A CENTURY OF SERVICE:  
100 YEARS OF THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY

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(Details as at time of publication)

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Peter Stanley is Principal Historian at the Australian War Memorial, where he has worked since 1980. His eleven books include The Remote Garrison (1986) (the first general history of the British Army in Australia), Tarakan: an Australian Tragedy (1997), and White Mutiny: British Military Culture in India (1998). He is currently working with Dr Mark Johnston on a study of Australians in the Battle of El Alamein.
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INTRODUCTION
Lieutenant General Peter Cosgrove
Chief of Army

In this year, the centenary of the founding of our nation, it is appropriate that we examine the relationship between Australia and the Army that has grown up with it. The Australian Army came into existence on 1 March 1901, thus making it one of the oldest federal institutions, a fact that I suspect is not understood by the broader Australian community. Defence was not as controversial a federation issue as many of the others, but it was one of the main incentives for it to occur. This low profile seems to have set the scene for defence in the public consciousness for the rest of the century.

Defence issues generally are not at the forefront of current community interest, while debates about the Army's role are even more rarely heard. External events can generate brief flurries of interest and activity, but the normal state is for the Army to feature only rarely in the headlines. Yet evidence suggests that the Army is, and has usually been, held in high regard by the Australian people. Traditional Army activities, such as Base open days, Freedom of Cities ceremonies and military tattoos are well patronised. The early years of the century even saw volunteers serving in the Army unpaid, some even providing their own uniforms. While the numbers of citizens volunteering to serve in the militia, CMF, or Army Reserve have fluctuated over the years, there has always been sufficient to ensure that the part time element is a key component of the Army. Clearly, Army retains a special relationship with the Australian community and must work to ensure it is maintained. Community awareness of Army's history and contribution to the nation is an essential ingredient in the retention of this relationship.

The Australian Army has acquired a reputation, both internationally and, perhaps more importantly, domestically, for professionalism of the highest order. Like the community it serves, the Army has experienced challenges, neglect, upheavals and crises: it has not survived unchanged but it has survived. Inevitably, the Army's experience has been shaped by the nation's experiences and by the nation's expectations of it. In its one hundred year existence, the Army has been at war for 32 years and on peace keeping operations akin to war for a further four years. For the rest—the majority of those years—the influences on the Army have been almost entirely domestic: the Government and the community. While we can all understand the impact of war on the Army, the impact of peace can be just as marked.

Parallels Between the Nation's history and the Army's History

The two World Wars and the Vietnam War are the prominent watersheds in Army's history. They also serve as significant milestones in the history of the nation as a whole. The experience of the Army between these events is identifiably different in each period. What is equally interesting is that these years—largely times of peace—feature distinctly different community experiences as well, including different attitudes towards defence and the Army. More recently, Australia's role in leading the operation in East Timor has the potential to be an important milestone in Australian military and political history.

Federation to World War I

On 1 March 2001, the Australian Army turned one hundred years old. On this date one hundred years ago, control of the various colonial military forces, including permanent soldiers, part time militia and unpaid volunteers was passed from the Colonial authorities to the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth inherited a force of 28,886 of whom just 1500 were permanent soldiers. Along with many of its newly acquired functions, the Commonwealth did not inherit any administrative machinery to manage its new forces. Indeed, it was not until
1904 that the *Defence Act*—which provided the legislative base for the administration of the Defence Force—was finally proclaimed. As a consequence, much of the day-to-day administration of the Army had to be left with the existing state authorities for several years.

This administrative confusion was perhaps reflective of the confusion within the rest of the community over what direction defence policy should take. Independence, emerging nationalism and anti-militarism conflicted with the traditions of Imperial loyalty and deference to London on all matters relating to defence and foreign relations. This conflict delayed passage of the *Defence Act* for several years, was a principal cause of the prohibition on the dispatch overseas of Australia's permanent forces and led to the peacetime tradition of defence underfunding.

Public interest in defence matters was generally low until external events occurred, such as the Japanese victory over the Russian fleet at Tsushima in 1905, or rare internal defence issues, such as the move to compulsory military training, arose.

Yet public interest in soldiering—as opposed to engagement with defence issues—was remarkably high, with over 20,000 serving in each year between 1901 and 1914 and quasi-military institutions, such as rifle clubs, flourishing. This was also the period when nearly all Australians subscribed to the myth that we were 'natural' soldiers, with some innate ability that obviated the need for formal military training. The horrific experiences of World War I quickly disabused us of this notion.

**Between the Wars**

Public attitudes towards the Army after World War I differed markedly from those of the federation period. A combination of war weariness and belief that war would never again occur caused the nation to turn its back on the Army. Immediately on war's end, the Army made plans for a large, peacetime army built around the Militia. It never eventuated. Public apathy and Government cutbacks ensured that recruiting targets were never met, obsolete equipment never replaced and training reduced almost to nothing. All of this was exacerbated by the Great Depression and by muddled strategic thinking. The permanent Army was very poorly treated by Government, individuals being forced to drop back to their substantive rank after the War with little prospect of regaining it. When the Depression bit, the permanent force was arbitrarily sent on leave without pay, the Royal Military College was transferred to Sydney and severely curtailed. All of this occurred with the tacit approval of the Australian community.

One interesting development in this time was the way cost saving drove the strategic assessment process. Government and the community were far too willing to accept proposed solutions to Australia’s defence that were based on low cost and promises of British aid. The Australian government chose to ignore Australian Army advice that any Japanese threat was likely to arise when Britain was fully committed in Europe. The three services had to compete for resources, based on these flawed solutions, rather than co-operate to develop an appropriate level of capability. In such an environment, the manpower intensive, and thus expensive, Army was the loser. The consequence was that, when World War II arrived and bore no relation to the solutions that had determined Government policy in the preceding decades, the Army was even less prepared than it had been in 1914.

**World War II to Vietnam**

The strategic situation confronting Australia in 1946 was markedly different from that in 1919. Australians had been forced to acknowledge geographic reality—that Australia was in Asia. Our international relations had also undergone an upheaval, with the United Kingdom ceasing to be the focus of our foreign and defence policies: although initially at least, many of our military operations were in support of British forces in current or former colonies. These dramatic changes were mirrored by changes in the Army. For the first time, the nation accepted the need to establish and maintain a standing army.
As Australia began to participate more independently in world affairs, the requirements on the Army began to change as well. The need to fight conventional wars remained but the reality was that the Army needed to develop new skills to deal with insurgency movements and low intensity wars of liberation. The Army had to operate in environments in which the actions of platoon leaders had political and international consequences, such as in the Claret operations in Borneo during Confrontation.

It was in this period the Army, for the first time in its history, found itself the target of much hostility and opposition. Many in the community seemed unable to distinguish between government policy and the instrument for implementing that policy. The Army bore much public opprobrium for the unpopularity of the selective national service system and for the war in Vietnam. In the divisive anti-conscription debates of 1916 and 1917, conscription was recognised as a political issue and the public did not hold the Army to account for it. After the 1960s, it took many years to repair the relationship with the community, indeed there remains a strong anti-military sentiment in some parts of contemporary Australian society that has its roots in these troubled years.

**Vietnam to East Timor**

The end of the Vietnam War ushered in the longest continuous period of peace in the nation’s, and thus the Army's, history. This provided the opportunity for much of the Vietnam bitterness to wash out of society. It also provided the longest single period for changing societal values to impact on the Army. The last decade especially has seen dramatic change in traditional Army culture, with women occupying mainstream functional and command positions, and deliberate attempts being made to widen the ethnic composition of the force. Much attention has been given to establishing standards of conduct and operation that reflect current community expectations.

Like the community, the Army has had to deal with the rapid advances in technology over the last decade. While the basic function of our infantry remains the destruction of the enemy and the seizing of ground, the range of new resources the soldier has available to help him achieve this has multiplied enormously. From sophisticated optical sights on his personal weapon to highly capable command and control systems that provide him with all the information he needs, technology has once again revolutionised the battlefield. Like the community, the Army is likely to get little respite from the constant upheavals of technological change.

**East Timor and Beyond**

The experience of East Timor has been a major event in the Army's history. It was a test of our ability to operate effectively in our immediate geographic region, lead a multinational force and operate at the three levels of military engagement, the strategic, the operational and the tactical level. Historically, Australia has fought as a junior partner in the armies of our large allies, first Britain, then the United States, and finally the United Nations. In East Timor, Australia was required to play this lead role. It was a new experience for the nation as well—international relations being directly affected by Australian decisions and actions alone. Whether this will have any ongoing impact on the community or the Army, only the coming century will reveal.
Official military history can be defined as that form of historical work done within and for a military institution. Naturally, such a general definition obscures any number of reservations, conditions and contingencies, but it is a good starting point for how one might see this subvariant of historical practice today. As a concept, official military history seems new; it seems to belong to the age of institutions, of organisations, of bureaucracies—in other words, to the modern age. Yet, if one remembers the purposes of official military history—casting experience into useful form—the practice must be very old indeed. From the very beginning of historical practice in the west, history at large and military history in particular have been aimed at learning from one’s mistakes, or better yet, the mistakes of others. Armies must always have wanted more information, more knowledge than they had. Armies that found themselves deficient in information could fight their way through ignorance, if they were lucky, but knowledge was a way of hedging one’s bets. In the eighteenth century and gradually thereafter, armies increasingly decided that knowledge was preferable to luck, and that they should begin to invest some of their time and treasure in the disciplined, systematic collection and analysis of information. Other varieties of history might yet be dismissed as a luxury or worse, as merely a hobby for the antiquarian, but military history was believed to possess certain operationally useful properties. By the nineteenth century, military officers were being chosen to serve as historians as an integral part of the new, evolving general staff culture in the West.

So we can date the appearance of modern official military history with some precision. Professor Jay Luvaas considers Baron Henri Jomini the first official historian, working under Napoleon’s patronage. We may suspect, however, that what Napoleon had in mind was his own good standing in the historical afterlife rather than good history per se. Captain William Siborne’s Waterloo researches during the 1830s, supported by the British Army, falls close to official history, or at least official commemoration. Siborne’s mission was to reconstruct in miniature the battle at the height of crisis, not to write a book, although he could not be prevented from doing that as well. He based his reconstruction on the straightforwardly tendentious notion that the winners of a battle knew more about the event than the losers, and in keeping with this notion he wrote letters chiefly to British survivors of the battle—survivors who had outlived the battle itself by an extra fifteen years or so. Later in the century, Siborne’s son, who had himself risen to the rank of major general, collected all his father’s Waterloo letters and published what is still today one of the most compact, useful sources on the battle.

Britain’s official military histories date from just after the Crimean War. The first project was not very successful and was quite publicly condemned in—of all places—the pages of the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution. The two authors, both army officers who could not disentangle their regimental prejudices from their authorial responsibilities, disliked each other and would not agree about what were the ‘major lessons’ of the siege of Sebastopol. Alas, now we shall never know.

Official history, as it evolved within the general staff culture, seemed to suit the Prussians and then later the Germans very well indeed. Almost at the outset, their official histories were regarded as having set the gold standard for such enterprises. Other European armies imitated their highly detailed approach and comprehensive scope. Given a choice between comprehensiveness or profundity of thought, the Germans always chose the former and so did their imitators, so that a proper staff history, ‘crammed full of facts and dull,’ might depict ‘a picture of war on a gigantic scale, slowly unrolled before the reader, with all its complex purpose and involved action calmly traced by a master hand.’

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ARMIES IN HISTORY, HISTORY IN ARMIES
Roger Spiller
The United States' first entry into official military history was inspired by a suggestion during the Civil War from General Henry Halleck, President Lincoln's military advisor, a suggestion that led to the eventual publication of the 128 volumes of *The Official Records of the War of the Rebellion*. The whole *Official Records* project spanned nearly forty years, and some sort of official military history work has been underway in the United States ever since.\(^5\)

By the time of the Russo-Japanese War, leading armies had recognised the need for obtaining and analysing operational and tactical data that might be of practical use in future, and military history offered the best means by which these analyses could be conducted. Just at the turn of the century, however, we are seeing other fields beginning to make their first contributions toward the understanding of modern war. Ivan Bloch's six-volume *magnum opus*, arguing the futility of future war by means of innovative, if crude, econometric analyses, posed one of the first direct challenges to history as the best way of viewing war present or past.\(^6\) History would persist as the intellectual mode for some time still, however. Great multi-volume official histories of this war were completed by both the Russians and the Japanese, and also by officers from several of the observing armies—the Germans, the French, and the British. The Americans reported their observations to headquarters, but one could not call these reports histories as such.\(^7\) All these works possessed a kind of Victorian stateliness, proceeding along similar lines from strategic appreciation to operational analysis to tactical exposition, written in the bloodless prose common to the professional's pose at the time.

These histories stand now as the very embodiment of that day's professional military knowledge. Legend around my own staff college has it that General William T. Sherman contributed a number of military works from his own library in order to get our library a good start. But when I arrived, the foundation stones of what is now a magnificent library were these very official histories—the German, French, British and Russian versions of the Russo-Japanese and other recent wars. Given the state of military history in general and official military history in particular, one could not have done better at the time than acquire these works. Strange to say, at the beginning of the twentieth century, military history of the academic sort in the United States had some growing to do. Not until after World War II could it be said that civilian academicians were gaining any ground on either the volume or the quality of military history produced under official auspices.

Official history projects represented a considerable investment in a nation's treasure, but they carried a certain emotional investment too, as when an Austrian officer was removed from the active list because he dared criticise his country's official history of the Austrian campaign of 1849. There was the celebrated case of the German general who challenged a crippled veteran to a duel because the veteran had taken issue in print with the general's official historical work. By the turn of the century, however, official military historical work had transcended these eccentricities by producing books of real and lasting intellectual and professional military value. This audience certainly needs no reminding of the work of C.E.W. Bean during and after the Great War and his important role in shaping Australia's national self-image. So far as can be told, however, no one ever challenged Bean to a duel.\(^8\)

The impulse to commemorate the nation's sacrifice was perhaps the most elementary motive behind all these projects. The record of that sacrifice had to be collected and set down in some useful form. Perhaps behind these tasks lay the understanding that a kind of accounting had to be rendered, not only for posterity but for the society that gave life and sustenance to the army itself. Modern official historians may be forgiven if they lay claim to the ancient fathers of history itself as their intellectual forebears. Motives such as these would not have seemed strange to Thucydides.

So, even though military history, officially committed, has been in operation for rather a long time, in my country one would search university curricula in vain for any mention of it. As far as I know, apart from programs in what is called 'public history'— by which is usually meant foundation, park, museum or memorial work—there are no courses in how the historian might actually practice in an environment that is not strictly academic. The conceit is that if one is up to doing the academic work necessary to stack up letters behind one's name, one is naturally
qualified to practice in all possible environments—academic, institutional, commercial, or official. This is demonstrably not true. Perhaps, then, the academic might deign to pay attention to this matter, because while the craft of official history offers professional challenges unlikely to be encountered elsewhere, it is very poorly understood within the profession itself. I think the following case is very much to this point.

In the spring of 1959, the British military writer B.H. Liddell Hart published an essay in the journal, Military Affairs, entitled, 'Responsibility and Judgment in Historical Writing'. He began by describing the several ways a historian might find himself subordinated to a raison d'être other than the pursuit of historical truth—the 'scientific' pursuit of historical truth, as he put it.

Standing in the way of truth, he wrote, were 'so many people [who] are compelled to cover up truth, often against their inclination, by the requirements of their jobs'. These were historians who had submitted to what Liddell Hart saw as 'an inevitable condition of service for anyone who is a servant of Government or any other institution: a political party, a religious body, or a commercial firm'. In all such cases, the outcome was predictable: something less than truth, official truth masquerading as truth. Or, the reader was left to infer, official lying.

While Liddell Hart was suspicious of historians with associations of any kind, he reserved his most trenchant remarks for those who worked as official military historians. He thought it was time to say 'Official History' is a contradiction in terms—the word 'official' tends to qualify, and often cancels out the word 'history'. Furthermore, 'the worst examples of suppression and distortion', he wrote, 'have been in the field of military history—since this has usually been entrusted to, or undertaken by, men who were brought up in a profession where obedience and loyalty to authority are inculcated as the prime virtues'—that is to say, military officers themselves. He did not consider the possibility that an officer's loyalties might actually assist in the discovery of scientific truth.

As it happened, Liddell Hart had one particular officer in mind as an example. This was Brigadier J.E. Edmonds, who had been placed in charge of producing the British Army's official military histories of the Great War, and in whom, Liddell Hart wrote, 'the effect is all too strikingly illustrated'. Liddell Hart did not tell his readers, however, that he and Brigadier Edmonds had a long and complex association that dated well back into the 1920s. In those days, before achieving public notice as a military critic with the Daily Telegraph and as a military historian in his own right, Liddell Hart saw Edmonds quite often. The relationship was important to Liddell Hart, who, having been medically decommissioned, was then making his start in journalism. It was also important because Edmonds was evidently something of a gossip. Today, journalists might characterise him as 'a source who wishes to remain anonymous'.

And, indeed, Edmonds did have a curious working philosophy. When he met with Liddell Hart, he would reveal information—information of the sort that, today, would be regarded as 'privileged', much as that shared by lawyer and client or doctor and patient—gleaned from his own official work on the history of the Great War. Edmonds clearly delighted in contributing to Liddell Hart's growing disillusionment with the war's generals, and in the 25,000 boxes of documents there was more than enough available to scandalise every meeting with Liddell Hart or anyone else for quite a long time. By the mid 1920s, more and more knowledgeable criticism of the conduct of the war was reaching the general public, very little of it redounding to the credit of the generals. But while Edmonds would tattle about his fellow officers to Liddell Hart and who knows how many others, he would not himself make the juicy bits public. Those who were really in the know, he said, would be able to 'read between the lines' of his Official History when it finally did come out.

No doubt Liddell Hart was flattered to be included among the cognoscenti. Fed horror stories by Edmonds, thoroughly attuned to the critical histories and memoirs that seemed to appear daily, Liddell Hart grew less forgiving of Allied war leaders. In the earlier days of his relationship with Edmonds, Liddell Hart had been rather more forgiving of the generals. That, most assuredly, would change.
By the mid 1920s, Liddell Hart had also formed an intellectual and personal alliance with the formidable J.F.C. Fuller, then Colonel, British Army, and very possibly the only human being Liddell Hart would ever regard as possessing an intellect and military knowledge superior to his own. Of course, Liddell Hart was very much the junior partner at the beginning of this relationship, just after the war. Reading through their earliest correspondence, while Liddell Hart was still on active service as a captain, detailed to write infantry tactical doctrine, one is impressed by his skilful dealings with the prickly Fuller. Liddell Hart's own intellect obviously impressed Fuller and before long the two were corresponding as near equals. I believe it does Liddell Hart no disservice to observe that this was as much because of Fuller's own personality as because of Liddell Hart's brilliance. Fuller was incessantly critical, but for him only ideas seemed to be worth arguing over. He certainly refused to stand on the dignity of his rank alone. When he took up an appointment in 1923 as an instructor at the Staff College at Camberley, he amazed his students (and no doubt scandalised the rest of the faculty) by announcing, 'Nothing clarifies true knowledge like a free exchange of ideas; consequently, because I happen to be a Colonel and you a captain or major, do not imagine for a moment that rank is a bar to free speech'.

Toward the end of his tenure at Camberley, Fuller published *The Foundations of the Science of War*, an eccentric and not particularly successful book which aimed to reduce modern war to a universal principle that might guide the soldier's actions, regardless of where or when those actions might occur. As Fuller would admit later, the book was gratuitously complex, and the reviewers reacted accordingly. An anonymous review in *The Army Quarterly* offered the hope that the young 'might not take it too seriously'. Characteristically, Fuller would not contribute to his own defence. 'I am trying to work out a science of war and not a *vade mecum* for fools', he said. No doubt this mulish behavior only encouraged the critics, one of whom was none other than Brigadier Edmonds himself. In a crushing, ridiculing review for *The Army Quarterly*, Edmonds belittled Fuller's so-called 'universal principle'—a crackbrained, pseudo-mystical fantasy cribbed from his studies of the occult during his younger days in India. What is more amazing is that any part of Fuller's *Foundations* was regarded as worthy of any attention after such a public drubbing. But it did. Even with its defects, *Foundations* is worth anyone's time.

By the late 1920s, Liddell Hart was outgrowing his tutorials with both Fuller and Edmonds. His correspondence, always assertively confident, grew increasingly contentious, as did his journalism and his writing in general. Tolerated by an amazingly forgiving military establishment, Fuller could afford to play the intellectual buccaneer, but Liddell Hart, living by his balance as a man of affairs, had no safety net to catch him if he imitated Fuller too closely. If Liddell Hart was coming to see Edmonds as the 'kept man', that put Liddell Hart somewhere between the two men. No doubt, Liddell Hart fancied himself as having created an environment of his own particular design, free from unwonted influences, one of near clinical purity. In reality, Liddell Hart alternated between these two models, Fuller the eccentric, Edmonds the insider, like a shuttlecock.

By the 1930s, Liddell Hart's relations with both men cooled. His correspondence with Edmonds grew quite adversarial. His judgment of British generalship had grown progressively more critical, so much so that he had alienated any number of his official contacts in the Army. At one point, Liddell Hart wrote bluntly to Edmonds, 'No one has given me clearer evidence of the deficiencies of our higher leaders as individuals than you have, yet you are inclined to pretend that, collectively, they were up to the problem they had to face'. In effect, the two men had switched opinions with one another, with Edmonds then defending, Liddell Hart attacking, Britain's wartime leadership. Of course, Liddell Hart would have said he was right on either side, and Edmonds was wrong. Edmonds was beyond the pale, now. Everything he touched was corrupted or corrupting, and in the process had become for him the very embodiment of the official military historian. Here is Liddell Hart, writing in 1933:

> Not a few military historians have admitted that they feel compelled by position, interest or friendship, to put down less than they know to be true. Once a man surrenders to this tendency the truth begins to slip away like water down a wastepipe— until those who want to learn how to conduct war in the future are unknowingly bathing their minds in a shallow bath.
Here, as in his *Military Affairs* essay so many years later, Liddell Hart is begging several questions. Being part of an official establishment is not a precondition for self-censorship. Independent or academic historians have shown themselves to be quite capable of withholding all manner of information, even distorting it at times. So can those who work within large institutions. For the better part of fifty years, official military historians produced huge multi-volume studies of the Second World War. Information that has come to light since these were published quite often revises or even overthrows the official story. To what degree should these histories be relied upon now? The answer, I think, is quite straightforward: official history is just as vulnerable to corruption or manipulation as any other sort of history.

The historian's environment is no guarantee one way or another of what Liddell Hart would see as 'scientific truth'. Those of us who use history, whether scholar or general reader, should not at any time surrender our own critical faculties. We are the ones Liddell Hart left out of his equation. In the end, it is we who will decide whether the work in our hands has been corrupted. Liddell Hart seems to have imagined that we would give up the privilege of that decision to the historian. Why would he think so?

Liddell Hart insisted on being thought right at all times. A brief examination of his papers, dating from later in his life, reveals a near-obsessive compulsion to argue and re-argue points he had made in books years before. I think this is because Liddell Hart, like Fuller, was essentially an autodidact, unschooled in the exchange of ideas, and therefore much less interested in explaining than in convincing. There is a very strong polemical element in the work of both men. They consider themselves most successful when there are no more arguments for them to meet, and for Liddell Hart in particular, success had very practical, personal consequences.

Ironically, Liddell Hart's own relationship to 'scientific truth' has come under close examination in recent years. *Liddell Hart and the Weight of History*, by John Mearsheimer, appeared in 1988, to no small amount of controversy in the United Kingdom. Mearsheimer's thesis was that Liddell Hart conducted a very deliberate campaign to rehabilitate his reputation after the Second World War, and that he did this in no small part by distorting and manipulating the record of his prewar activities.

It is no secret at all that Liddell Hart's dalliance in defence politics before the war led to his being banished from official circles during the war. Very much in keeping with the public opinion in Great Britain at the time, Liddell Hart championed very conservative defence policies while serving as a shadow advisor to Chamberlain's Secretary of State for War, Leslie Hore-Belisha. Liddell Hart's so-called 'limited liability' approach called for reducing Britain's commitment to continental defence to an absolute minimum in order to avoid being dragged into another disastrous war. He was certainly not alone at the time, but after Chamberlain, after Munich, and after May, 1940, he must have felt so.

At some point Liddell Hart had begun to consider himself a man of affairs as much as a man of ideas. His ideas and his writings had brought him greater and greater public attention. Those who were impressed by the workings of his mind and his pen solicited his views on subjects beyond the range of his historical research. Such was Liddell Hart's view of the functions of history that he would have seen these developments as merely the natural outgrowth of his historical work. Both Liddell Hart and Fuller were not unlike other historians of the day who believed that cautionary lessons could be deduced from any historical subject, and that these lessons could be directly and rather literally applied to the present. Both men measured their success at least in part by the degree to which the lessons they promoted were adopted by modern military institutions. This is a self-deception perhaps as old as history itself, and one that makes modern historians shift in their seats. In Liddell Hart's case, the illusion led to his nearly complete eclipse as an influence on British military policy during the war.

For all his confidence and self-assured worldliness, I suspect Liddell Hart had a very incomplete view of what he was getting into when he began to involve himself in contemporary defence policy. He thought he had a storehouse full of lessons; if only
blockheaded officialdom would take heed, the mistakes and miscalculations of the past could be avoided. This was his message to his readers almost from the beginning: the assumption of superior knowledge and the wisdom that was created by its acquisition. I do not think he understood that a subtle change in his relationship to officialdom had occurred. He believed he was applying history. In fact he was applying himself—two very different things. If I seem altogether too completely convinced of this difference, I might add, by way of extenuation, that I have been convinced in quite a direct way.

In the late 1970s, I joined a group inside the US Army's staff college that in many ways would test Liddell Hart's dim view of official history. This group, which came to be called the Combat Studies Institute, had the idea that military historians might be used to investigate the historical and common sense of military doctrines as they were being written, or, perhaps, even before. Our task required us to make ourselves into close students of contemporary foreign and defence issues, including innovations in military technology, in the military thought of other nations, and any other matter of significance to the Army of the present. None of these ambitions could be said to have been very new. As I noted earlier, military history was until the twentieth century the dominating mode by which warfare was analysed, if indeed any analysis was performed at all. Against our background of contemporary knowledge, we argued, our historical knowledge might once more prove itself as a useful means of analysis. I recall there was a great deal of enthusiastic talk at the time about what was called 'historical mindedness', and references to 'the historical mind', just as one might refer to the 'legal mind' or the 'scientific mind'. The thought was that a certain frame of mind was imparted while preparing for a professional life in these other fields, so why not history? Indeed, the employment of military history in this way was very close to what Fuller and Liddell Hart thought they were doing in the interwar period. But there was no doubt, either, that several of us thought our historical souls were in danger. I was fairly certain I would never be admitted to the company of historians ever again.

But, between this small group as I found it in the late 1970s, and Fuller and Liddell Hart's circle between the wars, were several important differences. Fuller and Liddell Hart had an agenda. We had none. While Liddell Hart's mission was to convince, ours was to examine. The distinction is critical, and it comes down to how one knows whether one is successful. For Liddell Hart perhaps even more than Fuller, being able to draw a straight line between what he has argued and what has been officially adopted was a matter of paramount importance. By contrast, when we received a problem, we studied it as comprehensively and objectively as possible and forwarded our findings without regard to any official positions then held. To my knowledge, we never asked, nor were we ever told, whether 'the Army' had a position on the question under review. Our attitude was that if our elders and betters did not want to know what we thought, they had better not ask us. Nor did we keep score on ourselves. We understood very well that we were not the only people being asked about these matters. We believed that the worth of what was being done would be evident over the long term.15

The formation of this group worked a subtle change on official military history as it was practised then. I do not think we quite realised it at the time, but official military history was being 'operationalised', for lack of a better word. We were conducting analyses of contemporary developments with the techniques and standards we had been taught as historians. We were not really in the business of applying history. We were really applying the historians themselves. I think that, in fact, was what Liddell Hart was actually attempting to do when he became entangled in military policy.

I did not really understand this distinction, oddly, until I left the staff college for an operational job at the headquarters of one of our joint commands. No one wanted to be lectured on history there. Things were moving too fast to retire to a classroom. Everyone's judgment was tested daily. In the case of some of my colleagues, the basis of their judgment was long field experience; in others, long experience at the national staff level. The basis of my judgment was a very long memory that was not entirely my own. When the In-Box filled up, only good solutions counted. No one seemed to bother much with how one arrived at them. I discovered that staff work was interdisciplinary. No one mentality would ever be allowed to dominate it. Nor, indeed, should it. But any staff work that occurs without a keen understanding of the historical foundation of the question under the glass is doomed to be stunted, and less useful than it would be otherwise.
When I think of Liddell Hart in such a light, I believe he was asking too much of the history he wrote. When he expected his views to be adopted without cavil he betrayed a fundamental misunderstanding not only of how modern historical knowledge worked, but also of how modern bureaucratic government worked. He expected too direct a correlation between cause and effect, and he expected that the agency of change would always come in the dramatic form of a human being. But all too often, routines and processes determined courses of official action. If the modern official historian means to traffic in this environment, he should not assume that this sort of work in these sorts of places will come to him naturally, or automatically by virtue of his training. It does not.

I had occasion once to talk with an army officer who had served in Whitehall when Liddell Hart was at the zenith of his pseudo-official power. Every few days, he said, Basil would call up on the telephone, full of enthusiasm for this or that scheme, and go on at length. It was only necessary for the officer to reply occasionally, 'yes', or 'Hmm', 'I see', or 'most impressive'. Then, having extinguished his enthusiasm, Liddell Hart would ring off. He always had something interesting to say, recalled this officer, but it was always rather remote from what he saw on his desk. When I asked him if he could remember just one thing from those conversations, he said no, he couldn't.

Years ago, C.P. Snow, later Lord Snow, wrote what I think must be the best description, drawn from his own long experience, of how policy is advanced in modern government. 'One saw policy', Snow wrote, 'shaped under one's eyes by a series of small decisions. (In fact, it was rare for policy to be clearly thought out, though some romantics or worshippers of "great men" liked to think so. Usually it built itself from a thousand small arrangements, ideas, compromises, bits of give-and-take. There was not much which was decisively changed by a human will.)'16

In his Military Affairs article, Liddell Hart writes of the historian's responsibility toward his craft, and no historian would disagree. But I believe the military historian has an additional responsibility, one that does not much trouble the social historian or the medieval historian or the ancient historian. Military history distinguishes itself by the very intimate connection between thought and action. There is always the very real possibility that someone will actually be influenced by what one has written, and indeed that was what both Liddell Hart and Fuller wanted when both were at the height of their powers. But the exercise of influence is no proof of having achieved historical truth. Liddell Hart says nothing about his responsibility to those who listened to him or read his work and accepted its findings. A keen appreciation of that responsibility might well have encouraged a good deal more moderation on his part, just when he needed it the most.

Perhaps if Liddell Hart were with us today he would reconsider his position. He would see, I hope, that the practice of military history, whether in official or academic venues, has changed considerably in the last quarter-century, and that we have learned (or remembered) a great deal about how to win for history the esteem it deserves and we need. Those of us who have been involved in these changes hope they are for the better, but we do not know for sure. Perhaps after a thousand small arrangements, ideas, compromises, bits of give and take, we will know how wrong we are.
Endnotes

3. Luvaas, 'The First British Official Historians', 51. The characterisation is Luvaas's, and no one could disagree.
4. Ibid.
5. No history or official historical work in the United States has ever been published, but a widely available bound typescript, written by Stetson Conn, is a very good general view. Stetson Conn, 'Historical Work in the United States Army, 1862-1954' (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1980).
9. As we shall see, Liddell Hart had been making this complaint for some time.
12. These remarks are based on my own reading of the Fuller-Liddell Hart correspondence at the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London. Fuller's remarks before his staff college students are recorded in Brian Holden Reid's J.F.C. Fuller: Military Thinker (New York: St Martin's Press, 1987), 83.
13. Holden Reid, Fuller, 81-7.
15. I have written about this period elsewhere. See 'War History and the History Wars: Establishing the Combat Studies Institute', The Public Historian 10:4 (Fall, 1988), 65-81. However, Dr Brooks Kleber, at the time the US Army Training and Doctrine Command's command historian, was the author of the phrase, 'historical mindedness'.
16. C.P. Snow, 'The Light and the Dark', in Strangers and Brothers (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1972), 244.
A CENTURY OF SERVICE:
100 YEARS OF THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY

FROM DEAKIN TO DIBB: THE ARMY AND THE MAKING OF AUSTRALIAN STRATEGY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Michael Evans

On 30 June 1911 Colonel James Whiteside McCay, Director of Intelligence in the Citizen Military Force (CMF) and a former Minister for Defence in the 1904-5 Reid-McClean Government, delivered an important address to the Victorian United Services Institute in Melbourne on the subject of 'The True Principles of Australian Defence'. In the years between Federation in 1901 and the outbreak of World War I in 1914, Colonel McCay was regarded as a leading military expert and one of Australia's best-educated citizen soldiers. This high standing was reflected by his later service in World War I as Inspector-General of the First Australian Imperial Force (1st AIF) and as commander of the First Infantry Brigade at Gallipoli and of the Fifth Division on the Western Front.

McCay's 1911 United Services address represents one of the best expositions of the enduring dilemmas successive generations of Australian strategists have faced since Federation. He identified two major philosophical problems that were beginning to develop in the strategic thought of the ten-year old Australian Commonwealth. The first problem was the growing schism between defence for local and national needs and defence for overseas and Imperial needs. A second and a related issue, was the tendency of many Australians to view the Royal Navy as the nation's front line force while relegating land forces to a passive role of territorial defence. 'The picture in the mind's eye of the public', lamented McCay, 'is [of] one huge ditch around the Australian coast with soldiers in khaki at regular intervals peering over its edge, and gripping rifles with tense hands.' McCay compared the desire to prepare only for local territorial defence to that of a man who designs his house to protect against solitary burglars while refusing to participate in measures to secure his neighbourhood against the depredations of organised brigands. He warned his United Services audience against trying to develop land forces only to defend the vast expanse of Australian territory. For McCay, the capacity to defend Australian interests anywhere rather than Australian territory everywhere was the key to the proper use of land forces. As he put it:

> Our field army must be in the highest degree mobile, ready to concentrate anywhere, march anywhere and fight anywhere—not everywhere ... It is better to invade than be invaded; better to carry the war into the enemy's country than to wait for the war to come to you; better to attack than defend, and better to go to the firing line than to be a reserve which waits for the enemy's firing line to come to it.

The issues outlined by Colonel McCay in 1911—local versus overseas defence; naval defence versus military defence and whether Australia should have an army designed to protect Australian territory everywhere or a force capable of upholding Australian interests anywhere—were to dominate the twentieth century. They are still present today—as even a cursory glance at the recent White Paper, Defence 2000, will reveal. The language of Australian strategy may change; particulars may differ; protagonists may come and go; but the essence of the defence debate remains unchanged. The dichotomy between local and overseas defence, between everywhere and anywhere has been perhaps the key factor in shaping the historical character and strategic outlook of the Australian Army in the century since Federation. To extend McCay's metaphor: in peacetime there has been a constant tendency to view the Army as a local constabulary designed to deal with random burglars rather than as an expeditionary force designed to meet organised brigands overseas.
Yet in pursuing the objective of an army designed largely for national territorial defence, Australian strategists have often been trapped between the contending forces of strategic theory and strategic reality. The peacetime defence programs whose intellectual foundations are associated with Alfred Deakin in the first decade of Federation and with Paul Dibb during the last decade and a half of the twentieth century are cases in point. In both instances, defence schemes that sought to focus the Army on local geographic defence were abandoned because the pressure of international events proved to be more important to the nation than the protection offered from an immutable strategic geography.

In the century framed at beginning and end by the ideas associated with the names of Deakin and Dibb, Australian peacetime strategy sought to emphasise the primacy of naval and later, sea-air forces, over land forces only to find that, in time of war or security crisis, the need has been mainly for soldiers. This was true of the World Wars, of Korea and Vietnam, of Malaya and Konfrontasi, of Somalia and, more recently, of East Timor. Because Australian strategic theory in peace has usually failed to anticipate the reality of military crisis, the Army has often been unprepared, underfunded and undermanned for operations in the field. It is, then, this striking paradox between irrelevance and neglect in peacetime defence policy and frenetic importance in times of military crisis that lies at the heart of the Australian Army's history in the twentieth century.

This essay seeks to provide a thematic overview of the place of the Army in the making of Australian strategy over the past century. Four areas are addressed. First, the ambiguous place of the Army in Australian strategic thinking in the era of Empire from Federation in 1901 to the outbreak of World War II in 1939 is examined. It is argued that that for much of the first half of the twentieth century there was a striking paradox between the theory of Australia's peacetime strategic planning and the reality of its wartime practice. In the Empire era, Australia neglected its peacetime land forces in favour of naval forces only to find that, in both world wars, it was soldiers rather than sailors that proved to be the dominant instrument of national strategy.

Second, the firm relationship between Australian strategy and the use of land forces as reflected by the development of a Regular Army in the first half of the Cold War is explored. The two decades between commitment in Korea in 1950 and military withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972—sometimes derided as the Forward Defence era—represent the only time in the twentieth century outside of the world wars when Australia's strategy, threat perception and the role of the Army reached a situation of approximate equilibrium. Third, a snapshot of the long and difficult Defence of Australia era from 1972-97 is provided. During this period, the Army's role in Australian strategy declined to a level not seen since the grim days of the 1930s. Fourth, the contours and future implications of the Army's post-1997 resurgence in Australian strategy are outlined and analysed.

The Army and Australian Strategy in the Era of Empire, 1901-39

The first decade of Federation confronted Australia with the enduring problem of reconciling national self-defence with Imperial strategic commitment. In 1907 Alfred Deakin could voice his belief in the need for a national defence effort 'of the people, for the people and by the people'. But in practice, as Deakin and other Federation politicians such as Andrew Fisher and Joseph Cook soon came to realise, a self-reliant defence policy was insufficient. Self-reliance was simply no guarantee of Australian security against the rise of a great power like Japan. Deakin and his successors therefore sought a solution through creating a balance between the demands of national and imperial defence. In May 1906 the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) advised Deakin: 'it is evident that so long as British naval strength is calculated and maintained ... attacks upon the Australian littoral against which land defence is required will be limited to raids hastily carried out by single vessels or small squadrons which have temporarily evaded our Naval Forces'.

By 1911 Australia had largely adopted this appreciation as the basis of its strategic thinking and it was an approach that was to last until 1939. Australia undertook a commitment to assist British imperial naval power by creating a Royal Australian Navy (RAN). For its part, an
Australian Army based on a large citizen militia force (CMF) and a small permanent force would ensure local territorial defence—mainly viewed as repelling raids and defending garrisons and coastal defences. Since the 1903 Defence Act restricted military service to Australian soil, the capacity to field an expeditionary force for overseas service was dependent first, on the outbreak of an actual crisis, and second, on the recruitment of volunteers. It was then, this curious blend of external navalism and internal military self-reliance that characterised Australian strategy in the era of Empire from 1901-39.

Few in the Army's Permanent Force during the Federation era contested the importance that Deakin attached to blue-water sea power. Australia was, after all, an island continent. Nonetheless, some of the leading soldiers of the day such as Major General Sir Edward Hutton and the future generals W.T. Bridges and C.B. Brudenell White questioned the passive strategic role afforded to the Army. Hutton was the main intellectual architect of the Army's claim to a broader and more significant role in Australian strategy. He was not deterred by the emphasis in Australian strategy on naval power. As he noted in his famous April 1902 Minute upon the Defence of Australia, it was precisely because Australia was an island-nation that her land forces could not be confined to a 'purely passive' territorial strategy. Australia had to be prepared to defend not simply her own landmass but also 'the vast interests beyond her shores upon the maintenance of which her present existence and her future prosperity must so largely depend'. In short, Hutton believed that Australia's maritime interests and her cultural affinity with the core values of Western civilisation would always mean that her soldiers would have to fight overseas for causes that transcended local geography.

Hutton was right. For all the emphasis on sea power in Australian strategy and defence policy from 1901-14, Australia's naval contribution was of marginal importance during the First World War. In contrast the 1st AIF on the Western Front played a central role in the vital battles of 1918. When Prime Minister Billy Hughes went to Versailles in 1919 to represent Australia he went as 'the little Digger' who justified his seat at the peace conference with the famous words. "I represent 60,000 dead". It was the first, and perhaps most graphic example, of peacetime strategic theory failing to match wartime reality.

The preeminent role played by the Army between 1915-18 was not reflected in Australian strategy during the inter-war years. As it had done before World War I, Australia quickly reverted to the primacy of naval defence—this time in the form of the Singapore strategy. The Army's official position on inter-war Australian defence strategy was formulated as early as February 1920 in the Report on the Military Defence of Australia drawn up by a Conference of Senior Officers chaired by Lieutenant General Sir Harry Chauvel. The 1920 Chauvel Report identified Japan as Australia's 'only potential and probable enemy' and sought to provide a land force of 180,000 troops based on seven infantry and cavalry divisions to meet a possible Japanese invasion. In August 1928 a Defence Committee appreciation reaffirmed the main thrust of die Army's argument in the 1920 Report. The appreciation stated that Japan could embark and maintain three army divisions and thus 'invasion of Australia, but only on a limited scale, is within the bounds of possibility and not so improbable as to allow it being definitely ruled out'.

However, any opportunity that the Army might have had to implement counterinvasion strategy was dispelled by the combined impact of Washington disarmament conference of 1922; the adoption of the Singapore strategy in 1923; and by the coming of the Great Depression in 1929. These three events reinforced Australia's preference for seeking security under the umbrella of the Royal Navy. Between 1929-32, the Army was in cut to the bone; compulsory service was suspended and militia strength dropped from over 46,000 in February 1929 to less than 26,000 by early 1930. In April 1930, Chauvel was moved to warn the Defence Committee that a possible Japanese invasion represented 'a vital danger' to Australia against which adequate land forces and shorebased air forces needed to be maintained. However, the Chief of the Naval Staff, Rear Admiral W. Munro Kerr, remained 'strongly of the opinion that the naval strength of the Empire is a sufficient insurance against invasion."

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In the Depression conditions of the 1930s, the corollary of a navalist approach to defence became the official abandonment of anti-invasion strategic planning on land. In 1932, and echoing the 1906 recommendation of the Committee of Imperial Defence, the Lyons Government decided 'that it would be better to provide efficient protection against raids rather than inefficient measures against invasion'. Counter-invasion planning was reduced to theoretical attention in staff-militia exercises and by 1938 the Australian Army was little more than a hollow shell, poorly manned and inadequately equipped.

The Chiefs of the General Staff for most of the 1930s, Major Generals Julius Bruche and John Lavarack, did not accept the stratjacket of fiscal decline and the raids strategy without protest. Bruche described planning for sporadic raids on land as 'definitely unsound and insupportable'; Lavarack never ceased to warn against the danger of Australia falling under the spell of navalist theory spun by 'wizards in Whitehall'. While Director of Military Operations and Intelligence in March 1930, Lavarack expressed the Army's central objection to a navalist strategy when he wrote, 'the issue is simple. Command in the Atlantic is of vital importance to the British people, command in the Far East is not'.

A bitter Navy-Army clash over the ownership of strategy soon divided the Australian Chiefs of Staff—a clash exacerbated by the rising influence in the inter-war Department of Defence of Frederick Shedden. Australia's arch-advocate of blue-water navalism. The Royal Australian Navy's attitude was summed up by the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sir George Hyde's April 1935 statement: 'a million trained men armed to the teeth, won't stop the Japanese fuelling their ships in a hundred inaccessible anchorages around our coast'. The Army's approach to strategic policy was reflected in Lavarack's emphatic view that 'over-expenditure on the Naval forces is gradually throttling the Land forces, and is preventing the proper development of the Air forces'.

The Lyons Government adhered to Admiral Hyde's view and, under Lavarack's stormy tenure as Chief of the General Staff from 1935-39, attempts to shift political opinion in favour of a greater strategic role for the Army caused only civil-military acrimony. The outspoken views of senior officers such as Lavarack and Colonel Henry Wynter, the Director of Mobilisation, on what they viewed as Australia's unbalanced and unsound defence policy, cost the Army the confidence of many politicians in the Lyons Government.

Lavarack proved tenacious in pressing the Government for funds to create a stronger field force at the expense of fortifying coastal defences. His views were unwelcome because as Sir Archdale Parkhill, the Minister for Defence put it, they involved 'implications of a highly political nature'. For his part, Wynter told the Melbourne United Services Institute in August 1935 that, reliance on the Singapore strategy amounted to asking Australians to 'immolate ourselves upon the lofty Imperial [defence] altar'. He went on to attribute the Army's lack of influence on Australian strategy to 'pundits ... mainly of the Blue Water school who, in a misplaced enthusiasm for their own arm, will not permit themselves to see any point which may detract from their fixed idea that the Navy is the be-all and the end-all of defence'.

Inevitably, the dissenting views of Lavarack and Wynter soon leaked into the public domain and were employed by both the press and by opposition members of parliament to embarrass the Lyons Government. When in November 1936, various anti-Singapore arguments—attributed by Parkhill as emanating from Army Headquarters—were used in parliament by John Curtin, the Leader of the Opposition, the Lyons Government took the opportunity to relieve Wynter of his duties. Parkhill warned Lavarack and the Military Board that 'the Government will not tolerate propaganda by Service officers on the political aspect of Defence Policy'. By the end of 1936 Parkhill seems to have become convinced that Lavarack's headquarters was infested, and possibly even controlled, by strategic schismatics whom Shedden called a 'radical "Young Turk" group' determined to try to change defence policy.

Shedden's view was exaggerated and self-serving. Nonetheless, it is true that the Army's approach to strategy during the inter-war years was characterised by professional polarisation from the RAN and by a general philosophical alienation from official defence policy. Denied a significant strategic role based on invasion, denuded of adequate resources and convinced,
as McCay had once put it, that 'the worst of raids would do infinitely less harm to our continent than the mildest of droughts', the Army was reduced to impotence and frustration. In February 1920, Chauvel had echoed the views of both Hutton and McCay, when he wrote:

The advantages, moral and material, of fighting in the enemy's country are so enormous that it is folly to await the enemy's attack on our own soil ... The AIF had an opportunity to fight abroad and defend Australia so effectively that it was defence and not offence, her troops had undertaken ... The community must, therefore make up its mind, however unwillingly, that all preparations for the defence of Australia, thorough and complete as they may be, may break down absolutely, if, at a final and decisive moment, the weapon of defence cannot be transferred beyond our territorial waters.

Yet the constraints of the 1903 Defence Act and the bitter legacy of the 1916-17 conscription debates reduced planning for expeditionary warfare to a purely theoretical exercise in peacetime. Nonetheless, when World War II broke out in Europe in September 1939, it was an expeditionary plan. Plan 401—originally dawn up in 1922 during the Chanak crisis—which provided the basis for raising the 2nd AIF.

Ultimately, for all the inter-war controversy over navalism versus territorial defence, in World War II as in World War I, it was once again a volunteer infantry force that came to represent a main focus of the Australian war effort. Furthermore, when the Pacific War with Japan broke out in December 1941, it was not, as might have been expected the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Sir Guy Rolfe, who played the decisive advisory role in the desperate weeks of crisis between Pearl Harbor and the fall of Singapore. It was instead the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Vernon Sturdee, who had to make sense of the immediate wreckage caused by two decades of inadequate and misguided defence strategy.

Between December 1941 and March 1942—that is prior to the forming of the Allied military leadership team in the South West Pacific of General Douglas MacArthur and Lieutenant General Thomas Blamey—Sturdee assumed the role of de facto Australian commander-in-chief and principal advisor to the Curtin Government. His advice proved critical to the resolution of such vital strategic issues as the deployment of troops in the northern islands and the return of the 1st Australian Corps to Australia. In World War II it was once again Australia's land warfare effort, in the form of the provision of some 25 per cent of all Allied troops in the South-West Pacific, that proved to be the most decisive aspect of the nation's contribution to victory in the Pacific. In 1945 as in 1918, Australian pre-war strategic theory bore little relationship to the reality of wartime conditions.

The Army and the Reorientation of Australian Strategy, 1945-72

Between the late 1940s and the early 1960s there was a philosophical reorientation in Australian defence strategy away from Empire and British Commonwealth security concerns centred on the Middle East towards the United States and a preoccupation with South-East Asian security. The development of an Australian Regular Army (ARA) that could help uphold Australian interests was at the centre of this strategic reorientation.

Unlike the era of Empire, when the citizen militia dominated the peacetime Army, a standing regular army became essential to allow Australia to meet the different strategic challenges of limited war and insurgency in the Cold War. The enemy was no longer the Japanese samurai moving by sea but the Communist insurgent moving on land—an opponent who could best be countered by deploying specialised ground forces. As Sir Philip McBride, the Minister for Defence, put it in February 1952, the new emphasis in Australian strategy on regular troops who could defend vital Australian interests anywhere, represented 'a radical departure from traditional Army policy.'
Indeed, the development of the Regular Army throughout the 1950s signified a major change in Australia's conception of the use of land forces in national strategy. For the first time during peacetime conditions, Australian strategy gave precedence not to a numerically large citizen militia but to the maintenance of a well-equipped, highly-trained and self-contained force-in-being for rapid deployment overseas. In short, a regular army became central to what Prime Minister Robert Menzies called a 'modern conception of Australian defence' in which professional soldiers would 'enlist as in other countries, for service anywhere, and not merely for service in Australia'. The result was a transformation in the ability of Australian land forces to serve the nation's political-strategic ends. In the twenty years from Korea to Vietnam, the Regular Army became a major component of Australian statecraft. Under the doctrine of forward defence, Australia's interests were considered to require the 'close co-ordination of political, economic and military activities'. In particular, diplomacy and strategy were fused together to provide a framework of security in which the aim was to keep military operations away from Australia's shores. The Army undertook continuous campaigning in Asia, in operations that perhaps came closest to fulfilling the Hutton-McCay vision of Australia using her land forces to defend its interests anywhere they were threatened.

The strategic rationale for the Regular Army owed much to the post-World War II leadership and influence of two Chiefs, Lieutenant Generals Sir Vernon Sturdee and Sir Sydney Rowell. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, both men were determined to try to integrate the Army's peacetime preparation with realistic threat perception and so avoid the strategic irrelevance of land forces that had marked the 1920s and 1930s. They believed that modern warfare made local defence, strategic isolation and, above all, long mobilisation time virtually obsolete notions.

Sturdee played a key part in drawing up the important February 1946 Chiefs of Staff Appreciation of the Strategical Position of Australia which recommended mobile, well-equipped land forces designed for overseas or coalition operations rather than local or continental defence. In their Appreciation, the Chiefs of Staff described the latter as a strategy of 'last resort' and declared 'the concept of strategical isolation is irreconcilable with the realities of modern war'. In March 1946, Rowell as Vice Chief of the General Staff, warned against developing a post-war Army based on the traditional Australian notion of basing peacetime land defence on militia forces. He stated:

"The peacetime army organisation of 1939 and earlier years affords no real basis for consideration of what is needed today. It was based on a conception of local defence against raids on, or invasion of, our country and carried carried no commitment, expressed or implied, in a wider strategical sphere. Even for limited outlook, it was woefully inadequate for its primary tasks as events were subsequently to prove."

Despite being frequently hampered by fiscal restraints and political ambivalence, Sturdee and Rowell never ceased to argue that peacetime land forces had to include regular and readily deployable units directly related to the commitments Australia might be expected to meet in a military crisis.

Although the framework for the Australian Regular Army was laid down by the Chifley Labor Government in June 1947, its character and role was largely moulded by the strategic policy of the Menzies' Coalition Government during its long tenure in office from 1949-66. After the mid-1950s, Australia's strategic priorities shifted decisively from preparations for conventional war in the Middle East to limited war and counter-revolutionary operations in South-East Asia. As a result, the Army often became the most significant form of usable Australian military power to support collective defence commitments under the Australia, New Zealand, Malaya (ANZAM), Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) and South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) treaties. By 1957, the emphasis in defence policy was on the development of 'hard-hitting, mobile and readily available forces' to meet a range of South-East Asian security contingencies.
Between 1957 and 1959, the development of a modern land force received close attention in the Menzies Government. In February 1957, the cabinet gave ‘absolute priority’ to the creation of an Army force-in-being consisting of an infantry battalion group and a new independent infantry brigade group. As Ian McNeill has observed:

The [February 1957] decision was a milestone in the development of the standing army, reflecting Australia’s new defence posture and strategic outlook. For the first time in peace, precedence would be given to the maintenance of a well-equipped, highly trained and self-contained force for rapid deployment overseas. The emphasis in defence planning [became] ... the maintenance of a force-in-being that could be sustained over a long period. Large manpower numbers gave way to modern equipment, mobility, and firepower.

By the mid-1960s, the Regular Army had not only supplanted the CMF in importance but had also weathered various organisational disruptions such as the impact of the 1950s national service scheme and the Pentropic experiment of the early 1960s. Furthermore, as Australia’s military commitment to South Vietnam escalated between 1962 and 1965, the Army consolidated its role as the predominant instrument of Australian strategy. In 1972 when the battle-hardened Australian Army emerged from the Vietnam War it was 45,000 strong and unrecognisable as an organisation descended from the minuscule Permanent Forces of the Empire era. In 1976, the American commander in Vietnam, General William C. Westmoreland, described an expert Australian task force led by ‘a succession of able administrators … and gifted field commanders’. He went on to write:

Aside from American soldiers, the Australians were the most thoroughly professional foreign force serving in Vietnam. Small in numbers and well trained, particularly in anti-guerrilla warfare, the Australian Army was much like the post-Versailles German Army in which even men in the ranks might have been leaders in some less capable force.

The Army and Strategy During the Defence of Australia Era, 1972-97

In the quarter of a century after withdrawal from Vietnam, under both Coalition and Labor governments, Australian strategy was dominated by the geographical theory of Defence of Australia. Between 1972 and 1997 Defence of Australia strategy elevated naval and air forces to primacy and, in terms of expenditure and strategic influence, reduced the Army to the least significant of the three services. By the early 1990s, the Australian Army was committed to a single strategic scenario: the territorial defence of northern Australia. As a result, the Army came to look less like Westmoreland's antipodean Reichswehr and more like a smaller version of the 1930s French Army deployed behind a coastal version of the Maginot Line stretching from Cairns to Carnarvon.

A trend in Australian thinking towards giving more emphasis to what the Defence Committee termed ‘the continuing fundamental obligation of continental defence’ first emerged during the early 1970s. By 1976 the Fraser Government's Defence White Paper had begun the complicated process of developing a new policy of self-reliance based on a form of continental defence. However, the conceptual approach that came to underpin the notion of a geographical defence of Australia was not fully refined or properly formalised until the mid-1980s. In 1986, a form of self-reliant geographical determinism as codified by Paul Dibb in his seminal Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities, became the philosophical basis for official Australian strategic thinking for over a decade.

Dibb laid down the intellectual parameters for Defence of Australia when he wrote that he had consciously sought 'to narrow the [strategic] options [for Australian strategy] ... by focusing on the unchanging nature of our geographic circumstances and the levels of threat we might realistically expect'. The Hawke-Keating Government's White Papers in 1987 and 1994 reflected Dibb's philosophy. Both documents used the unchanging nature of Australia's strategic geography as a conceptual device to align strategy with force structure, capability development and defence expenditure.
Three features of the Defence of Australia strategy impacted adversely upon the Army between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s. First, its geographical determinism resulted, like the Singapore strategy before it, in returning the Army to the cul-de-sac of continental defence. Second, the anti-raid philosophy of the Empire era was revived—this time under Defence of Australia's modern guise of a layered defence-in-depth. Since the Navy and Air Force comprised the front-line defence layers in Australia's maritime approaches, the only credible contingencies facing the Army were declared to be low-level operations or short-warning conflicts on Australian soil. In July 1986 in a minute that could have easily have been penned by the Military Board in 1936, the Chief of the General Staff's Advisory Committee (CGSAC) noted, ‘the priority demands on our ground forces are for the protection of military and infrastructure assets ... in the north of Australia from a protracted campaign of dispersed raids’.  

Third, by designating the maritime approaches as a sea-air gap, the architects of Defence of Australia succeeded in their declared aim of narrowing Australia's strategic options. The notion of a sea-air gap affected the role of the Army because it removed any necessity to create a more comprehensive and balanced strategy based on the reality that the maritime approaches embrace two northern archipelagos and represent a sea-air-land gap. The fact that the experience of World War II had shown that Australian operations in the northern approaches required a joint maritime strategy with a proactive role for land forces never appeared to be seriously countenanced in strategic guidance between 1987 and 1997.

Not surprisingly, against this strategic background, the Army's intellectual influence in the official defence debate appeared to decline. Successive Army Chiefs from General Sir Frank Hassett in the 1970s to Lieutenant General John Sanderson in the 1990s, found most of their energies absorbed less by the nuances of strategy and more by the enormous challenge of having to restructure land force organisation and doctrine for continental defence. An Army optimised for tropical warfare in South East Asia was, over two decades, transformed into a force designed for dispersed low-level operations in northern Australian conditions. This transformation was not made any easier by having to be accomplished against an ever-shrinking Army resource base—as symbolised by the decline in Regular Army strength from 29,000 in the late 1970s to less than 24,000 in the late 1990s.

The various concepts adopted by Army Headquarters to prepare it for a role in a continental defence strategy reached their climax with the 1995 Army in the 21st Century (A21) Review and the 1997 Restructuring of the Army (RTA) scheme. Both of these initiatives were aimed at reconciling the needs of rapid deployment with those of combat power in wide-area concurrent operations across northern Australia. Yet at the very time the Army was finalising its force structure to meet the geo-strategic complexities of Defence of Australia, the changing security environment of the 1990s suggested that such a single-scenario strategy had ceased to have credibility under post-Cold War conditions.

The Post-Dibb Era: The Army and Strategy Since 1997

Between 1997 and 2000, four factors transformed the place of the Army in Australian strategy. The first factor was the publication of the Howard Government's Australia's Strategic Policy (ASP 97) in December 1997; the second factor was the operational impact of the East Timor security crisis of September 1999; third, there was the release in August 2000 report of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (JSCFADT) into the Army entitled From Phantom to Force. The fourth and final factor was the publication of the new Defence White Paper in December 2000.

The first factor, that of the publication of ASP 97, introduced a new emphasis in Australian strategy on preparedness and required the Army to be able to conduct offshore regional operations, either unilaterally or as part of a coalition. This new strategic posture effectively rendered much of the Army's A21-RTA scheme for operations on Australian soil obsolete. In October 1998, the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Frank Hickling responded by calling upon the Army to seize the moment with what he called a 'reassertion of Army's intellectual leadership of defence processes'. In 1999 General Hickling declared the A21-RTA scheme
to be a 'passive, defensive strategy' imposed on the Army by a system of strategic guidance that viewed land defence from the perspective of what he described as 'a blue-water Maginot Line theory'. The Chief of Army formally replaced the A21-RTA program with a maritime strategy aimed at producing 'highly deployable, potent, medium-weight land forces for the conduct of manoeuvre operations in the littoral environment'.

The second factor in the transformation of the Army's place in Australian strategy was the crisis in East Timor. Stabilising East Timor involved the largest single deployment by Australian forces since 1945 and led in November 1999 to a much needed increase of 3000 troops for the Army. The Army's central role in East Timor again highlighted the striking contrast between the low priority of the land force in peacetime Australian defence strategy in comparison to its actual role in time of military crisis. East Timor drove home the reality that of the 22 operations undertaken by the Australian Defence Force in the decade since the end of the Cold War, land forces have predominated in 20 of them. In June 2000 in the wake of East Timor Hugh White, the Deputy Secretary for Strategy in the Department of Defence, reflected ruefully on the paradox between theory and practice in Australian strategic thinking with respect to the Army:

For a long time, Army strove … to reshape itself around a very particular operational scenario [low-level contingencies in Defence of Australia] … but I think historians will judge that, at about the time when restructuring the Army, building on the Army 21 study, had brought to a new state of perfection our planning for that particular scenario, we started realising that the Army might need to do some other things, like occasionally to deploy offshore to undertake operations like the ones we undertook in East Timor.

White went on to imply that, although international strategic circumstances had changed, contemporary Australian policy-makers had yet to come to terms with the need for a more pro-active, offshore role for land forces.

The third factor that highlighted the need for the Army to be accorded greater priority in Australian strategy was the August 2000 Joint Standing Committee Report into the state of the land force entitled From Phantom to Force. This Report, perhaps the most significant written on the Army in over a quarter of a century, directed urgent political attention to the fate of the land force under the impact of Defence of Australia conditions. The Report described force development priorities in defence policy since 1987 as having 'bolted the Army to the territorial defence of Australia'. This approach had driven the land force into the thankless process of continuous reorganisation without adequate resources. The result had been a systematic degrading of Army capabilities and almost perpetual force hollowness or phantom formations.

Noting that the Army's commitments were higher than at any time since the Vietnam War, the Report called for an end to Government neglect of the land force. In a cri de coeur rare for an official document, the Report stated, 'for the sake of the soldiers and for the defence of the nation, this approach must stop'. The Joint Standing Committee warned that national and regional security issues were not mutually exclusive but synonymous since Australia could not be secure in an insecure region. Accordingly, the land force-in-being needed to consist of an independent brigade and a deployable battalion group—optimised for warfighting operations—in what the Report defined as Australia's Area of Critical Security Interest (ACSI) stretching from Fiji to the Cocos Islands.

The fourth and most recent factor affecting the Army's strategic role has been the White Paper, Defence 2000. This ambitious document seeks to resolve the historic tension between a desire to limit force structure and expenditure to the self-reliant bedrock of Defence of Australia while simultaneously meeting a broadened security agenda beyond Australia's shores. While Defence 2000 has not succeeded in resolving the dichotomy that General Hutton and Colonel McCay first recognised between protecting Australian territory and defending Australian interests—that is between 'everywhere and anywhere'—it has sought to create a more realistic balance of, and integration between, local and regional defence needs and between self-reliance and a maritime strategy.
At the centre of this rebalancing and reintegration of strategic priorities is the Army. In a key statement the White Paper admits, 'the development of our land forces needs to reflect a new balance between the demands of operations on Australian territory and the demands of deployments offshore, especially in our immediate neighbourhood.' Accordingly the White Paper seeks to provide ready Frontline Forces composed of a brigade and a battalion group along with new equipment to the tune of 3.6 billion dollars. Indeed, in terms of land forces—and despite a different historical context—Defence 2000 is reminiscent of the 1957-59 Menzies defence program which, coincidentally, was also launched to deal with an upsurge of instability in the Asia-Pacific region. Like the late 1950s defence program before it, the 2000 White Paper's land force proposals seek to structure the Australian Regular Army to enable it to deploy a brigade group for extended periods while simultaneously maintaining at least a battalion group for operations elsewhere.

Moreover, Defence 2000 confirms the decline of the 1986 Dibb doctrine of 'narrow strategic options' based on enduring strategic geography. Despite declaratory statements about the primacy of defending Australia's geography, the White Paper emphatically states:

> Nothing can remove the element of the unexpected from our military affairs... So our defence planning should not leave us with a set of capabilities that is too narrowly focussed on specific scenarios. Our aim is to provide Australia with a set of capabilities that will be flexible enough to provide governments with a range of military options across a spectrum of credible situations.

The practical need for a range of military options helps explain the greater attention that the White Paper pays to improving both land capabilities and in explaining the nexus between defence planning and broader national security interests. Indeed, the relationship between defence policy and broader national interests—that include diplomatic and economic factors—is arguably more closely linked in Defence 2000 than in any major security-planning document since the strategic basis papers of the late 1950s and early 1960s. As the 2000 White Paper puts it, 'our armed forces need to be able to do more than simply defend our coastline. We have strategic interests and objectives at the global and regional levels. Australia is an outward looking country.' In historical perspective, then, the White Paper's focus on reviving the role of the Army, on developing a more supple strategy of options and on ensuring closer linkage between defence and broader politico-strategic interests places it firmly in the mainstream of the Coalition's international relations philosophy.

**Conclusion**

At the beginning of this essay it was suggested that the dichotomy between local and overseas defence, between Colonel McCay's 'everywhere and anywhere', has been a key factor in shaping the historical character and strategic outlook of the Australian Army in the century since Federation. In 1976, in perhaps an unconscious echo of McCay's 1911 ideas. Sir Arthur Tange, the Secretary for Defence, stated that the foundation of Australian security was primarily based on preserving 'two freedoms'—freedom of local territory from interference and freedom to pursue national and international policies without pressure or duress from a militarily superior power. What is striking about Australian strategy over the last century, is the frequent inability of diverse governments to balance local and overseas needs. The main difficulty in balancing McCay's 'everywhere and the anywhere' and Tange's 'two freedoms' has been, in large measure, due to Australia's strange ambiguity about the place and role of land forces in its national strategy.

In April 1954, The Times of London wrote of Australia, 'no nation acquits itself so valiantly in war, no nation takes so little pains in peace-time'. Many of Australia's twentieth century strategic-decision makers have long laboured under an illusion that where the nation wants to fight can be determined during peacetime by simple designation of preferred force structures and by identification of predictable arenas of conflict. The most striking examples of this strategic determinism are the absolutist beliefs in the efficacy of naval defence from the Singapore base in the 1920s and 1930s and in the theory of naval-air defence of the sea-air gap in the 1980s and 1990s.
As a consequence of such convictions, Australian land forces have often suffered from long periods of neglect and unreadiness. From the time Alfred Deakin laid the foundations for a system of territorial defence in 1907 to Paul Dibb's codification in 1986 of a modern geo-strategy of continental defence, the Australian Army has faced the striking paradox that while peacetime planning has usually wanted to confine the digger to defend home soil, wartime and crisis have always seen him serving in a decisive role overseas. The result of this paradox was, that for the first half of the twentieth century, the Army's peacetime organisation was of minimal strategic value to the nation. In the second half of the twentieth century, Australia developed a Regular Army that could be employed more widely. Yet, with the exception of the 1950s and 1960s, peacetime defence strategy has consistently failed to anticipate the kind of conflict the Army might realistically expect to confront. Australian defence policy-makers, for reasons of finance, politics or ideology, have usually tended to favour a strategy based on the primacy of naval-air forces over a strategy of balanced, joint forces.

In the twenty-first century Australia must recognise that its historic reliance has never rested simply on the individual dash of the volunteer digger but also on institutional skills that can only be provided by a properly maintained professional Army. The challenge is for governments of all persuasions to recognise that the role of the Army can only be clear to the electorate if Australian strategy is based on a broad and balanced conception of national security interests. In September 1950, Prime Minister Robert Menzies warned Australians that, even in the age of 'push button war', the nation had to have an effective Army. In words that are as relevant in the high-technology information age of today as they were half a century ago, Menzies said: 'give up discounting the Army. To allow it to become the Cinderella of the Services is to be blind to stem realities and forgetful of a splendid Australian tradition. In modern war, men need science ... but science cannot win without men'.

Endnotes

1. Colonel The Honourable J.W. McCay, VD, Director of Intelligence, CMF, 'The True Principles of Australia's Defence', Commonwealth Military Journal (August 1911), 395-402. I am grateful to Major Russell Parkin, Research Fellow in the Land Warfare Studies Centre, for bringing this article to my attention.
2. McCay was knighted in 1918 and retired from the Army in 1926 with the rank of lieutenant general.
4. Ibid, 398.
5. Ibid, 401. McCay did not deny a role for the Army in local territorial defence. As he put it, land forces might have to fight 'at Cambridge Gulf as at Geelong' but his clear preference was for an Army 'best suited to help in the protection of the Empire as a whole': ibid, 400, 401-2.
12. Ibid.
13. For the role of the 1st AIF on the Western Front in 1918 see Peter Pedersen, 'The AIF on the Western Front: The Role of Training and Command', in M. McKeman and M. Browne (eds), Australia: Two Centuries of War and Peace (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1988), 167-93; and E M Andrews, The Anzac Illusion: Anglo-Australian Relations during World War I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 143-64.


17. Ibid.


21. Ibid.

22. Horner, 'Australian Army Strategic Planning Between the Wars', 90.


27. Quoted in Lodge, *Lavarack*, 47.

28. Ibid, 45.

29. The best study of Australian civil-military relations in the 1930s is contained in Lodge, *Lavarack*, chs 3-6.

30. Ibid, 51.


32. Ibid, 23.

33. See AA CRS A5954, Box 886 (Papers of F G Shedden), 'The Case of Lieutenant Colonel (Temporary and Brevet Colonel) H. D. Wynter, CMG, DSO, Australian Staff Corps', Cabinet submission, 8 February 1937.

34. Lodge, *Lavarack*, 66.

35. Ibid, xiv.


48. AA CRS A 5954/69 (Papers of F.G. Shedden), Item 1645/9, 'An Appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff of the Strategic Position of Australia, February 1946', 6-8.

49. Ibid, 6.


55. Ibid.

56. For a detailed discussion see Grey, The Australian Army, chs 6-7.


58. Ibid.


60. Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Defence: Presented to Parliament by the Minister for Defence the Hon D. J. Killen (Canberra; Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976), ch. 3.


64. Australian Army, 'General Concept for the Development of the Army', CGS Advisory Committee Submission No. 22/1986, CGSAC Minute No. 31/86, 4 July 1986, 1. Document in author's possession.


70. Australia's Strategic Policy 1997, 44-6, 65.

71. Lieutenant General Frank Hickling, Chief of Army, 'Address to Senior Officers', Chief of Army's Exercise, Brisbane, 22 October 1998, Notes taken by author.

73. Australian Army, Directorate of Future Land Warfare, ‘Concept for Manoeuvre Operations in the
Littoral Environment’ (draft dated 16 December 1999).
74. See Alan Ryan, ‘Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks’: Australian Defence Force Participation
in the International Force East Timor, Study Paper No. 304 (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre,
November 2000).
75. These figures are drawn from Major General John Hartley, ‘A Review of the White Paper’, Asia-
Pacific Defence Reporter (February 2001), 29. Major General Hartley was Deputy Chief of the Army
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Official Hansard Report, 30 June 2000, 58.
77. Ibid, 59.
78. From Phantom to Force, 57.
79. Ibid, 1-5; ch. 9.
80. Ibid, 3.
83. Ibid, 79.
84. Ibid, 80-7.
85. Ibid, 183-4.
86. Ibid, 54, Emphases added.
87. For example the 1959 Strategic Basis Paper considered that Australia’s interests would require
‘close coordination of political, economic and military activities’: Key Elements in the Triennial Review of
Strategic Guidance since 1945, 6-7.
89. It is useful to compare the 2000 White Paper’s discussion of the existence of broad strategic
interests involving the ‘need to balance the Australian interest at stake with the human, financial, political
and diplomatic, and wider costs of committing military forces’ with the narrow emphasis on strategic
National approach to international relations see J.D.B. Millar, ‘Parties and Foreign Policy: The
Australian Way’, Current Affairs Bulletin (June 1988), 3-11, and Michael Evans, ‘Australia’s War in
Korea: Strategic Perspectives and Military Lessons’, in Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (eds), The
Korean War 1950-1953: A Fifty Year Retrospective (Canberra: Army History Unit, 2000), 166-70.
92. Robert Menzies, The Defence Call to the Nation, 22 September 1950, 10.
On 11 April 1910 four British Army other ranks stepped off the mail steamer *Omrah* at Melbourne to commence a two-year engagement with the Commonwealth Military Forces. They were members of the Royal Engineers and, with a locally-appointed lieutenant and a draftsman, constituted the first appointments in the newly-raised Survey Section, Royal Australian Engineers, which had been created to embark on an ambitious but formidable undertaking. This was to progressively provide complete coverage of the Australian continent with a unified series of tactical topographical maps at a scale of an inch to a mile, or what later became the 1:63,360 series.¹

The first printed sheets under this program appeared in 1913, and were immediately hailed as a useful and valuable 'national work' by a range of other bodies, both government and civil, which stood to reap considerable cost savings through the availability of proper maps.² Included among these users were State lands, railways, water supply and mines departments, universities and technical schools; even the Housing and Town-Planning Commission benefited. There was, in this, early recognition that a project which had been undertaken primarily to meet a military need could also hold enormous value for the civil community at large.

Despite additions made to the strength of the Survey Section, which in 1915 became the Australian Survey Corps, the resources which the Army was able and willing to invest in this activity were always modest. By 1931 sixty maps had been published, but this represented barely one per cent of the continental landmass of Australia and at that rate it was despairingly estimated that the mapping task was likely to 'take 1000 years' to complete.³ Happily, it did not take that long, because other Commonwealth and State mapping agencies entered the field after World War II. This enabled the commencement of a scheme to completely map the Commonwealth at a scale of one inch to four miles (what became the metric 1:250,000 series in 1956), a program which reached completion in the late 1960s.

In anticipation of this landmark, in 1965 the (now Royal) Australian Survey Corps took on a share of a new scheme to re-map at the larger—and hence more useful—scale of 1:100,000. By 1980 this task, too, was close to completion (it was actually finalised in December 1982), and the Army began planning for yet another map series at the military-preferred scale of 1:50,000. Since such a program was expected to entail a total of 7360 individual sheets, the requirement was cut back to 2600 maps by focusing solely on defence priority areas across northern Australia and the main land communication and supply routes. This work was still underway when the Survey Corps went out of existence in July 1996, amalgamated back into the RAE from which it originally sprang.

By the time of this change the Army could point with rightful pride to the very considerable role it had played in the nationally important work of mapping Australia. Not that this accomplishment was widely trumpeted or greeted with acclamation by a grateful nation. On the contrary, the unspectacular achievement of the Army's surveyors was, and continues to be, largely taken for granted within the wider community. Within the civilian agencies which were concerned with progressing the mapping task in the postwar period, however, the Army's involvement was periodically the focus of fierce debate and controversy over some thirty years. Even within the Army itself, the goal and extent of the service's commitment in this field was occasionally subjected to questioning and challenge. It is these episodes, and more especially the differences in philosophy and objective which they highlighted, that form the subject of this essay.
Since there were no real competitors to the Survey Corps’ role until after World War II, it is understandable that there were few objections expressed outside the service before that time. Indeed, external agencies were only too happy to see the Army engaged in this way, and full of praise for its endeavours and products. In 1928 the Army’s chief, Lieutenant General Sir Harry Chauvel, remarked on the continual flow of requests for maps received from federal and state departments, as well as semi-government organisations and commercial firms. This support extended right up to the point where Chauvel suggested that it seemed reasonable that ‘full financial responsibility for producing these maps should not rest on Army funds’. Only when the Army convened a conference late in 1929 to pursue this approach with State authorities did endorsement evaporate, and significantly it represented not an ideological rejection of Army participation but purely an aversion to making a financial contribution.

So, until World War II it effectively remained for internal critics to raise any objections that might be voiced over the propriety of, or necessity for, Army involvement. Opposition was, in fact, present, and at a surprisingly early stage. The terms in which this resistance was expressed shows that those holding counter views were genuinely calling into question the fundamental basis upon which the mapping program was based, but for a mix of reasons that was both principled and self-interested. To understand what these motives actually were, it is essential to briefly sketch in some historical background.

At the time at which the Department of Defence opted to borrow RE personnel to create a basis for the Survey Section, the Army already had in existence a body engaged in attempting to overcome the recognised lack of military maps. This was the Australian Intelligence Corps, a body of citizen officers authorised in December 1907 and brought into being during 1908 to perform an information-gathering role which included topography. Problems in making the new corps’ organisation functional, combined with the realisation that there were limits to what could be expected of personnel working only part-time, meant that the deficiencies which it was meant to remedy continued for some time. In December 1909, fully two years after the AIC’s creation, sharp criticism was being voiced in federal parliament over the dearth of proper military maps, this being described as ‘a state of things... so criminal that someone ought to be prosecuted’.

In fact, the real cause of dissatisfaction with the maps being produced by the AIC lay more in content than with output. The work of the Corps was almost inevitably focused on meeting the need for maps which was the most immediate, usually areas which were the site of training grounds for militia formations during annual camps and manoeuvres. The quickest way of producing such maps was by adding cultural detail, timber boundaries and contours to portions of existing civil maps. These were State lands department parish or hundred plans, the product of cadastral surveys necessary for land title registration and revenue assessment purposes. The outcome was that the AIC maps which resulted were only marginally better than those they were intended to improve upon, often contained the same inaccuracies as the originals, and in any event— because of the ad hoc manner in which they were called for— did not form a standard and cohesive set of joinable sheets at the one scale.

Realising that the course upon which the Army had embarked with the AIC might not be the best way to proceed, as early as November 1908 the Chief of Intelligence, Colonel W.T. Bridges, wrote to London seeking advice. His letter ended up on the desk of Lieutenant Colonel C.F. Close, who had been head of the Geographical Section of the General Staff at the War Office since 1905; in August 1911 Close would become director-general of the Ordnance Survey, the half-military, half-civilian organisation charged with mapping the British Isles. The reply which Close sent in March 1910 outlined the beginnings that should be made on a systematic mapping program which specifically eschewed using ‘any existing revenue survey or cadastral compilation’. Proceeding this way, he bluntly warned, had been ‘frequently attempted in many parts of the world and has always failed’. What Close recommended was that any program to produce high quality topographical maps which was undertaken in Australia should be based solely on geodetic survey, a system of triangulation from control points the position of which had been fixed precisely on the earth’s surface.
There is no evidence that the response received from Close triggered consideration of what the Army's involvement in the sort of program he proposed should properly be. The plain reality was that, in the absence of any civilian agency with an interest in carrying out such a task, let alone the ability, there was simply no alternative to the Army taking it on if it was to obtain the maps that it legitimately required for tactical purposes. In his original approach to London, Bridges had enquired about the possibility of obtaining British Army surveyors on loan—a request which clearly indicated his own thinking on the nature of the problem which the Army faced. It was Close's suggestion of the smallest field team that was feasible which set in motion the train of events leading to the arrival of the four RE personnel to pursue the goal he had enunciated, albeit in conjunction with and under the direction of officers of the AIC.

By 1913, at which time the first maps produced by the Survey Section were rolling off the printing presses, it was discovered that the course pursued by the Army had not proved as successful as expected. The plain fact was that these sheets were not accurate enough for military purposes. As was realised by the Director of Military Operations at Headquarters, Major C.B.B. White, Close's insistence on a rigid adherence to a framework of triangulation had been justified but ignored. In August White declared that he was convinced 'some efficient system of triangulation is an essential to further progress'. Whether inspired by White's disenchantment or fuelling it, the officer appointed to command the Survey Section from 17 March that year, Lieutenant C.V. Quinlan, proposed a solution. He urged the formation of a small trigonometric party within the Section to provide the framework for subsequent field work. This was just what those who understood the problem wanted to hear, since Quinlan had been selected for his post precisely on the basis that he had prior experience in controlling triangulation work.

Quinlan's plan did not convince everybody, however, and opposition to his plan emerged from some surprisingly senior and supposedly well-informed quarters. Among those who objected was Lieutenant Colonel John Monash, then commanding the Victorian Section of the AIC, who stressed that: We are not embarking on anything in the nature of an Ordnance Survey ... our maps are not intended for any purposes connected with the civil administration, and ... therefore the only criterion to be applied, as to the degree of accuracy, degree of detail and artistic finish is their utility for military purposes.

Monash evidently believed that what was proposed exceeded the strict requirements of the service and was meant to meet some external object serving the wider community. He was not alone in this misconception. After a geodetic subsection within the Survey Section was raised and set into action in 1914, a survey draftsman in the Victorian Lands Department named H.B. Walters protested to the CGS that geodetic survey was a retrograde step and demanded an inquiry into the matter. He urged a continuation of the AIC's existing system 'inaugurated by Colonel Monash, whose professional qualifications are beyond question'. The motives behind Walters' stance become clearer once it is realised that he was a captain in Monash's section of the AIC and had been passed over for the position which Quinlan secured.

Captain Walters did not get the inquiry he sought, and dispute over the issue which apparently lay at the core of affairs probably only hastened the decision to remove the Survey Section's operations from the control of either the AIC or Engineers by forming it into a separate corps the following year. What is plain is that this brief episode of resistance to the Army's embarkation on what became an eighty-year mission to map Australia was not taken seriously by authorities at the time. Monash's sincerity in expressing concern that the service risked intruding into an area which was properly a civil responsibility cannot fairly be doubted, certainly not on the basis of what little we know about his attitude, but it is also clear that both he and his supporters were technically ill-informed about what was at stake. Thus the Survey Corps was left to soldier on for the next thirty years, through two world wars and an intervening bout of economic austerity which saw its structure cut to the bone. The next challenge to what it was doing, and why, did not arise until World War II was in its final stages, when Army authorities found time to lift their gaze towards the far horizon of a postwar period and begin planning for it.
Late in 1943 an innocent request was made by the premier of Western Australia, about obtaining air photographs for development purposes, which was to have far reaching consequences. This approach prompted a decision to reactivate the Commonwealth Survey Committee, a body formed in 1936 to provide some coordination of mapping needs and activities across Australia but which had gone into limbo since the start of the war. Before doing so, the Committee had made proposals for a national mapping scheme to serve both defence and developmental purposes, which envisaged the creation of a section within a federal department such as Interior that would, functioning under a qualified director, control all government activities in the field. This did not require any change in the way that the Army's survey organisation operated, merely that it worked in accordance with a broad scheme along lines which the Committee laid down. Notwithstanding the promise of great progress which the scheme embodied, the States declined to contribute anything more than approval and access to information that they held, and there matters promptly stalled.13

What the request from Western Australia now brought into the open was a determination on the part of the Army's Director of Survey, Colonel L. FitzGerald, that his Corps would assume a pre-eminent role in post-war arrangements concerning survey. Accordingly, he aimed to see the revived Survey Committee become the central advisory body, while the Survey Corps assumed the mantle of national survey organisation and took over responsibility for certain mapping on behalf of the states. For this reason he was convinced that the Survey Committee must be reorganised, to ensure that the Army's authority became paramount.14 To someone like FitzGerald, who had joined the Corps as a corporal in 1923 and come up through its ranks during a period in which it had the topographical mapping field virtually to itself, such an outcome must have seemed perfectly logical and natural. Not everyone shared his vision, however. Chief among those who opposed FitzGerald's view was F.M. Johnston, the Commonwealth Surveyor-General, who actually chaired the meeting of the Survey Committee which finally took place at Canberra in August 1944. He was considerably put out when FitzGerald, supported by the Navy and Air Force members present, spoke against a call by representatives of the departments of Post-War Reconstruction and Supply and Shipping for the creation of a new authority. The issue Johnston saw at stake was that 'the national survey organisations established in Great Britain, Canada, India, South Africa and USA all function in their respective countries under the control of a civilian department'.15 While he understood that the services were anxious to maintain their respective survey and mapping organisations in the postwar period, he was as equally determined as FitzGerald that control in this matter would ultimately rest squarely in civilian hands.

The sorry story of the unseemly brawl that erupted in ensuing years is treated at length in my history of the Royal Australian Survey Corps. What is relevant to the theme of this essay is the difference in philosophy and purpose revealed by the dispute over the creation and activities of what began in 1947 as a National Mapping Section within the Department of the Interior. This had become the National Mapping Office in 1951, shortly before the government received a muddled and contradictory report from Major General RL Brown (Director-General of the UK Ordnance Survey) on how Australia's rate of map production could be increased.16 The result of Brown's visit was an unambiguous Cabinet ruling in July 1954 that the 'single authority' controlling the national mapping effort was to be the Department of the Interior, and that the Army was to hand over all responsibility as well as its 'staff normally employed thereon' for specific tours of full-time civil duty.17

Predictably, the Army was outraged at this ruling, especially when it received what was effectively a letter of demand that it vacate the survey and mapping field by 1 July 1955. Such a course would have effectively reversed any former cause for complaint that it was intruding into a civilian preserve. Now, all responsibility for military mapping was to be surrendered to a minor civilian department, including the management of Army obligations under top secret agreements with Allies! It did not really soften the blow when the National Mapping Office was transferred next year to the Department of National Development, there to be renamed the Division of National Mapping. Only after many further exchanges of rancorous correspondence was a working arrangement agreed under which the Army remained actively involved in mapping, with the Survey Corps' activities being co-ordinated into a national program approved by a new standing body called the Advisory Committee on Commonwealth Mapping.
Having followed events forward to an extent, let us step backwards for a while to consider the underlying vision for the Survey Corps held by Colonel FitzGerald at the end of the war. Understanding his outlook is important because he remained as Director of Survey until 1960, when he retired after seventeen years in the post. Was it simply, as Johnston seemed to think, a classic case of FitzGerald protecting Army's turf, or was there more to it? The large volume of FitzGerald's correspondence which has survived reveals a complex amalgam of goals and justifications behind his position. Undoubtedly he did not want the Corps, which had surged in size from just 50 in September 1939 to nearly 1700 by 1944, to merely wither away again to its 'starvation prewar number'.  

But he argued that retention of a Corps of sufficient size (he wanted 500 personnel) was essential to seeing the peacetime task of mapping Australia progressed within a reasonable time-frame, and pointed to the outstanding national asset which the Corps represented in the war's last stages. Did not it make simple sense to employ the skills possessed by the Corps to the nation's benefit? Johnston and others clearly believed that FitzGerald's enthusiasm for involvement in national development projects was purely a ploy to provide a rationale for maintaining the Corps on a scale which could not be justified on grounds of its military mission alone. (There was certainly truth to this charge, since many of FitzGerald's private utterances give this very distinct impression.  

Not just the States were prepared to build up the survey and mapping operations of their lands departments to an extent not seen before the war, but the Department of Post-War Construction (later National Development) was a new player on the geographic resources scene which was also keen to recruit surveyors. Did it not make equal sense for the skills acquired by members of the wartime Corps to be dispersed back into the civil community via the medium of the rapidly growing number of agencies wanting to become active in the field? Among those who thought so was the Minister for the Army in 1947, C. Chambers, who told his departmental secretary in unequivocal terms that he did not consider that the Survey Corps should be 'built up to carry out work that could be carried out by State or other Federal agencies'.

One of the ironies of the situation which developed was that many of those with whom FitzGerald and his successors had to deal, as heads and senior officers of sister agencies, were men who had also served in the wartime Survey Corps. Even the figure who was FitzGerald's arch-opponent in National Mapping—its director, B.P. Lambert—had been a senior major in the Corps, having finished the war as Assistant Director of Survey with 1st Australian Corps. It has been said, with what accuracy is now impossible to establish, that the enmity between the two men actually dated back to the period in 1940-41 when Lambert served in the Middle East as a lieutenant in the 2/1st Australian (Corps) Field Survey Company commanded by the then Major FitzGerald.

This then was the basis of the protracted dispute which was not finally put to rest until 1987, when the Division of National Mapping was disbanded and its mapping functions absorbed—along with those of the Australian Survey Office—into a new body, the Australian Surveying and Land Information Group. In the meantime, however, the Survey Corps had not been entirely debarred in the immediate postwar period from pursuing its goal of becoming involved in national development projects. These instances occurred in the years before 1950, a time when FitzGerald was vigorously seeking to demonstrate the Corps' capacity for such tasks and, in turn, using this effort as a means to fend off attempts to slash funding for his Corps' activities.

When confronted in August 1946 with a review of budgetary estimates that threatened to further prune £10,000 ($20,000) from the Survey Corps' funds, FitzGerald was able to point out that since the original figures had been framed the Corps had been directed to undertake two important tasks on behalf of other government departments. The first of these was the production of administrative maps required urgently by the Bureau of Census and Statistics to support the conduct of the national census planned for 1947. Because this work was beyond the capacity of the Department of the Interior, the Survey Corps had been directed in early August to assist. A special detachment of some twenty draftsmen was formed in Melbourne and worked for the next six months on completing a total of 74 divisional maps, 1032 subdivisional maps, and 15,376 collectors diagrams which were needed to plan and manage the distribution of census information forms.
The second task which had arisen in 1946 was in connection with the preliminary government considerations which gave birth to the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Power Scheme, a project which has since been hailed as one of the greatest engineering feats ever undertaken in Australia. In June that year the federal government promised the States of Victoria and New South Wales to complete the technical investigation of alternative schemes for tapping the headwaters of the Snowy River for irrigation and power generation purposes. It was soon discovered, however, that this essential supporting work, too, was beyond the capacity of the Department of the Interior, and in July the Survey Corps was called upon to carry out the necessary ground surveys.

This commitment kept detachments of Survey Corps personnel in the Snowy Mountains until late in 1948, working during some of the worst weather experienced for many years. Despite severe cold, flooded rivers and snow blizzards, the Army surveyors obtained the critical data on levels and gradients that would determine the feasibility of the proposed dams and diversion runnels entailed by the scheme. The results of their work became evident in the government decision to proceed with the huge project, leading to the creation in 1949 of the Snowy Mountains Authority to manage the venture. While much has been heard of the Authority and its achievement, most notably during its 50th anniversary celebrations recently, virtually no attention has been given to the critical early role played by the Survey Corps. It should perhaps surprise no-one here that, even at the official inauguration of the scheme by the Governor-General in October 1949, there was not even an invitation to No. 5 Field Survey Company (the Sydney-based unit which conducted most of the work associated with the preliminary fieldwork) to attend. Only after the officer commanding protested at this oversight did the Department of Works and Housing include unit representatives on the guest list—and even then in a manner that practically accused them of inviting themselves.

At the same time as the Corps was engaged in the tasks just described, it was also carrying out important work for development tasks elsewhere around Australia. In Queensland, for example, a ten-man detachment had been detailed in 1947 (at the request of the State government) to survey and map the Nogoa and Comet river systems, and the Burdekin Basin, to support water conservation and closer settlement schemes which were under consideration. This task involved observing a chain of triangulation from Rockhampton to Emerald, the standard mapping of the Emerald and Anakie areas, and the production of air-photo mosaics of about 17,000 square miles. At the same time the newly raised Western Command Field Survey Section was sent into the north-west of Western Australia to conduct triangulation surveys and mapping along the Fitzroy River and the Kimberley region, to help provide the Bureau of Mineral Resources with maps needed for geological exploration.

Although Army support of the civil community's mapping needs was rarely again as direct as the instances just cited, its participation in more general activities such as the production of the standard map series already noted continued unabated. In addition to that, however, the Survey Corps was also producing a range of other map products, including large-scale maps, which were eagerly sought by organisations and agencies with specific interest in areas for which they were available. But this was the case not just within Australia, so that it should be said that civil communities in a number of our regional neighbours—most notably Papua New Guinea and Indonesia—similarly benefited from the Army's participation in this way.

The history of the Australian Army's involvement in mapping is long and distinguished—almost as long as the existence of the Commonwealth. Beginning with the AIC in 1907 and the Survey Section, RAE, three years later, through the 81-year existence of the Royal Australian Survey Corps, and right up to the present where topographical survey units continue to meet current needs, the service has a record of achievement of which it can be justly proud. Much of that achievement has been of immense and wider benefit to the nation, not just the service for which the work was originally undertaken. This fact should not be obscured by the considerable discord which accompanied Army participation in the mapping field at various times. As the Chief of the General Staff correctly observed when the Survey Corps rejoined the Engineers in 1996:
Without the impetus of military survey, much of this continent would have remained unmapped, and hence much of our civil infrastructure, which we take for granted today, would have been retarded in its development.25

This is a record that should be worth an extra candle or two on the celebratory birthday cake.

Endnotes

1. The substance of this paper draws heavily on my published history of the Royal Australian Survey Corps, Australia’s Military Map-makers (Melbourne Oxford University Press, 2000), and should be read in conjunction with it.
2. Report upon the Department of Defence, 1 July 1914-30 June 1917, part 1, 83.
7. National Archives of Australia (Vic office), MP 133/2, item 143/10/29.
9. NAA (Vic), M P 133/2, item 143/10/29.
10. Notes on the Australian Survey Corps in H.A. Roseblade papers, AEM.
12. Ibid.
13. Cabinet submission by V.C. Thompson, Assistant Minister for the Interior, 14 July 1938, AEM.
15. Memorandum by Johnston to the Secretary, Department of the Interior, 1 December 1944, on file titled ‘Commonwealth Survey Committee and National Mapping Council’, AEM.
16. Brown report, copy held in Department of Defence by DSMGI.
17. Cabinet Decision no. 2 (VP), 22 July 1954, AEM.
20. NAA (Canberra), A1066/4, item PI45/116.
22. FitzGerald to the Director of Military Intelligence, 19 August 1946, on file titled ‘Estimate of Expenditure 1942/43, 1945/46, 1946/47-Aust Survey Corps’, AEM.
24. Paper titled ‘History of the post war army-Royal Australian Survey Corps’, September 1953, found with FitzGerald papers, AEM.
A CENTURY OF SERVICE: 
100 YEARS OF THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY

'QUITE PATHETIC TO SEE' 
THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY'S PERMANENT RECORDING NOTICES 
IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Richard Reid

The commemoration of war is something about which Australians have a nice conceit about themselves. We have done, and are doing it, rather well. Perhaps, even, we are doing, and have always done this labour of remembrance rather better than anyone else. Or so Pambo Morrison, a driver for the 6th Division's Photo Unit thought as he contemplated an Italian memorial near Sidi Barrani, north Africa, on 13 December 1940. Pambo had his photograph taken beside that statue by none other than Frank Hurley. The photograph's caption in the Australian War Memorial's collection reads:

Pambo Morrison ... fails to raise any enthusiasm over the Italian memorial that commemorates their liberation of Libya from Egyptian tyranny. Pambo has seen better statues in Swan Hill.¹

The 2nd AIF had not yet been in battle but Pambo was surely confident that their forthcoming exploits would be appropriately memorialised. Was this to be the case? Did the Australian Army, during World War II, leave behind adequate and appropriate memorials to its struggles on the battlefields of three continents and the islands of the Pacific? Indeed, just what did the Army do to carry out this task of remembrance and commemoration? How did what was done compare with the efforts of the 1st AIF after World War I?

Many Australians have visited Gallipoli and the battlefield sites of the old Western Front in France and Belgium. Fewer, probably comparatively very few, have been to the main battlefield sites in Papua and New Guinea. For those who visit Lae War Cemetery—one of the three consolidation war cemeteries in PNG (the others are Bomana at Port Moresby and Bita Paka at Rabaul)—there is a reminder, if they even notice it, of the Australian Army's wartime commemorative effort in Papua New Guinea. This is the so-called AIF Memorial in the driveway leading up to the cemetery entrance.

The memorial consists of a raised platform on which are arranged, in a circle and embedded in concrete, ten bronze plaques. Each of the plaques has at its head the Rising Sun badge and beneath a text outlining the significance of an Australian wartime site and usually the achievements of particular units—divisions, brigades and even battalions—that fought there. A similar arrangement can be found at the Popondetta Memorial, where there are seven plaques.

Another nine plaques can be seen at various locations throughout PNG—at Kokoda, Milne Bay, Wau, and Madang. In total there are 26 plaques. These are indeed the 26 notices or, to use the descriptions of the time, 'Historical Recording Notices' or 'Permanent Recording Notices' authorised for erection in PNG by the commander-in-chief of the Army in February 1946.

These plaques represent one of the Australian Army's central commemorative efforts in PNG. Before looking at how these plaques came into existence—indeed how they have even managed to survive—we need to go back to the AIF's commemorative efforts in World War I, primarily because it provides an interesting contrast to what happened later in PNG.
All who travel round the battlefields of the old Western Front become familiar with the cemeteries and monuments maintained by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. These are not national monuments per se but represent the collective effort to bury and commemorate the war dead of all Britain's Empire and Dominion armies. Aside from the cemeteries, there are the national battle monuments—the Canadian Memorial at Vimy Ridge, the South African Memorial at Delville Wood, the Newfoundland Memorial at Beaumont Hamel and the Australian National Memorial at Villers-Bretonneux.

These monuments were erected and paid for some time—in Australia's case a long time—after the armistice of 1918. However, among the first purely Australian monuments to appear on the Western Front were the five memorials dedicated to the battle exploits of the five divisions of the AIF. The initiative for the siting and building of these monuments came from the AIF itself and from the beginning they were considered to be Australian, not Commonwealth or Empire, memorials. What are the main characteristics of these monuments?

First, apart from one notable exception, they are uniform in shape, size and the nature of the information provided on each. This uniformity can be traced back to an AIF commanders' conference held at Ham-sur-Heure, France, on 14 March 1919 to consider a 'Battle Memorial Scheme'. Each division was represented at this conference and recommendations were to be made to an Imperial 'Battle Exploits Memorials' Committee in London. The GOC, Major General Talbot Hobbs, suggested that each memorial should be a 'plain granite obelisk, perhaps standing 50 feet high, mounted on a plain pedestal; the obelisk being quite plain, except perhaps for the 'Rising Sun', in copper or gilt one third of the way up'. Hobbs felt that what they were trying to achieve in France was not 'for today, or next year, but for all time'.
Consequently, the combined divisional memorial effort should be towards simplicity of design and a design that any Australian visiting the area would at once recognise. ‘Dignity en masse’ was Hobbs' watchword rather than ‘beauty in detail’. He rejected the idea of a ‘digger’ figure not only because of cost but because 'a monument erected in Western Australia, depicting an Australian soldier, went to pieces in 3 years'. Moreover, Hobbs thought the ‘digger’ figures would cost a lot more money and would be less impressive than stone obelisks. Apart from the 2nd Division's memorial at Mont St Quentin, Hobbs' views prevailed.

Secondly, these memorials were not specifically erected for the dead. They were, as the inscriptions on them indicate, dedicated to the officers and men of the division who had fought in France and Belgium between 1916 and 1918. To emphasise this point, each memorial carried a plaque listing the division's battle honours without reference to casualties. At the Ham-sur-Heure conference these memorials were referred to as ‘Australian Battle Memorials’ whose purpose was to ‘commemorate the actions’. Again, with one exception, that of the 2nd Division memorial, they stand today devoid of any other information apart from the 'Rising Sun' badge.

Thirdly, the site of each memorial was to be chosen by the division concerned. It should, Hobbs' said, 'mark the spot where it made itself most famous'. This was a subject that probably led to much debate within each division and it is possible that research into personal records could reveal the course of such discussions. What is readily available at the Australian War Memorial is a set of files about each division's memorials. Each file opens with a statement giving the reasons for the final choice of site by the division. That for the 1st Division, whose monument is at the western end of Pozieres village, is typical:

As the scene of the first operation on a large scale undertaken by the 1st Australian Division in France, because of its strategical importance in the Battle of the Somme, 1916, and on account of the intensity of the fighting and gallantry shown by both sides in its capture and retention, Pozieres so impressed itself on the minds of the members of the 1st Australian Division that its selection as the site for the Memorial to be erected to the fallen of the Division was unanimously endorsed.

The description goes on, as do the descriptions for the other divisions, with supporting comments from senior commanders, lists of VCs gained by the division in that area, and casualties and diagrams indicating the formations and units of the division.
Interestingly, the 1st Division had, by 1918, already erected and dedicated a wooden divisional memorial at Pozieres. The standard AIF obelisk replaced this memorial and the wooden cross was shipped back to Australia. It is also interesting to note that the division itself saw this monument as having been ‘erected to the fallen’ and not simply as a battle exploit memorial.\(^4\)

The only AWM divisional file that reveals contention and discussion within the division concerning site selection is that for the 4th Division.\(^5\) There is reference to a letter from Major General Sinclair MacLagan to Hobbs in which MacLagan mentions two ‘long and wordy meetings’ on the topic within the unit.\(^6\) It should be mentioned that one site that was explicitly excluded from all divisional choice was Villers-Bretonneux. So incensed was the CO of the 45th Battalion, 12th Brigade, 4th Division, at this exclusion that he threatened the following action:

I desire to protest most emphatically upon the arbitrary action of allocating Villers-Bretonneux to any Division to the prejudice of the 4th. I feel so strongly upon this point that I desire that this protest be sent through the proper channels to the Right Hon. The Prime Minister of Australia, with the request that he may be good enough to have this matter enquired into. I have reason to believe that it is intended to allocate Villers-Bretonneux to a Division to which, either on the ground of its special action in that area or its general work in the war, it is so entitled.\(^7\)

The writer, unfortunately, did not say which division he was referring to!

A final point to note about these AIF divisional memorials is that they were built by the men of the division. Circulars were sent around units asking for names and numbers of stonemasons, monumental masons and concrete casters willing to work on the proposed division memorial. These men were to be assured that this work would not interfere with their repatriation. In the 5th Division's AWM memorial file there is a page of detailed instructions for the erection of the division's memorial at Polygon Wood, near Ieper, Belgium. Apart from the skilled Australian personnel, the monument builders were allocated 100 German POWs for the heavy digging work. To entertain the Australian workers, arrangements were to be made on Sundays for them 'to visit places of interest such as Lille and parts of the old Battlefields'.\(^8\) Thus, the first Australian battlefield tourists in Belgium were the soldiers themselves.
In David Horner's biography of Field Marshal Sir Thomas Blamey is this sentence relating to Blamey’s visit to Washington D C in early June 1944:

With business over, Blamey visited the Shenandoah Valley, and Major McCleery (recently promoted and reassigned as ADC) organised a number of social activities.9

Leaving aside the social activities—a topic on which Horner has a bit to say in his biography—something which caught Blamey's attention on his journey he later described in a letter to the head of Australia's Military Mission in Washington, Lieutenant General Sir John Lavarack:

I noticed along the road from Washington to the Shenandoah Valley, what appeared to be small metal constructions, on which were recorded in relief, the various actions that had taken place. This method of recording the site of actions etc struck me as being very simple and very suitable. I would be glad if you could have two or three of these plates photographed and measurements taken, together with details of the method by which they are constructed. I have particularly in mind the tablets on the roadside recording the Manassas battles.10

One of the many battle signs erected by the 26th Australian Infantry Brigade in the Sattelberg-Finschhafen area of New Guinea in early 1944. This sign describes the action for which Sergeant T.C. Derrick, 2/48th Battalion, was awarded the Victoria Cross. [AWM 0712213]

Here, in these plaques about an American Civil War battle, is the genesis of the style adopted by the Australian Army in its effort to mark the key World War II battle sites in Papua New Guinea—those 26 so-called 'Permanent Recording Notices' which have already been briefly described. When he wrote to Lavarack about the Shenandoah notices in October 1944, however, Blamey had already seen in New Guinea a series of historical signs erected on the battle sites of the Huon Peninsula in the Finschhafen area. There were 150 of these 'Recording Notices' or 'Battle Signs', 34 of which had been placed along a jeep route around the sites of the Sattelberg action by the 26th Australian Infantry Brigade.

Their purpose was, in the words of Lieutenant General Berryman, 'to commemorate the actions of our troops on the actual battlefields and the secondary object was to assist in guiding visiting officers and other ranks around the battlefields'.11 Berryman also made the following point to Blamey as to the national usefulness of these signs:
Finschhafen is fast becoming a big American Army Base and our notices describing the operations will be a reminder to them that our troops captured the area.\textsuperscript{12}

In his reply to Berryman, Blamey wrote:

I also agree with you that the marking should be given some more permanent form, and hope you will determine upon a means of doing so before you leave the area.\textsuperscript{13}

By late 1944, therefore, Blamey had the essence of what he wanted in New Guinea as a permanent record on the ground of the Australian Army's battle exploits in those momentous campaigns. This was to be Shenandoah style notices with brief historical information outlining the basic achievement of this or that Australian unit at a particular place. Blamey set up a committee that by March 1945 had produced a report on 'the scheme for installing recording notices in New Guinea'.\textsuperscript{14}

There is no space here to detail the workings of this committee. Suffice it to say that it took recommendations from commanders and former commanders who had fought in New Guinea on the possible location of sites for plaques and draft text. From this consultation they recommended 132 notices and that an initial scheme should see 60 plaques erected. In its report the committee made much reference to its consultation with Lieutenant General Sir Edmund Herring and they took his suggestions to heart. For example, Herring felt that the withdrawal over the Owen Stanleys 'is overstressed' and suggested fewer notices. Herring also suggested, with less success, that more attention be paid to commemorating the actions of the 32nd US Division in the early actions in the Buna area.\textsuperscript{15} Herring's recommendation ultimately translated into a commemorative sign at Cape Endaiadere, Papua, with this text:

\textbf{18th Australia Infantry Brigade}

In this area, the 18th Brigade, with other Australian and United States troops under its command, engaged in heavy continuous fighting with Japanese between 18th December and 3rd January 1943.

In the vicinity of this notice, the 2/9th Battalion penetrated the enemy defences on 18th December 1942, and after heavy fighting, captured Cape Endaiadere.

The text for all the notices followed similar lines.

The committee's final recommendations envisaged the construction of 'permanent' notices plus a guide book. They would be rectangular in shape, carry the 'Rising Sun' badge, and be supported in a metal structure at approximate eye level above the ground.\textsuperscript{16} On 25 July 1945, Blamey, with modifications, accepted the committee's report. The recommended 60 plaques were reduced to 47.\textsuperscript{17} There matters rested until 15 February 1946. Blamey had gone—just—and the commemorative plaques scheme was revised; the guide book disappeared, 22 notices were cancelled as being in inaccessible locations and instructions given for the final construction and erection of 26 notices.\textsuperscript{18} These were put in place and promptly forgotten.

The plaques, or at least the problem that they posed, surfaced in the early 1960s in the files of the Office of Australian War Graves. On 30 January 1960, J E Norton, an Assistant District Officer for the Northern District of Papua, wrote to the District Officer at Popondetta:

There are a number of wartime memorial plaques sited along the Buna coast which commemorate famous battles and defeats of the Japanese army by Australian troops ... The condition of these memorials was quite pathetic to see. Their steel supports had weathered and rusted to such an extent that two had fallen over.\textsuperscript{19}
An example of one of the Australian Army’s ‘permanent notices’ erected at 26 battlefield sites through Papua New Guinea in 1946. This ‘notice’ was on the south west end of the Salamaua Isthmus. The inscription reads: ‘3rd and 5th Australian Divisions – Australian and American soldiers under the command of the 5th Australian Division captured Salamaua on 1943-10-11, after many months of strenuous fighting over the mountains from Wau by the 3rd Australian Division.’ [AWM 069813]

Such proved to be the condition of many of the plaques. Eventually, after lengthy consultations, discussions and much other to-ing and fro-ing, most of the plaques were brought in under War Graves supervision to Popondetta and Lae. There, gathered together on elevated concrete platforms, their status has been raised over time from that of ‘Permanent Recording Notices’ to that of ‘Battle Exploit Memorial’. Indeed, a quick scan of the files reveals that by the early 1980s, and probably even earlier, the collection at Lae and Popondetta were being called AIF Memorials. Who should now care for these structures, and the plaques that had been left in situ, was not quickly determined. In the mid-1980s one clearly frustrated Director of the Office of War Graves wrote in a letter to an Australian veteran who was seeking advice about erecting a monument to the 32nd US Division:

> My office charter does not include the erection of monuments but we are being called upon frequently these days to restore and maintain hastily erected relics of the war years. In most cases this is beyond our budget capacity.

The fate of the Army’s Papua New Guinea ‘Historical Recording Notices’ or ‘Permanent Recording Notices’ is a metaphor surely for the relative lack of national focus and imagination on commemoration after World War II. Canberra poet Geoff Page caught that essential difference in approach between the two wars in his well-known lines from the poem ‘Smalltown Memorials’:

> The next bequeathed us
> Parks and swimming pools
> But something in that first
> Demanded stone.

The men of the 1st AIF left behind them in France and Belgium monuments that they hoped would transmit down the years the significance of what had happened to them there, and to their country. The names they inscribed on those monuments such as Flers, Malt Trench, Langicourt, Broodeseinde, or Biache, may now carry little if any meaning in the Australian community. However, viewing those monuments in situ visitors are left in no doubt as to the importance which such place names must have carried for the men of the five divisions of the 1st AIF.
By comparison, with the singular exception of Kokoda, the places and battle information recorded on the 'Permanent Recording Notices' in Papua and New Guinea fail to evoke the same resonances and potential layers of meaning as do those five great Australian edifices along the Western Front. And yet, we are now all clearly aware of the singular importance of that struggle against an Asian enemy during 1942 and 1943 in what was then Australian territory. One conclusion which one might reach here flies in the face of the assumptions of our so-called 'information age'. At the end of the day it is perhaps stark, spare stone that best carries the message of human suffering and endeavour in battle from one generation to the next. In that respect, at least, the Army in World War I knew what to do to ensure that those who came after recognised what the 1st AIF had achieved in France and Belgium. Perhaps we should give the final word on those 'Permanent Recording Notices', significant and important though they undoubtedly are, to a paraphrase of Driver Pambo Morrison's thoughts:

Pambo Morrison ... fails to raise any enthusiasm over the Army 'Permanent Recording Notices' that commemorate the campaign in Papua New Guinea. Pambo has seen better efforts in Swan Hill.
Endnotes

1. Part of original caption to AWM negative 004421.
2. For a full description of the Ham-sur-Heure conference and Hobbs' remarks see 'Memorials—Aust Corps & Misc', 623/3, AWM 27.
3. 'Memorials—1st Division', 623/4, AWM 27.
4. Two interesting files concerning the shipment of battlefield crosses back to Australia are 'Relics, Crosses and Memorials of the AIF in France', 7/1/62 Part 1(b), and '27th Battalion, Keswick, SA Crosses of AIF Units', 7/1/62/2, AWM 93.
5. 'Memorials—4th Division', 623/8-623/12, AWM 27.
8. 'Memorials—5th Division', memo, HQ, 5th Australian Pioneer Battalion, 5 April 1919, 623/8, AWM 27.
11. Extract from letter of 2 February 1944, GOC 2 Australian Corps, to Commander-in-Chief, 'File dealing with Battle Signs in Finschhafen Battle Areas—Commemorative Tablets on Sites of Battlefields, Nov 44', 485/2/7, AWM 54.
12. Ibid.
13. Extract from letter of 25 February 1944, Commander-in-Chief to GOC 2 Australian Corps, 'File dealing with Battle Signs in Finschhafen Battle Areas—Commemorative Tablets on Sites of Battlefields, Nov 44', 485/2/7, AWM 54.
19. J. E. Morton, Assistant District Officer, to District Officer, Northern District, Popondetta, Papua, 30 January 1960, AIF Memorials in New Guinea, B68/1/Part 1, Office of Australian War Graves.
20. The following files in the Office of Australian War Graves deal with the issues surrounding the upkeep of the AIF Recording Notices in Papua New Guinea: B68/1/1 Parts 1 and 2, 77/0223, 93/348C.
21. Alf Clarke, Director, Office of Australian War Graves, to Stanley Bell, St Leonards, New South Wales, 17 December 1985, B68/1/Part 1, Office of Australian War Graves.
Anniversaries are often triumphal occasions: opportunities to celebrate, in this case, a century of the existence of the Australian Army. A centenary implies not only longevity, but also continuity. We are marking a hundred years of continuous institutional existence. This is right and proper. A valuable working definition of a community is ‘a human group with a sense of a shared past’. Knowledge and understanding of a shared past is as essential an element in the health of a national institution as it is for a family, a town, or a school. But we should not allow the celebratory tone to distort or conceal. I want to intrude into this festive occasion a more sober, analytical note.

My argument is that despite the institutional continuity that we are marking this month the history of the Australian Army has been much more fractured and discontinuous than the birthday hoopla might suggest. The ‘Australian Army’ is a title that encompasses a remarkable and rich diversity. Australia has had not one army but in fact several. It is arguable that every couple of decades the Army has assumed a different form and character. Each of these armies has been Australian, but that each has expressed different characteristics and constitutions. While the Army has enjoyed a continuous existence, it has also encompassed very different manifestations of the martial spirit in this nation's history. (Sometimes those different manifestations have existed simultaneously.) This anniversary is to an extent paradoxical. It is odd that the Australian Army should be marking the anniversary of a century of continuous existence, but that that existence has been marked by a series of major changes, changes which have exercised a significant influence over its character. It would be interesting to trace the ways in which individuals have helped to shape those different armies and how they have fared in them. The Staff Corps officers’ feelings of humiliation in the 1920s and 1930s and their role in creating a regular force offers an obvious example. In this essay, though, I want to consider the importance and the implications of this degree of change and discontinuity in the Army's past.

This is a sweeping, synoptic essay and not the result of the detailed research of the kind presented elsewhere in this conference. I have drawn gratefully on the work of several historians, such Jeffrey Grey, Michael Evans, Craig Wilcox, Chris Coulthard-Clark, and Albert Palazzo, who generously lent me the manuscript of his detailed organisational history of the Australian Army. I alone am responsible for the use to which I have put their work.

Change and Discontinuity

Australians have served as soldiers under many guises. They have been Permanent soldiers, boy soldiers (both cadets and conscripts), unpaid volunteers, paid Militiamen, Compulsory Trainees, members of the wartime AIFs, Regulars and National Servicemen. For long periods some of these forms of soldier have co-existed. These many manifestations have occurred because the Army has undergone a striking number of re-organisations.

These major transformations include the formation of the Commonwealth Military Forces after 1901, their conversion into a mass Militia and a would-be imperial reserve, and the formation of an all-volunteer Australian Imperial Force. At the Great War's end the AIF was demobilised but in an institutional sleight of hand its battle honours, colour patches and unit traditions were bequeathed to the Militia units of the home-based defence force. Between the world wars the Militia was maintained by compulsory service until in 1929 the Depression precipitated a sudden contraction to an all-volunteer force. The 1920s and 1930s saw the tension between officers of a citizen force and the regular Staff Corps. The bitterness between the two groups long poisoned relations among the Army's officers, negating claims that they served one
army. The 1930s also saw the formation of the short-lived Darwin Mobile Force, a precursor of the Regular Army of the post-1945 period. In 1939 a second Australian Imperial Force was raised, which coexisted with a Militia force for the rest of the war. After an Interim Army in 1947 the Australian Regular Army was created. From 1947 to 1975 the Regular Army gradually extended its domination so that in the end the Army Reserve supported a Regular Army, a complete reversal of the relationship prevailing in the first half of the century. Since 1975 while the organisational form has been more-or-less unchanged pressures have been exerted to meet new roles and do so with greater efficiency. At the beginning of the twenty-first century the Army faces the challenge of accommodating contracting resources to a vision of regional engagement through both conventional and peacekeeping operations.

The consequence of these periodic changes has bequeathed to the Army a complex lineage, that is, the trail of changes in numbering, title and affiliation by which units trace their institutional family trees. Lineage is an esoteric business; let me illustrate this point by describing briefly the lineage of one of the units inherited by the Commonwealth when the New South Wales Military Forces became subsumed into an Australian Army, a unit local to Canberra.

The lineage of the 4th/3rd Royal New South Wales Regiment, for example, shows how the unit can trace a succession—with gaps and anomalies—from the formation of the Goulburn Volunteer Rifle Company of 1869 to the present. The units in this lineage have undergone many changes, including eighteen changes of name, number or title since 1901. The major events in this lineage include:

- 1903, the formation of Australian Infantry Regiments from colonial antecedents;
- 1908, when these regiments were organised into separate battalions;
- 1912, when the introduction of Universal Training resulted in the formation of new territorially based regiments;
- 1914, when new AIF battalions were raised;
- 1921, when CMF units were re-titled based on AIF battalions;
- 1927, when territorial titles were introduced (in this case re-introducing a title used briefly before 1914);
- 1929-35, when CMF battalions were disbanded or merged;
- 1936-39, when CMF battalions were unlinked and re-formed;
- 1943-46, when CMF units were again disbanded or merged (in this case, unusually with its second AIF counterpart);
- 1948, when CMF battalions were re-raised;
- 1960, when CMF battalions were disbanded or incorporated into the state-based regiments as part of the Pentropic experiment; and
- 1987, when the 3rd and 4th RNSWR battalions were merged.\(^1\)

There is speculation that a further change of catchment area and numbering will see it become part of a 1/19th or 4/19th RNSWR. There is a geographical connection between the units that served under these many changes of number and title. The title 'Werriwa' was first conferred in 1914, and indicates a connection with southern New South Wales. But otherwise it would take a knowledgeable lineage specialist to understand that they shared at least a formal institutional connection.\(^2\)

This typically confusing lineage reflects the institutional history of the Australian Army's citizen soldier infantry. It is easy enough to remember the 60 battalions of the First AIF, the 48 of the second and the nine battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment. But no one besides a handful of aficionados and regimental enthusiasts can make any sense of this catalogue of numbers and titles. Large chunks of the Army's past are not so much forgotten as utterly incomprehensible. The Army's lineage is so much broken that it is now incomprehensible to itself. This is a bleak view, and one that I acknowledge must be modified by one major qualification. While the lineage of the old Militia infantry is virtually unintelligible, that of the corps which constitute the present Army is generally known and accessible. For example, while few possess a detailed knowledge of the Royal Australian Artillery's unit lineage, even the newest recruits soon acquire an awareness of the regiment's history, which pre-dates that of the Army itself.
The contrast is of course the British Army, which offers an example of marked institutional stability at least at the level of lineage. The Cheshire Regiment, for example, has been the 22nd Regiment since 1751, and has been connected with Cheshire since 1781. The British Army appears to adapt organisations rather than change them wholesale. Australia, by contrast, appears to have adopted a more pragmatic approach. For example, confronted in 1914 with a need to raise mass volunteer armies, Britain grafted the Kitchener volunteers onto its existing regimental structure while Australia formed a new force, the AIF. This willingness to adopt radical new organisational structures to meet current needs has been apparent throughout the twentieth century. While the British Army has confronted drastic contractions and has met them with multiple and often strained amalgamations, the impression is of continuity rather than change. The result for Australia, however, is that for a small army over a comparatively short period the Army has undergone a succession of profound changes. All of these have affected its character, its ethos, its relationship to Australian society and the relationships of power within the Army itself.

I want to look at three periods of change: the formation and transformation of the 'Federal army', the Pentropic experiment and the abortive 'Army 21' scheme. Each suggests insights into continuity or discontinuity and our understanding of the Army's institutional history.

**Periods of Change**

*The Federal Army*

In the wake of Federation the military forces inherited from the Australian colonies were organised into a federal force. Militia, volunteer and permanent soldiers and units from six former colonial forces, plus the few Commonwealth troops raised in the last months of the South African war, came together to form the Commonwealth's military forces. The *Defence Act* of 1903 ordered this colonial inheritance into what we might call the Federal army. (It is a sign of the neglect that this period has suffered that we do not even have a term for the army during the decade between Federation and the Great War.) The Federal army created by Edward Hutton embodied a vision of, as its premier historian Craig Wilcox, described it, 'a vast part-time army of seven infantry divisions and seven light horse brigades ... armed, equipped, trained and organised in exactly the same way as regular army formations'. The achievement of this structure represented, as Chris Coulthard-Clark described it, a 'spectacular transformation'. By 1913 it comprised 23 regiments of Light Horse, twenty batteries of field artillery and 52 battalions of infantry. The formation of these Militia units entailed the dismantling of the volunteer units which since the mid-nineteenth century had been the main and later the elite of the colonies' citizen forces. By 1912 the old-fashioned unpaid, self-funding volunteer passed from the scene, the first of many profound changes through which the new Australian Army would pass.

This army—and it was only about 1912 that it began to be described as one—was dominated by the Citizen soldier, the Militiaman. It comprised a tiny component of permanent units and cadres, mainly of artillery and technical troops, but its infantry and mounted units entirely comprised part time soldiers. Indeed, this army was under the *Defence Act* forbidden from possessing regular infantry. This citizen force army, reinforced by compulsory trainees remained in existence in 1914, so that Australia maintained a home-based Militia throughout the Great War. This Militia was virtually destroyed by the creation of the AIF. Denuded of officers and instruction, it was a shadow army, one which inherited the organisation, titles, distinctions and honours of the AIF when it was re-organised in 1921. Here was a blind alley, a brutal blow against the citizen Militia which had seemed to the creators of the Federal army a natural form for Australia's defence.
The Pentropic experiment

The great contest at the heart of the Army's history in the twentieth century is arguably not the campaigns against the Kings' enemies in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, but the turbulent partnership of regular and citizen soldier. It is widely acknowledged that in the mid-twentieth century Australia possessed two armies. Even after the creation of a Regular Army in 1947 the regular force was regarded as sustaining the citizen rather than the reverse. Indeed, it was not until the failed Pentropic experiment of 1959-64 that the balance decisively shifted, away from the citizen and toward the regulars. 5

The Pentropic experiment of 1959-64 deserves closer attention because its effects, if not its motivations, effectively completed the transformation begun by the creation of a Regular Army in 1947. At least 29 Militia battalions had been disbanded during the Second World War (including the 39th, the heroes of Kokoda and Gona). In 1960 the Army lost a further thirty CMF battalions. After the CMF had been reorganised the entire CMF infantry comprised only nine battalions. The CMF lost more than half of its artillery and all of its formation headquarters units. Successive commentators deny that the Pentropic reorganisation constituted a conspiracy or a plot by Regulars against citizen forces. It is implausible that such an elaborate, expensive and—because it failed—dangerous expedient would have been employed to cloak the evisceration of the CMF. At the same time, one of the most profound consequences of the Pentropic experiment was to destroy the primacy of the old CMF. The reorganisation following the abandonment of the Pentropic system resulted in the restoration of just six CMF battalions (which adopted the numbers of some of the 'lost' battalions).

This is important not only for sentimental reasons. While old citizen soldiers were undoubtedly sorry to see the loss from the order of battle of, say the old 6th Battalion, the NSW Mounted Rifles, a unit with colonial antecedents and connections to AIF battalions, it was not only a matter of sentiment. The change from a battalion conscious of a longer lineage than most in Australia into the Support Company of the 2nd Battalion, the Royal New South Wales Regiment, signified a decisive break in continuity of function as well as identity.

The creation of the state-based regiments in 1960—yet another novel form of unit—itself aroused resentment. Major General Kevin Cooke at an earlier Army conference described the formation of the Royal Queensland, Royal Victoria and the other state CMF regiments as 'seen by many as a deliberate attempt to destroy the long established citizen force traditions'. 6 Was there a Regular vendetta against the CMF? Certainly many CMF officers believe so. For example, one of the consequences of the Millar Inquiry recommendations of the early 1970s was to disband or amalgamate dozens of CMF units. This was based on a requirement that they reach 70 per cent of their establishments. Many could not—especially when they were required to meet the higher Regular Army establishments rather than the former, lower, CMF ones. That reason for the CMF's low strength in the early 1970s in the wake of Vietnam enabled the CMF's detractors to reduce it size and subordinate its function altogether. As a result, the old CMF passed out of existence and became in name as well as function, a Reserve to the Regular Army.

'Army 21'

Finally let me consider a change which did not occur. In the mid-1990s a review of the land force structure resulted in a report An Australian Army for the 21st Century, known as 'Army 21'. It proposed bold reorganisation based not on traditional structures but upon strategic needs and upon the characteristics of land warfare in the continuing 'Revolution in Military Affairs'. 'Army 21' envisaged not a battalion or brigade but an Enhanced Combat Force comprising a new all-arms unit integrating combat arms and support troops and including Regulars and Reservists. 'Army 21' was partially tested but not fully implemented. It aroused opposition from advocates of the need to maintain separate corps (and not only on sentimental grounds) and from those sceptical of the need for such thoroughgoing change. In the end the concept was negated by a change in 1997 in the government's willingness to meet crises in the Asia-Pacific region, though its justification in terms of the Revolution in Military Affairs arguably remains viable.
But 'Army 21', in the eyes of the Chief of Army who directed the development of its successor, a maritime strategy, was itself in some ways a conservative concept. It was founded on the 'continental defence' notion which had governed the Army's strategic thinking since 1975. In this light, however organisationally novel 'Army 21' appeared to be, it looked back as well as forward. And despite the intense arguments over its assumptions and implications, its opponents were not merely conservative in the sense of seeking to deny or impede change: many also advanced alternatives which likewise would have entailed organisational and even cultural changes.

'Army 21' was abortive in that no actual Enhanced Combat Force as such was formed. But it was fertile in that it arguably gave the Army a framework through which to consider the changing circumstances it would confront and to accept that changes in structure and function would continue to occur. 'Army 21', then, was merely the most thoroughgoing potential change of an Army which by the 1990s was accustomed to continuing change as a fact of life. Michael Evans, in his study *Forward from the Past*, shows how in the quarter century following the end of the Vietnam commitment the Army had become accustomed to reconsidering its doctrine, its force structures and its rationale in a climate of geo-political uncertainty. 'Army 21' did not occur as its advocates envisaged, but change did not stop and has not ended. Indeed, change itself is a certainty, in military as in other spheres in our society. Today's planners serve the 'Army-in-Being' looking forward to an 'Enhanced Combat Force' up to twenty years ahead and the 'Army-After-Next' a third of a century into the future.

Not that change is always beneficial. We can identify many changes which are highly debatable. The close relationship between an army and the society which sustains it can erode the effectiveness as a military institution. For example, in accordance with the values of our society women have assumed a progressively greater share of military roles. It is conceivable, however, that opening combat support tasks to women may be exposed as mistaken in a future war with an adversary observing different conventions. We have also seen the increasing bureaucratisation and civilianisation of the army in a political culture valuing economic rationalism over military efficiency. Reviewing the succession of efficiency reviews to which the Defence Force has been subjected over the past decade, it might be said that in hindsight the extent of change has been excessive and counter-productive. As Albert Palazzo points out, for a decade 'the defence report has identified the services as "programs" and their operations as "sub-programs" and referred to the chief of services as "program managers"'. This bureaucratisation, subordinating operational terminology and efficiency to the power of economic rationalisation may in time prove to be yet another discontinuity, a break with another strand of the past. It is difficult to imagine William Throsby Bridges regarding himself as the 'manager' of the 'Dardanelles sub-program'.

The Army's organisational history suggests that there have been two sorts of changes. On the one hand there has been a relatively slow evolution of ideas evaluated and refined. For example, from the 1970s to the 1990s there have been the extension of the idea of jointness, of the creation of one army able to be deployed operationally rapidly and supported efficiently, the move to the north. And there have been the dramatic changes such as I have surveyed: the creation of a Federal army; the introduction and the end of compulsory military service; the raising and demobilisation of the AIFs, the formation of the Staff Corps, the establishment of a regular army; the Pentropic and Ready Reserves experiments: the doomed 'Army 21' concept. Each of these events exerted a profound impact on the Army, its members and on its character as an institution.

It is arguable, then, that the Australian Army has a history of confronting and often implementing major, often profound changes, not least in the past twenty five years. Is it justifiable to describe the Army is an adapting army? Irrespective of whether those changes were regarded as effective (the formation of the AIFs or the creation of a Regular Army) or ineffective (Hutton's imperial reserve or the Pentropic divisions) the Army has not only survived change, but might even come to expect it as inevitable. Institutions, like the individuals who comprise them, can learn to adapt. Perhaps the Australian Army has done just this. Its history is not a seamless evolution. It includes major disjunctions, missed opportunities and dead ends: but it is a more interesting and arguably a stronger institution as a result.
This realisation prompts several important questions. How can an army conscious of its institutional heritage respond to changes imposed by external threat, political policies, social or technological transformation? On the one hand armies value tradition and continuity, not out of habit or romanticism, but because an awareness of an institution's past strengthens its members' sense of identity and leads to greater commitment. On the other, armies are increasingly obliged to adapt more rapidly than ever to a host of changing influences—strategic, operational, technological, social, financial and political—and remain static at the cost of their effectiveness. The question is: what has been the effect of the changes through which the Australian Army has passed since 1901 on the nature of the Army?

**Conclusion**

This is not to argue that any particular manifestation of an army is the right one for Australia, now or in the past. Indeed, one of the striking points about the Australian Army historically is that it has adopted different guises with success. Tolstoy may have been right in claiming in *Anna Karenina* that 'happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way' but if we apply that aphorism to military organisations the insight might be inverted. Effective military organisations are not all alike: they differ in a myriad ways. Take several Australian units at various points in the Army's history: a volunteer battalion of the early Federal army; an AIF battalion on Gallipoli; another in the autumn of 1918; an AIF battalion in North Africa or Borneo; a Militia battalion in New Guinea; a battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment in Korea, Borneo, Vietnam, Somalia or Timor. Each of these units is likely to have been an effective military organisation: but in composition, motivation, attitude, skills, styles of command and on many other dimensions they are likely to have been different. Many differences are subtle; others are profound. To take widely divergent examples, a permanent soldier of 1913 little resembles an AIF volunteer of 1917; a Militia conscript of 1943 might be very different from his son called up in 1968. A soldier of today's professional army is worlds away from a volunteer in a colonial unit turned overnight into an Australian one. Ours is a young army, but it is also one with a diverse history.

In conclusion, then, I suggest that in surveying the Army's first century we need to ask questions about the history of the institution in which we are closely concerned. Has the existence of so many Australian armies been a source of weakness or of strength? Should we deplore the frequent changes in title, form, terms of service and composition? Should we regard them as expedient and appropriate to changing circumstances? Should we regard these changes as signs of flexibility and an ability to adapt an institution to the needs of the society, government and nation it serves?

Australia might well lament the short-sightedness that has produced a succession of not always satisfactory solutions to the problem of how to form a defence force to match the aspirations, needs and resources of the nation. But it should also celebrate the fact that it has coped with the changes of the past century by rapidly adapting to changing realities. When I began to write this essay, I implicitly regarded stability and continuity as preferable to change and discontinuity. But in an age in which change is inevitable we should perhaps value discontinuity as being a more valuable and relevant heritage. If a clever organism adapts to change, then Australia's Army may be among the cleverest.
Endnotes

2. I am grateful to Nigel Webster of 4/3 RNSWR, who generously guided me through the maze of his unit's lineage.
There is a close and reciprocal relationship between armies and their histories that is not matched by other professions. Of course one can easily have an Army without having a written history of it. But consciously or unconsciously, armies draw their doctrine, organisations, training and ethos from past experience. And even if there is no detailed written history, ideas about doctrine, structure, training and ethos are drawn from collective and institutional memory. Anyone who has served in the Army will know that activities such as drill on the parade ground have their origin in the drill manoeuvres for the battlefields two centuries ago. History provides the spirit of armies and they cannot fight without it.

Soldiers, and particularly army commanders, know how much they rely on past experience. Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke asserted that military history was ‘the most effective means of teaching war during peace’.¹ But armies have not always treated history objectively. Sir Basil Liddell Hart noted that ‘[t]he discovery of uncomfortable facts had never been encouraged in armies, who treated their history as a sentimental treasure rather than a field of scientific research’.²

Military history is written not just to prepare armies for the next war or the next battle. Military history is important in the wider, non-military community, for it fulfils in society the same function as general history. Major General J.F.C. Fuller pondered the role of military history in society and concluded that, ‘as it is not subalterns or generals who make wars, but governments and nations, unless the people as a whole have some understanding of what war meant in the past ages, their opinions on war . . . today will be purely alchemical’.³

This year’s celebrations marking 100 years since Federation are also a celebration of the value of history, and demonstrate implicitly why it needs to be told well, with sensitivity to the past, and with understanding of what it means for the present and future. Likewise, the centenary of the formation of the Australian Army is also an occasion to reflect on how it has developed in that time, and what place it has in the future. The tools for that reflection are the 100 years of writing about the Australian Army.

Military history is one of the great intellectual disciplines, one that has produced many classic works of literature. These tell of the rise and fall of empires. They describe the powerful emotions of courage and cowardice. They recall the tragedies, and record the triumphs of the human spirit. They not only describe what happened and tell us why, but also bring alive the human drama.

Most of you will be aware of some of these great books, such as Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian Wars. Many of you will also recall that in the aftermath of the humiliation of the Vietnam War, the military colleges in the United States required their officers to study Carl von Clausewitz’s On War in order to formulate new doctrine to govern the conduct of war. Clausewitz’s work is not, strictly speaking, military history, though his analysis draws on several centuries’ worth of historical examples. Significantly, the forerunner of this requirement was the decision of the United States Naval War College in 1972 to put Thucydides onto its own curriculum. This history of a series of ancient wars waged by a single people was deemed the best tool for rediscovering conventional warfare and re-learning its fundamental premises, within the larger context of strategy.⁴ Thus even ancient history has played a central role in preparing armed forces for future wars.

Military history and Army history are not the same thing. In Australia we have three military services. But Australia’s military history has been dominated by the experiences of our Army. The achievements of Australian soldiers since the Gallipoli landing in 1915 have come to express in a special way what it means to be Australian. To most Australians, the Army—perhaps more so than the other Services—embodies the Anzac spirit.
It is often said that war, in which the Army has played the dominant role, has been a defining experience for Australia. The Australian Army was engaged in military operations or had forces stationed overseas for thirty-eight of its first seventy years. And the Australian Army has had its fair share of combat and, of course, casualties—almost 60,000 killed in the First World War, and over 20,000 in the Second World War. We also lost almost 500 soldiers in Vietnam.

March 2001 is a significant milestone for reasons that go beyond the centenary. On 2 March 1971 an Australian infantry company stopped for the night among scattered jungle and bamboo clumps, just back from a paddy field in Phuoc Tuy Province. It was warm, humid and still with a half-moon light. An attack on the position by a Viet Cong sapper reconnaissance company that night brought the death of the last Australian Duntroon graduate to die in action. Later in the year we lost the last National Servicemen in action. Despite the Army's operational deployments over the past ten years, it is thirty years since an Australian soldier was killed by enemy action. How much is the history of the Army in its first seventy years, with its many wars, different from that in its last 30 years of peace?

The written history of the Australian Army has provided Australia with some of its own great works of literature. Indeed there is probably no other institution that has had more written about it. In 1996 the late Syd Trigellis-Smith, Sergio Zampatti and Max Parsons published *Shaping History: A Bibliography of Australian Army Unit Histories including army formations, establishments, associated organisations and a selection of campaign and area studies*. This bibliography lists 873 books about the Australian Army, and if the bibliography been published in 2001 the number would have passed 1000 books. Some of these are about some pretty esoteric stuff. One that really caught my eye was *Tassie’s Fighting Pay Corps 1916-1991: 75 Years of Tasmanian History with the Royal Australian Pay Corps*, published in 1995. This is the first of a proposed six-volume history, a volume for each state. The bibliography did not cover biographies, autobiographies or personal reminiscences, and these surely must match the unit histories in number. We might laugh about the Pay Corps, but the stories of its members have just as legitimate a place in the Army's story as those of any other component of the Australian Army. Instead, we might look at such a work, and ask whether there is a distinctly Australian way of writing about war.

Before the First World War there was certainly no military history tradition in Australia. Like many other things, we drew our tradition from Britain, or more generally, from Europe. For the general reader there were tales of Empire, while specialists might read about the technicalities of the American Civil War or the Franco-Prussian War. The Australian colonists had had little experience of war, except perhaps the war with the Aboriginal population, and most white Australians did not count that as war.

The scale of action and the magnitude of injury and loss of life in the First World War demanded a new and different form of telling. The Australian official historian, C.E.W. Bean, came to his task familiar with the style of what was then traditional military history. But his unique approach to his history grew out of his personal experiences and his desire to tell his countrymen what their sons had achieved on the world stage—as individuals, as Australians and as the Australian Imperial Force (AIF). Bean accompanied the AIF throughout the war, witnessed many of the battles, knew most of the major people of the AIF, and recorded interviews with the participants.

Bean wrote six of the eight AIF volumes, the first of which was published in 1921 and the last in 1942. The official history provides a remarkably detailed account of the First AIF and is especially praiseworthy because Bean created the archive on which his books were drawn. It is both a memorial to those Bean called the ‘great hearted men’ who served, and a brilliant piece of history writing.” It is a record of service in that Bean set out to describe every action in which Australian soldiers were involved. Although the Bean volumes set the standard for Australian history writing, the volumes produced other outcomes. They confirmed the impression that the history of the AIF was really the history of the Army. This idea was to dominate Australian thinking about the Army for a generation.
The Army did little to change this impression. Some senior permanent officers, such as Brigadier General Blamey, seemed to disregard Bean's efforts, believing that the Official History was too detailed to be widely read, and that it was not particularly valuable to the military profession. On the latter score Blamey was wrong, but Bean needed to be looked upon almost as a primary resource, to be mined for relevant lessons, guidance and understanding. And there were few historians or Army officers that were inclined either to mine Bean, or to write their own accounts of how the Army was developing as an institution. There was no attempt actually to analyse Australia's operations during the war and to draw relevant conclusions about command, training, doctrine or technology. It is certainly true that Blamey, and other permanent officers such as White, Wynter and Sturdee, drew conclusions from their own experiences about the command of Australian forces in the First World War and they applied those lessons in the Second World War. But neither they nor others wrote much about it. Writing in 1934, Liddell Hart observed that military history had 'been left largely to soldiers, with unfortunate results'. This was not the case in Australia between the wars when soldiers failed to contribute to military history.

One regular army officer who did not fit this mould was Lieutenant Colonel Horace Robertson who published history articles in several British military journals. His pamphlet *The First Forty Days* was written to support military history instruction at Duntroon and after the Second World War was published for wider circulation.

Because Bean created the archive, other scholars were reluctant to tackle the war, believing that the story had already been told. And the volumes provided the underpinning for the Anzac legend that has become part of Australian life and character every since.

During the inter-war period other books were written about the Australian Army in the First World War, but they were either personal accounts, such as *The Desert Column* by Ion Idriess (1932), or unit histories written by former unit members. These works too seemed to be designed to support the Anzac legend of mateship and sacrifice. No attempt was made to place Australia's war experience in the context of Australian history, although to be fair, there were few books about Australian history, especially history since Federation.

One exception to the numerous books on the AIF was *Garrison Gunners*, by 'Fronsac" (1929), which described the role of coast defence gunners in Australia during the First World War. It was one of the many reminders that there was more to Army service than service in the AIF. Another important contribution was a long report on the Army's activities between 1929 and 1939 by Lieutenant General Sir Carl Jess, who had been Adjutant General before the Second World War. In his preface Jess wrote:

> Whilst actual methods of warfare may change, it can be assumed that the future of the Australian peace-time Army ... will include similar cycles of trials and tribulations as in the past, so that a record of this nature should provide ready solutions to many problems which otherwise could only be solved by again reverting to trial and error.

The historiography of the Australian Army after the Second World War differed from that after the First in several ways. After the outbreak of the Second World War the Army established a section to collect and organise historical material. But the official historians did not work for the Services. The historical sections became little more than archive offices and lacked the expertise to write history. The comprehensive nature of the official histories seemed to obviate the need for more historical writing. One concession to history was the series of yearbooks produced for the Army from 1941 to 1950. Although these generally contained personal interest articles, they also had articles describing the course of the war and, in the post-war editions, other military history articles. For example, *Stand Easy*, the 1945 edition, had seven articles on the operations from Bougainville to Borneo. The 1946 edition of *As You Were* carried an article on 'The Occupation Force in Japan'. There were also a few Public Relations booklets such as *Reconquest*, by Captain V.E. Acott, describing the Lae-Markham operation.
The official history of Australia in the Second World War ran to twenty-two volumes, seven of which were devoted to the Army. The general editor, Gavin Long, wrote three of them. Just as the soldiers of the Second AIF saw themselves as inheriting the mantle of the First AIF, after the Second World War Australian military historians seemed to rely on the tradition established by Bean. Like the First World War volumes, the Second World War volumes tried to record every action in which Australian soldiers were involved. In some ways they go further towards telling the story of the Australian Army than the First World War official history. The changes in the nature of the war meant that Long and his fellow authors had to devote more space to issues of strategy, higher command and allied cooperation. Furthermore, the story did not just have to cover the Second AIF but also the militia forces that fought in the South-West Pacific Area. The civil volumes of the official history series, those covering the government and the people, the economy, and science and technology, were recognition that the war touched all parts of Australian society.

More than in the inter war period, the Second World War resulted in the publication of personal memoirs, ranging from the memoirs of generals such as H. Gordon Bennett (1944), to the experiences of soldiers such as Peter Ryan’s Fear Drive My Feet (1959). There were, of course, many unit histories. But unlike the earlier period, there were also books by journalists and war correspondents, which analysed campaigns and discussed important episodes in Army history. These included Tobruk by Chester Wilmot (1944), Green Armour, by Osmar White (1945), and Retreat from Kokoda, by Raymond Paull(1958).

The official histories of Australia’s involvement in the Korean War, in the Malayan Emergency, Confrontation and Vietnam never had the same impact on Australian military history as the earlier official histories. In the first place, the time gap between their publication and the end of the wars was much greater. The first volume of the First World War series appeared just three years after the end of the war. The first of the Second World War volumes appeared seven years after the end of the war. The first Korean War volume appeared 28 years later, and the first of the Vietnam volumes, 20 years later.

But the main reason for the reduction in the impact of the volumes was the blossoming of other military history writing in the 1970s. Part of the impetus came from within the Army. During the 1950s and 1960s there had been a limited attempt to foster military history through officer promotion examinations. To support those examinations, the editor of the Australian Army Journal, Lieutenant Colonel Eustice Graham Keogh, wrote numerous military history articles. He followed this with the publication between 1953 and 1965 of six campaign study books that are still quite valuable as overall accounts of the campaigns.

Despite the good work of Keogh, it was not until the 1960s that considered military history articles started to appear in the Journal. Perhaps this was because of the encouragement of the new editor, A.J. Sweeting, who had taken over from Keogh in 1965. But even then there were very few articles by serving regular officers. There were several good reminiscences of the Second World War and two important articles by Generals Rowell and Beavis on wartime chiefs of staff, Sturdee and Northcott. Nevertheless, during this period the Army made no serious effort to encourage the writing of military history.

Although history had to be studied for promotion examinations, there was no incentive for officers to think more deeply about historical issues. Perhaps, however, as a result of the introduction of university level academic courses at the service officer colleges during the 1960s, it was realised that studying history was part of a broader educative process. Military history might provide important insight for policy-makers. And as Australian defence policy moved towards self-reliance it became necessary to understand the peculiar nature of the Australian defence problem.

One Army Journal article in 1966, by Captain Robert O’Neill, was the forerunner of a new attitude to military history. As a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University in the early 1960s he studied military history and published a highly regarded book on the German Army and the Nazi Party. He later served in Vietnam and his book on 5 RAR, Vietnam Task, was one of the few histories of units in Vietnam, until recent years, to make a real contribution to military history. The other Vietnam unit histories, written at the time by unit members, vary in quality, from a mere chronology in some cases to a picture book in others.
The real drive for writing military history within the Army came in the 1970s with the appearance of officers who had received academic training as historians. This began in 1964 with the introduction of degree-level courses at Duntroon, where lecturers such as Alec Hill and Professor Len Turner were important influences on the cadets who now studied military history as a proper academic discipline.

During the 1970s several Duntroon graduates continued postgraduate studies in history, and by the mid 1980s half a dozen or more Army officers had post-graduate degrees in history. Officers who had academic military history books published while still serving in the Army in the decade from 1979 to 1989 include John Blaxland, Bob Breen, Chris Coulthard-Clark, Bob Hall and Peter Pedersen. These books were read widely throughout the Army and indeed were well accepted by the public.21

During the 1970s and 1980s there were very few historians who were actually paid by the Army to write books. Apart from Keogh, who was really the editor of the Army Journal, the first Army historian was Brigadier Maurice Austin, appointed about 1970, who wrote a book on the Army in Australia between 1840 and 1850.22 Ian McNeill later joined the military history section and he wrote a book on the Training Team in Vietnam.23 In due course, John Mordike succeeded McNeill, and his valuable study of the Army before the First World War was published in 1992.24

The development of military history in the Australian Army in the 1970s mirrored that in the wider academic community. It has sometimes been claimed that the Vietnam War made the study of military history unfashionable in the universities, and there is some truth in that claim. But an objective assessment shows that in the 1970s more books on Australian military history were published than in the previous seventy years.

Several reasons might be proposed for the academic community's discovery of military history. First, there was a developing interest in Australian history more generally. Second, the archival records that had been used exclusively by the official historians were opened to the public. Third, the Vietnam War brought home to slay the vital point that military affairs in a democracy, especially decisions to commit troops to overseas operations, were matters that concerned the whole population and deserved close examination. In short the old aphorism that 'war is too important to be left to the generals' was given a new twist. Military history was too important to be left solely in the hands of someone like Bean or his successors, or in the hands of those who had served in action.

Dr Michael McKernan, a former Deputy Director of the Australian War Memorial, suggests that the academic histories that appeared in the 1970s fell into three categories: 'a social-democratic model inherited from Charles Bean; a "war and society" approach, derived from mainstream Australian social history; and a technical-analytical model, derived from an international perspective, dependent for its inspiration on contemporary work in America and Europe'.25

McKernan rightly points to Bill Gammage's The Broken Years (1974) as the seminal work in the social-democratic model. Gammage deliberately avoided military analysis and considerations of command and strategy. Years later he spoke at a Chief of the Army's conference on the role that the Army played in shaping Australia as a nation before 1939.26 He dismayed many of those attending the conference when he argued that the Army's role was slight. For Gammage, the First AIF was not part of the Australian Army—nor did he see his book as 'a military history of the First AIF'.27 Both views are open to challenge.

By any definition of an army, the First AIF was part of the Australian Army. The particular conditions for service in the AIF reflected the wishes of the Australian people. The volunteer citizen soldiers who landed at Gallipoli on 25 April 1915 represented the nation in uniform. But the compulsorily enlisted militiamen who fought on the Kokoda Trail, the volunteer regulars who served in the Malayan Emergency, and the national servicemen in Vietnam, also represented the nation in uniform. In many ways, once you are in the Army, it does not matter how you were enlisted. You still have to obey orders, including those that lead to your death.
As for military history, Gammage's brilliant book made a huge contribution to Australian military history. It led to other more popular books such as Patsy Adam-Smith's *The Anzacs* (1978), and to films and television serials. In 1987 John Barrett published *We Were There*, a study of the experiences of Australian soldiers in the Second World War, and more recently Mark Johnston, in *At the Front Line* (1996), has also looked at the experiences of Australian soldiers.

McKernan attributes his second category, the 'war and society' school, to the influence of Lloyd Robson at Melbourne University, whose study of the recruitment of the First AIF appeared in 1970. Books that fall into this category have attempted to place Australia's experience of war in the context of society at large. Significantly, the authors in this school usually come from non-military academic backgrounds, and thus present insights which military writers might overlook, or deliberately avoid. For example in *Gull Force* (1988), a study of the Australian force captured on Ambon, Joan Beaumont focuses on the social dynamics of the group. The increased role of non-military academics has been one of the most important developments in giving life to Australian military history.

McKernan's third category, the technical-analytic model, grew out of an attempt to analyse military campaigns in a way that reflected the military history traditions of American and Europe. In a sense it was a rejection of Bean's social-democratic style. Not surprisingly the authors came from within the Army and from those with close connections to the Army, Duntroon or the Defence Academy. John Robertson, for example, a lecturer at both Duntroon and the Defence Academy, never served in the Army, but his books on the Second World War and on Anzac have a great deal of astute analysis.

While McKernan's categories provide a useful starting point for an analysis of the development of military history in the past thirty years, the approach can be too confining. The story is more complex. Military history works include biographies, campaign studies, war and society studies, the human face of war, corps histories, unit histories, and personal memoirs.

Let us look at biographies as an example. Sixteen years ago I presented a paper on Australian military biographies and said that the following questions demanded answers: Did General Monash fail at Gallipoli? What was his contribution to success on the Western Front? Did General Blamey act correctly in failing to advise the government about the Greek expedition? Should he have sacked General Rowell? Was Australia well served by his arguments with politicians and other generals? Was he right to direct offensive operations in Bougainville? Did General Gordon Bennett fail at Muar River and on Singapore Island? Should he have escaped from Singapore? Did he unnecessarily antagonise the British? Should General Lavarack have by-passed Merjayoun in Syria? How good was his advice to die government when he was on Java? Was General Sturdee's strategy for the defence of Australia early in 1942 correct? Was General Morshead right to order the counter attack of the 2/48th Battalion at Tobruk? Could General Allen have gone faster on the Kokoda Trail? To what extent was Herring responsible for the poor command relationships with the Americans at Salamaua?

Sixteen years later I can report that most of my questions have now been answered. Before the Second World War there were only two military biographies or autobiographies, Monash's *The Australian Victories in France in 1918* (1920) and General Gordon's *Chronicles of a Gay Gordon* (1921). The overwhelming number of Australian military biographies has been written since the Second World War. In that time, by a quick count, there have been some 47 biographies or autobiographies of major Australian Army people. In the 1950s there were three biographies. In the 1960s there were two autobiographies. But in the 1970s there were eleven books, ten in the 1980s, sixteen in the 1990s, and five in 2000 alone.

Some of these works, for example, the biographies of VC winners such as Jacka, Derrick and Cutler, or of medical doctors such as 'Weary' Dunlop, are in the Bean social-democratic model of building up the Anzac legend. Serle's biography of Monash seeks to place him in Australian society while looking at him as both a man and as a military commander. Pedersen's biography of Monash is clearly in the category of military analysis, as is Lodge's study of Gordon Bennett and Hill's of Chauvel. Jeffrey Grey's biography of Horace Robertson tries to place his subject in the context of the development of the Staff Corps. Chris Coulthard Clark's biography of Gordon Legge looks at the issue of Australian nationalism.
The types of questions I posed above about commanders could be applied equally to campaigns and to issues concerning policy and strategy. Some of the campaign studies, such as my book on the New Guinea campaign, or John Coates's account of the 9th Division at Finschhafen fall in the analytical school. But others cross the boundaries to include aspects of the social-democratic or war and society schools. Examples might include Peter Charlton's account of Pozieres, Peter Stanley's Tarakan and Peter Brune's Those Ragged Bloody Heroes.

The publication of unit histories by former unit members has continued apace, fuelled by the retirement of many old soldiers who at last were able to devote time to the task, and also by the proliferation of personal computers. Several unit histories, including Margaret Barter's carefully researched Far Above Battle, explored wider issues and might just as easily be included among the 'war and society' studies.

More important to the study of the Australian Army as an institution was the publication of corps histories. Key histories included those of Armour, Engineers, the Special Air Service Regiment, the Royal Australian Regiment, and Artillery. Of a similar nature are the institutional histories covering Duntroon and Portsea.

Although the later official histories lacked the impact of the earlier volumes, they were, nonetheless, highly impressive pieces of scholarship. The official history of Australia in the Korean War by Robert O'Neill provides both a detailed account of the Army's role on that war, as well as the diplomatic background to its employment and the impact on the wider Army. The eight-volume Official History of Australia's Involvement in South East Asian Conflicts 1948-1975, edited by Peter Edwards, makes a major contribution to our understanding of how the Army developed during this period, and its operational experience in Malaya, Borneo and South Vietnam. From the Army's point of view the most important volume is Ian McNeill's outstanding To Long Tan published in 1993, but publication of his second volume covering Army operations in Vietnam from 1967 to 1972 has been delayed following his death in 1998. Unlike the earlier official histories, the South East Asia volumes have deliberately rejected the idea of describing every military action.

These books together comprise an impressive base for the understanding of the history of the Australian Army over 100 years. But there are still areas that need further research. These might include: tactical doctrine; operational logistics; the Army between the wars; the sociology of the Army and its officer corps; the relationship between the Army and the government; army training; and the development and role of the office of the Chief of Army and its predecessors. Some of these subjects have been explored in academic theses but have never been published.

The last seven years has seen something of a renaissance in Army history. In 1992, in a return to the days of Keogh, Army Training Command commissioned specific historical studies and Lieutenant Colonel Bob Breen wrote two useful books on the battles of Maryang San and Kapyong. Training Command also produced an excellent video on the Kokoda campaign, followed by videos on the battle of Hamel and on the Syrian campaign, both of which spawned books.

From Breen's experience with Training Command came the appointment of an operational historian in Land Headquarters. In due course Breen published his account of 1 RAR in Somalia. Breen's book raises important questions about Army history in terms of how lessons, and especially shortcomings, are to be analysed for future use. It is extremely difficult to write a critical account soon after an event, especially when the author is beholden to the organisation for the opportunity to visit the battle area, and also to the organisation for his future employment. To Breen's credit, he went about as far as he could with his Somalia story. But how much can a book published in 2001 tell the full story of INTERFET in East Timor, when we still have Australian forces there and when relations with Indonesia are still fragile?
While Training Command has been important, the driving force behind Army history has been the Army History Unit that was formed in the mid 1990s. Administered by the unit, the Army history grants scheme has encouraged the writing of Army history and has assisted with the publication of numerous books and articles. And the Army history publications program has resulted in the publication of a further twenty books in the last five years with more in the pipeline.

The key issue for the historian is sources. The Australian War Memorial is the first place one goes when researching any of the Army’s military operations. Just as Charles Bean set the standard for a distinctly Australian style of military history writing, the Australian War Memorial contains a distinctly Australian archive for the study of Australian military history. There historians finds the essential building blocks for their work. These begin with the war diaries or commanders’ diaries that give a day-by-day running account of the unit or headquarters. Attention is then given to the official records that originated in the large headquarters including Army headquarters. The War Memorial also has records donated by individuals, including letters and diaries.

But historians of the Army’s peacetime activities often cannot call upon these resources. When Dr Albert Palazzo began writing the history of the Royal Australian Corps of Transport he found that the files were almost non-existent. The Army needs to give more attention to recording its peacetime history and to preserving its record of peacetime activities.

With operational history there are usually more records than for peacetime activities, but there is always a danger in becoming a prisoner of the files, especially the war diaries. In his excellent book about 8 RAR in Vietnam, Bob Hall complained that many of the unit histories of the Vietnam War were merely chronological accounts based on operations’ logs and commanders’ diaries. He wrote:

Though particular incidents scream for a digression that would provide context or deeper analysis, the authors find it impossible to escape the tyranny of chronology. This approach may form a useful record for those who served with the battalion and whose memories provide the context, but it fails to explain to a broader readership what infantry operations in Vietnam were really like. The personal dimension is often overlooked.

He continues that history should not be a memorial, but contain critical and fearless evaluation. An attempt must ‘be made to confront reality because, no matter how depressing or negative this may be, it is the first step towards coming to terms with it’.

This view is both right and wrong. Critical analyses are essential to military history. But there is no one model of military history and the various styles all have their purposes. The first step in history is to determine, as much as possible, what happened. Only then can the analysis follow. And of course the members of each battalion want their history—their memorial to one of the formative periods of their lives and of their part in history. It is beyond dispute, however, that military history is about people, and the personal dimension must exist alongside evaluation and analysis.

What are the challenges facing the military historian today? One challenge is the proliferation of second-rate military history books—especially memoirs—published either by small niche publishers or by the authors themselves. There is always the danger of the bad driving out the good. Yet while many of these works are mediocre in terms of scholarship, style and balance, and generally deal with issues of limited interest, they often hide nuggets of valuable information. The military historian must be aware of these sub-standard works but not be lured into them simply because there is a market and a willing publisher.

As always, the problem of sources remains, compounded now by the multiplication of the means of transmitting information—written orders, telephone, radio, facsimile, email and intranet. Can we be sure that all die orders issued by these means will be preserved? There
is also the problem of the demands of immediacy—to gather military lessons and to win the struggle for public opinion. Perhaps this means that there is an even greater need than in the past for the Army to employ in-house historians. But will the Army be willing to put more resources into training and employing historians? In future almost all of the Army's operations will be conducted on a joint basis. At the moment, the Army's history is being driven by the Army History Unit or by one of the Army's commands. But in future, to provide a clear and useful picture the story will have to be told from a joint perspective. Will we see the demise of Army history, to be replaced by ADF history? Or do we go further? Do we include the work of other government agencies as well as non-government organisations?

Over a period of 100 years Australia had developed a distinct approach to the study of military history. Most of its components are not unique to Australia—it is the mix and the emphasis that is different. We have seen both a diversification of styles and approaches to army history, and a blending of McKernan's categories to produce histories with various layers of technical analysis and social commentary. The stories that these histories tell about the Australian Army together give us our special history. What then does the history of the Australian Army tell us about the Australian Army? Let me try to summarise that history in a few paragraphs.

Although Australia was only a small country on the world stage, in two world wars it played key roles in several campaigns that had a major influence over the outcome of the war. On the Western Front in the First World War the Australian Army met and defeated the enemy's main army in the decisive theatre. In the Second World War, at Tobruk, it became the first army to defeat a German blitzkrieg-style attack.

As the Army of a democracy it has fought in wars in which Australia was under direct threat, but also in wars and campaigns when the direct threat to Australia was not so clear. As well as the world wars it has fought in limited wars, counter-insurgencies and low-level conflicts. It has taken part in peace enforcement, peacekeeping and in humanitarian operations.

The Army has experienced disastrous campaigns and defeats, as well as great victories. It fought determined defensive battles, and pulled off some remarkable attacks. It captured hundreds of thousands of prisoners, but had thousands of its own members captured. It also had its tragic mistakes, such as at the Nek, Fromelles, Parit Sulong and Ruin Ridge. And we need to acknowledge that it has had its disgraces, such as Wilmansrust, the Wassa riots, the 1918 mutinies, the massacre at Surafend and incidents before the Singapore surrender.

Initially the Army made its name with light horse operations, and then gained renown for infantry operations. But despite the light horse tradition, the Army has never conducted armoured manoeuvre operations. The Army developed expertise in jungle warfare, and also in counter-insurgency operations. Its experience of amphibious warfare extends from Gallipoli to East Timor. Its experience of cooperation with the Air Force runs from Hamel to East Timor. A feature of its operations has been its heavy involvement in coalition operations. Indeed it is hard to think of an Australian Army campaign in which Allied forces have not been involved.

A popular image of the Australian Army on operations is one of dashing, reckless soldiers, buoyed by mateship, led by natural citizen officers, achieving great victories by seizing the moment. Since the middle of the First World War the record is more prosaic. Careful planning, usually by trained staff officers, plus a desire to minimise casualties have marked Australian operations. In short, while Australia has a tradition of citizen soldiers, it also has a well-deserved reputation for professionalism.

All this has been achieved by a democracy with a small population and a limited economy.

As an institution, the Australian Army has been based on part-time volunteers, on compulsorily enlisted part-time soldiers, and on volunteer full-time professionals. It has endured, or enjoyed, long years of peace, but in the middle of the century spent almost thirty years on continuous operations it has been decimated, abused and starved by politicians. It
has also been satiated with more personnel that it could usefully employ. The members of the Australian Army have at times held a central place in Australian society and in the hearts of its people. At other times they have been ignored, ostracised and even despised merely for carrying out the directions of the elected government. Through all this, the Australian Army has had little involvement in aid to the civil power, has never interfered in government, and has never oppressed the Australian people.

This is the record that shines through 100 years of Army history. It is a record told in hundreds of books, by hundreds of authors, in academic tomes, in personal memoirs, in emotive memorials to the Anzac legend, and in dry combat analyses. It is a story in which every Australian can take pride.
Endnotes

David Horner acknowledges the assistance of Carla Anne Schmidt of Yale University in preparing this essay.

3. Quoted in Heinl, Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, 149.
6. Syd Trigellis-Smith, Sergio Zampatti and Max Parsons, Shaping History A Bibliography of Australian Army Unit Histories, including army formations, establishments, associated organisations and a selection of campaign and area studies (Melbourne: published by the authors, 1996).
8. B.H Liddell Hart, Thoughts on War (London: Faber and Faber, 1944). 143.
10. Ion Idriess, The Desert Column: Leaves from the Diary of an Australian Trooper in Gallipoli, Sinai and Palestine (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1932).
13. Active Service, with Australia in the Middle East (Canberra: Australian War Memorial for the Military History and Information Section, 1941); Soldiering On, the Australian Army at Home and Overseas (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1942), Khaki and Green, with the Australian Army at Home and Overseas, (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1943), Jungle Warfare, with the Australian Army in the South-West Pacific (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1944); Stand Easy, after the Defeat of Japan (Canberra Australian War Memorial, 1945); succeeding issues of As You Were (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950).
14. Captain V E Acott, Reconquest: an official record of the Australian Army’s successes in the offensives against Lac, Finschhafen, Markham and Ramu Valleys (Melbourne: Director General of Public Relations, 1944).
15. H. Gordon Bennett, Why Singapore Fell (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1944); Peter Ryan, Fear Drive My Feet (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1959).
The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines a warrior as 'a person whose occupation is warfare; a soldier, a member of an armed force'. No gender is attached to this definition, yet the next entry is 'warrioress', which is defined as 'a female warrior'. Ask Americans to define warrior and they will probably do so in terms of men. Ask them about women warriors and they are likely to mention the Amazons or maybe television's Xena, Warrior Princess. Americans think of warriors as someone who takes the fight to the enemy, who takes offensive action. Under this characterisation, American women have officially been warriors only since 1991 when they were permitted to become combat pilots.

Nonetheless, throughout American history, women have fought, died and been captured in virtually every war in which the United States has participated. In early American history, women who fought usually did so disguised as men and some were 'accidental' combatants who through happenstance ended up in combat, at least for a short time. The vast majority of women involved in American wars, however, were not combatants but rather provided support services, doing what was considered 'women's work'. Now fast forward to today and you find American military women flying fighters over Iraq, firing cruise missiles from Navy combat ships, on patrol in Bosnia and conducting drug interdiction operations!

How did women move from providing women's services to being servicewomen? It was a combination of three factors. First, pragmatic decisions were made by the military to utilise women when men did not have the needed skills or to fill a void when not enough men were available. Second, changes for military women sometimes depended on the outcome of political disagreements between military leaders and their civilian bosses, between the services and Congress and between influential civilian women and Congress. Finally, underlying the first two factors is the role of American society. Changes in the US from what jobs women performed to whether or not they worked after they married affected how women were treated in the military. This essay will examine each of these factors more closely, beginning with pragmatism which will be discussed chronologically, followed by politics and American society in which examples will be used to show the influence these issues had on women's utilisation in the United States military.

Pragmatism

The American military is results oriented—get the job done, complete the mission. It has a preferred way of accomplishing this, and in the personnel realm that has meant using men. But over the years, the military leadership sometimes found that not enough men were available or men did not have the skills needed. Thus, when faced with a choice of not having a job done or having a woman do it, they made the pragmatic choice and opted to use women.

They made this choice, however, very reluctantly and placed major constraints on women's participation. Initially, women were isolated in organisations outside the services so they served with, not in, the services and they were not expected to become a permanent part of the military. The types of jobs they were permitted to do were limited to those men thought were appropriate for women, and men's estimates of the number of women who would be needed often were well below the number they finally recruited. But over time, men found that their suppositions about women and military service were not correct and the constraints began to disappear. Men learned that women had more abilities than expected or could be taught new skills. In the end, women were put in many more jobs than originally expected which was acceptable because they would 'free a man to fight'.
The pragmatism of the military can be seen throughout US history. The American Revolution, Civil War and Spanish-American War proved the efficacy of using women nurses. Beginning with World War I, the military found that if they wanted certain jobs performed, they would need to recruit women because they were the ones with the requisite skills. In World War II, the jobs women performed exceeded expectations and consequently, military planners dramatically increased the number of women. In the All Volunteer Force, the pool of appropriately aged men was shrinking so much that not enough of them were available to fill all the slots vacated by draftees. Pentagon officials found the answer was to increase the number of women. Increased numbers meant increasing job opportunities for women so as to not adversely impact men's careers. The result of the pragmatism of the military is that today women comprise over fourteen per cent of the armed services and are being assigned to virtually every military job, except direct ground combat.

**American Revolution**

During the American Revolution (1776-1781), the Continental Army had virtually no support troops, but it did have a ready source of help available—the wives of officers and soldiers who followed their Army husbands. Objections were raised that women would slow the Army's march, but General George Washington believed it was important to use the women because men might desert if their wives were not permitted to work. Consequently, he authorised each company to give rations to three to six women and their children in exchange for the women doing the cooking, sewing and laundry.

The other major need was for nurses. Washington specified that they should be women in order to free men to fight—He authorised the hiring often nurses and one matron for every 100 patients. The women's duties, however, were limited to emptying chamber pots, scrubbing the wards and bathing the patients, while skilled nursing care was done by men.

**Civil War**

The next major conflict involving women was the US Civil War (1861-1865). Similar to the American Revolution, women did cooking and laundering, but the vast majority of women associated with the military were nurses. With the huge casualties sustained by both sides, medical care was urgently needed. Inspired by Florence Nightingale in the Crimean War, many American women on both sides volunteered to be nurses. Nevertheless, the public did not believe it was appropriate for women to be in military hospitals. Critics said refined, modest women should not care for rough crude military men and the work was too demanding and exhausting. Army doctors also opposed women nurses on the grounds that an Army hospital was no place for a woman.

But the reality was that every available man was needed to fight so women nurses were the only option. On 10 June 1861, the Union Army's Surgeon General appointed Dorothea Dix as Superintendent of Women Nurses and later ordered that at least one third of hospital nursing jobs be filled by women. To make women nurses more palatable to the Army doctors, Dix required that they be at least thirty years old, be 'plain in appearance' and wear brown or black dresses without bows, curls, jewelry or hoop skirts. In August 1861, Congress authorised pay and a daily ration for the nurses and said they were to serve for six months or the war's duration. The South was slower in organizing its medical department. It was not until September 1862 that the Confederate Congress granted official status to women nurses.

It is not known how many women served as nurses in the Civil War. Including women who went to nurse without formal approval as well as the nurses of the Union and Confederate armies, the best guess is about 10,000. In addition to serving in hospitals, women also were aboard the Navy's first hospital ship, the USS Red Rover. Sometimes women were in the thick of battle. Some were wounded and an unknown number died, although more likely from disease than wounds. The war also marked the first time a woman was a prisoner of war. Dr. Mary Walker, the first woman doctor in the Union Army, was captured by the Confederates and held for four months. She was later awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, the only woman to ever receive this award.
Initially nurses were given menial jobs, but eventually many also provided skilled nursing care. Although many of the male medical personnel kept their prejudices against women throughout the war, others eventually began to see their worth and praised them. In the north, the head of the US Sanitary Commission, which was responsible for enforcing sanitation regulations in the Army, commented that 'God knows what we should have done without them, they worked like heroes...'. In the south, the Director of Hospitals of the Army of Tennessee praised the nurses efficiency and ability and said they had been of real service to the Confederacy. Overall, women nurses were generally credited with greatly improving military patient care. Nevertheless, at war's end, the US Army returned to using only men in its medical department.

**Spanish-American War**

At the beginning of the Spanish-American War (1898 - 1899), the Army tried unsuccessfully to recruit several thousand men to tend sick soldiers during a typhoid epidemic. The primary reason they could not find enough male nurses was that in the intervening years since the end of the Civil War, women had come to dominate the nursing profession. If the Army wanted nurses, they would have to be women and so the Army's Surgeon General asked Congress for authority to appoint women nurses. Congress said yes, but made it clear that they were to be contract civilian nurses, not military nurses. Eventually, some 1,500 women would nurse military men in the US, Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Hawaii, Japan and China. Navy nurses also served on the hospital ship USS Relief. No nurses died in military action, but twelve died of typhoid fever and one died participating in an experiment to prove that the mosquito caused malaria.

The war had shown the military how important women nurses were and so it began to consider giving them a more permanent status. American society had changed—nursing was now a female occupation. Women military nurses had greatly improved patient care and preventative medicine, and had skills beyond those of enlisted hospital corpsmen. The military also found that having the nurses as civilians caused problems because they were not under direct military control. Despite all the arguments for making the nurses part of the military, opposition remained strong to doing so. The Surgeon General was reluctant to have women with the troops in the field and expressed concern that the nurses might want 'luxuries', such as rocking chairs and other furniture.

In the end, however, the indisputable contributions of the women nurses in the Spanish-American War convinced the Army's Surgeon General that having them as a permanent part of his medical services was a good idea. Legislation was drafted to create a Nurse Corps (female) and its provisions were included in the Army Reorganization Act of 1901. Although the Nurse Corps (female) organisation was part of the regular Army, the nurses served under contract and had only quasi military status. They did not have military rank, received far less pay than men and were not given pensions or veterans benefits. In 1908, the Navy also established a Nurse Corps (female) with similar restrictions. Women nurses may not have received equal treatment, but now they had a permanent place at least with, if not in, the military.

**World War I**

By the time the US entered World War I in April 1917, women were generally accepted as military nurses, but the thought that women should enter the military as enlisted personnel seemed outrageous. Yet in early 1917, one person began to think exactly that—Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels. The Navy was in the midst of a major buildup of naval forces and faced a manpower shortage. Sailors needed to be sent to sea, but who was going to take their place in the expanding shore establishment? The Navy had civilian women working as clerks, but did not have money to hire more, and the Civil Service Commission did not have enough women to fill even a small fraction of the requirements. Furthermore, civil servants were not under full military control. So Secretary Daniels asked the unthinkable. Did the law require that yeomen (the Navy's clerks) be male? The answer was no, and so Daniels said 'then enroll women in the Naval Reserve as yeomen and we will have the best clerical assistance the country can provide'.

3
The result of Daniel's order was that, on 19 March 1917, the Navy Department authorised the enlistment of women into the Naval Coast Defense Reserve Force. By the end of the war, 11,880 women had served as Yeoman (F) or, as they were popularly called 'yeomanettes'. Despite their name, they were in a number of different occupations besides yeoman, such as telephone switchboard operators, draftsmen, translators, camouflage designers, fingerprint experts, contract monitors, torpedo assemblymen, telegraphers and recruiters. Thus, these Navy women established the precedent of doing jobs well beyond what military men thought was possible.12

The Navy's policy of enlisting women also extended to the Coast Guard which in peacetime was under the Treasury Department, but which in times of war came under the Navy Department. Apparently only a few women were enlisted and all were assigned to the Coast Guard's small headquarters in Washington, DC.13 For its part, as the war went on, the Marine Corps desperately needed clerical help to release combat marines to replace overseas casualties. Consequently, in August 1918, the Marine Corps began to recruit women, but because the war ended shortly thereafter, only 305 women joined the Marine Corps Reserve.14 On the other hand, despite a need for clerical help and telephone operators, the Secretary of War adamantly refused to enlist women, preferring to use civilians.

A notable aspect of the service of all the military women in World War I was that they were actually in the armed forces. Women were enlisted in the reserves and had the same status as men: they swore the same enlistment oath, had the same four year enlistment term, held the same ranks, were paid the same and were entitled to veterans' benefits. A sign of (heir acceptance was that one admiral protested: 'They must not be called yeowomen or yeomanettes. These women are as much a part of the Navy as the men who have enlisted. They do the same work . . . '.15 Nevertheless, in 1925 and again in 1938, the provision in the Naval Reserve Act that had permitted women to be enrolled in the Navy during the First World War was amended to require that all enlistees be male.16

World War II

Even before the US entered World War II, service leaders began discussing the possibility of utilising women. For example, in 1939, the new Army Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, realised that eventually the US would be drawn into the war that had started in Europe and that a severe military manpower shortage was inevitable. He directed his staff to undertake a study of the feasibility of using women outside the medical professions. The study concluded the Army could utilise women, but the duties it expected them to perform were demeaning, such as hostesses, cooks, waitresses, chauffeurs and strolling minstrels. Although condescending toward women, the plan was important because, unlike World War I, the Army anticipated having women in uniform as well as using civilian women.17

After America's December 1941 entry into the war, the services sent legislation to Congress to create women's military organizations. In May 1942, the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) was formed. However, its members did not have military status and so, in July 1943, it was disestablished and replaced by the Women's Army Corps (WAC) which was an integral part of the Army. In September 1942, the Army Air Forces established the Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASP). This organisation, however, consisted of women who were hired as contract employees and they were given only quasi military status. In March 1944, Congress considered legislation to militarise the WASP, but, despite the support of the commander of the Army Air Forces, General 'Hap' Arnold, it was defeated in June. Later in 1944, it was announced that, because enough male pilots were now available for stateside duty, the WASP would be deactivated on 20 December 1944.18

Within the Navy Department, a Women's Reserve was made a part of the Naval Reserve in July 1942 and a Women's Reserve was founded in November 1942 in the Coast Guard Reserve.
But the other component of the Navy Department, the Marine Corps, did not even begin to consider using women until the Fall of 1942. By then, however, they did not have much choice. It had suffered massive casualties on Guadalcanal in August and anticipated heavy losses as Marines fought their way toward Japan. The Joint Chiefs of Staff told it to add over 164,000 more men within a year, and the President was planning to draft them which threatened the Corps’ elite status. They had already lowered their recruiting standards and raised the upper age limit to 36. Yet, they still could not get enough men. Finally, the Commandant decided the only solution was to put women in non-combat jobs. In February 1943, the Marine Corps' Women's Reserve was established.\(^{19}\)

Although women were now in uniform, it did not mean they were the equals of men. Women had to be older to enlist, and officers were restricted as to how high they could rise in rank. Assignments in the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard were restricted to shore duty in the continental United States until September 1944 when they were permitted to volunteer for duty in Hawaii, Alaska, the Caribbean and Panama. Women were also prohibited from being assigned to Navy ships or combat aircraft. Women killed or injured on active duty were to receive the same benefits as US civil service employees, not those given to military men, such as a lump-sum death gratuity, retirement pay and veterans benefits.\(^{20}\)

Meanwhile, nurses continued to serve with, not in, the military. As the war started, Army nurses still had only relative rank, while Navy nurses had none at all (they were simply called nurse or chief nurse). In mid-1942, Navy nurses were finally given relative rank and all nurses received a pay raise, but their pay was still lower than that of male officers. In June 1944, all nurses were authorised commissioned officer status and all the benefits of rank, but it was a temporary measure that was to expire six months after the war ended.\(^{21}\)

Even though the services recognised their need for women, they greatly underestimated how many women would be required and the jobs they could perform. For example, in December 1941, the Navy projected a requirement for 1,150 non-nurse women, but by 1945, some 81,400 women were serving. In addition the Navy had over 11,000 nurses. The story was similar in the other services. Including women in medical occupations, the Army totalled almost 156,000 women, the Marine Corps about 18,400 and the Coast Guard had approximately 12,000. It is estimated that about 350,000 women were in the military during the Second World War.\(^{22}\)

Initially the services assumed women would be in traditional women's occupations, such as file clerks, typists, telephone operators and nurses. But women's roles in the American workplace had continued to evolve so that their civilian skills and their ability to learn new skills went well beyond what the military expected. This, combined with the needs of the services, soon resulted in women being in a wide variety of jobs. Women packed parachutes, were air traffic controllers, naval air navigators, weather forecasters and aircraft mechanics. They encoded and decoded military messages and translated captured enemy documents. Women gunner's mates trained American and Russian sailors in anti-aircraft gunnery. They tested rocket propellant and worked as chemists, metallurgists and electronics technicians on the Manhattan project that developed the nuclear bomb. They did almost every job short of direct combat.\(^{23}\)

World War II also was the first time that significant numbers of American women were wounded, died and captured in a war. At the very beginning of the war, nurses were bombed in Pearl Harbor, Guam and the Philippines. Five Navy nurses were captured by the Japanese on Guam, and 66 Army and eleven Navy nurses were taken prisoner in the Philippines. Although the Guam nurses were repatriated six months after their capture, those in the Philippines remained prisoners until American forces returned three years later. One Army nurse, who survived a plane crash in Germany, was held for about three months before returning to the US as the result of a prisoner exchange. In addition, thirteen Army nurses were in a transport that crashed in German-occupied Albania and spent the next two months climbing over rugged mountains in the middle of winter to reach the coast so they could be rescued.\(^{24}\)
Army nurses landed on the beach at Anzio, Italy five days after the invasion and four days after the Normandy landing. Six of the nurses at Anzio died when the Germans bombed their beachhead hospital. The Army nurses had the most casualties with 215 deaths. Their valor was recognised with some 1600 nurses receiving decorations, including Silver Stars, Bronze Stars and Purple Hearts. Navy nurses also served worldwide and on hospital ships. None of them were combat fatalities, but nine died while overseas and thirty-one died in the United States. The Navy awarded decorations to 303 Navy nurses and named a destroyer after a nurse.

Non-medical military women also died in the line of duty, albeit in smaller numbers. For example, a Navy enlisted woman was killed when depth charges exploded at the Naval Air Station in Norfolk, Virginia. Although not in a combat zone, the WASP's work was very dangerous. They were testing newly repaired planes which sometimes turned out not to have been fixed correctly, causing crashes. They also towed target sleeves for anti-aircraft gunner trainees to shoot at and sometimes came back with holes in their plane instead of the target. By the time of their deactivation, 38 WASPs had died.

**The Cold War**

At the end of World War II, the military leadership was effusive in its praise of women. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower said that 'during the time I have had WACs under my command they have met every test and task assigned to them ... Their contributions in efficiency, skill, spirit, and determination are immeasurable'. General Douglas MacArthur called the WACs 'my best soldiers'. Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz said that 'not only were they equally efficient in many duties previously performed by men, but in certain types of work they proved to be more efficient and psychologically better fitted'. The women definitely had made converts. More important than the words of military leaders, however, was their realisation that it made sense to give women permanent status within the armed forces. Not only had women performed well, but it was becoming increasingly evident that the world still was not totally at peace as the Cold War began to loom on the horizon.

Not surprisingly, the nurses were the first to benefit from the idea of permanent status. In April 1947, Congress passed the Army-Navy Nurse Corps Act. The law established a permanent nurse corps in both services and, in the Army, authorised a Women's Medical Specialist Corps for occupations such as dietitian and physical and occupational therapist. The nurses now were to be commissioned officers and would be eligible to transfer from the reserves to the regular Army and Navy. Congress, however, was still wary about women having status equal to men and so placed restrictions on the number of women who could serve, what rank they could hold and required them to retire earlier than men.

With regard to the line women, all Coast Guard women were discharged as part of the general demobilisation that occurred when the Coast Guard returned to the Treasury Department after the war. The rest of the services, however, found it necessary to retain women, some even involuntarily. Initially they were needed to discharge the men, to care for war casualties and to carry out administrative functions as part of US occupation forces. Later, the Cold War raised the possibility that if war were to break out again, women would be needed. Not wanting to reinvent the wheel, senior male officers began to propose that at least a few line women be given permanent status to form a nucleus around which future mobilisation could occur in event of a national emergency. Consequently, in June 1948, President Harry S. Truman signed the Women's Armed Services Integration Act which gave non-medical women a permanent place in the American military.

Even though line women now would be permanent members of the military, similar to the nurses, they did not have equal status. Provisions were included in the law to meet virtually every objection that had been raised during congressional hearings for including women in the peacetime military. To guard against there being 'too many' women, the number of women was capped at two percent of the regular force. The service secretaries were given unprecedented blanket authority to discharge women, which took care of the issue of what to do with pregnant women. The service secretaries were also given the power to prescribe the
military authority women might exercise, thus minimising the possibility of women 'giving orders' to men. The women's rank structure was truncated which would force women to retire earlier and thus help to solve the 'problem' that women might receive early disability retirements because of menopause. Concern over a woman getting dependent's allowances for her husband was dealt with by requiring the woman to prove that he was dependent on her for his chief means of support (and the assumption was that no self-respecting man would let this happen). To make sure women did not adversely impact men's promotions, all of the services, except the Air Force, had separate promotion lists for women. On the combat issue, Navy, Marine and Air Force women were prohibited from being assigned to aircraft with a combat mission. Navy and Marine women were also barred from assignment to naval vessels, except hospital ships and transports. However, the law did not specifically outlaw ground combat for women. The problem was that the Army could not come up with a practical, acceptable definition of combat, so the law was silent on the issue. However, it was made clear to the service secretaries that Congress did not want women in combat.\textsuperscript{32}

**Korean War**

Women may have become permanent members of the armed forces in the post-war period, but, similar to the men, they were demobilised in large numbers. From a total of 266,256 at war's end, the number of women on active duty in June 1950, when North Korea invaded the south, had dropped to about 22,000, of which about one-third were medical personnel. Furthermore, limited numbers were serving overseas with only one nurse and no line women stationed in Korea when the war started. Not surprisingly, the most immediate need was for nurses. By the end of the first year of the war, the Army Nurse Corps had grown from 3500 to 5400, with about 500 to 600 nurses serving in the war zone. Requests for line women also came into the Pentagon, but given the fluid nature of the fighting, the service headquarters refused to send them to Korea.\textsuperscript{33}

At the beginning of the war, initial manning goals were met by asking reservists to volunteer for extended active duty and involuntarily recalling other selected reservists, marking the first time women were called to active duty without their consent. Still, personnel shortages existed, so the services once again turned to women. However, despite a vigorous recruiting campaign, women did not answer the call the way they had in World War II—the total number of women went up by only a modest 31,000. The attempted expansion failed for several reasons. A 'police action' in Korea did not have the same patriotic draw as World War II. The reputation of servicewomen was not very good and parents often objected to their daughters joining the military. Also, the civilian job market had more to offer ambitious young women, and by the time the recruiting began, the war had already begun to slacken.\textsuperscript{34}

**Vietnam Era**

After the Korean War, the number of women dwindled throughout the rest of the fifties and into the first half of the sixties, reaching a low point of 29,795 in Fiscal Year 1964. However, their numbers began to rise in Fiscal Year 1965 and would continue to do so for the next 25 years. The immediate impetus for the increase was, once again, a manpower crisis, this time caused by the Vietnam War. The war was unpopular and men were reluctant to volunteer for military service. This meant the draft had to be extended in 1967 and to make it more palatable, President Lyndon B. Johnson said he would try to keep the number of men inducted as low as possible. Consequently, a number of military jobs were converted to civilian positions, recruiting standards for male volunteers were lowered and the end-strength goal for military women was raised by 6500. The number of women, however, actually exceeded this very modest goal, rising by a little over 15,000. Nonetheless, it was still only about half the growth rate that had occurred during the Korean War. Similar to men, the Vietnam War was not popular among women.\textsuperscript{35}

Unlike the Korean War, however, line women did serve in Vietnam. Most of them worked at headquarters commands in traditional jobs, such as stenographers, supply, administration and personnel. The Army sent a total of about 700 women and the Air Force 500 to 600, but the Marine Corps had only 36 women in-country and the Navy limited participation to just nine
women line officers. None of the line women were killed in action, but they were subjected to frequent artillery shellings and those in Saigon were also targets of terrorist attacks. Although relatively small in numbers, these line women showed that they could function effectively in a combat zone, even under hostile fire.36

**All Volunteer Force**

Although line women's participation in the Vietnam War had been minimal, events immediately after the war would result in an unexpected major expansion of their participation in the military. In early 1973, the draft was eliminated and the military turned to volunteers to fill its ranks. However, when it started doing so, the services found they were facing a long-term shortage of men between the ages of seventeen to twenty-five. In addition, the services had to fill a 1973 congressional mandate requiring that 55 per cent of all enlistees be high school graduates and at least 82 per cent be in the upper three mental categories of the entrance exam. Women were already required to be high school graduates and generally were better educated than male enlistees. Without additional women, the services would not be able to meet either their personnel requirements or the congressional education goals.37

Initially the services recruited women aggressively for the All Volunteer Force, but in later years it took some rather firm prodding of the services by civilian defence officials to keep the upward trend going. But the trend did keep going up. From 45,033 at the beginning of Fiscal Year 1973 to a high point of 232,823 by the end of Fiscal Year 1989. At the same time, the percentage of the military that was female rose from slightly under two per cent to 10.5 per cent. Although the number of women declined somewhat during the Cold War drawdown, the female proportion of the armed forces continued to rise, reaching its current level of over fourteen per cent. However, substantial variances exist among the services with the Air Force having the highest proportion at almost 19 per cent and the Marine Corps the lowest at six per cent.38

The increasing number of women also resulted in changes in the occupations women could enter and the positions and units to which they could be assigned. If women remained only in the traditional occupations and job assignments, they would begin to adversely impact men's careers. The Army, for example, said that women must be admitted to non-traditional jobs in order 'to prevent a surplus in MOS [military occupational specialty] favored by females, and to insure tour equity and male progression opportunity.39 Consequently, the Army opened 437 of its 485 occupations, including such non-traditional ones as ammunition specialist, plumber, military policemen, air defence crewman, heavy vehicle mechanic, and electrical/electronic equipment operator. As a result, the percentage of Army women serving in non-traditional occupations climbed from slightly under two percent in 1972 to a little over 22 percent in 1978.40

In October 1972, the Secretary of the Navy announced that women who wanted to become pilots could begin naval aviation training. The Army did the same in April 1973 and the Air Force and Coast Guard in 1975. Only the Marine Corps decided to keep aviation closed to women pilots. Female pilots were legally limited to non-combat support jobs, but the Navy did permit them to fly combat jets in training missions. Even with the restrictions, well over half of all flight operations were open to women.41

On the sea, the Coast Guard assigned women as permanent crew members to two high endurance cutters in May 1977. In the fall of 1978, the 1948 law prohibiting the assignment of Navy and Marine women from duty on ships, except hospital ships and transports, was changed to allow permanent duty aboard non-combat ships and temporary duty aboard any Navy ship as long as it was not assigned a combat mission. The law was changed at the Navy's request because it did not have enough men to 'man' its support ships. Without women in the crews, some ships could not deploy. But the need to change the law was reinforced when a federal court ruled in July 1978 that the combat ship exclusion was unconstitutional. The first women reported for duty aboard the USS *Vulcan*, a repair ship, in November 1978. The program began slowly, but with an ever increasing need for seagoing personnel, it expanded so that between 1981 and 1990 it rose from 2000 to 8000 women aboard ships.42
On the ground, the Army started to literally move women forward. In 1987, nearly 12,000 positions were opened to women in the forward support battalions of the Army's combat divisions. As pointed out by Major General Jeanne Holm, a leading authority on military women, 'the Army leadership realized that, given the large number of women in supply and service jobs, the readiness of combat units would be hampered if women were excluded from these forward support battalions. So ... women were moved forward where they were needed'. A year later, the Army opened about 3000 more jobs to women in headquarters units of infantry and armor divisions, air defence artillery battalions, signal battalions and some light infantry divisions. Even the Marine Corps began to assign women to its Fleet Marine Force, in service support groups of the Marine Amphibious Force, in aircraft wings and in division headquarters.

All of the changes were important because now women were moving, albeit slowly, into the core of the military—assignment to operational units. Technically they might not be in combat jobs, but they certainly were edging closer to the battlefield. And this became readily apparent beginning in 1983 when gender integrated Army units deployed to Grenada during Operation Urgent Fury. Women comprised two percent of the force and served in a number of positions, ranging from military police guarding prisoners of war camps, to helicopter pilots who ferried troops, to intelligence specialists who interrogated prisoners, to stevedores who loaded captured weapons and ordnance personnel who detonated unexploded ammunition. Similarly, in 1989, Army women participated in Operation Just Cause and deployed to Panama. This time they constituted four per cent of the force. The incident that received the most publicity was when an Army woman captain led soldiers of her police company in a firefight, but additionally three helicopters with women pilots were fired on and one was hit.

**Persian Gulf War**

But the real eye opener, especially for the public, was the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Suddenly, Americans were seeing images of women in camouflage uniforms trying on flack jackets and gas masks. In Saudi Arabia, women were shown doing their jobs in what was clearly a combat environment. The percentage of the forces in theatre that were female doubled from the four per cent in Panama to eight per cent. It was obvious that US forces could not go to war without women.

The Persian Gulf War showed that the current laws and policies did not keep women out of harm's way and that the line between combat and non-combat, both in terms of jobs and location, was extremely fuzzy. Women in 'support' assignments behind the 'front' lines were killed in SCUD attacks. An Army woman in a 'support' job of truck driver was captured by the Iraqis. Women flew medical evacuation helicopters as far forward as any of the Army's attack helicopters. One of the medevac helicopters flown by a male crew was shot down and the woman doctor on board was captured. An Army military police unit with women assigned was airlifted forward to take charge of enemy prisoners and ended up behind one combat unit, but ahead of two others. A Navy battle group commander commented that women on supply ships that shuttled to and from combatants in mine infested waters were in more danger than he was on the aircraft carrier. He also pointed out that 'the way naval forces are used today makes it virtually impossible to say what is a front-line area and what isn't'.

After the war, the commander of the coalition forces, the US Secretary of Defense and the Defense Department's report to Congress on the war all praised women's performance and said the war could not have been won without them. The Congress' investigative agency, the General Accounting Office, interviewed men and women who had served in the Gulf and found that attitudes about women's performance were highly positive. Consequently, in December 1991, Congress decided to remove the restrictions on women flying combat missions and modified the combat ship exclusion to permit women aviation officers to be assigned to Navy combatants as part of an air wing or other air element assigned to the ship. About a year and a half later, the Secretary of Defense directed the services to permit women to compete for assignments in aircraft with combat missions.
This left the combat ship exclusion as the only law on the books prohibiting women in combat. It would take another manning crisis to result in its demise. In early 1993, the Navy was in the midst of a drawdown of both ships and personnel. Most of the ships to which women had been assigned were being put out of service or turned over to civilian crews. This left a number of former seagoing women sailors sitting ashore while men were faced with more frequent and longer sea tours. Meanwhile, the Navy was having problems filling critical shipboard jobs aboard combatants but could not use the qualified women sailors who were ashore to fill the gaps because the law prohibited the permanent assignment of women to ships with a combat mission. The solution to the problem came in February 1993, when the Chief of Naval Operations sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense titled 'It's Time', recommending that legislation be forwarded to Congress removing the combat ship exclusion.48

The legislation was introduced in the House of Representatives and, in its hearings, the Chief of Naval Personnel said the change was needed because 'it is vital to our readiness, and I stress the word readiness, that we fill each position with the most qualified Navy man or woman'.49 He also pointed out that the Navy already had fifteen years of experience with women aboard ships and so this change was one of evolution, not revolution. In November 1993, Congress passed the legislation and in March 1994, the first woman reported for duty aboard a combatant, the aircraft carrier USS *Eisenhower*.50

In early 1999, the *Eisenhower* continued to show the importance of women to operational readiness. On its previous deployment, only 82 per cent of the *Eisenhower's* jobs were filled. In getting ready for the next cruise, the commanding officer found no additional men were available to make up the shortfall. He did discover, however, that qualified women were ashore who could fill many of those positions, but the ship did not have enough living space for them. He rectified the situation by creating more berthing and bathroom facilities for women, rather than waiting for the next overhaul period when they would have been added. As a result, the ship sailed with about 93 per cent of its positions filled, the highest level for any aircraft carrier in the previous three years. Also, the additional women helped the *Eisenhower* become the only Atlantic Fleet carrier to win the highly coveted Battle Efficiency Award in 1999.51

Although all the laws on the assignment of women had been repealed, policies remained in effect that continued to exclude women from direct ground combat—the infantry, armour and much of the field artillery. In October 1994, a direct ground combat policy issued by the Secretary of Defense took effect that excluded women from units below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage direct ground combat. Direct ground combat was defined as taking place well forward on the battlefield and having three components: engaging the enemy on the ground, exposure to hostile fire and having a high probability of direct physical contact with the enemy.52 By service policy, the other major areas still closed to women are Navy submarines and, in all of the services, special forces units.

**Politics**

Given the nature of many of the issues concerning military women, it should not be surprising that politics sometimes was a major factor in deciding women's policy issues. Some of the political tugs of war occurred within the military itself. During World War I, the Army field commanders tried to convince the Secretary of War to enlist women in the Army. They were not successful. During the early years of the All Volunteer Force, service leaders wanted to slow the growth of female recruiting, but it took several rejections of the idea by two secretaries of defence in two presidential administrations for them to finally get the message. On Capitol Hill, legislation caused several political battles. One of the biggest was when the military leaders of the Second World War took on the Senate in order to obtain permanent status for line women. Conversely, Congress twice opened opportunities for women that the military opposed: admittance to the service academies and entrance into combat aviation. Lastly, civilian women, both as individuals and as members of military advisory groups, were able to help push changes that were needed through Congress. While military pragmatism was discussed chronologically, political issues will be viewed from the perspective of who the participants were: (1) the uniformed leaders and their Pentagon civilian bosses; (2) the services and Congress and (3) civilian women and Congress.
Uniformed Leaders and their Civilian Bosses

One of the first disputes over the utilisation of line women occurred during World War I when the uniformed field commanders and their politically appointed boss, the Secretary of War, disagreed about having women in the Army. Although the Navy Department enlisted women in its reserve forces, the Secretary of War refused to utilise women in the Army and was even reluctant to hire them as civilians. Commanders facing severe personnel shortages pleaded with the Secretary for authorisation to employ civilian women in essential work for which men were not available. He finally relented, concluding that ‘with careful supervision, [civilian] women employees may be permitted in camps without moral injury either to themselves or to the soldiers’, provided the women were ‘of mature age and high moral character’.

The entreaties of military planners and field commanders to enlist women in the Army, however, were rebuffed by the Secretary. When the commanding general of supply services in Europe asked for 5000 military women for clerical work in order to release soldiers for combat duty, he was sent 5000 unskilled enlisted men instead. Also turned down were the Chief of Engineers, the Operations Branch of the Army General Staff and the Chief of Ordnance. The Secretary of War remained convinced that having enlisted women was just too radical an idea. In responding to a proposal from a congressional committee about forming a women's corps, he said such an idea would be unwise, undesirable, and exceedingly ill-advised.

Even a request for military women clerical workers from the Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces in Europe, General John J. Pershing, was denied, so to fill the need he 'borrowed' some from the British Women's Auxiliary Army Corps. When he needed bilingual telephone operators, he received authorisation from the Adjutant-General of the Signal Corps to hire civilians. In recruiting his 'civilians', however, he emphasised that he wanted women telephone operators for a military mission and a newspaper article said that 'in every respect these young women will be soldiers, coming under military restrictions at all times. The women were actually sworn into the Army, not once, but twice, and wore uniforms. Eventually, 233 of these telephone operators, known as 'Hello Girls', would serve in France. At the end of the war, it was decided that, because General Pershing should not have enlisted the women, the Hello Girls would not receive honourable discharges, but rather be given 'service termination letters'. In effect, they were civilianised retroactively.

A second instance of the uniformed leaders being at odds with their civilian bosses was in deciding how many women should be in the All Volunteer Force (AVF). In late 1971, as the military began personnel planning for the volunteer force, the Office of the Secretary of Defense became concerned about possible shortages of male recruits and told the task force overseeing implementation to study the use of military women. However, in March 1972, before the task force completed its work, Representative Otis Pike held hearings in the House of Representatives on the role of military women. Afterward he said that the services were guilty of 'tokenism' and that 'women could and should play a more important role' in the military.

In response, the head of the AVF task force told the services to develop contingency plans that would double the number of women in the Army, Navy and Air Force and increase the number of women Marines by forty percent between fiscal years 1973 and 1977. Sensing the inevitable, the services actually came up with action plans, and the Navy and Air Force even increased their goals. As it turned out, the services exceeded even these ambitious targets as the number of women increased by over 150 per cent between Fiscal Years 1973 and 1977.

After this dramatic increase, the services assumed they had done enough and that the expansion would slow down in 1976. Also, a former Navy man, Jimmy Carter, was to become President in January 1977 and surely he would understand the need to decrease the growth rate for women. They were wrong. Within a week of Carter taking office, the Secretary of Defense requested a study of the use of women and, although the study did not recommend any numerical goals for the services, it was made clear that the military was better off
recruiting high quality women rather than low quality men. The case for increasing the number of women was also buttressed by a study published that same year by the Brookings Institution, a distinguished Washington think tank. The study's authors concluded that potentially the number of enlisted women could be more than doubled and eventually women could conceivably comprise 22 per cent of the total force. Consequently, the Defense Secretary directed that the number of enlisted women be doubled by 1983 and, in 1985, raised the goal to over 250,000 women by the end of fiscal year 1986. Although the number of women grew by almost 60 per cent during the Carter administration, he was not able to follow through on attaining the ambitious goals he had set because he lost the 1980 election to Ronald Reagan.

With the conservative Reagan becoming president in 1981, the uniformed military leaders again assumed there would be a slowdown in women's recruitment. The Army and Air Force secretly gave the Reagan transition team proposals to scrap the Carter administration's projected increases and, in February 1981, the Army testified before a Senate subcommittee that it planned to slow the recruitment of enlisted women. Furthermore, in submitting its manpower requirements, the Army hinted it expected a return to the draft which meant it would need fewer women. All of this caught the Reagan administration by surprise and infuriated Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger who stated flatly that a return to the draft was not being considered. By January 1982, any hope the uniformed leaders had of decreasing the number of women was dealt the final blow when Weinberger wrote to the service secretaries saying that the administration wanted to increase the role of women in the military and expected the Service Secretaries to actively support that policy.

Despite the clear guidance from the Defense Secretary, apparently the Navy forgot the message. In February 1987, the Chief of Naval Operations announced that enlisted women's end strength would stay the same through 1991. He said this freeze was necessary to ensure enough shore jobs for men rotating from sea duty and because the Navy needed to increase the number of men to man its proposed 600 ship fleet. One day later, Defense Secretary Weinberger rescinded the freeze, saying that he was comfortable with the previously planned goals that called for a ten percent increase by 1991.

Overall, the services consistently misjudged the Reagan administration's commitment to the All Volunteer Force and the need to increase the number of women. The reality was that within nine months of the end of Reagan's term, women's end strength reached its all-time high of 232,823 and women constituted 10.5 per cent of the armed forces. The number of women did begin to decline during the administration of President George W. Bush, but it was not because the services were finally successful in fighting their civilians leaders. Rather it was a result of a personnel reduction-in-force caused by the end of the Cold War. Also, although the numbers were going down, as a percentage of the military women continued to increase from 10.5 per cent to slightly over fourteen per cent as of 31 March 2000.

The Services and Congress

In addition to battling their political civilian bosses, the services sometimes found themselves at odds with Congress. As mentioned earlier, after World War II, the military decided that at least a small number of line women should remain on active duty during peacetime. In 1946, bills were introduced to make women a permanent part of the Army and Navy, but both bills died in committee. The following year, the Army and Navy each tried again. This time the Navy bill also included the Marine Corps. The Senate acted rapidly on the two bills, first combining them into the Women's Armed Services Integration Act of 1947 and, within a month, passing the new legislation. But the bill ran into trouble in the House. Despite a personal letter from General Eisenhower urging quick action, the subcommittee responsible for the legislation announced it would delay the hearings for six months. One reason for the delay was the passage of the National Security Act which created the Air Force thus necessitating adding another service to the bill. But the real problem was a concerted campaign by a number of mostly former servicemen as well as House members who opposed giving women regular status.
Now the stage was set for the pragmatic military, convinced women should be in both the regular and reserve forces, to clash with House politicians who thought women should be confined to the reserves. When the hearings finally were held, the roster of civilian and military personnel who testified was very impressive, including Secretary of Defense Forrestal and the wartime leaders who now headed their services, General Eisenhower and Admiral Nimitz. All the witnesses expressed strong objections to a reserve-only status. The basic message was, in the words of Eisenhower, ‘We need them’. In six days of hearings, however, every objection imaginable was raised. The services responded to all the concerns, but to no avail. On 26 April 1948, the House voted to permit women to join only the reserves.

With two separate versions of the bill, the issue now had to be resolved by a committee of members from the House and Senate. At these hearings, an even more impressive array of senior civilian and military leaders testified: Secretary of Defense Forrestal; Generals Eisenhower and Bradley for the Army; Admirals Nimitz, Denfeld and Radford for the Navy, Generals Spaatz, Vandenberg and Eaker for the Air Force and General Vandegrift for the Marine Corps. Eisenhower testified that he considered the legislation a ‘must’, and Nimitz said women's 'skills are as important to the efficient operation of the Naval establishment during peacetime as they were during the war years'.

The testimony of the military leaders was an unprecedented display of support for military women, but what finally tipped the balance in favor of the Senate bill to put women in the regular forces was the deterioration of the international situation. The Soviets had taken control of Czechoslovakia and, two days after the House vote, had blockaded Berlin. The Army could not recruit enough men, so President Truman had asked for the first-ever peacetime draft. On 19 May 1948, the House gave up and agreed to pass the Senate version of the legislation. President Truman signed the Women's Armed Service Integration Act on 12 June 1948, thereby giving line women a permanent place in the regulars and reserves. In this case, the pragmatic military won the political battle.

Although the military won on the issue of the status of military women, two instances occurred in which Congress imposed requirements the military did not want. The first was the 1975 legislation requiring the services in the Department of Defense to admit women to their academies. The services should not have been surprised for there had been early warning signs it might happen. Legislation to admit women to academies had been introduced as early as 1944, but it would only be in the 1970s that Congress took on the issue in earnest. In September 1972, the House held hearings about military women during which the issue of admitting women to the academies arose. Representative Samuel S. Stratton from New York asked questions about the issue because one of New York's senators had nominated a woman for admission to the Naval Academy and the Secretary of the Navy had turned down the nomination. At the end of the questions, Stratton told the Navy representative at the hearings that 'the world is changing, and ... the Navy in this regard has not changed fast enough ... I am going to say flatly, the day is not far off when you will have women in the Naval Academy'.

In September 1973, two women sued for admission to the Naval and Air Force Academies. They lost in the lower court, but won a federal appeals court decision to send the case to trial. The pressure also continued when in July 1974, the Merchant Marine Academy, which was operated by the Maritime Administration of the Department of Commerce, opened its doors to women. This was followed a year later by an announcement that the Coast Guard Academy would beginning admitting women.

In May 1974, the House of Representatives again held hearings on the issue. The services, including all the service secretaries as well as the service chiefs, strongly opposed the admittance of women. They raised a number of arguments against women at the academies, including cost, lowering standards and social issues, such as eroding the academies' unique spirit. But the issue they focused on most strongly was that the mission of the academies was to develop leaders for combat and, by law, women were barred from combat. The problem with this argument, however, was that the facts did not support their case. For example, a study showed that of 8880 graduates of the Air Force Academy on active duty as of October 1974, 29 per cent had never had a career combat assignment.
The services began to realise in January 1975 that the end was clearly in sight. When Congress convened that month, six bills were introduced to admit women to the service academies. On 20 May 1975, the House voted overwhelmingly to admit women and, on 6 June, the Senate approved the measure on a voice vote. The die was caste. The superintendent at West Point considered resigning but changed his mind, telling alumni that it was the will of Congress and therefore the change should be made smoothly and efficiently. In July 1976, the first women entered the Military, Naval and Air Force Academies. 68

The other change that Congress imposed on the services was the opening of combat aviation to women. In the aftermath of the successful performance of women in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Representative Patricia Schroeder, a strong supporter of military women, introduced a provision in the defence authorisation bill in May 1991 to permit Air Force women to fly combat missions. She chose the Air Force because she thought it had the least defensible argument against keeping women out of combat cockpits and it seemed to be the service most amenable to making the change. Representative Beverly Byron thought it was not fair to exclude Navy and Marine Corps women and so they were added to the proposal. No hearings were held on the issue and the opening of combat aviation easily passed in the House. In July 1991, the first women entered the Military, Naval and Air Force Academies.

In the Senate, however, passage of the proposal was more difficult. Opponents tried to kill it by widening the issue to incorporate the entire women in combat issue, including ground combat. The service chiefs testified that they opposed opening combat aviation to women. Nevertheless, most Senators felt it was time to remove the ban because no persuasive arguments were actually made that opening combat aviation to women would adversely affect readiness. The services’ case was not helped when the Chief of Staff of the Air Force testified that he would select a male pilot to fly on his wing over a woman aviator who was better qualified than the man. He even acknowledged that such a decision did not make sense. Realising that they were about to lose, the opponents tried to postpone the vote on women entering combat aviation by proposing that the issue first be studied by a presidential commission. The supporters knew that a delay would probably thwart opening the new jobs to women so they argued that Senators could vote yes on both proposals. And that is what Senators did—voting overwhelming to create a presidential commission, but also voting to repeal the combat aviation exclusion. 69

Against the desires of the services, Congress had now told them they could put women in combat aviation. However, the law did not mandate that they do so. The presidential commission voted eight to seven to recommend to Congress that the legal ban on combat aviation be reimposed. However, the day the vote was taken was the same day that Democrat William J. Clinton defeated Republican George W. Bush for the presidency. The new, more liberal administration was not convinced by the arguments to keep combat aviation closed and, in April 1993, the Secretary of Defense directed the services to permit women to compete for assignments in aircraft with combat missions. 70

Congress was successful in imposing new policies on the services, but the military generally remained opposed to them. Although service leaders usually said the right things about accepting the changes, in fact all did not go smoothly. Even today, some men still are not happy to have women at the academies. For example, surveys at the Naval Academy show that men leave it with a lower opinion about their women classmates than they had when they arrived. In aviation, women’s acceptance has been very slow, especially in the Navy. Accusations have been made that the standards have been lowered for women in order to ensure their success. This was especially true in the wake of the death of Lieutenant Kara Hultgreen in a crash off an aircraft carrier. The perceived hostile environment has been one of the contributing factors to the low rate at which Navy women are entering the combat jet community. 71 Both of these cases illustrate that Congress may have won the legislative battle, but has not yet won the implementation war.
Civilian Women and Congress

Civilian women have also been involved with issues concerning military women. Sometimes the women acted individually and at other times as members of advisory groups appointed by the military. Mention has already been made of the role Representatives Patricia Schroeder and Beverly Byron played concerning the combat aviation issue, but they certainly were not the first women in Congress to bring about changes for military women.

One of the first congressional women to act with regard to military women was Representative Edith Nourse Rogers during World War II. With US participation in the war seeming ever more likely, in May 1941, Rogers proposed to introduce legislation to create a women's corps in the Army. She wanted women in the Army to ensure that they had the same protection as men because, in her experience, women had not been treated fairly after World War I. Seeing the handwriting on the wall, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel said the Army was willing to permit the organisation of a women's force but only 'along the lines which meet with War Department approval, so that ... we shall be able to run it our way'.

Although Rogers wanted women in the Army, she realised that the only way to get any legislation passed was to compromise and let the Army run things 'its way', so she decided to support the Army's bill creating a Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) outside the regular and reserve Army. However, many congressional men, especially in the House of Representatives, were not very receptive to even this modest proposal. In the words of one congressman: 'Take the women into the armed service, who then will do ... the humble homely tasks ... Think of the humiliation! What has become of the manhood of America?' Nevertheless, Rogers and the Army succeeded in getting the legislation passed. In May 1942, the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps was established.

Although the Army got its way, the auxiliary status of the women did not work because they had separate administration, supply and disciplinary procedures outside the Army and commanders did not know who was in charge of the women. In essence, the Army found that Representative Rogers had been right—women should be in the Army. Consequently, it went back to Congress in 1943 for new legislation creating a Women's Army Corps (WAC) under direct military control. The male politicians again were not enthusiastic, but with continued prodding from Representative Rogers and the Army, Congress passed a bill giving non-nurse women military status.

Meanwhile, the Navy faced a dilemma. Navy Secretary Frank Knox wanted to bring women into the Navy again, but unlike Secretary Daniels in World War I, he would need legislation to do so. At that point, the Army's bill, which had women in a separate auxiliary, was already in Congress and he would have to convince its members to pass different legislation for the Navy. The Navy went ahead with a bill putting women in the Navy, but it would take the work of several civilian women to make it happen.

Even before the bill reached the Congress, the Navy ran into a roadblock when the Bureau of the Budget said the legislation would be acceptable only if it were the same as the Army's bill putting women in an auxiliary. Knox would not agree to such a provision, resulting in an impasse. The bottleneck was broken in March 1942 when Dr. Margaret Chung, a woman surgeon who was a friend of a number of naval aviators who supported the bill, asked a congressman she knew to introduce legislation on the issue. Not surprisingly, the bill was virtually identical to the one the Navy proposed, and the House passed it within a month. In the Senate, however, the bill ran into trouble again when the chair of the Naval Affairs Committee insisted that the Navy's bill parallel the Army legislation. He recommended to President Franklin D. Roosevelt that Navy women serve in an auxiliary. The President approved the proposal, but Secretary Knox continued to oppose the idea.

Once again women came to the rescue. Secretary Knox had established a Navy Women's Advisory Council to assist in setting up the Navy's women's program. The council's chair, Dr Virginia Gildersleeve, and one of its members, Harriet Elliott, each wrote to Mrs Eleanor...
Roosevelt explaining why Navy women should not be in an auxiliary outside the Navy and asking for her help. Mrs Roosevelt then explained the situation to her husband and gave him Elliott's letter. Meanwhile, she sent Gildersleeve’s letter to Under Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, who replied to the President that the Navy opposed placing women in a separate auxiliary corps. Mrs Roosevelt's intercession worked—the President changed his mind and told the Navy Secretary to organise a women's reserve as he thought best. On 30 July 1942, President Roosevelt signed the law creating the Women's Reserve in the Naval Reserve.  

The idea of having a group of women to advise the military on women's issues was resurrected in 1951 when Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall established the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS). Composed of distinguished American women, initially the committee focused on recruiting women for service during the Korean War, but as time went by they began to work on a variety of issues of importance to military women. In the 1960s, one of these issues concerned the adverse impact some of the restrictions in the 1948 Women's Armed Services Integration Act were having on women, especially with regard to their promotions. DACOWITS recommended that a bill be prepared to correct the situation.

Military leaders supported the legislation, but it was the efforts of DACOWITS members that were critical to the bill's passage. They sought the support of women's groups, veterans groups, former servicewomen and others, encouraging them to write members of Congress. The DACOWITS chair held regular strategy planning sessions with military women. After each DACOWITS meeting held in Washington, DC, the members visited anyone they knew on Capitol Hill to gain critical backing for the bill. Some focused on the media to build public support. They also worked with retired military women who helped draft the bill and talked with anyone who would listen on the need for the legislation.

All of the DACOWITS’ hard work paid off. In October 1967, Congress passed the bill and President Johnson signed it into law on 8 November. It provided for the removal of restrictions on the number of women at various ranks, allowed women to hold permanent rank as captains/colonels, permitted women's selection to general/admiral and removed the two per cent ceiling on women's strength levels in the regular forces. As it turned out, while much publicity was given to the promotion of two Army women to brigadier general two and a half years after the law passed, it was the removal of the two percent ceiling that would prove critical when the draft was abolished. Civilian women had not only provided increased equity for women, but removed a barrier for the services which would let them increase the utilisation of women in the All Volunteer Force.  

American Society

Underlying the progress, or in some cases lack of it, of military women has been the attitude of American society about what is appropriate for women. Generally, the services have not wanted to get ahead of society in making changes and sometimes have been reluctant to open new opportunities even though society has moved forward. In the case of occupations, for example, changing women's roles in the US sometimes left the armed forces with little choice but to place women in certain occupations, such as nursing. Although sometimes these changes clashed with military culture, Americans have become more accepting of military women's new roles, including combat assignments.

Another aspect of society’s views that had a major impact on military women were policies concerning family issues, such as pregnancy and being a working mother. The public tended to be conservative on these issues as did the military. Major changes came in civilian society, however, due to the women's rights movement, the proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the US Constitution and gender specific court cases. On the other hand, until fairly recently, the military has clung to a traditional view that the roles of wife and mother were not compatible with a military career. To examine these issues more closely, the discussion will first focus on women's occupations, both as nurses and in nontraditional, non-medical jobs and then on family policy issues.
Occupations

Americans have always accepted women tending the sick because they were seen as the nurturing caregivers within the family. Society, however, was very reluctant for women to do this type of work in the male environment of the military. During the Civil War, although women nurses were becoming more common, objections were heard to using women to tend the sick and wounded because the Army was no place for a lady and the work was too difficult. However, with the outbreak of the Spanish-American War at the end of the century, women military nurses were more acceptable. Female nurses had become the norm in society which meant if the military wanted nurses, they would have to be women. The acceptance was not total, however, because women nurses served with, not in, military. This was a reflection of society’s belief at the time that no women, not even nurses, should have a permanent place in the military.

Ironically, despite society's general lack of enthusiasm about women serving in the military, from the very beginning, women nurses served near and sometimes on the battlefield. But society drew the line at other military women serving there. An example of this double standard occurred as recently as the Vietnam War in the 1960s. Nurses were expected to serve in Vietnam; line women were not. Somewhat over 1300 line women went to Vietnam, compared with 5000 to 6000 nurses. The services assumed that line women should not be sent to bases that were hot, dusty and dirty; nurses, however, learned to select camp sites, pitch tents and read maps. During the Tet Offensive, consideration was given to removing the line women; there was never any question of pulling out the nurses. In fact the nurses were among the last Americans to leave Vietnam in 1973. Given the predominance of women in the nursing profession, the military had little choice but to put them in or near the combat zone. However, there was also an assumption that doing so was acceptable to a public accustomed to nurturing women caring for the sick and injured. Having line women in a combat zone just did not seem as compelling, particularly when enough men were available.  

Not only was the nursing profession overwhelmingly female, but as the US entered the twentieth century, women also started to dominate other occupations. By the beginning of World War I, businesses were training and hiring women to be clerks, typists, factory workers, telephone operators and technicians. Some occupations had virtually been taken over by women. Previously, the office had been a male domain, but because women learned to use the new fangled office equipment, i.e., typewriters and telephones, they began to take the lead in the field. This left the services with a small pool of men from which to recruit for certain occupations. For example, in 1902, the Bell telephone system had 37,000 female switchboard operators and only 2500 male operators. This was why, when General Pershing needed telephone operators in France during World War I, he turned to women to fill the gap.  

The trend of American women moving into new occupations continued over the years and began to include dangerous non-traditional jobs, such as coal miners, police officers, construction workers and firefighters. On television, Americans also saw military women in the combat environments of Vietnam, Grenada, Panama and Saudi Arabia. Consequently, the public began to express more acceptance of women in combat jobs. For example, a 1992 survey by the Roper Organization showed that a majority of Americans approved of women being assigned to aircraft carriers, submarines, destroyers, bomber and fighter aircraft, tank crews, artillery units and special forces units operating behind enemy lines. A survey of military personnel showed, however, that they would not go as far. Although a majority supported women serving on combat ships and as combat pilots and crew, they did not believe women should be in the ground combat arms of infantry, armor, artillery or special forces. The reality today is that women's military occupations more closely mirror the views of the military than society as a whole. Women serve on all combat ships, except submarines, and are combat pilots, but all the direct ground combat occupations remain closed to them. The public's view, however, does give the services some latitude if they should decide to open more occupations to women because a majority of Americans would not disapprove of women on submarines or in tanks, artillery units or special forces.
Family Issues

Provisions in the 1948 Women’s Armed Service Integration Act restricted women not only in their occupations, promotions, and numbers, but also regulated a number of family matters. The law made it virtually impossible for a woman to marry and have children and remain in the service. Unlike married men, married women were not entitled to family housing, did not receive dependents’ allowances and, if the husband were a civilian, he could not use the military medical facilities or stores. The discharge authority in the law resulted in President Truman issuing a 1951 Executive Order that said if a woman became pregnant, gave birth to a child or had a minor child residing in her home for more than thirty days a year, she must leave the service.

These restrictions seem onerous and sexist by today's standards, but reflected societal values at the time. A man was expected to be the breadwinner for the family and not be dependent on a woman for his support. Pregnant women were supposed to leave work, and it was assumed mothers would stay home. But in the 1950s some women began to question these inequities. In 1963, Betty Friedan published the landmark book The Feminine Mystique which helped launch the women's rights movement. In March 1972, Congress passed the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) which, if ratified by the states, would assure equal rights for women in the US Constitution. Additionally, federal courts began to strike down laws and policies relating to women.

Beginning in the 1960s, and accelerating substantially in the 1970s, all of this began to have an impact on military women. For example, five months after the Senate passed the ERA, the Navy's Chief of Naval Operations issued a message on changes for Navy women. The message's subject was 'Equal Rights and Opportunities for Women in the Navy', and showed a clear link to the ERA. Within a year, the All Volunteer Force would be launched and with it came increasing numbers of women in a much wider variety of jobs. But the greatest impact of the ERA and court decisions was in the area of family policies.

The first policy to change had to do with marriage. In the 1960s, the ban on recruiting married women was lifted. Next to go was letting women who married leave the service before the end of their obligated service, a policy that discriminated against men. At first a woman could still get out if the service could not assign her to a job near her husband, but eventually this was changed to discharging married women only if they could show a hardship. In 1970, First Lieutenant Sharon Frontiero, U S Air Force, sued in federal court to overturn the requirements that she provide over half of her husband's support and show that he was incapable of earning an income before she could get dependency entitlements. She lost in the lower courts, but in May 1973, the US Supreme Court declared the law unconstitutional. Subsequently, the services also changed references to 'wife' and 'husband' to 'spouse'.

The next policy to be challenged was the mandatory discharge for having a minor child in the home for more than 30 days. Captain Tommie Sue Smith, a divorced mother with a son, took the Air Force to court on 28 September 1969. The next day, the Air Force announced it was changing its policy to permit mothers to remain on active duty. Next, Major Lorraine Johnson, married with a son, sued in federal court to retain her Army reserve commission. The Army granted her a waiver which then became the norm. In 1975, the Secretary of Defense ordered the practice of discharging women with minor children discontinued.

The pregnancy discharge policy, by far the most emotional issue, went through a series of changes. Initially the policy required that pregnant women be discharged, but slowly the services began by quietly granting waivers to a few pregnant women so they could stay on active duty in order to be eligible for retirement. Beginning in 1970, women in the Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps went to federal court contesting the mandatory pregnancy separation policy and so the services began to routinely give waivers to women who wanted to remain in the service. This meant that women would be discharged from the service, unless they asked to be retained. In June 1974, the Office of the Secretary of Defense told the services that, effective May 1975, they must stop involuntary discharges for pregnancy. Now the policy was reversed: pregnant women stayed in the service, unless they asked to get out but normally
the request was granted. In 1995, the Secretary of the Navy took it one step further by telling
the Navy and Marine Corps that pregnancy and parenthood are compatible with a naval
career and that although a pregnant woman could request separation, such requests will not
normally be approved. Today, the other services, however, generally still discharge pregnant
women who ask to get out.\textsuperscript{83}

Although significant changes have been made in family policies to more closely reflect what
happens in American society, they remain among the most contentious issues with regard to
military women. Questions are still raised about the impact of pregnancy on readiness,
especially in operational units. Extensive research by the Navy, however, has shown that
pregnancy is not a major problem. Men are available for duty 95 per cent of the time and
women 94 per cent. Women were more likely to be gone for medical reasons, including
pregnancy, while men tend to be absent because of disciplinary infractions.\textsuperscript{84}

The data are also reflected in the real world of the fleet. When interviewed prior to a
deployment, the commanding officer of the USS \textit{Eisenhower} commented that pregnancy was
a cause for concern, but was manageable. He went on to say that women do not seem to
leave the ship at higher rates than men who left the \textit{Eisenhower} primarily because of
disciplinary problems. The difference with women leaving because of pregnancy, he said, is
that they are going to stay in the Navy and may report back to the same ship. When a guy is
kicked off the ship for discipline reasons, he is just put out of the Navy.\textsuperscript{85}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Male military leaders may not have been thrilled with the prospect of using women in 'their'
armed forces. Nevertheless, they were pragmatic enough to realise that sometimes, in order
to achieve their mission, women would be necessary. Thus, women nurses were used even
before the United States was formed and continued to serve throughout the nation's conflicts.
Non-nurse women did not make a major appearance until the World War I and even then, the
Army refused to enlist them. It would take World War II and the All Volunteer Force before
substantial numbers of women would be in the armed forces.

Men may have been resigned to women 'helping', but they did not want them in the military
and certainly not on a permanent basis. It would take 170 years for that to happen. They also
wanted them doing 'women's work', not assigned to the essence of the military-operational
combat units. It would take 215 years for that to happen.

Women, sometimes to the amazement of men, were able to do much more than they were
originally asked to do. They went well beyond typing letters and answering telephones to fill
virtually every support role in the armed forces and now have moved into some of the combat
arms. In war, they were wounded, died and captured, a fact that some men chose to ignore.

The issues involving military women often caused political battles. Sometimes the military,
including its most distinguished World War II leaders, had to cajole the Congress into
supporting changes it needed made. Other times, the Congress told the military what to do.
The uniformed leaders and their civilian bosses got into tugs of war over issues, such as how
many women should be in the All Volunteer Force. On at least a couple of occasions, it took
the efforts of civilian women to ensure that military women's legislation was passed.

Finally, American society's view of women's role in family life certainly had an impact on
military women. Until the 1960s, the traditional roles for women were as wife and mother and
so the military tended not to promote married women and would force them out of the service.
If a woman became pregnant, she would be discharged. If a woman married a widower or
divorced with children who were in the home more than thirty days, she would be discharged.
The man was expected to head the household, so if a woman married, she did not receive
any of the normal benefits that a married man would receive. It would take the women's rights
movement, the Equal Rights Amendment and several gender specific court cases to change
these practices.
Today, although women have certainly moved much more into the mainstream of the US military, they still are not all the way there. Even now, women are prohibited from entering what is seen by many as the very core of the military—direct ground combat. Army women on the ground are being shot at, but are not allowed to shoot first. Nothing on the current horizon makes it seem likely to change in the near future.

But taking the long view, women may move into ground combat through evolution, not revolution. For example, in August 2000, 430 women were in the Army's 82nd Airborne Division, and two of them were assigned to infantry regiments. A woman captain—who was an enlisted paratrooper in the division in the late 1980s, is a Gulf War veteran and a master parachutist—was commanding the 82nd Aviation Brigade. All of these women were in support jobs and assigned to headquarters units, but in the future, at least some of them may find themselves in combat. As pointed out by military historian John Duvall, 'A woman in an 82nd unit, particularly in an infantry unit, stands a higher chance of facing a hostile force, being killed or injured more than any other woman in the Army that I can think of'. Importantly, the women in the infantry regiments are there because they can do the job, not because of affirmative action. The commander of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment says the woman captain is there because 'she was my choice. Bottom line, she is the best person for the job. I made my decision based on performance and potential. Period. We will alter nothing because she is here. And she wouldn't expect it. She's a top-notch officer'. As women continue to show they can do the non-warrior jobs in combat units perhaps one day they will find themselves there as infantry soldiers as well.

Endnotes


23. See chapters 4-8 in Holm (ed), In Defense of a Nation: Servicewomen in World War II; Josette Dermody Wingo, Mother Was a Gunners Mate (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994).


30. For ease of use, the non-medical women will hereafter be referred to as 'line women'.


34. Holm, Women in the Military, 150-7; Ebbert and Hall, Crossed Currents, 140-6; Morden, Women's Army Corps 1945-1978, 92-105.


37. Ebbert and Hall, Crossed Currents, 192.

38. DoD, Manpower Statistics, 95-6, Captain Lory Manning, USN (Rtd), and Vanessa R Wight, Women in the Military: Where They Stand, 3rd edn (Washington, DC: Women Research and Education Institute, 2000), 11, 21-6.


41. Ebbert and Hall, Crossed Currents, 265-8; Morden, Women's Army Corps 1945-1978, 272-3; United States Coast Guard, Women in the Coast Guard Study, Commandant Publication 5312.17 (Washington, DC: US Coast Guard, 10 July 1990), II-50; Holm, Women in the Military, 317-23.

42. Ebbert and Hall, Crossed Currents, 237-50; Holm, Women in the Military, 326-37.

43. Holm, Women in the Military, 406.


45. Ibid, 405, 434-6.


47. Sadler, 'Women in Combat', 82-5.

48. Ibid., 86.

49 Quoted in ibid., 87.

50. Ibid., 86-9.


53. As quoted in Holm, Women in the Military, 13.

54. Ibid., 13-14; De Pauw, Battle Cries, 226.

55. As quoted in De Pauw, Battle Cries, 226.
73. Quoted in ibid, 24.
82. Ibid, 292-7.
84. Sadler and Thomas, ‘Rock the Cradle’, 54-5.
87. Ibid.
When considering how and why the United States armed forces integrated minorities in the past and integrates minorities (and women) today, five factors stand out:

1. The need for an adequate number of people to promote mission effectiveness.
2. The necessity for armed force units to be cohesive if they are to be effective in combat (or, for that matter, in support of fighting).
3. The fact that the United States armed services integrated themselves with a minimum of outside, political pressures (because key military leaders recognised the essential nature of the necessity for enough cohesive people to perform the missions assigned them by the national command authority).
4. The reality that politicians have tried and will continue to try to manipulate the racial, ethnic, and gender integration issue in the services with concern for the service secondary to social or political gain (which may be the same thing in the view of a politician).
5. The recognition that bigotry and sexism are powerful predilections that can make one act contrary to the interests of the service and the country, and also contrary to one's personal interests. Regarding point 5, because of the negative power of prejudice, it must be carefully monitored, guarded against, and overturned.

Recognise at the outset, that the United States military is the most racially and gender-integrated profession in the United States, but also realise that the United States military is not perfect in regard to racial or gender integration. Its record in racial and gender integration has not always been consistently positive and has been and will certainly be in the future marred by bigotry.

A paper this brief calls for generalisations, and all generalisations contain some false elements. When compared to other institutions in the United States regarding racial or gender integration, the American military stands out as more successful than any other mass institution. It got to that point by seeing clearly the connection between non-discrimination policies and mission effectiveness. The generalisations regarding military racial and gender integration in this paper will be positive, but I recognise the exceptions to the generally successful record, and I acknowledge the shortcomings in policy and especially application.

Since this is an historical essay, let me pay homage to the historical law of multicausation. The military racial integration process in the United States had begun in World War II. It was surely hastened by American congressional and presidential politics and actions during and primarily after the war. It was, furthermore, expedited by articulate and forceful campaigning by black newspapers such as the Pittsburgh Courier and leadership organisations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). It was also accelerated by black protests against racial discrimination within both the military and greater civilian society. It was, moreover, encouraged by the changing, more tolerant human climate of the times. But for all of the influences delineated above this reform (and that is the correct word for military racial integration) was promoted mainly by the practical, pragmatic needs of the armed services. Armed forces racial integration was carried out because of military necessity.

The first, and most prominent element or force in regard to integrating minorities and women in the American military, therefore, was and is the sheer need for people. Above everything, that is the essential motivator—the absolute necessity to populate the force with enough people able to perform the military mission. Clausewitz asserted that superiority in numbers is
the first principle of war, and Napoleon declared that God is on the side of the bigger battalions. The essentiality of people drove the armed forces to practise non-discrimination and equal opportunity and that is the reason why there are so many blacks in the United States military and the reason why there are so many women (and, incidentally, so many black women). Once the military needed to go outside the majority and also beyond just men to people the force—and this became even more crucial in the United States when the all-volunteer force instead of conscription became the peopling system—each of the armed services found it essential to practise nondiscrimination and equal opportunity. The need to people the force with talented men and women is the best antidote to bigotry. Why?

If one is required to turn to a minority population—blacks for example—to organise a force the size necessary to protect and promote national interests, or turns to women for the same reasons, then one immediately is confronted with the question: what kind of blacks or women does one want to recruit (either as officers or enlisted) and how does one retain trained and qualified superior people irrespective of race or gender? There is a simple answer to this question—the services want to enlist the best (the smartest, bravest, most disciplined people). How do the services enrol the best qualified? By promising equal opportunity or nondiscrimination in all aspects of the military, for all—all minorities, both genders.

At the base of the ramp that runs from the Air Force Academy parade ground to the academy quad are the first three words of a poem, 'Bring me men.' The whole line reads: 'Bring me men to match my mountains, bring me men to match my plains.' If that is the kind of men one wants, and when 'Bring me men ...' was put on that wall, there were no blacks or females at the Air Force Academy, what kind of blacks (or any other minority) and what kind of women does an armed service want? The answer the uniformed leaders give is this, they want all men and all women—blacks, Hispanics, Asian-Pacifics, etc—to match the mountains and to match the plains. That is, they want the best they can get. How does one get the best men and women into any profession? By ensuring that anyone entering has an equal opportunity to succeed. Equal opportunity and non-discrimination are not ends, they are means to an end, and the end is an effective military.

Equal to the essential nature of populating the military in terms of motivating equal opportunity and non-discrimination programs is the necessity for cohesion. In a military unit cohesion is everything. Uniformed people fight for each other—for the people in the unit. A commander aspires to weld a unit so tightly together that the people would rather die than let down the others in the unit. Discrimination and cohesion cannot coexist. If there is discrimination in an armed service unit there will be no cohesion. The services are ruthless about rooting out discrimination because it destroys cohesion. Again, non-discrimination is not an end, but rather a means to an end, and that end is cohesion without which a military unit will not be effective in combat.

The first points, then, are these: (1) the foundation for United States military racial and gender integration is the need for a sufficiently abundant number of effective people; such people are those with a high order of discipline and also high aptitudes and attitudes, and such people are definitely sought and seldom easy to find; (2) to get these people and to keep them and to ensure that the units that these outstanding people populate are cohesive, the United States armed forces practice equal opportunity and nondiscrimination.

The third point to be made is that the United States military integrated itself. Politicians served mainly as catalysts. That is, when the leadership of each service came to the conclusion that racial integration would be beneficial, segregation was abandoned. I recognise the services would not have been able to integrate racially if the commander-in-chief opposed it, and although President Harry S. Truman was a segregationist, he did not oppose military racial integration when it came. However and furthermore, despite his racial bias and segregationist attitude, he believed blacks deserved such civil rights as voting and opposed ruses like the whites-only-primary elections, falsely applied literacy tests, and poll taxes that prevented blacks from voting. Truman also lobbied hard for anti-lynching legislation. All of the above put him well in front of nearly all successful southern or border state politicians on the matter of race, but he was still a segregationist. Truman therefore is, indeed, complex, but for all his
belief in the 'little man' (and no part of the population was more disadvantaged than the
black), he did not favour social integration. In other words, and we will deal with this below,
Truman (and many of his biographers) takes (give him) credit for integrating military life,
something he personally opposed for himself.

One could say he encouraged racial integration in the Air Force (the first service to integrate)
by political actions taken during and inspired by the presidential campaign of 1948. He,
however, did not order integration and failed to implement it in the services. Military
integration in the Air Force was announced several months before Truman's Executive Order
9981, July 1948, and no other service followed the Air Force lead before or after the
Executive Order until well into the Korean War. Truman's record on armed forces integration
is ambiguous. The armed services' record is not.

When Truman issued Executive Order 9981, no service integrated a single person. In fact the
Executive Order did not call for integration (the word is not used), just equal opportunity.\(^9\) The
armed forces had argued in the past and even several services in July 1948—falsely of
course—that they were in fact practising equal opportunity, although it was in a segregated
environment (impossible to do of course, but that was the position taken by the military
leadership, even if the Supreme Court of the late nineteenth century argued that 'separate but
equal' was the law of the land).

Understand, furthermore, the military did not integrate to improve the lot of blacks in the
general population; the armed services did not see racial integration as an ethical, moral or
constitutional imperative. The military did nothing to help the life of blacks in racist communities, North and South, and the late 1940s were not good years for blacks. Lynching
still occurred in the South and border states, schools were segregated in every state formerly
in the Confederacy (and several that were not), and the differential in spending for white
schools versus black schools was intolerably high. Colleges and universities in southern and
border states were also segregated. Blacks were denied access to parks, swimming pools
and libraries all over the South. Movie theatres and other public access facilities were also
segregated. Housing was segregated in the South and much of the North. Transportation was
segregated in southern and border states. These mores humiliated blacks, but the services
paid no attention. They did not see their role as rectifying this social problem. The armed
forces integrated racially to make better use of black people, and to enlist black people with
talent—people who could perform the military mission—into the armed services. Each service
came to the conclusion that segregation was unnecessary and in fact counterproductive, and
when that conclusion was reached, that service integrated racially. Military racial integration
was accomplished well ahead of American society.

The United States Air Force, for a prominent example, announced it would racially integrate in
April 1948, three months before Truman's Executive Order. Why? Because the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Personnel, Lieutenant General Idwal Edwards, had come to the conclusion that
segregation was wasteful—maintaining two sets of barracks, mess halls, recreation facilities,
transportation, etc—and, worse, was depriving the Air Force of blacks who could fly and fight,
who could maintain and arm aircraft, and who had proven to his satisfaction that blacks could
do anything whites could do if given the training and opportunity.

After World War II demobilisation, furthermore (and this is crucial), blacks were more eager to
remain in the Air Force, and to enter the Air Force than whites. Blacks in the enlisted Air
Force exceeded, furthermore, the black fraction of the American population, but blacks were
limited to half the specialties in the Air Force because of segregation. There was only one,
segregated, black, flying wing in the Air Force (flying single, reciprocating-engine fighters),
and there were almost fifty white, flying wings. There were, moreover, surplus, qualified
bomber pilots in this black fighter wing, left over from World War II, but these men could not
be assigned to other wings because these were all 'white' wings. There were also engine
mechanics in this black wing who would have been very useful in bomber outfits, but these
too could not be reassigned because of segregation. There were high aptitude blacks who
wanted to join the Air Force, but they were confined to menial tasks outside of the one, black
fighter wing. General Edwards was Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and such limitations
of assignment were anathema to people in the personnel management world.\(^10\)
As much to the point, there was in fact no basis in science—anthropological, biological or sociological—for racial segregation. Blacks were not inherently or biologically inferior to whites. In other words, there was no justifiable foundation for segregation. Segregation was based on the shaky foundation of race prejudice.  

Edwards called on a Lieutenant Colonel from his staff, one Jack Marr, to research the issue of racial superiority or inferiority as it pertained to the military. Marr looked at the success of the Tuskegee Airmen, their record in World War II, and also at the record of other black units in the Army Air Forces that had technical jobs. His focus was on the facts of success of the 99th Pursuit Squadron in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. He also inquired into the success of the 332nd Fighter Group that defended American bombers uniquely well—having never lost a bomber to an enemy fighter in 200 missions (about 10,000 sorties).

The 332nd had escorted bombers to some of the most heavily defended targets in Hitler's Europe: Ploesti, Munich, Berlin for three examples. No white fighter unit, and all the rest were white, that stayed in the hunt nearly as long as the 332nd could claim never losing a bomber to an enemy fighter. Tuskegee Airmen shot down the third, fourth and fifth German fighter jets that were shot down by allied pilots in World War II. Pilots in the 332nd sunk a German destroyer with machine gun fire, the only such victory in the war, shot down more than 110 aircraft in air-to-air combat, destroyed another 150 on the ground, and ruined many German and Nazi-allied barges, locomotives and railroad cars.

The 332nd flew as one fighter group among many others in XVth Air Force (all the rest were white) and was employed by General Nathan Twining, the XVth Air Force commander, as any other unit. The 332nd was scheduled as often as any other Group in Italy. All the aircraft were maintained by blacks, armed by blacks, and all the maintainers, armourers, cooks, clerks and pilots were supervised and commanded by blacks.

Before World War II began, virtually nobody in the Army and the Army Air Corps who had rank or responsibility would have believed the Tuskegee Airmen could have accomplished all they did. Lieutenant Colonel Marr came to the conclusion that blacks who were given the same training as whites, and who had the same aptitude as whites (and aptitude test scores certainly verified many blacks had the capacity to succeed), would perform equally to whites. There was, therefore, no biological basis for racial segregation. The only basis for racial segregation was racial prejudice.

Marr, at great risk to his career, reported his findings to General Edwards who convinced United States Air Force Chief of Staff, General Carl Spaatz, who announced in April 1948, that the Air Force intended to integrate racially. This announcement did not meet with the approval of the United States Army, but the Air Force had been independent of the Army for about six months and carried out integration in May 1949. The Air Force broke up the 332nd Fighter Wing at Lockbourne Air Force Base, Ohio, in May 1949, sending the men all over the Air Force—including four to Arizona to begin teaching whites how to fly. From that moment blacks joining the Air Force were assigned to the positions their aptitude called for and not to black units. It took two years to break up all of the black service units and send these men to integrated outfits.

The United States Army and the United States Marine Corps did not integrate until more than two years later. They began the process during the Korean War and actually in Korea. Both services came to the conclusion that combat-effectiveness lay in the direction of integration and, therefore, integrated. It is more than arguable that the pressures of combat during the Korean War were the primary instigator of Marine and Army racial integration.

The fourth aspect I mentioned in the introduction is the role played by politics. President Truman's motivation in 1948, for issuing Executive Order 9981 was political. He was in a very tight race for president and two of his three major opponents—Governor Thomas Dewey and former Vice President and cabinet secretary Henry Wallace were ardently campaigning for the black vote. Truman was known to be a segregationist and he became convinced by his aides—most prominent of whom on this issue was Clark Clifford—that he had to make
dramatic gestures to the black community to win the black vote, without which, in Clifford's estimation, he could not be re-elected. Politics, therefore, drove the decision to issue Executive Order 9981. In 1940, Franklin D. Roosevelt, running for an unprecedented third term, needing to retain the black vote, promised if reelected to create a black flying organisation. He won and did as he promised, against the wishes of his uniformed generals and the leaders of the War Department. In the 1980s, a prominent member of the United States House of Representatives threatened to legislate a quota of 25 per cent women for the United States Air Force. An arbitrary number to be sure, and one that the Air Force has not been able to reach in a completely open environment.

Probably the most well-known political gesture is candidate Bill Clinton's promise if elected to order that gays be permitted to serve in the military openly (and that adverb is the key word) after he took $6.2 million in campaign contributions from gay organisations in the election campaign of 1992. He asserted that he would do as President Truman had done, that is, integrate gays openly with a stroke of a pen as Truman had done with blacks. But Truman, as we have seen, had not done that. Bad history is a killer.

Clinton announced soon after inauguration his intent to carry out his promise and ran into objections from the uniformed military primarily because recruiting and retention—not at that moment robust—would be deleteriously affected. Unquestionably homophobia among young Americans was the key factor, but that does not alter my point that the military was being used by Clinton as a social or political tool, as Truman had done in 1948 and Roosevelt in 1940, all presidential election years. Clinton ran into more substantive objections yet from the Congress, and in the end a compromise with the service chiefs was hammered out, and later a policy was legislated. This became the 'don't ask, don't tell, don't pursue' policy in the military, but the legislation enforcing that policy is strict.

Candidate Al Gore asserted in the presidential campaign of 2000 that he intended to reverse the 'don't ask, don't tell policy' (which was actually a law that only Congress could change) by executive order. He also said he would use as a litmus test for future senior commanders their ratification of a policy of gays serving openly. On both issues he was required to backtrack immediately. He was brought up short by being reminded that the Congress had legislated limits on homosexuals serving openly which he could not overturn by executive order, and the notion of such a litmus test for senior commanders aggravated many more people than it attracted. Nowhere in any of these moves by Roosevelt, Truman, Clinton or Gore, is there so much as a word on what effect such moves would have on the military and, therefore, die national security of the state. There is definitely a bent by politicians to use the military for personal social or political purposes.

Finally, I want to deal with the notion that prejudice can be an overwhelmingly powerful emotion, blinding one to the country's interest and also one's own. Examples abound. The one I talk about the most is one I uncovered many years ago—the Freeman Field Mutiny, in which a medium-bomber group commander, eager to get his unit into combat so that he could probably be promoted to general, drove the unit into mutiny over his illegally segregating officers' clubs. The unit never got into combat because its morale collapsed. There are numerous examples of officers and non-commissioned officers discriminating against blacks during the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, 1970s provoking race riots, and, of course, diminishing the service's capability to perform its mission.

Finally, the services decided to fight bigotry directly by educating the troops at all levels and to teach the men and women in the military the costs of discrimination and what could be done to avoid it and prevent it.

In 1971, the Defense Department created the Defense Race Relations Institute to educate people at all levels of the price the military and the country paid for bigotry, prejudice, racism and the discrimination these led to. At the same time, the Defense Department mandated an equal opportunity staff at virtually all installations that was responsible for monitoring the social climate and also accountable for solving problems at the lowest level possible. The institute and the apparatus have existed for thirty years.
The Defense Race Relations Institute broadened its mission and changed its name to the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute some years ago when it widened its canvas to take in more than just race discrimination. Today there is certainly as much emphasis on gender bias and sexual harassment as there is on racial discrimination. The Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (or DEOMI as it is called) carefully monitors the racial climate in all services, conducts and analyses equal opportunity climate surveys, and, most importantly, educates human relations officers in a multimonth course, to provide trained and educated people for military units to solve human relations problems in units.  

We end as we began. The United States military is the most racially and gender integrated major institution in America because it practices equal opportunity. It does so because it would not be mission effective if it did not practice non-discrimination. Were it deficient in this its equal opportunity practices, it would not have the people necessary to protect and promote United States interests, and it military units would not have the cohesion essential to make them effective in combat.
1. See, for one example of the degree of military racial integration, Charles C Moskos and John Sibley Butler, All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration The Army Way (New York: Basic Books, 1996), I, 2. The United States military ‘is an organization unmatched in its level of racial integration. It is an institution unmatched in its broad record of black achievement. It is a world in which Afro-American heritage is part and parcel of the institutional culture. It is the only place in American life where whites are routinely bossed around by blacks.’ Moskos and Butler are writing about the Army, but, as the statistics below will indicate, their comments apply to the other services as well. Moskos and Butler are experts on the United States Army specifically and the military in general. Moskos is probably the leading military sociologist in the world. See also Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, DEOMI Statistical Pamphlet 00-1, ‘Demographic Trends in the Active Armed Forces’ US Coast Guard, 1989-1999’. Blacks make up 26.5 per cent of the United States Army, more than twice the percentage blacks make up of the United States population. 18.7per cent of the Navy, about 150 per cent of the black fraction of the population. 15.7 per cent of the Air Force, more than 125 per cent of the black fraction of the population, and 15.6 per cent of the Marine Corps. See also Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute Statistical Series Pamphlet no 00- 4, ‘Semiannual Race/Gender Profile by Service/Rank of the Department of Defense & U.S. Coast Guard, September 2000’. Across all the armed services, black non-commissioned officers at the highest rank (E-9) serve well out of proportion to the black fraction of the population and usually the black fraction of the particular service. Thus blacks are 22.1 per cent of the enlisted force in all services, and 23 per cent of the E-9s. In the Army blacks make up 29.1 per cent of the enlisted, and 39.6 per cent of the E-9s. In the Navy 20.6 per cent of the enlisted are black, but only 9 per cent of the E-9s. In the Air Force, 11.4 per cent of the enlisted are black, and 18.5 percent of the E-9s. In the Marine Corps 16.2 per cent of the enlisted are black, and 30.3 per cent of the E-9s. In every service the percentage of officers is much lower than the percentage of enlisted. In the Army it is 11.4 per cent, Navy 6.5 per cent, Air Force 6.4 per cent, and Marine Corps 6.5 per cent. Despite the fact these figures are lower than the enlisted, they are out of proportion to comparable figures in any other walk of life in the United States. See Moskos and Butler, All That We Can Be, 47: ‘If officers are the executives of the armed forces, the armed forces boast more black executives than any other institution in the country’. Women make up 15 per cent of the service officer corps and 14.5 per cent of the enlisted force. In the Army 7.2 per cent of the E-9s are women, Navy 4 per cent, Air Force 11 per cent, Marine Corps 3 per cent.

2. See Morris J. MacGregor's wonderfully detailed, well written and definitive account, Integration of the Armed Force's, 1940-1965 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1981). Other books that can be consulted are Alan L.Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964, 2nd edn (Washington, DC Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998); Richard M . Dalfiume, Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts. 1939-1963 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1969); Lee Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front (New York: Random House, 1954); Richard J Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the U.S. Armed Forces (New York: Praeger, 1968). Dalfiume and I disagree about the role and motivation of President Harry S Truman in promoting armed forces racial integration. Nichols' book is sentimental and journalistic, and Stillman's is polemical. I also want to insert early in this essay the argument that the services integrated racially because it was the militarily right thing to do. Racial integration in the military was carried out with celerity and thoroughness, especially in the Air Force, Army and Marine Corps, because it was motivated from within. There is no question that thoughts of racial justice were in the air in the mid-1940s and early 1950s, and that the prime military racial reformers were probably affected by these notions. Certainly some politicians were urging equal and civil rights for blacks. Unquestionably Harry S. Truman's Executive Order 9981 promulgated during the presidential campaign of 1948 had a catalytic effect on the mind and mood of some military leaders. There is no doubt in this historian's mind that eventually military racial segregation would have been overcome, but this process would have been years off had not some pragmatic military leaders sought to make the services more effective by integrating racially. The key civil rights and voting rights acts were not passed until fifteen years and sixteen years after Air Force racial integration, and it took the skilled manoeuvring of President Lyndon B. Johnson—a brilliant political and legislative tactician—to get the bills passed. And Johnson's legislative acumen needed Martin Luther King, Jr to bring the American majority to a peak of moral indignation over segregation, discrimination and racism. Truman is given much more credit than he deserves on this matter. See Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 75-85; the first edition contains the relevant documents, including the regulations that governed integration.

3. See William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2000), 105-9; and appendices F-20-F-23 on black and white propensity to enlist. These charts demonstrate that blacks have a much higher propensity to enlist in the military than whites. See especially 109 for the essentiality of equal opportunity in an all volunteer atmosphere: ‘Entering the 21st century, the Department acknowledges that the continued success of the all-volunteer force and the continued achievement of national security interests requires the full use of the talents of quality recruits, irrespective of race, ethnic background, and gender’.

4. See Department of Defense Directive 1350.2, 18 August 1995,1.2. This publication applies to everybody in the Department of Defense and demands support for the military equal opportunity program ‘as a military and economic necessity’ and charges the chiefs of the service with the
responsibility for 'eliminating any unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment'. The four-star leaders of their institutions must '[p]romote an environment free from personal, social, or institutional barriers that prevent Service members from rising to the highest level of responsibility possible. Service members shall be evaluated only on individual merit, fitness, and capability. Unlawful discrimination against persons or groups based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is contrary to good order and discipline and is counterproductive to combat readiness and mission accomplishment. Unlawful discrimination shall not be condoned'.

5. Here is what the United States Congress in Title 10 United States Code 654, Part ii—Personnel, Chapter 37—General Service Requirements, says about cohesion. First of all the 'primary purpose of the armed forces is to prepare for and to prevail in combat ... Success in combat requires military units that are characterized by high morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion ... One of the most critical elements in combat capability is unit cohesion, that is, the bonds of trust among individual service members that make the combat effectiveness of a military unit greater than the sum of the combat effectiveness of the individual unit members.'

6. See Air Force Instruction 36-2706, 1 December 1996, Military Equal Opportunity and Treatment Program, 7: 'The primary objective of the EOT [equal opportunity and treatment] program is to improve mission effectiveness by promoting an environment free from personal, social, or institutional barriers that prevent Air Force members from rising to the highest levels of responsibility based on their individual merit, fitness and capability ... Unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment are contrary to good order and discipline and counterproductive to combat readiness and mission accomplishment ... discrimination ... will not be tolerated'.

7. David McCullough, Truman (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992). This is the definitive biography, but the author is an overwhelmingly sympathetic biographer. McCullough writes that Truman 'had strong opinions and no small share of bigotry', and used 'expressions like "coon," "nigger," freely (83). During World War I he wrote about his hate for orientals and his belief that he was 'strongly of the opinion that negroes ought to be in Africa ...' (86). McCullough wrote about Truman as a campaigner in 1940 (247): 'Privately... he still used the word "nigger" and enjoyed the kind of racial jokes commonly exchanged over drinks in senate hideaways. He did not favor social equality for blacks and he said so.' (My emphasis, recognising that Miller interviewed Truman decades after he left office, and the former president was still a social segregationist.) See also Merle Miller, Plain Speaking : An Oral Biography of Harry S Truman (Berkley, CA: Berkeley Publishing Corporation, 1973), 183. Miller writes: 'Privately (Miller's emphasis) Truman always (my emphasis) said "nigger"; at least he always did when I talked to him. That's what he said when he was growing up.' Of course, Independence was a Southern town, a border town, one of whose more prominent organisations has been the United Daughters of the Confederacy. 'Well, all right, but Truman obviously knew the word was highly offensive to blacks because he never used it when on the political stump, when he campaigned in Harlem or on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial. Realise, further, Miller recorded Truman at the end of his life, long after he retired, and, apparently, long after he believed he needed to be politically correct. No matter what McCullough and Miller write in their overwhelmingly favourable volumes, Truman's nature regarding blacks comes through—he was and remained throughout his life, a segregationist. But, then again, Truman certainly transcended his origins and certainly was more tolerant than most politicians in Missouri, a slave state (that remained in the Union, however) before and during the Civil War, with strong Confederate sympathies afterwards. He, however, always thought himself representative of the little man, and 'he wanted fairness, equality before the law' for blacks and whites. Truman had indeed advocated civil rights for blacks in his hotly contested re-election campaign of 1948, but what I am dealing with here is motivation (always tricky). The impetus for his advocacy seems to have come from Phileo Nash and Clark Clifford recommending civil rights promotion in order to win the black vote in 1948. See Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 79-82. Incorporated in these pages are the memoranda written to President Truman pushing the civil rights agenda for political purposes.

8. Executive Order 9981, July 1948: 'It is essential that there be maintained in the Armed Services of the United States the highest standards of democracy with equality of treatment and opportunity for all those who serve ... It is hereby declared to be the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the Armed Services without regard to race ... There shall be created in the national Military Establishment an advisory committee to be known as the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services ... the committee is authorized ...to examine into the rules, procedures, and practices of the Armed Services ... to determine in what respect such rules, procedures and practices may be altered or improved with a view to carrying out the policy of this order'. Significantly, the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment (the so-called Fahy Committee (after its Chairman Charles Fahy), was not established until 1949, well after Truman was safely elected, and it was disestablished long before the Army, Marine Corps, and Navy racially integrated.

9. For Edwards's role and Marr's supporting research see Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 67-72. I interviewed Edwards extensively (the interviews are in the Alan Gropman Collection at the Air University Library Archives, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama). He had no warm feelings for black people, but, on the other hand, he would not tolerate racial bigotry destroying the effective use of people.

10. Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marr, below in the text and in the subsequent footnote, made this point in his study. By this time, furthermore, and in the aftermath of the Holocaust and the propaganda campaign.
during World War II for national unity, numerous students at various war colleges researched the bases for military racial segregation and unanimously came to the conclusion that there was no biological or other basis for segregation. Segregation was based on bigotry, was their conclusion. This is very different from the 'studies' done in the 1920s and 1930s at the Army War College These found that blacks were biologically inferior. Read one line to make the point: 'The cranial cavity of the Negro is smaller than the white; his brain weighing 35 ounces contrasted with 45 for the white'. False, of course, but distortions like this were propagated by those in the United States who wanted to reinforce legal segregation. Blacks, moreover, in the same reports, were deficient morally: 'Perry thieving, lying, and promiscuity are much more common among Negroes than among whites. Atrocities connected with white women have been the cause of considerable trouble among Negroes'. Most damning of all, perhaps, in a military report: 'In physical courage it must be admitted that the American Negro falls well back of the white man and possibly all other races'. Therefore, racial segregation was required because blacks supposedly possessed 'physical, mental, moral and other psychological characteristics' that 'made it impossible to associate with any except the lowest class of whites [Negro] social inequality makes the close association of whites and blacks in military organisation inimicable to harmony and efficiency'. See Gropman, _The Air Force Integrates_, 2, 3. The document I am quoting can be found in the Air University Library Archives and also in the Army War College Library. It is the Army War College 'Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, The Use of Negro Manpower in War', 30 October 1925, worked on by the entire student body and faculty during academic year 1924/1925 and signed by the College commandant, a major general. At the Army War College library, one can find additional reports on the same subject, through 1939, all saying about the same thing. The point I am making here is that less than a decade later, the view on race changed in the military. There are more than a dozen studies done at the Air War College and elsewhere that deny biology or any other valid basis for race segregation. See Gropman, _The Air Force Integrates_, 198-9, for bibliographic citations for such studies at the Air War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces. I read all of these when writing _The Air Force Integrates_ and perused others in various war college libraries. The difference in a short period of time is dramatic.

11. For Marr and his report and for Edwards's role see Gropman, _The Air Force Integrates_, 64, 72, 91, 99, 102. I interviewed Marr extensively and corresponded with him for several years. His objective report cost him his career. A bigoted senior officer opposed to racial integration destroyed him. Marr concluded that segregation was an unnecessary drag on efficiency, and Idwal Edwards used Mart's work to justify Air Force racial integration. Regarding the combat success of the Tuskegee Airmen, instrumental in Mart's findings, one should look at Stanley Sandler, _Segregated Skies: All-Black Combat Squadrons of World War II_ (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992). Sandler's is the best monograph dealing with the achievements of the Tuskegee Airmen.

12. See John L. Frisbee (ed.), _Makers of the United States Air Force_ (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987), 234-42, for a quicker summary of record of the 99th Pursuit Squadron and the 332nd Fighter Group. This is a biography by me titled 'Benjamin O. Davis, Jr.: History on Two Fronts'. The chapter covers Davis's entire active life in the Air Force and in government after his military service, and makes his command of the 99th and 332nd the nucleus of his active life.

13. For a focus on the treatment of the Tuskegee Airmen, the men of the 99th, 332nd and 477th Medium Bombardment Group, see Bernard C Nalty, _Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military_ (New York: The Free Press, 1986), 143-61. This remains the best single volume on blacks in the American military.

14. See MacGregor, Jr, _The Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965_, 287-8, 342, 616. MacGregor is the definitive work on armed forces racial integration, dealing with all services (including the United States Coast Guard), and the most articulate argument on who and what integrated the United States military.

15. Gropman, _The Air Force Integrates_, 85-105. For the objections of the Army Secretary, Kenneth Royall, see 65-6.

16. MacGregor, _Integration of the Armed Forces_, 428-72. MacGregor emphasises the role played by the Korean War and military pragmatism.

17. Gropman, _The Air Force Integrates_, 78-82, for the role Clark Clifford played in Truman's election campaign manoeuvring. See also pp. 4 and 6 regarding Franklin D. Roosevelt and the election of 1940. See MacGregor, _Integration of the Armed Forces_, 18-19, for Roosevelt's actions in 1940. Regarding women in the Air Force, see _The New York Times_, 5 March 1984, 7.

18. The demand was made by a powerful member of the House of Representatives, Les Aspin, chair of the subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation in the House Armed Services Committee. Aspin later became the Committee Chairman and later yet Secretary of Defense. He proposed legislation that would force the Air Force 'to raise the proportion of recruits who are women to 25 percent by 1987 from the 1983 figure of 15 percent'. Aspin never mentioned where the figure '25 percent' came from, but with no bars to female enlistment, the percentage has not increased since Aspin made his demand. The services abhor arbitrary quotas. There were no limits on numbers of female in 1984 (although there were limits on the specialties women could fill), and in the year this chapter is written, with more than 99 per cent of the specialties in the Air Force open to women, the percentage has not increased. I find the role played by domestic politics in defense matters is often overlooked or grossly underestimated.
19. The press of the day had many articles regarding Clinton and his attempt to change the policy on gays serving openly. For a good summary of the way issue unfolded one might read *Air Force Magazine*, July 1993, 12. The magazine's editor in chief, John Correll, opposed Clinton's attempt to change policy, but he reports the facts straight. Importantly, he places the issue in context. Gay liberation organisations wanted to use the military to improve the civil rights and status of gay people by permitting them to serve in the military openly. It was not, as Correll pointed out, simply a matter of permitting gays to serve their country, as Clinton said many times.

20. On 13 July 1993 the Secretary of Defense promulgated a 'Policy on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces' (note the word 'conduct' because nothing in the policy denies the right of a homosexual to serve so long as he or she kept his or her sex life private and did not harass others in the military). The Congress passed legislation that is now the law of the land. It was promulgated under Title 10, the Armed Forces, Subtitle A , General Military Law, Part II, Personnel, Chapter 37, General Service Requirements, Section 654, Policy concerning homosexuality in the armed forces (note the limiting word 'conduct' is not used). It asserts in its first paragraph 'Section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the United States commits exclusively to the Congress the powers to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a Navy and make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces'. And 'there is no constitutional right to serve in the armed forces'. It argues later that 'unit cohesion' is essential to success in combat, and implies that open homosexuality would endanger cohesion. Further: "The prohibition against homosexual conduct is a longstanding element of military law that continues to be necessary in the unique circumstances of military service . . . The armed forces must maintain personnel policies that exclude persons whose presence would create an unacceptable risk to the armed forces' high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability . . . The presence in the armed forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order, and discipline, and unit cohesion . . . A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed forces . . . if one or more of the following findings is made ... the member engaged in, or attempted to engage in, or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts . . . that the member has stated that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual unless . . . he or she is not a person who engages in, or attempts to engage in, has a propensity to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts . . . The member has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the same biological sex'. Later in the law, the Congress gives the Secretary of Defense the right to suspend the 'don't ask' part of the policy/law. In other words, if the Secretary of Defense wants to return to the policy whereby a person enlisting in the service had to declare his or her sexual preference, the Secretary was fully permitted to do so.

21. See the DEOMI [Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute] homepage on the world wide web. Here one can find the history dating back to 1971 and the reasons for the Institute's founding. Here one can find the Institute's mission 'To enhance leadership and readiness by fostering Equal Opportunity (EO) and Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) programs and positive human relations through world class education, training and research'. Here one learns that the Institute is accredited and offers college credit. Throughout readers will find that the organisation is promoting equal opportunity as a means to an end and the end is readiness, not helping members of a minority. This education program is open to Australian officers and enlisted personnel.

22. See Department of Defense Directive 1350.2, 'Department of Defense Military Equal Opportunity (MEO) Program'. This directive prescribes 'the functions of the Defense Equal Opportunity Council ... and the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute'. It states; 'It is DoD [Department of Defense] policy to: Support the MEO (Military Equal Opportunity) program as a military and economic necessity'. Military leaders at all levels are charged with promoting EO [equal opportunity] and affirmative actions, and for eliminating unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment within the Department. Each service is charged with producing a regulation supporting the program. See, for example, Air Force Instruction 36-2706, 1 December 1996, 'Military Equal Opportunity and Treatment Program', which is a 42-page document. The United States military is serious about its non-discrimination programs.
I would first seek to acknowledge the history of women's services in the Australian Army. The women who serve in the Army today continue a lineage that dates back to the forming of the Australian Women's Army Service—which this year celebrates its Diamond Jubilee. During World War II 25,000 women in the AWAS and provided a major contribution to the war effort, enabling many men to be released for service in fighting units. That war-time experience fundamentally changed Australian women's expectations of employment, but despite the fact that the AWAS was the only nonmedical women's service to send personnel overseas during the war (to both Dutch and Australian New Guinea in 1944-45), it was not regarded as central to the Army's needs, and by June 1947 all its members had been demobilised. Again in the Korean War, when full employment and the demands of the national service scheme placed great strains on the Army, the Women's Royal Australian Army Corps began to enlist members. From the 1970s on women were gradually integrated into the mainstream of the Army to such an extent that in early 1984 the WRAAC was disbanded, the perception being that there was no longer a need for an exclusively female organisation within the Army.

I speak as someone who has had 25 years service in an Army that has changed along with society from the immediate post-Vietnam era to the present. In 1976 when I enlisted, the demand for equality and opportunity in employment was strong and increasing. While we can now reflect on how far we have come, let us recall some of the steps along the way:

- the marriage bar for women the public service was removed only in 1966;
- equal pay for equal work was only enacted in 1969;
- women's rights were strengthened through family law reforms in the early seventies; and
- by 1976 the mood was that no impediments remained to realisation of all opportunities for women.

My perspective is that of one who has been both a participant in the military and an observer of it from a different employment and career model.

I enlisted direct to a unit but my corps was the WRAAC. Women at that time had a career structure that was different from that of male enlistees and the greatest threat was Ma'am WRAAC approaching—usually a very formidable looking Major. Although the WRAAC was not disbanded until 1984, the structures underpinning it were being dismantled from 1976 onwards and by 1979, women were being commissioned to the non-combat corps. Regular Army training was integrated in the early 1980s.

I offer a number of observations and conclusions I have drawn from that experience—this is not a report of in-depth research—but a commentary from someone who remains actively involved and as someone who has recently commanded soldiers born in the year Bob Hawke was elected (1983), and officers born in the year Ronald Reagan was elected (1980)—or far more importantly—the year John Lennon was murdered. Among these soldiers and officers are young women who cannot comprehend that barriers can exist to their realisation of career and life aspirations. While it is great that we have created that belief, I consider that we have a responsibility to deliver that reality and that we have some way yet to go.

There are three major areas where the military still has hidden barriers to full employment opportunity for women:
• employment policy—where the increase in women’s expectations for opportunities and equality is faster than ADF policy development which in turn is ahead of the outcomes driven by devolved practices.

• career progression—where the rubber hits the road for building a career, and where are the women who did so well at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA)?

• women in command—issues with few gender role models, lack of accepted authority.

Employment Policy and Practice

Employment policy in Australia underwent major reforms in the late 1960s and 1970s but longitudinal studies showed that women were not well represented at senior levels in industry or private sector companies and were not represented in decision-making forums.

In 1994 Cabinet decided that all public sector boards and committees were to have fifty percent women as a goal. Analysis showed that Defence did not look good in this area—the National Consultative Group of Service Families and the Defence Special Needs Group raised the average—but most Defence decision-making bodies drew their membership from ex-officio representatives. Even where an external appointment was to be made, it was generally from Defence Industry.

This prompted a review of the necessity for ex-officio members always to be tied to particular employment positions and it was considered that greater diversity in decision making bodies would be a good thing. A change of government diverted attention from this area.

But the concerns should remain. Today senior Defence decision-making is limited by the consistency of view of its senior officers (both military and civilian)—all white anglo-saxon males of a certain age with only Defence or public sector experience. The fact that for the past several years the Defence Executive has had two external members—both white anglo-saxon males of a certain age—is considered by many women in Defence as a missed opportunity. In the Defence Senior Executive Service—total, including reservists, of about 230—there are less than fifteen women and only one of those is military. By contrast, in the department for which I work as a civilian, the Department of Finance & Administration, has forty per cent of its SES as women, and twenty-five per cent of its management board. In fairness they are all white anglo-saxons of a certain age. But the issues are not far different: many would say that the qualities sought in a warrior are also necessary in Finance officers, particularly at budget time!

Why is diversity in the members at senior levels of an organisation important? How do you get that diversity? If it is not being grown internally should it be brought in laterally, at least for a time? These groups make decisions on running the business—whatever that business may be. It should concern them that they are making decisions from a very narrow collective set of values and understandings of available Australian society.

In particular, when the Military sit down to make decisions on how their workforces want to be managed and what motivates people to join and stay in the military they should be conscious of their limitations. The expectations of women, generation X-ers, people with non-traditional family compositions, for example, are quite different from those with more traditional family compositions approaching the latter half of their career. In an organisation which is team based and the strength of the team lies in having and harnessing differing strengths of the team, playing with a full side of front rowers necessarily limits performance.

Employment

In 1992 a major review of employment of women in the ADF was conducted. Restrictions remained on employment areas directly linked to combat. The impetus was not from the Military; rather at the political level it was considered that Australia was in breach of its international agreements.
Some women have made it through the processes but not in the numbers that represent the talent that is recruited. Women have dominated the graduating classes from ADFA for a number of years but five and ten years down the track their numbers have declined more rapidly than the men in their cohort. This is not due to the comfortable reasons such as they are getting married and settling down; rather that they keep seeing other apparently less-qualified and competent men getting key postings.

Looking at early career patterns of those who are successful, a pattern emerges of the types of jobs for which they are selected, jobs that are an indicator of future success—the SO3 Ops on Headquarters, the Adjutant positions in units, the squadron and company commands, and of course unit commands. Unfortunately, some inherent characteristics of the military structure will mean that for the foreseeable future the numbers will not be representative. Although women can be fully employed in all but the combat arms of the Army—allowing them into some sixty-five per cent of categories available in the Army, senior ranks are drawn almost exclusively from the remaining thirty-five per cent. This becomes rapidly apparent to ambitious and capable women who, having had what they see as the best opportunities they are likely to get in the service, will get out early and establish themselves in a career where there are fewer observable barriers.

It is important to ask at this time who makes the decisions to post well-reported men into those key early positions and to post equally well-reported women into other positions. I would contend that such decisions are generally made by relatively junior staff who do not consciously understand the through-career effect for those whose careers they manage.

What is the downstream impact of these decisions?

A number of women at the LTCOMD/MAJ/SQNLD rank have resigned after being offered what they saw as the leavings from the table of more favoured sons of their services. These have been women who have moved quickly through the early years of their career, being highly reported, ticking all the boxes that were said to be important for future success. Outside of the military, their options broaden rapidly and many have become very senior very quickly using in their new profession the mix of skills they gained in the military. It is good for Australian industry and the public sectors—and a loss for the military.

Let us skip to 1994—two years after a large number of the restrictions on women's services were lifted. In one case in particular, a women who had a key appointment as an escort officer for a Minister sought to further her career by an overseas posting. The language aptitude tests were passed with flying colours—even the tests for tonal languages, the most difficult. Her poster said that postings for women as Assistant Defence Attaches would be inappropriate, in particular in Asia, as the Asian countries would not accept women. This was said with confidence—six years after Benazir Bhutto became President of Pakistan and eight years after Corazon Aquino became President of the Philippines. Not surprisingly, the officer left the service the next year. Her only satisfaction was that she had managed to get the Page 3 girl removed form the Navy Newspaper.

The Assistant Chief of Personnel of the time attempted to translate the policy of the government into practice by requesting of the service offices that each panel for overseas posts would contain at least one women. The silence was deafening. After several followup calls to relevant posting areas a response was forthcoming: 'No-one in HQADF is going to tell us in the services what to do'.

You may be thinking—we have moved passed that point now; our policies are operationalised, we can measure performance etc etc.

Skip again to the year 2000. A similar situation to the aspiring attache—a young and highly competent RAAF officer—two operational tours in Somalia and Papua New Guinea behind her. When discussing options for follow-on postings she finds that all the interesting ones are gone: her reward for performing to a high standard in a high-risk high-profile position is to be
offered, on promotion, a position she held live years earlier on Higher Duties. When actively canvassing possibilities with her poster she is informed that as she now has a child she cannot expect to get key positions. Yet another high performer is about to be lost to the service.

It is examples such as this that cause one to reflect on where we are going wrong. Why is there a disconnect between the intent of the policy and the effect? Why, with the best will in the world, can lots of small decisions by relatively junior posters invalidate policy?

Many people sincerely believe that there is no glass ceiling for women in the military but only a pipeline problem: when women have been in the pipeline long enough to work their way up some will reach positions at the top. ADFA has been producing graduates for some fifteen years and yet the numbers of women flowing through the system are not in proportion to those graduating.

As late as 1995, a two star officer responsible for personnel policy was not concerned about the lack of progress in increasing numbers of women in allowable employments. In his view the policy was flawed— ‘but women just don't want to be pilots’. His deeply held belief about employment expectations wound back efforts to better understand why highly achieving women were leaving the three services or why their careers were behind lesser performing men in their cohort.

Those implementing the policy on an every day basis are generally not aware of the big picture and make local decisions—not always the best way of achieving change. Without a more planned, measured and evaluated approach to job descriptions, job competencies and a more strategic approach to the posting and promotion cycle, women will not be represented at higher ranks in proportion to expertise, talent and potential and the military will continue to lose access to fifty per cent of the Australian workforce.

**Career Progression**

A weapon's instructor offered the following comment as an explanation of a woman top scoring on a range practice: 'Women don't try to out think the weapon.' Instructors and assessors in the Army are usually male, and judgements about performance and relative worth are made in that framework. Sometime you do feel it is Christians versus lions—round sixteen, last quarter. I paraphrase it as 'women are assumed to be incapable until they prove themselves capable, men are assumed (by other men) to be capable until proven otherwise'.

The styles of leadership considered appropriate in the military appear to be fewer than those that prevail in other fields. We all look for role models to help us understand and develop our own leadership style and characteristics. A behaviour that is rewarded in military promotion courses and general workplace is being heard in syndicate or group discussion: you know the context—give a group a topic and see who speaks the most. There is seldom allowance for differing styles of interaction or learning.

While in command over the last two years I was reading course reports of recruits and those on promotion courses. There were many instances where comments were made (and the context was not favourable) that certain students, especially women, lacked confidence and did not speak up in class. This judgement has a strong bias. Confidence is not linked necessarily to so-called speaking up. Some students may be more interested in learning from the views of others. They may have gender or cultural inhibitors to how long a pause in a conversation there must be before they feel they have an opening to speak.

This view of dominance of conversation as confidence in knowledge base is generally a wrong judgement but one that permeates assessments not only promotion course reports but also of annual reports. 'Quiet' is often used in a pejorative sense in women's reports. The converse of this is that if a woman interrupts or speaks over another person, it will be seen as aggressive, not a demonstration of confidence. Is this a no-win situation? These comments
and judgements become an enduring marker on annual reports and course reports file of a person's perceived self-confidence and therefore suitability for promotion and higher rank. Women in the military are given strongly conflicting messages: you need to be assertive to the point of aggression to be considered the right stuff for promotion, but that very behaviour is considered inappropriate or immature in a woman.

For at least fifteen years, the public service has recognised that there is value in seeking diversity of views when selecting people for appointment or promotion, and that where necessary someone from outside should be brought in to assist with the process and to give professional advice. One could almost wish that this diversity on an Army promotion board meant that not everyone is Infantry! More seriously, as for the reporting of soldiers on recruit courses, it takes considerable natural insight and self awareness or a great degree of training to resist the urge to affirm one's own strengths by selecting for promotion someone in your own image. Senior selection processes for the military are almost, if not exclusively, male dominated.

One way of breaking the cycle and viewing objectively the data on which career and promotions decisions are made—and thereby helping to make more strategic decisions—would be to bring in routinely a more diverse range of decision makers, and not to rely solely on the generals and colonels that are now on the boards. Industry and the rest of the public sector has moved greatly over the last ten years to getting professional advice for key staffing decisions. The military could gain much from adopting a similar model.

**In Command**

Going into command as a woman is an interesting experience, to say the least. The best preparation is having had command at more junior levels and having had excellent senior NCOs to assist that learning process. As a woman, a more difficult issue is the finding of a 'suitable' role model, someone who has a style that you consider both effective and achievable.

The Army recognises the difficulties that unit commanders face by gathering them all together for a period where they focus on command issues. During the week of the pre-command course there was overt encouragement to acknowledge the strain that the demands of command would put on your wife and family. Needless to say, the two women and the single men were feeling a little isolated at about this time.

A more difficult area for women is in the direct command of men. A young Major on assuming her command here in Canberra last year was confronted by her Company Sergeant Major who felt quite confident in saying to her that he could not work for a woman. She agreed that was a dilemma for him and offered him a discharge! He was re-posted but it demonstrates that the acceptance of women in the ADF, particularly in positions of authority, has some way to go.

The particular area of how men and women communicate that can cause confusion. Women as leaders will often have to work harder to give clear, direct messages to those under their command. It is most difficult where the person under command is strongly steeped in a culture where age or bulk is an indicator of authority.

A robust sense of humour is necessary. The conflict in messages sent and received became particularly clear when I was head of the Defence regional office in Darwin during 1995-96. I could not understand the frustration and anger of a relatively junior but very aggressive male in some discussions as part of the management team (of which he was the most junior member). We were busy reallocating resources as we approached support to Kangaroo 95, when during one outburst he said, 'Don't bother asking me what I think unless you are going to do what I say'. He considered that the only reason I could be seeking input from my staff was because I didn't know what to do. Therefore, if one of my staff (him) had all the answers, I should go along with his solution. Simple in his view.
It emerged that he had not previously worked for a manager who actually consulted staff. His view was that by asking for ideas or views I was ceding authority for decision-making to the group and therefore to whomever was loudest in that group. Other women in command have commented on this behaviour; it takes real self discipline not to take the easier approach and default to a directive, autocratic model.

How many women is enough in the Army before it is not a matter worthy of comment, particularly for women in command? Again, going from local observations, once a unit gets above about twenty per cent of women in it there appears to be enough critical mass to approximate the more common external workforce mix. When I was in subunit command, one young soldier obviously was feeling overwhelmed and said there were more women than men in the unit and they were outnumbered. On checking the data, the ratio of women to men was only one in three. But he was quite correct in noting that women were present in the unit in much higher proportions than other units.

**Conclusion**

The real and continuing risks for the ADF are in its ability not only to pursue good personnel policy as a way to meet the expectations of those it wants in its ranks, but to ensure that everyone in the ADF truly understands and is committed to those policies.

We all like to say the devil is in the detail, but in the management of people it is in the consistent implementation of good policies.

To come to the title of my presentation, ‘why would a woman want a job like that?’ This was asked of me when I worked in a force development area; after assuring the caller that I was not an assistant but an analyst in my own right, he asked the question. How do you answer that? The interest in and love of the military is not genetically encoded. The complexities and challenges of a career in such an environment are as appealing to a woman as a man.

It remains a little harder for some of us to enjoy it as fully as others. To be able to meet the challenges of a changing world environment, the ADF needs a diverse and flexible workforce that can adapt rapidly to emerging demands and changing needs.
"Very few of the new manifestations in war can be ascribed to new inventions or new
departures in ideas. They result mainly from the transformation of society and new
social conditions."¹

Clausewitz was not the first writer to recognise that changes in society influence the character
of armies and the way in which they make war, but he was one of the first to analyse at length
how the basis of war was shifting in his time from the aristocratic class to the people as a
whole. In place of war limited by resources and manpower a new form of warfare had arrived
which drew on the entire population with commensurate increases in power and ambition.
Subjects became citizens and citizens acquired the duty of military service for their country.
Essential in Clausewitz's view, especially after Prussia's stunning defeat by France in 1806,
was the creation of a military spirit among the populace and the opening of the officer corps to
those with talent who could bring education and professionalism to the business of war.

After the final defeat of Napoleon in 1815 armies became more national, less willing to accept
foreigners in their ranks and more suspicious of the practice of officers changing from one
army to another (as Clausewitz himself had done in 1812). Foreign troops had been found not
always reliable and national loyalty promised to provide the motive power for mass armies,
encouraging volunteers, making conscription workable and providing the glue to hold a state's
forces together.² In turn, many European armies in the nineteenth century promoted
nationalism by breaking down parochial ties, reducing language barriers and actively rousing
patriotism among the population.³

Three principal themes—which remain with us today—can be identified in these social and
political changes. First, the idea that citizenship and military service are closely linked, that
fighting for one's country is a duty of the citizen which goes alongside the rights he enjoys.
The exclusion of women from this duty was to become an issue in democracies only in the
late twentieth century.⁴ Second, the idea that since armies are national they should exclude
those who do not belong to the nation and share its values. Third, the idea that armies, having
ceased to be the instrument of kings save in ceremonial terms, now represented the people
both symbolically and substantively. The composition of the nation's forces was thus a matter
of public concern.

These ideas often proved controversial. Disagreements arose within armies and between
armies and governments about the extent to which military forces should become more
representative. Should privileges continue for the aristocratic class—by tradition the most
loyal of all to the monarch? Should money and land be a factor in securing commissions—
since these meant officers had a stake in the country? Should foreign nationals be enlisted in
any circumstances? Should immigrants belonging to alien cultures be permitted to serve?
Should Jews or other racial minorities who were citizens be accepted? Most armed forces
and governments have at times considered it self-evident that certain ethnic or migrant
groups could be disloyal. They have also believed that native populations are unsuited to
modern warfare, that women have no role to play in fighting, that homosexuals undermine
military discipline and cohesion. All of these issues troubled not only armies but also politics.

The mass conscript armies which became a feature of the European scene for much of the
twentieth century were by their nature highly representative of the wider society. But for
reasons of military effectiveness they naturally excluded those too old, too young, too unfit,
too illiterate, too incompetent or too unwilling to fight. As well, exemptions were often granted
to those who were married, in certain occupations or undertaking study. Women were
excluded as a matter of course. Frequently difficult questions arose as to whether recent migrants should be conscripted or, at the other end of the scale, those of aboriginal descent. No-one believed that armed forces should be perfectly representative of wider society.

In the last quarter of the twentieth century conscript armies steadily went out of fashion. Smaller, volunteer forces had to compete for recruits on the open market. In the absence of conscription the question arose whether armed forces could or should remain representative of the wider population along particular dimensions. Was there an obligation to recruit from groups such as ethnic or religious minorities, native peoples, immigrants, women, homosexuals and so on? Would armed forces benefit or lose from doing so? In democratic societies, at least, debate arose about the wisdom and justice of including or excluding such groups.

Further questions focused on whether particular groups should be fairly represented not only in the military as a whole but within its components—such as each of the services, officers and other ranks, regulars and reservists, fighting and support units. During the Vietnam War, for example, it was frequently claimed that blacks were overrepresented in front-line combat units in the US Army and consequently suffered disproportionate casualties. Analysis, however, does not back up this claim either in Vietnam or in subsequent conflicts. And if misrepresentation was found, what was to be done about it? Should quotas or targets be set? Pursued to its logical and absurd conclusion, the search for perfect representativeness would mean turning away qualified individuals if their group was already fully represented; it would also mean dismissing personnel if the matching group in the population shrank in size.

Nonetheless, it is sensible for armed forces to ask themselves from time to time whether they are reasonably representative of society across the board—and if not, whether such a situation can be justified. It may be they are failing to draw recruits from particular groups or are favouring some groups over others, either deliberately or inadvertently. Remedies might be found which would improve capability, enhance public support, and increase equity in the military. Failure to act might mean lost opportunities for recruitment and retention, as well as outside bodies, including government or the courts, taking steps to change matters, perhaps in ways that do not suit the military.

This essay focuses on the how the ADF and the Australian Army in particular have dealt with two minority groups: Aboriginal and Torres Strait islanders (ATSI) and migrants from non-English speaking backgrounds (NESB). In large part because of its numbers, Army has been more to the fore than its sister services in dealing with questions of representativeness; it has also pursued different policies at times. This essay examines the following topics:

- Australia's policies and practices from 1901 to 2001 and their interaction with wider social and political changes
- the relationship between representativeness and military capability
- factors influencing the recruitment and retention of minority groups, and strategies for improving representativeness
- comparisons with other organisations and with other seemingly similar issues such as the role of women and the acceptance of homosexuals in the armed forces.

The conclusion assesses how the military have accepted or resisted, followed or led changes in the wider society.

**Australia 1901-2001**

An episode in the early history of the Australian army illustrates a significant clash of ideas on social representativeness—in this case between the government and its British military adviser. Field Marshal Lord Kitchener's proposal for a military college in Australia recommended that fees be paid by cadets (more accurately, by their parents) to ensure that only people with a substantial interest in the nation would fill the officer corps. The government took a contrary view, insisting that egalitarian principles were more appropriate to
Australian society. Politicians also feared that militarism would result from 'a closed and elitist military caste which derived its authority from social standing'. As well, opening the officer corps to all levels of society would make the proposed universal military training scheme more politically acceptable. \(^6\) The Military Board argued pragmatically that impoverished officers would probably serve for longer periods than wealthy ones. \(^7\)

Also evident from the earliest years of Federation was the government’s determination to preserve a White Australia and an even whiter army. Parliament’s first legislation restricted migration in order to preserve ethnic homogeneity, enshrining a White Australia policy that lasted until the late 1960s. Accordingly, the Defence Act of 1903 required volunteers for military forces to be ‘substantially of European origin or descent’. \(^8\) Recruiters and medical personnel were left to make the necessary judgements. Similar exclusions applied to the universal training scheme that commenced in 1911. The Royal Military College which opened in the same year was limited to natural-born British subjects, provisos being added in 1914 that they also be ‘substantially of European origin or descent’ and after World War I that they be of ‘British origin or descent’. \(^9\)

Up to the middle of the century the principal ethnic minority in Australia was Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island people. \(^10\) Considered inferior races, their place in Australian society was a subordinate one, if they had anywhere at all. ATSI were denied citizenship and remained without a vote at federal and state elections. A series of Protection Acts treated them as inferior and backward up to 1939 when a policy of assimilation into the white community was adopted. If they had a warrior tradition, it was believed to be that of tribal warfare not Western style armies. Accordingly, many regarded them as unsuitable for military discipline and training. Their supposed lack of a work ethic was a common complaint.

Rather than reject a society that marginalised them, however, many ATSI were willing to participate in Australia’s wars. A few Aboriginal trackers served in the Boer War, about four-to-five hundred volunteered for service in World War I, and some 3000 were formally enlisted in World War II (out of a total of about 85,000 ATSI or little more than 1 per cent of the Australian population). \(^11\) Considerable numbers of Australians of Chinese extraction also served in both World Wars. \(^12\) Officially excluded minorities got into uniform because for various reasons some in the recruitment process either ignored or bent the rules about European descent. It was the exigencies of war, in particular, that also caused official minds to become rather more open.

In May 1940 Army still formally regarded the enlistment of soldiers of ‘non-European origin or descent’ as ‘neither necessary nor desirable’. \(^13\) Mixing blacks and whites, it was argued, would result in less cohesive and effective fighting units. Doubts were also expressed about the loyalty of Aborigines, some of whom were suspected of assisting the Japanese. \(^14\) The Air Force was less concerned than Army on such matters, focusing on the technical skills of potential recruits as well as being short of manpower due to the Empire Air Training Scheme. The Navy was more concerned, believing that confined living on board ship made mixing of races unworkable.

By July 1940 Army decided that Aboriginals already enlisted would be allowed to stay and that suitable ‘half-castes’ would be permitted to join. \(^15\) With the threat from Japan even more apparent by 1941 irregular units were set up in northern Australia, notably the Northern Territory Special Reconnaissance Unit (NTSRU), to make use of the local knowledge and bushcraft of Aboriginals. \(^16\) A Torres Strait Light Infantry (TSLI) battalion and other units were also formed with white officers and NCOs. \(^17\) Many other ATSI supported the military effort in an unofficial capacity. Even those formally enlisted in the TSLI, however, were underpaid (about one-third of their full entitlement) while those in units such as the NTSRU and the Melville Island Patrol received no pay at all. \(^18\)

The efforts of minorities in World War II were not recognised by immediately ending discriminatory policies. ATSI who had served in the war were given the vote, a mark of citizenship, but a ban was placed on further recruitment. When Arthur Calwell announced the new migration program in 1945, he pointed to the important contribution it would make to the
defence of Australia. But any recruits from migrant background were naturally expected to be primarily British or at least European. This made it easier to eliminate references to race in the Defence Act in 1951, a move also motivated by the development of closer relations with Asian countries to counter the perceived communist threat.

The compulsory military service schemes that operated between 1951-59 and 1965-72 did not progress the cause of minorities very far. Both initially excluded ATSI though the later scheme was amended in 1967 to require them to register. One justification for differential treatment was that military service should not be imposed on those who were not full members of the community: no conscription without political representation. Thus ATSI were not treated as full citizens until a referendum to amend the Constitution was passed in 1967 and were not required to enrol and to vote until 1983. Some in favour of conscripting aboriginals argued that they should be prepared to bear the burdens if they wanted equal citizenship, while others believed that conscription would signify or facilitate acceptance of their equal status in the community.

Whatever the merits of such arguments, they were rendered irrelevant by administrative difficulties. The decision to register aboriginals from 1967—the year of the citizenship referendum—ran up against the fact that each State had its own definition of aboriginality and often different administrative practices for recording dates of birth (essential to the ballot system). Efforts by Commonwealth and State governments to have the Department of Labour and National Service determine aboriginality by administrative decision were successfully resisted by the Department. The matter remained unresolved by the time conscription ended.

Another controversial issue in the 1960s was whether or not to conscript migrants who had settled in Australia but had not yet become naturalised. (None had been called up in the 1950s.) Public opinion seemed to think it only fair that people who had chosen Australia as their home should accept the duty of defending it. One poll reported 89 per cent in favour once Australian conscripts were already fighting in Vietnam. To many it was an appropriate test of a migrant's commitment to Australia. The government prevaricated: objections were likely from foreign governments whose former citizens were to be conscripted; some governments might respond by conscripting Australians overseas; prospective migrants would be discouraged by fear of conscription; and some individuals might face military service in Australia as well as their home country. Besides, the Army was unenthusiastic, citing language problems and difficulties with security checks.

It was also the case that the Army did not need more personnel; conscription was already highly selective.

Some migrant communities also opposed the idea but the Australian government bowed to popular pressure. The rules adopted, however, required registration only for those migrants who had been in Australia for at least two years; in addition, non-British migrants could defer their service until the age of 21, giving them the option of leaving Australia as an adult. They would also be permitted to return to Australia at any time, though remaining liable for military service up to the age of 26. In the event, few actually saw military service since language and security checks still proved major barriers.

The election of a Labor government in 1972 and the abolition of conscription created an entirely new set of circumstances. Henceforth the services had to rely on attracting sufficient volunteers to maintain their numbers. Attention therefore had to be paid to the attitudes of individuals towards military service and to the changing nature of society as a whole. One wider development of significance was the expansion of non-European migration, notably from Asia, following the end of the White Australia policy in the late 1960s and Australia's withdrawal from Vietnam in 1972. Successive governments also placed greater emphasis on the values of multiculturalism in Australian society and its institutions.

A series of legislative and institutional initiatives not only promoted the value of multiculturalism in society as a whole but also enacted equal rights and the ending of discrimination. The rights of all citizens, including indigenous and migrant minorities, received legal protection and public affirmation from governments of both left and right. It also became widely accepted that the Defence Force as the principal symbol of national unity should adopt
and implement such principles as far as military efficiency permitted. By the early 1990s, however, some were beginning to wonder whether the ADF had fully adjusted to the changing times. An evaluation of recruiting in 1991 by the Inspector-General Division of Defence also flagged the need to examine the prospects for increasing enlistment among the migrant community.  

In late 1991 a report was commissioned by the Minister for Defence Science and Personnel, Gordon Bilney, after a resolution at the ALP conference called for a recruiting policy that aimed at 'an ethnic balance more representative of the wider community' in the ADF. A study of minority issues in the ADF, including ATSI and NESB representation, was commissioned from four academics—three from ADFA, one from ANU. The report not only surveyed the composition of the ADF but also examined recruiting practices, personnel policies and military traditions to see whether they worked against the recruitment and retention of minority groups.

An immediate problem for the survey was that Army had no record of the ethnic background of its personnel for the reason that it now recruited Australian citizens regardless of origin. The Report therefore relied on a mixture of personnel records from Navy and Air Force (which did collect country of birth of members and their parents) and a survey of Army personnel to identify the place of birth of members and their parents or their self-identification as ATSI. The response rate for the ARA was just over 70 per cent, for the Army Reserves only 45 per cent. Another issue was that of privacy: can members be required to declare their ethnicity? In the event, the Report relied on voluntary reporting, while noting the probability of underestimating the size of minorities as a result. Some ATSI, for example, stated that they wished to be recorded simply as Australians.

The 1993 Report remains the most thorough and comprehensive study of ethnic representation in the ADF to date. Table 1 shows the number of ATSI personnel (column 1) and their percentage of the ADF as a whole (column 2) according to service. Column 3 compares the proportion of ATSI in the ADF with the proportion of ATSI in the general workforce (one per cent) within the age range 15 to 54 years according to the 1986 Census; column 4 does the same comparison for those in the 15 to 24 age bracket (where ATSI represent 1.58 percent of the workforce). In these two columns a percentage of 100 per cent means that the proportion of ATSI in the ADF exactly matches the proportion in the comparison group; less than 100 per cent indicates under-representation in the ADF, above 100 per cent indicates over-representation. In all tables figures for the RAN and RAAF refer only to the full-time component.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>ATSI% in ADF</th>
<th>Workforce 15-54 (1%)</th>
<th>Workforce 15-24 (1.58%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARA</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARES</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAN</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAAF</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of ATSI representation it is clear that Army does better than Navy and Air Force. The reason for this appears to be the more technical nature of these two services, requiring higher levels of training and qualifications to which ATSI generally have less access for a variety of reasons. At the same time, Army has more opportunities to employ less technically skilled personnel in, for example, combat and reconnaissance units.

It is also clear that ARES does better than ARA. The principal factor is that ATSI make up approximately half of the Far North Queensland Regiment and of the North West Mobile Force (Norforce) which is based in Darwin. These Regional Force Surveillance Units offer unique opportunities for service by ATSI: they will not be deployed away from their home area and are required to meet standards lower than for regular service (hence they cannot transfer to the regular forces without going through the normal recruitment process).
Army’s good showing compared with the civilian workforce in the 15-54 age bracket must be tempered by the fact that ATSI in the community are markedly underrepresented in the workforce in this age range. In addition, the comparison with the 15-24 age bracket where younger ATSI are doing better in employment terms is probably a better test. While the age range 15-54 covers virtually all ADF members, about 40 per cent of members were under 25 and about 60 per cent under 30 in the early 1990s. (By 1999 a majority were still under 30 though the figure had slipped to 53 per cent.)

Table 2 shows the percentage of ADF members born in Australia (column 1), the percentage of these with one or two NESB parents (column 2), the percentage of those born overseas in English-speaking countries (column 3) and the percentage of those born overseas in Non-English-speaking countries (column 4). Table 3 refers to those in the 15-24 age range. In each Table the bottom row provides comparable Figures for the civilian workforce. The anomaly noted earlier—that some born in non-English-speaking countries are likely to have English-speaking parents—applies both to ADF members and the civilian workforce.

### Table 2 31
ADF by birthplace and parentage
15-54 age range

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Australian born</th>
<th>NESB parent(s)</th>
<th>Overseas born (ES)</th>
<th>Overseas born (Non-ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARA</td>
<td>85.1%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARES</td>
<td>85.2%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAN</td>
<td>83.0%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAAF</td>
<td>84.0%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>75.3%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3 32
ADF by birthplace and parentage
15-24 age range

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Australian born</th>
<th>NESB parent(s)</th>
<th>Overseas born (ES)</th>
<th>Overseas born (Non-ES)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARA</td>
<td>89.3%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARES</td>
<td>88.6%</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAN</td>
<td>89.3%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAAF</td>
<td>89.5%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workforce</td>
<td>85.5%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows that while all three services have fewer Australian-born members than the civilian workforce (by about ten percentage points), they seem to have attracted Australian-born personnel with one or two NESB parents roughly in proportion to numbers in the civilian workforce. Table 3, however, which reflects more recent recruiting, shows that in the younger age bracket none of the services does particularly well, though ARES does better than the others. This suggests that the ADF has not been attracting the children of migrants in recent times as well as in the past. This is most likely due to the greater proportion in the migrant intake of ethnic groups with relatively low propensity to enlist.

In terms of recruiting those born overseas in English-speaking countries (mostly UK and New Zealand), all services have done well in the 15-54 age group though ARES trails the rest. In the 15-24 age group ARES also trails but the three full-time services all do worse than against the 15-54 age group. Again, this suggests that more recent recruitment has failed to attract members of a group on which it could rely in the past.
The picture with regard to recruiting those born overseas in non-English speaking countries is somewhat different. For the age range 15-54 all services perform poorly, though this might reflect the high number of older migrants in the workforce who lack English language skills and/or who migrated after prime recruiting age. The more recent picture is encouraging, suggesting that the ARA and ARES in particular are attracting a reasonably high proportion of the younger group of migrants born in non-English speaking countries. But both could do better.

There were also wide variations in the propensity to enlist as between different national groups. Better represented in the ADF at the time of the survey were those born in (or with parents born in) Germany, Holland, Malta, India and Malaysia; less well represented were those with Polish, Yugoslav, Greek, Italian, Lebanese and Vietnamese backgrounds. These findings, however, are liable to considerable fluctuation over time.

Following the 1993 Report the ADF increased its efforts to stimulate minority recruitment, including use of ethnic press, television and radio, issuing publications in several languages and greater training for recruiting staff. Defence Force advertising and press material included more faces of non-European appearance. For ATSI a Recruitment and Career Development Strategy was established with the aim of bringing representation in the ADF from about 0.7 per cent to about 2 per cent in line with their presence in the community by about 2005. A newsletter for ATSI was established, a cultural awareness program developed, attitude surveys conducted, and a video highlighting ATSI members produced.

How well the ADF has in fact done in the last decade is difficult to judge. Apart from the scarcity of information, comparisons of changes in the composition of the ADF are problematic since methods of calculation vary over time; response rates to surveys differ; assessments may or may not include reserves; ATSI and NESB may or may not be included separately; distinctions may or may not be drawn between first and second generation migrants and so on. At the same time, of course, the size of migrant groups against which the ADF is measured will grow or decline, thereby changing the baseline for comparative figures.

Figures from the 1999 ADF Census indicate that with regard to ATSI, at least, the ADF has succeeded in attracting significant numbers in all services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1992 Survey</th>
<th>1999 Census</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARA</td>
<td>1.19%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARES</td>
<td>1.33%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAN</td>
<td>0.26%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAAF</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1996 Australian Census provides a benchmark of 1.8 per cent ATSI in the general population (as opposed to the workforce).

Figures for other minorities are less easily compared since detailed information is lacking. The ADF Census 1999 shows that both ARA and ARES have 87 per cent of members born in Australia which is essentially the same as the 1992 survey (The RAN is 86 per cent, RAAF 85 per cent—both slight increases over 1992). By contrast some 76.7 per cent of the general population were born in Australia. Indicative, too, is the fact that some 95 per cent of full-time ADF members speak only English at home compared with about 75 per cent in the general population. A study of applicants (not necessarily successful) for the ADF conducted between January 1998 and May 1999 found them less than representative, with both general and officer applications for the Army being more unrepresentative than the other two services. Overall, therefore, no major changes are evident in terms of increasing NESB recruitment in recent years.
How Does Representativeness Bear on Military Capabilities?

In considering military effectiveness it is clear that old arguments about mixing ethnic groups being detrimental to cohesion and old stereotypes of certain races being inherently lazy or ill-disciplined are well and truly gone. On the contrary, the benefits of diversity are widely acknowledged and welcomed as is the value of recruiting from a wider base among the population. There is no doubt that the ADF is committed to ensuring minority groups are not the subject of discrimination. Debate is more about whether the ADF has done enough to maximise minority recruitment and to minimise discrimination against those individuals it does recruit.

Nonetheless, some of the arguments against the presence of minorities need to be considered. One concern is that diverse migration in recent years makes possible the importation of ethnic rivalries into the ADF with consequent damage to cohesion. The chief response to this is that the socialisation and strong discipline of the armed forces is likely to overcome any minority factionalism. Another concern relates to deployments overseas where members may come into contact with people of the same ethnic background or another community likely to be hostile towards their ethnic background. It would have been unwise, for example, to send a soldier of Vietnamese origin to the UN operation in Cambodia or a Yugoslav Australian to the Balkans. But this is a minor issue, to be dealt with case by case rather than by any policy of exclusion.

As far as the benefits of increasing minority recruitment are concerned, the first and most obvious is that it promises to secure more personnel at a time when the recruiting environment is highly competitive. Thus only about twelve per cent of young people consider the military as a career. This may have improved to 14-18 per cent by 2000 according to one study, though the 'East Timor effect' may prove only a temporary boost. Also important is that about 40 per cent of the indigenous population are under fifteen compared with 20.7 per cent (and declining) in the rest of the community. Anything which expands the target population is welcome.

Second are the benefits to the ADF as an organisation of having cultural diversity. There is, in fact, a business case for successful diversity in an organisation—better leadership and management, increased capacity for innovation, greater creativity and innovation, improved problem solving, easier integration of new personnel, reduced absenteeism and a more productive workforce. This is quite apart from questions of equity and individual rights. A reputation as an employer who welcomes recruits from a wide range of backgrounds and who treats them fairly and equally is another desirable consequence of successful diversity policies.

Third, minority groups offer valuable skills to the ADF. The bushcraft and local knowledge of ATSI, for example, contribute to surveillance of northern Australia and would be highly relevant to any defence against invasion or infiltration of northern Australia. Language skills are another specific asset. Arabic speakers were used in the Gulf War of 1990-91 with one ADF member of Arab background employed as an interpreter for the captain of a RAN ship. In East Timor the Army has made much use of the language skills of a member of Portuguese origin. Special forces, in particular, are likely to find knowledge of foreign languages and cultures useful.

Fourth, benefits arise in the form of better understanding of other communities with whom the Defence Force has to deal. Army, in particular, benefits from good relations with ATSI communities, especially in the north where military capability depends heavily on support from the local population such as assisting patrols in the bush or providing information about unusual movements of ships, aircraft or strangers. Knowledge of different cultures is also likely to assist the ADF in understanding other countries, especially regional neighbours. Again, Army in particular often finds itself on the ground dealing with local communities in places such as Bougainville, East Timor and Malaysia. At the strategic level, the ability to empathise with other cultures may improve decisions on defence policy and avoid the ethnocentrism that often pervades strategic thinking.
Finally, the standing of the Defence Force in the community is likely to be enhanced. Public support is likely to be strengthened if all groups can be seen to be participating ("our ADF"). An ethnically diverse military also demonstrates that the burdens of security—as well as the benefits of employment—are being fairly shared in the community. General public approval may also be helpful in gaining the approval of political leaders, securing more resources, and ultimately ensuring the backing of the community in times of conflict.

What Factors Influence the Recruitment and Retention of Minority Groups?
What Strategies Exist for Minority Recruitment?

Despite the significant benefits of high representativeness, the ADF has not achieved optimum levels. Many of the factors making for underrepresentation in the ADF were analysed in the 1993 Report. Most of them, it turns out, are beyond the control of the services, having to do with the inherent nature of ethnic communities and especially migrant groups. A major thrust of the Report—though this was not its intention—was to explain why NESB (especially first generation) are underrepresented in the Defence Force and why, in fact, this is likely to remain the case.46

One factor is the age profile of new arrivals in Australia who are predominantly over 25 years of age. Most ADF recruits first think about joining in their mid-teens and make the final decision to join before they are twenty. Even if migrants have thought about a military career while still in their home country, they will not easily transfer it to another armed force. In addition, migrants are more likely to be married, if only because of the age factor, and this is a further deterrent to enlistment in the Defence Force.

A second important factor is proficiency in English. The ADF must have personnel who are able to understand written and spoken orders, instruction manuals, training systems and so on, and who are able to use English effectively to communicate to others—often in situations of danger and urgency with no room for error. It is no surprise that in general migrants are less proficient in English that those born in Australia. The 1991 Census showed about 400,000 people born outside Australia assessing themselves as having poor English, an increase of nearly twelve per cent compared with the 1986 Census.47

A third factor predisposing some migrants against a military career is their experience of war and conflict. Many come from countries that have lived in the shadow of the Cold War or suffered internal strife. For them settling in Australia may have been a chance to escape from and forget about conflict. Nor is a military career likely to appeal to those who have had negative experiences with armed forces in their own country, whether as victims or conscripts.48 Some migrants also believe that Australia's military forces are unnecessary for a country that is secure and peaceful.49

Finally, two technical barriers to recruitment can be mentioned. Security checks normally require a person's history to be traced back ten years which may be difficult with regard to a number of overseas countries. Citizenship status can be another barrier to entry into the ADF (as it is to the Public Service and the Australian Parliament). Recruits must be Australian citizens or be eligible to become citizens. This may delay those who have difficulty in obtaining citizenship or disbar those who are unwilling to renounce their original citizenship for various reasons. Certain migrant groups also have a historically low rate of taking up citizenship, not least those from New Zealand, Canada and the United Kingdom.50

The factors discussed so far relate primarily to first generation migrants but they reach down in various ways to the second generation. First, parental attitudes are an important influence on recruiting so that any reluctance to enter a military career on the part of first generation migrants may serve to discourage their children. Other factors can reinforce this. Some migrants, for example, come to Australia seeking economic advancement for their family so that a military career for their children seems unattractive. Similarly, some migrant groups, particularly those from Asia, tend to see entry into mainstream professions such as medicine
and the law as paths to success for their children. Other groups look to private enterprise to provide rewards and encourage their children to follow in the family business. Finally, some migrant and ATSI families may be particularly reluctant to see their children join an organisation likely to post them anywhere in Australia—or even overseas—for lengthy periods. Their greater involvement in reserve forces which do not require such mobility supports this interpretation.

Second, there are various multiplier effects from first to second generation migrants. Given that parents—as well other family members and friends—are less likely to have served or be serving in the Australian military, this removes one of the major influences in favour of enlistment. Similarly, if parents are less likely to encourage their children to enrol in cadet units, this reduces another positive factor favouring recruitment. It is significant that recruiters are reported as less influential in the case of migrants than non-migrants (perhaps reflecting greater influence on the part of parents).

The 1993 report found little bias in the selection process itself except possibly in one or two minor instances—for example, the reference to Christian names on certain forms. Most recruiters were found to have a general understanding of and sensitivity towards applicants from an ethnic background. The ADF probably compares well with any organisation in the country for the rigour and consistency of its selection procedures. Unlike private industry, the process is relatively open, it must follow certain routines and it is subject to scrutiny by senior officers. Complaints can also be made to members of Parliament. If discrimination against NESB and ATSI exists at this point, it is marginal and unintentional.

Retention of minority groups is a key factor since higher attrition rates will negate efforts to improve recruitment. No figures are available on minority retention as such but it is clear that with minor exceptions the ADF treats minority groups fairly once enlisted. The 1993 report found that about seven per cent of NESB and ATSI recruits reported some cases of prejudice e.g. in promotions or the allocation of tasks. But few lodged complaints and even fewer pursued the matter formally. While there are obvious disincentives to the pursuit of grievances, there is clearly no widespread or systematic discrimination. This is also evidenced in terms of representation in the officer corps and other ranks. In a sophisticated analysis the report finds, with the partial exception of Aboriginals, that those with ethnic backgrounds are fairly represented in the officer corps.

The report also examined potentially difficult issues for migrant and ATSI groups relating to dress requirements, dietary needs and religious observance. Any of these could be instrumental in deterring potential recruits or causing those enlisted to leave. Again, the report found a wide degree of tolerance, for example, of dress required for religious reasons. In the US, by contrast, the wearing of the yarmulke by a Jewish serviceman became an issue for the courts. The bottom line for the ADF, of course, is military effectiveness which must not be compromised—but cultural and religious groups have no argument with this.

A complex and contentious issue discussed in the report is the suggestion that ADF's overall character which it projects to the public may deter non-Anglo-Saxon recruits. Historical British connections account for constant references to the Queen (as in the oath of allegiance), use of the prefix 'Royal', affiliations with British units, and the wearing of Scottish or British regalia by Army bands. Directly or indirectly, the report suggests, many non-Anglo-Saxons may be dissuaded from joining up or staying in. The proposed answer was to emphasise and develop the ADF's Australian character—the Army's reversion to the slouch hat, for example—with a view to improving its attractiveness to minority recruits wishing to identify fully with their new country. At the same time, it was suggested, the ADF would become more attractive to younger people in general who are less attached to Britain and British institutions.

Discussion of changing public perceptions of the ADF indicates some of the complexities in strategies that might be used to increase minority recruiting. Changes in ADF traditions and adoption of more 'modern' ways, for example, may not prove beneficial. It should not be assumed that migrants dislike tradition, even that of their new homeland. Recruits from
migrant communities may be quite conservative and be deterred by a Defence Force that seems to adopt change too readily. It is also possible that a culturally diverse ADF will put off a proportion of young Australians whether due to simple racism and xenophobia or to a perception that the ADF discriminates in favour of minorities.

A similar difficulty relates to the encouragement of cadet units. One study has proposed that greater support be given to cadet units where NESB representation is high. This may serve to increase recruits from such a background but promoting cadet units might also attract many non-minority recruits. Clearly, any strategy that makes the ADF more attractive or that reinforces existing factors in favour of recruitment in general are liable to work across the board without necessarily attracting recruits from particular minorities. This is not to say, of course, that such strategies should be eschewed.

Other strategies target minority recruits directly rather than indirectly and are less likely to have wide range effects. Among first generation migrants it is age, language and personal experience that make many of them unpromising prospects for recruitment. The ADF can do little about these factors which appear likely to persist over time. Whether greater impact can be secured among second generation migrants is the key question, given that parents are always going to be important influencers. Strategies have been devised that focus on parents' attitudes—for example, pamphlets about the ADF in foreign languages designed for the families of prospective recruits. Greater use of ethnic personnel for recruiting, and greater awareness of ethnic and aboriginal issues among recruiters are also sensible moves. But it is possible that the ADF could be perceived as trying to win young people away from their families.

Difficulties also exist with regard to targeting particular minority groups. If a given ethnic community is found to be significantly underrepresented, for example, should that group be the focus of greater recruiting effort—or should it be concluded that the group is inherently disinclined to enlist and efforts directed elsewhere? Conversely, ethnic groups already well represented in the ADF might be the most promising groups for further recruitment. The reactions of community organisations also need to be taken into account. Some might object to being targeted, some to not being targeted.

Finally, there are strategies that reduce some of the barriers to enlistment in the recruitment process itself. Accepting lower literacy levels may also be possible in some situations where military benefits exist. Army, for example, already accepts some Aboriginal recruits with lesser standards into reserve units where their specialised local knowledge compensates for deficiencies in formal English. Some efforts may also made to bring potential recruits up to the required educational standard but this is not directed specifically at minorities. Greater flexibility may be possible with regard to security and police checks, noting, for example, that the Army already discounts minor criminal records in the case of more promising Aboriginal applicants. Speeding up citizenship procedures would be another obvious move but the requirement of citizenship must clearly remain.

How much the ADF can increase its representativeness remains an open question. There are many factors the ADF simply cannot change in relation to minorities. Securing proportional representation of ATSI across the board depends in some measure on these groups gaining equality with the bulk of society in terms of schooling, health and employment prospects. Of the strategies which target minorities directly, some, such as entry standards, seem to be of limited value. Some, such as focusing on parental attitudes, are more difficult but promise greater returns. In all cases, however, it seems that diminishing marginal returns are likely to set in. Increasing efforts further will prove more and more costly while the response continues to diminish.
Comparisons

How does the ADF compare with other military forces on the question of representation? There are strong parallels with the experience of blacks in the US forces who fought in the Civil War on both sides, in World War I (about 300,000) and in World War II (over one million) while being systematically denied equal civil and political rights. For decades blacks were segregated within the military but in 1948 President Truman, albeit for electoral advantage, set racial integration as a goal for the military. No time limit was set but shared experience of combat in the Korean War helped speed up the process. Compulsory service in the 1950s and during the Vietnam War also ensured proportionate black representation in the military. With the all-volunteer force in 1973 the US military made substantial and successful efforts to minimise discrimination in the treatment of black personnel. Surveys report that blacks in the military perceive less racism than blacks in civilian society, while rates of dismissal of blacks are lower in the military than in the public service.

In the United Kingdom the level of representation of minorities, notably blacks and Asians, is far below their numbers in the general population. In 1987-8 ethnic recruitment was reported to be only one per cent compared with four per cent minority representation in the general community; and an independent study by management consultants found racist stereotyping and language to be entrenched in the services. The government ordered programs to reduce racism in the services. It also pressed for better recruiting of ethnic minorities. The armed services are publicly committed to improving the situation and have set what seems to be a modest target of two per cent. The British Army achieved this goal in 1998-99 though the Royal Navy (1.6 per cent) and the Royal Air Force (1.4 per cent) fell short.

The New Zealand Defence Force is committed to cultural diversity and in 1997 included 22 per cent Maori and Pacific Islanders, who make up even higher proportions of other ranks. The long-term importance of recruiting from these groups is reinforced by the fact that there are twice as many Maori and Pacific Islander children under the age of fifteen as there are European children.

Compared with civilian organisations in Australia the ADF probably scores reasonably well in the treatment of minorities. In contrast to much of private enterprise, the ADF has processes and procedures which make discrimination in recruitment, conditions of service and dismissal far more difficult. The ADF also appears to be doing better than some police forces. The NSW police force, for example, has only about two per cent NESB personnel compared with about sixteen per cent in the state as a whole despite government commitments and considerable efforts by police leaders. Reasons given for poor representation parallel those found by the ADF: ethnic communities who have out-dated ideas about the police in Australia, parents who do not approve of the police as a career, and the absence of role models already in uniform.

The question of minorities resembles other issues faced by armed forces. The role of women and the admission of gays, for example, have been controversial in Australia as in many other countries. In these two cases, as with minorities, discriminatory attitudes are found among service personnel and the community at large. In each case, personnel policies have existed in the past which have formally excluded these groups from equal membership, often on the grounds of a threat to military cohesion. Women, like minorities, have also had to overcome stereotypes about suitable occupations, about their capabilities and their impact on male co-workers. In each case, too, attitudes in society have become more positive, assisted by legislative and institutional measures outlawing discrimination.

But each issue is distinct in its own way. The acceptance of gays in the ADF raised concerns about sexual identity which go far deeper than factors such as colour of skin or language spoken. It may have been the very inability to distinguish gays that was a major source of resistance. The acceptance of women in the ADF obviously differs from that of minority groups in that females are not a minority but constitute about half of the population. The Sex Discrimination Act of 1984 still permits the exclusion of women from combat roles although this is currently under examination. By contrast, once minorities have been accepted, they have generally been able to take part in combat.
In all these comparisons, it may be noted, the ADF, like other militaries, is generally held to a higher standard. This is in part because it represents and symbolises the community in ways no other organisation does, and is expected to embody society's values and aspirations in the way it deals with minorities. The ADF is also assumed to be better able to control and manage its members than other organisations. Even the most authoritarian and disciplined organisation, however, cannot shift attitudes and prejudices among its members simply by fiat. Education and enforcement of appropriate rules helps but these require time to take effect. Full acceptance of minorities within the military is probably not possible until society itself has changed in the desired direction.

**Exclusion and Inclusion**

With regard to the inclusion or exclusion of minorities, armed forces are unlikely to be totally out of step with views prevailing in society. They may, however, lead or follow in varying measure. For seventy years after Federation military forces reflected more or less faithfully Australia's predominantly European society, albeit one that included greater numbers of non-British background after World War II. Nonetheless, the military showed some ability to adapt in recruiting ATSI in both World Wars almost regardless of official policies. The threat to the nation in World War II, in particular, led to a distinct change of policy and the creation of ATSI units. Once the war was over, however, the reluctance to recruit ATSI in peacetime returned. Some attempts were made to include ATSI in the compulsory service scheme in the 1960s but with little effect.

One obvious lesson is that existing preferences and prejudices that exclude ethnic minorities can be and often are put aside in time of emergency and/or manpower shortage. Somehow their presence becomes not only acceptable but also effective despite what has been asserted previously about loss of cohesion. Such ambivalence might seem justified on the grounds that a focus on actual war-fighting will overcome any tensions or differences. But this seems a dubious argument since it assumes that minority and majority service members are unable to focus on their professional responsibilities in peacetime.

In the relationship between minorities and the military individuals and communities such as ATSI have faced a dilemma. To oppose compulsory or voluntary military service makes them more liable to be considered as 'outsiders' who do not merit or who are simply not interested in full citizenship. On the other hand, to accept military service may be seen as acquiescence in a social and political system that unfairly excludes or disadvantages them in other respects. This sort of dilemma is still evident today. Reports of ethnic under-representation in the ADF can lead some in the community to conclude that non-English migrants are not pulling their weight. Yet minority members themselves may regard service in the armed forces as a way of demonstrating their desire to be good citizens, in the hope that the community will recognise their contribution and grant equal status. Certainly, many ATSI have been proud of their military service and have seen it as a means of achieving personal and even political goals.

Whether the ADF can do much more to increase the level of representativeness remains a moot question. The goal is set to some extent by wider community concerns such as principles of equal opportunity as well as by internal factors such as the need for a wider recruiting base and increased organisational effectiveness. These aims are worthy but not necessarily achievable. The principal factors making for under representation of ethnic groups in the ADF compared with the population in general are largely characteristics of the first generation migrant population, some of which flow into the second generation. The ADF cannot expect to be able to overcome or modify them in large measure. ATSI groups mostly do not share the characteristics in question but are disadvantaged by their relative lack of access to education and training in the community at large.

There has never been any significant support existing inside or outside the Defence Force for fixed quotas, positive discrimination or lowering standards for particular groups. Such moves would certainly create public concern and lead to tensions within the ADF. The one target that has been set relates to the recruitment of ATSI. Concerns in Australia in recent times have focused less on the representation of particular groups as a whole than on protecting the
rights of individuals whatever their background. Ensuring absence of discrimination at the micro-level, it is assumed, will minimise under representation at the macro-level. What remains will be due to inherent and unchangeable factors.

It is significant that minority groups in Australia are many in number but none constitute a large part of the population. Even the largest communities such as Italians, Greeks and Yugoslavs each constitute only a small percentage of the whole. In the US, by contrast, blacks and Hispanics constitute very substantial minorities and their treatment by the military attracts greater attention. Annual reports on the racial balance in the services are made to Congress. Another important characteristic in the US is that the sizeable black population in the US remains readily identifiable—and identifies itself as such—from generation to generation.

In Australia only the small Aboriginal population and those of Asian origin remain more or less distinguishable through the generations. High levels of marriage outside ethnic groups—estimated at 60 per cent and over—also progressively reduce the distinctiveness of these communities. By the third generation the process of assimilation is often complete and the birthplace and language of a person's grandparents may well be irrelevant to the disposition to enlist in the military. This underscores the focus of government policy which is primarily to protect the rights of individuals rather than to protect the rights of groups. It also accords with the Defence Force's claim that it simply recruits 'Australians' regardless of national, cultural or racial background.
I am grateful to Robert Hall, Manager, Australian Defence Studies Centre, and Colonel Geoff Hay, Action for People Plan Team, for assistance with this essay.


7. Ibid., 23.


18. These anomalies were not remedied by the government until 1986 and 1992. I am grateful to Robert Hall for information on this matter.


22. Ibid., 103.


28. On the difficulties of setting criteria for ethnicity and gaining accurate information about individuals, see *Ethnic Composition*, 36-8. Birthplace, for example, obviously does not equate with ethnicity if parents are Australians living or travelling overseas.

29. Based on Tables 4.2, 4.5, A4, B4, C4 and D4 in *Ethnic Composition*.


31. Based on Tables 4.5, 4.6, *Ethnic Composition*.

32. Ibid.


34. A wide range of measures were recommended: *Ethnic Composition*, 222-37.


37. Ibid., 7.

44. Evidence from the US, however, suggests that minorities are significantly underrepresented in special forces units. Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Margaret C Harrell, and Jennifer Sloan, ‘Why Don’t Minorities Join Special Operations Forces?’, Armed Forces & Society 26: 4 (Summer 2000).
47. ‘Poor English a problem for 400,000’, Canberra Times, 6 September 1993.
50. Ethnic Composition, 152-4.
53. Ethnic Composition, ch 11.
54. Ibid, ch 7.
55. Ibid, ch 14.
56. Ibid, ch 10.
57. The British Army also stands accused of being too focused on its British heritage, a factor said to reinforce belief in the superiority of the white race: Reggie von Zugbach and Mohammed Ishaq, ‘Managing Race Relations in the British Army’, Defense Analysis 16: 2 (August 2000), 191.
58. Silk et al, The Case for Cultural Diversity in Defence, 69. It would be essential that cadets units not discriminate directly or indirectly against minorities.
59. Ethnic Composition, 16.
61. Moskos and Butler, All That We Can Be, 5-6.
63. See von Zugbach and Ishaq, ‘Managing Race Relations’.
67. ‘Police failing to attract ethnic recruits’, Sydney Morning Herald, 30 April 2001. There are about two per cent ATSI in the police force which is in line with the general population.
There can be no question of unhealthy rivalry or jealousy between the Regular Army and the Citizen Forces. In Australia we have only one Army. The regular and non-regular elements are both essential parts of it, each is complementary to the other: 

Lieutenant General Vernon Sturdee, Chief of the General Staff, 1948

The issue of the integration of the regular and reserve components of the Army has been a running sore in the history of Australian defence planning. The 'Total Force' concept that Dr T.B. Millar advocated twenty-seven years ago has not yet been realised, though the passage of legislation freeing up the reserves for operational deployments means that, once again, the opportunity is within our grasp. In the past, the aim of forging a cohesive and complementary team has been frustrated through a combination of mismanagement by successive governments, political game-playing by Reservist pressure groups and attempts by many members of the Regular officer corps to realise exclusive control over the profession of arms. If the Australian people are to get the very best return for their investment in land forces, we would do well to learn the sorry lessons of our past failure to build 'one army'.

So much has been written and said about the place of the citizen soldier in Australian military history that there is danger of 'issue' fatigue setting in. All too often, what emerges from a reading of past accounts of army history are the prejudices of different cliques within the defence establishment. Instead of confirming these limited perspectives, institutional history must challenge the comfortable patterns of thought that take root in organisations such as the Army. The real issues in the Reserve debate are obscured by a century of myth making by an often overly romantic Reservist lobby and the equally destructive counter-cynicism of many Regular soldiers. There is, in fact, no Reserve debate. The real issue is how in a changing society the Australian Defence Force (ADF) can maximise its access to, and use of, the limited human resources available to it.

At the Defence Strategy Seminar held in June 2000 to inform the Parliamentary Joint Standing Committees, Mr Hugh White, Deputy Secretary Strategy in the Department of Defence, frankly admitted that:

It does seem to me to be a perfectly legitimate response to what has happened to us recently that we need to have more highly mobile land forces ready to go at short notice, able to do tasks like East Timor and so on, than we have had available ... we have succeeded in the past in drawing very effectively from forces we have kept developed for other purposes the resources needed to do those sorts of tasks. But when East Timor came along, we found that we were stretching ourselves pretty thin. Too thin? That is not for me to say.

Nonetheless, it needs to be said that the necessity to lead, deploy and sustain the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) exposed a critical vulnerability in our modern, lean, technologically advanced defence force. Contrary to the expectations that had underpinned Australian defence planning since the Dibb Report was submitted in 1986, the defence force had not run out of 'high tech' capabilities; it had very nearly run out of people. If a one-off, low-intensity operation that was well supported by the international community faced this problem, where might the Army be if it had to find forces to sustain a medium-intensity operation at short notice? The problem also arises if the tempo of operational commitments increases and the Government calls on the Army to supply forces for a number of small missions to contribute to regional stability.
Our current perception of the way in which we can configure and employ our Army is obscured by three persistent institutional fallacies that have grown out of the way in which our defence force, and the Army in particular, has developed. The first of these three fallacies is that of the 'skeleton force'—that we can entrust our national security to an army that can be rapidly mobilised on the foundations of a skeleton peacetime militia. Second, there is the fallacy that a country as small as Australia can maintain and afford a viable, full-time force that can be sustained on operations requiring the deployment of brigade-sized groups for extended periods. Third, there is the fallacy that, in conditions of modern technological warfare, reserve forces will not be able to perform combat functions, but are restricted to combat service and combat service support roles. If we are to escape being trapped as prisoners of our history, we need to understand how these fallacies came to be so widely accepted and reconsider them in the context of Australia's present security dilemma.

This essay focuses on the postwar development of the Australian Army because the idea of the 'total force' has particular implications for land forces. The manpower needs of the Army are greater than those of the other two services and—unlike the Air Force and the Navy, which are also reliant on reserve capabilities—the Army has a greater need for a large pool of trainable, but essentially non-technical, personnel. Accordingly, while the ADF as a whole is reliant on reservist labour, the Army has a particular need for manpower who provide not only supplementary skill sets but a 'surge capacity' to enable the Army to deal with contingencies requiring additional troops.

The Failure of the ‘One Army’ Concept Since 1945

In his excellent, recently published history of the Australian Army, Jeffrey Grey argues that the raising of an expeditionary force for service abroad in the First World War established the beginning of the tensions that have marked relations between regular and citizen forces this century. In fact, the causes and nature of these problems are more complex than that. Until the establishment of the Regular Army in 1948, the conflict was more between two concepts of citizen soldiering than between the alternatives of having a professional, standing, full-time combat force or a part-time citizen force.

The 1903 Defence Act specifically forbade the creation of regular infantry battalions, and it was only with the establishment of the Royal Military College (RMC), Duntroon, in 1911 that Australia started to grow its own professional officer corps. The Defence Act provided that only volunteers could serve overseas; therefore in 1914 and again in 1939, rather than enact the necessary legislative changes to release the militia for overseas service, the governments of the day elected to raise separate expeditionary forces for overseas service. Although both the First and the Second Australian Imperial Forces were long-service forces, they were almost exclusively comprised of citizens who enlisted for the duration and who did not expect to remain in the army in peacetime. As a British regular officer described the members of the First AIF to ‘Jo’ Gullett in the Western Desert, ‘I saw something of your chaps in the last war. Very few of them professional soldiers. But very professional men of war’.

Australia’s small permanent peacetime establishment consisted only of a regular Staff Corps, an instructional cadre for the militia and some permanent gunners for coastal emplacements. In 1922 the total strength of the army was only 31,000, of whom only 1600 were full-time personnel. By 1929 there were only 259 Staff Corps officers. In an almost counter-intuitive fashion, these professional officers were regularly passed over in rank by their militia counterparts and were denied opportunities to exercise command. Denying Regulars command represented something of a self-fulfilling prophecy— Regulars could not command (citizen) soldiers because they had no experience of command. While still a Colonel, Duntroon graduate Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman expostulated: ‘We were to be the hewers of wood and drawers of water. We the only people who really knew the job, were to assist these militia fellows’.

This resentment was the source of tension between staff corps and citizen officers during the Second World War, but it cannot be said that the tension arose from a rejection of the notion that citizen soldiers had the ability to serve or that regular and citizen soldiers could not work
together. In fact, the great majority of Second AIF officers were drawn from the ranks of the militia. As the war went on, despite initial poor enlistments, substantial numbers of AIF other ranks had previous militia experience. David Horner has convincingly demonstrated that the experience of war rapidly melded the regular and citizen officers within the AIF together so that, by the middle of the war, they began 'to think of themselves as belonging to one Army'. However, until 1948, that army was a citizens' army. Australia did have a record of maintaining two armies in time of war, but that was a consequence of the disastrous political decision in both wars to raise a volunteer force overseas and maintain a separate part-time home-service force. Even this distinction was rendered irrelevant from 1942, when militia units were sent to fight in New Guinea and the island campaigns. The fact that the Army could get on with the job regardless of the origins of its members demonstrated that the one-army concept could be a reality. As the war progressed the performance of the militia battalions proved that it was the quality of the men, their training and their officers that counted—not whether they were nominally identified as overseas forces or a home army.

The announcement of the Labor Government's postwar defence policy by the minister for defence, John Dedman, on 4 June 1947 marks the point at which a standing army began to supplant what had been a primarily citizen-soldier tradition. Although the postwar peacetime army was based, as it had been since Federation, on a part-time force (known as the Citizen Military Force or CMF), for the first time provision was made for the existence of a small permanent combat force based on an infantry brigade group. This was a drastic departure from prewar policy.

What had changed was the recognition by both military and political circles that the ad hoc mobilisations that had occurred in both World Wars were not appropriate for Australia's changed strategic circumstances in the nuclear age. Australia was no longer simply a small dominion of the British Empire perched on the periphery of a Eurocentric world order. The war had demonstrated that international security was truly global and the Asia-Pacific had, if anything, greater strategic significance than Europe in the emergent Cold War. Planning for the postwar army, the Vice-Chief of the General Staff, Major-General Sydney Rowell, identified the key implication of Australia's position as a Pacific rim power:

The peacetime organisation of 1939 and earlier years affords no real basis for consideration of what is needed today. It was based on a conception of local defence against raids on, or invasion of, our country and carried no commitment, express or implied, in a wider strategical sphere. Even for its limited outlook, it was woefully inadequate for its primary task as events were subsequently to prove ... [the size and readiness of the peacetime army] ... must be directly related to the commitments we have entered into, or expect to meet in war. It is thus essential that it should be capable of taking the field unhampered by the dislocation and inefficiency which result from a major reorganisation on the outbreak of war.

Rowell had the foresight to determine that Australia's security in an international environment that remained characterised by conflict was not simply a matter of the defence of Australian sovereign territory. The postwar world was riven by great power conflict and subject to enormous stresses as emergent national groups sought statehood. Like the present, in the years following the war the likelihood of attack on Australian soil was remote, but Australia existed in a region that was undergoing considerable political, social, religious and ethnic ferment. To protect its vital national interests and to contribute to international and regional peace and security, Australia had to possess the capability to deploy ground forces rapidly and to contribute those forces to coalitions with allies. Such deployments were not possible without a high-readiness, standing combat force.

Still, the small regular field force that was formed in 1948 on the return from Japan of two of the three British Commonwealth Occupation Force battalions was hardly likely to make much impact on the regional balance of power. The Chifley Government's '1947 Five Year Plan' made provision for a permanent force of 19,000 and a CMF of 50,000. The primary function of the permanent force was still to support the CMF. Of the planned regular forces, only 4470 were intended to serve in the independent brigade group, while 13,380 were assigned to fixed
defences, as base and administrative troops; a further 1150 were assigned as cadres to CMF units. The Army was given four tasks: to provide forces for United Nations operations; to provide forces for British Commonwealth Defence; to constitute the expansion base; and to cover requirements for the local defence of mainland Australia. Of these tasks, the new regular force was only responsible for, and capable of, providing units for short-term UN and Commonwealth commitments, and even then it is worth noting that the brigade group did not actually eventuate. The strain of sustaining the force in Korea led to the plan being shelved, and it was not until 1958 that a regular brigade was formed.

The creation of a full-time combat force (however small) did represent a major turning point in the development of Australia’s Army. For one thing the professional officer corps had finally come of age, with permanent officers with wartime command experience distributed throughout the Army. Where the prewar Staff Corps had simply been too small to exercise much influence, the war had finally seen the officers who had graduated in the first classes at RMC reach general officer rank. In July 1941 only one RMC graduate was a Major-General; a year later there were eleven. Critical mass had been achieved, and young regular officers now had the opportunity to fill full-time command positions from graduation and not just support CMF units. With this opportunity to hone their skills to a level denied their part-time colleagues also came the chance to gain experience on a range of operations short of war. The career of the postwar regular officer was to take a very different path from that of his predecessors.

Although it was to take some time for change to occur, and even longer to be appreciated by the CMF, the ascendency of the citizen soldier within the Army was over. As Graeme Sligo pointed out in his work on the postwar army, from 1945 until the CMF was re-established in 1948 the part-time force remained in ‘suspended animation’. During that period, there were also no CMF generals serving as principal staff officers or on the Military Board. Even when Major-General Wootten (a RMC graduate in 1914) was appointed to the board, his role was limited to providing advice on matters affecting the Citizen Forces. Although on a semi-formal basis, groups of officers conducted tactical exercises without troops, ‘held information and teaching sessions and lobbied government for positive action on defence’, the prevailing sentiment within society was to focus on postwar reconstruction.

Perhaps the most important paradigm shift that had occurred after the war was the changed emphasis on the role of the Army. Even though the CMF maintained a numerical preponderance on paper, its functions were limited. It existed to be called upon in time of war and even then its members had to volunteer before they could be sent overseas. In the meantime, it was unavailable for the growing range of military operations short of major war that were becoming increasingly common. The postwar CMF was structured to provide forces for conflicts similar to the two World Wars. What actually occurred was a succession of limited wars and counterinsurgency operations. In those circumstances the CMF rapidly lost relevance while the regular army won the laurels of almost continual operational experience. As Jeffrey Grey put it:

The young regular officers who graduated from Duntroon from the late 1940s and, increasingly, from Portsea after 1952 found themselves repeatedly on active service for twenty years; the platoon commanders of the Korean War were the battalion commanders in Vietnam. The 1960s confirmed the process, begun in the 1950s, whereby the regular army formed the centre of the policy and thinking on the land defence of Australia, usurping the role which had given meaning to the CMF for over half a century.

At the same time, the professionalisation of the Army led to the growth of bitter rivalry between the CMF establishment and many regular officers, who questioned the relevance of a mass army in the light of their own experiences of limited war. In 1971, writing about the expansion of the regular army officer corps in the 1950s, Peter Young made the savage observation that, ‘[a]s all of this took place, the CMF began its inevitable decline; the brilliance and dedication they had inherited from World War II gave way to the solicitor-soldier on the social make’.
There is no doubt that the fifteen years after the end of the war saw the balance of experience tip from the largely citizen-soldier veterans of the AIF to the younger professional soldiers of the Cold War conflicts. Ten years represents an entire generation in military careers; in a rapidly changing strategic environment, military thinking and organisations must adapt or lose relevance.

It would be easy to dwell on the history of the antipathy that developed between many members of both the regular army and the CMF in the postwar period. The focus of this essay, however, is not on the political machinations that took place, but on the organisational failures that prevented the creation of effective synergies between the two components. In any case, in his doctoral thesis, soon to be published as a book, Dayton McCarthy has done a brilliant job of charting the erosion of CMF influence and relevance over the 1950s and 1960s. His is a frustrating tale of missed opportunities, poorly thought-through reorganisations and an obdurate refusal by both citizen soldiers and regulars alike to recognise the limitations imposed by their particular form of service. He concludes that in the postwar period, governments have accepted the dilemmas of the ‘two army’ conundrum and have continued to inflict them on our defence structure.

On successive occasions reviews have been conducted and reorganisations entered into (or were at least contemplated) that might have made a difference. Nothing came of any of them. As the inquiry in 2000 into the Army by the Joint Parliamentary Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade concluded: 'Despite all these reviews and enquiries, fundamental and sustainable reform to produce a useful reserve has not eventuated'. Leaving aside the unspoken assumption that this was a reserve issue and not a 'one army' issue, we need to ask ourselves: 'What has gone wrong?' A brief examination of some of the moments when a 'total force' seemed within our grasp provides some answers.

**Compulsory Service in the Postwar Period**

On two occasions, first between 1951 and 1959 and then from 1965 to 1972, the Army found itself making up its numbers with conscripted personnel. The two schemes were quite different in nature. The 1950s scheme applied to all eighteen-year-olds and imposed an active training obligation of 176 days on those who elected to complete their service in the Army. This service obligation was broken down into 98 days of full-time training and 78 days of CMF service. The justification for national service was that Australia's Army would not be large enough, or ready enough, for a major war without a guaranteed supply of trained men. The idea of national service was to provide a pool of ready, trained members of the CMF who could be deployed at short notice. In this first scheme, the national servicemen were members of the CMF—not short-service regulars.

As far as the Government was concerned the army that they would send to war was to be the nation in arms, not just a regular brigade-sized force. Prime Minister Menzies broadcast his 'Defence Call to the Nation' in clear and uncompromising terms. Given the fact that his comments represented a recognition that Australia's strategic circumstances had changed forever, and that this new environment required a whole new army, it is worth dwelling on his comments:

> In each of two World Wars months elapsed after the declaration of war before our own troops were substantially engaged. We therefore had time specially to enlist an AIF and train and equip it. Citizen Force units became disintegrated so that an entirely separate AIF could be created. If there is to be a third war, it is most unlikely that we shall have leisure to prepare for it. It will probably come without declaration and with the violence of a sudden storm. If this is so ... it would be suicidal to go through the old process of improvising an expeditionary force. We must either stand promptly beside our great allies and friends in the real place of contest, or let them, and ourselves down to disaster. Hence the CMF must be enlisted and trained as a force which, with the regular units fed into it, is itself an expeditionary force ...

... It is hoped and believed that most of ... [the] ... National Service trainees will enter the CMF as trained recruits and so become part of a force, continuous in its character and enriched by honourable history, available for war. I have heard some people say
that with National Service the volunteer Citizen Military Forces are not needed. This is
completely wrong. If we are to have a real Army, the recruit trained under National
Service must have a force and units into which to go. The system we are now
introducing is parallel with that in Great Britain under the advice of Field Marshal
Montgomery. There they have the Regular Army, the Territorials, and the National
Service-men, making up one Army.23

Menzies' 'one army' was still designed to be employed as the First and Second AIF had
been—as a keystone of British Commonwealth strategy in the Middle East, should global war
break out again.24 However, while national service might have provided some basis for
expansion in times of mass mobilisation, it was not what was to be required for an army that
was to spend two decades fighting in limited wars and counterinsurgencies. At the time, it was
generally assumed that in a national emergency Parliament would pass legislation to make all
members of the Army liable for overseas service. In fact as the scheme progressed, the CMF
fell prey to a whole range of differing service obligations. National servicemen could not be
called upon to serve overseas unless they first volunteered; from September 1950, however,
all those who voluntarily enlisted in the CMF were liable for overseas service, but only when
the CMF was called out by proclamation in the case of a major war. National Servicemen who
were commissioned as officers had to volunteer for overseas service in times of war, but
those who were promoted to noncommissioned rank did not. National servicemen who
volunteered for further service in the CMF on the completion of their initial obligation had to
re-volunteer for overseas service and could, in any case, apply at any time for transfer to the
inactive list. Only regular soldiers remained liable for service anywhere, anytime. With such
uncertainty as to who would be available for deployment, the CMF was not a credible basis
for an expeditionary force.25

The outbreak of the Korean War demonstrated the hollowness of a one-army concept, which
was based on such a truly bewildering and bizarre variety of service commitments. At a time
when the Army was flooded with troops undergoing national service, the regular army faced a
critical shortage of personnel for service in Korea. The shortfall was so great that the Army
had to seek recruits from Britain.26 It was impossible to characterise the Army as a unified
force when only a small percentage were liable for combat service and the great majority had
only achieved a basic level of training. The Korean War also led to an obvious schism in the
Army's ranks: between those with combat experience and those who, despite their training,
were unlikely to see action in circumstances short of global war. Although at the time the
prospect of a third world war seemed quite likely, from a psychological perspective the
existence of a class of soldiers with operational experience, first in Korea and then Malaya,
drove a deep wedge through the Army.

The introduction of the second postwar experiment with conscription in 1965 further
marginalised the CMF and exacerbated the rift within the Army. Unlike the earlier scheme,
which provided for universal training, this second scheme was a selective service model with
only a limited percentage of those liable being selected by ballot. Service was full time initially,
for a period of two years, and servicemen were posted to regular units. On the conclusion of
their obligation the national servicemen were required to render three years part-time service.
What distinguished this scheme from any system of conscription that had preceded it was
that, for the first time, draftees could be compelled to serve outside Australia in circumstances
short of a major war posing an immediate threat to national security. On 6 May 1965, one
week after the announcement of the commitment to Vietnam of an Australian battalion, the
Government introduced amendments to the National Service Act to make conscripts liable for
overseas service.27 For all intents and purposes this made the conscripts short-service regular
soldiers. There might have been nothing inherently wrong with this approach, but it did mark
the final abandonment of the notion that its citizen army would fight Australia's wars.

The final indignity that was heaped on the CMF was the option that made it possible for those
enlisting in the CMF to defer their national-service obligation. By opting for six years service in
the CMF, potential draftees could 'dodge the draft'. At its worst this option meant that
enlistment in the CMF could be used as a form of insurance policy. Until January 1971 men
could join the CMF before they registered for national service and if their birth date was not
drawn in the ballot, they could then resign from the CMF and not be liable for further call-up. Although the loophole was belatedly closed, the damage had been done. The CMF that had inherited so many of the proud traditions of the Second AIF as well as many of its former members was now firmly marked with the stigma of the ‘chocolate soldiers’.

Dayton McCarthy sums up the postwar decline of the CMF with the pithy observation:

In the period from 1947 to 1966, the CMF’s role in the Army’s plans had slipped from that of the 1st XI (but trained by the regulars) to a distant 3rd XI, with little chance of performing its nominal role of serving in a defence emergency.

In less than twenty years the notion of what the Army was had been completely inverted and the 'one army' concept was abandoned with little consideration of the consequences.

**The Pentropic Disaster**

The most dramatic shift in force structure that occurred in that twenty-year period took place in the brief period between the two compulsory service schemes. The Pentropic experiment was intended to provide ‘a lean, powerful, versatile organisation, readily adaptable to any type of operation in which it is likely to be involved in South-East Asia’. Introduced in March 1960 the reorganisation was designed to be compatible with the 'Pentomic' organisation that had been adopted by the United States (US) Army in the late 1950s. The failure of this reorganisation has been adequately covered by a number of authors and there is little value in raking over that ground again.

Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to remark briefly on the impact that the process had on the concept of the one army.

Sold to the public as the 'new army', the Pentropic structure broke the numerical superiority of the CMF within the army. With the abolition of national service the size of the CMF fell from approximately 50,000 to 20,000. The axe fell most obviously on the CMF infantry battalions, which were reduced from thirty-one to seventeen and then again to eight, grouped into state regiments. In his work on the reorganisation John Blaxland has demonstrated how the CMF lost almost half of its senior command and staff appointments in the field force while at the same time the number of regular army appointments quadrupled. Not surprisingly this reorganisation created great bitterness and charges from some quarters of a regular-army plot 'to reduce the capacity of the CMF to a nullity'.

Clearly there was something in this charge. The Pentropic organisation was not well thought through, or even trialled prior to implementation. As the Australians were preparing to implement their structure, the US had made up its mind to abandon the Pentomic ideal. Although the Australian planners were not aware of this decision at the time, the fact remains that the Army's force structure was being predicated on the basis of a supposed compatibility with our number-one ally, although no-one was apparently consulting with that ally.

At the command level the reorganisation confirmed the ascendancy of the regular officer corps. Blaxland has shown that the members of the Military Board were aware that the restructure could bring about the demise of the CMF and proceeded with it anyway. Although the trend to the professional dominance of the officer corps was well entrenched by the early sixties, the manner in which the scheme was implemented smacked of a purge. In a very short time the CMF lost much of its senior leadership, including large numbers of officers with wide experience in the AIF. While change to bring the structure of the Army into line with its actual functions was clearly overdue, little thought seems to have been given to the social and political fallout of that change. This insensitivity to the feelings of those who had invested a large part of their lives in the Army was the cause of much bitterness. Ultimately, the failure to develop consensus within the Army proved counter-productive since it confirmed many reservists in their hostility to change.
In November 1960 the editor of the *Australian Army Journal*, Colonel E.G. Keogh, published an impassioned defence of the need for an integrated army. His words ring true today, though it is clear that the Pentropic structure was not the way to achieve his objective:

> All elements of the Army, and all the training problems peculiar to them, are complementary. We cannot separate them, think about them, in watertight compartments without damaging the structure as a whole. If that basic concept is kept steadily in mind, discussion can proceed with profit to the army and the nation. If we fail to keep it in mind, not only in debate but in everything we do or say, much harm will inevitably result.

Instead, from the perspective of the one army, perhaps the most damning judgment on the advocates of the Pentropic idea was that it was implemented in a clumsy and destructive way. Major General Paul Cullen, CMF Member of the Military Board from 1964 to 1966 and a noted partisan of the citizen-soldier cause ever since, has since commented that:

> integration ... was clumsily done, and was an additional factor causing disillusion, discontent, disruptions and resignations. The effect of integration on the Regular component was also adverse ... [This] in turn had the effect of further disturbing the Reservists ... In some instances in technical units, [Postmaster General] technicians in the signals unit were so superior to the Regular technicians, that it generated friction and jealousy. In . . . other units, the superiority of the Regulars had a similar effect. There were all types of psychological superiority-inferiority side effects.

Again, those psychological factors remain as big an issue in reserve-regular relations today as they always have. A clear lesson that should have been learnt from this experience, but one that remains an issue, is that the two components of the army need to be complementary if they are to succeed. Reservists are not part-time regulars, they bring different skills, experiences and domestic circumstances to the Army. The trick is how to make those factors an asset, rather than a liability.

**The Millar Report**

Discussing this issue with a student at Staff College recently, who was charged with writing an essay on the future employment of the Reserves, I was disturbed to find that he had never heard of the Millar Report—it had not even surfaced in his research. This is a matter for concern, as the *Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Citizen Military Forces* is perhaps the most cogent analysis of the functions of the Australian Army ever undertaken. The Report was tabled in Parliament in April 1974, and Dr T.B. Millar of the Australian National University chaired the committee that wrote it. In some ways this report exceeded its principal terms of reference, which were:

a. To report on the role of Citizen Military Forces as part of the Australian Army in the strategic circumstances of the 1970s and 1980s.

b. To report on the military capabilities and specialist support which could be efficiently and economically provided to the Australian Regular Army by Citizen Military Forces as at present constituted.

In fact the report concluded that it was not possible to consider the two components of the Army in isolation, and its findings went beyond just the CMF to reflect on what sort of organisation the 'total force' should be. The committee found that:

> There is only one Australian Army. There are obvious advantages in forging the two components into a common team, and bringing them into close contact and association, for they are substantially interdependent and will become more so in the future. But there are limits beyond which it would not be wise to go, because there is no escaping the fundamental differences of service on a part-time and full-time basis. We believe a better term than 'one army' is 'total force', whereby the assets of the Army Reserve and the Regular Army are welded into a single total effort.
Coming up with the phrase ‘total force’ was more than an exercise in semantics. The idea of the ‘one army’ and the buzz phrase the ‘new army’ had fallen into such disrepute that the idea needed to be redefined if it was to have any meaning. Accordingly, and controversially, the CMF was renamed the Army Reserve—a change that more accurately reflected the fact that the citizen forces no longer constituted the primary deployable force, but were the enabling force that allowed the Army both to sustain operations and to call on a varied skill base. Of the many reorganisations attempted before it and the multitude of reports conducted since, the Millar Report came closest to showing how in the strategic circumstances of the foreseeable future the Army’s personnel assets would be best employed. With some adjustments for the changed strategic circumstances of today and taking changes in the nature of employment into account, the principles identified by the committee still apply today. The three key findings of the committee were that:

a. a Reserve of partly trained army units and personnel is an essential component of the defence of Australia;

b. such a Reserve is only possible and effectual if the Government of the day, the community, the Regular Army and the Reserve believe it has a role that gives it present significance, which provides for effective action in the future, and which it is known the Government will implement if necessary; and

c. any Reserve component must be prepared for total integration with the rest of the Army in the event of call-up for full-time duty, and that in peace both Regular and Reserve components should be treated and act as part of a single force.

Three verities emerged from these findings and have been long understood within the Army, though the ability to translate the philosophy into reality has so far evaded us. These facts are that the Army requires an expansion base in times of defence emergency; that these Reserves require a role that is ‘relevant, achievable and credible’; and that on mobilisation there could be no distinction between soldiers as to where or how they could be employed. Unfortunately, the Committee’s recommendations were only partly implemented, with the consequence that the Reserve once again lost units and personnel, but did not receive the legislative protection on call-out that was necessary to provide some degree of security for their families. Most critically, the distinction in the Defence Act between the regulars and reserves in terms of their differing liability for call-up in circumstances short of war remained. Millar was disappointed with the patchy implementation of what was a carefully considered and coherent force review. His comments were not just sour grapes, but accurately described the problems faced then, as now, by those who try to bring about meaningful change. Today’s force planners would do well to heed Millar’s comments:

The processes of change in an institution as large, bureaucratic and conservative as the Army will always be slow and cumbersome. I confess I did not appreciate ... how much resistance or apathy the recommendations would encounter, in both the Regular Army, the CMF and the Defence Department. Parliament has shown almost no interest. Financial restraints aimed at short-term savings will have inestimable long-term costs ... [I]f—as is presently the case—the recommendations are implemented in dribs and drabs with modest momentum and little enthusiasm at the top, then despite the devoted labours of many Regulars and Reservists we are in fact frittering away a great human and national asset.47

The Millar Report, founded as it was on an appreciation of the Army's history and a critical appreciation of its needs, should remain essential reading for all of those involved in force development and capability planning. It is notable that it has taken over twenty five years for many of the same proposals to re-emerge as undertakings in the Government's recent White Paper. This paper announced that the Reserves would be made available for a wide range of operations in peace as well as in war; different categories of reserve service appropriate to reservists' circumstances would be introduced; and legislation would finally be introduced to protect the jobs of reservists and support their families and employers.42
That legislation was finally passed in the Senate on 7 March 2001. On commencement it will enable the Governor-General to call out the Reserves for continuous full-time service for a range of operational deployments—not just in the case of war or defence emergency. The circumstances in which reservists may now be called out include peace operations, civil aid, humanitarian assistance, civil emergency or disaster relief, and support to community activities of national or international significance.\textsuperscript{43} Other changes involve protecting reservists' capacity to deploy by providing financial incentives as well as protection against discrimination in employment and education arising from reservists' obligation to serve.\textsuperscript{44} Protection against financial loss is covered by compensation to employers and self-employed reservists for losses incurred while members are absent on full-time service. In finally receiving legislative support for the total-force concept the Army has taken a big step towards accomplishing the Millar Committee's vision. However, even now the achievement of this ideal depends on bringing about the cultural changes that will produce a 'seamless' force. This cultural evolution will only be attained by finally killing off the three fallacies that have so bedevilled the Army in the past.

\textbf{The Fallacy of the 'Skeleton Force'}

The recent parliamentary inquiry into the Army concluded that, as a consequence of its historical development, the Army had developed an 'unsuitable personnel model' and that:

\begin{quote}
For legislative and cultural reasons Dr Millar's concept of a total force has not been realised. The failure to realise this concept practically has been costly. It has directly resulted in the need to increase the Army's trained manpower by 3,000 as a result of East Timor. This is despite a theoretically available total force of nine brigades. The personnel structures are clearly not suitable to the tasks repeatedly demanded of the Army.\textsuperscript{45}
\end{quote}

In large part this failure is due to the historically based assumption that the reserve component represented a skeleton force on which a mass mobilisation would be based. Not only is the prospect of Australia having to mobilise the bulk of its available manpower for war highly unlikely, but such an approach would not deliver Australia the combat edge that it would require in a major conflict.

It is necessary to be blunt about the justification for the continued existence of Reserve forces in a work force increasingly defined by a trend to specialisation. Francis Fukuyama has demonstrated that the world:

\begin{quote}
of abundant low-skill, blue-collar work disappeared during the 1970s and 1980s. As a result of international competition, deregulation, and (most important) technological change, many new high-skill jobs were created and many low-skill jobs began to disappear . . . put in its starkest form, an information age economy substitutes mental for physical labor ...\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}

The nature of work has changed, and with it the comfortable assumption that workers will enjoy conditions of security and guaranteed long-term employment. This radical change in career profiles has drastic implications for the Army, which now has to plan for a more mobile and highly skilled work force with substantially higher expectations than those of earlier generations. As defence commentator Malcolm McGregor has pointed out: 'there is no strict correlation between numbers and capability ... [t]he age of the mass mobilisation is over.'\textsuperscript{47} With it has gone the idea that the Reserves form the base for the mass mobilisation of Australian society. There are virtually no conceivable circumstances in which Australia will need a mass army of hurriedly trained citizen soldiers. In his recent history of the Army, Jeffrey Grey concluded that:
Too often, schemes to boost the Reserve have concentrated on numbers or retention, not on capability. The army must find ways to attract and retain people with the skill and educational levels needed, in a globalising economy where such people are widely sought. Traditional notions of a service career and the military vocation do not sit easily with currently fashionable ideas about a multiple-career working life. If the emphasis is to be on quality not quantity, the rewards must match those offered elsewhere or ... people will not join.

On the face of it, traditional Reserve forces, which by their very nature do not achieve high levels of efficiency in peacetime, do not appear to fit the new paradigm in the nature of work. The question that has dominated the one-army debate with increasing urgency since 1948 is whether there is still place for citizen-soldiers alongside their more highly trained, generally fitter and more easily deployed Regular counterparts. As the Millar report pointed out:

The regular officer or soldier has to be brought repeatedly to his peak of training. The reservist usually never reaches it, or reaches it only once. The training of a reservist is far less continuous than that of a regular. On the other hand, some reservists bring to the Army special skills the Army has not paid for. Also, the voluntary 'amateur' enthusiast will sometimes achieve remarkable levels of professionalism, perhaps higher than are achieved by some people occupationally engaged in the same pursuit.

From an organisational perspective, if the Army is to be able to access reservists' potential easily and efficiently, then reservists need to be employed in such a way that, when the call to serve comes, they are individually and collectively ready to go. The best way to achieve rapid deployment is not to pretend that reserve formations should mobilise and deploy under reserve command. Given the short periods of notice that characterise modern conflict, the model of deploying the 'nation in arms'-style expeditionary force is too slow and inefficient. Australia also risks repeating the errors of 1942 when under-trained, under-equipped and unready AIF and militia soldiers were deployed to Malaya, New Guinea and the northern archipelago.

Instead, the Army needs to be able to access trained teams—units and sub-units that can easily integrate into deployable forces at short notice. Membership of these units needs to be defined by current levels of capability, not potential capability. A combat unit, for instance, cannot wait to deploy because some of its members need to be brought up to an acceptable level of readiness or because it does not have sufficient equipment. At the point when they are required, reservists need to be ready to go.

The imperative that reservists be easily and rapidly deployable requires us to rethink our image of the employment of the reservist and to make distinctions between the high-readiness combat forces we require and the range of other functions that reservists can perform. Combat soldiers are young people, and it is really only the young—school leavers and university students—that have the available time to devote to the level of training required to make them rapidly deployable. Once reservists reach their thirties, it is likely that family responsibilities and the demands of their civilian career are going to interfere with their ability to find time to stay ready to deploy at short notice. Accordingly, it makes sense that our reserve combat component be largely drawn from younger people who do not belong to a skeleton force, but constitute a part of the force in being.

The best way to achieve this objective is to tailor-make units that will facilitate access to young peoples' time, without damage to their civil prospects and in away that will enhance the contribution that they can make. The experience of reserve forces overseas provides a number of useful precedents. We might emulate the United States Marine Corps and institute a system of high-readiness, short-service soldiering with an ongoing part-time commitment. Alternatively, we might accept that tertiary education is now the norm rather than the exception and do away with the idea that students should automatically train to be officers. University regiments might return to their dual role of providing military training to undergraduates and officer training to selected members. A number of countries have
recognised the value of institutionally based infantry units that tailor their training to the academic year and provide military training at a range of levels. Opening up the university regiments to general enlistments would enhance the Army's access to a pool of labour that is available for training, capable of learning and will represent the surge combat capability that the ADF so sorely needs.50

The Army does not consist solely of high-readiness combat troops. Any modern army requires a wider range of capabilities than can be provided by its 'warriors'. Reservists who do not fit into the 'ready to deploy' category fill the need for skill sets that a peacetime regular army cannot maintain. While there is no justification for retaining personnel who do not contribute to the defence force, what of those reservists who, having completed the high-readiness phase of their military careers, wish to continue serving, but with a reduced commitment? Again these personnel represent an asset in terms of their time and expertise, but they can rapidly become a liability if their service degenerates into a job-creation scheme for members who do not deliver easily realised capability. Posting members to units where they actually derogate from the team's readiness is foolish. The Army needs to cast off its traditional ad hoc and lazy approach to reserve personnel management and start to employ its resources more professionally. This change means abandoning the industrial-age model of bloc unit formation and adopting more flexible, information-age employment practices. A register of reservist civil qualifications would enable the Army to access skills hitherto untapped. The terms of reservists' military employment must reflect their degree of readiness. The Army must adopt a tiered structure of reserve units and job opportunities that accurately reflects members' competencies and availability to serve. Reservists and regulars who expect to continue serving must accept that, as in every other occupation, their employer is more interested in the capability they deliver than their sentimental attachment to their job.

In an article in the Australian Defence Force Journal published in 1997, Lieutenant Colonel Gary Tamsitt demonstrated that much of the Reserve's time was wasted on internal administration and in training its own members.51 While this self-sufficient approach makes sense if the Reserve is to be the basis for a national mass mobilisation, it makes no sense in the context of the one army. Standards of readiness will only improve if the Army emulates the model of the British Territorial Army and the US Marine Corps Reserve and outsources these functions to the full-time component or civilian staff.52 In a one-army concept, what matters is not providing the individual with a rounded career experience, but ensuring that the most is made of the resources available.

The skeleton force model does not provide the sort of capability that our current strategic circumstances demand. Our history demonstrates that the decision not to deploy the militia in either world war failed to maximise its potential. The marginalisation of the citizen-soldier in the postwar period similarly failed to utilise the potential of a major national resource. Organisational change is required to enable individuals and teams to move as rapidly as possible to their peak of training. Accordingly the employment of reservists in peacetime must be as close as possible to their wartime roles.

The Fallacy of a Sustainable 'All-Professional' Deployable Force

In many ways it would be 'neater' to dispense with the messy problem of a mixed force of full-time and part-time soldiers, by getting rid of reservists altogether. It is a solution often bandied about by regular officers who see resources being wasted on reserve units that currently return very little in the way of capability. However, as the problem of sustaining even a small force in East Timor demonstrated, Australia simply cannot afford a standing army large enough to sustain protracted operations of any size. While INTERFET largely consisted of regular troops with only about 100 specialist reservists participating in the operation, the follow-on forces that made up the Australian contribution to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) were heavily reliant on reservists. In the 6th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (6RAR) alone, 186 members were general reservists on full-time service and fifty-five of them subsequently transferred to the regular army.
Oddly, no figures have been collated for the overall contribution of Reservists—specialist or otherwise—to this operation. As they were serving on full-time duty they were counted as regulars for all administrative purposes. While this is a heartening recognition of the principle of the total force, it does make it difficult to quantify the contribution that the Reserves are capable of making to operational deployments. Not only was the reserve contribution important in terms of 'boots-on-the-ground' in East Timor, but reservists were integral in force administration in Australia. One prominent example was the Deployed Forces Support Unit—Darwin, which was responsible for managing the training, preparation and deployment of contingents departing for East Timor. Commanded and largely staffed by reservists, the unit was integral to the success of the operation, but its contribution has largely gone unnoticed. That omission reflects the '2nd XI' attitude to reserve employment and is not in keeping with the needs of a modern, professional force. Now that reserves are available for call-up for a range of operations, it will become important to identify and recognise the extent to which current and future deployments depend on supplementary forces.

In the area of specialist skills at least, the Army has long recognised that it cannot afford to pay 'market rates' for the many specialist skill-sets that a force conducting operations requires. These skill sets include those of medical specialists, lawyers, linguists, civil affairs officers and information technology experts and logisticians. The ADF's reservist medical specialists, in particular, are in danger of experiencing deployment 'fatigue' as many of them have been repeatedly utilised on operations ranging from Somalia and Rwanda to disaster relief in Papua New Guinea and more recently in East Timor. On peace operations in particular, civilian skill-sets that the Army does not usually emphasise in its primary warfighting role are in great demand. The INTERFET deployment demonstrated that the focus on maintaining 'sharp-end' capabilities in the ADF had resulted in the loss of a broad range of capabilities that are required to sustain offshore operations. If the ADF is to carry out many more deployments, particularly those humanitarian-style operations that require the military to replicate or support the civil infrastructure, it will need to identify those civil specialists that it wants in uniform. Accordingly, not only are Reserves still required, but they need to be more closely integrated into the total force and included as one of the key elements in contingency planning.

The Fallacy of the Noncombatant Reservist

Those who argue that Reservists cannot achieve adequate standards of physical fitness or professional competence to carry out combat duties often invoke Professor Samuel Huntington's famous assertion that:

Before the management of violence became the extremely complex task that it is in modern civilization, it was possible for someone without specialized training to exercise officership. Now, however, only the person who completely devotes his working hours to this task can hope to develop a reasonable level of professional competence.

Putting aside, for a moment, the distinction between officers and enlisted personnel, we need to examine the blanket assertion that individuals need to be fully engaged in military service to be capable of performing well in combat.

To open this analysis I will break my own rule and make one anecdotal point drawn from experience. Over a decade ago, somewhere in northern Germany at the end of a battalion assault one early dawn, a bright twenty-year-old (regular) lieutenant acting as an umpire for the exercise turned to a twenty-five-year-old (reservist) lieutenant and smugly observed: 'You're getting a bit old for this, aren't you?' That lieutenant was taken aback—and I might possibly have been even more mortified if I had known that I would be a lieutenant for nine years in total, specialising in the command of rifle platoons. In fact I—like most of my colleagues—gained very little wider military experience outside the battalions of which I was a member and was quite content not to receive the more rounded staff qualifications that my regular contemporaries gained.
The point is simple: reservists, be they officers or enlisted personnel, do not expect to have the same balanced military career structures that their regular counterparts have. There is little incentive to 'punch their tickets', and indeed most reservists prefer to concentrate on their one speciality—be that as a rifleman, a small-unit commander or some form of combat technician. Realistically, no reservist imagines that their training will equip them for the command of armies in war. In any case, it appears improbable that the type of general war that requires mass mobilisation will ever occur again. In the current strategic environment, people serving in the military need to be competent, and professional competence—contrary to Huntingdon’s assertion—is not a function of a lifetime dedication to a chosen profession; it is judged by whether the individual can do the job on the day.

While the Army is unlikely to have to expand in the same way as the First and Second AIF had to in the two World Wars, the primary function of peacetime military establishments remains largely unchanged. Perhaps the best formulation of that role was set down by the Cardwell Committee, which accomplished wide-ranging reforms in the British Army of the 1870s. That task was:

1. to place in the field immediately on the outbreak of war, in the highest state of efficiency, as large a force as is compatible with the peace-time military expenditure; and

2. to maintain that force in the field throughout the continuance of hostilities undiminished in numbers and efficiency.56

Making allowances for the fact that the modern army will need to deploy forces for more contingencies than interstate war, the Australian Army must still be capable of providing an immediate response, an acceptable range of military response options to government and the ability to sustain a force in the field for the duration of the operation. It cannot rely on a slow mobilisation and in any case would be hard-pressed to manage a general mobilisation. If a war requiring a national call-up were to break out an army of 26,000 regulars and 21,000 reservists would be quite inadequate to train and lead the nation-in-arms.

The need to provide forces at short notice and to continue to sustain them means that a significant proportion of the Army's combat forces must inevitably be in the Reserves to enable the Army to relieve and rotate forces as well as replace the casualties that inevitably occur. In their Review of the Ready Reserve Scheme published in 1995, Lieutenant-General John Coates and Dr Hugh Smith argued that the Reserves could provide the infantry, in particular, with a 'surge' capability that regular forces simply could not maintain in peacetime.57 Employment as infantry is probably the best use of 'non-specialist' reservists. Although the skills of the infantryman require rigorous training and a high level of physical fitness, it is possible to produce competent, collectively trained infantry in a reasonably short time—certainly faster than it takes to produce an armoured vehicle crewman or combat engineer.58 This observation represents no reflection on infantry, whose multi-skilled professionalism is essential to almost any conceivable land operation. In fact the potential shortfall in the 'infantry labour pool' represents perhaps the greatest threat to the sustainability of land operations in the future.

Experience has demonstrated that the standard of young Australian reservists is high and that, given adequate training, they can match their regular counterparts.59 If they are to be deployed on combat operations, they need to achieve the standard described in the recent Officer Professional Effectiveness Review for the Army (Project OPERA) as 'fit for purpose'. There is no room for any 'fat' in a combat unit: individually and collectively soldiers and officers need to be 'physically vigorous and have the stamina to endure the rigours of combat and military support operations'.60 Inevitably this requirement means that our combatant reservists will be almost exclusively young.

Most soldiers do not spend their lifetimes performing the same tasks as the trained rifleman; however, this is a role that young people (traditionally men) are relatively easily trained for, and can remain effective in—generally only for a limited number of years. Skill levels and
standards of physical fitness fade over time, as inevitably does the level of commitment that the individual possesses. Accordingly, it makes sense to fit the available labour to the most suitable employment category. If the Army wishes to maximise the enthusiasm, ability to serve and physical fitness of the young people who represent its primary reserve force demographic, it must organise itself to utilise them.

Conclusion

An understanding of the history of the 'One Army' or 'Total Force' concept in Australia is essential if we are to understand how Reserve issues have been an ongoing impediment to force structure development. However, such an account would be a specious exercise if the purpose of dredging up the past was only to relight old battles and re-raise past antipathies. In fact, the social conditions that gave rise to most of the staff-corps/ militia, Citizen Military Forces/Regular disputes have changed irrevocably, though something of the antipathy that these conflicts caused lingers on. Consequently, there is little value in ascribing blame, given that the Army we have inherited exists in circumstances very different from those that gave rise to the earlier conflicts. What is needed is not more consideration of the future of the Reserve, but the implementation of holistic planning processes that do not make a 'special case' of the Reserve in army planning. This was recognised twenty years ago when the Chief of the General Staff's Advisory Committee submitted that:

Proposals and plans cannot be considered and implemented in isolation without assessing their total and future effect. There is an interrelationship between force structure, equipment, manpower, facilities and level of activity; one factor cannot be altered without effect on the others. In addition, Army development proposals have to be considered in relation to their impact upon the other Services, the Department of Defence and other Federal and State instrumentalities.

Instead of this approach, it has to be admitted that within the Department of Defence reviews of the Reserve have attained the status of a cottage industry. At any stage there are several taking place. This tendency to duplicate the staff processes of the past is not due to any fault of those tasked with investigating the Reserve, but is due to the lack of an institutional memory. In fact, most of what we need to know about the employment of Reservists within a 'total force' is to be found in the pages of the Millar Report. Developing a greater appreciation of where we have already been would obviate the need for each generation to reinvent the wheel.

In addition, not only do we need to improve our historical awareness of the manner in which the contemporary army has developed, but we need to understand something of the changing relationship between the Army and the society it serves. This is not simply a matter of understanding how the Army stands in public estimation. Force planning also needs to consider the relative demographic composition of the civil and military communities; the impact of changing patterns of work in the post-industrial era and the changing expectations of the domestic responsibilities of members of the work force. With the record of past failed attempts to forge a single army before us, any more attempts will simply take us back to our future. Having made so many errors in the past, we have no excuse for not being aware of the pitfalls now.

It makes no sense to talk of the Army Reserves purely as a mobilisation base, or as a separate force optimised for vital asset protection, or as units providing niche capabilities only. These, and the many other proposals that regularly float around the defence organisation, smack of a job creation scheme and reflect a grudging acceptance of the (quite incorrect) proposition that the main justification for the existence of the Reserve is that it is politically impossible not to have one. As the Millar Report pointed out '[T]here is only one Australian Army'. Put simply, that Army exists to meet the operational demands imposed on it by the Government. The Australian Army is, and always has been, too small to afford to devote over half its available combat power to second-tier or 'boutique' tasking. To prescribe that large sections of the force-in-being will not be available for short-term deployment is to fall into the same trap that saw two completely new expeditionary forces raised for overseas
service in the two world wars, while the pre-existing forces were kept idle at home. In the conditions of global conflict during the industrial age, Australia could (only just) afford a relatively slow mobilisation—in the conditions of modern conflict it is always 'come as you are'. If the 'Total Force' is not part of a continuum of readiness, capable of deploying, sustaining, relieving and replacing troops from day one of an operation, then the Australian Army has no business hanging out its shingle at all.

Forty years ago, in a novel reflecting on the divisions within France's Army during the Algerian War of Independence, Jean Larteguy identified the tensions that exist between the conservative and progressive vision of the army. He wrote:

I'd like France to have two armies; one for display, with lovely guns, tanks, little soldiers, fanfares, staffs, distinguished and doddering generals, and dear little regimental officers who would be deeply concerned over their general's bowel movements or their colonel's piles; an army that would be shown for a modest fee on every fairground in the country.

The other would be the real one, composed entirely of young enthusiasts in camouflage battledress, who would not be put on display but from whom all sorts of impossible efforts would be demanded and to whom all sorts of tricks would be taught. That's the army in which I should like to fight. 62

We too need to question continually the cost of maintaining two armies. Historically, laziness, ambition and indifference have combined to prevent the realisation of the one army ideal. The legislative changes to enable the utilisation of reserves on operations represent a significant opportunity for the Army. However, to translate that initiative into the reality of one army requires the Australian Army to overhaul its internal culture radically. Whether we are capable of building the Army in which we would like to fight depends on whether we have the will to overcome the institutional truths and inertia of our past.
Endnotes

14. Ibid. A good discussion of this period is to be found in Major Graeme Sligo, 'The Development of the Australian Regular Army 1944-52', in Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey (eds), *The Second Fifty Years: The Australian Army 1947-1997* (Canberra: Australian Defence Force Academy, 1997), 22-47.
18. Major General K.G. Cooke, 'One Army', in Dennis and Grey (eds), *The Second Fifty Years*, 75; see also McCarthy, 'The Once and Future Army', 3.
33. Ibid., 47.
34. Ibid, 60-1, 68.
38. Ibid., ix.
39. Ibid., 49.
40. The phrase ‘relevant, achievable and credible’ is a new one, coined by the then Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Frank Hickling, in an address to the Defence Reserve Association on 15 May 1999 in Canberra. It does, however, sum up the spirit of the Millar Report very well.
44. Defence Reserve Service (Protection) Bill (Cwlth) 2000, parts 4-7.
45. Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, From Phantom to Force, 147.
47. Malcolm McGregor, ’We need to fortify our reserves’, The Australian, 10 August 2000, 11.
54. For further discussion see Alan Ryan, Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks: Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor, Study Paper No. 304 (Duntroon: Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2000), 108-11, 122.
57. Lieutenant General John Coates and Dr Hugh Smith, Review of the Ready Reserve Scheme (Canberra: University College, University of New South Wales, June 1995), 14-5.
60. The Australian Army Officer Corps of the Future: The Officer Professional Effectiveness Strategy (Canberra: November 2000), 26-31.