Australia during the National Service scheme. It is not always recognised that this is a particular advantage of such a scheme, even a selective one. The Army inevitably became less ethnically representative when the scheme was terminated.

Women

It may be fair to state that the Army was too slow to appreciate the usefulness of females to its overall effectiveness. In this regard (as with many trends in society) the Army seemed to be behind the attitudes held by the community. For most of the period, women were discriminated against because of the demonstrably poorer commissioning and other courses available to them as well as employment restrictions in areas where females had amply shown their capabilities in the Second World War. From 1982 the employment of women in the Army spread to most non-combat jobs.

Retention of Lessons Learned

A strong feature of conflicts in Malaya and Vietnam was the retention of the lessons learned in conflict. For example the regular production of Training Information Bulletins followed the reports of combat actions and were translated into practical training at the Jungle Training Centre with little or no delay. This habit was perhaps too connected with combat and its practice has tended to diminish. It is far from certain that the lessons for peacekeeping from, for example, the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Rhodesia, are preserved in a fashion that will be taken up by those undertaking a similar task in the future.

This point needs to be extended to relate to the lessons derived from training in peace and particularly exercises. While exercise reports distil valuable lessons, they are relatively inaccessible documents to most junior leaders in a short time thereafter, and memories tend to fade towards zero in a two-year posting cycle. A system like the US Marine Corp's 'Combat Lessons Learned' arrangement is needed to preserve experience for the future.
Service Conditions

Service conditions were subject to two pivotal examinations during this period. The Kerr-Woodward inquiry set up pay structures based on the existence of an Armed Services Industry, while the Jess committee set up a demonstrably better retirement scheme that took account of the early retirement age. These fundamental examinations provided a basis for much improved service conditions. In contrast, Army housing for married couples remained poor throughout the period.

Public Relations and Psychological Operations

It can be shown that Army's Public Relations effort had been poorly focussed in Vietnam. If, for example, the majority of press releases at a time such as 1970, when the Australian involvement in the war had matured, were devoted to listing casualties without balancing releases on the many positive achievements of the force, then this service was not performing as it should. It is tempting to attribute this shortcoming to a departmental public relations effort that had too great a civilian influence, though commanders at higher levels must also share responsibility for these outcomes.

The skills of psychological operations which were effectively learnt in Borneo and Vietnam seemed to be quickly forgotten thereafter. It is questionable whether these important skills can be regenerated at short notice.

Medical

The high standard of health care maintained throughout this period, particularly during the Vietnam conflict, despite a shortage of Regular doctors, was notable. There was an influx of National Servicemen at a very high standard complemented by a very sensible use of reservists providing good surgery, nursing and specialist skills. The standard of battle medical care was excellent in Vietnam and up to the best US standards. Despite this, and perhaps as a consequence of community standards, the post-stress counselling given was either poor or non-existent. This was a shortcoming that was especially relevant to National Servicemen.

Marksmanship

The standard of individual rifle marksmanship was satisfactory in Malaya but almost uniformly poor in Vietnam. There is little evidence that this major shortcoming was redressed after that conflict.

Leadership and the Production of Leaders

The Army was strongly led at its highest levels throughout this period. In several instances, Chiefs of the General Staff introduced fundamental but necessary alterations to the Army, but in addition they successfully protected their commanders and the Army as a whole from arbitrary and ill-informed direction by some politicians and public servants.

The Army continued to be characterised by the strength of its junior leaders during this period. This was particularly so of the levels of junior and senior non-commissioned officers, the standard of which became the envy of many other armies. The system of non-commissioned officer training, however, became stressed to breaking point in the latter days of the Australian Army Training Team in Vietnam, when many fine soldiers had become worn out.

Further leadership successes included the products of the Officer Cadet School at Portsea and particularly the Officer Training Unit at Scheyville. The young officers who graduated from these establishments were a fine tribute to those who trained them.
Technical Competence of Arms and Services

The Army deployed on operations in Malaya and Vietnam was an efficient all-arms team, with all the technical competence that this simple term implies. Peace is not a time that nurtures these skills, nor do short-duration exercises. The decline in these skills is always one that must receive particular attention from commanders at higher levels.

National Service Effectiveness and the Aftermath of Separation from the Service

The National Service scheme initially swamped the Army but this situation soon improved. National Servicemen became very well integrated into the total force of the Army, producing very good soldiers and junior non-commissioned officers. National Servicemen were indistinguishable from their Regular counterparts in Vietnam. The expansion to three training battalions was well managed.

The mode of separation of National Servicemen from the Army was poorly handled. Many returned from war to civilian occupations without any further Army contact, including being asked to accompany their former units’ return marches through capital cities. Counselling for trauma was close to non-existent, and should have been much more important for those in transition back to former occupations. Post Vietnam care for wounded ex-National Servicemen by the Army was poor to the extent of negligence—does the Army have any contact with its former wounded still in Repatriation care today?

Resources Management

There are several observations that can be made about financial controls on the Army during this period. Few Army officers were concerned by financial or resource management issues at the earlier part of this period: the responsibilities lay with civilian representatives of the secretary. In many instances this financial control was unnecessarily parsimonious, concentrating on the money spent rather than the combat power generated. Delegations of financial power were rarely effective. This attitude undertook a revolutionary alteration at about the time of General Dunstan’s stewardship of the Army. The contrast was great: staff officers and sometimes commanders considered costs and outcome, managed budgets and were held accountable.

The tools for management of resources developed too slowly. Initial budgeting methods were poor and too much based on historical spending rather than needs. In this skill area, Army (and perhaps the Department) were well behind civil practice in many areas such as accrual accounting, activity based costing and performance measurement. The management skills of an Army must not be allowed to lag behind those in the business community.

Relations with the Community

In 1965 the Army was generally held in low public esteem. This status altered when the Army became employed in its prime role in times of war and emergency. Nevertheless, there was strong community empathy with military service prior to Vietnam. Whilst much, perhaps the majority, of the public supported the Army during that conflict (as opposed to supporting the war) there was certainly a period when the external signs of military service, such as wearing uniform in public places, was avoided.

In contrast the support given to Army was always good in situations such as the disaster relief operation mounted after the Darwin cyclone.

The attitudes of those serving in the Army seem to have been less polled. Those examples that exist reinforce the subjective impression of many of those serving that the Army and its members had considerable pride in the service they were providing to the nation.
Logistics

There was an overburden of logistic installations in the mid-1960s that had carried over from the Second World War. It took too long to review this structure and the stockholdings and procedures that underpinned them.

Conclusions

This analysis of the performance of the Australian Army during a period where it faced great challenge could lead to many conclusions. In the context of this conference several findings are perhaps worthy of consideration.

This important period deserves much closer treatment than that given by this introductory analysis. More historical study is needed. Fortunately, there would appear to be a high level of interest in such studies. When such studies are undertaken, it may well be found that the fundamental documents are less than complete. At the risk of drawing a conclusion outside the period of reference, it would appear that the compulsory keeping of unit narrative records (or war diaries) in peace, on operations such as peacekeeping and in conflict should be mandated. To extend this point of the need for fundamental documentation further, a medium for active and healthy written debate within Army (and in addition to the Defence Force Journal) is required. The Army needs its Army Journal again!
APPENDIX 1
Chronology

1965-     Army contributions to UNMOGIP (Pakistan, to 1985), UNCMAC (Korea, continuing), UNIPOM (India & Pakistan, to 1966).
1964-August Australian Army contribution to operations against Confrontation in peninsular Malaysia and Borneo.
1966      The Prime Minister (RG Menzies) announced the reintroduction of selective National Service, expansion of the CMF and the expansion of the Regular Army in North Queensland and Papua New Guinea.
10 November Report by Major-General JS Anderson recommended abandonment of the Pentropic Divisions organisation.
1964-1966 The Division in Battle, Pamphlet No 11, Counter Revolutionary Warfare, Patrolling and Tracking and Ambush and Counter Ambush published.
January 19653RAR and an SAS squadron deployed to Borneo to counter Confrontation.
May 1965   1RAR deployed to Bien Hoa Province, South Vietnam.
May 1966   1st Australian Task Force deployed to Phuoc Tuy Province, South Vietnam.
August 1966 Confrontation ended.
1967       The ninth battalion of The Royal Australian Regiment raised.
1970       Commencement of Army withdrawal from South Vietnam announced.
1971       The Five Power Defence Agreement for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore came into effect.
January 1972 Army reorganisation based on functional commands and administrative military districts based on the Hassett Report.
1973       Infantry battalion and artillery battery withdrawn from ANZUK force in Singapore.
September 1973 South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) military planning function phased out.
November 1973 Department of the Army and Military Board abolished.
April 1975  The majority of the Australian Army contingent in ANZUK withdrawn from Singapore, though a rifle company continued to be rotated through Butterworth, Malaysia.
1977       Initial Army contribution to UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) (Syria-Israel), continuing.
1979       Counter-terrorist role introduced for the SAS Regiment.
1979-80    Army provides a 152-man detachment to the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Rhodesia.
1981       Specialised roles for Regular Army Task Forces adopted.
1982       Women enter a wide range of non-combat appointments.
1982       Commencement of Army contribution to Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai.
1982-1984  Army contributed a small team to the Commonwealth Military Training Team - Uganda.
1982-1986  Army contributed a contingent to the Multinational Force and Observers in Sinai.
1984       Women's Royal Australian Army Corps disbanded and females allocated to other corps.
## APPENDIX 2
### The Size of the Army 1965-1986

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### Endnotes

THE SECOND FIFTY YEARS:
THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY 1947-1997

FIFTY YEARS OF AUSTRALIAN ARMY PEACEKEEPING
Peter Londey

Beginnings: Indonesia 1947

In opening this conference, General Sanderson mentioned the significance of 13 September 1947 as a key date in the development of the concept of an Australian regular army. By an amazing coincidence, that date was also of critical significance in the history of Australian peacekeeping, for on that day the four officers whom I would regard as our very first UN peacekeepers arrived at Batavia, capital of the Netherlands East Indies, to take up a role as 'military assistants', essentially military observers, for a body set up by the UN, the Consular Commission.¹

The Netherlands East Indies were in a state of civil war between the Republican Indonesians, seeking independence, and the pre-war colonial masters, the Dutch. In 1947, two years after the Japanese surrender, the Dutch had still not re-established control, and negotiations dragged on. They then resorted to what they termed a 'police action', in reality an invasion of Republican territory. This finally prompted United Nations intervention, resulting in the establishment of a Consular Commission, consisting of the diplomatic consuls in Batavia representing Australia, Belgium, China, France, the UK and the US; and a UN Good Offices Committee (UNGOC), consisting of Australia, Belgium and the US.

Australia, still under Labor, was sympathetic to the Indonesian caused and believed that the delay was favouring the Dutch who were steadily consolidating their position. So when the Consular Commission called for its member states to provide military observers to report on and monitor the situation, Australia proved eager enough to fly its four observers to the NEI within a few days, and as a result they arrived before those of any of the other countries.

The four were a distinguished group.² Their leader was Brigadier LGH Dyke, Director of Artillery at Army HQ in Melbourne. Dyke had been to the Netherlands East Indies before, commanding Timor Force which accepted the Japanese surrender on Timor in 1945.³ The second Army officer was Major DL Campbell. The RAN provided Commander HS Chesterman, who had been decorated by the Americans for his role as a liaison officer in the Pacific during the War.⁴ Finally, Squadron Leader LT Spence was a distinguished fighter pilot who had won the DFC in the Middle East, and was later to be killed while commanding No 77 Squadron in Korea.⁵

So at 8.15am on the morning of Sunday, 14 September, the four boarded an RAAF plane and flew from Batavia to Djogjakarta, the capital of the breakaway Indonesian Republic, to be greeted rapturously by the Indonesian Republicans. Next day Chesterman and Campbell flew on to Surabaya, to spend the next two weeks observing in the Dutch-controlled enclave in eastern Java, while Dyke and Spence stayed to report on the Republican areas.⁶

Each pair travelled widely and interviewed as many officials as possible, though the language barrier made it difficult to communicate with the general population. On their return they wrote a report, not to the Consular Commission but in the first instance to the Australian Consul-General. The report dealt with general conditions in the areas visited, but also argued fairly fully the case that the ceasefire was unworkable and that there was no peace to observe.⁷ In an interim report, Dyke and Spence had summed it up: 'As each party to the dispute is using a different set of rules, it is certain that no umpire can function effectively'.⁸
A week or so after their return to Batavia, Spence became our first peacekeeping casualty, evacuated home ill with fever. The other three stayed on, working with the other nations' observers on joint reports and conducting further investigations, until replaced and augmented over the coming months. With the Renville Agreement of January 1948, the observers' role became specifically one of monitoring the ceasefire line between Dutch and Republicans, investigating incidents, and liaising with the forces on either side.

Thus began UN peacekeeping, though similar developments were taking place at much the same time on the other side of the world in northern Greece. There is, of course, a history of pre-United Nations peacekeeping, not perhaps stretching quite back to classical antiquity, but certainly to the League of Nations and maybe beyond. In general, however, it is only with the much wider participation in international affairs achieved under the United Nations that peacekeeping has been able to develop in the varied forms seen today.

Inventing Peacekeeping

Yet peacekeeping, as has often been observed, is nowhere defined, or even mentioned, in the UN Charter. The invention of peacekeeping has often been seen as a workaround imposed by the Cold War, given the UN's impotence when its actions might be vetoed by either of the US and the USSR. That is probably an over-simplification. The greater problem was that the UN Charter, written while the Second World War was still being waged, fundamentally focussed, as far as security was concerned, on the problem of overcoming inter-state aggression through a collective security regime. No doubt its authors had before their minds the great failures of the League of Nations, in Manchuria and Abyssinia, while Germany's conquest of Europe allowed people to ignore the question of what they would—or should—have done about a Nazi regime that had stayed within its borders.

Obviously, inter-state aggression has occurred since 1945. In two cases, Korea and Kuwait, the UN has been able to deal forcefully with the problem, within the terms of the Charter, though for practical reasons acting through proxies in each case. In other cases Cold War rivalries have prevented the UN from taking any effective action.

But in most cases, including some early ones, the conflicts faced by the Security Council did not conform to a simple A-attacks-B model. In several cases problems arose in the course of decolonisation: in Indonesia, the conflict was between the colonial power and those seeking independence; in Kashmir, and in even more complicated fashion in the Middle East, neighbours disputed where the post-colonial boundaries should run. Sometimes the wars have been civil wars, as in the Congo, or more recently Western Sahara or Rwanda. Or Yugoslavia, where war broke out over the boundaries of the successors to a disintegrating state. In these sorts of cases, the boundaries of right and wrong are not clear enough to make simple collective security arrangements adequate: more subtle and varied arrangements are needed to deal with them.

Then there are cases in which UN or other multinational forces have helped to ease the transition from colonial rule to independence, for example in Zimbabwe and Namibia. In West New Guinea the UN took over the entire rule of the territory for a transitional period, a forerunner in a sense of UNTAC (but without the elections). Again, this calls for a type of force not envisaged in the Charter.

Even in cases where there is clearcut aggression by one side, it is not necessarily obvious that fighting a war to eject the aggressor would not prove to be a cure worse than the disease. To eject the Turkish forces from northern Cyprus, or the Indonesians from East Timor, would have involved a degree of fighting and possibly a horrifying level of civilian casualties, though in both cases the problem has subsequently proved so intractable that many might be tempted to argue that forceful action 20 years ago, if politically possible, would have been worth it.
But my point overall is that, if the UN wanted to be an effective agent to promote peace and limit suffering in the postwar world, then it was going to have to invent a range of peacekeeping options, Cold War or no. Two factors ensured that the UN would be busy. First the steady progress towards decolonisation created continuing instability in many of the areas affected (and mirrored in a sense by more recent changes in the post-Soviet world). Secondly, the UN was imbued (much more even, I think, than the still largely eurocentric League of Nations) with a vision of a world in which all peoples should share in the ideal of living in peace (and perhaps prosperity, though the West has never made any serious attempt to share that). That greatly expanded the number of conflicts which would seem worthy of international attention.

**Definitions**

So far I have avoided the ugly problems of terminology, but unfortunately we cannot ignore the issue altogether. Peacekeeping has not escaped modern man's obsession with cautious exactitude in naming things, whereby we are afraid to call spade a bloody shovel in case somewhere there is a manual earthmoving implement which remains undefined. In the usual way that we have today of making adjectives do the work we are afraid to give to nouns, we now have 'peace operations' and even 'peace support operations'. The public, however, in its overwhelming innocence, continues to use the word 'peacekeeping' to represent a whole range of activities which we might summarise as having the following linking features:

- they are preventing, or stopping, or dealing with the effects of fighting (as against natural disasters, etc);
- a peacekeeping operation will include a substantial military element, needed for the special skills, both individual and organisational, which the military can bring to bear;
- the peacekeepers themselves have no vested interest in the conflict, other than to save people from it;
- mainly in order to demonstrate impartiality, peacekeeping is done by nations grouped together in multinational forces, usually under the umbrella of some international organisation;
- the use of force is kept to the minimum needed to achieve the operation's mandate.

There is a great distance between the most primitive of all impulses, for groups to resort to violence to get their own way, and the complex set of material securities and interpersonal trusts needed to allow a modern state to function. We are less inclined than, say, the ancient Greeks to accept cross-border raiding, ravaging of crops, or being captured by pirates and sold into slavery as normal events within relatively civilised society. At the same time, technology has made destruction too easy, with bombs and guns and landmines readily available to all. This means that the range of tasks involved in ending conflict and reconstructing nations is vast. The institutions of what we regard as civilised life need to be assembled or rebuilt, whether by holding elections, setting up criminal justice systems, or whatever. Even before that can happen, a transition may be necessary to the point of trust between people to allow such institutions to exist at all: ceasefires may need to be assured through monitoring, guerrillas assembled and disarmed, third-party negotiation may be needed to help settle local disputes. Then too the physical environment may need repair, whether through rebuilding transport and communications systems, removing hazards such as landmines and unexploded ordnance, or building amenities such as schools, hospitals and prisons.

All this the public rightly wants a simple term to cover, and by general usage that term is 'peacekeeping'. The technocrats, on the other hand, would like to keep the word 'peacekeeping' for a more limited set of operations, mainly observer missions, armed if at all only for self-defence, in the field with the consent of all the parties, essentially monitoring an agreement or ceasefire already reached. This view distinguishes between 'peacekeeping' and 'peace enforcement', with 'peace support', 'peace building' and a range of other terms added to the doctrinal mix. Quite a few attempts have been made to construct all-embracing terminological systems, and no doubt this is useful in an entomological sort of way, but in the end every operation is going to have its own unique set of problems and to require a
purpose-designed force structure and purpose-written set of rules of engagement. The issue of consent is less, I think, a matter of objective description than a political statement, and is by and large a red herring. I will come back to it later. For now, I will continue to use 'peacekeeping' to refer to the whole range of what others may call 'peace operations'.

**Australian and the Invention of Peacekeeping**

The Australian role in the development of peacekeeping is neglected because the academic fraternity interested in these matters has tended not to count the Indonesian operation as peacekeeping at all. This is unfair. Australia's first group of four observers in Indonesia, whom I discussed earlier, went there as 'military assistants' for the Consular Commission, a body set up by the Security Council when it became clear that the parties, and especially the Dutch, were not adhering to the ceasefire agreed to some weeks earlier. The Commission, consisting of the six career consuls in Batavia (from Australia, the US, Britain, France, Belgium and China), was to report back on 'the observance of the cease-fire orders and the conditions prevailing in areas under military occupation or from which armed forces now in occupation may be withdrawn by agreement between the parties'.

Peacekeeping did not exist, it had to be invented, not only by the states involved but also by the individual military officers on the ground. A key point in this development occurred when participants ceased to be primarily servants of their own governments and moved towards being servants of the multinational body employing them. Now Australia was keen to send its military observers to Indonesia because the government had its own strong views about the rights and wrongs of the situation, but above all, one might say, because of a belief in the value of transparency: one side was being favoured by the lack of information getting back to New York about what was going on on the ground in Indonesia. Two of the observers (Dyke and Spence) were briefed by John Burton, Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, prior to their departure, but we do not know what he said. (Burton was later to clash with Richard Kirby, Australia's representative on the Committee of Good Offices, over whether Kirby should take instructions from Australia).

Once in Indonesia, the observers' first report was to the Australian Consul-General, Charles Eaton, but once the other observers turned up they were soon working in cooperation with them, and all the observers planned a joint report through the Consular Commission to the Security Council. This was prevented only by the Americans, who arrived last with instructions from the State Department to report only to the American Consul-General. In a handy pointer to the future, UN peacekeeping was born with the Americans already reluctant to subsume their interests into those of the group. Despite this, over a short time the operation assumed a genuinely multinational character.

A Military Executive Board, or Milex, was set up to control the observers, consisting of the senior observers from the US, Australia and Belgium. In 1948 the Australian member was Brigadier Ted Neylan. By March 1948 Milex felt that things had settled into enough of a pattern to organise a conference of observers in Batavia, in order to codify current practice. The Directive which resulted, 'General instructions for military observers', of 20 March 1948, represents one of the earliest formulations on paper of the duties of a UN military observer. The 'cardinal principle' was that observers were representatives of the UN, and must do nothing to embarrass the Committee of Good Offices (to whom they were by now attached): impartiality was essential. Moreover, the observers had no power to give orders, and must not even appear to do so: rather, they were to bring the parties together 'through the use of initiative, a sense of fair play, ingenuity and common sense'. They were to work in teams of mixed nationality, each under the control of a team coordinator. The teams were to operate as units, located at intervals along the 'status quo line' and (unlike many subsequent observer groups) operating on both sides of the line: each team was to divide its time as equally as possible between the territory of the two parties (thereby, it would seem, emphasising their active role as communicators and intermediaries rather than simply as remote observers). All this is surely peacekeeping. Whether or not it was directly under the control of the Secretary-General is irrelevant. Peacekeeping was being invented, not in New York, but on the ground in Java.
The History of Australian Peacekeeping

Since then, Australia has always been involved in peacekeeping, largely but not entirely under UN auspices. If we look at the number of Australian peacekeepers in the field over time, then it is obvious (and well known) that Australian peacekeeping hit one great peak, in 1993, when for a time we had large contingents in both Cambodia and Somalia. But there is a lot more to it than that. First, it is clear that Australia has been a consistent peacekeeping nation, but scarcely a prolific one. The more than 30 multinational peacekeeping operations in which we have participated have taken us into more conflicts than we have visited as belligerents—a proud record, I would think. We have been involved in peacekeeping on every continent except North and South America (though we have been to both Central America and the Caribbean) and Antarctica. But for much of this time the numbers of personnel involved have been low, as indeed they are at present. Many other nations have provided much larger peacekeeping forces over time than we have. Compared to others, Australia has shown a marked reluctance to send anything approaching battalion-size forces to peacekeeping operations.

Smaller, often specialised contingents have been our way. In the 1950s, we initiated long-running commitments of observers to Kashmir (providing the force commander, Major-General—later Lieutenant-General—Nimmo, from 1950, and observers from 1952) and to the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle East from 1956. Since 1964 we have had anything up to 50 police in Cyprus (though the number today is about 20). Then in the 1970s the scale of commitments started to increase, with the deployment of four Iroquois helicopters to the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) II in the Sinai, from 1975 to 1979, and an infantry force of 150 to the non-UN Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Zimbabwe (1979-80). Following the end of UNEF II, there was a hiatus before the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO), a non-UN mission set up to supervise implementation of the Camp David accords, got off the ground. Australia and New Zealand provided eight helicopters from 1982 to 1986.

There was then a major decline in our peacekeeping, as a post-Vietnam Labor government sought to end overseas military commitments, pulling out of Kashmir and the Sinai as soon as it decently could. By the late 1980s, however, things began to move again, with a deployment of 300 engineers and others to Namibia in 1989-90 (an operation which had almost taken place a full ten years earlier, before peace negotiations broke down) and a new commitment of observers, this time to the Iran-Iraq border, commencing in 1988. After that there was a steady rise, with contributions of deminers to the UN Mine Clearance Training Team (UNMCTT) in Afghanistan and Pakistan from 1989 to 1993, doctors to Operation HABITAT in northern Iraq in 1991, weapons inspectors to UN Special Commission in Iraq since 1991, and signallers to the Western Sahara from 1991 to 1994.

In 1992-93 came the large scale deployments to Cambodia and Somalia. Some 600 Australian troops, including the UN Force Commander, Lieutenant-General John Sanderson, participated in the work of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, while a force of over 1000, based around 1RAR, operated in Somalia in the US-led Unified Task Force. With contributions still being made to sanctions enforcement against Iraq, observers still in the Middle East, police still in Cyprus, with personnel in Western Sahara, Iraq and even a few in the former Yugoslavia, and with a new commitment, this time of Army personnel, to the MFO, 1993 represented easily the high point of Australian peacekeeping.

Since then, there has been a most significant decline. One more major operation was to come: the deployment of 300 medical and support personnel to Rwanda in 1994-95. Smaller commitments were made to Haiti and Mozambique. Today we have 27 Army personnel in the MFO, 12 with UNTSO, 20 police in Cyprus, a few seconded to S-FOR in the Balkans, a few de-miners operating in what might or might not be called peacekeeping operations, and that is about it. Australia has very nearly ceased, as of 1997, to be a peacekeeping nation.
The Australian Experience of Peacekeeping

Mercifully few Australian peacekeepers have died. General Nimmo died in 1966 while commanding the UN operation in Kashmir, but he was 72 at the time. Captain Peter McCarthy was killed by a landmine in Lebanon in 1988. Lance-Corporal Shannon McAliney was killed accidentally in Somalia in 1993, and Major Susan Felsche was killed in a plane crash in Western Sahara in the same year. In addition, three police have been killed, all in Cyprus, one by a landmine and two in road accidents. I should also mention Stuart Cameron who served as an observer on the Iran-Iraq border, later left the Army, went back to Iraq as a worker with Care Australia, and was killed in an ambush, also in 1993.

Our peacekeeping has also been carried out in a great variety of settings, ranging from the tropics of Cambodia and Rwanda to the snows of Afghanistan and the deserts of Western Sahara and the Middle East.

All Australians I have spoken to about peacekeeping say (a) that we are particularly good at it, and (b) that we make up for the lack of numbers involved with the high quality of the people we send. These observations may or may not be true, but it is certainly the case that the Australian Army has been able to bring to bear a great range of specialist skills in peacekeeping. Throughout Australia's 50 years of peacekeeping, there have been, for example, military observers: in Indonesia, until 1951; in Kashmir, from 1950 to 1985; in the Middle East, as part of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO), from 1956 to the present; and in the late 1980s on the Iranian side of the Iran-Iraq border. These peacekeepers are doing something directly for local security, by providing (to the extent they are able, and without complete cooperation from the parties) that transparency which the Australian government wished to bring about in Indonesia 50 years ago. They are also in a general sense adding to Australia's security by minimising the chance of war in a volatile area.

At the other end of one spectrum are the peace enforcers, the infantry on patrol to establish their dominance on the ground, to provide a secure space in which other activities can go ahead. This function was most obvious in Zimbabwe and Somalia, but was also one among other functions in Cambodia and Rwanda.

However, while the creation and maintenance of secure conditions are obviously a cardinal peacekeeping activity, they represent only a beginning in creating a peaceful future. Many operations have had to deal with the problems of landmines, unexploded ordnance, and in the case of Iraq the stockpiling of all sorts of weapons. Landmines were a problem in Namibia, in Cambodia, in the Middle East, in Cyprus. UNMCTT was specifically tasked to provide mine clearance training and mine awareness training to returning Afghani refugees.

But rebuilding takes many other forms. Building returnee camps, schools, hospitals in Namibia, communications systems in Cambodia, improving hygiene and water quality in Rwanda—all these are also ways of ending war and building for peace. Then there are the less physical structures, such as the expression of political consensus through elections, in Cambodia, for example, or Namibia. Equally important is the direct contact between peacekeepers and the people they are helping, sometimes rendering assistance, getting information, or just having a chat. Peacekeeping at heart is about people, and the direct relationship between peacekeepers and those they are helping is fundamental. The so-called 'revolution in military affairs' may well be of very limited importance to peacekeeping (and as a result may represent a threat to future military peacekeeping, as soldiers focus more than ever on the technological side of their craft).
Problems

The experience of the Second World War created a climate of opinion in Australia favourable to the idea of giving teeth to a system of collective security. In 1944 an opinion poll found that two-thirds of the Australian public favoured proposals to give the League of Nations armed forces after the war. In 1945 there was overwhelming support for Australia’s ratification of the United Nations charter, while just over half the population favoured UN control over the former Japanese mandated territories north of the Equator, with their clear security implications for Australia.

But peacekeeping has gone well beyond the idea of collective security, if it ever had much to do with that at all. Peacekeeping is really about people, not states, but it is bedevilled by the twin ideas of sovereignty and consent. Short of a completely failed state such as Somalia, it is argued that the consent of the parties is necessary, either on moral grounds to avoid breaching sovereignty by intervention within someone’s borders without their consent, or on practical grounds that the necessary force cannot be put on the ground to make such an undertaking acceptably risk-free. The first argument is morally vacuous, because it ignores the fact that in any situation where peacekeeping is needed, the real conflict is not between the partisans of the two sides but between on the one hand those who want to continue the cycle of conflict and violence and, on the other, those on both sides who want peace, cohabitation and the rebuilding of society. The keys of sovereignty are generally in the hands of the bully boys on one or both sides; the consent we are seeking is their consent. Time and again we have simply abandoned the people who want peace while we wait for the warmongers to be ready to stop. To take an extreme example, the Paris peace accords came too late for all too many Cambodians. Nor is Australia innocent here. Our government delayed for weeks in 1994 in announcing a commitment to Rwanda, when an early decision could have helped international efforts to build a multinational force, and while thousands were dying.

As to the question of risk, ultimately that does presumably come down to a question of resources. The Gulf War was probably justified in conception, though not entirely so in manner of execution, but public disquiet with it probably reflected an expectation that other situations, less clearcut as far as national boundaries were concerned, but involving greater human suffering, would not receive any remotely comparable level of resources. By and large, that expectation has been met.

Another side of the sovereignty coin is the problem of lines of command within UN forces, as national governments contribute forces but retain considerable control over them, often I would imagine to the frustration of force commanders, and sometimes with disastrous results. But this problem is well-known, and I do not propose to discuss it further here.

In the end, these are problems which may not be remedied without major (and unlikely) surgery to the UN. A standing UN force seems the only plausible way of reacting quickly to crises. Can we imagine an Australian prime minister who had to react to a threat of invasion by going off and asking the state premiers to contribute some units to an ad hoc force to meet the threat? (On the other hand, the two AlFs did work, but we are here to celebrate regular armies!) Secondly, the UN Charter opens with the words, ‘We the peoples of the United Nations’, but never mentions the peoples again. The UN is a club for national governments, many corrupt, only some democratic, and most imbued with an amoral ethos which values pursuit of their own (perceived) interests ahead of any genuine interest in common good. Only the replacement of the Security Council and the General Assembly with a directly elected General Assembly could solve this problem, but I imagine that solution lies some way in the future.

One other serious problem is the perception that peacekeeping operations have tended to drag on, and in some cases even become an element in the situation militating against a settlement. This is sometimes said, for example, of the UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Yet one must balance any apparent entrenching of the situation at UNFICYP’s hands against the many ways in which, for example, Australia’s police in Cyprus have improved individuals’
lives, by assisting in settlement of local disputes, by helping people cross boundaries when necessary, by generally creating a greater belief in societal order than would exist without them. The alternative sometimes touted about is a short, sharp war to sort things out. This is a nonsense. We could leave UNFICYP there for 100 years without incurring anywhere near the human and economic cost of the shortest, sharpest war.

There is an opposite view, probably of more validity, that we are today in too much haste to withdraw peacekeeping forces before they become bogged down. Robert Patman has argued convincingly that the attempt to find a quick solution to a very complex political situation was a major cause of the disastrous results of peacekeeping in Somalia.23 We will never be able to guarantee the future of any state, no matter how successful a peacekeeping operation has been; Cambodia is a sad example of that. But looking for a quick fix greatly reduces our chances of establishing anything lasting. The current arguments over the future of S-FOR in the former Yugoslavia are a good example of this.

Opportunities

So what does peacekeeping offer us, apart from problems? I do not believe it adds greatly to our security, and the cry of good international citizenship is the plea of those who judge that pseudo altruism is less embarrassing to our society than true altruism. The fundamental advantage we gain is simply the chance to build a little more of the sort of world we would prefer to live in, the world which we believe, morally, should exist. That in itself should be an adequate justification for the use of resources.

Indeed, if we accept the Samuel Huntington view that future history will unfold as a 'clash of civilisations', with inevitable conflict over basic cultural values, then peacekeeping represents one of the best ways for us to attempt to disseminate our values. That is not to deny for a moment that peacekeepers must be sensitive to local culture; yet as soon as we intrude a preference for non-violence, or for the absence of landmines, or for schools and prison systems, or for elected governments, we are in fact promoting a set of cultural beliefs which are our own.

But there is more. Peacekeeping is about people, not only those we are helping, but also our own peacekeepers. To send any group of young Australians to areas of conflict will add immeasurably to our national understanding of a world beyond the TV screen. The Army and other services benefit from real world experience which no training exercise can match, and in an age of marketing campaigns and superficial hype, our soldiers must benefit from making a genuine contribution to the end of conflicts and participating in the rebuilding of nations and communities. As Professor O'Neill has suggested, these are the sort of range of activities in which soldiers of the future will have to be proficient.

More than that, in an age in which the public is probably increasingly cynical about the existence of direct threats to Australia, peacekeeping in its broadest sense may come to be seen by many as the chief justification for having an army at all.
Endnotes

The author acknowledges with gratitude the assistance of a research grant from the Australian Army.


2. The four were chosen within five days and arrived in Batavia five days after that. Cf Shedden to Dedman, 3 September 1947, Diplomasi no 311; Department of External Affairs to Eaton, 8 September 1947, Diplomasi no 321.


6. ‘Report by Cdr HS Chesterman RAN on duties as a Military Observer on the staff of Australian Consul General Batavia Sept 1947-Jan 1948’, AA MP1049/5:1 877/17/63; for dates, see especially Enclosure (iii).

7. ‘Report of Australian military observing officers to the Consul General for Australia on the military situation in Java, August-September 1947’, date approx 1 October 1947, AA AA4355: 7/1/7/6. Part of this document appears as Diplomasi, no 360.


9. For example, in December 1947 Chesterman and another Australian observer, SQRDR LN Kroll, the replacement for Spence, took part in a joint Australian, Belgian and US inspection of the situation on Madura (Report submitted by the Madura observation team to the Committee of Good Offices’, 8 January 1948, UN document S/AC.10/86, AA AA4357:48/255 pt 3).

10. A number of League of Nations’ actions were clear forerunners of the development even of complex peacekeeping under the UN, most notably perhaps the multinational force of over 3000 men which maintained order in the Saar territory in the period leading up to a plebiscite on reunification with Germany in 1935, See, (or example, DW Wainhouse, *International peace observation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), 20-29.


13. Thus recently, for example, Hill and Malik, *Peacekeeping and the United Nations*, 27-32, discuss the origins of peacekeeping entirely in terms of UNSCOB, UNTSO and UNMOGIP. Nor does the UN itself include the two Indonesian operations, UNOGC and UNCI, in its lists of peacekeeping operations. 14. UN Security Council Resolution 525(I), 25 August 1947.

15. Shedden to Department of the Army, 9 September 1947, AA MP742/1: 251/1/2942.

16. Kirby to Burton, 19 November 1947, Diplomasi no 424; Department of External Affairs to Kirby, Renville no 43; Kirby to Burton, Renville no. 50.

17. Eaton to Department of External Affairs, 1 October 1947, AA AA4355: 7/1/7/3; Eaton to Burton, 3 October 1947, Diplomasi no 364.


22. Ibid, 92.

I wish to talk about what we are doing in the Army at the moment. My starting point is the post-Vietnam era and the sorts of considerations we had to make when we started to look at the realities that emerged after President Nixon’s announcement of the Guam Doctrine in 1969. Nixon stated that nations had to be responsible for their own defence within their own regions and the United States would only engage in their defence at the higher levels. When we came back to Australia, moving away from the forward defence policies that had taken us up to the Vietnam War from the Second World War, and we looked around us, we discovered that we had no defence infrastructure. Certainly we had some Second World War infrastructure, mainly mobilisation and industrial infrastructure in the southeast, but we lacked a proper command and control system. We had no effective intelligence systems. We had no effective surveillance systems. We did not have a range of air bases in the north, nor did we have naval bases which could project power along the maritime approaches to the continent. All of those things were important when we had to think about defending ourselves in a self-reliant way in a regional context.

And so we were confronted with a very significant problem of where we were going to get the resources from to do this sort of work. It meant a readjustment in the organisation of the total organisation. It also entailed a very quick realisation that unless we got into harness with the Navy and the Air Force and indeed the civil community, we were not going to be able to do this.

Now, as the historical record shows, the harmony required has not always existed between the services; and it has taken a long time for us to reach a satisfactory level. Throughout this period, of course, we in the Army have fiddled around with the Army structure—first of all combat development guides and Army development guides and so on—seeking some sort of a consensus amongst ourselves, which we could then pass up the line into the joint and politico-strategic environment and get a measure of consensus on the way we should go.

The truth of the matter was that development of force structure priorities within the Department of Defence was a very difficult issue throughout the 1970s and 1980s. It created a lot of acrimony within the organisation. The mechanisms were discordant, to put it mildly, and it was not until the end of the 1980s that we actually produced a Joint Staff, which was capable of conducting a Joint Force Structure Review, which would then determine a framework for the development of the Defence Force.

I was closely involved in this process. I took over from John Coates in 1989 as Assistant Chief of Defence Force Policy. My first task was to address the issue of the higher ADF staff arrangements and processes. This was a difficult task, I might add, but I was given the period from March to May to produce a plan because there were a number of political deadlines associated with it, and as a consequence of that we determined the need to develop a long-term plan for the development of the Defence Force, with a clear set of Defence priorities within which the rest of the staff would be able to get on with the process of developing the force structure, equipment and command and control systems that went with that.

I became Chief of Defence Force Development in 1990 as a consequence of that review, and in 1991 we commenced our first Joint Force Structure Review, the primary purpose of which was to produce a ten year development plan to provide that long-term framework. When we got into this process, we had to question each of the Services about their development basis.
What were they developing their force structure on? When it came to Army, I have to tell you that what Army came forward with was not very convincing.

The idea that we have to have a divisional structure because it is the divisional structure that allows us to develop all the capabilities that we need, is not a very persuasive argument in this sort of forum. But that was the basis on which we had developed the Army throughout the 1970s and 1980s. We got away with the Force Structure Review by virtue of the fact that there was agreement that the Army had to move to the north in order to move along with the bases in the north and we also got away with it to some extent by the development of the Ready Reserve as an offsetting process, as a way of producing force structure on a much broader basis and cheaper cost.

But there was still a lot of unfinished business out of that Force Structure Review, and we still lacked the means to convince people in the defence environment that our force structure priorities were something that they should finance with gleeful certainty that this would be the way for the future, and it was not until after the 1994 White Paper which actually foreshadowed an Army Force Structure Review that we conducted the Army in the 21st Century Review.

I was involved in this from quite an early time. My instructions, so far as they were appropriate at that stage to those involved, were that whatever we did, it had to be bold and innovative, otherwise it would not be able to capture the agenda. But of course it had to be totally relevant to the defence view coming out of the strategic guidance and in that sense had to be part of a joint approach to the development of force structure for the defence of the country, and indeed to enable us to operate with allies both in the region and further abroad in international endeavours.

So the Army 21 Review was carried out not as an Army review but as a Defence review and it was carried out under the steering group of the Vice Chief of the Defence Force and the Deputy Secretary Strategy and Intelligence. Of course there was a very large Army profile in this process and of course whatever we came up with had to have real substance in it. It had to go through a process of analysis and wargaming, and at the same time it had to embrace a broad cross-section of the army in the process so that at the end of the day whatever was agreed at the top had some solid foundation in the army itself.

What did we come up with? Well, essentially we came up with a requirement for a standing army of 53,000. A 53,000-person army consisting of seven Task Forces and a Special Forces group. The idea of these task forces was that they were not simply designed to defend northern Australia, they were designed to operate in the 21st century and to take advantage of the emerging technology which we were becoming increasingly aware of through our association with American and European developments in these things.

What is a task force? I hear people talking about Brigade Groups and I guess we are comfortable with Brigade Groups, but this actually steals something from the idea of a task force. A task force can be anything from 2000 people to 10,000 people. It is an organisation which is inherently flexible. We sent a task force to Vietnam. Essentially, everything that we have sent overseas since the Second World War has been a task force. It has been something put together specifically for the mission it had to carry out. It was not something based on established doctrine or organisation, although elements of it might have been. It was an organisation task-organised. The key elements of it are the command support systems which not only allow it to take on additional elements to adjust its fundamental structure, but also empower the organisation to draw on the joint command and control systems—and also the combined systems where we are operating in an alliance arrangement—and to draw power up from the field and push it into the command and control system. That essentially is what a task force is about. It is essentially designed to be commanded at a one-star level but could be commanded at two-star level.
Those are the structures we have come up with and that is the path we have set ourselves on. We are, of course, going through a process of trial and evaluation to work out exactly what those ingredients of the task forces should look like in the future environment and how those command support systems should work and how the command and control systems should be put in place. And indeed the logistic support which goes with these very flexible and mobile task forces is a complex issue. We have been through a process of analysing that. We have come to the conclusion that we can end up with a lighter and more mobile set of logistics, but I tell you that the logistics concepts we have produced mean that the first and second-line logistics units are taking on inherently the sort of characteristics which we used to attribute to combat and combat support units. The distinctions become less defined. Those sorts of organisations, of course, are designed to operate off the civil infrastructure and also to operate in an expeditionary climate with allies as well.

We are currently going through a process of redefining all our training structure to match the demands of this high technology structure. From Christmas this year, we will see the beginning of the Combined Arms Training and Development Centre at Puckapunyal, with the arrival of the School of Artillery there, colocating with the School of Armour, and eventually all combined arms combat team leaders will be produced out of this organisation. A Combined Arms Training and Development Centre includes a Combined Arms Training Wing and a Doctrine and Development Centre. The essence of the Doctrine Development Centre is to produce a battle laboratory environment which has the capacity to produce a synthetic environment which can integrate with the field training environment and which is translatable into the field.

Now why are we doing all of these sorts of things? Many of the issues that have driven us along this line were touched on by Professor O’Neill in his keynote address. I would simply add that a forum such as this is valuable because it puts our endeavours in the context of the past and tells us where we have come from and what is the essence of our existence.