Australian Army

Land Warfare Doctrine

LWD 3-0-4

Stability Actions

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Preface

Aim

The aim of this publication is to provide guidance on stability actions across the range of military land activities and operations.

Level

This publication is the functional tactical doctrine written to support all levels of training in stability actions. It is intended to support commanders, staff, and students. This publication draws upon the philosophy and the planning and execution of operations described in *Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0, Operations* and guides companion doctrine on specific environmental and operational contexts as well as subordinate doctrine on techniques and procedures.

Scope

This publication contains information on the following:

- tactics within the context of stability activities
- stability activities, tactical actions, tactical tasks and techniques
- enabling activities and tactical tasks.

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Chapter 1

Tactics

Warfighting in proximity to and within populations and critical infrastructure is the enduring reality of the contemporary operating environment (OE), and a major factor when considering the application of formation tactics.

Historically, few battles have been fought entirely removed from populations and the infrastructure upon which they rely; this is unlikely to change in future conflicts. However, the potential impact of noncombatant casualties and collateral material damage on operational objectives and strategic end-states cannot be underestimated. Moral imperatives and international conventions notwithstanding, the contest for hearts and minds during and after a conflict may be won or lost through the perceptions of the population affected by combat and its consequences. Therefore, all military action must be planned, executed and enabled in this context. The short-term tactical advantage of targeting a key element of infrastructure must be weighed by commanders against the longer-term operational and strategic detriment of its loss.

Furthermore, demands associated with controlling and supporting the indigenous population throughout a conflict is a major factor in the planning and conduct of formation missions, fundamentally requiring consideration in the attribution of resources and assignment of tasks.

Tactics, techniques and procedures, drills and tasks

The difference between TTPs, drills and tasks is as follows:

• **Tactics.** Tactics leaves maximum discretion to the user and requires decision-making by commanders at all levels. Land force stability activities are classified into various tactical actions, which are listed in Table 1–2 in Annex A. The application of tactics is in the employment of techniques, procedures and drills.

• **Techniques.** Techniques are the ‘military methods’ for accomplishing a result in a particular situation. They are intended to improve the force’s efficiency by ensuring uniformity of action or by ensuring that the actions of various individuals and elements complement those of other individuals or elements. Specific techniques may form part of one or more tactical action. Table 1–2 in Annex A details the various tactical techniques.

• **Procedures.** Procedures are a particular course or order of action. Both tactics and techniques involve specific procedures. It is also important to note that SOPs remain distinct from procedures in doctrine; SOPs lay down specific procedures for particular circumstances within an operational
environment. While SOPs are not doctrine, they are necessarily derived from doctrine.

- **Drills.** Drills are a precise military movement.
- **Tasks.** Tactical tasks are linked to and associated with specific tactical actions as listed in Table 1–2 of Annex A. For example, the tactical action ‘control’ includes such tasks as ‘conflict containment’ and ‘crowd control’; while ‘restore’ can include ‘immediate medical assistance’, ‘provision of public utilities’ and so on. Importantly, tactical tasks have a broader application than mission task verbs, and any of these tactical tasks could reliably be undertaken at any time across the range of land force military activities.

This chapter will describe the employment of land forces and the specific nature of tactics at formation level within the context of stability actions.

**Study of tactics.** The study of tactics is critical to gaining an understanding of how best to manoeuvre in the battlespace and how to apply tactical doctrine. Doctrine guides the study and application of tactics. Tactics is not restricted to dealing with threats alone. It also includes contending with such elements as the media, neutral parties, coalition partners and other interested parties. In applying tactics, students and practitioners must develop a clear understanding of the contemporary OE.

**Developing understanding.** Understanding tactics has two major aspects: understanding the nature of conflict in general, based on experience and a detailed study of history; and understanding the characteristics of the current conflict and its environment. Caution should be exercised in the comparison of military history to contemporary events, as what has worked in the past may not necessarily work today.

**The need to be adaptive.** The need to be adaptive involves seeking innovative solutions to a wide range of situations across the spectrum of conflict within the theatre or area of operations (AO). In this way, the study of tactics and its subsequent application requires the manoeuvrist mindset to focus on developing sound tactical judgment relative to the situation at hand. It also requires of commanders and planners the ability to effectively transition from one type of activity to another; and from one tactical action, technique or assigned task to another.

**Developing tactical judgment.** Developing tactical judgment depends largely on the development of three attributes: intuition, mastering the art of combat decision-making and creativity. These are further discussed as follows:

- **Intuition.** Intuition is the human attribute of immediate insight. Intuition and intuitiveness can be achieved by attaining subject matter expertise, undertaking extensive training and seeking a wide variety of opportunities to gain experience. The subject matter expert has the basic building blocks which, when coupled with training and a wide variety of experiences, reduce the need for conscious action thus saving valuable time in decision-making.
• **Combat decision-making.** It is combat decision-making, not tactical planning, that is the essential skill of the warfighting commander at all levels, as few plans survive the first shot. Effective decision-making requires the combination of intuition and creativity to devise innovative solutions to a wide variety of problems and situations, frequently under extreme stress, and where time is of the essence.

• **Creativity.** Creativity is the human attribute of demonstrating inventiveness and imagination as well as routine skill. Creativity and innovation are the essence of competitive advantage and winning in warfighting and in other diverse situations where warfighting is not the primary activity. While the MAP remains an effective decision-making tool, it is largely process driven and should not be allowed to degrade an emphasis on tactical creativity.

## Tactics at formation level

The application of national power depends on a whole-of-government approach that mobilises and integrates the elements of national power within a nation’s strategy. The military contribution to this whole-of-government approach to national security is managed through three levels of military command: strategic, operational and tactical.

A study of formation tactics including the application of manoeuvre, employment of a range of tactics, techniques, procedures and drills specific to given military objectives. These are elaborated upon in other publications, including:

• **LWP-CA (AVN) 3-1-2, Aircraft Support**
• **LWP-CA (MTD CBT) 3-3-1, Mounted Minor Tactics**
• **LWP-CA (DMTD CBT) 3-3-1, Dismounted Minor Tactics (Developing Doctrine)**
• **LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics.**

Manoeuvre must be more than physical; it must also involve the intellectual and moral dimensions. Land force tactical activity requires careful synchronisation to ensure that tactical actions are intimately aligned with achieving strategic objectives.

The tactical employment of land forces and the context for the application of tactics includes the environment and nature of contemporary and emerging threats. Tactics may include the deployment of forces and organisations for activities that do not involve, or are not intended to involve, combat actions.

The art of tactics lies in how forces and organisations are formed and applied in a given situation across the range of land force activities; it involves the creation, positioning and manoeuvre of fighting power and other forces. The science lies in the technical application of fighting power and other forces; it involves the development of tactics, techniques, drills and the assignment of specific tasks.
This chapter includes an explanation of the application of tactical planning considerations. Annex A describes the range of tactical stability actions, activities and techniques.

**Manoeuvre theory**

Manoeuvre theory is a way of thinking of war rather than applying a particular set of tactics or techniques. Its essence lies in defeating the threat’s will to fight by destroying the threat’s plan rather than destroying tactical forces. Manoeuvre theory seeks to shatter the threat’s will and cohesion through a series of actions orchestrated to a single purpose: creating a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the threat cannot cope. In this context, the intention of manoeuvre is to create an expectation of defeat in the threat’s mind. At the tactical level this is achieved by the coordinated use of speed, shock action, and lethal and nonlethal force. Figure 1–1 illustrates the application of manoeuvre theory through the range of military activities.

![Figure 1–1: Applying manoeuvre theory](image)

**Campaign lines of effort**

The land force does more than fight. It takes a comprehensive approach to influence and shape the overall environment in order to allow for peaceful political discourse and a return to normality. Historically, lines of effort have been a component of all campaigns. Successful adaptive action requires the synchronisation of tactical, operational, strategic and informational actions across these lines of effort. In a campaign, lines of effort describe where military effort is required to win the fight and influence the people. These lines of effort are interdependent and mutually reinforcing, and will vary to suit the campaign. The following are examples of the five lines of effort for a campaign:

- joint land combat to secure the environment, remove organised resistance and set conditions for the other lines of effort
• population support to establish/restore or temporarily replace the necessary essential services in affected communities

• indigenous capability building to nurture the establishment of civilian governance – which may include local and central government; and security, police, legal, financial and administrative systems

• population protection to provide protection and security to threatened populations in order to set the conditions for the re-establishment of law and order

• public information (PI) that informs and shapes the perceptions, attitudes, behaviour and understanding of target population groups.

Further information on campaign lines of effort is detailed in LWD 3-0, Operations and in LWD 3-0-1, Counterinsurgency.

**Tactical employment of land forces**

Land forces may be employed unilaterally or as part of a joint, combined or interagency task force across the range of military activity. It is most likely that all military activities in the contemporary OE remain joint and interagency to accord with the whole-of-government approach. In offensive and defensive activities the focus is defeating the threat by the use of or threat of force, whereas stability activities seek to defeat the threat by achieving political, economic or humanitarian objectives. This requires a comprehensive approach to the range of military activity and an understanding that offensive, defensive and stability activity will be concurrent. The range of military activity is described in the following paragraph.

**Range of military activities**

The range of military activity is shown in Figure 1–2. The spectrum of conflict relates the balance of effort, the nature of the activity and the level of interagency cooperation to each operation theme, fully described in LWD 3-0, Operations, within a whole-of-government approach. For example, peace support is likely to involve a greater proportion of interagency cooperation and stability activity than defensive and offensive activities. At any particular time during that campaign, the emphasis may change according to threat actions, or according to a command decision to transition to, for example, counterinsurgency (COIN) and other peacetime military engagements as the situation dictates. Importantly, a combat team attack during peace support will be no less violent than one during major combat, but there will be far more combat team attacks during major combat.
Types of tactical actions

Within each nature of activity there are a number of tactical actions. The frequency of tactical actions within an operation will shift between an offensive, a defensive, a stability and an enabling activity; Table 1–1 depicts these. They are elaborated on in Annex A to show specific tasks for each action.

Table 1–1: Types of tactical action within each nature of activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offensive</th>
<th>Defensive</th>
<th>Stability</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attack</td>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance</td>
<td>Delay</td>
<td>Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuit</td>
<td>Withdrawal</td>
<td>Compel</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
There are no tactical actions for an enabling activity, see Annex A for the tasks.

Task organisations

Grouping. The grouping of forces for specific operations and phases within operations is described by the task organisation. The task organisation consists of an appropriate HQ and subordinate components grouped to meet the requirements of the task. The general term for a force formed by cross-attaching elements from parent formations and units is ‘task force’. Below this level sub-units
are cross-attached to form battlegroups (BGs). The term ‘battlegroup’ has a specific meaning, being a combined arms grouping based on the HQ of an aviation, a tank, a cavalry or an infantry unit. Combat teams operate as smaller task groupings or components within a BG. Smaller groupings within combat teams are known as ‘platoon/troop teams’.

**Annex B** provides an overview of the various types of operational land forces.

**Interagency cooperation**

Interagency cooperation is essential to the success of the whole-of-government approach to solving conflict. The operational requirements (within coalitions) for interagency cooperation differ from Defence assistance to the civil community (DACC) and Defence Force aid to the civil authority (DFACA), which are conducted on Australian territory only. Stability actions are those military actions which contribute to order and security to set the necessary conditions that will allow for the primacy of non-military and indigenous organisations to develop accountable bodies and the mechanisms of government. Interagency cooperation is integral to the formation of joint interagency task forces (JIATFs) for specified tasks. The JIATF is an integrated force in which multiple services are fused with state and federal agencies and other non-military stakeholders. This force synchronises national effort (ie, military, political, economic, cultural and social) and coordinates the military contribution in order to transition to lasting peace. Interagency cooperation, to be successful, requires significant pre-deployment training to enable disparate organisations to work together effectively.

**Interoperability.** The land force must be prepared either to take the lead or contribute to coalition activities while maintaining its self-reliance. Its force elements (FEs) must be interoperable with allies and coalition partners. Coalition partners, including other agencies, must be able to be integrated into our systems (and vice versa) as military activities become more dependent on technically complex coordination; particularly in the realm of information and communications.

**Lead agency.** The lead agency is one which accepts responsibility for the planning and execution of the activity, and can be military or non-military. Military agencies are task-organised military organisations, based around an appropriate level of HQ. Non-military agencies can include – and usually have included in recent Australian practice in the region – the DFAT or Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), supported by such organisations as the Australian Federal Police (AFP). Abroad, they can be elements of the national or local government, and police and NGOs. Agreement on which type of organisation should be the lead agency is a decision for Government within the whole-of-government approach. An example of a non-military lead agency is DFAT, supported by the ADF and AFP, working for the re-establishment of public safety and effective government in the Solomon Islands. More recently, the development and deployment of provincial reconstruction and mentoring teams in Afghanistan provides examples of military-led interagency operations. Non-military-led interagency operations emerged in 1997–98 in the form of
Operation PLES DRAI, which was led by AusAID and sought to provide famine and food relief to affected areas in Papua New Guinea. In any event, the main consideration for lead agencies is to achieve unity of effort and unity of purpose, which requires an understanding of, and the resolution of, potential points of friction and the ways in which they may be addressed. The changing of lead agencies during period of activity transition need to be carefully considered and managed by all involved. These aspects are discussed in detail in LWD 3-0, Operations.

**Level of engagement.** The level of engagement on a particular operation will depend on whether Australia leads or contributes forces, and the operation’s theme. Where Australia leads, the force must be able to provide all of the capabilities required in the operation. However, an Australian contribution to a foreign-led coalition may have narrower capabilities. The Australian Reconstruction Task Force in Afghanistan, for example, has the role of contributing to the Netherlands-led and NATO-sponsored International Security Assistance Force involved in COIN. Its organisation consisted largely of engineer FEs which fully integrated its planning procedures with Dutch partners. The noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) conducted in Lebanon in 2007 was similarly restricted to a stability activity but took place during a time of major combat.

**Command and control arrangements.** C2 arrangements for interagency cooperation and JIATFs are planned at government level after extensive consultation with the ADF and non-military government agencies such as DFAT, AusAID and the AFP for overseas deployments. At home, C2 arrangements are established under DACC and DFACA provisions. This is discussed further in Chapter 3.

**Planning.** The planning for interagency cooperation and the enabling of JIATFs is integrated with Government and coalition partners, and those supporting government agencies.

LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics provides detailed information on the considerations for working with other agencies and organisations.

**Contemporary operating environment**

The contemporary OE is characterised by a continuing diversity of diffusion, lethality and complexity: the evolving lethality (ie, the availability and destructive power of weapons in the hands of individuals with a lower discrimination threshold), the diffusion of conflict and force manouevre in small groupings, and the level of complexity (characterised by the human population, the terrain and the information environment). Increasingly, threat elements are moving into urban terrain for better force protection. The contemporary OE is described fully in

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1. The military component of the JIATF will usually be a combined task force or a joint task force (JTF).
relation to operation themes, lines of effort and lines of operation (LOOs) in *LWD 3-0, Operations*.

**Human population.** Numerous population groups coexist in the same physical space – which is often a city or other urban area – and are likely to include diverse ethnic and linguistic groups, political factions, tribes or clans, religious sects, ideological movements, outlaw and criminal gangs, and government organisations and NGOs. These groups may live peacefully together, ignore each other, or compete with or without violence. When land forces operate amongst such diverse populations, distinguishing between these groups is a major challenge which requires a significant level of cultural and linguistic understanding across all ranks and responsibilities. The misapplication of lethal force has a high risk of counterproductive and unintended consequences.

**Terrain.** The terrain includes the physical geography, which typically varies from very restricted (ie, impeding the movement and manoeuvre of land forces) to unrestricted (ie, open spaces acting as movement corridors, engagement areas, compartments and opportunities for various actions which can be afforded to either combatant or noncombatant). Restricted or very restricted terrain, represented by mountainous regions, dense forests and/or urban areas can draw land forces readily into close combat without warning.

**Information environment.** The information environment is represented by a presence, to varying degrees, of multiple sources or transmission paths for communications, data or information (including news media). A force can find itself unable to successfully control the information flow in its own AO. This most often occurs in urban areas where, for example, all forces in any conflict can use the same mobile phone transponders, satellite relays, and broadband or dial-up connections, and gain tactical information from news media operating in the same area. As such, tactical actions will often have an effect on the local population which will resonate through the information environment.

**Specific environments**

Five specific environments impact differently on the application of formation tactics. The following publications provide operational- and tactical-level guidance on the way each specific environment influences the foundation warfighting described in the following publications:

- *LWD 3-9-1, Operations in Specific Environments*
- *LWP-G 3-9-2, Operations in Tropical Environments (Developing Doctrine)*
- *LWP-G 3-9-3, Operations in Desert Environments (Developing Doctrine)*
- *LWP-G 3-9-4, Operations in Cold Conditions*
- *LWP-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments (Developing Doctrine)*
- *LWD 3-9-7, Operations in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Environment.*
There are five specific environments, as follows:

- tropical
- desert
- cold conditions
- CBRN
- urban.

Each type of specific environment impacts on the conduct of land force military activities in a variety of ways as detailed in *LWD 3-9-1, Operations in Specific Environments*. Urban environments have a particular significance in regard to the conduct of stability actions.

**Tropical environments.** The tropical environment has a significant impact on the conduct of military and non-military activities, the principal factors being those climatic conditions, vegetation and diseases not found in more temperate areas.

**Desert environments.** The desert is a harsh environment and commanders must understand the limitations imposed by terrain and climate on operations. Equipment and tactics need to be modified and adapted to account for dusty and rugged landscapes with extremes of temperature and levels of visibility that vary from 50 km to a few metres. Specialised desert forces find such an environment challenging, and non-specialised forces must work doubly hard to overcome the difficulties it poses.

**Cold conditions.** Cold conditions are not the usual battlespace environment in which the Army is trained and equipped to fight. Cold conditions have a significant impact on military activities, particularly when there is little knowledge of the area and conditions in which the force is to deploy. Such conditions may include one or all of the following: wind chill, snow, precipitation, altitude, fog, glare, and physical and psychological effects.

**Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear environments.** CBRN environment threat remains more of a probability for land forces in military activities operating abroad. It must be noted that both friendly force and enemy commanders may normally be authorised to use certain chemical agents, such as incendiaries, smoke, riot control agents, herbicides or flame weapons which are not considered special weapons and the use of which is not regarded as chemical warfare. A further, more alarming, contemporary development is the possibility of threat forces of any type gaining access to, and then deploying, weapons of mass destruction such as mini-tactical nuclear weapons (ie, ‘suitcase nukes’), or a variety of delivery means for ‘homemade’ lethal biological toxins and chemical agents.

**Urban environments.** Increasing expansion of urban areas is a feature of the modern world, and at least 400 cities worldwide are likely to have populations of more than a million people. Poverty, overcrowding and crime foster dissent and frequently involve warring factions. As this trend continues, land forces may find
themselves in urban environments as the rule rather than the exception. The urban environment is characterised by physical infrastructure (eg, a variety of styles of buildings, installations, road systems, railways, power conduits, waterways and canals, sewers, and basements), by populations and by information networks. Urban areas are also strategic centres of political control, population concentration, resource distribution and communication facilities. Taking control of an urban area from an enemy or other perceived type of threat may be the decisive psychological or material blow in a specific campaign. Such control can also be the main effort in the conduct of oil spot tactics, as discussed in Chapter 3. Emotional or psychological factors may, however, distort the perceived military value of an urban area, encouraging political leaders to order a disproportionate effort towards its capture or defence. The attack on, and subsequent defence of, Stalingrad in 1942 and the capture of Berlin in 1945 are examples. Urban environments also restrict fields of fire, observation and detection, and probably afford more of an advantage to the defender than the attacker. Lower intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) thresholds are characteristic of conflict in urban environments.

Threats

Threat source categories

Threats are interrelated with risk management. The elements of the OE are assessed to identify potential threats and opportunities, and their likely impacts. To focus the effort of commanders and staff, there are nine threat categories from which threats and opportunities inherent in the OE may present. The list is not exhaustive and a broader examination of the OE should be undertaken where practicable to minimise the likelihood of unforeseen risks arising. These are discussed in the following paragraphs in terms of risk assessments as part of the intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) and mission analysis steps of the MAP.

Hostile forces. The threat source category of the hostile force is shaped by such factors as capability, intent, doctrine, and other influences (eg, political beliefs and ideology); these may introduce potential threats and opportunities for sabotage, riot, subversion and IEDs. The countering of IEDs must always be a planning factor which becomes relatively more important as other threats diminish, particularly where there is a marked advantage over the threat in close combat, such as may be the case during stability activity. When suffering a conventional disadvantage, threat groups may also seek to exploit ROE limitations, information or propaganda effects, or engage in actions targeted to undermine the moral authority and public support of the coalition force. The land force also has to deal with many adversaries beyond the regular armed forces of nation states. The range of adversaries represents the emerging threats forcing an increased

2. Recently the trouble spots for Australia’s deployments have been focused in urban areas and urbanised environments: Iraq, Afghanistan and East Timor.
weighting, or emphasis, on information objectives. These threats vary from conventional military forces to armed criminal elements; and from conventional forces operating in an unconventional way to insurgents, foreign fighters, mercenaries and terrorists. Alternatively, this type of threat can comprise disparate groups who have a shared ideology but have never met, and who communicate freely in a variety of ways through global networks in the information environment. Hostile forces are considered in planning in the commander’s IPB.

**Natural environment.** The natural environment, apart from that described in the preceding section on contemporary OE, includes natural factors such as terrain, weather, climate, flora and fauna, which may introduce potential threats and opportunities encompassing temperature, altitude, wind, dust, earthquakes, floods, fire and disease. The effects of the natural environment on mobility and personnel should be considered in the commander’s IPB.

**Cultural and artificial environment.** The cultural and artificial environment includes cultural and artificial factors such as population demographics and attitudes; political and religious environments, and normality patterns; infrastructure and utilities; and the electronic and information spectrum, all of which may introduce potential threats and opportunities encompassing lawlessness, lack of sewerage, industrial sites and chemicals, and conflict between religious and ethnic factions. The potential impact of these factors in planning should be considered in the IPB.

**Operational complexity.** Operational complexities include factors that can cause friction or introduce potential threats and opportunities such as strategic and operational direction, the prevailing tactical situation, force composition, ‘mission creep’, the span of command, the orchestration of joint and combined actions, task complexity, and the aims and expectations of external agencies working with or alongside JIATFs. In the national support area, this includes cross-group support and coordination issues such as memorandums of understanding, Service-level agreements, maintenance acquisition/materiel containment agreements and contractor deliverables. The impact of operational complexities should be considered in the mission analysis.

**Resources.** Resource factors include equipment and stores, finances (ie, financing, insurances and contracts), and facilities and support services. These may introduce potential threats and opportunities encompassing procurement issues, the inability to conduct resupply (the interdiction of CSS FEs), the suitability of equipment for tasking, the possibility of inadequate maintenance, the disposal and management of hazardous materials, and any risks associated with local contracting and winning local resources in the AO.

**Personnel.** Personnel factors include the composition and required technical competence of available personnel, which may introduce potential threats and opportunities encompassing an insufficient number of qualified drivers, plant operators and refuellers to sustain the operation or conduct any activity safely. Opportunities to provide support to other forces with any excess capacity should also be considered in addition to drawing on resources from other coalition/JIATF
members. The standard of training and experience of military members involved in stability action-specific tasks should also be considered. Personnel factors are considered as part of the mission analysis and may also include the need for close cooperation with other agencies and specialist personnel to augment the capacity of the JIATF.

**Time and space.** Time and space factors include the time available for the operation or activity, for lead-up training either prior to deployment on in-theatre, rehearsals, acclimatisation, vaccinations, phasing, concurrent activities and the duration of the operation. These factors may introduce potential threats and opportunities encompassing the inability to achieve objectives in accordance with the commander’s intent, stress and fatigue, and psychological pressures. Opportunities to unhinge or dislocate hostile force plans should also be considered. Time and space is considered in depth in the mission analysis.

**Human nature.** Human nature includes such behavioural factors as group dynamics, laziness and inertia, competitiveness, enthusiasm, and the effects of leadership styles. These may introduce potential threats and opportunistic behaviours such as ‘cutting doctrinal corners’, fraud, unethical and immoral actions or orders, reduced morale, fatigue, and may affect the status of the unit culture and ethos. Opportunities to form strong relationships and develop a positive rapport with local populations, contractors and support agencies should also be considered. Human nature factors should be considered as a part of the IPB and mission analysis.

**Legal, media and mandated requirements.** These requirements include factors that may limit freedom of action or could otherwise induce threats and opportunities, such as military and Australian or international law, political and strategic direction, local laws and customs, ROE, orders for opening fire (OFOF), orders for the use of force (OFUF), individual guidance for the use of force (IGUF), memorandums of understanding, status of forces agreements, and extant UN resolutions. Opportunities to win and maintain local and international support through demonstrations of respect for local and international customs and laws should be considered as part of the IPB and mission analysis.

**Formation planning and employment**

**Planning process.** The fundamental basis of formation planning is the MAP. Further information on its description and application is contained in:

- **LWD 5-1-4, The Military Appreciation Process**
- **LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics.**

**Employment of formations.** Formations may be employed unilaterally or as part of a joint, combined or interagency task force across the spectrum of conflict. It is most likely that all activities in the contemporary OE remain joint and interagency to accord with the whole-of-government framework. As Army’s unit of action, combat brigades will frequently comprise the land component of a JTF or JIATFs.
Interagency cooperation and interoperability are discussed in more detail in *LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics*.

A summary of control measures is included in Annex C.

Destruction of critical infrastructure and essential services, attributable to combat, may require restoration which can significantly improve the security situation. Reconstruction tasks are a key feature of stability actions. Commanders should therefore plan to minimise and avoid damage to infrastructure where possible.

**Basic tactical considerations.** Basic tactical considerations are derived from the principles of war and are the criteria to validate tactical plans. They differ for each tactic, technique and procedure. The basic considerations for stability action activities are listed in Table 1–3 in Annex A. Further information regarding formation tactics is contained in *LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics*.

It must be understood that the ability to transition rapidly from offensive or defensive to other types of activities is essential. In offensive activity, it may become necessary to destroy a threat in close combat, and the attack is the means by which this is done. Attacks are also employed in defensive and stability activities. Examples of this are the use of counterattacks in the defence and the securing of an area to distribute humanitarian assistance (HA) during stability activities. The primacy of reconnaissance cannot be overstated.

The low discrimination threshold that exists in contemporary conflict is likely to lead to more frequent contacts. A contemporary example from Operation IRAQI FREEDOM/Operation TELIC is shown in the historical example of an offensive action and its transition to a stability activity.

**Operation TELIC – March/April 2003**

Operation TELIC was the codename for British operations conducted to support Coalition objectives during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. A total of 46 000 British Service personnel were committed to the operation, including some 26 000 British Army soldiers, 4000 Royal Marines – constituting the 1st United Kingdom (UK) Armd Div placed under command of the United States (US) 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1 MEF) – 5000 Royal Navy and 8100 Royal Air Force personnel.

Initial operations supporting Operation TELIC commenced on 21 March 2003 with 3 CDO Bde and the attached 15 MEU securing objectives on the Al Faw peninsula and the port of Umm Kasr. Concurrently, an element of 1 MEF also captured Rumaylah Oil Fields in the south to ensure the integrity of the oil infrastructure.

On the break-out of Kuwait, north along the main road into Iraq, 7 Armd Bde (the Desert Rats), made a rapid advance towards the city of Basra. They reached the outskirts and secured the airport to the west, and critical bridges across the Shat-Al-Basra. Throughout the advance, the brigade met sporadic, though fierce, resistance.

During the period 23 to 31 March 2003, the brigade isolated Basra and commenced company-size raids into the city to defeat isolated pockets of
platoon-size resistance, primarily from the Fedayeen militants. 7 (UK) Armd Bde commenced preparation for a brigade attack to secure Basra.

The attack involved a number of combined BGs moving to secure key locations within the city, with a planned time line of 6 to 8 April 2003. Major engagements occurred in an uninhabited factory complex to the south of the city, at the Baathists and Fedayeen HQ in the north-east and the College of Literature. It was at this location that the 7 (UK) Armd Bde established its HQ on the evening of the 6 April 2003, with all major threat elements defeated and some 48 hr ahead of schedule.

Having secured Basra, the 1 (UK) Armd Div switched to security and stabilisation operations ahead of US President Bush declaring major operations over in Iraq on 1 May 2003.

**Agility – Force Transition to Stability Activity**

The requirement during Phase IV to conduct activities across several different LOOs is one of the key things that made Operation TELIC complex. Although the tenet of orchestration does suggest the need to synchronise multiple, and potentially conflicting effects, it does not adequately express the requirement for forces to quickly transition to different roles. There is evidence that British forces found many aspects of the transition to Phase IV operations difficult. Looting was widespread after Basra’s capitulation and served to make reconstruction considerably more difficult. It indicates that the same forces which had excelled in manoeuvre warfare during the invasion were not adequately structured or equipped for what they found after the end of formal conflict.

The British review of Operation TELIC established agility as the cornerstone of their emerging doctrine. This strongly suggests that agility should be added to tenets describing the conduct of operations in complex terrain, noting the common requirement for combat elements to provide initial stabilisation and reconstruction effects in the immediate post-conflict period.

**Annexes:**

A. **Stability activities, tactical actions, tactical tasks and techniques**

B. **Types of land forces and organisations**

C. **Control measures**
### Annex A to Chapter 1

#### Stability activities, tactical actions, tactical tasks and techniques

Table 1–2: Land force stability activities, tactical actions and tasks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stability activities</th>
<th>Tactical action</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Conflict containment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Crowd control</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Curfew</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Enforcement of out-of-bounds areas</td>
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<td>KPP and VAP</td>
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<td>Internment and detention</td>
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<td>Population protection</td>
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<td>Refugee and IDP movement</td>
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<td>Separation of hostile forces</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Supervision of ceasefire</td>
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<tr>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>Allocation and control of equipment and infrastructure</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selection and recruitment of future security forces</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Training, mentoring and transfer of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Compel</td>
<td>Immediate health assistance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Restoration of essential public utilities</td>
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<td>Restoration of essential public services</td>
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<td>Restoration of essential services and infrastructure</td>
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<td>Provision of post-conflict special services</td>
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<td>Restoration of intellectual and institutional infrastructure</td>
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### Stability activities

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<tr>
<th>Tactical action</th>
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<td>Support</td>
<td>Supporting the rule of law</td>
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<td>Support to elections</td>
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<td>Enabling HA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cordon and search</td>
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<td>Noncombatant evacuation</td>
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<td>TCPs and VCPs</td>
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#### Table 1–3: Basic considerations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tactical action</th>
<th>Basic considerations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Population</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Security</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Information</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exclusive jurisdiction and use of force</td>
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<td>Establishing rule of law</td>
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<td>Information</td>
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<td>Influence</td>
<td>International consensus</td>
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<td>Local ownership</td>
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<td>Accountability</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tailored approach</td>
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<td>Coordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>Compel</td>
<td>Intelligence-led</td>
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<td>Coordination</td>
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<td>Community involvement</td>
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<td>Manage locally</td>
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<td>Affected area/community approach</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Differing effects and needs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Empowering individuals and communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactical action</td>
<td>Basic considerations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Minimum interference  
  Recognition of resourcefulness | |
| Planned and timely withdrawal  
  Accountability, flexibility, adaptability and responsiveness  
  Integration of services  
  Planning | |
| Support | Rule of law  
  Protection of existing facilities  
  Use of existing institutions  
  Elections |
Annex B to Chapter 1
 Types of land forces and organisations

Military

**General composition.** All Australian Army land forces comprise combat, combat support, CSS and command support FEs. The proportion of each varies with the campaign theme and across the range of military activity. These FEs are described as follows:

- **Combat.** Combat FEs are those elements that engage the threat directly; they fight typically employing direct fire weapons. They include armoured, infantry and some aviation FEs.

- **Combat support.** Combat support is fire support and military activity (operational) assistance provided to combat FEs. Combat support FEs include fire support, air defence (AD), reconnaissance, combat engineer, some aviation, and electronic warfare FEs.

- **Combat service support.** CSS is the support provided to combat forces in the areas of administration and logistics. These FEs include logistic, medical and equipment support; personnel welfare; and administration. Force support engineers are also generally required; they provide the water and power supply, construct infrastructure, and maintain supply routes.

- **Command support.** Command support FEs assist commanders in the exercise of command. They include staff of all types, communications, intelligence and information systems and all life support FEs to protect, sustain and move commanders and staff.

**Combined arms teams.** Combined arms teams are a case-by-case mix of combat, combat support, CSS and command support FEs, selected on the basis of a specific combination of task, terrain and threat. Combined arms teams may comprise, or contribute to, formations, BGs and combat teams, and may be smaller than combat team size (eg, platoon/troop teams are possible groupings for a specified task).

**Task force.** Task forces, in the military sense, are operational groupings which are generally brigade sized and above, including those formed in the Australian Army for coalition forces (CF) and combined and joint formations. Importantly, the term ‘task force’ can also be applied to a formation-level organisation in the Australian and British armies, although some task forces can be of different sizes depending on the mission. For example, law enforcement and aid organisations can form a task force consisting of only a few specialist persons task-organised for a specific purpose, such as anti-drug task forces or those formed for humanitarian relief. Formations generally comprise a mix of BGs and all the FEs described in the first paragraph of this annex.
**Battlegroups.** BGs are task-organised combined arms groupings based on the HQ of an aviation, a tank, a cavalry or an infantry unit. They typically comprise a mix of combat, combat support, CSS and command support FEs which is determined by the mission or task. Two or more BGs typically make a formation, together with other combined arms groupings. Military combat units include armoured, aviation, and infantry regiments and battalions; however, it must be noted that these units exist in this form for raise, train and sustain roles and never deploy on their own; rather they always deploy as part of a BG or contribute to a combined arms team.

**Combat teams.** Combat teams are task-organised combined arms groupings based on a manoeuvre sub-unit HQ. They typically comprise a mix of combat, combat support, CSS and command support FEs which is determined by the mission or task. Two or more combat teams, together with other combined arms groupings, typically comprise a BG.

**Platoon/troop teams.** Platoon/troop teams are small combined arms teams based on the HQ of a manoeuvre or other types of sub-units of these sizes. The composition is determined by the task or mission. Specialist FEs are included as the task or mission dictates. The general characteristics of platoon teams are that they should be semiautonomous and capable of conducting combined arms actions including manoeuvre, firepower, and the development of joint tactical and operational situational awareness and C2. They can also access offensive fires, logistics and mobility support.

**Interagency cooperation**

As discussed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, interagency cooperation enables JIATFs and similar organisations. JIATFs are task-organised and can be military led or non-military led with a mix of military and non-military organisations. They provide a unique organisational structure that capitalises on the ‘force-multiplier effect’ realised from an entity staffed and led by personnel from multiple agencies with one common commander and mission. Agencies usually exercise independent command authority. Unity of command in the JIATF is achieved through liaison, formal arrangements between agencies and nations, and by the articulation of interagency and international relationships by national agency command systems.

**Interagency task forces**

In US experience, JIATFs have been created for tasks such as the disruption of drug trafficking in South Asia. For example, JIATF West is an international, interagency task force reporting to the Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Command. Based at the Naval Air Station Alameda, JIATF West has representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the US Coast Guard and allied militaries conducting and supporting Caribbean counter-drug operations.
In Australian experience, as yet not fully realised, JIATFs incorporate a military joint or combined task force with an allotted identification number as part of an overarching civilian and military organisation which will include other government and/or international agencies. Their life is limited to the achievement of the mission and then they are disbanded. In this way they reflect an operational need.
Annex C to Chapter 1

Control measures

Control measures are used to reduce the chance of friendly forces clashing and to focus the efforts within a force. Control measures are usually depicted as graphic representations on an overlay to provide all commanders with a proscriptive guide to their freedom of action. The most common features include boundaries, routes, start points, release points, axes and checkpoints. They differ from task graphics in that they generally specify movement limitations for subordinate commanders within a specific AO. In joint and combined military activities, it is important for commanders and their staff to liaise with other Services and national armed forces to establish agreement on the types of control measures required in the AO.

Generic graphic control measures

The following list of control measures depicted on overlays, while not exhaustive, is in current common use and applies to the range of military activities described in this publication:

- AOs
- avenues of approach
- assembly areas
- axis (of attack or advance in any direction)
- battle handover (BHO) line or handover line
- battle positions
- boundaries
- coordination points
- defended areas, defended localities and defended posts
- engagement lines and/or engagement areas
- feature numbers
- fire lines
- fire support coordination measures
- forming-up places (FUPs)
- lanes and gaps
- limits of exploitation
- line of departure
- objectives
Contents

- patrol area or sector
- phase lines
- release points
- rendezvous
- report lines
- routes
- start points
- traffic control posts (TCPs).

Application of control measures

Control measures are generally combined with task mission graphics such as those representing units, formations, all types of vehicles, weapons, and others which depict a commander’s intent for the concept of operations and subsequent operational plan. This method is used throughout this publication.
Chapter 2

Command

Command and control arrangements

C2 arrangements for interagency cooperation and JIATFs (the military component of the JIATF will usually be a combined task force or JTF) are planned at Government level after extensive consultation with the ADF and non-military Government agencies.

Lead agency

The lead agency is one which accepts responsibility for the planning and execution of the activity and can be military or non-military.

Command and control measures

In joint and combined operations it is important for commanders and their staff to liaise with other Services and national armed forces to establish agreement on the types of control measures required in the AO. Such measures must not unduly restrict subordinates in accomplishing their own missions within the commander’s intent. Control is covered more fully in Chapter 3.

Flexibility and adaptability

Control measures can be permissive (allowing something to happen) or restrictive (limiting how something is done). While mission command encourages permissive measures, the requirement for some restrictive control measures (eg, no fire or restricted fire areas) may be inevitable. As with any rule, exceptions exist, and in all operational circumstances the risk of action (or inaction) must be assessed. The subordinate is expected to remain within the commander’s guidance and therefore situational awareness is critical in such cases.

Enabling tasks

Reconnaissance, surveillance and patrolling inform the command decision-making process through the timely provision of intelligence.

More detailed consideration of these tasks can be found in Chapter 8. Further information is contained in the Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual and in LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics.
Chapter 3

Introduction to stability activities

Stability activities

This chapter introduces stability activities and their purpose, with a general description, which includes coverage of the 'oil spot' model and an overview of stability activities tactical actions, tasks and techniques. DFACA and DACC are also covered in this chapter, as many aspects of stabilising actions and techniques can be included in these activities.

Purpose

The purpose of stability activities is to maintain or establish a secure environment, which creates the conditions for the provision of essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction and humanitarian relief.

Description

Stability activities involve actions that may or may not involve the use or threat of force. They include tasks ranging from HA to training indigenous forces, and the transition to normalcy after major combat. Conducted throughout all campaigns, in conjunction with offensive and defensive activities, they may be the main effort to achieve a campaign objective. Military activities provide the conditions in which the other whole-of-government efforts can be applied to achieve normalcy. An emerging feature of stability activity is key leader engagement (KLE). KLE aims to identify the influential leaders in the AO for close engagement by the friendly forces to enable the foundation for positive relations throughout the conduct of their tasks (see Figure 3–1).
Stability activities are usually conducted in complex physical terrain, with mixed populations and within a complex information environment. They are manpower and time intensive, and incidents at the tactical level can have significant higher-level consequences. These consequences are discussed in successive chapters. Among the most significant requirements for security forces in a stability activity is counter improvised explosive device (CIED) capability, as IEDs remain responsible for the most casualties in the OE.

**Application of the tenets of manoeuvre**

**Focus all actions on the centre of gravity.** The possible contributions that could be made to disruption and dislocation of the threat’s centre of gravity in stability activities may be less apparent and harder to define than for offensive and defensive activity. However, stability activities are central to winning the hearts and minds of the population, and to separating the various threats from any support they provide. For example, at the strategic and operational level it is likely to be represented, or seen as, the credibility of the stability force and their moral standing. At the tactical level, it is likely to be represented as a force’s ability to take control successfully, and retaining the support and respect of the local population. Military actions, diplomatic actions and civil development must all be harmonised in support of the common objective: a stable environment. Denying the threat, or potential threats, the freedom to interfere with a secure environment is the focus of stability activity.
**Surprise.** Influencing and shaping the perceptions, allegiances and actions of a target population is pivotal to achieving surprise over the enemy. Commanders must constantly evolve and adapt their local activity to achieve surprise and degrade the threat’s initiative. At the tactical level, for example, surprise can be applied to a wide range of activity, including patrolling, cordon and search, route security and protection, convoy escorts and protection, snap vehicle checkpoints (VCPs), and raids. A proactive approach is required from the outset.

**Main effort.** In stability activities, the main effort can be described in terms of a task or condition relating to a specific tactical action. For example, the main effort at the operational level may be, at least initially, an information activity (IA) to establish force credibility; while at the tactical level it may be focused on establishing control through route security and protection. Alternatively, the main effort in restore tasks could be establishing health and other infrastructures.

**Reconnaissance pull.** Successful stability activity requires information dominance underpinned by effective reconnaissance pull. Human aspects of decision-making assume critical importance, whereby forces can obtain information in the context of close physical contact and personal interaction with the population. Operational planning must factor in a considerable capability to react immediately to these fleeting opportunities. Commanders must be flexible enough to exploit the dynamic environment in which stability activities are conducted, particularly at the ‘strategic private’ level.

**Tempo.** Superior tempo provides the initiative to the side gaining it; therefore establishing an environment which will deny the threat the ability to direct the tempo can give the commander the ability to control the conditions under which the campaign develops. Tempo should be considered relative to the potential multiplicity of friendly, threat and other actors (eg, noncombatants within the AO). This is particularly important for information dominance and getting inside the ‘news cycle’ that has a marked influence on public perceptions of the force.

**Combined arms teams.** In a stability activity context, this tenet extends to the unity of purpose and coherency of action of military, political and civilian agencies acting together in the JIATF, which include the deployment and actions of the reconstruction task force. The combined arms team approach, and the effects it can deliver, is the organisational and functional basis of all stability activities. The mastery of specialist skills, whether individually or collectively deployed, is fundamental to survival and mission success.

**Orchestration.** Effective synchronisation and integration with offensive and defensive operations, and effective synchronisation with indigenous security infrastructures and forces, is essential for successful stability activities. Orchestration requires an understanding of the potential influences and consequences of discriminate hard and soft force options through the range of interagency elements which may be present. Interagency cooperation underpins the successful orchestration of effort; and the need to establish this initial rapport may well be a main effort initially.
‘Oil spot’ model

The oil spot model involves the establishment of control through an integrated framework of security measures covering specified locations, which can include cities, towns, villages and key installations. These areas, once under control or secured, are then expanded (like an oil spot spreading) to include other important objectives in the AO.

The oil spot model is an example of those security and control actions that support the creation of conditions for reform, restore and assist. It is fully described in Annex A.

Civil–military cooperation stability activities tactical actions, task and techniques

Military activity in another nation-state is undertaken – in concert with other diplomatic and economic elements of national power as part of a comprehensive approach – in order to achieve national and political strategic objectives. Regardless of the initial and subsequent campaign themes, stability actions conducted by military forces are central to achieving wider national aims and are likely to be an enduring aspect in campaigns and land force military activities. Setting the conditions for international and host nation (HN) organisations to operate is a primary concern and, particularly in a post-conflict or post-disaster situation, military actions can provide the foundations for longer-term stability and wider reform.

Tactical actions

Stability activity is undertaken to establish control so that the whole-of-government effort can be applied to reform the security forces, to restore essential services and to assist the existing government to function. Interagency cooperation is central to effective stability activities. The stability tactical actions are:

• **Control.** Control over the situation and target population is achieved through the imposition or management of civil order. To achieve this, the land force must deny adversary interaction and influence over the target population, set and maintain a regulatory system for civil control, and establish an effective means of communication with the target population or interlocutory civil agencies. The land force must have both the credibility and capacity to monitor, regulate, support civil primacy and if necessary impose civil order to achieve population control.

• **Influence.** The land force must be able to effectively communicate, shape and secure the support of the target population in order to set the conditions for stable political, economic and civic activity. The land force must present as a credible, supportive and effective interlocutor with a viable vision for the future and an effective counter narrative to any opposing force or agency. Information operations, physical actions and interagency efforts
must reinforce and support the desired operational endstate in order to facilitate influence over the target population and other stakeholders.

- **Compel.** It is unlikely that the land force will be able to identify, contain and/or remove all malign actors or destabilising influences during the conduct of a stability or transition operation. While friendly force and population protection, restraint and the use of minimum force remain predominant principles, the threat and/or use of force remains essential in facilitating control and influence over the adversary and target population. Strength of arms, tactical credibility and capacity for decisive action must be emphasised and recognised by adversary groups and the target population. The land force must be structured, equipped and enabled with appropriate rules of engagement in order to deter and/or defeat any threat to stability.

- **Support.** The land force must be able to provide necessary support to both the target population and/or operative civil power, while marginalising or delegitimising alternate support provided by malign actors. The capacity of the HN to provide its own population support can also be a significant contributor to mission success. Assessing, re-establishing and then reinforcing HN or interlocutory capacity for population support is normally the focus of interagency efforts. It is important for the land force and/or other agencies to effectively reduce HN or target population support dependency prior to or during transition operations.

### Civil–military cooperation

Civil–military cooperation (CIMIC) applies to all military activity. It is the relationship of interaction, cooperation and coordination, mutual support, joint planning and constant exchange of PI at all levels between military forces, civilian organisations, agencies and in-theatre civil influences which is necessary to achieve a full result in the nature of all activities. Since the inception of the Army in 1901, Australian military forces have cooperated extensively with civilians representing governments, international organisations, humanitarian concerns, special interest groups, the media and the general population.

**Participants.** The participants in CIMIC can be categorised as follows:

- military forces, both HN and international
- the HN civil community
- HN government authorities
- international organisations
- NGOs.

**Purpose.** The purpose of CIMIC staff attached to a JIATF is to assist the commander with the successful completion of the overall mission; which is achieved through a wide range of activities including liaison, coordination,
information gathering and exchange, and participation in reconstruction tasks and community projects. These activities aim to achieve the following:

- fulfil the responsibilities of the military forces under Australian domestic and international laws relevant to civilian populations
- minimise civilian interference with military land force activities and the impact of those activities on the civilian populace
- coordinate military activities and tasks with civilian agencies
- coordinate with humanitarian agencies to meet the life sustaining needs of the civilian population
- provide the commander with expertise in civil sector functions that are normally the responsibility of the local civilian authorities.

Further information on the application of CIMIC in land force activities is detailed in *LWD 3-8-6, Civil–Military Operations*.

**Stability activities tactical techniques**

Tactical techniques conducted during stability operations may include:

- defence activity
- cordon and search
- key point protection (KPP) and vital asset protection (VAP) tasks
- noncombatant evacuation
- patrolling
- route security
- strongpoint defence
- TCPs and VCPs.

**Defence Force aid to the civil authority**

The ADF operates within the constitutional framework and laws of the Commonwealth of Australia, which also provide the legal framework for the conduct of stability activity in Australia and overseas (following the laws of armed conflict) in peacetime or during hostilities. The responsibility for civilian order in Australia rests with the Commonwealth, state and territory law enforcement agencies as arms of their respective governments. The ADF, and the Army in particular, must be prepared to assist in specific circumstances which are assessed as being beyond the capability of civilian authorities and most likely requiring the use of force. In these cases, the provisions DFACA for a call-out of selected ADF units may apply. It should be noted that DFACA represents 'control'
conducted on Australian territory and, as described here, can be applied in any of a number of stability actions. The underpinning authority is the ADF operations law and the laws of armed conflict.

**Purpose.** The purpose of a DFACA is to action a call-out of the ADF when there is a possibility that force may be necessary to achieve a task – a task which cannot be achieved, or is unsuitable for, the civilian authorities.

**Description.** DFACA involves the call-out of the ADF where there is a possibility that force may be used to achieve a task. The types of tasks envisaged under the provisions of DFACA legislation can involve:

- assistance to the police
- cordon and search techniques
- assistance in stopping widespread public disorder, such as domestic violence or terrorism
- control of public movement including road, rail, air and sea/water movement
- protection of personnel and property, particularly VAP and KPP
- general support to the civilian authorities.

**Authority to act.** The Commonwealth resorts to the use of the ADF for DFACA tasks only when civilian authorities are unlikely to be able to deal with the situation without assistance or are unsuitable, and the situation can be most appropriately resolved by use of military force. This action requires the authority of the Prime Minister, the Minister for Defence, the Attorney-General in consultation with states and territories, and the Governor-General in Council (who is advised to make or revoke a call-out order). The Prime Minister and the Governor-General in Council are the only authorities who can direct a call-out, and the primacy of the civil authority must be respected and upheld. The legal basis for call-out is grounded in Section 61 of the Constitution\(^1\), which provides executive power to call out the ADF and Part IIIAAA of the *Defence Act 1903*\(^2\), which is the main legislative basis for a call-out of the ADF. Part IIIAAA specifies the following:

- how the ADF is to be called out, that is, as requested by the State or initiated by the Commonwealth
- the powers of the ADF under the circumstances warranting a call-out; that is, a deliberate assault, cordon, cordon and search, and maintaining security areas.\(^3\)

Considerations for the application of DFACA are based on the following principles:

- *Primacy of the rule of law.* The civilian authority remains paramount at all times and is not superseded by a call-out of the ADF. The general

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1. See the *Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900.*
2. As amended by the *Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2006.*
3. For more specific listings of Part IIIAAA in its various divisions, legal officers should be consulted to provide the necessary guidance.
maintenance of law and order remains the responsibility of the civilian authorities. Within the provision of aid the ADF must always be, and be seen to be, supporting the lawful directions of Government. Consequently, personnel and equipment provided in DFACA must be withdrawn as soon as the task is complete. The ADF must remain under military control throughout.

- **Use of force.** The phrase ‘reasonable and necessary force’ does not refer to the number of troops used but to the degree of force applied in achieving a task. Section 51T of the *Defence Act 1903* authorises ADF members on DFACA tasks to use such force against persons and things as is reasonable and necessary under the circumstances. They must not use more force than is reasonable and necessary. This means that the level of force used must be appropriate to the level of threat faced. Every use of force by ADF members will be subject to close scrutiny. If an ADF member uses force or orders the use of force, that member may later be required to justify that use of force. Reasonable and necessary force may range from the presence of ADF elements, to the use of weapons. In planning operations commanders must apply only that degree of force required to establish conditions that allow the return of control to the civilian authorities. Throughout, the ADF remains subject to the law and accountable.

- **Rules of engagement.** The CDF issues the ROE to ADF commanders. These will be situation-specific rules to regulate the use of force. The force commander translates these ROE into situation-specific OFUF. These orders are then issued to all ADF members before they are deployed. ADF members must have these orders explained to them and be trained in their application so that they are clear as to the level of force which is authorised in a particular situation as well as the way in which force may be used. All ROE which are situation-specific also include either specific guidance for OFOF4 and/or OFUF, and IGUF. ROE vary with each situation but should include:
  - the deployment and carriage of weapons and equipment
  - the authority to use force
  - the level of force that may be used.

- **Command and control.** The C2 authority of ADF elements remains with the CDF. However, these elements will be responsive to tasking requests provided by the designated civilian authority. Specific ADF C2 arrangements are detailed in operational orders, and the formal legal procedures must be strictly adhered to. The CDF delegates command responsibility for elements of the ADF through the normal chain of command.

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4. OFOF provide specific guidance to soldiers for the use of weapons (discharge of firearms) where necessary; however, firearms may not be required and so OFUF and IGUF are also issued to guide the use of physical force, ranging from restraint to the use of batons, sprays or debilitating agents in more extreme cases.
command. These arrangements vary according to the operational requirement, and are most likely influenced by the political sensitivity of the situation. Close coordination with the supported civilian authority is required before command arrangements are activated. Usually, forces are assigned under theatre command to the Chief of Joint Operations and then formed into a JTF under an appropriate status of command to the assigned commander. Commanders at all levels are legally accountable for actions carried out under their authority and they are to ensure close coordination with the controlling civilian authorities for the duration of the DFACA mandate.

- **Types of forces.** Only appropriately trained components of the ADF, both permanent and reserve, should be called out under DFACA arrangements. The structure of the force is determined by the specific requirement and influenced by experience gained during DFACA training conducted by the ADF in cooperation with Commonwealth, State and self-governing territory authorities. In addition, specific directives are issued by the Service chiefs detailing the types of forces and the force structures, roles and tasks. Authorities must be cognisant of the influence that the selection of forces and C2 arrangements will have on public perception. The association of ADF FEs with their military-specific roles, regardless of their assigned DFACA tasks, may create unfavourable public perception.

- **Liaison.** The requirement to maintain close cooperation and coordination with the civilian authorities during any DFACA operation dictates the need to establish liaison at all levels within the civilian authorities’ command structure. ADF LOs are normally assigned by the appropriate force commander to the Commonwealth, State or self-governing territory agencies responsible for the conduct of the operation. At a minimum, ADF LOs would be appointed to represent the ADF at the strategic and tactical levels represented by the following:
  - the Protective Security Coordination Centre
  - the State Crisis Centre
  - the Police Operations Centre
  - the Police Forward CP.

- **Exchange.** Similarly, it is expected that there would be an exchange of LOs between the civilian authorities and the ADF at each level of command. Furthermore, specialist LOs may be appointed at each level as required and may include engineers, intelligence staff, communications specialists and linguists. The primary responsibilities of the ADF LO are to provide advice and other assistance to the responsible civilian authority, and to keep both the military commander and the civilian authority informed of the other’s activities and perspectives.
**Defence assistance to the civilian community**

DACC is a type of Defence assistance provided to civilian communities and authorities in Australia where the use of force is not involved. As a general principle, the provision of DACC should be regarded as the exception rather than the rule. Defence resources are intended to be used for defence purposes only. Requests for DACC may receive favourable consideration if there is no suitable alternative source of assistance, particularly in instances of emergency and for other requests where worthwhile training or public affairs benefits accrue to Defence as a result of the provision of assistance.

**Purpose.** The purpose of DACC is to provide Defence resources, in response to requests for assistance, for the performance of tasks that are primarily the responsibility of the civilian community or of other government organisations that do not involve the use of force.

**Description.** DACC includes Defence assistance to state or territory governments during emergencies or disasters, for events of public significance, and for civilian counter-disaster training. DACC also includes assistance to Commonwealth, state or territory governments and their civilian authorities in the performance of law enforcement related tasks where there is no likelihood that Defence personnel are required to use force. It also includes the provision of training assistance to federal/state/territory police forces and other government agencies and organisations, such as the state emergency services. Where there is any possibility that the use of force may be required, the activity is defined and handled under the auspices of DFACA.

**Tactical application.** Before DACC is provided, it is to be formally requested, offered and accepted. In non-emergency situations where life and property are not threatened, the conditions governing the provision of assistance are to be specified, the resources are to be accurately detailed and the recipient is to be clearly identified. Other supporting considerations for the application of DACC are:

- *Types of assistance.* The following types of assistance can be provided under DACC:
  - counter-disaster and emergency assistance, which comprise Category 1 (provided by local commanders with own resources), Category 2 (assistance for continuing disasters) and Category 3 (recovery from a civil emergency not related to life or property)
  - non-emergency assistance, comprising Category 4 (public or government bodies), Category 5 (minor assistance to local organisations) and Category 6 (law enforcement)
  - defence assistance to overseas disasters
  - special aeromedical evacuation of civilians
  - ceremonial support.
• **Command and control.** C2 of DACC Category 1, Category 4 and Category 5 are normally effected using the appropriate service chain of command. Command arrangements for DACC during emergencies/disasters, or when providing non-emergency law enforcement-related assistance, are no different from any other type of military activity. Accordingly, for Category 2, Category 3 and Category 6 tasks, the Chief of Joint Operations may direct the DACC task, may direct tasks through theatre component commanders, or establish a force under the operational command of a JTF commander.

• **Coordination.** ADF liaison on DACC matters with state/territory authorities on a day-to-day basis is the responsibility of the local defence support group, except in the Northern Territory, where Commander Northern Command is responsible. Emergency Management Australia coordinates the provision of Commonwealth assistance to the states and territories following a disaster or civil emergency. ADF liaison with supported civilian agencies during DACC disaster relief tasks (Category 1, Category 2 and Category 3) should be conducted through suitably experienced LOs deployed with contingents.

Further information is contained in the *Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual*.

**Annex:**

A. **Oil spot model**
Annex A to Chapter 3

Oil spot model

The oil spot model involves the establishment of control through a secure integrated framework of security measures covering key locations, which can include cities, towns, villages and key installations. These areas, once under control or secured, are then expanded (like an oil spot spreading) to include other important objectives in the AO.

The oil spot model, illustrated in Table 3–1, is executed in the following stages:

• entry
• local dominance
• corridor control
• sector clearance.
Stage 1 – entry. Terrain representation is generic indicating a theatre of operations; comprising population and industrial centres, a road/route network, and points of entry (ports/airfields). The first stage of framework security, ‘Entry’, may follow on from major combat operations or be undertaken as an operation in its own right. The force seizes a point of entry (including sea/air points of disembarkation), then deploys to and establishes FOBs to cover principal population centres. Reserves and QRFs are established in each FOB, and at the theatre level, to support subsequent stages.
Stage 2 – local dominance. In the second stage, the force establishes FOBs in all key population and infrastructure zones and develops local dominance through patrolling, security and ISR programs around these key bases. This stage equates to effective dominance over all major population groups in the theatre. The force establishes control over main supply routes as needed to support its operations – control in this sense includes the ability to guarantee friendly usage and to monitor route crossing by adversaries.
Stage 3 – corridor control. In the third stage, the force establishes dominance over all main movement corridors (major roads, routes and transport links) in theatre. Dominance equates to the ability to guarantee friendly force use of the corridors as required, to deny the adversary’s use for specific periods and to minimise the adversary’s ability to prey on civilian route traffic. Establishment of control corridors creates sectors between controlled routes which are targeted through intelligence-led operations. Corridors become ‘trip lines’ which allow adversary movement between sectors to be detected and/or denied.
Stage 4 – sector clearance. In the final stage, the force establishes control within sectors through a similar oil spot process on a smaller scale. This involves the establishment of forward bases within a targeted sector, the development of local dominance through satellite security programs, then controlling key corridors and routes within the sector, and then the clearance of sub-sectors. This process continues until effective dominance is achieved over the whole AO.
Chapter 4

Control

Control is employed to reduce disorder and violence to an acceptable level and, in a COIN environment, is likely to require the balance of military effort. Establishing a secure environment achieves the following:

- the conditions for other stakeholders to operate
- the opportunity for the development or resumption of normal social, political and economic activity
- the opportunity for dialogue between the opposing factions.

This chapter describes the basic considerations and tactical tasks for the conduct of control. The NATO tactical symbol for control is shown in Figure 4–1.

![NATO Tactical Symbol for Control](Figure 4–1: The tactical symbol for control (North Atlantic Treaty Organization))

Purpose

The purpose of control is to create the conditions in which reform, restore and assist stability actions can occur.

Description

**Tactical tasks.** A detailed list of tactical tasks is provided in Table 1–2. They are as follows:

- conflict containment
- crowd control
- curfew
- enforcement of out-of-bounds areas
- KPP and VAP
Basic considerations

Population. Population protection for control includes those activities to provide immediate security to threatened populations in order to control residence, identity, movement, assembly and the distribution of commodities – which set the conditions for the re-establishment of law and order and the rule of law. Effort should be focused on enhancing the capabilities and interoperability of local authorities and the military to combine the comparative strengths of both, thereby compensating for their respective weaknesses. This approach is dependent upon the following:

- training, coordination and doctrine
- nonlethal capabilities
- logistics
- linguistic and cultural sensitivity, and positive perceptions.

Security. Threats to security in failed states or failing states are diverse, they vary over time and space, and they are often interrelated. Key considerations in eliminating or reducing these threats include:

- the protection of vulnerable elements of the population, particularly key political and societal leaders
- the protection of critical infrastructure
- the supervised disengagement of belligerents
- identifying and neutralising ‘spoilers’
- the provision of security for negotiations among indigenous belligerents
- developing confidence-building measures between belligerents
- establishing demobilisation camps and ensuring that they have adequate health and food provisions and are secure for belligerents
- establishing and enforcing weapons control regimens
- establishing a monitoring regimen.

Exclusive jurisdiction and use of force. Australian domestic law and the domestic law of the HN strictly govern the use of force, which is also discussed in Chapter 3. If Australia has been granted exclusive jurisdiction regarding its soldiers’ actions, HN domestic law does not apply to acts they carry out in the
course of their duties. This exclusive jurisdiction may be granted by the HN as a specific provision in a status of forces agreement negotiated between Australia and the HN or a lesser international agreement such as a memorandum of understanding. In either case, Australian domestic law continues to apply to all Australian soldiers. Factors for commanders to note include:

- Soldiers must act only in accordance with their specific mission so that their actions are covered by any exclusive jurisdiction provisions. If they act outside mission parameters, their actions are regarded as subject to the domestic laws of the HN.
- Soldiers are to use only such force against persons and things as is reasonable and necessary under the circumstances – the level of force used must be appropriate to the level of threat faced.
- Soldiers may use force (lethal or otherwise) only where permitted by OFUF and as specified by the commander in the IGUF.
- Nonlethal weapons and munitions are meant to temporarily disorientate or impair people. The incorrect use of nonlethal weapons, however, would be regarded as an excessive use of force, which may result in criminal proceedings being commenced against the soldier or soldiers concerned. It may also render the soldier liable under civil law for negligent performance of duty and possibly assault.

Establishing rule of law. Establishing the rule of law is an early measure that can increase the chances of mission success in control. Military-led actions are usually underpinned by the UN Charter1 [Chapter VI or Chapter VII], while police-led actions are used to assist in the establishment or re-establishment of the rule of law. Delivering personal and property security to the civil population sets the conditions, and possibly the agenda, for the resumption of normal economic and social activity. In establishing a rule of law, it is essential to effectively communicate to the civil population its expected behaviour, the restrictions imposed and the consequences of noncompliance. The engagement of prominent local figures within the civil community to proclaim their support for this action, the initiation of an IA plan, and the use of local media to influence behaviour, are key determinants for success. Measures for establishing the rule of law enabled in assist are fully discussed in Chapter 7.

Information. The information requirements to support stability activities are often more complex than the environmental and battlespace information requirements of offensive and defensive activities. IAs are required to influence local, national and regional attitudes and perceptions in order to support the establishment of a secure environment and the development of law and order. These activities can

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be generated through PI and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) as follows:

- **Public information.** PI requirements can include, but are not limited to:
  - identifying and/or establishing outlets for international, national and local news media
  - using media as a PI tool to provide factual information and the control of rumours
  - assisting the national transition administration and/or national government to regularly inform the public.

- **Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.** In addition to the ISR-generated information and PI initiatives, commanders need a comprehensive knowledge of:
  - the cultural and political traditions
  - the interrelations among local populations, factions, adversaries, criminals and other elements
  - the motivations and aspirations of other coalition members and stakeholders.

## Conflict containment

Conflict has been continuous since the end of World War II, whether limited to confined areas within nations (eg, insurgent activities in Indonesia, Sri Lanka or the Balkan civil wars) or consuming some nations themselves (eg, insurgent activities in Afghanistan and Iraq), and it is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. In stability activities, conflict containment\(^2\) seeks to stop further conflict from spreading and can be seen as an integral part of overall peace enforcement activities involving humanitarian actions in support of human rights (see **Chapter 7**). These necessarily include preventive deployments, deterrence (ie, the discouragement of further conflict), the forcible separation of belligerent parties, the establishment of safe and protected areas, movement and area control, the enforcement of sanctions, and a wider range of enabling activities to restore the primacy of local governments and the effectiveness of institutions and infrastructure.

### Purpose

The purpose of conflict containment activities and tasks is to prevent the spread of the conflict to neighbouring areas and states.

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Description

Conflict containment, by its very nature, requires interposition by military forces and/or monitoring organisations to restore law and order; to protect human rights; to facilitate humanitarian relief; and to aid in other reform, restore and assist tasks.

Conflict containment actions and tasks are designed to interpose into areas of actual or potential conflict and to use or threaten force in order to prevent any further hostile acts and enforce a cessation of hostilities. By preventing the spread of a conflict or potential conflict into neighbouring areas and other states, actions should be designed to stabilise the situation and create the environment in which means other than the use of force, such as negotiation, can be used to resolve differences. Conflict containment actions and tasks can require several overlapping tasks: preventive deployment, the forcible separation of belligerent parties, the establishment of protected and safe areas, guarantees and denial of movement, and the enforcement of sanctions. These are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Tactical Application

Preventive deployment. Conflict prevention is primarily a diplomatic activity; however, preventive deployments and other military activities play an essential role in supporting diplomatic activities to prevent, contain or control conflict. At the tactical level, activities to pre-empt conflict, or at least prevent its spread, involve five overlapping tasks as part of a preventive deployment. These are as follows:

- **Early warning.** By identifying the threat of violence, early warning buys time for a range of diplomatic, humanitarian and military actions to be initiated. As a consequence, commanders at all levels should focus their ISR assets on any potential crisis within their AO.

- **Surveillance.** The presence of widespread surveillance in the AO helps to deter breaches of the peace by any party. Surveillance can also provide the means for a later attribution of culpability to any party. It is closely linked to the observation and monitoring of normalcy patterns, as discussed later in this chapter. Effective surveillance is therefore a major conflict prevention technique and is discussed further in Chapter 9.

- **Stabilising measures.** Stabilising and confidence-building measures, supported by CIMIC programs and activities, may contribute to the lowering of tension in an AO and may represent the first step towards the restoration of law and order, and negotiations for political settlement. These measures include:
  - establishing effective liaison and communications networks between all parties
  - mutual and balanced reductions in personnel and equipment
  - the separation of forces (as discussed later in this section)
zonal restrictions on the deployment of weapons and military personnel, including the enforcement of no-fly zones

the advance reporting of military activities or exercises, most likely through surveillance, observation and monitoring actions

joint inspections of disputed areas.

Training assistance programs. Training and assistance to indigenous efforts to reform the defence and security sector are designed to enhance democratic accountability and transparency, and to ensure that security resources are used to support the legitimate aspirations of the whole country. Education and training programs can be specifically designed to enhance the understanding of human rights issues and promote democratisation efforts within all elements of HN military and security forces.

Restoration of law and order. The creation of a secure environment and the provision of assistance to local civil authorities to restore the rule of law (as discussed in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7) are common tasks for the stabilising forces. In such actions tasks may range from COIN and counterterrorism tasks to the specific protection of human rights, the detailed recording and collection of evidence of violations, and the arrest of designated war criminals.

Forcible separation of belligerent parties. Peoples and states have an inherent right to use force in self-defence and when they believe their primary interests are threatened. In these circumstances, international intervention may be considered inappropriate. Should political pressures fail to achieve separation and forcible military separation is the only option, the achievement of the mission may require the commander to exercise discriminate force. In an intrastate conflict, the forcible separation of parties who are determined to continue fighting may require the deployment of an overwhelming force. Commanders given a mission in which the end state is not the defeat of any of the warring parties, but to force their separation and subsequent disengagement, should conduct actions in an even-handed and impartial manner. As the commander develops the situation, forces should be redeployed and the tempo adjusted so that belligerent parties have the option to disengage and withdraw. If they do not, the alternative is to pursue a military action option more vigorously. However, diplomatic activities should continue to run parallel with military actions, and every pause in any enforcement campaign should be viewed as an opportunity for further diplomatic initiatives.

Establishment and supervision of safe and protected areas. The requirement to establish and supervise a protected and safe area can arise when any community is at risk from persistent attack. However, commanders must be aware that unless those within a safe area are disarmed it may be used as a base to conduct raids and other activities. Clear guidance should be given to the commander of the assigned force about what is demanded of it. As a matter of course, efforts will be needed to counter any accusations of bias, from those within
and outside the safe area, that the action is designed to assist a particular party. A detailed analysis of the likely threats can establish which force profile and grouping is required. The area to be protected or made safe may contain residents, refugees, displaced persons and substantial numbers from one or more of the belligerent forces. Forces may be charged with the establishment and supervision of such areas and required to provide support and assistance to other organisations within the safe area. The first stage is to demilitarise the area that requires some enforcement actions. Having accomplished demilitarisation and taken measures to defend it, other tasks for the assigned commander can include:

- establishing, monitoring and enforcing weapon exclusion zones and out-of-bounds areas
- establishing and maintaining cantonment areas, and weapon holding areas and sites
- holding ground
- dominating approaches
- conducting patrols and searches
- maintaining checkpoints and other control measures
- developing reinforcement and extraction plans
- controlling the air and maintaining surveillance.

**Guarantee and denial of movement.** Such actions to guarantee movement by air, land or sea for further conflict prevention and containment are jointly conducted and generally planned at the operational level. These actions are not credible if they rely on the consent of the parties to the conflict for success and therefore require peace enforcement forces capable of rapid escalation. Examples at this level may include the enforcement of maritime and air exclusion (ie, no-fly) zones to prevent further harassment of an unprotected population, and/or the creation of a safe corridor to allow for the free and unmolested movement of aid and refugees, and for the protection and preservation of own forces. At the tactical level, a commander’s actions can include the designation of safe and protected areas, the enforcement of out-of-bounds areas, and the use of tactical control measures (eg, curfews, convoy escorts and protection, TCPs and VCPs).

**Enforcement of sanctions.** The enforcement of sanctions already in place, or intended, can be considered synonymous with the denial of movement as another control measure for conflict containment and prevention. Sanctions concern the denial of supplies; diplomatic, economic and other trading privileges; and the freedom of movement of those living in the sanctioned area. Again, these actions are conducted at the operational level; at the tactical level they may translate to those tactical actions as described in the preceding paragraph.
Crowd control

Public order is the management and containment, by security forces, of groups and crowds intent on confrontation and violence in order to achieve specific outcomes. Responses to incidents of public disorder vary from tolerance, escalating through riot control, to the use of discriminate force to protect human life. In control actions, crowd control and management are one of several tactical actions underpinning the establishment and maintenance of the rule of law. It should be noted that crowd control might also involve the monitoring of peaceful as well as hostile demonstrations. Further information on crowd control TTPs is contained in LWP-G 3-8-2, Population Protection and Control Techniques. Figure 4–2 illustrates the tactical symbols used for various types of demonstrations by crowds.

Figure 4–2: Tactical symbols for a friendly demonstration (left), hostile (centre) and unknown (right)

Purpose

Military forces are deployed on crowd control when local security forces are either unavailable or incapable of primacy.

Description

Public disorder ranges from increased tension in the civil community through to rioting involving loss of life. The incidence of crowd violence does not imply that the situation is irreversible. Careful management, situational awareness and communication may allow de-escalation below the violence threshold that may enable the restoration of order.

Security forces must give careful consideration as to whether a gathering is legal or illegal, as this influences the force posture and method of interaction with the crowd. An aggressive posture adopted prematurely risks antagonising the crowd and escalating the situation.
Tactical application

In support of civil police. The deployment of military in support of police assumes that the police lead in the activity, which implies:

- that the planning is interagency and the police must state the resource requirement and overall intent of the operation
- that the police must place themselves at the point where confrontation is most likely
- that the police must lead with the management and interaction with members of the crowd
- that the military commander must be aware of their own and the police’s use of force constraints.

In the absence of effective policing. The deployment of military forces in the absence of effective policing may arise when the civil police lose control, or when operating in a state where law enforcement institutions no longer exist. This implies that:

- Military forces are likely to be responsible for relationships with the local community and its representatives, and for crowd management. This requirement is likely to have to be met against a background of poor intelligence and language difficulties.
- Military forces are restrained by international law and the need to apply reasonable and proportional force.
- Military forces may be able to resort to equipment and tactics that would normally be considered excessive (e.g., the deployment of armoured vehicles).
- A breakdown of law and order requires military forces to withstand a higher intensity of violence than would be expected of a civil police force.
- The level of force necessary is governed primarily by the applicable use of force constraints, but with a need to preserve life and prevent serious injury. This may require the application of lethal force in appropriate circumstances.

Community engagement. Commanders must understand the local area, its geography and demography and the wider political situation in order to identify potential public disorder flashpoints. Commanders must be prepared to listen to community concerns and should establish liaison with community leaders whenever possible.

Legitimacy. The security forces, if seen to be acting reasonably, will gain credibility and legitimacy. If security forces’ actions are not lawful, proportionate and disciplined, credibility and the ability to influence the crowd, short of the application of force, is lost.
Balance. There may be hostile elements which have a vested interest in provoking a riot and therefore, crowd violence may be inevitable, regardless of the posture developed. Commanders must retain the initiative and ensure that they can react as the tactical situation develops.

Negotiation. Commanders must be prepared to negotiate with identified community representatives. The commencement of crowd violence should not bring negotiations to a halt.

Curfew

A curfew is a means by which movement can be controlled for short periods. As such, it is one of several actions that underpin the establishment and maintenance of the rule of law. It may be general and imposed over a wide but clearly defined area, or it may be restricted to a small area such as a town centre or housing estate. The size of the area and the duration for which the curfew is imposed depends on the reason it was imposed. Probable sources of authority for the imposition of a curfew are the force HQ undertaking overall responsibility for the campaign or specific action, and/or the local authorities in the interests of public safety and as a control measure for movement.

Purpose

Curfews are imposed for the following purposes:

- to assist the security forces in re-establishing control after rioting and serious disturbances have occurred
- to prevent civilian movement in a selected area while a search or the investigation of an incident is undertaken
- to disrupt insurgent groups by making movement of individuals difficult
- to allow the security force more freedom of action.

Description

Curfews are a discrete tactical action used in both control and assist operational tasks, which underpin the establishment of a temporary rule of law. They can provide one of the optional means for a commander by which the movement of personnel can be controlled during specific times and for limited periods. The following points should be considered:

- Curfew timings should support the establishment of a secure environment but not prevent the civil community from conducting legitimate business.
- Curfew restrictions, the reasons for them and the consequences of noncompliance must be clearly communicated.
- Curfews should not be imposed on punitive grounds or as a demonstration to the civil population of the inconvenience and hardship they invariably suffer if hostile action occurs.
• Sufficient resources must be allocated to ensure effective enforcement.

Tactical application

Sequence of events. The following should be undertaken:

• The decision to impose a curfew is made by the civil authorities in consultation with police and military commanders.

• Joint agency planning identifies the boundaries, timings, troop requirements and administrative requirements.

• Security forces adopt a profile to impose the curfew, and control instructions are communicated by appropriate means.

Command and control. C2 aspects can include but are not limited to:

• A multi-agency HQ should be established and jointly manned by police and military forces to control the curfew.

• There must be a system of passes for key personnel, such as medical personnel.

• Residents who were absent from the area when the curfew was imposed need to be processed when they return home.

Military tasks. Troops are required for the following:

• cordons

• roadblocks and other checkpoints

• ISR

• civilian vehicle movement bans

• static and mobile patrols to supplement the police

• assistance to the civil authority in the maintenance of essential services.

Civilian support. Normally the civilian authorities are responsible for dealing with the difficulties the population may experience if a curfew is imposed for an extended time; however, military assistance is likely to be required in supporting any arrangements. Potential problems include:

• a lack of water to houses

• a shortage of food supplies and essential commodities in shops

• refuse disposal

• a shortage of cooking, heating and lighting fuel

• medical emergencies.
Enforcement of out-of-bound areas

The enforcement of out-of-bound areas is a key component of conflict containment and also underpins the establishment and maintenance of the rule of law. A commander or civilian authority may make the assessment that the only practical means of preventing and containing further conflict through protecting key infrastructure, or vulnerable communities, is by declaring the area ‘out of bounds’ and restricting all access to, or through, the declared area. The following must be considered:

• There may also be safety issues that trigger a need to designate any area out of bounds, for example, damaged buildings or undetected unexploded ordnances. Alternatively, a commander may wish to isolate areas occupied by military and other security forces from general population access.

• Enforcement of the out-of-bound designated area normally causes disruption to the local community affected and has the potential to inflame extant resentment and tensions. The use of the media in a wider PI program to assist in lessening this resentment is recommended.

Purpose

An area is designated out of bounds as the only practical means of denying hostile activity, or prohibiting entry to specific areas for safety or own force security reasons. Military forces are deployed to enforce entry denial to the designated area.

Description

Key infrastructure, vulnerable communities and other key facilities may be kept out of bounds, as may other areas deemed necessary for public protection or for the security of military forces. The means of enforcing out-of-bound areas include:

• dominating approaches
• patrols and searches
• barriers, patrols and checkpoints.

Tactical application

Sequence of events. The following activities are likely:

• The decision to designate an area out of bounds is made by the civilian authorities, or the commander if the military forces have primacy, in consultation with other security agencies.

• Joint agency planning identifies boundaries, timings, troop requirements and administrative requirements.

• Security forces move rapidly into position and the out-of-bound restrictions are signposted and announced by other appropriate means.
**Military tasks.** Troops could be required for the following:

- cordons
- roadblocks and other checkpoints
- ISR
- static and mobile patrols to supplement the police
- to assist the civil authority in the maintenance of essential services within the out-of-bounds area.

**Key point and vital asset protection**

When a force is inserted into an AO, either in Australia or overseas to conduct specific operations, it is likely that its diverse tasks may include the protection of assets within its designated AO or tactical area of responsibility. Such assets are called key points (KPs) and may also be vital assets (VAs). VAP differs from KPP in that the assets usually require a greater amount of resources for protection and security. VAP invariably consists of KPs and vulnerable points (VPs) and may also be vital national assets (VNAs).

Important buildings and installations may be targeted for hostile action because they are vital to the functioning of the government or economy, or because their damage or disruption is likely to be politically embarrassing. Additionally, KPs and VAs may include buildings or areas of cultural and religious significance, such as sacred sites, traditional graveyards and burial sites, places of worship, and tribal/ethnic areas which are in dispute of ownership or have an ancestral conflict between parties underway.

KPP and VAP includes the requirement for security at the KP and all actions that are associated with its protection: routes in and out; the movement of persons and vehicles to, through and from it; and the checking of all transits through it.

**Purpose**

KPP (including VAP) is the process of protecting installations, products or services which are of such importance that their total loss or severe destruction would critically impair defence or security, or the functioning of government. Specifically, KPP and VAP are undertaken to:

- avoid disruption to normal life and the welfare of the civil population
- maintain law and order
- prevent any adverse effect on the economy
- maintain the morale of the population
- maintain military superiority.
Description

**Definition and description.** The following descriptions are relevant:

- **Key point.** A KP is a concentration, site or installation that, if it were destroyed or captured, would seriously affect military activities. KPs may include:
  - communication centres
  - power stations
  - refineries
  - transportation facilities
  - other buildings or installations so designated by the civil authority.

- **Vulnerable point.** A VP is a likely area of attack along a given route. Such places include:
  - junctions
  - culverts
  - areas with buildings and walls near the route
  - areas with parked or abandoned vehicles near to the route
  - areas with piles of debris or earth embankments near to the route.

- **Vital asset.** A VA is a facility, installation or resource the loss of which would severely disrupt the orderly life of the community, or, if damaged, would cause a major public hazard. Nodal points within a VA are called critical points, the loss, damage or destruction of which would render the VA (or VNA) inoperable and must therefore be provided with close protection.

- **Vital national asset.** A VNA would be a population centre, area, facility, installation or resource, including important cultural objects, the loss or destruction of which would be unacceptable to the nation.

- **Critical point.** A critical point is a nodal point within a VA, the loss, damage or destruction of which would render the VA inoperable and which therefore must be provided with close protection.

**Categorisation of assets.** A clear priority for the protection of assets, including the KPs and critical points located there, should be established. The responsibility for this usually remains with the civil authority. However, commanders should participate in the planning process for assets located in their AO, which may be categorised as follows:

- **Category A.** Category A assets are those that the interruption or denial of which would cause extreme disruption to the functions of governments and/or the economy, and seriously impair the morale of the population and its confidence in the government’s abilities to preserve the rule of law.
• **Category B.** Category B assets are those that the interruption or denial of which would cause severe disruption to the functions of governments and/or the economy, and have a detrimental effect on the morale of the population and its confidence in the government's ability to preserve the rule of law.

• **Category C.** Category C assets are those that the interruption or denial of which would cause serious disruption to the function of governments and/or the economy and adversely affect the morale of the population.

**Listing.** In consultation with civil authorities a list of KPs, VPs along routes, and those contiguous with VAs and VNAs is developed. Commanders must be mindful that the provision of guards to KPP tasks often exceeds available troops and therefore they must critically review all requests to provide guards. It must be noted that KPP can effectively commit large numbers of troops and any unit assigned this task should have no other tasks; similarly, VAP tasks must be assigned to other FEs that are available.

**Responsibilities.** Responsibility for guarding civilian installations normally rests with the civil police. Military assistance may be needed for one of the following reasons:

• to free the police to perform other tasks which are more suitably performed by them than the military forces

• to supplement the police if their forces become unduly stretched

• to supplement or relieve the police if weapons and techniques are required that can only be provided by military forces.

**Tactical application**

**Threat assessment.** The commander’s threat assessment of hostile forces' likely aims and objectives can assist in the overall design for security of the listed VAs, VNAs, KPs and associated VPs, and critical points to them from assault, from direct and indirect fires, and/or protect from infiltration and subversion, based on the assessed threat options discussed in the following paragraph.

**Threat options.** To protect a VA or VNA, consideration should be given to the threat aims, which are likely to be one or more of the following:

• destroy the value of the VA/VNA by overt means such as assault, bombing or indirect fires

• impede by covert means such as sabotage, the prevention of staff attendance and subversion, or force closure or abandonment due to political or social forces

• capture the point for immediate use or another purpose by overt means such as assault, or covert means such as infiltration or subversion, or

• gain intelligence on the VA/VNA for later use by overt means such as reconnaissance, or covert means such as infiltration and subversion.
Planning. Once a KP (which is likely to contain critical points and VPs, and be near a VA or VNA) has been identified and prioritised, combined police and military planning decides the method or methods of protection. Consideration should be given to the following:

- **Troops to task.** A careful assessment of troops to task is essential, as most KPs require a continuous coverage. The number of troops and specialists required is determined by the nature of the threat and the type and priority of the KP.

- **Field defences and equipment.** The following aspects of field defence stores and equipment should be considered:
  - full use should be made of existing protective facilities and, when required, they should be augmented by additional defence packs and stores, particularly if a strongpoint(s) is to be constructed
  - the deployment of surveillance devices (including other surveillance resources as discussed in Chapter 9) and additional physical barriers, such as wire obstacles, can enhance early warning and reduce troop requirements
  - the need for any special measures to protect guard posts, VCPs and VPs, and troop accommodation.

- **Communications.** Internal communications must be linked/integrated and networked with the controlling HQ, next higher HQ and all attachments/support FEs (eg, police) where possible.

- **Off duty/rest areas.** Depending on the size, location and nature of the KP, troops may need to be accommodated on site or very near to it. Rest, feeding and recreation areas must be identified, and these may have to be located within a secure base area.

**Training for vital asset protection tasks.** Effective training for KPP/VAP tasks includes developing a wide range of skills that are covered in this publication, including:

- the construction and conduct of checkpoints, VCPs, TCPs and roadblocks
- all forms of search techniques, including high-risk searches (usually undertaken by RAE personnel)
- the construction and hardening of facilities, including strongpoint defence and KPP
- the deployment of all forms of reconnaissance and surveillance equipment
- patrolling
- crowd control and the establishment of curfews
- PR and PI
- applying ROE and OFOF.
Methods of protection. The methods employed to protect and secure a KP (and VAs when resources are allocated) are influenced by the threat, resource availability and the priorities accorded to it in planning. The main methods of protection, used singly or usually in combination with a reserve back-up, can include:

- guards
- static posts
- vehicle patrols
- foot patrols
- airmobile patrols.

Guards. The guard is to detect and deter anybody seeking to gain intelligence about the installation, to prevent damage or looting, and to ensure the maintenance of essential services. The guards control access and conduct searches of vehicles and personnel entering the area. The guard must remain until relieved and must not be called to upon to respond to request for help elsewhere. A mobile reserve should always be available to support the guard.

Static posts. Static posts imply the provision of a full-time detachment located at the KP. The size of the detachment is determined by the size, the threat, the distance to the nearest available reserve and nature of the KP, including its priority. Consideration must be given to conserving resources (eg, troops and equipment) by employing surveillance devices and intruder alarms. Static points can also be constructed as strongpoints for a viable and integrated strongpoint defence network if required. Strongpoint defence is discussed in *LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics* and *LWP-CA (MTD CBT) 3-3-1, Mounted Minor Tactics*.

Vehicle patrols. Vehicle patrols can be employed to provide periodic coverage to a number of lower priority KPs. Timings for these patrols must be staggered to prevent the likelihood of ambush and to retain the element of surprise. Patrols should be strong enough to deal with anticipated threats and must be supported by a local reserve. Vehicle patrols as part of route protection and security are further discussed in *LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics* and *LWP-CA (MTD CBT) 3-3-1, Mounted Minor Tactics*.

Foot patrols. Foot patrols operate in the same manner as vehicle patrols. Their area of responsibility should be determined by their capability to provide adequate coverage. Foot patrols are also particularly vulnerable at KPs (particularly if located within or near a VP, VA or VNA) where movement is likely to be congested, observation is difficult, and concealment is easily afforded to a threat. Aspects of foot patrols are further discussed in *LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics* and in *LWP-CA (DMTD CBT) 3-3-8, Patrolling*.

Airmobile patrols. Airmobile patrols may be used as a valuable supplement to vehicle and foot patrols. They are valuable in checking KPs, VPs and VAs/VNAs over extended distances or where vehicle access is difficult. The employment of
Airmobile assets for VCP tasks is detailed in *LWP-CA (AVN) 3-1-1, Aviation Minor Tactics*.

**Reserves.** No method of KPP can sustain a determined attack from substantial forces and therefore a quick reaction force (QRF) must be located in a secure position nearby and able to rapidly respond to any incident as required. A QRF is generally constituted from the available resources of the FE tasked for KPP.

**Security.** Sandbags, barbed wire and screens should protect guardrooms, living areas and sentry positions. Measures which can increase the security of the guard without increasing manpower include:

- the supplementation of observation posts (OPs) with surveillance devices and sensors
- establishment of an efficient alarm system so that sentries can be rapidly reinforced from within, thus enabling more rest rather than having most of the force constantly on watch
- improvement of physical protection and effective external lighting.

**Dealing with an unarmed mob or crowd.** It is possible that a KPP force or detachment faces the risk of being overwhelmed by the sheer number of a mob intending not to damage an installation, but to occupy it for political reasons. Where the military force is empowered to control public movement, commanders should consider the use of dogs, fire hoses and nonlethal weapons in this eventuality. Any adverse reaction to these events can be mitigated by wide PI, the presence of the media, and reporters with cameras to ensure that an accurate record of the event is captured.

**Internment and detention**

The term ‘captured person’ is now used extensively in tactical doctrine dealing with internment and detention tactical tasks by the ADF. It is a generic term that encompasses all persons, other than ADF members, captured or otherwise taken into custody by a deployed force. All such persons in the custody of the ADF are referred to as captured persons until they have been classified, after which they are referred to in accordance with the following terminology:

- POW
- retained person
- security internee
- compassionate internee, or
- criminal detainee.

The tactical symbol for a captured person is shown in Figure 4–3; the tactical symbol for a captured person holding area, Figure 4–4; and the tactical symbol for an enemy POW holding area, Figure 4–5.
The internment and detention procedure encompasses the following stages (explained later in this section) with separate but coordinated paths for healthy and wounded, injured or sick personnel:

- Stage 1 – the common capture procedure
- Stage 2 – internment or detention (as appropriate to status)
- Stage 3 – repatriation or release.
Guarding and processing captured personnel is invariably a drain on available troops and support personnel, and adds to the difficulties facing a commander. Captured persons must be handled in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions\(^3\), and at all times are to be handled humanely and with respect for their personal life, race and religion. Further information on prisoner and detainee handling procedures are contained in *LWP-G 0-1-7, Internment and Detention (Developing Doctrine)*.

**Purpose**

The purpose of internment and detention procedures for captured persons is to ensure, and ideally guarantee, the proper conduct of soldiers towards the correct and humane handing of captured persons during any form of conflict in accordance with the Geneva Convention and force orders and instructions.

**Description**

Internment and detention control tactical tasks comprise all actions which ensure the safe and secure movement, and humane treatment of captured persons from the point of capture through to exploitation and classification, to internment or detention, and ultimately to release or repatriation. Army remains responsible for the conduct of internment and detention tasks for the ADF.

Depending on the legal framework governing military control, internment and detention tasks may be conducted across the range of military activities in all LOOs. Internment and detention remains a critical task within any line of effort or LOO in which it is authorised, due to the sensitive legal, political and diplomatic nature of these tasks; the need to extract information of value from captured persons; and its importance in winning the perception battle.

**Internment and detention process.** Figure 4–6 depicts the internment and detention process employed in the classification and handling of captured persons.

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3. There are four Geneva Conventions relevant to internment and detention procedures: *Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War*, 12 August 1949, also known as the Third Geneva Convention, especially Part 3, which relates to the Australian Army; *Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War*, 12 August 1949, also known as the Fourth Geneva Convention; *Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, Relative to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977*, also known as Protocol 1, and *Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, Relative to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts of 8 June 1977*, also known as Protocol 2.
Principles of internment and detention. The principles guiding the conduct of internment and detention tasks are as follows:

- humane treatment
- efficient care
- protection
- exploitation (noting that this term is not discriminatory; it refers to the need to extract possibly vital information)
- prompt evacuation
- effective use of CSS assets.

Further information detailing application of these principles is contained in *LWP-G 0-1-7, Internment and Detention (Developing Doctrine).*
Tactical Application

Common capture procedure. The common capture procedure is employed for the initial collection and processing of all captured persons. It is predicated on the treatment of all captured persons in accordance with the minimum provisions for POWs. Following capture, units implement the common capture procedure as follows:

• **Step 1 – point of capture to initial collection and processing centre/exploitation unit.** The force commander promulgates a maximum unit holding period for captured persons to be held at Stage 1, not usually longer than 6 hours. On some operations a written agreement will be actioned to allow captured persons to be transferred into the custody of HN security forces, a civilian police element or a coalition partner before they have been classified. Where the authority for such transfer has been given, the transfer usually occurs following tactical questioning. In such cases, detailed SOPs governing transfer must be promulgated. Step 1 incorporates action by capturing units to:
  • disarm
  • search
  • restrain
  • guard
  • tactically question
  • escort captured persons to an initial collection processing centre or exploitation unit.

• **Step 2 – initial processing centre/exploitation unit.** This step incorporates actions by the force MP unit and the exploitation units to take custody of and hold captured persons received from capturing units at initial collection processing centres and exploitation units. If selected for interrogation, captured persons usually undergo primary interrogation at an exploitation unit during Step 2. Captured persons may only be held at an initial collection processing centre and/or exploitation unit for an initial holding period, not usually more than 24 hours. The initial holding period may be extended by an additional holding period for reasons of imperative military necessity. The length of both the initial holding period and the additional holding period is determined by the force commander and promulgated to the force MP unit and the exploitation units.

• **Step 3 – classification, review and appeal.** This step incorporates procedures to classify all captured persons, and procedures for review and appeal of classification. At the conclusion of the initial holding period or additional holding period (as applicable), or earlier if practicable, the classification of individual captured persons is determined. Details of the circumstances of capture which might assist in classification, including details of who was responsible for capture and lists of those captured at the
same time and location, are to be recorded at the time of capture and evacuated with the captured persons. This information can be effectively recorded on the captured personnel and equipment/documents tag (commonly known as CAPTAG) attached to each captured person immediately following capture in accordance with LWP-G 0-1-7, Internment and Detention (Developing Doctrine) [Part 2]. Depending on the circumstances, captured persons not entitled to POW status may be treated as follows:

• classified as retained persons, and then retained or repatriated
• classified as security internees, and then interned or assigned residence
• classified as compassionate internees, and then interned or assigned residence
• classified as criminal detainees and detained, or
• released immediately, if found to be innocent civilians.

Searching and handling procedures – detailed common capture procedure. Detailed descriptions and guidance for the searching, screening and handling of captured persons is contained in LWP-G 0-1-7, Internment and Detention (Developing Doctrine) [Chapter 6 and relevant annexes].

Protection of captured persons. The protections of the laws of armed conflict and human rights law apply to captured persons from the time of their capture until they are repatriated or released. When a person is captured, they are entitled to the same protections as a POW until their status is determined or they are released.

Treatment. The human dignity, honour, family rights, religious beliefs, manners and customs of captured persons must be respected. Captured persons must receive humane treatment without adverse consequences because of race, colour, religion or faith, birth, wealth, sex, language, nationality, political or other opinion, or similar criteria. They may not be subjected to the following:

• murder
• mutilation
• physical or mental torture
• corporal punishment
• outrages on personal dignity – in particular cruel, humiliating or degrading treatment, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault
• being held hostage
• punishment for alleged criminal acts without previous judgment pronounced by a legally constituted court that has accorded them judicial guarantees recognised as indispensable to a fair trial, or
threats of any of these.

Individuals and capturing nations are responsible for acts committed against captured persons if the acts violate the laws of armed conflict or human rights law. Captured persons are entitled to respect, and they are to be treated with honour and as fellow human beings. They are to be protected against violence, insults, public curiosity and reprisals. They are not to be subjected to physical mutilation or medical or scientific experimentation that is not required for normal medical, dental or hospital treatment.

**Documentation.** The timely and accurate compilation and transmission of documentation relating to captured persons is crucial to the successful implementation of the common capture procedure and compliance with Australia’s legal obligations. Unless captured persons are properly documented, they cannot be effectively administered and accountability cannot be ensured. Captured persons’ documentation is also of immense value to the exploitation process. Finally, Australia is legally obliged to advise the protecting power(s) and/or the International Committee for the Red Cross and Red Crescent of taking captured persons, and of every subsequent event affecting each captured person, including transfer, judicial processes, release, repatriation, escape, admission to hospital, or death.

**Medical.** Medical attention must not be withheld and should be given with the same priority for dealing with friendly forces. Wounded captured persons must be searched but, if necessary, first aid can be given as the initial priority.

### Population protection

Control is underpinned by the requirement to protect civilians and general populations from the ravages of conflict apart from the other control measures as described in this chapter. These measures include activity to provide immediate security to threatened populations in order to control residence, identity, movement, assembly and the distribution of commodities, therefore setting the conditions for the re-establishment of law and order and the rule of law.

The protection of the populace in conflict and in post-conflict situations is covered by the *Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 1949*, which includes many specific provisions in its parts and associated articles. The following definitions, for the purposes of this section, are immediately relevant:

- **Part I, Article 4.** Persons protected by the convention are those who, at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of conflict or occupation, in the hands of a party to the conflict or occupying power of which they are not nationals. Nationals of a state which is not bound by the convention are not protected by it. Nationals of a neutral state who find themselves in the territory of a belligerent state, and nationals of a co-belligerent state, shall not be regarded as protected persons while the
state of which they are nationals has normal diplomatic representation in the state in whose hands they are. This has wider application in Part II, Article 13 and naturally affects a commander’s actions in control situations, whereby these individuals should receive the same treatment as refugees and IDPs.

- **Part II, Article 13.** The provisions of Part II cover the whole of populations of the countries in conflict without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race, nationality, religion or political opinion, and are intended to alleviate the sufferings caused by war.

These provisions — through population support and population protection measures, and actions at the operational and tactical level — generally guide commanders of any force assigned in stability activities covering all control and security actions. Notwithstanding the joint actions for population support as an integral part of control, protection of the civil population remains of equal priority to sustain the credibility of the force as a stabilising entity and assist in maintaining positive civilian perceptions of the force and its personnel (see Figure 4–7). In addition, **UNSCR 1325** articulates the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response and post-conflict reconstruction.
Figure 4–7: An Australian Defence Force medic shelters a child sick with malaria during a medical evacuation operation in a mountain village of Timor-Leste during Operation WARDEN

**Purpose**

The purpose of population protection tasks is to provide immediate protection and security to threatened persons and the general populace in order to set the conditions for the re-establishment of law and order; and to control residence, identity, movement, assembly, and the distribution of basic commodities and necessities of daily life.

**Description**

While the overall aim of the protection of civilians, aside from refugees and IDPs, and resident populations (as defined at the beginning of this chapter) is to set the conditions for the reestablishment of law and order and the rule of law, there is an immediate and longer-term goal. In the first instance, protection measures are designed to defuse often widespread civil unrest and restore a degree of order to
daily life. In the longer term, actions are conducted in concert with indigenous capacity building to re-establish legitimate law and order, and to return the affected societies to an accepted level of normality.

To achieve this, in most cases military actions are conducted under a specific agreement with either a HN or a multinational organisation, probably in the form of a JIATF. At least initially, it is possible that this force may be required to fulfil some roles normally associated with law enforcement agencies. Failure to do this may create a security vacuum that could be exploited by a variety of interest groups who may or may not be parties to the conflict. Therefore, the need for the protection of civilians in the conflict during control actions must be anticipated in planning and provided for in any implemented agreements.

**Tactical application**

**Actions.** Specific actions that can be undertaken by the commander for the protection of civilians include, but are not limited to:

- measures and techniques to ensure the immediate security of threatened populations – including designated safe areas, the enforcement of out-of-bounds areas, and the establishment and supervision of curfews
- undertaking constabulary functions – including the arrest, investigation, processing and detention of criminals and criminal elements – noting that this requires augmentation at a later date by international civil police as a part of broader peacekeeping operation initiatives
- crowd and riot control measures
- vehicle and personnel movement control through the establishment of TCPs and VCPs
- special recovery actions and close personnel protection for selected dignitaries
- the physical security and protection of KPs, VPs and VNAs
- active patrolling
- surveillance
- the employment of cordon and search techniques
- arms control – including disarmament, accountability, audits and destruction
- explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), CIED measures and hazardous material management
- assisting in the registration of residents and determining non-residents and those persons caught up in the conflict who may not be nationals
- the inspection of identity documents and passes
the protection of the production, storage and distribution of foodstuffs and protection of foodstuffs production services.

**Perception management.** Most civil populations encountered are intimidated by the presence of a military force. This stigma has the potential to limit the force’s ability to get close to and develop intimacy with the population. Any force commander needs the ability to produce and disseminate PI in the printed and electronic media in order to explain their actions and intentions, advise the public on what they should and should not do, and to counter any threat propaganda. The production of this type of material is fundamental to shaping the perceptions of civilian populations and is critically important to the success of control actions and those it facilitates (ie, reform, restore and assist).

**Refugee and internally displaced persons movement**

Support to refugees is usually conducted by specialist agencies such as the International Committee of the Red Cross or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). However, depending on the scale and location of the problem, military forces may be required to assist with the movement of refugees and may not receive support from the UNHCR, who refers to refugees as ‘IDPs’. The following general definitions apply:

- **Refugees.** Refugees are persons who, because of real or imagined danger, move of their own volition, spontaneously or in violation of a stay-put policy. Regardless of whether they move within their own country (national refugees) or across international boundaries (international refugees).

- **Displaced persons.** A displaced person is a civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of their country. While no specific official definition of an IDP exists, it appears that there is a recognised difference, centred on the affected person or the person’s volition. In any case, commanders should view refugees and IDPs as the same as far as treatment and handling are concerned.

Whatever the case, all commanders may be unable to act on their own initiative without some general basis of agreement for action. Figure 4–8 shows the tactical symbol for refugees and IDPs, and Figure 4–9 shows the tactical symbol for a refugee/IDP holding area.

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4. This is a NATO definition and can be found in the Australian Defence Glossary.
The displacement of populations as a consequence of armed conflict is a significant problem. The resolution process requires the cooperation of the country of origin towards its own people, but implementation of such efforts requires sustained action and support from countries of asylum and the international community. As resettling uprooted and displaced persons is challenging and complex, return agreements must affirm all parties’ agreement and commitment to the resettlement process. Five basic elements are present in such agreements, which necessarily underpin, and provide the mandate for, any force’s actions committed to refugee and IDP movement. Such agreements usually involve:

- a preamble, defining the situation and overall process relative the parties concerned
- definitions of terms used, including who are and who are not, refugees and IDPs, and their status under the specific agreement
- appropriate language guaranteeing the parties’ cooperation to the resettlement process
- enumeration of the rights of refugees and IDPs/displaced persons

**General basis for action.**
a definition of the process for implementation, usually with the support and authority of an implementation commission.

Notwithstanding this underpinning authority, commanders may well be faced with a more immediate and pressing problem in the AO for which some immediate measures are required along humanitarian grounds. This most likely involves the provision (where possible) of immediate health care, the provision of temporary shelter, and the provision of basic items (eg, food, water, protection and security) until a more formal agreement has been made. An added complication not addressed here, but for consideration by planners, is the handling of those former fighters who may give themselves up and/or are themselves temporarily displaced, who are not refugees and who are obviously not noncombatants.

**Purpose**

The purpose of refugee and IDP movement control is to provide military assistance to assist specialist agencies with the movement and protection of refugees.

**Description**

The military force’s principal role in refugee and IDP movement is the facilitation of the movement and protection of refugees as is appropriate. Advice should be sought from subject matter experts such as the UNHCR, and activities should be coordinated with other civil humanitarian agencies as far as is practicable, noting the guidance provided in Annex A.

**Tactical application**

The following factors should be considered when called upon to assist with refugee and IDP movement:

- The return of refugees is a voluntary process, meaning that refugees should have the option to voluntarily return to their home areas or be resettled elsewhere; whereas IDPs/displaced persons should either be protected in a safe area until return is possible or allowed to return to an area made safe in their own area.

- Refugees and IDPs/displaced persons should be involved in the planning and management of their return and resettlement as far as is practicable.

- Arrangements must be made for refugees’ protection and security, which can mean the requirement for designated safe areas and camps as a temporary measure.

- The conditions established in the destination should, where possible, meet essential food and water, shelter and housing, medical and sanitary, and security requirements.

- IDP and refugee camps have been employed in the past as HQ for states-in-exile and logistics supply depots and dependent safe areas for militias.
General guidance for commanders for dealing with refugees and IDPs is outlined in Annex A.

**Separation of hostile forces**

This section provides details on the forcible separation of belligerent parties and discusses an integral part of conflict containment actions, which in turn underpins the establishment and maintenance of the rule of law. As with all such tasks and actions as part of conflict prevention and containment, the separation of hostile forces forms part of ceasefire agreements and is based on a supporting process.

**Basis for agreement.** Generally, such agreements for the separation of hostile forces/belligerents comprise the following six elements:

- the establishment of a security zone
- the establishment of a coordination zone
- troops and weapons
- controls on armaments
- disengagement
- the withdrawal of forces.

The agreement, once drafted, is translated into a series of actions, the type of which is dependent on the existing situation between belligerent parties.

**Purpose**

Military forces conduct separation of hostile forces tactical tasks to support the administration, monitoring and enforcement of agreed ceasefire lines, buffer zones (BZs) and areas of separation.

**Description**

The separation of hostile forces is normally conducted as a part of peacekeeping or peace enforcement campaigns intended to provide monitoring, verification and policing of the ceasefire agreements between conflicting parties. The overarching process is demilitarisation and arms control, and it is normally a progressive series of actions where targets are set, and achieved, in recognised steps. The first of these may involve actions such as interposition and the establishment of control lines concurrent with conflict containment. These are discussed in the following paragraphs.

**Interposition.** A force can be deployed as an interpositional force as a form of ‘trip-wire’ either when consent exists or when it is fragile, if it is supported in turn by a credible external deterrent power or a stand-off force. Troops involved in interposition actions are generally deployed to pre-empt conflict. As such, these actions take place in areas of recent or potential conflict, rather than actual conflict, either between states or within a state where tension is rising between parties.
Although it is likely that there would be consent for the action, at least from the HN, a peace plan or formal ceasefire may not have been agreed to and the situation may be characterised by sporadic outbreaks of violence. Interposition actions generally take the form of the establishment of a BZ or, where communities are intermingled, the establishment of areas of separation wherever the communities are physically mixed. Should one of the parties not consent to the action and it is judged that enforcement may become necessary, a force capable from the outset of escalation should conduct the action.

**Control lines.** Conflict containment actions, and the rule of law actions that underpin them, often require deployed forces to interpose between two or more opposing forces and use control lines to separate the factions. These lines delineate areas and are normally split into one of the following three categories:

- **Ceasefire line.** This marks the forward limit of positions occupied by the troops of the opposing sides at the suspension of hostilities.
- **Armistice demarcation line.** The agreement of ceasefire lines may pave the way for the establishment of a BZ and the withdrawal of an invading force. Belligerents may agree to an armistice demarcation line, perhaps leading eventually to a formal peace treaty.
- **Buffer zone or area of separation.** There is not always agreement on the location of the armistice demarcation line. This may be because the parties to the dispute do not use the same map grid or because one side refuses to give up a position near the line which is considered essential to its security. In such cases a BZ or area of separation is created. Armed forces are excluded from this demilitarised zone; however, if the zone is sovereign territory of at least one of the parties, its right of administration must be recognised.

**Tactical application**

**Marking.** All separation lines should be marked by wire fences and signposted wherever possible. Units operating in these areas must be familiar with the detail of the markings, and interposed troops must be able to provide clear instructions to opposing factions in order to avoid disputes over ground which can rapidly escalate.

**Demilitarisation and arms control.** Demilitarisation and arms control may be one of the tasks given to a military force under the terms of its mandate, or there may be local tactical initiatives attempted to reduce tension in a specific area. Enforcing or monitoring any control measures is only possible once a ceasefire or peace agreement is in place.

**Verification.** Verification depends on the mandate. If the situation allows it, the deployed force may restrict all military movement within its scope of authorisation. In such cases it would be normal to monitor these activities to ensure compliance. This level of monitoring may extend to barracks and cantonment areas to provide an assessment of readiness, capability, intent, morale and any intention to deploy forces.
Enforcement. Enforcement is also dictated by the deployed force’s mandate and may involve restrictions on a faction’s military activities, training or movement and may extend to punitive inspections and the confiscation of weapons and equipment.

Supervision of ceasefire

Military forces may be deployed to supervise any commitments agreed to by the parties as part of a truce, ceasefire or other peace plan. This may include operational level joint force deployments to supervise the agreed arrangements of the plan, which can involve the use of observers and monitors, backed by forces with the capability for enforcement if necessary. As a first step in the cessation of hostilities, ceasefires have the overall aim of confidence building between parties and establishing the framework for future dialogue. However, ceasefires alone are not self-sustaining, but require monitoring and supervision by military forces, international organisations and/or national groups whose functions are to ensure that the provisions, once agreed, are maintained. Further actions include the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of hostile forces as discussed in Chapter 5.

Basis for agreement. As with all such activities, the successful supervision of a proposed or existing ceasefire is based on a general agreement which has four elements:

• the identification and definition of prohibited acts, defined as either non-military or military acts of aggression
• requirements for the separation of belligerents and hostile forces
• arrangements for verification, supervision and monitoring. This includes the monitoring and supervision of the disarmament process and the ceasefire, usually involving specialised peacekeeping forces such as a ceasefire commission, a joint military commission and a monitoring commission
• ‘ad hoc’ provisions which address those issues specific to the situation and can include but are not limited to the protection of civilians and noncombatants, refugees and IDPs, POWs, the reformation of a national army, ceasefire timetables, and the handling of those former fighters who might join a new national army or paramilitary police force, who are not refugees and who are clearly not noncombatants.

This section covers the supervision aspects of ceasefires, which include the basis for agreement which commanders are bound to observe. For a full coverage of ceasefire agreements and the four critical elements of such agreements, refer to The Ceasefire Drafter’s Handbook – An Introduction and Template for Negotiators, Mediators, and Stakeholders.

**Purpose**

The purpose of a ceasefire supervision is to prevent further conflict through a suitable structure and organisation which undertakes the following three main responsibilities:

- general observation and monitoring of the cessation of hostilities and the terms of ceasefire
- oversight and investigation of violations to the ceasefire
- verification of disengagement actions and that the terms of the agreement are carried out.

**Description**

Ceasefire agreements incorporate the verification of what the parties agree to and the supervision to ensure that the elements are maintained. Some treaties use a general statement which includes how verification is obtained and what group(s) is responsible for the subsequent supervision and monitoring of the signing parties. The general statement of agreement to a ceasefire concisely asserts that there must be verification and supervision without addressing the specifics in accomplishing it; other treaties often address this provision with several specific components relevant to the situation at hand.

The verification of ceasefire agreements involves the critical underpinning action of supervision, which ensures compliance of the parties with the general agreement and is therefore a key element of the ceasefire agreement process. As discussed earlier, the verification mechanism involves one or more bodies with complementary functions: a ceasefire commission, a joint military commission and/or a monitoring commission. In most cases, the supervisory body has the responsibility to solve disputes arising from the interpretation of the agreement and is assisted in the field either by a peacekeeping force or by local committees that observe the actual implementation of the agreement in the field. At the tactical level, commanders are guided by these agreements which are further implemented and mandated by the various ceasefire commissions in place.

**Tactical application**

**Ceasefire commission actions.** Any commander responsible for the supervision of ceasefire arrangements is bound by the dictates of a ceasefire commission and is required to liaise and cooperate with it. An established ceasefire commission is responsible for the following, which necessarily influences planning:

- establishing the location of units at the time of the ceasefire
- establishing liaison between the parties for the purpose of the ceasefire
- finding appropriate solutions in the event of difficulties in disengagement
- conducting investigations of any ceasefire violations
- verifying all information, data and activities relating to the military forces of the parties to the agreement
• verifying the disengagement of the military forces of the parties where they are in direct contact
• monitoring the storage of arms and munitions equipment
• monitoring the quartering of troops and police
• undertaking the disarmament of all illegally armed civilians
• undertaking mine clearance throughout the country
• parties undertake to provide the commission immediately with all relevant information on the organisation, equipment and position of their forces, on the understanding that such information shall be held in strict confidence.

Monitoring commission actions. In most cases the international peacekeeping force is established with a monitoring commission which supervises any violations to the ceasefire that may occur on the ground and verifies that the terms of the agreement are actually represented by the parties. Usually, membership in this mission ranges from unarmed monitors and observers to the UN through to armed peacekeepers. The purpose of this commission is to supervise any violations to the ceasefire and verify that the terms of the agreement are carried out. The commission serves as a liaison between the parties to the ceasefire agreement.

Supervision – establishment and management of the ceasefire. Those commanders participating in, or responsible for, ceasefire agreements need to be aware of the following for planning purposes:

• **Scope.** Ceasefires normally depend on a clear geographical delineation and an agreed upon timescale for their implementation. However, in more volatile circumstances, and when forces are intermingled, the best that can be achieved may be a cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal to a camp.

• **Delineated ceasefires.** In geographical terms, a ceasefire may be delineated by:
  • ceasefire lines
  • a zone or area of separation
  • a control zone
  • an area ceasefire.

• **Management.** The effective management of a ceasefire requires close supervision on both sides of the line; with radio communications by observers, monitors and patrols on the ground and in the air (ie, aerial surveillance), and possibly at sea or along waterways, canals and other lines of demarcation. The ceasefire document should contain the procedures and responsibilities for arbitration, attribution, and penalties and rewards.

• **Responses.** A prompt and firm response to a breach of the ceasefire agreement is essential. Delayed and inappropriate responses prejudice the
credibility of the ceasefire and risk a degeneration of the overall security situation.

Further DDR action supporting the supervision of ceasefires is discussed in Chapter 5.

**Historical Example of Control: The Battalion Group in Timor-Leste 2000–2008**

Control (in NATO terms, ‘security and control’) is nothing new; it has been employed in a variety of forms in ancient history and in modern day, with varying degrees of success, particularly in Timor-Leste by Australian forces and supporting agencies. Control actions set the conditions for assist, reform and restore – many of which often occur at the same time and usually in a non-contiguous, nonlinear battlespace with multiple threats. Such was the case in Timor-Leste, where Australian troops and agencies have undertaken all these stability actions to date. This example traces the recent history of Timor-Leste, from occupation to independence, and then focuses primarily on selected battalion group actions and the various tactical techniques employed over time. It should be noted that forces were deployed as part of a JTF combined with other nations and agencies.

**Background**

In late 1975 East Timor declared its independence but was invaded and occupied by Indonesia later that year, and declared that country’s 27th province in 1976. Following a UN-sponsored agreement between Indonesia, Portugal and the US, and a surprise decision by the Indonesian President, BJ Habibie, a UN-supervised popular referendum was held on 30 August 1999 to choose between ‘Special Autonomy within Indonesia’ and ‘independence’. It had shown overwhelming approval for East Timorese independence from Indonesia. After the result was announced on 4 September, violent clashes, instigated by a suspected anti-independence militia, sparked a humanitarian and security crisis in the region with Xanana Gusmao calling for a UN peacekeeping force the same day. Under international pressure to allow an international peacekeeping force, BJ Habibie announced on 12 September that he would do so. The districts of Timor-Leste are shown in Figure 4–10 and a topographical map of the area is provided in Figure 4–11.

On 15 September 1999, the United Nations Security Council expressed concern at the deteriorating situation in East Timor and issued Resolution 1264 calling for a multinational force to restore peace and security to East Timor, to protect and support the United Nations Mission there, and to facilitate HA operations. This multinational force was the International Force, East Timor (INTERFET) and was led by Australia from 1999 until 2000. With the arrival of INTERFET, the militias fled across the border into Indonesian West Timor (Timor Barat), from which sporadic armed raids by pro-Indonesian militias were attempted. As these raids
were repelled and international moral opinion forced Indonesia to withdraw tacit support, the militias dispersed. INTERFET proved highly successful. Five months later, on 28 February 2000, INTERFET handed over command of military operations to United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), involving 6 RAR and supporting FEs. Successively over the next seven years, other battalion groups followed under the guise of various operations as the situation developed. Selected activities are outlined in the following paragraphs.

Figure 4–10: Districts of Timor-Leste
The battle/action/activities

6 Royal Australian Regiment. On 25 April 2000 the battalion deployed on Operation CITADEL and assumed duty as the Australian battalion responsible for the security in the border region of Bobonaro from 5/7 RAR (Mech). The rifle companies were deployed into integral, contiguous sub-unit AOs and commenced an aggressive patrolling program. Throughout the deployment, 6 RAR had at least 14 contacts with trained militia elements. The 6 RAR battalion group suffered one fatality from 2 Cav Regt.

1 Royal Australian Regiment. On 25 October 2000 1 RAR group took over the role of the Australian Battalion of UNTAET, that is, the Australian Battalion in the International Force for East Timor from 6 RAR. The 1 RAR group was comprised of 15 FEs, including approximately 1062 personnel, 29 armoured fighting vehicles, 238 B vehicles, 40 C vehicles and four Blackhawks. The AO for Operation MATILDA stretched over an area of 1500 km of Timor-Leste. The following actions were undertaken by 1 RAR and other agencies:

- Population protection. The battalion’s mission was to provide security to the people so that civil infrastructure and government systems could be
re-established, under the guidance of the UN, in order to help the population transition to an independent nation.

- **Patrolling.** In providing security, the battalion was required to undertake extensive patrolling, at this time organised as fighting patrols. These patrolling tasks (of the 1 RAR group) resulted in several ‘contacts’ with militia groups, resulting in one member of the militia being killed in action and one member of the friendly forces being wounded in action. Other minor contacts with suspected militia occurred; however, militia casualties could not be confirmed due to the close proximity of the contacts to the tactical coordination line (TCL)\(^6\).

- **Interagency.** UNTAET also consisted of a force of international police. The UNTAET Crime Scene Detachment was formed to investigate alleged atrocities.

- **Other transitional administration tasks.** Apart from oversight of the peacekeeping force, the transitional authority’s responsibilities included restore and assist tasks such as facilitating and coordinating relief assistance to the population, facilitating emergency rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, administering the country and creating structures for sustainable governance and the rule of law, and assisting in the drafting of a new constitution and the conduct of elections.

**Operation ASTUTE.** Operation ASTUTE was UN authorised and came under the authority of the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste whose mandate was established under the authority of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1599 through to 20 May 2006 and extended by resolution 1677 through to 20 June 2006 but was still extant in 2008. The actions and tasks undertaken in the period to May 2006 were as follows:

- **Noncombatant evacuation.** The immediate tasks of the operation were to allow for the evacuation of Australian nationals (ANs) and other approved foreign nationals (AFNs) for Timor-Leste. A forward deployment of approximately 200, including a commando company from 4 RAR (CDO), secured an entry point for follow-on forces centred on Dili Airport. The full deployment consisted of a battalion group of approximately 1800 personnel drawn from the 3 RAR and other Australian and New Zealand Army units. Evacuations were carried out by C-130 Hercules aircraft from the RAAF, using RAAF Base Darwin as a forward operating base (FOB). Initial assets deployed included the guided missile frigate HMAS Adelaide, the replenishment vessel HMAS Success and the amphibious landing/hospital

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\(^6\) The TCL is an agreed demilitarised zone separating West Timor from Timor-Leste, designed as a tactical boundary for the conduct of operations. Pending the land border agreement, both security personnel used a TCL agreed upon by the field officers. Under the TCL, there were three zones; Zone 1 was patrolled by Indonesia and Zone 3 by Timor-Leste. Both sides also agreed that in Zone 2 no one was allowed to conduct patrols or any other activities. Occasional infringements occurred.
ship HMAS Kanimbla. Landing ships HMAS Tobruk and HMAS Manoora were also sent to East Timor with follow-on forces.

- **Control actions.** In May 2006, FEs of 1 RAR returned to Timor-Leste following resurgence in civil unrest. These deployed forces conducted a variety of control tasks; such as conflict containment to secured areas, population protection, the separation of hostile forces and factions, KPP and VAP, the assessment and location of weapons possessed by conflicting groups, and the establishment of a safe environment for dialogue to resolve the crisis. A Coy 1 RAR deployed from Townsville in mid-May on HMAS Manoora, flying into Dili by Black Hawk on 27 May and conducted sustained stability activities, including the restoration of public order in Dili for approximately two months (July 2006). Operation CHINDIT saw the company conduct airmobile techniques to Manatuto and Baucau to conduct further security tasks, before returning to Australia in August of 2006. In September 2006 further violence flared in Dili which resulted in the redeployment of FEs of 1 RAR (B Coy) to reinforce the efforts of the BG already in-country. B Coy took up a blocking position in the hills behind Dili, operating mostly in and around Gleno. The platoons of B Coy were often required to conduct further airmobile missions to other parts of the country.

- **Special recovery.** In September 2006, 6 RAR BHQ, Alpha Company, Charlie Company, Support Company and Administration Company formed the core component of the Timor-Leste Battle Group Rotation I that deployed on Operation ASTUTE to Timor-Leste. Timor-Leste Battle Group I was recognised as the Anzac BG in theatre due to the force assignment of a Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment Rifle Company. With effect from November 2006, the Victor Company 1 RNZIR was deployed with 6 RAR, which had not occurred on an operational deployment since May 1969 in Vietnam. 6 RAR directly supported the SOCOMD Operation FARScape to apprehend MAJ Alfredo Reinado at Same in February 2006. The battalion(-) returned to Australia over March–April 2007 after extensive stability tactical tasks in Dili and throughout the Timor-Leste AO.

- **Cordon, search and sweep.** By April 2008, Timor-Leste Battle Group 3 was in rotation, consisting of FEs from 2 RAR, 7 RAR and 3 CER, supported by the UN police and local Timorese police in cordon and search techniques involving weapons sweeps. FEs from Timor-Leste BG 3 provided the secure outer cordon and perimeter security for the UN police and the Timorese police during the search of a number of homes in the suburb of Bebonuk in Dili for illegal weapons. Police teams entered identified houses to question the occupants, possible members of the martial arts gangs, concerning the possession of any weapons.

- **Enabling actions – patrolling.** Patrolling was a consistent feature of a soldier’s life in Timor-Leste and is undertaken for a variety of purposes, covering most types of patrols. In Timor-Leste the BG has identified its priority information requirements (PIRs) directly from the staff MAP; and the essential elements of friendly information, the commander’s critical
information requirements (CCIRs) and friendly force information requirements have been identified and listed in the PIR (ISR) matrix. From this information, and as directed by the commander, each week a force-targeting working group identifies a number of PIRs they wish to target and include any number of special information requirements in the targeting matrix which may be one of several pieces of information. These targets are then considered in terms of the combat functions that the BG or FE wish to apply to the target, as appropriate to the prevailing tactical situation, and a weekly targeting schedule is then dispatched to the subordinate FE for their commanders to develop their own patrol programs. An evolving requirement was the KLE program, which supported the information campaign and was included in the targeting requirements. KLE is an active component of community involvement which seeks previously identified local leaders and influential persons (from the initial stakeholder analysis) for continuous contact and engagement by the security forces. Keeping these contacts alive provides credibility for the force and a valuable source of information.

Observations and comments

Control actions in Timor-Leste represent an excellent example of how various other stability actions are interrelated and the necessity of a prevailing mandate for the forces to be able to undertake their assigned missions successfully. The observations and comments in the following paragraphs are made in relation to the basic considerations required for control, all of which were satisfied in this contemporary account. Apart from the basic considerations, credit must be given to the leadership qualities and soldier qualities of the Australian and allied soldiers, which contributed to success.

Population. Population protection for control includes activity to provide immediate security to threatened populations in order to control residence, identity, movement, assembly and the distribution of commodities, therefore setting the conditions for the re-establishment of law and order, and the rule of law. In Timor-Leste, Australian BGs and supporting forces and organisations provided initial security for the protection of the local population. This was achieved firstly through an initial presence and the threat of discriminate force (the arrival of INTERFET), and secondly through active engagement with the people at every level. Patrolling, in most of its forms, provided an active presence to restore confidence for the population, who were wearied by years of strife, abuse and neglect; and, through KLE initiatives, underpinned the credibility of the security force to do its job.

Security. Threats to security in failed states or failing states are diverse, vary over time and space, and are often interrelated. Timor-Leste is an example of multiple and diverse threats to the population and security forces alike, ranging from various hostile elements (opposing militia factions), to the deteriorating environmental conditions augmenting an already poor nation. To ensure more than adequate security in a hostile environment, all of the key considerations listed
at the beginning of Chapter 4 were undertaken at an early stage of the UN-mandated intervention and in the subsequent Australian-led missions.

**Information.** The information requirements to support stability activities are often more complex than the environmental and battlespace information requirements of offensive and defensive activities. In Timor-Leste, the perception battle was won at an early stage, in order to support the establishment of a secure environment and the development of law and order. This was achieved through the key components of PI and ISR activities.

**Exclusive jurisdiction and use of force.** Australian domestic law and the domestic law of the HN strictly govern the use of force, but where the State’s laws are in suspension due to a breakdown of law and order, other agreements must be in place. Australian forces were provided with a UN mandate to operate (under stated conditions) and status of forces agreements were implemented to cover command jurisdictions. All Australian forces’ actions were, and still are, governed by the national ROE and subsequent OFOF, with the OFUF and IGUF issued by the force commander. Fortunately, Australian soldiers are well trained in these aspects, and this factor, coupled with their innate sense of fair play, provided a sound basis for the successful conduct of missions.

**Establishing rule of law.** Establishing the rule of law is an early measure which can increase the chances of mission success in control. Military-led actions in Timor-Leste were underpinned in general terms by the *Charter of the United Nations* [Chapter VI or Chapter VII], while police-led actions by the UN police were used to assist in the re-establishment of the rule of law; to reinforce a secure, stable and safe environment; and to pave the way for elections and the establishment of a democratic government. The actions of Australian-led forces were successful because a stable environment, albeit with sporadic outbreaks of violence, was first achieved and maintained. Subsequent actions reinforced success, such as KLE through the engagement of prominent local figures within the civil community to proclaim their support for this action. Supporting IA plans and use of the local media to influence behaviour also underpinned success. Measures for establishing the rule of law are further discussed in Chapter 7.

**Annex:**
A. Guidance for dealing with refugees and internally displaced persons
Annex A to Chapter 4

Guidance for dealing with refugees and internally displaced persons

If faced by a request to deal with refugees and/or displaced persons, it is important to listen and respond to those on the ground. Do not try to second-guess them. On receiving any request do not ask them to justify it; they will not have the means or the time in many cases.\(^7\)

Provide assistance to UN organisations and NGOs as directed. Listen to them and support them. Do not expect the UNHCR to support military forces. The UNHCR will probably refer to them as IDPs. The help required is for military commanders to control and coordinate effectively without lengthy discussions.

The immediate requirements are for water, food and shelter. Followed up with medical and sanitation (health) requirements.

If asked, request suitable civil affairs staff (probably CIMIC) through superior HQ without delay to act as the focus for refugee matters.

Useful stores that might be quickly available are body bags, tentage, medical/health packs and water purification chemicals.

Useful equipment to be sought includes diggers, tippers, water purification units and lighting towers.

Use refugees and IDPs to build their own camps under direction, allowing them to organise in family/tribal groups, as this aids camp administration. Monitor tribal/ethnic groups carefully. Do not let majority groupings live in close proximity or there may be violence.

Have a policy for orphans. It will be dependent on local culture and traditions.

Avoid feeding refugees and IDPs military rations, as it may cause sickness. They are generally not used to this type of food.

Adhere to local customs and respect religious beliefs. Failure to do so is the quickest route to complaint and more serious trouble.

Identify and use local/refugee/IDP elders, headmen and leaders to disseminate information and instructions. This aids in keeping the social fabric together and assists in maintaining discipline in the camps.

Allow the refugees and IDPs to police themselves, within reason. Their culture and perception of right and wrong may be fundamentally different from ours. Do not interfere unless serious harm would result or life is in danger.

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Be careful when using women to issue orders. The use of professionals such as doctors is no problem, but women ordering men to do manual work such as pitching tents could end up with unexpected results.

Prostitution could be the first major endemic crime. Commanders should emphasise the no-fraternisation policy for both credibility and health reasons.

Whenever possible, ensure that resources are purchased from locals. Often, refugees end up in a better situation than the locals and this causes resentment and possibly violence against the refugees.

Ensure that a high standard of personal hygiene among troops is maintained at all times. Use the most powerful disinfectants and wash hands and faces regularly; otherwise dysentery could become rife. Deploy primary health care teams for this purpose.

Finally, hand over responsibility for refugee/IDP handling and camps at the first opportunity; otherwise those properly responsible (the UNHCR and NGOs) will begin to rely on the military force.
Chapter 5

Reform

Reform involves the effective development of security structures to enable the population to live in safety. Reform is likely to be required in countries emerging from conflict where indigenous security forces are no longer effective. It makes a significant contribution to conflict prevention in fragile or failing states. In all cases it is a critical tactical action to provide the basis for long-term stability. To be successful, reform requires a comprehensive, whole-of-government approach and coordination with other donors and the recipient or HN.

This chapter describes the basic considerations for successful reform, together with the tactical tasks that support its implementation.

Purpose

The purposes of reform is to ensure:

• that the quality of governance in the state in terms of relationships between security institutions, the wider government and the general public is established and maintained

• that the technical competence and professionalism of those within the security institutions is established and maintained.

Description

**Military support to reform.** The precise scope and nature of military support to reform varies according to the level required in the HN security sector and the limitations on the capacity of other stakeholders. It is unlikely that a military force would be tasked to undertake reform in isolation. Any Australian force contribution is likely to be in concert with the AFP and other agencies as part of a wider reform program within a coalition/JIATF setting and may include assistance from private security contractors. Depending on the security situation, the military contribution varies in size and nature. Immediately following a conflict it is likely that Australian military forces will be the major element. Military forces are likely to be the supported function in these circumstances where it is the only organisation with the capacity, relative to the situation, to conduct reform. Military support may range from training and mentoring indigenous armed forces to taking the lead in establishing indigenous security forces. The supported/supporting nature of military involvement changes over time. Military actions, likely to be part of a coalition or JIATF, can contribute to conflict containment measures (see Chapter 4), contain conflict should prevention measures fail and can attribute to the development of the HN’s security sector as stability is restored. Whatever the situation, military support to reform must ensure that the planning and conduct of activities is part of a comprehensive and whole-of-government approach (across
various responsible departments) underpinned by the appropriate level of technical expertise. The likely tactical tasks for military support are listed in the following paragraphs and described in the following sections.

**Tactical tasks.** Tactical tasks conducted as part of reform are detailed in later sections, and include:

- the allocation and control of equipment and infrastructure
- DDR
- the selection and recruitment of future security forces
- the training, mentoring and the transfer of responsibility to indigenous military authorities, including the training and mentoring of existing security and police forces
- supporting the rebuilding of the criminal justice system, including the deployment of interim justice personnel to supplement the indigenous criminal justice system.

**Basic considerations**

Reform is a complex, highly political, long-term and intensive undertaking. Effective and sustainable reform requires the involvement of a myriad of different international and local actors who often have different views on the objectives and process of reform. A number of basic considerations are discussed in the following paragraphs, although these are not considered exhaustive.

**International consensus.** Coalition and neighbouring nations play a key role in the design and implantation of reform programs. A high level of consensus and commonly agreed goals and performance measures are essential. This level of agreement must also devolve from the executive government to diplomacy and aid agencies, security and justice agencies of the international partners, and international NGOs.

**Local ownership.** The reform process must include involvement from other than state actors. Private sector actors and stakeholders who are not part of the security sector need to be represented. These include vulnerable and marginalised groups, community groups, and local and international business and religious representatives.

**Accountability.** Accountability systems and redress mechanisms need to be created to protect the population from abuse of power by the indigenous security forces. The effectiveness of these measures depends on how free the political and legal process is from security force interference. International tribunals can be established to deter violations of human rights and build public confidence in the restore process. Examples of such accountability past and present include the international war crimes commissions and tribunals.

**Tailored approach.** Reform must address not only the overall security environment but also the unique society fundamentals and specifics. No single templated methodology is suitable for all reform efforts. Resources need to be
managed efficiently to allow the provision of security that does not threaten democracy or human rights, or undermine other development goals.

**Coordination.** The overall reform strategy needs to be broad and is often very complex; for example, financial reforms may need to be part of a general public expenditure management reform. All of the agencies participating in reform and the specific reform plans need to be coordinated. Given the involvement of international participants in the reform process, significant coordination is required to ensure that the international effort is coherent and timely, that it meets the needs of the local people, and that it respects the lead role of the HN.

**Allocation and control of equipment and infrastructure**

An integrated and synchronised plan must be developed for equipment and resource issues, which must include funding, procurement, allocation and distribution. Indigenous security forces are likely to be issued with new equipment as part of the reform program. It is essential that the equipment is appropriate for the tasks identified for the indigenous security force and is issued and accounted for effectively.

The indigenous security force may require new infrastructure, such as barracks and training facilities. The delivery of new infrastructure needs to be adequately resourced and integrated into the reform program, and a plan must be developed for the handover of any CF infrastructure to HN agencies.

**Purpose**

Rebuilding indigenous security forces normally require the issue of, and training on, new equipment and critical infrastructure. The allocation and control of this equipment and facilities requires effective distribution and accounting by CF.

**Description**

The HN governing authority, in consultation with coalition support agencies, must identify the structure and future role of security forces. This determines the appropriate equipment needs of the force. Once procured, this equipment is then issued and accounted for, and CF assist with identifying the training liability and with the conduct of training.

In addition to new equipment, indigenous forces may require new or modified infrastructure. This also requires coalition management and an effective system to manage the handover of infrastructure to HN authorities.

**Tactical application**

**Funding.** Reform can require significant expenditure and resource restraints can pose a threat to a successful program. Funding is likely to come from a range of donors, and there is a requirement for a clear understanding of financial authority and the accounting rules applied to manage and account for the funds.
Manning. Staff with relevant experience in equipment and infrastructure, financial, and resource management should oversee the allocation and distribution process. This may involve non-armed forces personnel.

Planning. In consultation with host government and indigenous security force staff, coalition planners must develop a comprehensive distribution schedule for the issue of all equipment, including CESs. This distribution schedule must be accompanied with a training schedule related to the equipment issued.

Training. Military forces should be tasked to plan and deliver training and to mentor and monitor the indigenous security forces in their employment of new equipment.

Handover. Planning must include a procedure for the formal handover of equipment and resources to HN authorities. It is important to establish or confirm that the HN has a system for control of and accounting for this equipment before any handover occurs.

Disposal of equipment. There may be some equipment and infrastructure that the coalition is prepared to provide as part of the restore process, but is not prepared to handover to the indigenous authority, preferring the equipment’s destruction. A plan of verified destruction needs to be implemented to dispose of this equipment.

Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

DDR is only one task in a wider and longer term transition designed to reform the indigenous security sector and to reintegrate those military personnel considered surplus to military requirement back into society. The task invariably involves many stakeholders and military agencies in a fully integrated reform plan.

A process of decriminalisation and concerns over child/juvenile soldiers is likely to be a major effort throughout, and may be a main effort initially in the DDR aspect of the reform process. Without a rudimentary security framework, there is little or no chance of armed forces agreeing to disarm or demobilise, let alone reintegrate into a new situation imposed by foreign intervention. Financial inducements and an offer of future employment may encourage disarmament and demobilisation; however, unless armed forces can see a sustainable future for themselves and those they represent, development programs and the creation of a self-sustaining peace remain highly problematic.

The tendency to revert to violence to achieve objectives remains high until an alternative, guaranteed and economically viable form of employment can be provided. Forcible disarmament may be considered, but over a wide area would be too resource intensive and, in certain cultures, impossible to accomplish. The final military phase of a DDR plan may be the handing over of security tasks to legally and trained constituted local forces. The creation and training of such a force may be a prerequisite for longer term success and a task for elements of the peace support force/JIATF.
Definitions. For the purposes of this section, the following definitions are relevant:

- **Disarmament.** Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of weapons, ammunition and explosives belonging to combatants.

- **Demobilisation.** Demobilisation is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from the armed forces or other armed groups.

- **Reintegration.** Reintegration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income.

- **The security sector.** While the composition of the security sector differs in each country, and there is no currently accepted definition of it (except as presented in this section), there are four generally accepted categories that may comprise the security sector in the HN:
  
  - **Core security actors.** Core security actors include armed forces, paramilitary forces, presidential guards, and intelligence and security services (military and civilian), coastguards, border guards, customs authorities, reserve or local security units (eg, civil defence forces, national guards and militias), and veterans groups.
  
  - **Security management oversight bodies.** These bodies include the national executive; national security advisory bodies; the legislature and legislative select committees; ministries of defence, internal affairs and foreign affairs; customary and traditional authorities; financial management bodies (eg, finance ministries, budget offices, financial planning and audit units); and civil society organisations (eg, civilian review boards and public complaints commissions).
  
  - **Justice and law enforcement institutions.** These include the police, gendarmeries, the judiciary, prisons, criminal investigation and prosecution services, human rights commissions and ombudsmen, and customary and traditional justice systems.
  
  - **Non-state/statutory security forces.** These include liberation armies, guerrilla forces, private security and bodyguard services, and political party militias.

Purpose

DDR is undertaken to remove weapons, to reduce the number of combatants in an area of former conflict, and to contribute to the conditions necessary for longer-term stability by reintegrating former combatants into society. This can be facilitated by a formal ceasefire agreement.

Description

DDR is a major task of reform. It aims to take former combatants through the process of becoming ex-combatants and transform them into productive members of society. The process usually forms part of the peace agreement and is conducted as part of the post-conflict reconstruction process immediately following a conflict.
The successful execution of DDR requires high-level coordination across government departments, nations and other agencies in order to set the conditions and provide the guidelines for disarmament, which is likely to be led by an international organisation such as the UN. Military involvement is likely to be as part of a coalition acting in a supporting role, providing security, monitors, and logistic and administrative support in the early stages of what is a complex and time-consuming process. CF should be prepared to take the lead role, especially in the early stages. At the operational and tactical application level, DDR is likely to follow the following broad sequence of tasks:

- securing agreement, as a part of the preconditions for implementation and success
- establishing and managing a ceasefire (see Chapter 4)
- the withdrawal and assembly of former warring factions
- disarming former warring factions
- weapons management
- demobilisation, requiring the selection and retention of those forces needing retraining and those considered surplus for discharge
- verification
- security
- reintegration and rehabilitation of former warring forces.

**Tactical application**

**Securing agreement.** Agreement to any DDR process is ideally voluntary but may be secured through sheer exhaustion, truce, or a successful peace enforcement action. Whatever the case, the following preconditions are required to deliver an effective DDR program:

- the establishment of a formal ceasefire agreement or other operational conditions enabling the security forces to impose disarmament (ceasefires are discussed in Chapter 4)
- clear and unambiguous leadership with defined roles for all participants involved and coordination and cooperation between the coalition, indigenous security forces, other combatants and parties to the conflict NGOs and UN agencies
- financial and other resources for near-term, mid-term and long-term activities
- the commitment of expert personnel
- international and regional support for the DDR plan and actions, including HN support
Establishing and managing a ceasefire. Ceasefires are discussed in Chapter 4.

Withdrawal and assembly of former warring factions. Following a ceasefire or peace agreement, DDR may require the coordinated disengagement and withdrawal of forces into prescribed assembly areas or cantonment sites. For security reasons, such actions are best conducted simultaneously and tied to specific times and dates throughout the AO. Suitable reception arrangements and efficient administrative and logistic support plans are essential for success. Should the local authorities be incapable of performing these tasks, they may fall to the peace support force/JIATF.

Disarming former warring factions. The separation and disarmament of warring parties requires a clear mandate for the CF to execute it. A disarmament plan must be developed to include an appropriate element of force protection for the disarming party and other actors, the inclusion of amnesty and incentive programs, and robust verification measures. The plan should also provide for the separation and protection of the warring parties and provide for the security of movement of belligerents. At the tactical level this may involve activities such as formal weapon surrenders, weapon amnesties, weapon-free ceremonies, weapon exchange programs, PI campaigns, skill-sharing programs, the imposition and enforcement of weapon prohibition, weapon destruction, and support to other agencies conducting similar activities. Careful thought should be given to the subsequent arrangements for civil security as a consequence of disarming former warring factions. Planning should account for:

- security, in terms of a secure environment, usually through the provision of a force for the separation of hostile forces
- eligibility criteria for disarmament and registration into the remainder of the DDR process should be clearly defined
- priority for disarmament should be established by the lead agency who should consider force protection, parity of disarmament between parties, and reducing the possibility of conflict re-escalation through weapons management
- key locations for disarmament in relation to major cities and potential flashpoints.

Weapons management. The plan for the verification and control of weapon systems in all stages is essential. The plan must consider the range of weapon types and systems to be managed and include methods to register, remove, store, secure and, if necessary, destroy weapons, ammunition, and mines. It must also consider controlled civilian access to weapons (e.g., for the destruction of dangerous wildlife). If it is determined that there should be no civilian use of
weapons, the security forces will have to provide that function. Options for verification and identification include:

- the cantonment of belligerent forces
- electronic tagging
- safe storage areas
- weapon registration
- controlled access systems.

**Demobilisation.** The disarmament having been completed, the next step in the process is to select those individuals or units who are to be retained and trained, and those considered surplus to military and other security requirements and to be discharged. The size and shape of any future defence and security force should be the result of a comprehensive review that balances requirements with resources. Military forces wishing to transfer to the police services require comprehensive retraining, and those being discharged require education and training for civil employment. Planning for demobilisation is undertaken as a parallel activity for the selection and recruitment of future security forces, which is discussed in the section on the selection and recruitment of future security forces in this chapter, and should include the following general criteria:

- the registration and identification of personnel into the DDR program, including the categorisation of combatants for separation or further selection and recruitment (ascertained by the responsible agency), which could include:
  
  - military personnel with fewer than 18 months service
  - military personnel with more than 18 months service
  - special status combatants, such as political or religious troops, secret police, mercenaries, and others whose association with the previous regime may hinder the DDR process
  - female combatants, who should be treated under UN guidelines
  - child/juvenile combatants, who should be treated under UN guidelines
  - disabled combatants
  - irregular forces combatants
  - non-state combatants
  - medical screening to identify injuries and disabilities, HIV/AIDS, drug dependencies and mental instability
  - war crimes screening, although this may be too confrontational and could be retitled/advertised as a truth and reconciliation process
  - information and advice on future options for former combatants
• post-conflict orientation for those traumatised by conflict, to prepare them to return to civil society
• formal discharge and transportation to home regions.

Verification. Verification is essential to dispel suspicion between sides. A multi-agency observer mission, comprising military and civilian observers, should be established to oversee the process. A joint monitoring commission, chaired by a senior coalition officer and comprising representatives of the warring parties and the force protection group, should be established to arbitrate disputes.

Security. One of the main tasks of the CF is to provide security until the new indigenous security force is capable of fulfilling that function. This security must be seen by all, including the belligerents and their supporters, as being impartial, fair and capable of responding to likely threats.

Reintegration and rehabilitation. Reintegration and rehabilitation is a long-term process that often takes years. Military involvement in this process is likely to be limited in both scope and timescale and will be in support of a civilian lead agency. Ex-combatants need to be taught skills to enable them to settle back into civilian life and support their families and communities. Reintegration and rehabilitation involves reconciliation with communities and former enemies and the return of former combatants to their communities. The process often needs to be supported by parallel regeneration programs and investment.

Selection and recruitment of future security forces

The selection, recruitment and training of security forces is a vital task in reform. Prior to selection, recruitment and training (see the section on the training, mentoring and the transfer of responsibility to the indigenous authority in this chapter), a clear role and structure of the new security force must be identified from analysis of the threat, historical precedent, cultural requirements, economic sustainability and the aspirations of the HN. Boundaries and points of interface between police and military functions, roles and activities need to be identified, and an appropriate legal framework that serves as a basis of military and police actions for the new force needs to be developed. Selection and recruiting programs are then initiated to staff the structure that the DDR process has facilitated, with several preconditions.

Preconditions. Post-conflict indigenous security forces should not resemble their predecessor in either image or practice. An integral part of DDR, as discussed earlier, is the requirement to conduct a vetting process that ensures that those who have been identified with past abuses or poor conduct are removed and that the remainder of existing aspirants are capable of being trained or retrained. This process is discussed in the section on DDR in this chapter. Following the vetting process, a concurrent action is force development, which involves several major
activities which govern selection and recruitment. The force development includes:

- the force development of military, police and other security sector forces
- a delineation of roles and the separation of powers
- the security force structure
- moral and intellectual aspects
- equipment and resources
- infrastructure
- geographical force dispositions
- selection and recruitment policies.

This section focuses on selection and recruitment issues only.

**Purpose**

The purpose of selection and recruitment of future security forces is to ensure the establishment of an effective and capable military and security force that has a culture grounded in national laws.

**Description**

**Selection and recruitment policies.** Planning for reform, and as part of DDR, must include policies for the selection and recruitment of the future security force personnel. Consideration has to be given to those who are to be placed in the higher levels of command in order to achieve an acceptable cultural–ethnic balance. Consultations with HN authorities are required in order to avoid inaccurate assumptions and unsupportable structures and practices.

**Staffing, selection and recruitment.** Once the outline force structure is determined, the new force may be staffed by members of the existing indigenous security force, other combatants and new recruits as follows:

- All personnel should be subject to a selection and screening process (as discussed in the section on DDR in this chapter) to ensure that they are suitable for the new role and are not from undesirable elements of former regimes within the HN, or members of non-state forces that may cause disruption at a later date.

- Where possible, the ethnic balance within the force should reflect that of the HN as a whole.

- Selection and recruitment policies should be established in accordance with the general criteria for demobilisation, as outlined in the DDR section.

**Police services.** Police services invariably form a part of security forces in the security sector and, in many states targeted for reform, include such services in the military hierarchy. One of the most significant elements of any reform and DDR program is the reform of the police services and introducing police primacy to the
security sector. The selection and recruitment of future police services should be allocated to a specific organisation and not usually to a military force undertaking other reforms. As a general rule, the following principles apply:

- The police service should answer to an appropriate government department (i.e., not the Department of Defence). They should be regarded as civilian (or specialist) police and not as military personnel or subject to military leadership and control.
- The new military/security force should not conduct policing activity.
- Systematic and conceptual separation from the new military force is required. The new police service should have its own distinct and specialised selection, recruiting, education and training programs.
- Police and military powers should complement each other.

Based on these guiding principles, a separate authority should be identified, after demobilisation, to effect the selection and recruiting process. Such an authority may be a joint effort deploying police teams under the reform program (most likely to be under the auspices of the UN and AusAID) from the AFP, supported by specialists from the state police services of the lead nation if Australia takes the lead in this case. An additional consideration is that, in some circumstances, the military force may be required to take the initial lead.

**Tactical application**

The selection and recruiting process differs from state to state; however, a generic process can be established parallel with DDR programs, based on critical initial actions and the establishment of training teams to assist in the selection and recruitment process, with HN support.

**Initial actions.** Following the satisfaction of necessary preconditions, the following initial actions to support the selection and recruitment process at the operational level should be taken:

- A national military HQ must be established to provide overall command and translate government and strategic direction to the operational level.
- A culture of service to the state and its people should be engendered and become the key theme for recruiting. The armed forces should be seen as a career of first choice. Significant effort should be dedicated to public confidence in the armed forces. The role and ethos should be published and leaders, civil society and the media engaged to promote the new culture. Indigenous security forces and authorities should be adequately rewarded in order to make service an attractive career.
- A vetting process needs to be established to ensure that individuals with a known history of abuse, corruption and sympathies for or membership of insurgent or criminal organisation are denied entry (where practicable). Public consultation and the widespread publishing of recruitment lists, particularly for human rights organisations, can aid identification.
• The structure of the security forces needs to take into account the ethnic and cultural demographics of the HN and ensure that each ethnic or religious group is represented proportionally to the society of the HN.

• The process should be locally controlled, with coalition personnel supporting the activity as part of the training, mentoring and monitoring program.

Army training teams. Following the vetting process, the involvement of Army training teams for facilitating the selection, recruitment and subsequent training of indigenous forces is critical for the longer-term success of the reform and DDR program. How successful such teams can be was demonstrated by the Australian Army Training Team Iraq, as part of Operation CATALYST, which contributed to the selection, recruitment and training of the Iraqi army with a team of up to 100 trainers working at various locations throughout Iraq. Their contribution has yielded approximately 16 500 Iraqi army personnel benefiting, with 11 500 army recruits, 400 NCOs, 330 officers and 4200 specialists identified, selected, recruited and trained.

Selection. Selection processes for establishing a future security force which includes former armed forces members, new members that have been identified as volunteers, and those who can either be transferred directly to the police forces or recruited separately, can be based on the general selection criteria as discussed for demobilisation in the section on DDR in this chapter. These criteria should initially apply equally to those who intend to join, or are identified for, the future police service.

Recruitment. Recruitment actions, following the initial selection through the vetting process, can include the following training team activities, relative to the HN’s needs and culture:

• recommendations from local tribal leaders, who provide the names of appropriate persons to be part of the new force
• physical aptitude testing, which can include a basic assessment similar to the Army basic fitness assessment
• medical screening, based on information from initial screening in demobilisation and on the required fitness standards for the new force, conducted by a HN doctor
• a board interview, consisting of HN personnel who may be officers of the former army
• a limited background check, usually conducted by HN personnel in addition to the DDR screening checks
• a civil leader overview and approval board, manned by the HN.

Transfer to the training base/system. Those responsible for force restructuring must also provide a suitable national training framework, which invariably includes a training system, or a training base consisting of appropriate levels of resources
to enable the training of the new recruits. Care should be taken to ensure that the training system provides for the development of a balanced force structured to meet local circumstances. Once the selection and recruitment process has begun, plans should be made to transfer suitable recruits and members to the established training base or system on a progressive basis.

Training, mentoring and the transfer of responsibility to the indigenous authority

The Australian Army has undertaken the task of training and developing local forces for a HN on many occasions in the past, in both conflict and benign situations. Generally, this is provided through training assistance programs which include training teams. This rehabilitation process includes the establishment of a wide variety of training programs which include training, liaising and mentoring responsibilities, noting that military training programs are likely to run parallel to those conducted by other agencies, such as AusAID, within the broader UN-mandated programs (see Figure 5–1).

Figure 5–1: Iraqi security forces training under the supervision of Australian Army members of Task Group Taji-7
Definitions. For the purposes of this section, the following definitions/explanations are relevant:

- **Mentoring.** The process of mentoring permits experienced and trusted advisers to be partnered with HN forces (and police), with an agreed agenda, who provide expert advice and guidance and, where necessary, take the lead throughout the training and mentoring program. Mentoring involves teaching or instructional work and requires patience, professional skill and acute cultural sensitivity. While mentoring can occur during the initial retraining process, it is most effective in providing expert support to the indigenous force once trained as a part of ongoing assistance.

- **Transfer of security responsibility.** The transfer of security responsibility (TSR) is conducted by a multinational force/JIATF to the civil authorities. This includes the transfer of responsibility for security to the HN security forces, once deemed sufficiently trained, as an overall part of the operational transition process. An example of the transfer could be represented as a phased transition plan and then formally acknowledged at a suitable ceremony and then the subsequent withdrawal of the multinational force/JIATF. TSR does not necessarily avoid the need for further training assistance under other agreed arrangements (e.g., the Defence Cooperation Program).

Purpose

The purpose of training, mentoring and transfer actions is to support military and security force (police) training assistance programs through the establishment of military training teams (MTTs) as an integral part of reform and the task of DDR.

Description

In order to avoid a repeat of historical problems and sources of past instability, the moral and intellectual realms of a reliable and politically subordinate security force must be addressed. The proper and accountable role and conduct of an armed force within a democratic society must form the backdrop and context for all military training and mentoring.

The HN identifies the structure and requirements for its new indigenous security force after a detailed analysis of its desired capabilities, and in response to the needs and limitations of the nation. Following DDR the training and mentoring strategy must identify resources for training, operations and subsequent maintenance of the HN force capability. It must also identify infrastructure requirements and transition arrangements. These considerations are most likely to include the formal raising of a training system, the implementation of training assistance programs (which include the initial selection and recruiting of suitable personnel), and the formal tasking of training and mentoring teams.

Teams of trainers and mentors are capable of being temporarily embedded into all aspects of the new structure to facilitate its development and transition to sustainable independent operation. Once deemed capable of independent
operation, a formal process of TSR between the CF and the indigenous security forces occurs, which is likely to be progressively phased.

**Tactical application**

**Resources.** No training system or basis for training is possible without appropriate resources to sustain it. Resources are planned for, identified and provided at the highest level before a training assistance program can be established and implemented for training, operations and subsequent maintenance of the HN force capability. The time and resources available should be used to achieve the best standards possible. The identification of resources includes:

- identify HN, coalition and donor resources available
- include governance and due diligence measures/procedures and processes (eg, auditing and accountability) when planning the use of resources
- identify procurement budgeting and the resource distribution plan
- identify infrastructure requirements and transition arrangements for ownership
- plan for future acquisition and maintenance.

**Equipment.** Any training base must include the acquisition and allocation of suitable equipment, some of which could be identified from existing HN stocks. Whatever the case, the following applies:

- equipment must be provided that is appropriate for the role of the new force, which includes any equipment available from existing HN stocks
- new equipment should be introduced in a timely manner
- train-the-trainer packages should be conducted on the use, care and maintenance of any new equipment
- equipment support training should also be provided, most likely in the form of storage and accounting procedures, and procured in a holistic manner to reduce the equipment support burden
- advice on equipment requirements must be based on what the HN requires and not on what the donor has to offer.

**Sustainability.** It is critical that the ability of the force to sustain and administer itself is developed concurrently with other capabilities. CSS and equipment support organisations should be formed and equipped appropriately, administrative staff trained, and administrative and accounting procedures established. Effective sustainability for the new force requires training to develop administrative and logistic capabilities, which must be started from the outset and must reflect the design of the structures required by the overall reform training and mentoring strategy.
**Training assistance programs.** Training assistance to indigenous efforts to reform the defence and security sector are likely to be designed to enhance democratic accountability and transparency, and ensure that security resources are used to support the legitimate aspirations of the country as a whole. Specifically, education and training programs should be designed to enhance the understanding of human rights issues and promote democratisation efforts within all elements of military and security forces. In practical terms, these programs can be wide ranging; however, the generic strategy is to provide a framework for effective training, mentoring and TSR. These aspects are discussed in the following paragraphs.

**Development of doctrine.** Sound doctrine provides the basis for appropriate, effective and realistic training. Identifying and codifying baseline doctrine for the force should be a collaborative effort to provide:

- a reflection of the capability requirement desired by the force
- a reflection of current or planned equipment for use by the force
- preferably, a use of existing doctrine, a historical linkage or doctrine agreed to between CF and the HN force
- an assurance of the consistency of doctrine at all levels of training
- the development of mission-essential task lists to meet the requirements of the force, which are an aid to refining training programs, providing coherence and assessing performance.

**Establish training system/base.** Once the doctrinal basis for training is established, the provision of training ranging from basic training centres, through to specialist training, to provincial and regional planning and CP exercises, will be required to produce a force that meets the desired end state. The following should be considered:

- **Needs analysis.** A thorough training needs analysis must be conducted at the outset. Training programs should be developed accordingly, and with the HN force’s involvement, to ensure that they meet requirements in a realistic manner, make the most appropriate use of resources, and continue after TSR.

- **Training objectives.** Once the training needs analysis is agreed upon, training objectives must be developed that are appropriate, progressive and realistic; are achievable in an agreed upon and/or realistic time frame and reflective of experience and education levels; and allow for HN forces to continue the training in the future. Future development, after TSR, is most likely to include mentoring activities and train-the-trainer programs.

- **Measures of effectiveness.** Measuring the effectiveness of training delivery is essential. These measures should:
  - begin with an identified set of baseline standards (developed from doctrine)
• reflect the levels of operational capability desired, such as small unit versus formation-level operations
• test and evaluate against simulated situations, such as CP exercises, tactical exercises without troops and exercises
• reflect the ability to achieve and maintain readiness/preparedness requirement
• reflect the ability to administer, maintain and resource/sustain the force at all levels.

Training centres. Training centres should become centres of excellence, with instructors from the HN forces, once trained or already available, playing an increasingly prominent role in their running.

Selection and tasking of training teams. During the planning phases involving the establishment of the training system, a concurrent activity is to identify and task a suitable training force which should include a coalition training team. This may be a joint effort with coalition partners and can involve:

• Training force actions. The training force, which may include a tasked training team working with it:
  • develops the training program and standards for the training force/team prior to the formal commitment of the reform program, including cultural awareness training for team members
  • develops a training force C2 structure
  • tasks coalition training forces that reflect their capability, culture and experience, which should also include suitable specialists for technical and specialist capabilities.

• Training teams. Once the HN training base has been established with a viable training system and is sufficiently resourced, MTTs provide the practical means for implementing change and improving the competence and professionalism of armed forces. Their role is to conduct training and mentoring with support from the remainder of the force. Implicit in this role is not only to transfer responsibilities to the HN authorities, but also to continue the training and mentoring process if so requested by the HN. In the latter stages of reform, in response to improving indigenous self-reliance, the CF conducts the TSR to the civil authorities. This includes the transfer of responsibility for security to the HN indigenous security authorities as part of the ongoing operational transition process. A suggested guide for training and mentoring indigenous security forces is provided in Annex A. Other tasks include:
  • Where new units are being formed, there is a requirement to select and train officers, SNCOs and soldiers individually and then conduct training as formed units. ‘Surge’ MTTs may be required to assist in the latter stages of this process, both before and possibly after TSR.
Shorter term MTTs may need to be provided to make the best use of opportunities to provide support to the force, most likely on a rotational basis, with reconstruction task forces undertaking tasks to rebuild or repair military facilities.

Joint training and operations with other elements of the HN force and combined training and operations with the coalition/multinational force should be introduced as soon as the HN's capability and the situation permits.

Mentoring teams. Some coalition partners raise, train and employ specific teams called operational mentoring and liaison teams (OMLTs) as a means of developing the HN indigenous security force as part of the reform program. In Australian practice, this capability is usually undertaken by the specific training team identified for the target HN; however, it is also likely that any Australian effort in providing training teams could be jointly managed as part of a coalition effort, in which case an Australian Army training team may work in close cooperation with an OMLT. The OMLT functions remain generally similar to those of the Australian Army training team and include:

- the overall functions of training, mentoring, liaising and enabling in support of the indigenous security force activities
- establishing and running training facilities
- conducting operations with and providing additional capabilities to the force it has trained
- ensuring active engagement with the HN force commanders to provide the opportunity to conduct further mentoring, an operational linkage between the two organisations and the subjective assessment of HN force capabilities.

Transfer/transition to indigenous/host nation authority. Triggers for the progressive handover of responsibility, when an organisation has demonstrated capability, must be identified and articulated. The arrangements for the formal transfer of responsibility must be linked to these triggers and measures of effectiveness. Transfer/transition plans should include:

- an IA plan which should precede the transfer/transition and which should continually support it
- a period of mentoring, particularly if the conflict is ongoing
- a progressive or phased handover of responsibilities, which is synchronised with a measured disengagement plan
- contingency plans for the re-engagement of CF; these can take the form of an agreement to provide ongoing MTT and mentoring support.
Historical example of reform: mentoring the Afghan National Police

The stability activities conducted in Afghanistan since the first intervention to oust the Taliban and seek the reduction of Al Qaeda, have produced the ongoing requirement to both restore the national infrastructure and reform national organisations. While such efforts in Afghanistan cover most, if not all, stability actions, some of the most notable have occurred in the area of the reformation of their institutions. This particular contemporary example is indicative of reform efforts and focuses on the role of Canadian Forces in training mentoring teams who trained the Afghan National Police (ANP).

Background

The Canadian experiences in Afghanistan provide several lesson synopses reports, which are drawn exclusively from their Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (Canada) (P-OMLT) serving with the Canadian Task Force 3-07 in Kandahar Province. The principal task of the P-OMLT is that of training and mentoring the ANP in the conduct of their tasks. The current P-OMLT was formed by bringing together the Canadian Military Police with combat arms personnel from an OMLT intended for the Afghan National Army (ANA) unit. The observations that follow are indicative of recognising the requirements for the team’s own force protection, suitable selection, training, composition and appropriate actions in-country, in terms of training and education delivery.

The battle/action/activity

Since early 2006, the Canadian OMLT has been advising, mentoring and assisting ANA units in Kandahar Province. During 2008, the OMLT consists of approximately 150 Canadian Forces personnel who are training approximately 1000 Afghan soldiers of the 1st Brigade, 205th Corps, broken down into Kandaks (battalions) of approximately 350 soldiers each. Some Canadian Forces personnel have also reinforced Canadian civilian police officers who are training the national police. Canadian Forces mentors accompany their national army protégés in operations against insurgents.

The overall objective of the OMLT is to bring the Afghan army and police to a level where they can take over responsibility for the security and stability of local areas within Kandahar Province and extend the legitimate authority of the Government of Afghanistan.

The P-OMLT teams live with the ANP in their police substations in-country. The ANP are not strictly police in the Western sense, but more like paramilitary police, so they frequently conduct combat operations in the hinterland. Mentoring the ANP therefore requires a blend of combat arms and law enforcement experience (although no civilian police advisers are currently allocated to the teams).
Observations and comments

The following observations and comments are contained in the report of the Canadian OMLT, and are provided from the perspective of the soldiers deployed on operations as part of the training team. It is interesting that the recommendations place considerable focus on force protection of the team itself (which includes weapons proficiency and an all-arms call for fire skills), CIED training (to pass on these skills), law enforcement procedures, and attendance at common NATO courses.

Formalisation of the training team. The Canadian Forces’ P-OMLT had already undertaken four rotations with each rotation from the OMLT and MP organisations. A key recommendation to facilitate their staffing by suitable personnel was to formalise the team’s establishment in the orbat. This action would also facilitate future force generation for the expertise required.

Team composition. The recommended team composition to mentor an ANP element is an infantry SGT, an MP senior CPL, three infantry CPLs and two MP CPLs. As the security situation changes, this composition should be constantly reviewed.

Training. The training observations and comments relate to the team’s approach to their tasks and the level of preparation required for P-OMLT. The requirements for their own force protection should be noted. Observations and comments are as follows:

• **Weapons.** Every P-OMLT section member should be qualified to the set infantry standards for personal small arms, machine guns, heavy machine guns, the M72 (short-range anti-armour weapon), the M203 (grenade launcher model), the 84 mm Carl Gustav direct fire support weapon, the 60 mm mortar (not in the Australian inventory) and grenades. An implication here is that the P-OMLT must be prepared to fight, as well as train others, but also to ensure that the ANP (a paramilitary organisation) can also fight and defend itself.

• **All-arms call for fire.** Due to the isolated nature and locations of the P-OMLT, it was recommended that they be qualified in all-arms call for fire procedures.

• **Driver training.** All sections require qualified drivers and gunners for the relevant combat vehicles being deployed. In this case, the Canadian P-OMLT uses the RG-31, a modified South African Nyala, a four-wheeled armoured vehicle with remote weapons station and gunner’s turret, but smaller than the ASLAV.

• **Counter-improvised explosive device training.** The P-OMLT requires a high level of CIED knowledge, training and practical application to be able to impart appropriate TTPs to the ANP. The Canadian Forces have provided extensive guidance on CIED for refinement and inclusion in TTPs. Australian guidance in tactical doctrine is provided in *ADDP 3.17, Counter*
Collective training skills. The report recommends that the P-OMLTs conduct advanced collective training skills (for the ANP) and tasks in accordance with the Canadian Forces’ infantry battle skills training standards. These likely skills and tasks remain consistent with the techniques associated with stability activities and currently include:

• the manning and conduct of OPs
• mounted and dismounted patrolling in rural and urban areas
• convoy procedures
• VCPs
• the defence of a strongpoint
• urban environment procedures
• section attacks
• patrol and vehicle searches.

Law enforcement. MP section members are required to train and mentor the AFN in the following law enforcement subjects:

• arrest procedures
• vehicle and personnel searches
• prisoner rights and handling procedures
• police values and ethics
• human rights
• note-taking
• the use of force procedures.

Training exercise. The P-OMLT also conducts training exercise and simulations to practise their own procedures, and includes ANP exercise players for mentoring practice.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization course. It is notable that apart from conducting their own mentoring courses and training the Canadian Forces also sent P-OMLT members (including section commanders and their 2ICs) to the NATO OMLT course conducted in Hohenfels, Germany.

Materiel and equipment. The following comments were made relating to vehicles and personal weapons:

• Vehicles. The Canadian Forces RG-31 combat vehicle (light armoured vehicle) is seen as the preferred P-OMLT section vehicle; the M113 can be reliably substituted if the RG-31 is unavailable.
Personal weapons. The P-OMLT preferred weapon is the Canadian Forces C7A2, a Canadian Forces version of the US M16. The P-OMLT also uses the C8, which is a carbine version of the US Colt series of weapons.

Policies. The report emphasises the requirement for all P-OMLTs to become familiar with procedures and policies taught to the ANP by other nations, to ensure that any differences in national policies are identified.

Evaluation. Anecdotal evidence from service Canadian Forces officers indicate that the Canadian Forces P-OMLT has been successful in its training and mentoring procedures. It is notable that, as the ANP is largely a paramilitary organisation, there is no attendance in the teams from civilian police organisations or agencies, nor is there any such plan.

Annex:
A. Interim guidance for training and mentoring indigenous forces overseas
Annex A to Chapter 5

Interim guidance for training and mentoring indigenous forces overseas

Background. A large number of ADF and other agency personnel have been involved in training foreign troops overseas. In theatres which have included diverse places such as South-East Asia (eg, the Australian Army Training Team – Vietnam in South Vietnam) and the South-West Pacific area (eg, those under the auspices of the Defence Cooperation Program) for many years, and more recently in East Timor, Iraq and Afghanistan. These experiences for trainers have brought many challenges, both old and new. Older challenges have involved inspiring personnel from another culture to learn, having linguist support available (if not linguists themselves) and the assessment of training liability. Newer challenges, have seen the need for force protection as the trainers and trainees themselves increasingly become insurgent targets.

Doctrinal basis. As no formal Australian doctrine currently exists, the following guidance is provided from a wide variety of sources: from Australian trainers currently overseas, from the experiences of trainers in the South-West Pacific area, from the Australian Army Training Team – Iraq and from Canadian OMLT reports (which include the ‘14 tenets’ reproduced here). This guidance is neither exhaustive nor proscriptive and should therefore be considered interim and evolving. A further cautionary note is made that the preparation for training and mentoring indigenous overseas forces is also contextual; it must relate to the country of deployment as many cultural aspects and practices will differ from nation to nation, and sometimes between ethnic/tribal groups within nations.

Applicability. This guidance does not cover training indigenous personnel in Australia, although some aspects are clearly applicable. Information on working with Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples can be found in the Regional Force Surveillance Unit (RFSU) set of publications and in their relevant TTPs.

Training team force preparation

The preparation of the training and mentoring team prior to deployment is essential. Force preparation should allow sufficient time prior to deployment to allow teams to bond and build formal and informal relationships. The following four basic tenets are offered:

- **Why are you there?** Trainers and train-the-trainers are also mentors and must fully understand their role and have clearly defined parameters, including their status in theatre. Training objectives and learning outcomes must be clearly defined and relevant to the indigenous force being trained and mentored.
• **Understand the culture.** Preparations must include cultural awareness and the languages of the target nation, the soldier being trained, their leadership positions within their culture and why they are fighting (ie, their motivation).

• **Personal leadership style.** Those selected for training and mentoring roles must set irreproachable personal standards. They must know the difference between understanding the culture and/or being absorbed by it.

• **Resource availability.** Training and mentoring teams must be provided with sufficient resources to undertake their tasks successfully, deliver what they are required to do and deliver what the HN wants.

**Cultural awareness.** Cultural awareness is a critical aspect to be understood and applied before the team can be effective in its role. Cultures differ significantly around the world and in countries where Australian Army training teams are deployed. Once the target country for deployment is identified, training should include understanding local protocols, the culture of CF deployed there and the nature and practices of the organisational culture of other agencies. These are described as follows:

• **Local protocols.** Engagement with the local community, particularly KLE, is an essential part of deploying on operations and it is important that care is taken not to offend. This can be difficult at times when the values of another nation differ significantly from those of Australia. For example, in some cultures it is considered rude not to accept food when offered. A commander in the Middle East area of operations (MEAO) will encourage personnel to accept food whenever offered; however, a high level of personal hygiene should be encouraged to avoid stomach upsets. Opportunities to develop a rapport with the local community should be taken where possible, while keeping in mind any cultural differences and social mores. Religious and cultural holidays must be understood by all personnel, particularly those who are working with the local population, which includes military trainers. Activities and training regimens need to be adjusted accordingly. Trainers must understand that religious holidays differ between ethnic and religious groups (eg, between Sunni and Shiite Muslims). This means that they can be the catalyst for violence between the two groups.

• **Coalition culture.** Just as importantly, deployed troops should also familiarise themselves with the languages and customs of the Coalition troops they will be working with. Even our closest allies, who speak English, use different terminology and apply different meanings to words. For example, in Australian and British practice, the street-level floor of a building is called the ground floor and the one above this is called the first floor; however, in US and European practice, the street-level floor is called the first floor. Similarly, words that carry concepts such as ‘gratitude’ should be used carefully – for us it is just a word, for other cultures it may connote the giving of favours and a sense of obligation.
Interagency culture. Significant cultural differences can also be manifested between organisations from the same country. When sharing amenities with Australian Government organisations and NGOs, commanders need to be aware of any discrepancies in regard to what is allowed. For example, in the Solomon Islands AFP personnel are allowed to drink alcohol while off duty, while our soldiers are not. This can lead to leadership and morale problems if not managed. In these circumstances, the commander reinforced to soldiers that the importance the mission demanded their abstinence and soldiers were separated from AFP personnel except where common standards were applied.

Language training. Language and culture are inextricably related. Basic language training in common greetings and courtesies yields positive results in an AO where English is not the primary language. Commanders should provide access to this training for as many personnel as possible. Personnel also need to be aware that body language is universal, and that postures Australians find threatening are likely to threaten others as well. A comprehensive cultural training package with an extensive language component is generally seen as a first step to preparing soldiers for communicating with locals in theatre, to be augmented by other language training if possible. Contemporary experiences reveal that those undertaking just two weeks of language training found that their communication skills on operations offered several returns on the investment. This period must be planned well in advance of deployment. If insufficient time is available during pre-deployment training, additional resources such as phrasebooks should be sought. Voice recorders have also been used to capture human intelligence for later translation where translators are scarce. Whatever the level of language proficiency obtained in the pre-deployment phase, language training should continue on operations as part of in-theatre training.

Elastic skills. While on operations, soldiers of the training team will need to draw on so-called ‘soft’ or human skills (eg, negotiation, mediation and cultural awareness). It is recommended that incorporating these skills into pre-deployment training programs be attempted. Conversely, training team soldiers also need to be sensitive to, and adapt for, situations that may deteriorate from stability to violence, either as a result of misunderstandings or planned intervention.

Further information on training team selection can be found in LWD 3-0-5, Security Force Capacity Building [Chapter 2].

In-theatre

Tribal/clan issues. Tribal standing within the community has more bearing than military rank. For example, in the MEAO a local sheik’s son may be a PTE while his officers may be of ‘common’ background. This impacts the internal leadership dynamics of the training team and the indigenous training unit. The local pecking order needs to be determined quickly to avoid overstepping local social boundaries and mores. Posting low-rank, high-social class members to other regions may be an option. Alternatively, the early identification of these issues in the selection and recruitment stage may provide opportunities for local leadership
to be coincident with military rank. In any event, local culture may demand that they select their own leaders to be trained. Importantly, tribal and clan issues are not restricted to the MEAO, but also occur in Australia’s Top End among our own indigenous people, and in the South West Pacific, and can also impact on the effectiveness of training and mentoring.

**Building trust.** Mutual respect and relationship building are essential elements to training foreign forces. Once the trust of the trainees has been won, a higher standard of training can be achieved. Building trust must start from the very moment trainers come into contact with their indigenous counterparts and will take patience and sensitivity. Understanding culture, language and social mores is critical to win trust, as is something as simple as sharing meals and conversation.

**Leadership framework.** Apart from closely developing their own leadership style, leaders will need to develop those skills within their indigenous charges. When training foreign troops, concentrate effort on building up NCO/SNCO/WO skills, confidence and understanding of their role. The leadership function and authority are often taken over primarily by junior officers, with WOs conducting administration. The leadership framework is closely related to the tribal and clan issues, whereby their own social standing and rank will overlay military rank. In many situations, teams will be faced with developing leadership frameworks with overlapping social and tribal rankings, complete with the obligations that come with them. This is often the case in the South West Pacific, such as in Papua New Guinea, where the ‘Big Man’ and ‘Wantok’ concepts overrule the superficialities of military ranks.

**Motivation.** Some foreign soldiers join their army primarily for money. This motivation has an impact on their fighting spirit and the risks they are prepared to take. Be conscious of this when working with them.

**Skill building.** The skill sets of local trainees should not be underestimated, as some may have decades of experience in a previous state system and local knowledge that can be applied. The early determination of previous experience can assist with grouping of trainees and the allocation of training resources.

**Use of interpreters.** It is common to use interpreters and linguists on operations but it is recommended that SOPs be developed for their application. These SOPs need to consider the following:

- Interpreters require adequate rest, as translating can often be mentally challenging.
- Personnel are to understand how best to employ an interpreter (eg, where they should stand, when to pause to allow translation and body language).
- Personnel are to ensure that interpreters and linguists have the appropriate technical knowledge to translate technical, military, legal and local jargon. This aspect may require significant in-theatre preparation as many languages derive from non-technical cultures and may not have the appropriate vocabulary we are used to in training.
• Personnel should try to use multiple interpreters or recordings to ensure that translations are correct and precise.

• Personnel are to note that foreign interpreters have the potential to collect information and pass it to others.

• Personnel are to be aware that the locals may pretend that they do not speak English which means that soldiers should still try to be conscious of key themes discussed between sources and interpreters.

• Regardless of the level of trust developed, locally employed MEAO interpreters have had threats made against their families to have them undertake tasks against their employers.

### Canadian Army experiences – the ‘14 tenets’

The 14 tenets can provide a useful guide and, while drawn from the Canadian Army’s OMLT experiences in Afghanistan, may have universal application when generalised, noting the requirement for all pre-deployment training and mentoring team training to be country specific or contextualised. These tenets are summarised as follows and the full article can be viewed on the CAL website:

- **Tenet 1: credibility is our centre of gravity.** In the case of mentoring the ANA, a warrior culture with a strong sense of personal honour, our personal and professional credibility is our centre of gravity. Our mentoring efforts and advice will fall on deaf ears unless the ANA sees the source as being credible.

- **Tenet 2: be patient. Every day your patience will be tested.** You will wake up with a plan for the day and it will be in tatters by mid-morning. You will have a perfect solution for a relatively simple but important problem, but your ANA counterpart will not want any part of it and will instead want to focus on something you consider trivial, or you will discover that they are not empowered to make the simple decision. The ANA has a different way of doing business from what we are accustomed to. Get used to it because it will not change.

- **Tenet 3: show respect – always.** The mentor (and trainer) must be careful not to offend, even if upset or frustrated. The ANA sense of honour must not be violated, as doing so will significantly harm future mentoring efforts, and in the worst case may require some form of revenge. The easiest way to show respect is to treat ANA soldiers and officers like our own. Officers are paid compliments and professional courtesies, and soldiers are given the same type of care as we would our own. This is incredibly important in terms of medical support. Nothing has gained more respect for Canadian mentoring efforts from the ANA than our willingness to provide their soldiers with exactly the same medical attention our own soldiers receive.

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- **Tenet 4: develop personal relationships.** The method you use for mentoring (and training) is intensely personal. It will be based on your personality and that of your counterpart. You must use what works for you naturally, and not pretend, as the veil of falseness will be quickly lifted. Quickly developing rapport with your counterpart should be your first order of business. This is a culture where personal relationships must be established before professional ones. Once you have the rapport and are seen as a credible mentor, you will then begin to make progress. Methods to achieve personal rapport can be as simple as sharing a meal or a cup of tea.

- **Tenet 5: avoid mirror-imaging.** Due to their unique culture and history spanning thousands of years, the ANA will never be a model of a Western army; nor should they be. What this means is that we must find culturally relevant solutions that will endure after we depart. To blindly impose Western military doctrine without an understanding of its theoretical (and thus cultural) foundations will doom it to failure. Force structure, planning processes, personnel administration and discipline all have historical and cultural underpinnings which do not readily accept the blind transfer of a Western system. They require a military bureaucracy, just not necessarily ours. Find solutions that work for them.

- **Tenet 6: integrate planning and mentor counterinsurgency fundamentals.** Planning must be collaborative, with the ANA and Coalition units integrating their efforts from the start. Given their experience in the AO, ANA leadership have valuable insights into the conduct of operations which should be included in the conceive phase of operational planning. In mentoring (and training in) operational planning, the fundamentals of COIN must be at the forefront. Our experience has shown that the ANA has a very good understanding of what is required to win an insurgency, especially with regard to maintaining popular support. We must ensure that all of our actions, both ANA and Coalition, are conducted with the interests and support of the population in mind.

- **Tenet 7: small victories.** You will not want to change everything overnight, and indeed your progress may be disappointingly slow if you set unachievable goals. The ANA will not become a first-world army during the course of your six-month tour, nor should your goals be that lofty. Steady and incremental progress is necessary, and thus you should set small, achievable mentoring objectives that continue toward developing a competent ANA that can stand on its own. If you do not do this you will leave frustrated and disappointed.

- **Tenet 8: understand.** In mentoring the ANA, one must have a detailed understanding of many issues. Foremost is a grasp of their culture, history and some language. You must understand the societal networks your counterpart may be a part of, as interpersonal dynamics and individual histories play a very important role. What was their prior military service? Did they fight with the Mujihadeen? If so, what group? What is their tribal/ethnic affiliation? These issues all play a role in ANA internal politics.
It is a given that Afghans have a different sense of time. They think in terms of the past more than we do, and likewise we think of the future more than they. This has implications in terms of planning and meeting timelines. We must also understand that everyone has an agenda and wants to accomplish something, many times for personal gain. Given the fact that the Afghan people have been in survival mode for two generations, corruption is a fact of life. In many cases what we would view as corruption, however minor, is, in their perspective, just the way business is done. An awareness of its potential is vital, as is an awareness of the differences in ethical boundaries.

- **Tenet 9: know your role.** You must understand your role as mentor and trainer. The ANA have their own chain of command and you are not in it. Their orders are issued through the Ministry of Defence through to the lowest soldier. You must resist the temptation to intervene with direction in order to achieve short-term aims. Your mentoring efforts, depending on a number of factors, may indeed achieve the desired ends. Your advice may or may not be taken; do not be offended if it is not. Your counterpart must weigh many factors. In any case, never usurp your counterpart’s authority, as it will cause them to lose face and your relationship may suffer irreparable harm.

- **Tenet 10: use methods that work.** The explanation of abstract concepts will often be lost in translation. Likewise, given low literacy rates, ‘death by PowerPoint’ is even less useful than it is with Western militaries. Mentors and trainers must use methods that work for them to convey ideas and better ways of doing business. Hands-on training for soldier skills and diagrams for concepts instead of lectures and notes are proven methods. Following every significant activity, ‘after-action reviews’ (ie, a summary of what has been taught or mentored) are priceless in mentoring improvements; they highlight to the ANA what went well and what needs improvement, and what to do to achieve that improvement. They should be encouraged to conduct their own after-action reviews, and have it become part of their routine.

- **Tenet 11: use interpreters wisely.** Your interpreter (when available) is your vital link to your ANA counterpart. You must find one who matches your personality and that of your counterpart. You will find that they will come to understand the issues and terminology, making translation much easier, and will become a trusted source of cultural information. In using an interpreter, it is important to talk ‘through’ them, not ‘to’ them. Eye contact must be maintained with the individual you are talking to, not the interpreter. By this, body language can be observed and the essential non-verbal link maintained. Trainers and mentors must realise that concepts, especially more complex ones, may be imperfectly translated and some meaning lost. Avoid jargon and nuanced speech, and keep speech as simple as possible. Use diagrams if they can help.
• **Tenet 12: ‘do not try to do much with your own hands’.** This quote from TE Lawrence is nowhere more true. ANA soldiers will be more than happy for their mentors and trainers to do their work for them, such as defensive preparations and other ‘tedious’ types of tasks. Likewise, their leadership would be quite supportive of the mentors providing all logistics planning and support. The issue is that if we take the easy way out and do it ourselves, these competencies will never be developed in the ANA. The challenge to be faced is that, for short-term operational reasons, based on prior experience with CF, they expect that we will not let them fail.

• **Tenet 13: balance short-term operational employment with long-term professional development.** The ANA must be developed into an enduring national institution. Unfortunately, many CF commanders have ‘six-monthitis’, or similar ailments based on tour length, while dominant personalities naturally want to see significant operational success during their tenure. The ANA, on the other hand, have been in this conflict since its inception and will be so for the foreseeable future. With this in mind, there is an inherent tension between short-term operational employment and long-term professional development. To address this, the ANA have instituted a nine-month readiness cycle (the red–yellow–green cycle) that allows for programmed leave and training throughout to ensure long-term health and growth. It specifically assists in lowering AWOL rates and increasing collective proficiency. In the face of immediate operational demands, there is sometimes pressure to disregard the cycle. The cycle must be enforced and these pressures resisted to the degree possible by mentor and trainer advocates.

• **Tenet 14: look after yourself.** The final tenet is to look after yourself. Afghanistan is harsh and the environmental and operational challenges will take a toll on your mental and physical health if you do not take preventive measures. The following points are important:
  • Arrive in-theatre physically fit and maintain fitness throughout, which will also set a good example to those being mentored and trained.
  • Get sleep, as nothing will affect you more than sleep deprivation.
  • Eat and drink properly to keep hydrated, and have a well-balanced diet.
  • You will see much that may disturb you, so talking with your fellow trainers and mentors about your experiences is important. Along this vein, blow off steam away from the ANA.
  • Do not go ‘native’ or ‘feral’. You are a soldier and still subject to our well-established rules and regulations – do not lose your moral compass in the passion of conflict.
Conclusion

The following remarks were made by a trainer and mentor who had recent experiences with the Papua New Guinean Defence Force. They provide a suitable conclusion:

*Remember that in the end what you leave behind in theatre does not live on in perpetuity. You can make a difference for the period of time you are there. Maybe you can influence a small group of soldiers to respect their people a little more, treat them a little better for the time being. Just remember nothing lasts forever if it is not fostered, mentored and sustained continually over time.*

*In the end the training and mentoring is the easy part. You are already trained to do it and you do it in your home unit now. The secret is to know why you are there and what is expected to be achieved. Knowing who and what you are dealing with to achieve these goals and having the resources to achieve them.*

*You can achieve a small degree of influence and achievement with your training skills, leadership and the resources of the host nation. However in the end the cruncher is having the personality, the leadership skills, the professional knowledge and judgment to become accepted, trusted and appreciated by the people and organisation you are there to help. In addition the indigenous tronops and/or their commanders must want to accept this assistance. Without these you cannot commence to achieve your goals.*
Chapter 6

Restore

Restore is the process of ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ or ‘provincial reconstruction’. Initially, restore involves the provision of immediate health assistance, and essential services and facilities, and it is invariably associated with disaster relief. The conduct of restore should be carefully linked to IAs and calculated to influence the population. To demonstrate quickly and positively the authority’s determination to restore essential services, initial projects should have short completion times. The results should be tangible and lend themselves to publicity as part of influence actions. The local population should be able to clearly make the connection between the military forces and their success at restore.

This chapter describes the basic considerations for restore and those tasks undertaken by Australia (which may be the lead nation) or the HN, or in combination with indigenous forces and agencies.

Purpose

The purpose of restore is to re-establish essential services, facilities and infrastructure by repair, provision or restitution, and the provision of HA and health assistance.

Description

Essential services are products that do not necessarily rely on facilities to support them; facilities are normally defined as water and electricity supplies, sewerage systems, waste disposal services, roads, bridges and other critical infrastructure. Support to the restoration of essential services and facilities can be provided for the following reasons:

• because civilian agencies are incapable of delivery due to the security situation or the loss of capacity
• in order to improve security by fixing street lighting, improving routes and removing the causes of discontent among the civil population
• to support a whole-of-government approach to achieving political victory
• to promote campaign authority
• to support the logistics and infrastructure requirements of a military force
• to be in accord with legal obligations placed upon occupying powers by international law.
Tactical tasks

The tactical tasks conducted as part of restore are listed in Table 1–2. They are as follows:

- immediate health assistance
- the restoration of essential public utilities
- the restoration of essential public services
- the restoration of essential facilities and national infrastructure
- the restoration of post-conflict special services
- the restoration of intellectual and institutional infrastructure.

Basic considerations

Restoration concepts. There are a number of concepts which provide the basis for effective restoration management. These are outlined in the following paragraphs.

Intelligence led. An effective restore must be carefully targeted to achieve positive results for the force and the society. The aim is to provide the right thing, at the right place and at the right time for the right community. To do this requires a careful and rigorous analysis of the many considerations and factors discussed throughout this chapter and the myriad of interactions that exist between them.

Coordination. Effective restoration relies on coordination by a single agency. An identifiable coordinator who has the responsibility for the full breadth of restoration activities should represent this agency. To ensure community input into all aspects of the restoration process, human service agencies must have a significant role in all decision-making processes. Restoration activity must be coordinated with the efforts of other stakeholders and in line with the long-term strategic objectives. CIMIC staff play a role in this process, conducting liaison with civil agencies and, if practical, establishing a civil–military operations centre as a mechanism for coordination. Subject matter experts such as military engineers and medical staff are also critical actors in the coordination process. This ‘top-down’ approach must be conducted concurrently with a ‘bottom-up’ approach involving close community involvement.

Community involvement. Experience gained through a range of events (from the Army’s involvement in Cyclone Tracy in Darwin in 1975 onwards) has taught us that the restoration process is most effective when individuals and communities actively participate in the management of their own community’s restoration. The involvement of the affected community in the restoration management process creates and supports community infrastructures, and provides the resources necessary for successful restoration, noting that a community’s capacity to sustain an effective restoration process will vary. One of the most effective means of involving the community is through community restoration committees. These committees comprise representatives of government, private and voluntary agencies, and local councils, as well as ethnic leaders and other representative
members of an affected community. Community restoration committees provide a mechanism through which information, resources and services may be coordinated in support of an affected community, priorities established and information regarding the progress of an affected community made available. These committees also provide a useful source of information and advice for the affected community and restoration agencies. The advantages of community restoration committees include:

- reinforcement of local and community orientation of the restoration process
- recognition of the common interests of members of the affected community
- ensuring the equitable application of resources and services
- establishing a mechanism for the identification and prioritisation of community needs
- overall monitoring of the restoration process
- providing a means for identifying needs which cannot be met from within the community and which require resource support from different levels of government.

Depending upon the scale and geography of a conflict, and other issues (e.g., ethnicity and religion), one or more community restoration committees may be activated. Where an event impacts upon a number of communities, it may be appropriate to activate local restoration committees for each of the affected areas. Sub-committees may also be required to meet the needs of special needs groups in a large urban area. In instances such as these, a central community restoration committee may also be necessary to provide an overall forum for advice, coordination and consultation.

Manage locally. Management of restoration activities should be devolved as much as possible to the local level. Experience has shown that, when restoration programs and assistance measures are imposed upon a community, they are less effective than those that are managed at the local level. Resource support is often required from the regional or national level. However, by maintaining participation at a local level, community input and a capacity for incident-affected persons to participate in the management of their own restoration can be maintained. In this way, national and regional restoration strategies, services and resources supplement and complement local initiatives, rather than replacing local endeavour. The local authority may require additional management support following a major incident. This should be provided through the responsible person, agency or committee in the HN government.

Affected area/community approach. Recognising that conflicts rarely occur within the confines of a single local government area, the management of the restoration process is generally undertaken on the basis of an identifiable affected area. The affected area is the entire geographic area affected in any significant way by the event. It is distinguished by the losses that have resulted and by the common interests of the people involved. It may be contained within a single
municipality or administrative region or may cross municipal, regional/district or national boundaries. Affected areas are not always clearly definable and affected persons may be from a dispersed population. For example, a bombing incident in a religious centre or other public place may affect people from a range of different localities. In an instance like this, the affected community should be defined by other than geographic means.

**Differing effects and needs.** This is the capacity of individuals, families and communities to restore losses and re-establish normal living patterns following conflicts varies depending upon their own capacity, the specific circumstances of the conflict and its effect upon them. Consequently, assistance measures must be adapted to most appropriately meet the needs of those affected. This requires sensitivity and extensive consultation with affected people and communities.

**Empowering individuals and communities.** Throughout the restoration process it is essential that incident-affected persons and communities participate in the management of their own restoration. The capacity of many individuals, families and communities to recover is likely to be diminished by the physical and emotional impact of an incident. While assistance from outside may be required to overcome these difficulties, it is important that such assistance does not overwhelm those affected and detract from their participation in the management of their own restoration. Other principles include:

- Emphasis should be given to supporting and maintaining the identity, dignity and autonomy of those affected by the event. Support services and assistance measures should be well advertised on a repetitive basis and easily accessible, but allow people to make their own decisions.

- Restoration should be seen as a developmental process that should seek to develop the community rather than just return it to the previous level. This is one of the potentially positive aspects of a well-managed restoration process. Community infrastructure and functioning may in fact be improved following a conflict, rather than just reinstated to previous levels. The benefits of nation building are well understood.

**Minimum interference.** The restoration management approach should be one of minimum interference in the HN’s conduct of its own affairs. However, restoration services and information should always be readily available within affected communities and be responsive to the range of evident needs. External restoration services and resources are provided as a support to an affected community, and are to be used if the needs following the event are beyond the capacity of existing services and resources. Wherever possible, additional resources should be under local management through the network of existing service providers.

**Recognition of resourcefulness.** In successfully managing post-conflict restoration, recognition needs to be given to the level of resourcefulness evident within an affected community. As with other aspects of needs assessment, the capacity of individuals and communities to participate in the management of their
own restoration and the level of need for support services only becomes clear as the restoration process unfolds.

**Planned and timely withdrawal.** One of the most critical aspects of the restoration management process is that of the withdrawal of outside services. If this aspect of the process is not managed successfully, the positive effect of all previous efforts may be undone. A planned withdrawal ensures community involvement and ensures that a void is not left. This is an area in which community restoration committees have a crucial role.

**Accountability, flexibility, adaptability and responsiveness.** These principles represent four key aspects of restoration management. As with any area of public administration, accountability is an important issue. However, the most critical element of restoration management is the speed with which events may unfold, and it is in this context that managers and staff working in restoration management need to be flexible, adaptable and responsive in a potentially ever-changing environment. The public, media and political scrutiny inherent in large-scale incidents further accentuates the need for these skills.

**Integration of services.** While combat and restoration activities may be separate, they are not always sequential activities and may initially occur in parallel. Consequently, it is essential that there be an integration of all services. This is particularly important when there is an overlap between combat and restoration activities; such as in COIN, or where combat and restoration agencies both require access to limited resources. Many of these issues can be resolved through the planning process, while those that are not can be more easily negotiated during the operational process if effective liaison arrangements and networks are in place prior to an event taking place. There is also a need for an effective integration of restoration services. This is the basis for a coordinated approach to restoration management. Again, the establishment of networks and management arrangements during the planning process will ensure that any difficulties which arise throughout the restoration process will be resolved as easily as possible.

**Planning.** Planning should be undertaken early, as part of the comprehensive planning process in the absence of appropriate civilian agencies. An overall assessment of the HN’s infrastructure should be made and used to target military and civil resources to best effect in support of the campaign plan. Provision should also be made for the military forces to hand over responsibility for reconstruction tasks to appropriate civil authorities and agencies, as soon as practicable. Planning activities should include both HN technical experts and local community representatives. Other factors can include:

- **Formalisation.** Restoration plans generally set out to develop and formalise arrangements for the effective management of the restoration process. This may include details of interagency coordination and specify responsibilities for the overall management of the restoration process, as well as identifying resources and defining responsibility for the range of specific services to be provided.
Whole-of-government approach. Restoration planning is required at all levels of government. This allows for the management of restoration to be undertaken and resourced at the most appropriate level, depending on the scale of the event, and provides for support from the next higher level to be properly coordinated where necessary.

All agencies. All agencies that have a role to play in the restoration process must be involved in the planning process. Through this involvement, working relationships and networks are established and developed, and representatives of the various agencies gain an understanding of the range of tasks that make up the restoration process. In addition to contributing to the development of overall restoration plans, individual restoration agencies require their own plans to manage those restoration services that they provide or administer. These plans should take account of the overall restoration plan and the programs, goals and methods of all other relevant agencies.

Regular review. It is critical that restoration management arrangements are reviewed on a regular basis, particularly after the occurrence of major events. This ensures the currency of the arrangements as well as enhancing interagency arrangements. To ensure an effective interface between response and restoration, response agencies should have some involvement in the restoration planning process and restoration agencies should be familiar with response plans. A restoration plan should also undertake an educative function, which raises awareness about the importance of the restoration process and provides some insights into how the effective restoration process is managed.

All-hazards approach. Restoration plans must be flexible enough to cater for a wide range of post-conflict incidents, resulting from either natural events or confrontations.

Objectives. The broad goal of any restoration plan should be to facilitate the restoration of affected individuals, communities and infrastructure as quickly and practicably as possible. This is best achieved through the activation of management arrangements that ensure that the restoration process following a conflict proceeds as effectively and efficiently as possible. Specific objectives to be embodied in restoration plans should include:

- the provision of suitable security arrangements
- the activation of mechanisms which ensure community participation in the restoration process
- the identification of responsibilities and tasks of key agencies
- the identification of appropriate restoration measures
- the setting out of appropriate resourcing arrangements
• the outlining of restoration management structures and management processes.

• Planning integration. It is important that plans for each of the functional areas take account of each other and that there is appropriate liaison. The most effective means of achieving this is at the committee level, with representatives of the various planning committees attending meetings of the other committees.

• Agency plans and services. In addition to government plans, many agencies also have their own plans. It is in these plans that the detail of the specific services provided by each of the agencies may be found.

Tactical application

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace. Basic services and infrastructure should be examined as part of the IPB process. A correctly targeted reconstruction effort can achieve significant results. Recent campaigns have demonstrated a direct correlation between enemy actions against CF and a lack of basic services. Subsequent reconstruction activity in these areas has led to an improved security situation and reduced the influence of insurgents over the population. 

*LWP-G 3-6-2, Engineer Intelligence* focuses on the military engineer aspects of the IPB.

Funding. Restore activity must be adequately resourced. The mechanism for obtaining funds must be clearly understood and financial authority must be delegated to the appropriate level to ensure that sufficient funds can be accessed in a timely manner.

Use of local expertise. An essential task is to identify and make the best use of local expertise as soon as possible. In order to set the conditions for long-term success and the eventual transfer of responsibility to HN authorities, it is important to involve local authority personnel in problem-solving and decision-making from the outset. This supports the restoration of institutional infrastructures.

Employment of military support

Security. The task of providing a secure environment in which to conduct restoration will usually fall to the military component of the JIATF. This may be seen as a component of control; however, the planning of security will be influenced by the requirement to provide protection to both military and non-military restoration efforts.

Specialist advice. The military component may possess expertise unavailable in other parts of the JIATF or HN, and the tasking of such experts to provide advice to other agencies or the HN can be key to achieving timely restoration. Examples of such expertise include engineering, health, communications/information, transport and logistics.
Specialist assistance. Military engineers will provide the major component of specialist assistance. Although care should be taken not to become competition for the local economy, military engineers may be employed in the following ways:

- conducting technical assessment of existing utilities, facilities and infrastructure
- the preparation of emergency utilities, facilities and infrastructure plans in conjunction with civil agencies
- advising on targeting
- managing civil contractors
- program and project management
- advice on the handling of dangerous goods
- the repair, maintenance and operation of utilities, facilities and infrastructure
- the re-establishment, training and mentoring of HN service institutions.

General assistance. This is the direct effort in non-specialist tasks such as street clearing, disaster victim recovery, sandbagging and unskilled construction.

Transition management

Where military forces have been obliged to undertake activity normally carried out by stakeholders, there is a requirement to hand over responsibility to HN authorities. This process should be 'conditions based', with the conduct of the transfer of responsibility linked to other LOOs. IAs should exploit opportunities to highlight progress and the effectiveness of legitimate HN institutions.

The cessation of formalised support services from outside agencies is a critical time in the affected community’s recovery. Experience has shown that a gradual handover of responsibilities to local agencies and support services is most effective. It may also be timely to hold a commemorative event to symbolise the end of the restoration program and the renewal of the community. In the past this has been achieved through such events as community ceremonies, religious services and a range of other activities that involve the entire community and give a positive focus to the end of the program.

Immediate health assistance

Immediate health assistance can be provided to assist with natural and national disasters, including post-conflict situations, within a whole-of-government approach. The health FEs deployed usually comprise tailored teams, who provide a selected range of primary health care environmental health support, emergency dentistry and aeromedical evacuation support. These teams are structured in their capabilities and staff to be able to respond to the public health needs of designated communities in a post-disaster or conflict setting.
When an already deployed force is called upon to provide health assistance to an emerging crisis, its ability to assist may be restricted by the fact that military specific health support is normally tailored to, and deployed in, support of the health requirements of the deployed force. In these circumstances the only health support available is normally the residual capacity not fully committed to supporting its dependency.

**Purpose**

Health assistance is provided to assist HNs to cope with natural and national disasters. In the immediate aftermath of a disaster, whether it be natural or man-made, the land forces and the broader ADF health community are capable of providing a range of health support options to a deploying FE, which include those efforts made within a coalition. Regardless of whatever health support assets are physically deployed, the end state of any ADF health contribution is to enable the HN to re-establish effective public health programs in the disaster area.

**Description**

It is normal practice for deployed Army and ADF health services to cooperate with international medical aid organisations and to augment the HN’s medical/health capacity. Deployed health FEs usually include primary health care, preventative medicine and environmental health specialists who operate in standard team structures to provide:

- an assessment of major public health threats endemic in the AO
- assistance with the establishment of local health infrastructure
- critical medical supplies based upon standard World Health Organization kits
- assessment of the capability of the HN’s pre-existing health infrastructure
- environmental health services, including vector control, sanitation and water quality assessment
- primary health care, including immunisation against major disease threats
- general assessment of displaced persons.

**Tactical application**

**Selection of suitable personnel.** Often in health assistance situations, whether in Australia or overseas and whether or not Australia is the lead nation, the health support delivered becomes the main effort for the military force deployed to assist. It is therefore essential that the C2 of deployed health support assets is exercised at the highest level within the JIATF HQ and that a suitably experienced and qualified senior health officer be appointed. The senior health officer should be selected on the basis of possessing appropriate skills, knowledge and attitudes required for such tasks, and not on the basis of belonging to one particular health services craft group. In the early phases of a deployment, it is advantageous to the
deploying FE if the senior health officer selected has public health qualifications and a disaster management background.

**Planning considerations.** Planning for the provision of health support to disaster and post-conflict situations follows the standard MAP, although there are some key differences between those activities supporting land force and other ADF and joint military activities which must be considered. These considerations are generic and not necessarily limited to those listed here:

- countering the endemic health threats known within the AO
- acquiring knowledge of the demographics of the population being supported, including cultural sensitivities
- quantifying the availability of the HN’s existing health infrastructure
- identifying culturally suitable water resources and sanitation systems
- coordinating with, and deconflicting the tasks of, the deployed health services of other nations (who may or not be part of a CF) in the disaster or post-conflict area
- using the standard World Health Organization medical kits to provide primary health care services to the impacted HN’s population
- understanding and, if necessary, applying the HN’s system for referral of casualties who require medical support above that which is normally included in the deployed JIATF
- applying the system of resupply of Class 8 (medical stores) and blood, if required, to the deployed FE
- establishing linkages with NGOs and other international organisations that may be providing health support to elements of the population in impacted areas
- establishing the appropriate deployment and allocation of health services LOs
- establishing a clear end state and a post-disaster/post-conflict extraction plan.

**Deployment of health services liaison officers.** In order to ensure that the health activities delivered by the deployed health FE remain focused on achieving strategic outcomes within the whole-of-government approach, and contribute to the re-establishment of the HN’s public health system, the deployment of health services liaison LOs is critical. As a general principle, health services LOs should be allocated to:

- the HN’s national and/or regional government health organisation(s)
- any (and possibly all, if human resources permit) coalition HQ established with the AO
• interface with the HN’s national Red Cross/Red Crescent organisation present in the AO.

## Restoration of essential public utilities

Essential public utilities are those organisations that perform functions essential to the maintenance of the convenient survival of community members. They require:

- a functioning specialist infrastructure for the processing and distribution of those commodities
- the associated technical staff to operate, repair and maintain the system.

Essential public utilities include:

- communications and information systems
- potable water, distributed through either reticulated water mains or tanker shuttles
- electricity supplies generated and distributed through national or local power grids
- gas supplies for domestic and industrial use delivered through either reticulated systems or tanker distribution to local cylinders
- sewerage systems.

### Purpose

Military forces help to re-establish essential public utilities in order to improve the standard of living for the affected community and to foster a sense of returning normalcy in the post-conflict community. Achieving these results will enhance the credibility of the authority and demonstrate a positive intent ‘on the street’.

### Description

The reliable provision of essential public utilities is likely to be used as a key performance indicator of the post-conflict authority and as such may be targeted by those by those interested in prolonging the confrontation or undermining the authority.

The military forces may often be required to restart the management of local utility and service providers, particularly where local authorities have broken down due to the loss of key managers and workers. Wherever security allows, maximum use should be made of the skills and knowledge of local workers and contractors in restoring and running local infrastructure in order to ease the burden on the military forces as well as helping to develop the local economy.

### Tactical application

**Priorities and planning.** Activity should be prioritised in accordance with operational and humanitarian needs. Detailed planning is required by military
experts in conjunction with available HN experts and other stakeholders. As a general rule military involvement should occur where no other organisation has the capacity to act. Military engineers assist in the restoration of essential services and facilities when the civil authorities lack the capacity to do so. While repairs are likely to be of a temporary and improvised nature, early activity should seek to complement longer term repair and development plans. RAE personnel are likely to require the assistance of suitably qualified or experienced RAEME personnel to aid in the repair and maintenance of key machinery involved in the provision of utilities.

**Security.** HN personnel with local technical knowledge are critical to keeping such utilities functioning and must be encouraged to assist. This may require the provision of security for key HN personnel and their families to minimise the threat's attempts to undermine the efforts of the authority. Security of the infrastructure and facilities required for the provision of the utilities is also required and should not be underestimated. The infrastructure can involve extensive networks of sometimes very vulnerable connectors and widely distributed facilities, such as pump houses and sub-stations.

**Spare parts.** Large quantities of spare parts should be built up as quickly as possible to minimise the effects of failures and attacks.

## Restoration of essential public services

Essential public services are those institutions that support the continued survival of the community. They depend on the availability of trained staff and specialist equipment but do not necessarily require specialist infrastructure. They include such services as:

- the police
- fire and rescue services
- basic education
- solid waste disposal.

### Purpose

Military forces help to re-establish the provision of essential public services in order to re-establish the services of the civil authority and to foster a sense of returning normalcy in the post-conflict community. Achieving these results enhances the credibility of the authority and demonstrates the return of the positive aspects of government control.

### Description

The restoration of public utilities involves significant emphasis on facilities and infrastructure, while with public services the emphasis is on personnel and equipment. Activity should be prioritised in accordance with operational and humanitarian needs. Detailed planning is required by military experts in
conjunction with available HN experts and other stakeholders. As a general rule, military involvement should occur where no other organisation has the capacity to act. The handover of public services to the HN authority should be conducted as soon as possible, noting that many of these services are traditionally the responsibility of local rather than national government.

**Tactical application**

**Specialist equipment.** While essential public services rely on trained, experienced personnel, the need for specialist equipment must not be undervalued. While these services probably existed prior to the conflict, they are unlikely to have been structured and equipped for the post-conflict environment. Additionally, the degradation of personnel numbers and skills and the destruction of equipment and facilities may have reduced these organisations beyond the minimum required for even basic functioning. While the capability is being regrown the military forces may have to both fill the capability gap and assist in the restoration of the services to a standard that adequately meets the demands of the post-conflict environment. This standard is invariably greater than that which existed before the conflict.

**Training.** The military forces’ capability to directly fill the gap is very limited. However, their ability to train and foster these public service organisations is considerably greater with various specialists, such as MPs and RAE emergency responders, who have a direct and immediate role in the provision and supervision of services and the conduct of training.

**Waste disposal and security.** The need to provide waste disposal has always been associated with sound public health. However, in the post-conflict environment it also supports the security of the military forces by reducing the opportunities for hiding explosive devices such as mines, booby traps and IEDs. The removal of debris and rubbish from areas likely to be targeted or used by military forces is described in greater detail in *LWP-G 3-6-5, Mines, Booby Traps and Improvised Explosive Devices.*

**Local employment opportunities.** Labour-intensive public services that do not require high levels of training, such as sanitation and debris removal, can be used as employment opportunities to disguise the true level of unemployment and to reduce the numbers of disenfranchised males in the post-conflict period. Again, this indirectly enhances the security situation by reducing the threat’s recruiting pool.

**Restoration of essential facilities and national infrastructure**

The restoration of essential facilities and national infrastructure is an activity that should be prioritised in accordance with operational and humanitarian needs. Detailed planning is required by military experts in conjunction with available HN
experts and other stakeholders. As a general rule, military involvement should occur where no other organisation has the capacity to act.

**Purpose**

Military forces help to restore essential facilities and national infrastructure in order to enable restoration efforts to reach all corners of the affected area, provide for economic recovery and provide freedom of movement to the population. Achieving these results increases wealth, enhances the credibility of the authority and demonstrates the return of the positive aspects of government control.

**Description**

Essential facilities and national infrastructure are those constructed objects necessary to the long-term provision of community function and economic prosperity. They include:

- highways, railways and navigable rivers and canals
- terminal facilities, including:
  - airfields and ports
  - specialist terminal facilities for significant imports and exports
- public buildings, such as:
  - hospitals and community medical facilities
  - schools
  - facilities for community and national leadership, including parliaments.

**Tactical application**

**Construction tasks.** Horizontal and vertical construction is an ongoing activity for military engineers in times of peace and war, with tasks being conducted in remote areas of Australia and overseas. The skills necessary to plan, conduct and manage such tasks are predominantly found within RAE Works Sections and RAE Construction Squadron HQ. These organisations are capable and practised in planning and managing construction, whether civilian or military construction agencies conduct the works. Construction tasks should not be conducted without project management by appropriate military engineers, even if the works are to be conducted by contracted construction agencies, whether or not they are local firms. HN involvement should be maximised through the use of larger construction firms or local sub-contractors, suppliers and materiel importers.

**Construction methods.** Construction methods and the ongoing maintenance of the finished infrastructure should be designed to provide employment. This means that the labour-saving techniques and equipment used in the developed world should not be employed in the post-conflict environment without consideration of the socioeconomic effects and, in turn, the effects on the medium-term security situation.
Security. Security of work sites is required because of the high-profile nature of the finished construction and the amount of funds and effort required by the project. While the failure to complete a project may be seen as a major defeat, each delay or localised failure undermines the authority if not properly addressed by a proactive public affairs strategy.

Provision of post-conflict special services

The provision of post-conflict special services is an activity that should be prioritised in accordance with operational and humanitarian needs. Detailed planning is required by military experts in conjunction with available HN experts and other stakeholders. As a general rule, military involvement should occur where no other organisation has the capacity to act.

Purpose

The purpose of providing post-conflict special services is to remove the direct and immediately damaging residual effects of the conflict.

Description

Post-conflict special services are those functions unique to post-conflict or confrontation periods that facilitate the restoration process and include, for example:

- the clearance of the explosive remnants of war
- the ongoing route clearance of mines, booby traps and other devices to counter the insurgency
- human services such as victim rehabilitation, family reunification and the repatriation of displaced persons.

Tactical application

Clearance of the explosive remnants of war. The clearance of the explosive remnants of war and the ongoing route clearance of mines, booby traps and other devices require special troops such as combat engineers and EOD teams. As these are scarce resources within any military force, they should commence sharing the responsibility with other organisations as soon as it is possible to do so. Certain tasks, such as route clearance and EOD response, are intimate elements of the provision of post-conflict security and may in fact still be combat tasks during this period. This limits the ability of the military forces to reduce their responsibilities in such tasks. For further information, see the United Nations' Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons [Protocol V: Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War], 2006. This key protocol is also further described in ADDP 06.4, Law of Armed Conflict.

Local employment. While contractors are widely available for the clearance of the explosive remnants of war, careful consideration should be given to the employment of HN community members, especially the disenfranchised males of...
military service age. With appropriate military technical supervision and operational and security oversight, contractors or NGOs should be used to employ local staffs to conduct the clearance. Care is needed to ensure that adversaries do not recover explosive materials and devices for sale or use. Local personnel should only be used for locate and destroy-in-place activities, with only trustworthy specialists being used when destroy-in-place is an unsuitable neutralisation technique. Examples of such activities include the highly successful Operation SALAM in Afghanistan, where RAE personnel conducted train-the-trainer courses and supervised the clearance of the explosive remnants of war during the late 1980s and early 1990s.

**Human services.** Human services should be, and usually are, addressed by NGOs. They may require the assistance of the military forces, particularly in the areas of security and environment shaping.

**Restoration of intellectual and institutional infrastructure**

The restoration of intellectual and institutional infrastructure is critical to political victory. The establishment of a community’s normal organisations and institutions reflects the growing stability and independence of the recovering nation or community. These institutions and organisations must be seen to reflect the true nature and culture of the nation or community and display a strong sense of local ownership and success. Consequently, they must never be allowed to be perceived as mere copies of foreign institutions and organisations, or proxies of foreign governments. Restore tasks involve significant interagency work and cooperation.

**Purpose**

Military forces and supporting agencies help to restore intellectual and institutional infrastructure in order to enable the development of independence and cultural development in accordance with nation-building and political objectives. Achieving these results enhances the credibility of the authority, demonstrates the return of positive aspects of government control, and demonstrates in a meaningful way the intent to restore national and community independence. From these actions will also come increasing national self-confidence.

**Description**

Intellectual and institutional infrastructure includes the organisations, the associated facilities and the communications systems of the following:

- **Intellectual infrastructure.** This type of infrastructure concerns the provision of learning and discussion beyond basic education and includes:
  - trade and vocational training
  - teacher training
• professional training
• universities and colleges.

• Institutional infrastructure. This type of infrastructure concerns national and community organisations that enable the community to survive and grow without overt foreign involvement and includes:
  • community and national governments
  • religious groups
  • financial institutions such as banks and credit unions
  • market organisations such as cooperatives, stock exchanges and trade boards.

Tactical application

Local models. These institutions and organisations should be developed using local models and with close community involvement. The form of the institutions and organisations being developed must be locally suitable, relevant and acceptable if they are to last beyond the withdrawal of the military forces and supporting agencies. Where possible, they should be a clear and corruption-free reflection of the post-conflict ideals. While they should be local models, there is also great benefit in having the institutions and organisations linked to, and mentored by, equivalent foreign institutions and organisations, especially those from nations with similar social and cultural characteristics.

Security. There are two aspects to the application of security. The first relates to the attractiveness of these emergent institutions and organisations as targets to be attacked because they demonstrate the return of normalcy to the community and the increasing control of the civil authority. The second aspect relates to their attractiveness for infiltration and control by insurgents and criminal elements. Criminal elements are particularly interested in those institutions associated with finance and markets, and political influence; insurgents are interested in those that control ideologies, such as religious groups (especially where literacy levels are poor and religion is a dominant concept), those that control influence and those that can provide revenue.

Training and mentoring. The necessary knowledge and skills to establish and operate these institutions and organisations may not be available locally and should be imported through the training and mentoring of selected personnel. These personnel must not only have the aptitude to perform the functions demanded of them, but also be acceptable to relevant key stakeholders. The skills and knowledge can be provided through locally run courses and mentoring programs, and the attendance of carefully selected individuals at foreign courses and institutions. Care is also needed to ensure that the training and mentoring is culturally appropriate and not perceived as being imperious or an attempt to replicate a foreign model locally.
Construction tasks. These are discussed in the preceding paragraphs on the restoration of essential facilities and national infrastructure.

Historical example of restore: Operation SUMATRA ASSIST/TSUNAMI ASSIST, Joint Task Force 629, Banda Aceh, Sumatra, 26 December 2004

In 2004, Australian forces and other organisations have responded rapidly to provide HA and to meet the inevitable requirement for restoration of essential services and facilities as a result of natural disasters. This contemporary historical account provides a short coverage of Operation SUMATRA ASSIST/TSUNAMI ASSIST as a result of the earthquake and subsequent tsunami in Banda Aceh, North West Sumatra. It focuses primarily on the provision of immediate health assistance and other support as key aspects of restore, including interagency cooperation. Figure 6–1 depicts the general region most affected.

Background

The disaster. On the morning of Sunday, 26 December 2004 a massive earthquake off the coast of northern Sumatra caused a series of tsunamis that devastated coastal communities in Indonesia and 11 other countries in the Indian Ocean: Sri Lanka, India, the Maldives, Thailand, Myanmar, Malaysia, Somalia, Tanzania, the Seychelles, Bangladesh and Kenya. The earthquake measured 9.0 on the Richter scale and was the world’s largest in 40 years. The Boxing Day quake shook the Earth’s crust for 8 minutes. It unleashed enormously powerful waves that hit Sumatra within 15 minutes and crossed the Indian Ocean at nearly 800 km/h. 7 hours later, the waves reached the East African coastline some 5000 km away from the earthquake’s epicentre.

Initial impact. The human and physical impact of the tsunami was unprecedented: UN sources estimated that more than 225 000 people perished, one million people displaced and five million deprived of basic and essential...
services and facilities. The greatest number of fatalities occurred in Aceh, North West Sumatra, which was closest to the epicentre. Table 6–1 highlights Indonesian casualties and lists the other nations affected. In barely 24 hours, the disaster caused damage estimated at US$10 billion. The tsunami devastated over 8000 km of coastline, destroyed 3200 km of roads, swept away 430 000 homes and damaged or destroyed 100 000 fishing boats. In the three worst affected countries, Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India, the tsunami compounded existing conditions of poverty and conflict.

Table 6–1: Casualties from the disaster

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Fatalities</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia(1)</td>
<td>130 736</td>
<td>37 000</td>
<td>167 736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>35 322</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>35 322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>12 405</td>
<td>5640</td>
<td>18 045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>8212</td>
<td>8212</td>
<td>8212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:
1. These figures also reflect the thousands of foreigners who were holidaying on the coast who died, including 26 Australian casualties.

The battle/restore action

International response. The UN launched a flash appeal for US$1.1 billion for immediate needs, 85 per cent of which was pledged within four weeks. Governments, international organisations and hundreds of NGOs galvanised into action. Relief operations proceeded swiftly and effectively, providing food, clean water, health services and temporary shelter for hundreds of thousands of people. It is widely acknowledged that this quick response helped to prevent a much-feared effect of a second disaster of disease and malnutrition. In the weeks
following the disaster, multi-agency assessment teams calculated that approximately US$10 billion would be needed to repair the destroyed communities. In response, international pledges from governments, international organisations, private individuals and companies reached US$13.6 billion.

**Australia’s immediate response.** The Australian whole-of-government response was Operation SUMATRA ASSIST and involved various departments and agencies: the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Department of Defence, DFAT, AusAID, the Department of Finance and Administration, the Department of Health and Ageing, Emergency Management Australia and various state agencies. Within 36 hours of the occurrence, the following actions were undertaken as part of the whole-of-government approach:

- **26 December** – an emergency task force of senior officials was established in Canberra to coordinate Australia’s response.
- **27 December** – the AusAssist Plan, a standing AusAID disaster response plan, was activated.
- Essential supplies from the AusAID emergency store were sent to Indonesia on four RAAF C-130 Hercules, also taking two medical teams to conduct initial health assessments and provide emergency primary health care.

**Australian Defence Force response.** ADF personnel were deployed within hours of the disaster. They served mainly in Aceh, with Army medical staff being prominent. The ADF contribution, Operation TSUNAMI ASSIST, was multidimensional in its approach and included the requirement for reconstruction and immediate and emergency health care, as well as the restoration of essential services and facilities of the most basic kind. However, a key focus for this operation was health care. The following FEs were initially deployed as JTF 629:

- **RAN** – HMAS Kanimbla and the embarked Sea King helicopter flight of two aircraft.
- **Army** – Aviation (four UH1H rotary wing helicopters), engineering, medical (ANZAC Field Hospital – 1 HSB and New Zealand Defence Force medical staff) and construction FE.
- **RAAF** – four C130 H/J Hercules, 36 Sqn RAAF and 37 Sqn RAAF (Medan and Butterworth), an air operations centre (deployable), and aeromedical evacuation and air load teams. Also, a B350 King Air was used from Medan for C2 and liaison missions (subsequently replaced by a B200 King Air from Army Aviation).
- **Head of mission (HOM) support staff** – Defence supplementation staff to augment the Defence section at the Australian Embassy in Jakarta.
- **Joint staff and organisations** – HQ JTF 629, Joint Movements Group Detachment and the Joint Logistics Support Force. Later in the operation, the HQ JTF was relocated afloat on board HMAS Kanimbla.
Allies – New Zealand Defence Force medical personnel to supplement 1 HSB.

1st Health Support Battalion. On 2 January 2005 the ADF deployed 1 HSB, which was a Level 3 surgical facility to Banda Aceh, the provincial capital. 1 HSB joined with medical personnel from the New Zealand Defence Force to form the Anzac Hospital. Their mission, as part of Operation TSUNAMI ASSIST was to provide immediate medical and surgical care to the population of Aceh during the most critical stages of the region’s restoration. The Anzac field hospital’s surgical teams of were some of the first to provide definitive surgical care to the critically injured survivors of the disaster. During the first four weeks of the deployment, 173 surgical procedures were carried out for 71 patients in this facility. Thirty patients underwent 119 procedures (69 per cent of the total) for injuries sustained in the tsunami. Most of these patients underwent 78 procedures (83 per cent of the total), requiring debridements, dressing changes and wound management procedures for the management of severe soft tissue infections and fractures. Three amputations were carried out. The remaining 41 patients underwent 54 procedures (31 per cent) for emerging surgical conditions unrelated to the disaster.

Interagency cooperation. A highlight of Operation TSUNAMI ASSIST, and also Phase 2 of the operation, was the high degree of interagency cooperation. After the operation, in after-action reports, several NGOs had placed on the public record their appreciation for the support they did receive from government organisations. However, such cooperation, as discussed in Chapter 1, Annex B to Chapter 1 and also extensively in LWD 3-0, Operations, does not occur or come easily unless actions are undertaken early in the start of the operation to resolve working procedures. Anecdotal evidence suggested that, for future operations of this kind where there would be a high level of interagency cooperation required, it would be necessary to have all agencies together in the initial phase of the operation.

Civil–military cooperation. Army now has a well-established CIMIC organisation and procedures; however, as anecdotal evidence suggested, although the NGOs and other organisations had a good working relationship with the ADF at senior levels, there was still much to be gained from greater interchange between civil and military organisations. A key issue was lack of understanding about each other’s procedures, methods and cultures.

Level of assistance and restoration. As the disaster came under control, the following figures indicate the level of assistance and degree of restoration provided in a relatively short time:

- 1200 t of HA distributed by air
- 70 aeromedical evacuations
- 2530 people transported by air
- 3700 medical treatments
• 4.7 million L of clean water produced
• 9000 m$^3$ of debris cleared
• 1000 m of road cleared
• 1700 large drains cleared
• six large fishing boats salvaged.

Observations and comments

Restore planning involves a large number of basic considerations, many of which apply to post-conflict states rather than to disaster-affected regions. The brief observations and comments in the following paragraphs focus on those considerations applicable to this example.

Coordination. Effective restoration was facilitated at several levels. The first level was that of Prime Minister and Cabinet, which led the initial crisis meeting on 26 December with other key departments present. At this meeting, procedures were reviewed and an immediate plan for the response made. The next level of coordination was located in the various departments that worked together to formulate the overall plan and decide on the lead agency, in this case, AusAID. The next level below was that of coordination of the operation in-country, to ensure that relief efforts were not wasted. Fortunately, most Australian government departments are used to working together, but there is still progress to be made with NGOs. Coordination in-country occurred not only between aid organisations and reconstruction teams, but also between those and their Indonesian counterparts.

Community involvement. In Aceh, the disaster was so devastating that many local organisations had ceased to exist as functioning entities. However, local leaders, with their Indonesian Military (commonly known as TNI) counterparts, were intimately involved from the start of the operation. ADF initiative also played its part in seeking out those counterparts who can provide assistance.

Manage locally. The management of restoration activities should be devolved as much as possible to the local level. Experience has shown that, when restoration programs and assistance measures are imposed upon a community, they are less effective than those which are managed at the local level, and this was the case in Aceh. Because the community was so badly affected, with destruction widespread, it became necessary to undertake projects focused on the immediate needs of the local people within the capabilities of the deployed force. 1 HSB provided the Level 3 facility and had local advice as a network to channel the most affected casualties to the Anzac facility.

Affected area/community approach. Recognising that conflicts rarely occur within the confines of a single local government area, the management of the restoration process is generally undertaken on the basis of an identifiable affected area. These areas are generally geographical in nature. On a global scale, as seen in Table 6–1, the affected area was enormous and could only be assisted ‘locally’, that is, by the affected nations themselves. Aceh was the main affected
area because it was the closest to the epicentre and received the bulk of the immediate aid and restoration effort.

**Differing effects and needs.** The capacity of individuals, families and communities to restore losses and re-establish normal living patterns following conflicts varies depending upon their own capacity, the specific circumstances of the conflict and its effect upon them. In Aceh, the bulk of local people were utterly devastated by the enormity of the level of destruction: more than 167,000 casualties and thousands of dwellings of various types destroyed, with roads, infrastructure, sewerage, power and practically every facility gone. Anecdotal evidence again pointed to the remarkable ability of affected people in Aceh to deal with their shattered lives and try to help the arriving organisations. Indonesians possess a resilience that greatly impressed supporting agencies, a factor which prevented further catastrophic effects such as disease. The initial assessment team that flew in on 27 December was able to provide detailed information to guide the response. Invariably, such disasters will require the generic basic needs of food, water, shelter and health care before anything else can be done.

**Empowering individuals and communities.** The capacity of many individuals, families and communities to recover is likely to be diminished by the physical and emotional impact of an incident. While assistance from outside may be required to overcome these difficulties, it is important that such assistance does not overwhelm those affected and detract from their participation in the management of their own restoration. Such was the case in Aceh and, as discussed previously, the Indonesian’s resilience and community spirit (sustained by religious life) enabled individuals and communities alike to have ownership of their own recovery and the long restore process that was to follow.

**Minimum interference.** Minimum interference relates to empowerment and the need for self-capacity building. Reconstruction teams often use local support and resources to supplement their stocks, and will invariably leave behind suitable supplies to aid local efforts. In Aceh, because of the scale of destruction and relief effort required, the concept of minimum interference related more to empowerment issues, underpinned by the need to avoid the ‘aid dependency’ mentality.

**Recognition of resourcefulness.** As mentioned, the capacity of individuals and communities in Aceh to participate in the management of their own restoration was impressive. This recognition was freely granted, as it was experienced as the level of need for support services became clearer and evolved as the restoration process unfolded.

**Planning.** As a general underpinning principle and basic consideration, restore planning for disasters should be undertaken immediately when the disaster becomes known. On the day of the disaster, 26 December 2004, Australian Government planning for the immediate and later responses were already underway by early evening (1800h). This planning, undertaken by an experienced government and experienced government agencies, provided the immediate response and the necessary assessment team to evaluate the full scale of the
disaster, and was therefore what was needed in terms of the detailed response. The rapid transmission of this information allowed for the appropriate and relatively scarce resources to be targeted and deployed. Disaster planning for restore also falls into several levels: the whole-of-government approach facilitates interagency planning (but not always between government organisations and NGOs) between the political and military arms of government very well and cascades to lower levels, where each agency or department has its procedures worked out. ADF deployed FEs have well practised procedures to ‘get there’ and for ‘what happens when they get there’ and also for future requirements (often not possible until the force is in-country). Another factor is that planning for restore does not occur when the incident happens or requires it; it is ongoing based on experiences. The response to Aceh was an example of sound planning at all levels and, as discussed earlier, was not without some issues (eg, interagency cooperation and CIMIC).
Chapter 7

Assist

Assist aims to preserve the rule of law, enable the conduct of elections and provide environmental and HA assistance (in the form of selected services), which may be conducted on Australian territory or abroad. Examples of assist on Australian territory include those activities conducted under the auspices of DACC (comprising various categories, ranging from public displays through to disaster relief) and DFACA (comprising mainly internal security actions in support of government requirements). DACC and DFACA are discussed in Chapter 3. Actions abroad usually comprise a suite of interrelated activities, such as assisting a HN to preserve the rule of law (establishing the rule of law is discussed in Chapter 4); enabling the conduct of elections; the provision of environmental aid, health aid and HA; and other support under the Defence Cooperation Program. These assistance programs can be ongoing past the conclusion of a specific stability action and may require long-term commitments to realise their goals. A recent example is the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, which invariably included aspects of control, restore and reform.

This chapter describes the basic considerations for the conduct of assist and CIMIC, and provides a historical example for perspective.

Purpose

The purpose of assist abroad is to provide relevant forces and organisations, usually as part of a JIATF or JTF, to enable the preservation of the HN’s rule of law; the conduct of free elections; and the provision of environmental, health and HA.

Description

Tactical tasks. The tactical tasks associated with assist, detailed in Table 1–2, are:

• supporting the rule of law
• providing support to elections
• enabling HA.

Basic considerations

Rule of law. The rule of law is a precondition to successful assistance, and can be considered a trigger for transition from control to assist tasks. The guidelines for establishing support for the effective rule of law in post-conflict states is based on the Charter of the United Nations [Chapter VI – Pacific Settlement of Disputes and Chapter VII – Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the...
Peace, and Acts of Aggression], underpinned by the authority of the military forces.

**Protection of existing facilities.** Early efforts must be made to protect existing government infrastructure. Failure to do so is likely to increase the resources and time required to establish even basic HN governance capability.

**Use of existing institutions.** The use of existing institutions, augmented if necessary, establishes the return to indigenous self-sufficiency. An early assessment of local capacity and subsequent action to assist in the full restoration of institution capacity stimulates confidence in indigenous capability building. Experience has shown that co-opting existing government institutions produces faster results than establishing new ones. In order to provide an initial degree of governance, there may be a requirement to permit some former regime elements to remain until they can be replaced by a suitable alternative.

**Elections.** A possible task in supporting elections is the maintenance of a secure and stable environment. Military forces can be deployed to provide a physical deterrence to aggression and, if there is a threat of intimidation, routes to the polling booths and workers involved in the management of the election should be protected. The military forces can also play a role in publicising the event by explaining eligibility to vote and how, and where, to vote. This process, however, must be conducted in a way that is seen to be completely impartial in respect to election outcomes.

### Supporting the rule of law

Supporting the rule of law is a critical task for assist. For commanders of JIATFs executing post-conflict control and assist, establishing a rule of law is an operational task that should be viewed in three tiers. The first tier is that of understanding what the rule of law means as part of the general principles of democracy; the second tier is the general practical application of these relative to the situation in the affected state; and the third tier is the set of tactical actions (usually temporary in nature) undertaken to enforce these measures where necessary.

The challenge for the transition military force is to convince the population of failed states, who are traumatised, to reaffirm their trust in new institutions, often centred on a police force and judiciary which had terrorised them under the old order. Conducting assist to re-establish the rule of law must therefore balance the need for diplomatic approaches (soft force) with the imposition of discriminate (hard) force.

**Definition.** The rule of law describes a condition in which a state is governed by a lawfully constituted government which administers the business of the state according to laws that apply equally to all citizens of the state, and the only authority in the state exists under this law.
Purpose
The purpose of establishing a rule of law is to deliver personal security for the population, particularly against criminal activity, and set the conditions for the resumption of normal economic and social activity.

Description
As discussed in Chapter 4, establishing the rule of law is an essential early measure that can increase the chances of mission success and is underpinned by the Charter of the United Nations [Chapter VI – Pacific Settlement of Disputes and Chapter VII – Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression]. Its basis lies in effective policing and the protection of HN citizens against criminal activity. Its enactment enables the delivery of personal security for the population and also serves as a confidence-building measure. Experience has shown that it can take over a year to build and deploy a foreign civil police force. Military forces can consequently come under pressure to maintain internal security and fill the vacuum, at least as an interim measure. Where this is necessary, they should be complemented by civil law enforcement capabilities and replaced entirely by an appropriate civilian organisation as soon as practicable.

Policing needs to be linked to judicial and penal processes and will form part of a wider reform and assist process as the situation progresses. Specialist pre-deployment training is usually required for elements of the assistance force, including the early identification of suitable civil police from the donor nation for deployment to the HN as part of the initial stages. Legal guidance and clarification must be sought concerning powers of arrest and detention. Appropriate information actions to influence the population are key to the successful establishment of the rule of law.

Tactical application
Interim measures for establishing the rule of law. A broad framework for interim measures can include, but is not limited to:

• the provision of law enforcement by deployed forces (either military or police)
• the interim legal codes and procedures permitted by international law, and the establishment of police and judiciary structures
• the identification, security and preservation of evidence of war and other major crimes, and the identification and detention of perpetrators of these offences
• the development of a media plan to educate citizens on their rights and responsibilities, and on the interim procedures and codes
• support for the establishment of an international monitoring presence
• the development of a plan to publicise successful indictments and encourage citizens to come forward with information on criminal activity.
**Information actions.** Information actions are required concurrently to influence local, national and regional attitudes and perceptions in order to develop law and order. They provide the means by which military commanders can communicate with the local population. Adversaries can exploit any information vacuum. The following are examples of how information actions can be directed:

- to promote the authority of and generate popular support for legitimate HN institutions and their security forces
- to marginalise violent factions, criminals and other spoilers from the majority of public support
- to explain the reason for military actions and the use of force
- to communicate instructions to the population
- to shape conditions prior to military activity in order to pre-empt negative effects.

**Tasks for establishing temporary rule of law.** Establishing and maintaining the rule of law is essential when undertaking stability activities. In some situations, such as the immediate aftermath of a conflict, HN law and order institutions may not be capable of performing this function, and it is unlikely that a significant number of international police can be immediately available to replace them. Responsibility for enforcing law and order therefore falls to military forces. The steps outlined in Table 7–1 provide a framework that can be employed to develop solutions to the problem of establishing law and order where no other capacity exists.
Table 7–1: Establishing temporary rule of law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Execution/activity</th>
<th>Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Understand legal authority.</td>
<td>Understand the means available to the military to enforce the rule of law. This includes the use of force and powers to stop, search, detain and intern civilians. Ensure that actions taken in order to establish the rule of law are legal.</td>
<td>Legal authority specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Communicate – expected behaviour, restrictions and consequences must be clearly articulated to the civil population.</td>
<td>Engage prominent local figures within the civil community. Use local media. Use information operations activities to inform and influence behaviour.</td>
<td>Tactical PSYOPS teams, Legal authority specialists, Interpreters, Civil police advisers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Impose/maintain the rule of law.</td>
<td>Consider the use of curfews. Conduct patrolling activity (if possible with the local law enforcement). Stop/search/detain persons as necessary.</td>
<td>Interpreters, Manoeuvre FEs, Civil police advisers, Legal authority specialists, MPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task</td>
<td>Execution/activity</td>
<td>Resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish and a run temporary detention facility:</td>
<td>a. Include inspections by IOs (eg, ICRC) and prominent local figures.</td>
<td>MPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. Provide opportunity for inquiries and visits by family members (through the ICRC).</td>
<td>Prison service advisers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. Publish lists of detainees and their location.</td>
<td>Logistic and medical advisers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>d. An independent oversight mechanism should be established (eg, a committee of prominent local figures, appropriate IOs).</td>
<td>Clerical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Interpreters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Information operations personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Legal services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Establish an interim judicial system to determine the need for internment:

a. A panel of military and prominent civilian figures may provide an appropriate means of doing this.

b. Efforts should be made to reduce the numbers held in detention facilities for minor offences.

c. Processes and findings should be publicised.

4. Transfer responsibility to appropriate organisation. These could include international or HN police and prison services and judicial systems.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Execution/activity</th>
<th>Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree on the conditions for the transfer of authority early.</td>
<td>As previous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support the development of police, judicial and penal systems.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Address the preceding two points as components of broader reform actions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Support to elections

Establishing a secure environment may be another task for the military forces, apart from providing a physical presence and protection for the process. Regardless of the level of support provided, the deployed forces should take every measure to avoid suggestions of influencing the outcome of elections, including during the monitoring process. Immediately after the election the deployed forces must be prepared to respond to the reaction to election results, particularly to a controversial outcome. Public disorder control may become an immediate post-election task for the deployed forces.

Purpose

The purpose of implementing and monitoring fair elections in a HN is to establish the democratic basis for interim governance by the HN and to ensure that democratic processes, once established, can be maintained.

Description

The temptation to hold early elections in order to meet deadlines and exit strategies should be avoided to prevent the legitimisation of spoilers and the disruption of the democratic process. Studies suggest that it is desirable to hold local elections in the first instance to provide the opportunity for local leaders to emerge and gain experience, and for political parties to build a support base. Extended preparation periods also facilitate the establishment of other aspects of civil society, such as a free press, which in turn can facilitate IA campaigns to advertise the electoral process, known as elections outreach. While military involvement underpins the electoral process, largely through the creation of a secure environment, it cannot do so effectively without a sound initial election framework, which is a collaborative responsibility of the UN and HN bodies. Their activities include the following steps in the sequence as presented in the following paragraphs.

**Elections planning and execution.** Elections planning and execution establishes the initial framework, which includes:

- where practicable, maximum responsibility for the security, conduct and counting of an election must be left to indigenous authorities
- setting realistic timetables, goals and budgeting for the elections
- facilitating indigenous decisions on the mode of representation and sequencing of elections at national and local levels
- determining the identification requirements for registration and voting (this aspect could be dovetailed with the initial DDR program as part of the reform process)
- establishing an independent national electoral commission
- establishing or verifying a voter registry (ie, who is eligible to vote)
• providing telephone links to remote locations where voting is undertaken, as
the local communications infrastructure is likely to be moribund,
underdeveloped and/or subject to continual break downs.

**Elections monitoring.** Elections monitoring is usually undertaken at the following
two levels:

• *Securing agreement.* The first level is to secure agreements for an
international and domestic monitoring presence. This means the
recruitment and organisation of indigenous and international monitoring
teams. Their tasks would include providing the expertise to support the
electoral process through effective monitoring, which most likely includes
persons and organisations to verify voting procedures and counts; and
military organisations to provide the means for security and protection of
those individuals, the persons who run the process and the voters
themselves.

• *Deployment.* The second level involves the deployment of international and
domestic monitors, as described, once agreements have been secured. An
important feature at this level is joint cooperation between international
security forces and the local indigenous security forces to effectively
monitor the process. The monitoring process is described in the following
paragraphs in terms of election outreach, and civil and military support
measures.

**Elections outreach.** Elections outreach is the method by which the newly
established electoral process can be monitored in terms of its effectiveness by an
electoral commission. This method can include the use of the media and IA
campaigns for the following purposes:

• to enable the electoral commission to publicise the election timetable and
encourage citizen participation
• to gauge public opinions throughout the polling process
• to facilitate a broader voter education campaign
• to make election results widely available to avoid fraud and misperception
about the process.

**Tactical application**

**Civil support measures.** Establishing the initial basis for the conduct of elections
is a task usually undertaken by the UN, with military support for security measures
during the entire electoral process. The general measures undertaken jointly by
civilian organisations would include:

• *Independent electoral commissions.* Independent electoral commissions
are usually appointed to run an election process. They usually comprise
representatives of the HN and a chairman appointed by the UN.
Independent from political influence, they are charged with the organisation,
oversight, implementation and conduct of elections in order to deliver
impartial, effectively delivered and credible elections. These commissions may also require protection.

- **Private companies.** Private companies may be employed to provide logistic and administrative support (voter registration; election kits of booths, ballot boxes and paperwork; and the transport of ballots) to elections in order to maintain the independent nature of the process. These companies may also require protection.

**Military support measures.** Providing support to the electoral process is a key element in transition assistance. The re-establishment of law and order and the creation of a secure environment are essential prerequisites to the successful conduct of elections. Without some guarantee of protection and security, individuals do not have the confidence to vote and the electoral process lacks credibility. The requirement for security and the desirability of facilitating the electoral process must be weighed against the requirement for the JIATF to be functionally and visibly impartial. Military support for the electoral process may take many forms but can consist of:

- the establishment and protection of voter registration centres
- the establishment and protection of voting centres
- the establishment and registration of polling centres
- the secure transportation of ballot boxes and electoral staff
- security for and the protection of electoral staff (eg, scrutineers and tally room personnel)
- security for and the protection of voters during the voting process, particularly to avoid intimidation by vested interest groups and criminal gangs
- general monitoring tasks, including joint oversight with UN, HN and indigenous forces of the entire process, including the protection of vote-counting centres
- the conduct of security duties once the election outcomes are known
- ensuring that the indigenous security forces (preferably the police services) are actively included in the election assistance process.

**Enabling humanitarian assistance**

A military force is only likely to provide HA when the security conditions in an area preclude the operations of NGOs and other civil agencies. Commanders should seek expert planning advice from appropriate civil agencies (eg, UNHCR and competent NGOs) when planning for this type of assistance, assisted by their CIMIC staff. Poorly planned and executed HA can lead to deterioration in the security situation and sour civil–military relations. Should a deployed force be
tasked to provide direct HA, responsibility should be handed over to the appropriate civil agency at the earliest opportunity. The symbols of protection for civilian and military medical units and religious personnel (the International Red Cross and the Red Crescent Movement) are shown in Figure 7–1. The symbol of protection for civil defence personnel used to protect personnel and equipment engaged in providing assistance to civilian victims of war and used by such personnel as firefighters, police and emergency rescue workers is shown in Figure 7–2.

Figure 7–1: Symbols of protection for civilian and military medical units and religious personnel (International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement)

Figure 7–2: Symbol of protection for civil defence personnel

All military forces engaged in HA should do so in uniform, not civilian clothing, in order to assist in maintaining the independent status of the aid agencies. Enabling HA also has the following three discernible levels, which require a broad understanding and interpretation:

- In a very narrow sense, HA is the provision of aid, assistance and immediate relief, which is primarily the province of aid agencies, although these may be supported by military actions and equipment.
- In cases of dire emergency, military forces are often required to conduct relief activities, which can include immediate health assistance, conflict prevention to prevent human rights violations as part of human rights issues, and reconstruction activities such as those discussed in Chapter 6.
In terms of social wellbeing, HA can also involve dealing with refugees and IDPs in the form of:

- the prevention of population displacements
- refugee assistance
- displaced person assistance
- refugee and IDP camp security
- assistance in the prevention of human trafficking.

**Purpose**

Military forces provide security and support to civil aid agencies in order to enable the provision of emergency humanitarian needs and longer term assistance projects.

**Description**

HA often has a broader meaning and application than the provision of aid, which is largely the preserve of humanitarian agencies (eg, Médicins Sans Frontières), international aid agencies (eg, AusAID), other national equivalents (eg, the British overseas Development Administration) or NGOs (eg, Oxfam). As discussed earlier, dire emergencies in an affected state are likely to require military forces, including their own, to conduct relief actions and activities. Such assistance should be coordinated with other ongoing and pending emergency aid and development programs. Usually, it is military forces working to create the conditions in which these other agencies can operate more freely and effectively.

Planning HA to an affected state should be the province of that state initially to avoid an overabundance of unwanted or inappropriate assistance and an uncoordinated approach to aid delivery, which can fuel the disaster prompting the need for HA in the first place. In the broadest sense planning is aided by understanding that the enabling of successful HA usually involves the following areas:

- **Strategic and operational coordination.** Strategic coordination should involve military planners from the outset, seeking the advice of the international aid agencies and human rights groups. Strategic and operational planning can be improved by contingency planning meetings and the harmonisation of doctrine and procedures. When many agencies are involved, the establishment of a lead agency can more easily achieve coordination. Early liaison by contributing national representatives is critical.

- **Subjects of relief.** Common features of some humanitarian crises are the abuse of human rights and the forced migration of IDPs and refugees. The numbers of such persons needing help can range from individuals to entire ethnic groups. In the first case, support to IDPs and refugees should be left to specialist agencies such as the International Committee for the Red Cross and the UNHCR. However, the scale of the problem may require the
assistance of military forces, as covered in Chapter 4. In any case, for a nation that is either a lead or contributing nation, the subjects of relief must be clearly identified for the subsequent task organisation of appropriate forces.

- **Human rights issues.** In the wider sense, HA activities can include the protection of human rights, the recording of violations, the implementation of a justice system and the introduction of a self-sustaining improvement in the human rights situation in-theatre. These wider issues may be outside the province of a military support effort in the short term and would be addressed in a UN-mandated action plan.

- **Emergency relief.** Emergency relief concerns the containment of the means to safeguard life, which can include physical protection and emergency supplies. The protection of human life should be an inherent responsibility of a peace support force in the longer term and should be specified in the UN mandate. In the shorter term, every commander has the responsibility to undertake reasonable actions (consistent with capability) to safeguard loss of life in an affected population.

- **Reconstruction activities.** Reconstruction activities also form part of restore programs and are discussed in Chapter 6.

- **Protection of humanitarian assistance programs.** HA is not always conducted in a permissive or benign environment, requiring a peacekeeping force or other force for protective tasks. A combination of private civilian protective security companies and military forces prevail in the OE, particularly in Iraq and other countries where HA is administered.

- **Understanding negative effects.** HA programs and supporting security force actions, while relieving suffering in the short term, if not carefully managed, can actually sustain the conflict and prolong the suffering. By taking the responsibility of the care and feeding of their own people from the parties, humanitarian relief actions can encourage intransigence and actually sustain the will and the means to fight, rather than the will to make peace. In effect, it can take the blame for the disaster away from those responsible and allow them to challenge the intention, status and impartial nature of the HA mission. In such circumstances, the selective but impartial delivery of aid can be used to refute such allegations and accusations of partiality.

### Tactical application

**General conduct.** Military HA and relief actions may be designed to provide emergency relief; the delivery of aid supplies; the prevention of human rights violations; the protection and containment of IDPs and refugees, as covered in Chapter 4; or longer term reconstruction assistance (elements of which are covered in Chapter 6) to aid agencies and the civil sector, including local communities. Relief missions and tasks should be conducted impartially. However, aid to one party, even when it is based on a perception of need, invariably can be seen as partial by other parties, and relief supplies can inevitably
filter through to belligerent forces. In much the same way, the administration of justice against those responsible for violations of the mandate and international humanitarian law can be perceived as being partial to those in receipt of enforcement actions. In neither case should this dissuade the force from taking the necessary enforcement actions. However, every effort should made to explain which actions are, and are not, acceptable and what their consequences are in order to demonstrate and reinforce the impartial status of the force and to support the independent and impartial position of aid agencies. The delivery and protection of HA and relief involves the establishment of ground transport corridors, air transport bridgeheads and protected distribution centres to ensure that the HA reaches those in need.

Emergency relief actions. Humanitarian relief concerns the containment of the means to safeguard life and usually involves:

- the provision of shelter
- victim registration and family reunification
- the delivery of food and potable water
- the provision of water points, drilling of wells and installation of water treatment plants
- the provision of first aid and medical and dental treatment
- aeromedical evacuation
- the operation of airfields, including air dispatch, air traffic control and air movements
- the air dropping of relief supplies
- the building of roads, bridges and dams
- the provision of electricity
- the burial of large numbers of dead.

Protection actions. The protection of humanitarian relief may involve:

- shaping the environment through effective information actions
- assisting in the negotiation of degrees of freedom for NGOs
- securing a forward mounting base for relief efforts
- securing food storage and distribution points, which can include famine prevention, emergency food relief and food market response
- securing towns, airfields and ports
- securing refugee and IDP camps
- convoy escort
- crowd control
• civil affairs assistance
• providing support to anti-trafficking measures.

Reconstruction actions. Reconstruction actions are also part of restore actions, and these selected aspects are covered in Chapter 6. Key aspects that the force commander for HA should consider, however, are as follows:

• Reconstruction actions are also regarded as longer term HA, and concern the reconstruction of a life support infrastructure capable of providing facilities such as food, water, fuel and other means of life support, containment and the guarantee of human rights. Typically, such actions could involve the digging of wells, the reconnection of water and electricity grid systems (where they exist) and the rebuilding of schools, hospitals and a communications network.

• A speedy and effective response to requests for assistance (while being mindful of possible negative aspects) enhances the credibility of the force, as previously discussed.

• In the conduct of reconstruction actions, care must also be taken to ensure that military activities, such as those currently underway by reconstruction task forces, do not create a dependency culture (eg, reinforcing a 'cargo cult' in some countries) that would hinder the return to normalcy patterns.

• Irrespective of the success of other reconstruction activities, without justice and an effective legal system that guarantees human rights, peace is unlikely to endure and be self-sustaining. The creation of such a system is therefore vital to the longer-term success of the mission, and resources should be allocated accordingly.

• CIMIC staff allocated to the force HQ assist in facilitating reconstruction actions, and a dedicated budgetary officer is normally needed to deal with the proportionally larger nature of engineering expenditure.

• Longer term reconstruction actions are likely to become a joint responsibility between civil agencies and force reconstruction task forces.

Civil–military cooperation coordination. In order to make the best use of scarce resources and to pre-empt potential sources of friction, it is essential that military and civil agencies coordinate their activities and cooperate fully to achieve unity of effort. The following factors apply:

• CIMIC and liaison are the responsibility of the CIMIC staff, but in close coordination with other staff branches, particularly the S3/G3/J3/X3 staffs.

• It is the CIMIC staff’s function to ensure that decisions that affect military activities and the conduct of HA/relief actions are fully coordinated and briefed to commanders.

• CIMIC staff may be increased through the establishment of CIMIC centres. These provide a place of liaison with aid agencies, and the local government and communities, and can react to requests for assistance and
complaints against the parties or the force. These centres should be also regarded as referral centres and should ideally be located away from the main force and in a position of maximum accessibility to the aid agencies and the local population.

- As discussed, it is important that the local population does not develop a reliance or dependency on the force to resolve all their problems.
- When appropriate, CIMIC centres should also contain a media/public relations section.

**Historical example of assist: Multinational Force–Iraq – support to the Iraqi electoral process 2007**

Assist (in NATO terms: ‘interim governance tasks’ and supporting activities), as a facilitator of control, aims to preserve the rule of law, enable the conduct of elections, and provides humanitarian and environmental assistance (in the form of selected services), which may be conducted on Australian territory or abroad. Elections are generally conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Development Program through International Electoral Assistance Teams. The UN does not observe, or monitor, elections unless specifically mandated to do so by the UN General Assembly or UN Security Council, and then only under the strictest of conditions. The UN aims to transfer professional skills, expertise and long-term capacity building to the indigenous electoral management bodies\(^1\), and generally through the engagement of electoral NGOs and civil society organisations. Civil society organisations may be considered to be ‘governance NGOs’. They engage in teaching democratic principles and educating the community in electoral and governance processes. The principal NGO involved in Iraq on capacity building the Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI), and later the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), was the International Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES), and was engaged by the US Agency for International Development.

In Iraq the United Nations International Electoral Assistance Team (UNIEAT) provided logistical support to the Iraqis as well as international observers. The effort was coordinated by the IFES. However, in Timor-Leste, for example, the UN conducted the elections under a mandate. The guiding principle for the UN is free, credible and transparent elections. The ADF has provided considerable assistance for the support of elections in recent times, most notably in Timor-Leste, which included other support such as control and restore, and also in Iraq in support of the IECI. This contemporary account is based on the experiences of an Australian appointed to the Civil–Military Operations Directorate in the Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF-I).

\(^1\) In this case, the IECI which was the transitional election body responsible for the 2004 and 2005 elections, and now replaced by the Iraq IHEC.
The support provided to the Iraqi electoral process in 2007 by the MNF-I is detailed in the following paragraphs as a historical example of assist. Figure 7–3 illustrates the ethno-religious demographics in Iraq, and emphasises the difficulties of holding truly representative elections with so many factional loyalties with deep family ties and personal agendas.

**Figure 7–3: Ethno-religious demographics in Iraq**

**Background**

Following two separate major coalition operations, Iraq has been engaged in a fundamental political and economic transformation, resulting in regime change and subsequent stability activity which has laid the foundations for recovery, reconstruction and the transition to a representative government through assisted and supervised electoral processes. On 15 December 2005, successful elections were held in Iraq for a Council of Representatives in accordance with Iraq’s new constitution. These elections were an important step in Iraq’s transition to
representative government. In May 2006, following these internationally observed elections, Iraq’s first democratically elected and representative government took office, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.

Australia continued to actively support Iraqi efforts to establish and develop a democratic and economically sound Iraq through the establishment and monitoring of the electoral process. The following paragraphs contain a description from personal reports (unclassified and abridged) of the most recent process from the perspectives of Australian LOs attached to the MNF-I assisting the IECI.

**Governance in Iraq.** The overall aims of governance activities in Iraq are to strengthen the democratic process, assist public institutions to become efficient and accountable, and promote the principles of good governance, human rights, gender equality and the rule of law, thus contributing to an environment where the Iraqi people and institutions can interact in a vibrant, participatory and transparent manner.

**United Nations Development Program – Iraq.** As of 2004 the United Nations Development Program – Iraq, in coordination with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, has been a leading partner in assisting the electoral process. The program has provided capacity building to the IECI, logistical support for the deployment of international election experts, support to establish local government and national electoral offices, and support to facilitate voting from Iraqi expatriates. The United Nations Development Program also accesses significant international resources, training and expert knowledge to support the drafting of the new Iraqi Constitution.

**Australian involvement.** As well as Australia’s International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq contributions, Australia also provides additional support through the Australian Electoral Commission and the IECI. Specific ADF involvement saw Australian Army personnel, usually as selected individuals, deployed to Iraq for a tour lasting from January to June 2007 as LOs to the IECI. The position was embedded in the Civil–Military Operations Directorate within the MNF-I, which was the strategic HQ in country. Two weeks after arrival, a US colonel heading the branch was transferred to another organisation and the branch was reorganised, making the Australian LO the ‘Chief Elections’ for the duration of the tour.

**The battle/campaign/action**

**Key issues.** The period was part of the ‘down cycle’ in the elections cycle. The key issues faced were as follows:

- The IECI was to be wound up and replaced by a permanent body to be called the IHEC.

- The IHEC enabling legislation had not been brought before the Council of Representatives.

- The local staff at the IECI were to lose their jobs once the new body was in place.
International electoral experts largely ran the three electoral events held in 2005 as part of the UNIEAT. While there was considerable expertise resident within the Iraqi officials at the IECI, much was not documented or in a form to allow transition to a new body, with the exception of the after-action reports (see the following paragraph titled ‘Multinational Force–Iraq Agenda’).

The capacity building within the IECI which was being conducted by an electoral NGO (the IFES) had stalled due to minimal attendance at work by IECI staff, and low morale within the IECI staff and the NGO.

The IHEC legislation was passed into law in March 2007 and the IHEC was established in March 2007/mid-April 2007.

**Role of chief elections and the Elections Working Group.** The Australian Army officer appointed as Chief Elections also became the Chair of the MNF-I Elections Working Group (EWG), which was originally established and chaired by MAJGEN Jim Molan in 2005. This group comprised representatives from the Multinational Corps C9 (Civil–Military Operations Operational HQ) Branch, Department of State political sections, the Department of State Office of Provisional Affairs, the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq, provincial reconstruction teams, multinational division LOs and the IFES. At the time of the Chief Election’s rotation, representation from the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (Police) and Ministry of Defence was being negotiated, together with a suggested enhanced planning role for the EWG.

**Multinational Force–Iraq agenda.** The MNF-I driving force for the EWG was the requirement for provincial elections to rebalance the distribution of power in the provinces, particularly Anbar (see Figure 7–3) and other Sunni-dominated areas. The US had encouraged this agenda forcefully, as President Bush had set the holding of provincial elections by December 2007 as a key benchmark for progress in Iraq and they were also likely to be linked to a draw-down strategy prior to the troop surge. At this point, it became an issue to attempt to encourage the EWG to refocus its agenda, from trying to predict a provincial election date, to assuming the role of a planning body for generic future electoral events. This issue arose as a result of experiences from the elections held in 2005.

**Previous electoral experiences, 2005.** The mission statement of the EWG clearly justified a refocus towards what it was designed for, without the baggage of impressions that it had become externally politically driven: ‘To plan coalition support to a future electoral event embedding the lessons learned from 2005, in order to minimise the coalition footprint by transiting the conduct of the election to the Government of Iraq and its institutions’. A review of the after-action reports from the previous three elections conducted in 2005 (run by the UNIEAT) revealed that electoral planning was conducted too late in the electoral process which led to significant errors that nearly compromised the necessary impartiality, and critical transparency, of each of these elections. Consequently, little time was available to embed the lessons learned from each of the previous elections, for the following reasons:

- late staffing of the Elections Branch to full staffing levels
• excessive staff rotations over the 12-month period in 2005
• as a result of these problems, the Elections Branch team reacted to electoral deadlines rather than planned ahead to manage the electoral event proactively.

**Lessons learned, 2005 elections.** The lessons learned from the 2005 electoral processes provide a suitable guide for the planning, management and conduct of elections. While these lessons are contextual and therefore apply to Iraq in this case, it is possible to draw some generic lessons. Where this is the case, a notation has been made. Relevant lessons are discussed as follows and are not necessarily accorded any priority in the order of listing:

• *Physical security of the electoral mechanism.* In many nations where elections are a relatively new experience, physical security of the electoral and voting process is essential, and in Iraq this was the certainly the case. The broad security plan was designed around a ‘three ring’ system, supplemented by a coalition QRF and an extensive information campaign as follows:
  • security within polling booths handled by security staff from the IECI
  • an Iraqi police and/or Iraqi military presence outside polling booths
  • an Iraqi military outer security cordon (rocket and mortar range)
  • coalition QRFs located away from the booths but positioned ready to react rapidly
  • a massive IA campaign to disrupt potential insurgent activity and any politically inspired violence.

• *Information activities.* The IA plan was directed towards ensuring that identified disruptive elements had no freedom of movement, or action, on election day. Additionally, and significantly for planning considerations, there was a curfew on any road and vehicular movement on the two days leading up to the elections, and on election day, to disrupt the probable effects of vehicle-borne IEDs. Notably, similar arrangements were undertaken for the elections in Timor-Leste and in some African states.

• *Physical security of personnel.* In a country with insurgent activity the physical protection, secure movement, and provision of secure accommodation and meals to the electoral officials and supporting personnel will invariably fall to CF. This was the case in Iraq and tied up considerable rotary wing and fixed wing assets, ground transport and FOB accommodation assets. This will often be the case in some non-Western countries where stability actions by UN forces have allowed for free elections that are invariably alien to their experiences.

• *Information security.* For the 2005 elections there was a tendency to over-classify planning details and other associated electoral information. As anecdotal evidence and reports suggested, there comes a point when any
written material needs to be declassified for public consumption. The identity cards issue (see the following paragraph, ‘Transport’) is a basic example. On these occasions in the 2005 elections, too much relevant and useful material necessary for Iraqi public consumption was over-classified and was therefore unreleasable to Iraqi FEs and public officials, who had primacy in the conduct of supporting their own electoral process. Such actions only fuel distrust and feed suspicions that the process is ‘rigged’. ‘Secret’ should not be the default setting unless it relates to very sensitive information. Material needs to be appropriately vetted, by a joint Iraqi and coalition body, to allow declassified material to be sent by the indigenous government, its agencies and supporting military FEs. Significantly, this could easily be the case in many non-Western cultures, and it requires careful handling. It should be remembered, for example, in choosing the vetting body, that there may well be a dominant clan or ethnic group who could use this process to avoid passing information to another competitive or rival group. Information is power.

• **Telecommunications.** In any post-conflict country telecommunications are minimal to non-existent in regional areas, and this situation existed and still exists in Iraq. The number of polling booths over the three elections varied from 8933 to 12,042. The coordination of booths and getting booth counts back to the national tally room required significant supplementation from CF in providing technical communications equipment and secure communications channels. This was a significant impost for the coalition.

• **Logistics.** Logistic support in nations where stability actions are required is invariably the province of the UN-mandated forces and/or CF. In Iraq for the 2005 elections, logistic support was undertaken mainly by the UNIEAT, IECI and IECI/UNIEAT private security contractors and the Iraqi Ministry of Transport. Not only was coalition supplementation required but also a large number of assets were tied up in ‘be prepared to’ tasks. An important point is that, while the coalition provided major assistance in the loading and unloading of electoral material around the country, it did not directly handle, nor was it seen to be handling, any ballot or related material so as not to compromise the credibility or transparency of the process.

• **Transport.** Secure movement around the country into regional warehousing to and from polling booths and other locations is the responsibility of the electoral management body. Coalition strategic air was on be-prepared-to tasking to bring ballot papers into the country if required, but was not used for the same reasons as mentioned in the preceding subparagraph on logistics. The biggest transport commitment was the supplementation of various deployed VCPs around Iraq, but it was a challenge as a curfew on movement was imposed for three days. IECI and Ministry of Transport vehicles required personal identification cards for each day to prevent duplication by disruptive elements. This created enormous communications problems, as the details of each day’s ID card were issued late for security reasons. These details had to be communicated down through coalition and
Iraqi chains of command to the lowest levels (ie, those manning the VCPs). Additionally, the identity cards had to be distributed across the entire country at the last minute and sometimes did not reach the end user, particularly in the more remote regional areas (see Figure 7–3).

**Major achievements in 2007.** 2007 saw major achievements in electoral planning for the Iraqi Government and its supporting institutions. These were an electoral/elections National Operations Plan and a refocusing of the EWG:

- **National Operations Plan.** Through a coordinated effort with the IFES, the corporate knowledge was captured by the IECI and a National Operations Plan was produced and transferred to the new IHEC. The plan detailed the following, which were ratified by the outgoing IECI Board of Commissioners and accepted by the new IHEC Board:
  - a generic time line for an electoral event
  - updated electoral procedures manuals
  - national, departmental and provincial Electoral Office planning Gantt charts
  - individual staff duty statements.

- **Refocused elections working group.** As highlighted previously, the EWG was eventually refocused from a reactive planning body to a proactive committee to plan for a future electoral event that minimised the coalition footprint and transferred responsibility to the Iraqi Government and its institutions. As part of developing the National Operations Plan a generic time line was developed for the conduct of an election from first principles. This time line schedule also has utility for election planning in post-conflict countries.

- **Election and voting process.** The preparation of voter lists, registration and testing of the final voter register takes from -40 to +190 days estimated back from the election date. This requires a voter registration period from about -120 to -100 days, which places an additional security demand upon the FEs supporting the election process. The preparation of ballot papers and the security of holding warehouses commences from 45 days to +15 days. The 15 days after election day is to allow for the repatriation of ballot material to a central source to allow for recounts, dispute resolution and any other complaints. The previous generic time line is in line with the UN assessment of election time lines for post-conflict countries. Significantly, provisional elections were voted on in late February 2008 and occurred on 1 October 2008. As yet, a supporting elections law detailing the electoral process, voter eligibility, boundaries and other information has yet to be passed, leading the Chairman of the IHEC on 12 May 2008 to demand this of the Council of Representatives. Apparently, the Chairman stated that, if voter registration did not commence by 15 June 2008, provincial elections could not occur on 1 October. This is approximately 100 days out and again in line with the National Operations Plan.
Observations and comments

The success of the three Iraqi elections in January 2005, albeit with UNIEAT support, demonstrated not only that it was possible to hold elections at all in such an ethnically diverse nation, but also that the process could be made to work and the Iraqi people believed in that process. Democratic government can appear in many forms and the path to democracy is a difficult one. Furthermore, the success of the UN supporting organisations, the MNF-I and the embedded Civil–Military Operations Directorate, and the efforts of the Iraqi electoral bodies, demonstrate the willingness of the local people and officials to return to responsible governance underpinned by the rule of law. The observations and comments in the following paragraphs are based on the basic considerations for assist.

Rule of law. The rule of law is a precondition to successful assistance, and could be considered a trigger for transition from control to assist actions. The guidelines for establishing support for the effective rule of law in post-conflict states is based on the Charter of the United Nations [Chapter VI – Pacific Settlement of Disputes, and Chapter VII – Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression], underpinned by the authority of the military forces. In Iraq, the pathway to stabilisation has been very difficult and troubled – largely due to factional and internecine strife, and the lack of experience with democratic processes. Following UN mandates as a precondition for success, bodies such as the MNF-I have provided solid guidance and assistance to establish the rule of law in order to underpin the electoral process as a pathway to free and fair elections.

Protection of existing facilities. Early effort must be made to protect existing government infrastructure. Failure to do so is likely to increase the resources and time required to establish even basic HN governance capability. Iraq’s conflict is still underway; however, despite this, other stability actions have been in progress for several years, particularly in terms of reconstruction. From this report, however, it is clear that there is still a long way to go in terms of the transport and communications infrastructure, which is a critical asset in supporting elections processes.

Use of existing institutions. The use of existing institutions, augmented if necessary, establishes the return to indigenous self-sufficiency. The early assessment of local capacity and subsequent action to assist in the full restoration of ‘institution capacity’ stimulates confidence in indigenous capability building. Experience has shown, and it has been demonstrated in this report, that co-opting existing government institutions produces quicker results than establishing new ones. In order to provide an initial degree of governance, there may be a requirement to permit some former regime elements to remain until they can be replaced by a suitable alternative. This report demonstrates that it was, and still is, possible to establish or modify developing organisations and processes, such as the refocusing of the EWG.

Elections. Establishing the election processes and the infrastructure to support those elections is the key focus of this report, and in Iraq it has been facilitated by
the maintenance of a secure and stable environment. In Iraq the conduct of any electoral or representative activity would not have been possible until some degree of stabilisation had occurred through the intervention of military forces. In this case, the UN and the MNF-I provided a credible and stable basis for the success of the 2005 elections and the success of the 2008 election process. In Iraq, military forces and supporting FEs were, and still are, deployed to provide a physical deterrence to aggression and, if there is a threat of intimidation, routes to the polling booth and workers involved in the management of the election can be protected. The military forces also played, and still play, a role in publicising the event by explaining the eligibility to vote, and how and where to vote. This process, however, must be conducted in a way that it is seen to be completely impartial in respect of election outcomes, as emphasised in this account. This impartiality and transparency has been a critical success factor for the 2005 elections and remained so for the provincial elections on 31 January 2009.
Chapter 8

Stability activities tactical techniques

Stability activities tactical techniques are military methods for accomplishing a result in particular situations. They are intended to improve efficiency and a uniformity of action, and ensure consistency. Techniques provide an opportunity for commanders to exercise a series of options according to the dictates of the situation.

This chapter describes, cordon and search, noncombatant evacuations, TCPs and VCPs.

Cordon and search

In the past, Australian soldiers have employed the cordon and search technique during the Malayan Emergency, in South Vietnam and, more recently, during Operation SOLACE in Somalia. This technique is applicable to all natures of land force activities. This section should be read in conjunction with LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics and LWP-CA (DMTD CBT) 3-3-1, Dismounted Minor Tactics (Developing Doctrine).

The general factors that need to be considered in cordon and search are the terrain, the nature of the urban and country environments to which troops may be deployed, the human population, the transport networks, the communications (eg, radio, TV and all types of telephones), and the legal and political constraints placed on this type of technique if conducted in Australia; as opposed to the nature of similar techniques if conducted in other countries during conflict or post-conflict reconstruction.

For the conduct of cordon and search it is desirable to maintain a good relationship with the population in order to defeat a threat.

Purpose

The purpose of cordon and search may be:

• to capture or kill target threat personnel
• to capture threat sympathisers or wanted persons of interest
• to capture or destroy material used to support a threat, such as arms and ammunition, explosives, supplies, radios, drugs, or documents
• to capture or destroy an installation used to support a threat, such as a safe house or room, weapons, plant, or a printing press
to safely remove people from threat control, such as unwitting or unwilling sympathisers, hostages, or civilians in an area of likely conflict
• to harass a threat, or
• to gain and/or retain the initiative.

Description

Cordon and search involves the isolation of a chosen area and then its systematic search. The establishment of the cordon and the conduct of the search are two separate tasks resolved in one well-coordinated activity. In any country, this should usually be conducted as a joint military and interagency (including police forces) task.

Whatever the purpose, the technique warrants military involvement when police forces and firepower cannot meet the task. However, the employment of military forces is always restricted by:

• the legal situation
• the need to minimise damage to civilians and facilities
• the difficulty in identifying the threat
• the prevailing political considerations.

These limitations are reflected in the ROE, OFOF, OFUF and IGUF. Where a cordon and search is to be conducted in an area free of civilians, and against an identifiable and aggressive threat, the task may be conducted primarily by military forces and with a greater degree of force.

Tactical application

Planning. The main planning considerations are:

• **Intelligence.** Each cordon and search must be mounted on accurate and detailed intelligence which needs to be continually updated during the planning stage. Intelligence gained must provide the threat dispositions and identify likely reactions.

• **Reconnaissance.** It is difficult to conduct a reconnaissance of an objective without prejudicing security. Reconnaissance will usually be clandestine, and must blend into the normal routine of the area. It may be undertaken by police agents. A great deal of information can be gained from local knowledge. When obtaining this information, reconnaissance groups must be careful not to alert lookouts and informers.

• **Surprise.** The element of surprise is essential. For a threat to operate for any period among a hostile population, they must be well prepared, alert, possess support and be mobile. Any early indication of a cordon and search causes a threat to move unless the objective is confrontation, or they are already trapped by other factors, such as injury.
• **Appreciation.** Commanders must undertake a thorough MAP to arrive at a detailed plan for a cordon and search. While contingency planning is necessary, this technique is less stereotyped than others and the consideration of detail is important. The considerations must account for interagency cooperation to formulate a joint plan.

**Activities.** Cordon and search techniques can be mounted to support the following activities:

• in response to an incident such as a shooting, an explosion or a find
• for IED and booby trap clearances, involving high-risk search techniques
• for area and route searches
• for engineer tasks, such as demolitions and building work
• for public events such as public meetings, funerals and demonstrations
• for arrest, confiscation and seizure actions
• to react to any specific situation based on information, intelligence or other means.

**Interagency tasks.** Where reliable police and other agencies are involved, they should be responsible for:

• advising on the area to be searched
• carrying out any plain-clothes reconnaissance and surveillance
• providing police/agency intelligence specialists to quickly evaluate information
• providing any guides required for the cordon troops
• warning the inhabitants of the search, if appropriate, and any imposition of curfew, after the cordon is in position
• conducting the actual search with protective and specialist assistance from the military forces, including the handling of critical evidence
• making arrests
• controlling personnel screening tasks
• controlling traffic.

**Military tasks.** Whenever possible, military forces should avoid the collection, handling or carriage of evidence relating to police investigations. Military forces may be responsible for:

• providing the inner and outer cordon (if established) and any internal cordons
• conducting the initial sweep through, or assault on, the target if necessary
• escorting police/agency searchers
• setting up detainee holding areas
• guarding detained suspects
• providing aerial surveillance to observe movement within the cordon area and to broadcast instructions to the inhabitants
• providing technical assistance for the searchers, such as mine and IED detection dogs and EOD teams.

**Conduct.** The general conduct of cordon and search (see Figure 8–1) involves the placement of the cordon and the subsequent search as the following two discrete tasks:

• **Cordon.** Cordon involves the deployment of land FEs and supporting organisations to place a ring of troops and physical barriers around the target to an extent that there can be no interference from outside the cordon in order to provide a sanitised area inside within which other agencies can operate. Resources permitting, it is usual to mount two cordons around the target: the outer cordon to prevent interference from the outside, and the inner cordon to seal off the target and prevent movement out of the area. These actions establish the conditions for the search.

• **Search.** Searches vary considerably depending on the type and aim of the search required. It can include search of persons, detainees, vehicles, buildings, installations and general areas. Such a search invariably involves the requirement for the detention of suspect individuals, and areas where IEDs and booby traps are likely. Searches also involve careful handling of all persons and the precise handling of any evidence gathered.
Command and control. Members of the ADF always remain under ADF command and act in accordance with orders issued through the chain of command. However, in many situations military forces are required to act in coordination with appropriate civil and other agencies and authorities. Under these circumstances, a JIATF HQ would be likely to be formed and LOs exchanged with other agency HQs and detachments involved. Where it has been necessary to employ military forces in a cordon and search action, it should be commanded by the military forces, unless they are in a support role to the police. The primacy of the rule of law still remains.
Detailed cordon and search TTPs and drills are covered in *LWP-G 3-9-6, Operations in Urban Environments (Developing Doctrine).*

**Noncombatant evacuations**

Noncombatant evacuations are so termed because they are largely conducted out of contact and do not constitute a part of any purely military retrograde action, although they may well be conducted in concert with such an action. Several such activities have occurred in the recent past that were mounted, but never enacted: Operation MORRISDANCE in May 1987, to evacuate ANs from Fiji as a result of the coup; and Operation SAILCLOTH in May the following year, to evacuate ANs and AFNs from Vanuatu as a result of its constitutional crisis. However, more recently, events in East Timor in 1999 prompted Operation SPITFIRE, and events in 2000 in the Solomon Islands, Operation PLUMBOB.

Previously termed ‘services assisted evacuations’ and ‘services protected evacuations’, noncombatant evacuation techniques can be employed at any time when the situation demands it, from any nation where ANs are based (either as expatriates or tourists), and with or without HN support. They are complex undertakings, invariably involving extensive diplomatic support from DFAT staff (particularly the HOM, who may be an ambassador or a high commissioner1) to secure HN support from its agencies. During the planning of any evacuation by a JIATF evacuation force, early liaison with the HN through the HOM is critical. It is important to note that Defence will not always be the lead agency of an evacuation activity.

**Purpose**

The purpose of noncombatant evacuation is to seek to relocate to a safe place noncombatants who are at risk in a foreign country. It may be conducted in permissive or hostile circumstances. Noncombatant evacuation requires land forces, as part of a JIATF, to conduct, participate in or contribute to the evacuation of ANs, and/or other AFNs from a conflict area.

**Description**

**Permissive noncombatant evacuation.** Permissive noncombatant evacuations most commonly occur following a natural disaster or civil unrest, where no resistance to evacuation is expected and there is HN consent and support for those wishing to leave. It should be noted that there can be no compunction for ANs, resident overseas or on holidays, to leave against their free will. Under such circumstances, the evacuation force commander must elicit the full cooperation of the locally based Australian diplomatic mission during the initial planning phase in

1. In Australian government usage, the Australian DFAT HOM in a nonCommonwealth foreign nation is called an ambassador. Those HOMs in nations which are members of the British Commonwealth of Nations are called high commissioners. In Australia, for example, the United Kingdom, Canadian, Papua New Guinea and New Zealander HOMs are high commissioners, as are the Australian DFAT HOMs resident in those nations.

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order to identify and locate those ANs and AFNs who wish to leave. Force employment under these circumstances varies, given that most forces possess considerable resources to assist. In any case, the likely effect on force employment is a change to the normal operational deployment groups, which are likely to consist of a controlling HQ (any joint commander can be appointed commander of the evacuation force), LOs, appropriately equipped and staffed FEs, and joint assets from the RAN and the RAAF. Early liaison with local authorities through the resident Australian diplomatic mission is essential, as large DFAT missions abroad usually have crises management centres that are interagency staffed for this purpose. A noncombatant evacuation is described in a historical vignette of an NEO under permissive circumstances.

**Historical example – permissive environment – Solomon Islands, Operation PLUMBOB**

In anticipation of a likely evacuation operation from Solomon Islands, HMAS Tobruk was diverted from her program in order to stand by for an evacuation. Over the period, 1086 Australians and AFNs were evacuated from Honiara to Australia. Two LCM8s, embarked on HMAS Tobruk, were used to convey a total of 483 passengers from the jetty at Honiara and from over the beach to HMAS Tobruk. These evacuees were then conveyed to Cairns. A further 603 evacuees were evacuated by RAAF and RNZAF aircraft and transported to Townsville.²

**Hostile noncombatant evacuation.** Hostile noncombatant evacuations most commonly occur when the HN’s civil and military authorities have lost control, are likely to lose control, or have ceased to function altogether and there is a general breakdown in law and order. In such circumstances, hostile evacuation techniques may well be conducted as part of stability activities, necessitating support by combat forces to the evacuation force. In these latter cases, land-based FEs as part of a JIATF are likely to be employed in their normal role but with specific tasks tailored to the situation, such as the provision of security to the evacuation force and securing KPs, evacuation assembly areas (EAAs), routes, and evacuation points (EPs) or embarkation areas. As in permissive evacuations, the evacuation force commander must conduct early liaison with the local authorities (if cooperative) through the local Australian diplomatic mission staff. These staff may include a Defence section, and diplomatic staff who are appointed in-country evacuation/crisis managers. Again, despite the situation, ANs may be under no compunction to leave. A key problem in these situations is the control of local nationals who seek to leave and are not necessarily AFNs. A noncombatant evacuation is described in a historical vignette of an NEO under potentially hostile circumstances.

². Extract from ADDP 3.10, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.
Historical example – uncertain environment – Operation SPITFIRE

An evacuation of Australians and AFNs was conducted from East Timor following the ballot of 30 August 1999, after indications of the continuing possibility of serious unrest in East Timor, particularly if autonomy was rejected. Although other FEIs were assigned to the operation, only C-130 aircraft were utilised, the non-availability of diplomatic clearances meant that ships were not allowed alongside. The evacuation occurred over a 24-hr period, with a total of 1020 evacuees transported to Australia.

Tactical application

Commander’s initial information requirements. The detailed tactical application of noncombatant evacuation is covered in ADDP 3.10, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations and in specific orders and instructions for each event, which are always going to be different from each other. While no template for these types of techniques is advised, there are some tactical planning considerations which fall outside the standard ‘basic considerations’ for each type of tactical action, which are:

• details of all known evacuees, including names, ages, sex, identification details and addresses if possible (these details can usually be provided by DFAT consular staff on site)
• whether the evacuation is under permissive or hostile conditions; if hostile, the nature of the threat and the troop requirement for security
• details of instructions given by the HOM and the Defence Attaché (if one is resident, as assistant crisis controller) to evacuees
• action to be taken by the evacuation force personnel if evacuees refuse to leave
• full details of the HOM, Defence Attaché and LO (if appointed)
• maps, street directories and any intelligence reports that may be available (these are likely to be part of the briefing material from DFAT crisis control personnel)
• copies of the consular emergency plans for evacuations, which includes details of the suitable EAAs, evacuation handling centres (EHCs), evacuation routes, EPs and evacuation embarkation points; and contact details of the owners (likely to be private or public property)
• simple ROE (noting that these are provided by a higher authority and not available to troops) and OFOF
• details of the authority empowered to order the force to detain suspicious personnel or personnel endangering evacuees and hindering their evacuation
• details of any local authority still operating, such as the police, emergency services and emergency management authorities (if any)

• details of supporting medical plans in the case of serious injury or illness among the evacuees, which can include any known or pre-existing medical conditions

• details of any available local resources such as water, fuel, power and food

• details of any local operational forces who are well disposed towards the evacuation forces

• the time expected in the HN, and any foreign languages spoken requiring an interpreter to be located with the force (DFAT can probably supply some of these on site).

**Requirement for evacuation planning.** It should be noted that all diplomatic missions are required to plan for emergencies and contingencies and have been directed by DFAT to undertake crisis action planning. These activities are jointly managed by the HOM in close consultation with the resident ADF Defence Attaché, who remains responsible for liaison with HQ Joint Operations Command and other Defence organisations for evacuation contingency planning and actions.

**Operational phases.** Evacuation actions are conducted in the following four phases, the tasks for each varying according to the nature of the task:

• **Preparatory phase.** The preparatory phase involves:
  
  • preliminary actions, and the establishment of any forward mounting base and/or FOB required for the evacuation plan
  
  • HOM requests for the deployment of Defence supplementation staff, which includes a forward command element to assist in the crisis action planning
  
  • the forward command element, in conjunction with the HOM staff and Defence Attaché/advisory staff, conduct initial feasibility studies and the on-site operational planning
  
  • the raising, staffing and where necessary, the additional training conducted by the crisis action centre\(^3\), located in the mission.

• **Control phase.** The control phase includes the build-up of the force at a forward mounting base and securing the point of embarkation. The establishment of an EAA and EHC (there may be more than one) and the

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3. All overseas DFAT missions have been directed to raise crisis action centres and create crisis action plans (ie, Consular Emergency Plans) for emergencies. These actions are managed jointly by DFAT and Defence staff. Crisis plans usually include the establishment and monitoring of an emergency alert network whereby all ANs are requested to register online with names, addresses and contact details. This alert system usually includes the nomination of volunteer ANs as wardens. Usually, the consular staff within the mission are responsible for the management of this system as emergencies are part of their normal tasking.
securing of important routes between them may also be required. In permissive circumstances, the early involvement of the HN is critical.

- **Evacuation phase.** The evacuation phase involves those actions necessary to collect, assemble, screen and process evacuees (some of whom may not be ANs). While all DFAT missions are concerned primarily with ANs, there are situations where the DFAT mission has an agreement with other foreign nations represented in the HN to also assist them, because they may not have access to the resources to evacuate their own nationals. An example is Papua New Guinea, where the Australian mission has agreed to assist the US, French and Italian missions. These actions could be conducted in conjunction with local forces. Once screened and processed, evacuees are moved from the EAA to the EHC and then subsequently recovered to the nearest safe haven for repatriation to Australia. It should be noted that some ANs may not choose to leave and cannot be forced to do so; alternatively, some may choose to leave of their own volition under their own initiatives.

- **Withdrawal phase.** The withdrawal phase occurs, normally directly to Australia, on completion of the evacuation. Alternatively, where this is not advisable, possible or feasible, the evacuation force could withdraw to a third nation, remain afloat or remain in place to conduct subsequent tasks not directly related to the initial evacuation.

Further detailed information on the planning and conduct of evacuations is contained in *ADDP 3.10, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*.

**Tactical tasks.** In situations where ADF support is required for NEOs in the form of an evacuation force, the tasks to be conducted depend on the nature of the evacuation. Broad tasks can include, but are not limited to:

- secure a point of entry (this may be shore- or land-based but is usually both)
- secure and protect the EAA
- secure and protect the EHC
- conduct responsive protection
- conduct close personal protection where necessary
- conduct protection of the DFAT embassy/high commission
- conduct recovery tasks if necessary
- escort groups of evacuees to the EAA and then to the EHC
- conduct actions to evacuate Australians and AFNs
- assist with the documentation of evacuees
- assist with the reception of evacuees at the reception point (this may be on Australian soil).

Further tasks and sub-tasks that may be required are detailed in *ADDP 3.10, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*. An illustration of an indicative
noncombatant evacuation is described in Figure 8–2, in the control, evacuation and withdrawal phases. ANs and AFNs are collected at the EAAs by surface or air means to designated EPs. Those EPs closest to airfields are evacuated by air, while those others closest to the FOB and EHC are evacuated by sea or air.

**Figure 8–2: Indicative noncombatant evacuation**

**Related tasks.** In certain circumstances, the ADF could be required to conduct related or subsequent tasks in support of the HN. These tasks might include HA or relief activities and are likely to be longer term. Evacuation must be closely coordinated with any intended related tasks so that the safe and effective conduct of the evacuation is not compromised. The dimensions of related tasks may also include hostage rescue or other special recovery actions, in which case SF would be involved.

**Responsibilities.** Responsibilities for the planning and conduct of evacuations are fully detailed in *ADDP 3.10, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*.

**Traffic control posts and vehicle checkpoints**

TCPs and VCPs form an integral part of general road and track movement control. They can be established by security forces or any other land-based force across the range of military activities. A higher planning HQ is generally responsible for establishing TCPs and VCPs on all route networks through an established control organisation.
Traffic control posts

Purpose. A TCP is established by a road movement control organisation, usually conducted by the RACT joint movement control organisation, and often jointly staffed by MPs, for the purpose of controlling and monitoring the flow of road traffic. Road traffic can include larger amounts of vehicular movement of any type along designated routes and tracks.

Description. Where road movement control is required, a control organisation should be established. The size and complexity of the road move being undertaken determines the size and complexity of this control organisation. The control organisation always has a HQ and usually includes sector controls staffed by mobile MP detachments, TCPs, and a series of road patrols to monitor traffic flow and density. The TCP forms an integral part of the traffic control organisation and can be established as required, and can be mobile or permanent (eg, in an established base in an AO). The traffic control organisation, staffed by MP detachments, is based on TCPs, which are normally located on the roadside at start and release points, critical points, staging posts and harbour areas and, if required, close to the boundaries where main axial routes pass from the control of one HQ to another. Figure 8–3 depicts the symbol for a TCP.

Figure 8–3: Tactical symbol for a traffic control post

Tactical application. TCPs, as part of the traffic control organisation, are often established and deployed not only for administrative moves, but also for tactical purposes during most military activities. As such, they can be combined with VCPs for the following purposes:

• to help maintain a regular flow of traffic to avoid congestion
• to ensure that columns follow the prescribed route and conform to prescribed timings
• to prevent unauthorised military and civilian traffic and refugees from interfering with scheduled moves
• to monitor the progress of movement and report to the MP traffic control HQ or the movement control detachment responsible
• to help transmit any alterations in orders to columns on the move
• to report on the state of roads and tracks.
Further information is detailed in *LWP-CSS 4-3-2, Road Transport Operations Handbook*.

**Vehicle checkpoints**

**Purpose.** A VCP is established as a means of controlling movement on roads and tracks, for the purpose of blocking or closing a route to vehicles, and may be also be used to restrict or monitor the movement of pedestrians. A VCP has different specific purposes from a TCP and is used for the following purposes:

- to maintain a broad check on road movement, in part to provide reassurance to the local population
- to frustrate the movement of arms, ammunition and explosives
- to assist in the enforcement on the controls of movement of people and materiel
- to gather information and data on suspect persons and vehicles.

**Description.** VCPs can be established in all environments (usually rural and urban) and can be ground based with vehicle-mounted patrols or deployed by helicopter, as eagle VCPs (for a detailed coverage of eagle VCPs, see *LWP-CA (AVN) 3-1-1, Aviation Minor Tactics*). VCPs generally have the following layout and conditions as a minimum requirement:

- **Layout.** VCPs have a simple construction of two parallel lines of knife rests, each with a gap, across the road approximately 50 m apart. The enclosure formed can then be used as a search and administrative area. The symbol for a VCP is illustrated in Figure 8–4. Possible indicative layouts are illustrated in Figure 8–5 and Figure 8–6. Within the search area there could be:
  - separate male and female search areas
  - a vehicle waiting area
  - a vehicle search area
  - a holding area for detaining people prior to being passed on to other agencies
  - VCP HQ
  - an administrative area
  - signs in the local language and, in theatres where there is a high level of illiteracy, recorded loudspeaker broadcasts giving the instructions/information on the signs.

- **Staff.** The number of troops required depends on the number of roads or tracks to be covered and the expected volume of traffic. If people are to be searched, female searchers must be available and special accommodation should be provided. Whenever possible, or practicable, there should be a police presence at the VCP, and interpreters may be required.
• **Search equipment.** Specialist search equipment may be required, particularly for heavy vehicles and certain types of loads.

• **Communications.** External communications are essential so that revised instructions may be given, information about wanted persons passed quickly and incidents at the VCP reported. Internal communications can be achieved with landline or personal radios.

• **Legal issues.** As well as standard ROE and OFOF, troops staffing a VCP must be well acquainted with their powers of search, arrest and use of force. These are clearly established in orders.

• **Concealment.** Where terrain permits, the VCP should be sited where it cannot be seen from more than a short distance away. Sharp bends or dips in the roads or tracks provide good positions provided the requirements for road safety are met. Ideally there should be no room for an approaching vehicle to take avoiding or evasive action by turning, leaving the road or reversing.

• **Security.** There must be enough troops to protect the VCP, particularly during the initial occupation. Sentries should be sited as backstops on both sides well clear of the search area to watch traffic and to prevent evasion. All but the shortest duration VCPs should have a reserve force available to them. The use of a mobile QRF from the nearest SF base should also be considered. The site of a VCP must always be checked for booby traps, IEDs and ambushes before occupation; and a pattern of use should be avoided.

![VCP]

Figure 8–4: Tactical symbol for a vehicle checkpoint
Figure 8–5: Indicative layout for a vehicle checkpoint in a rural area
Figure 8–6: Indicative layout of a vehicle checkpoint in an urban area
**Tactical application.** There are five types of VCP currently in use: permanent, deliberate, snap, triggered or reactionary. Their application is explained as follows:

- **Permanent.** These are in effect small bases or outstations set up to monitor traffic on a daily and permanent basis. They are typically established on a main road coming into or out of a city or on the edge of a controlled area. By their nature these installations are the equivalent of any security force base or OPs, and the procedures for their staffing, occupation and protection are the same.

- **Deliberate.** These VCPs are of longer duration or semipermanent in nature and are typically used in support of another tactical task, such as a cordon and search.

- **Snap.** Snap VCPs may be deployed by troops already on patrol or by troops deployed by eagle VCPs. An indicative layout for a snap VCP is depicted in Figure 8–7. For both ground and air VCPs unpredictability is essential to avoid pattern setting and to maintain the initiative. These VCPs are explained as follows:
  - Ground VCPs are used to conduct spot checks frequently, acting on intelligence. Initially they can achieve surprises but once their position is known their usefulness decreases rapidly and the potential for hostile reaction increases. They seldom last longer than 20 minutes.
  - Helicopter or eagle VCPs are primarily used in rural areas and may be employed to dominate an area for limited periods. They can take the initiative away from hostile groups and help suppress activity on the ground. Eagle VCPs have the advantages of maintaining the initiative, flexibility of deployment and a wide area of coverage. The opportunities for capturing, interdicting or disrupting hostile activity are high. For a more detailed coverage, refer to *LWP-CA (AVN) 3-1-1, Aviation Minor Tactics*.

- **Triggered.** This is a variation of the snap VCP but it is planned, prepared and triggered by a specific event or piece of intelligence. Triggered VCPs are usually very short in duration.

- **Reactionary.** This is another version of the snap VCP but is established specifically as a reaction to an incident or attack in another area. It may be ground or eagle VCP based and is placed to interdict hostile activity following an incident.

Further information can be found in *LWP-CA (DMTD CBT) 3-3-1, Dismounted Minor Tactics (Developing Doctrine).*
Figure 8–7: Indicative layout for a snap vehicle checkpoint

Not to scale
Chapter 9

Enabling activity

Enabling activities link offensive, defensive and stability activities. These activities include those intended to make, or break, contact with the threat and those that can be conducted out of contact. Enabling activity does not have any associated specific tactical actions, as they can be conducted across the nature of military activities that they support at any time in the course of an operation.

This chapter describes the various tasks which underpin successful enabling activity across the range of military activity conducted by the land force.

Tactical tasks

Tactical tasks inclusive of enabling activity are listed in Table 1–2. These are as follows:

• reconnaissance
• surveillance
• patrol
• march
• link-up
• passage of lines
• relief-in-place
• obstacle breaching and crossing.

Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance is an enabling activity undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy threat, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It is also conducted by aerial means and, to be effective, requires the extensive use of electronic sensors and effective combat support systems. These are linked to, and interdependent with, AD systems for actions against air threats, and also with ground-based systems and capabilities through the ISTAR process for actions against ground-based threats.

Reconnaissance differs substantially from surveillance but is closely linked to it and interdependent with it and intelligence. It is important to note that, like
reconnaissance, it is interdependent with intelligence\(^1\), but is primarily concerned with gathering information. Surveillance tasks and techniques generally detect the presence of a target with an area of interest while reconnaissance is then undertaken to determine more precise information, such as target identity and movements. Armour, engineers, infantry and aviation combined arms teams form part of the ISR battlespace operating system (BOS) and are capable of conducting all types of reconnaissance tasks. Descriptions and applications at the joint level are covered in *ADDP 3.7, Collection Operations*.

**Purpose**

The purpose of all reconnaissance undertaken by any FE is to obtain information about the threat or secure data regarding an area. Similarly, the purpose of aerial reconnaissance is to obtain, through air platform based systems, information about the threat or to secure data regarding an area in which a threat, an activity or objects of interest are located. This involves the collection of information of intelligence interest either by visual observation from the air or through the use of airborne sensors.

**Description**

Reconnaissance is performed throughout the range of military activity. It provides information to a supported commander of any combined arms team (or often, another agency such as a JIATF, which can be non-military led) and confirms or modifies an understanding of the tactical battlespace picture. It enhances overall situational awareness. Reconnaissance is vital to the fight for the information, rather than with it. The separate roles of those combined arms teams that contribute to the ISR BOS and undertake reconnaissance missions are laid down in *LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics*.

Reconnaissance provides timely and accurate information by day and night in all conditions across the range of military activity. It is generally conducted within the range of supporting indirect fire. While the general principles of most reconnaissance tasks remain the same, there are differences in the detailed tactical application by various combined arms teams so tasked.

**Aerial reconnaissance.** For stability activities, the commander has a range of options that are invariably used in combination for the best results. These options include the general deployment of ground-based assets, such as cavalry and infantry reconnaissance FEs and/or the deployment of aerial reconnaissance assets such as RAAF aircraft, armed reconnaissance helicopters (ARHs) and tactical unmanned aerial vehicles (TUAVs). Depending on the requirements of the mission or the commander’s intent, ground-based reconnaissance is invariably supported or led by aerial reconnaissance (and surveillance) assets.

**Maritime reconnaissance.** A maritime reconnaissance mission can be conducted in support of land-based reconnaissance for land-based military

\(^1\) Intelligence is the evaluation process by which information is assessed and evaluated.
activity. These missions determine the identity of a target detected during surveillance and are discussed further in *ADDP 3.7, Collection Operations*.

**Tactical application**

**Link to other processes/systems.** The ISR BOS and the ISTAR process support and complement ground and aerial reconnaissance. These are discussed as follows:

- *Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance battlespace operating system.* Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance are, like ground-based techniques, part of the ISR BOS for the commander’s planning purposes and link directly to the ISTAR process. The ISR BOS provides the commander and staff the opportunity to plan for a holistic approach to information acquisition through a variety of personnel, systems and other means that may be available at the time. While largely regarded as ‘combat-centric’, the ISR BOS can be applied in planning to ensure that all sources and capabilities are employed or deployed to provide the CCIRs and PIRs. For aerial reconnaissance, for example, ground-based assets such as ground surveillance radar deployed by combined arms patrols can be supplemented by aerial assets, such as TUAVs, to confirm information gained and subsequently monitor situations through aerial surveillance methods. Other assets may be used for critical verification as required. This represents the ISR BOS at work.

- *Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance process.* In turn, the ISR BOS links into the ISTAR process. This process is the coordinated acquisition of timely, accurate, relevant and assured information that supports the planning and conduct of military (and other) land force activities, targeting and the integration of actions. It refers to both the operational application of the process and the personnel, assets and architecture involved in this process. ISTAR provides the process by which ISR outcomes can be applied to targeting threats. ISTAR includes all actors in the ISR BOS, which are usually intelligence assets (e.g., human intelligence, imagery, signals intelligence and communications intelligence); active and passive ground and aerial surveillance and target acquisition assets, such as the artillery locating and surveillance and target acquisition assets and TUAVs; and ground and aerial reconnaissance assets, such as cavalry and infantry reconnaissance FEs, RAAF aircraft, ARHs and TUAVs. ISTAR is detailed in *LWD 2-2, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.* In practical terms, once aerial reconnaissance and surveillance confirms or initially gains information for the commander through the ISR BOS employment, it can be fed into the ISTAR process to feed back to user units for targeting. This targeting may be a combat FE task, such as offensive support (OS) BOS missions for harassment or destruction, or alternatively may be related to other stability activity requirements, such as the need to deploy TCPs and VCPs in a certain area.
Likely reconnaissance tasks. Ground-based reconnaissance is invariably either supplemented by or led/cued by aerial reconnaissance assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ARHs, which provide an observation and detection capability that supplements ground-based sensors and line-of-sight observation. Ground-based and aerial reconnaissance assets, in concert, can:

- detect and maintain visual contact with a threat without becoming decisively engaged
- report information rapidly and accurately
- record, store and transmit data and real-time televisual and thermal imaging
- provide real-time surveillance and monitoring of disputed areas and areas of conflict.

Avoiding contact. Using stealth, tasked ground-based reconnaissance FEs avoid physical contact with any threat and gather information by quiet and deliberate, and most often dismounted, techniques. Trained cavalry scouts, for example, operate in small teams to penetrate between strongpoints, seek gaps and observe threat activities without detection. While stealth is often the underpinning requirement of the combat FE, CBRN reconnaissance also undertakes similar missions to monitor contaminated environments, as discussed in Chapter 1. Today, other reconnaissance assets include a variety of non-human detection systems, such as UAVs, where an operator receiving the information is located in a remote area.

Fighting for information. Historically, reconnaissance forces have found it essential to be able to fight aggressively for information. This has been because of the need to penetrate threat security forces and because time pressures prohibit stealth by land forces, other than that provided by UAVs. Using the aggressive approach, reconnaissance FEs avoid decisive engagement but are prepared to fight – especially threat reconnaissance, security and counter-reconnaissance forces – to acquire information and force the threat to disclose intentions or locations. Fighting for information includes techniques and tasks used on other missions such as attack by fire, quick attacks and raids.

**Surveillance**

Surveillance differs from reconnaissance; surveillance is the systematic observation of areas, persons or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means. Surveillance is generally categorised by the environment being observed rather than the medium from which the observations are being made. Surveillance can be undertaken by military or nonmilitary agencies as part of a broader activity, and can be land based, aerial or sea based/maritime, or a combination of all three as part of an integrated surveillance network. For reconnaissance to be effective it requires the extensive use of electronic sensors and effective combat support systems. These are linked to and interdependent with AD systems for actions against air threats, and also with ground-based
systems and capabilities through the ISTAR process for actions against ground-based threats. Aerial surveillance, as a complement to reconnaissance, can also be most effective in monitoring situations and confirming information from groundbased sources for the CCIRs and PIRs.

Surveillance as an enabling tactical task is undertaken by manoeuvre FEs across the range of military activities. Some organisations specialise in it, such as the RFSUs, which conduct both wide- and focal-area surveillance; infantry reconnaissance and surveillance FEs; cavalry FEs; UAVs; and maritime patrol aircraft.

**Purpose**

The purpose of all surveillance is to detect activity or change over a period in an assigned area. Similarly, the purpose of aerial surveillance is to undertake, through the employment of air platforms, the systematic observation of areas, persons or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means.

**Description**

Surveillance is a tactical task to systematically observe the aerospace, surface or sub-surface areas (for maritime application), places, persons or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means. It provides an enduring and systematic observation to inform higher CCIRs for a specified tactical action or task and to increase command situational awareness. It may also involve activities undertaken through interagency cooperation during control tactical actions.

**Aerial surveillance.** As previously described, stability activities are wide ranging and require the commander to maintain situational awareness through an all-informed network. While aerial reconnaissance actions can seek information or confirm existing knowledge, aerial surveillance can effectively monitor any battlespace through the systematic observation by persons or sensors. Air surveillance systems can be made available to the commander at the tactical level from fighter and strike/reconnaissance aircraft, and TUAVs. As discussed for aerial reconnaissance, the commander may use a variety of options for the monitoring and systematic observation of a chosen area or locality, complemented by ground-based reconnaissance assets. Reconnaissance assets seek and/or confirm information of intelligence value for subsequent active surveillance tasks. Ground-based surveillance, as discussed earlier, therefore also represents a necessary and inseparable activity complementing aerial surveillance.

**Sea-based/maritime surveillance.** While the RAN is responsible for overall maritime operations, it is jointly responsible with the RAAF for the development of procedures for joint maritime actions in support of the JIATF or formation where the AO (eg, an amphibious objective area during an amphibious assault or evacuation) includes a contiguous shoreline and waters. In any case, the information is shared with the land force as the ISR requirements may dictate. Further information is detailed in *ADDP 3.7, Collection Operations.*
Principles. All surveillance relies on the following key principles:

- layered surveillance
- redundancy
- the identification of activity patterns
- the continual assessment of effectiveness
- universality
- flexibility
- matching mission to sensor
- centralised coordination
- decentralised control
- first-line information processing
- interoperability
- sensor–shooter link
- electronic signature management.

Further information is contained in LWP-CA (DMTD CBT) 3-3-5, Infantry Reconnaissance and Surveillance and LWD 3-1-1, Employment of Regional Force Surveillance Units.

Tactical application

Link to other processes/systems. As for reconnaissance, the ISR BOS and the ISTAR process support and complement surveillance. These systems are inextricably linked with intelligence and reconnaissance and are fully described in the reconnaissance section previously.

Types. Surveillance as a tactical task is invariably conducted in concert with other activities and can be passive or active, and applied to ‘focal’ areas or ‘wide’ areas as follows:

- Passive surveillance. Passive surveillance includes actions and/or equipment deployed which emit no energy capable of being detected. The deployment and use of non-electronic visual aids such as binoculars and photographic equipment, and the deployment of patrols to conduct visual surveillance of a focal area are examples.

- Active surveillance. Active surveillance, on the other hand, includes actions and/or equipment which emit energy capable of being detected, such as thermal imaging and image intensifying equipment.

- Focal-area surveillance. Focal-area surveillance is the systematic observation of small or specific areas of significance to a commander to detect threat or other presences and activities. Surveillance assets employed within focal areas can include specialist FEs, such as RFSUs,
ground surveillance radars or aerial platforms. Focal-area surveillance is routinely integrated with ISTAR processes and contributors to support the immediate engagement of a target, or to continue ongoing observation and monitoring tasks in control tactical actions.

• **Wide-area surveillance.** Wide-area surveillance involves the systematic observation of large areas of significance in order to detect threat presence and activity, or in control tactical actions as part of monitoring the pattern of life. Surveillance assets employed on wide-area surveillance tasks may include maritime and/or air, and land-based forces using the full range of static and platform base sensors. Wide-area surveillance is routinely integrated with ISTAR processes and contributors to inform planning and cue focal-area surveillance activities. An example of this in operation is the deployment of TUAVs in concert with other aerial surveillance platforms, such as ARHs to cue artillery or naval gunfire support targeting. Other examples may be the use of aerial surveillance to cue and redirect reconnaissance patrol activities.

Further information on these types of surveillance is contained in *LWD 3-1-1, Employment of Regional Force Surveillance Units, ADDP 3.7, Collection Operations* and *LWP-CA (DMTD CBT) 3-3-5, Infantry Reconnaissance, Surveillance* and *LWD 2-2, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance*.

**Organisation and command and control.** Surveillance within formation and subordinate organisations at the tactical level can be organised, commanded and controlled in four ways – decentralised, centralised, shared and layered:

• **Decentralised.** If control is decentralised, subordinate FEs within the formation and at BG level each control an area using their own and any additional resources and/or assets allocated. Control at these levels is exercised using tactical command nets passed back to the next higher HQ.

• **Centralised.** If control is centralised, the formation and BG HQ establish a dedicated net for linking every ISR asset deployed on task.

• **Shared.** If control is shared, the controlling HQ exercises its control and jurisdiction over deployed assets, such as OPs, patrols and TUAVs which are located outside the subordinate FE’s AO or area of responsibility, while those assets within the subordinate FE’s AO are controlled by that FE.

• **Layered.** Changes in military activity for offensive and defensive activity differ from those actions undertaken for stability activity in control tactical actions, although the underlying principles are directed towards the same end state: detecting changes in patterns or detecting new patterns. Layered, land force based surveillance tasks can be established through a linked and networked system of reconnaissance and surveillance, or other patrols; human intelligence resources, which often includes established intelligence FEs (eg, intelligence companies), elements of the general community, sources and agencies, and local observer elements if
established; government agencies (eg, the AFP, local indigenous police forces and customs); and non-government civil reporting networks.

Patrol

Patrols form an integral part of the conduct of all military activities at any particular time and can therefore be considered an enabling activity. They are described here to avoid repetition in the other chapters. To be successful, patrols need to be well planned, active and generally aggressive, although there are occasions when this is not necessary, particularly during other stability activities tasks. Patrols are the responsibility of any combined arms team across the range of military activities and in all environments. New equipment and weapons continue to enhance the commander’s ability to obtain information about threats, areas or activities and, when necessary, to inflict damage on any threats. Patrols provide an essential means to feed the ISR BOS for the commander and link to the ISTAR process. Figure 9–1 provides an illustration of a mechanised platoon patrol area.

![Image of a mechanised platoon patrol area]

Note:
The blue lines at each flank indicate the extent of the patrol responsibilities (boundary limitations not shown).

Figure 9–1: Indicative illustration of a mechanised platoon patrol area

Purpose

The purpose of patrols and active patrolling is extensive. Generally, they are undertaken for the following reasons:

• to gain and retain the initiative or dominate a local area by deterring and disrupting threat activity, protecting security force bases, and protecting key infrastructure and civilian authorities
• to gain information for the commander, or deny information to any threat
• to harass a threat
• to provide security to deployed troops and other persons
• to reassure or gain the trust of the population
• to prevent public disorder
• to support other military activities in the AO.

Description

Impact of technology. While technology changes the way in which some patrols are conducted, and may require the development of new and imaginative techniques, it should not replace the requirement to place troops on the ground. An example of this is the growing development and refinement of TUAVs and the ‘virtual battlespace’, whereby a UAV controller can remotely undertake visual reconnaissance and surveillance from great distances without stepping a foot on the target territory. Air power also claims to avoid, in some cases, the need for troops on the ground; this is not the case, as patrols are invariably required to physically verify information, to fight for information required for the CCIRs, to maintain an active and continuous presence and credibility, or to simply reinforce the fact that friendly forces are capable of delivering discriminate force if required.

Troops of all forces – including those that may be attached to, or working alongside, land-based forces – must be proficient at patrolling and their staff must be capable of providing the needed operational control and administrative support for the patrol program. Commanders are responsible for the formulation of the patrol policy, the staff are responsible for the patrol program in detail and subordinates for the execution of those patrols.

Patrols can be mounted (including by air) or dismounted, can be conducted in any type of environment, and may be specialised (eg, for CBRN or engineer reconnaissance). An underlying assumption for all patrols is that selected patrol members also possess ‘call for fire’ skills.

Successful patrolling depends on:

• the effective assignment of appropriate missions and tasks, driven from other ISR assets as informed by the ISR BOS and the ISTAR process, and linked to the overall information dominance and influence campaign
• realistic and achievable aims in a coordinated patrol program
• thorough planning and briefing conducted by relevant planning staff
• realistic timings and rotation plans, when required
• thorough preparation and rehearsals
• a high standard of training and equipment care
• a high degree of initiative and leadership by patrol commanders
• accurate recording through thorough debriefing, and quick dissemination of all information gained through patrolling.

Further information on the conduct of patrols and patrol planning is contained in LWP-CA (DMTD CBT) 3-3-8, Patrolling.
March

The movement of land forces of any size and composition from one location to another is inherent in all military activity. The essence of battlespace agility is the capability to conduct rapid and orderly movement to concentrate fighting power at decisive moments and locations. Movement is the mechanism for positioning forces, initiating offensive activity and exploiting success. The term ‘march’ does not necessarily involve dismounted troops, but is more appropriately used to describe movement of the FE as an entity while adopting appropriate formations.

The march is the critical link between deployment and subsequent engagement in military activities. For most FEs within formations it is a well-practised SOPs which enables tempo to be built from the start of any task.

Purpose

A march is conducted to efficiently move a military land force to its place of tactical employment. The underlying intent for every march is to reach the destination in the best possible condition to execute the mission. Although march discipline is of great importance, it is secondary to the successful completion of the mission at the end of the march.

Description

Forces moving on a march usually do so dismounted or mounted, in an administrative or tactical method, and in advance or retrograde actions. Tactical methods are addressed in the following segment on ‘tactical application’.

Dismounted marches remain important when speed is not of the essence and vehicles are unavailable or are in short supply. Forces marching under a single command, mounted or dismounted, and on a single route form a march column.

Long march columns should be subdivided into march serials, which should not exceed the strength of a BG or major unit. The rate of march is the average speed at which forces are expected to move, excluding halts.

Whenever possible, multiple routes should be used for the movement of a force. This increases flexibility, reduces the length of the march columns and shortens the duration of the move, and reduces the vulnerability to air attack and the length of time that the routes are not available for movement.

By the use of movement sectors the commander executing the move may use all existing routes, or even move the force cross-country within a designated sector. This type of movement is most flexible and is best employed in situations when troops are required to be at a high degree of combat readiness.

All movement requires protection to a greater or lesser extent; which means that protection at the halt drills are conducted routinely. The strength and composition of the protective FE varies depending on the situation. It may include reconnaissance forward of covering flanks, advance guards and/or rear guards, and passive or active ground-based AD, as for any advance.
March discipline is essential throughout the move. Any deviation from the specified routes and times and, in particular, speeds may interfere with other movements and can have serious consequences. Unexpected interruptions should be dealt with immediately and the situation reported accordingly. Plan changes should not interfere with the overall movement plan. Support by a movement and traffic control organisation is highly desirable.

Detailed information on the march can be found in *LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics* [pp. 52–53]

**Link-up**

Link-up is a task conducted to join two friendly forces and may occur frequently as part of regrouping. It may be necessary to destroy the threat between these two forces before a link-up can be established. Both forces may be moving toward one another, or they may be stationary or encircled. They may have the same or different missions, but the task itself is always part of the overall tactical plan. As both forces attempt to link up, there is an inherent danger of fratricide; therefore, the planning and coordination must account for these increased risks and it is preferable that one force is stationary.

**Purpose**

Link-up can occur under the following circumstances:

- A link-up with friendly encircled forces may take place on the perimeter of a defensive position established by that force, or be combined with a break-out defensive technique at another designated objective.
- A link-up with an air landed or infiltration force may take place on the perimeter of its defensive position in a rear area or vulnerable area. In this case, the link-up is normally followed by a passage of lines, or a relief-in-place of the forces involved.
- A link-up between two forces engaged in converging attacks may take place when each force captures the adjacent objectives allocated. The threat can also then be dislocated through encirclement.

Detailed information on link-up is found in *LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics* [pp. 53–56]

**Passage of lines**

The passage of an FE of any size through an area occupied by another force, whether own forces or a coalition partner (where special considerations generally apply), can be a common occurrence across the range of military activity. The passage may be either forward or rearward through an ‘inplace’ force (ie, one in
an existing defensive locality, base, installation or defended area). The following are examples of this type of tactical task:

• mounting an attack, or other offensive action, through a developed defended area
• moving a force through a secured objective in a multiphase attack
• the passage of a force rearward through an intermediate position in a retrograde action.

The main challenges in the conduct of any passage of lines tactical tasks are:

• the time of transfer of responsibilities during the transition
• the control of fires
• movement and guidance through any obstacle system in front of the defensive position
• the control of demolitions
• traffic control when both transiting forces are using the same routes
• the synchronisation of tactical plans by both commanders of the in-place (stationary) force and the moving force.

**Forward passage of lines**

Ideally, a force deploys across a wide frontage to disguise its main effort and maximise chances of achieving surprise. The force should seek to concentrate its actions to achieve the desired outcomes. However, as a tactical task or action progresses, it may become necessary to concentrate forces and, consequently, to pass one force forward through an area occupied or controlled by another. This task involves an orchestration of events by the in-place force with the moving force seeking to pass through their lines. It can be undertaken in or out of contact.

**Purpose.** The purpose of a forward passage of lines is to pass one force through another while maintaining the overall momentum of any task or tactical action.

**Description.** In many situations, the task is conducted while in contact with the threat. The stationary force (the in-place force) remains in position and supports the moving force (the in-transit force) in the initial stages of its passage and continues this support until the completion of the passage. The in-place force should not be further tasked until the passage is completed. The forward passage of lines is frequently used during the execution of multiphase attacks, the start of advances and the launching of counterattacks. It is a complex task that requires thorough planning and coordination, and rehearsals are of critical importance. A passage of lines is usually regarded as successful only when the in-transit force has deployed clear of the in-place force without significant threat engagement.

**Tactical application.** Thorough preparation is the key to the successful tactical application of a forward passage of lines. Detailed planning, sound information for ISR, operations security and rehearsals (preferably out of direct threat
observation) are critical success factors. Commanders should take every opportunity to conduct shaping activities to maximise the likelihood of achieving the aim. The in-place force provides all possible support to the in-transit force, including the securing of an FUP, the provision of guides, the opening and crossing of obstacle gaps and the provision of OS. Control problems may limit the amount of direct fire provided by the in-place force and so greater reliance must be placed on providing indirect fire support to the in-transit force. These actions are:

- **In-transit force.** The actions of the in-transit force during the forward passage of lines include:
  - the deployment of advance parties and LOs to the in-place force
  - a final route reconnaissance through the position
  - confirming arrangements for the FUP, gap marking and security, as well as the command status of the in-transit force
  - the dissemination of any changes to plans as a result of the threat situation
  - movement of the main force from its assembly areas or rendezvous point to meet guides from the in-place force
  - movement through the in-place force’s positions and linking with advance parties in the FUP of rear harbour areas
  - coming under the control of the in-place force commander while transiting obstacles in that commander’s AO
  - assuming operational responsibility for the area forward of the in-place force.

- **In-place force.** The actions of the in-place force include:
  - the preparation of routes and the securing of the FUP and gaps for the in-transit force
  - dispatching LOs to the in-transit force
  - briefing advance parties from the in-transit force
  - positioning reserves, if necessary, to facilitate the passage of the in-transit force
  - guiding the in-transit force through the area
  - providing security, OS and administrative support for the in-transit force during their move
  - conducting BHO and returning operational control to the in-transit force, as required
  - continuing their current task or starting their next task.
Layout. Figure 9–2 depicts an indicative layout of a forward passage of lines and control measures.

Command and control. The following planning considerations are relevant:

- **Status of command.** The status of command of the in-transit force must be clearly defined (by recognised control measures which may include RLs, timings or events). During an attack, the commander of the in-transit force usually assumes responsibility for an agreed area once that force crosses the line of departure. The in-place force commander retains responsibility for the area occupied by the in-place force.

- **Tempo.** Any passage of lines presents an ideal opportunity for effective threat action, so it is critical that superior tempo be generated. This is best achieved in the planning process through clearly understood procedures and linked DEs, prior liaison and close coordination, effective command, control and communications (C3) arrangements, and careful orchestration. All FEs should be comprehensively briefed, with the commander’s intent clearly understood. Where possible, troops should be well rested prior to the start of the forward passage of lines.
• Control measures. Figure 9–3 illustrates indicative minimum control measures.

Sustainment. No special CSS arrangements are required for the forward passage of lines other than to ensure that passage routes are kept clear and traffic flowing, and to designate the new maintenance routes and arrangements for the in-transit force once the passage is completed.

Rearward passage of lines

A rearward passage of lines is essentially a retrograde tactical task adapted from the forward passage of lines as previously discussed. It is also a complex and difficult tactical task, particularly if the withdrawing force has reached its culminating point or is disoriented and under pressure as it falls back towards friendly defences of which it may know very little. Any rearward passage of lines typically occurs at the completion of covering force or guard duties and during other retrograde tactical actions such as the delay. The success of this task demands a good understanding of the basic considerations for retrograde actions and careful tactical application.

Purpose. The purpose of a retrograde action through a rearward position is to enable one force to disengage from the threat and pass through another force, to which it hands over the battle so that the withdrawing force prepares for subsequent activity.

Description. A rearward passage of lines is a tactical task in which a force in contact with an advancing threat disengages itself, then conducts a BHO to a force in a prepared defensive position, and then withdraws through those prepared defences. The in-place force must orchestrate assistance to the withdrawing force and actions against the threat. Security is essential to all aspects of a rearward passage of lines, as all FEs must leave no scope to be surprised by any threats. Commanders must rigorously apply the principle of security throughout such tasks. In the lead-up to the rearward passage, commanders must also seek to shape the battlespace to maximise the chances of success. The circumstances are complex and the potential for confusion is significant, especially as the withdrawing force is invariably under pressure and may have very reduced situational awareness. Success requires cooperation at all levels. The withdrawing force relies heavily on the in-place force to assist disengagement and passage through obstacles and prepared positions.

Tactical application. A rearward passage of lines is usually conducted in two groups, the withdrawing force and the in-place force, with the planned assumption of achieving a clean break. These are discussed as follows:

• Withdrawing force. Actions taken by the withdrawing force include:
  • reconnaissance of the new position or harbour area
  • the deployment of LOs to the in-place force
  • the passage of tactical information to the in-place force
• modification of any changes to plans or withdrawal routes

• disengagement, reporting when the outgoing force is clear of the position, BHO and the movement of the withdrawing force through the in-place force’s area (firm base)

• passing control of the forward area to the in-place force when the last FE of the withdrawing force has crossed the handover line

• preparation for subsequent tasks.

• **In-place force.** Actions of the in-place force include:

  • briefing of all LOs

  • the positioning of guides and traffic management elements

  • the deployment of forward security FEs, and assisting the disengagement and clean break of the withdrawing force

  • assuming operational responsibility for the forward area once the withdrawing force has crossed the BHO line

  • guiding the withdrawing force through obstacles and to the rear of the area

  • taking up the defensive battle against the threat.

• **Achieving a clean break.** Achieving a clean break is the critical stage of the rearward passage of lines and the main effort for all forces involved. It usually involves the deliberate handing over of targets by the withdrawing force to either the in-place force or its security FE. This is done at all levels and is assisted through the use of digital C3 systems. The threat must be dislocated or disrupted so that the withdrawing force can achieve its clean break and conduct the rearward passage of lines. Both commanders must shape the battlespace to maximise the likelihood of a clean break. A clean break can only be achieved satisfactorily by the use of a clearly defined handover line, which usually coincides with the rear boundary of the withdrawing force’s AO or the in-place force’s AO.

**Layout.** Figure 9–3 provides an indicative layout for the rearward passage of lines.
Command and control. The following considerations are relevant:

- **Handover line.** A handover line is a control line located at the rear of the withdrawing force’s area, which can be its rear boundary. It is designated before the rearward task starts. It is the line by or on which the withdrawing force attempts to break contact with the threat, and the orchestration of forces and events around it is critical. Once the withdrawing force crosses the handover line, it completes the BHO to the commander of the in-place force. The following points about the selection of the handover line are relevant:
  - It should be located forward of an obstacle belt and adjacent to dominant terrain from which the withdrawing force can be assisted by direct and indirect fire from the in-place force.
  - It should be forward of any area from which the threat can first engage the in-place force’s defensive positions with observed direct or indirect fire.
Any forces controlling the handover line should aim to reduce the threat’s tempo but avoid becoming decisively engaged.

As the withdrawing force crosses the handover line, responsibility for coordination of its fire support passes to the in-place force.

Routes are controlled and signposted, if necessary, by the in-place force, all the way from the handover line to the rear of their AO.

Under circumstances where the withdrawing force is withdrawing under pressure, the in-place force may be required to place security FEs, together with LOs, to occupy the handover line itself.

Timings. Although timings for the withdrawing force to be clear of the area are mandated by the higher commander, the transfer of responsibility between the withdrawing force and the in-place force is not normally tied to a specific time, and is usually expressed in terms of a DE, such as the completion of movement across the designated handover line.

Control measures. A framework of simple and clearly understood control measures is essential for a successful rearward passage. Figure 9–3 illustrates a range of such measures.

Command. HQ FEs of the withdrawing force may be co-located with the HQ of the in-place force to facilitate C3 during the task, although secure digital networked communications may allow the withdrawing force commander to remain close to the forces involved. The commander of the withdrawing force is responsible for identifying the last FE as it passes through the in-place force.

Sustainment. Sustainment considerations for a rearward passage of lines are similar to those for a withdrawal; however, the main differences are:

- the increased and ongoing sustainment needs of the in-place force after the BHO
- the overall higher rate of personnel and materiel casualties
- the probable reduced capability of CSS FEs allocated to the withdrawing force
- the replenishment of a withdrawing force that has passed its culminating point substantially adds to the sustainment burden.

Meeting these increased needs requires detailed CSS planning, including close liaison with the operations staff. CSS staff require high situational awareness so they can rapidly respond to the development of the passage of lines. A simple, flexible sustainment plan enables the withdrawing force to quickly transition to the next phase of the tactical action or task.
Relief-in-place

Relief-in-place is employed to replace one FE with another, usually in static defensive positions. It is a force preservation measure and a tool for allowing a commander to rotate forces before they reach their culminating point or to employ them on other tasks. The tactical symbol for relief-in-place is shown in Figure 9–4.

Figure 9–4: Tactical symbol for a relief-in-place

Incoming and outgoing forces are vulnerable during the conduct of this task. There are many troops on the move in forward areas and C2 is difficult to exercise if a threat develops while the relief is in progress. Relief-in-place should, therefore, be conducted during any period of low activity.

Purpose

The purpose of relief-in-place is to pass the responsibility for an occupied locality or area from one force to another while maintaining the overall integrity of the defence.

Description

Relief-in-place is a tactical task in which all or part of a force in defence is replaced by another incoming force. Relief-in-place is conducted during periods of low activity and success depends on cooperation and security. Relief-in-place tactical tasks are conducted when the following applies to the outgoing force:

• it is required for tasks elsewhere
• it is directed to handover a task
• it has successfully completed a task, or
• it has reached or is about to reach its culminating point.

Further information for relief-in-place can be found in LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics [pp. 59–62]

Obstacle breaching and crossing

The decision to breach or cross an obstacle is not simple, and the commander must weigh up a variety of considerations. The enabling task of breaching and
crossing an obstacle is seldom an end in itself, but is often a decisive event (DE) as part of a higher command tactical plan. Successful obstacle breaching and crossing requires careful orchestration of all BOSs, and is not solely the responsibility of the mobility and survivability BOS. Figure 9–5 depicts the tactical symbol for a bridge or gap.

![Figure 9–5: Tactical symbol for a bridge or gap](image)

Obstacles are defined as an impediment or restriction to movement which normally requires special equipment, munitions and procedures to overcome it. Obstacles that prove the greatest impediment are natural, such as inland waterways, rivers and very restricted non-urban terrain; and artificial, such as all types of minefields, antitank ditches, extensive wire obstacles, and extensive arrays of booby traps and IEDs spread randomly along any route, particularly in urban environments.

**Purpose**

Threat defences usually incorporate natural and artificial obstacles that are designed to disrupt, turn, fix or block an attack or advance. The purpose of obstacle breaching and crossing tactical actions is to minimise the effect of obstacles and threat actions on friendly forces mobility and survivability.

Further information for obstacle breaching and crossing can be found in *LWD 3-0-3, Formation Tactics* [pp. 94–104], *LWP-G 3-6-8, Combined Arms Obstacle Breaching*, and *LWP-CA (ENGR) 2-1-2, River Crossing*. 
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The Public International Law & Policy Group 2013, *The Ceasefire Drafter’s Handbook – An Introduction and Template for Negotiators, Mediators, and Stakeholders*


United Nations 1945, *Charter of the United Nations*

Associated publications

This publication should be read in conjunction with the following publications:

• Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 06.4, Law of Armed Conflict
• Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.7, Collection Operations
• Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.10, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
• Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.17, Counter Improvised Explosive Device
• British Army, Army Field Manual Volume 1 – Combined Arms Operations, 2007
• Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Manual
• Land Warfare Doctrine 1, The Fundamentals of Land Power
• Land Warfare Doctrine 2-2, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
• Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0, Operations
• Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-1, Counterinsurgency
• Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-3, Formation Tactics
• Land Warfare Doctrine 3-0-5, Security Force Capacity Building
• Land Warfare Doctrine 3-1-1, Employment of Regional Force Surveillance Units
• Land Warfare Doctrine 3-8-6, Civil–Military Cooperation
• Land Warfare Doctrine 3-9-1, Operations in Specific Environments
• Land Warfare Doctrine 3-9-7, Operations in a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Environment
• Land Warfare Doctrine 5-1-4, The Military Appreciation Process
• Land Warfare Procedures - Combat Arms (Aviation) 3-1-1, Aviation Minor Tactics
• Land Warfare Procedures - Combat Arms (Aviation) 3-1-2, Aircraft Support
• Land Warfare Procedures - Combat Arms (Dismounted Combat) 3-3-1, Dismounted Minor Tactics (Developing Doctrine)
• Land Warfare Procedures - Combat Arms (Dismounted Combat) 3-3-3, Tracking
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- *Land Warfare Procedures - Combat Arms (Dismounted Combat) 3-3-5, Infantry Reconnaissance and Surveillance*
- *Land Warfare Procedures - Combat Arms (Dismounted Combat) 3-3-8, Patrolling*
- *Land Warfare Procedures - Combat Arms (Engineers) 2-1-2, River Crossing*
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- *Land Warfare Procedures - Combat Service Support 4-3-2, Road Transport Operations Handbook*
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- *Land Warfare Procedures - General 3-6-5, Mines, Booby Traps and Improvised Explosive Devices*
- *Land Warfare Procedures - General 3-6-8, Combined Arms Obstacle Breaching*
- *Land Warfare Procedures - General 3-8-2, Population Protection and Control Techniques*
- *Land Warfare Procedures - General 3-9-2, Operations in Tropical Environments (Developing Doctrine)*
- *Land Warfare Procedures - General 3-9-3, Operations in Desert Environments (Developing Doctrine)*
- *Land Warfare Procedures - General 3-9-4, Operations in Cold Conditions*
- *Land Warfare Procedures - General 3-9-6, Operations In Urban Environments (Developing Doctrine)*

**Doctrine Online**

This and other doctrine publications are available via the Doctrine Online website located at: [http://drnet.defence.gov.au/ARMY/Doctrine-Online/Pages/Home.aspx](http://drnet.defence.gov.au/ARMY/Doctrine-Online/Pages/Home.aspx). Paper copies may be out of date. Doctrine Online is the authoritative source for current doctrine. Users are to ensure currency of all doctrine publications against the Doctrine Online library.

**Gender**

This publication has been prepared with gender-neutral language.
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Glossary

The principal source for Australian Defence Force terms and definitions is the Australian Defence Glossary located at http://adg.eas.defence.mil.au/adgms. Terms and definitions contained within this publication are in accordance with the business rules, guidelines and conventions for the Australian Defence Glossary at the time of its release.

adaptability
The ability to embrace new or unforeseen tasks.

agility
The ability to transition between tasks rapidly.

area of operations
An operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime forces to conduct military activities.

Note: Normally, an area of operations does not encompass the entire joint operations area of the joint commander, but is sufficient in size for the joint force component commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces.

assist
A stability tactical action to preserve the rule of law, enable the conduct of elections and provide environmental and humanitarian assistance.

attack
To take offensive action against a specified objective.

battlegroup
A combined arms grouping based on the headquarters of an aviation, tank, cavalry or infantry unit.

battlespace
The area of influence and interest, includes the traditional domains of land, air and sea, space, the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace. Note: Also embraces the social, political and temporal contexts in which conflict is waged.

battlespace operating system
The combination of personnel, collective training, major systems, supplies, facilities, and command and management organised, supported and employed to perform a designated function as part of a whole.
**block**
To deny access to a given area or to prevent an advance in a particular direction.

**breach**
Break through an obstacle or defensive measure.

**bypass**
To manoeuvre around an obstacle, position, or enemy force.

**campaign**
A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic end state or objective within a given time and geographical area.

**capture**
Take and hold including by force an adversary’s resources (for example, personnel, equipment, materiel, infrastructure, information).

**centre of gravity**
Characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. (derived NATO)
Note: The centre of gravity at each level of conflict may be diffused or surrounded by competing decisive points.

**close combat**
Combat carried out with direct fire weapons, against identifiable individuals, supported by indirect fire, air-delivered fires and nonlethal engagement means.
Note: Close combat defeats or destroys the enemy forces or seizes and retains ground.

**combat team**
A combined arms grouping based upon a manoeuvre sub-unit headquarters.

**combined arms team**
A case-by-case mix of combat, combat support, combat service support and command support elements selected on the basis of a specific combination or task, terrain and threat.
contain
To restrict the movement of an individual, group or organisation to a defined area or to have or hold them under control.

Note: This may also apply to diseases and disasters where the intent is to prevent its spread or the situation becoming worse.

control
The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under their command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives.

Note: All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.

control measures
1. For counterinsurgency, restrictive measures imposed upon a civil population and relating to such matters as movement, registration or the possession of foodstocks or weapons.

2. Directives given graphically or orally by a commander to subordinate commands in order to assign responsibilities, coordinate fires and manoeuvre, and to control combat operations.

convoy escort
An escort to protect a convoy of vehicles from being scattered, destroyed or captured.

cordon
An offensive technique that contains, disrupts or attacks an enemy on urban terrain without decisive engagement.

cordon and search
In land operations, a security activity conducted to capture persons or seize things within a defined search area, consisting of an inner and an outer cordon, where the inner cordon contains the search area and the outer cordon screens or guards the inner cordon and the search force from external interference.

cover
The action by land, air or sea forces to protect by offence, defence or threat of either or both.
crowd control
A tactical task to prevent or stop trouble. These measures including standing preparatory measures (especially intelligence), preventative measures (implementation of plans) and intervention measures.

curfew
A tactical task, imposing a specific regulation, enforced during civil disturbances, which establishes strict controls on movement after nightfall.

deception
Those measures designed to mislead the adversary by manipulation, distortion or falsification of information to induce behaviour prejudicial to their interests.

decisive event
A major event or effect that is a precondition to the successful disruption or dislocation of the enemy centre of gravity within the framework of the superior commander's intent.

demobilisation
A tactical task, to reduce the number of factions’ forces and their equipment in the area of operations to the levels as agreed in the peace settlement.

demonstration
An attack or show of force on a front where a decision is not sought, made with the aim of deceiving the enemy.

disarmament
A tactical task, involving the controlled process of taking weapons away from military forces. Demilitarisation and disarmament usually take place within the framework of demobilisation.

enabling activities
Activities that link, support, or create the conditions for offensive, defensive and stability activities, ensuring continuity and maintaining tempo.

internally displaced person
A person who, as part of a mass movement, has been forced to flee their home or place of habitual residence suddenly or unexpectedly as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violation of human rights, fear of such violation, or natural or man-made disasters, and who has not crossed an internationally recognised State border.
lane
A clear area within a tactical or protective obstacle that will allow a friendly force to pass through the obstacle but not in tactical formation.

Notes:
1. A lane may be included when an obstacle is constructed, or formed when an obstacle is reduced.
2. A lane is usually physically marked on the ground and covered by observation and fire.
3. A personnel lane is usually about two metres wide and a vehicle lane is usually about 8 metres wide.

line of operation
A line linking decisive points to allow sequential progression towards an operational objective or the desired end state.

military support to reform
The transformation or establishment and training of armed forces conducted within the strategic guidelines set for reformation of the security sector.

reconnaissance
A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an adversary or potential adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area.

reform
A stability tactical action to transform or establish and train armed forces/paramilitary forces conducted within the strategic guidelines set for reformation of the security sector, within a permissive environment.

refugee
Any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
reintegration

In personnel recovery, the task of providing medical care and decompression to allow the conduct of debriefings to return recovered personnel to duty and their family.

restore

1. To bring degraded command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance systems back to their original state.

2. A stability tactical action re-establish essential services, facilities and infrastructure by repairing, provision or restitution and the provision of humanitarian aid and medical assistance.

stability activities

Activities that impose security and control over an area while restoring services and support to civilian agencies, which set the conditions to allow the primacy of indigenous organisations.

stakeholder

A person, entity or organisation with a pecuniary and/or significant interest or influence in a particular issue.

surveillance

The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic or other means.

synchronisation

The arrangement of related and mutually supporting actions in time, space and purpose to maximise their combined intended effects.

tactical task

The specific activity performed by a unit while executing a form of tactical action, technique or form of manoeuvre. It may be expressed in terms of either, actions by a friendly force of effects on an enemy force.

tactics

The ordered arrangement and manoeuvre of units in relation to each other and the enemy in order to utilise their full potentialities.

tempo

The relative measure of the abilities of opponents to understand, decide and implement appropriate adaptations to plans, dispositions or postures.
terrain
A tract of land, especially as considered with reference to its natural and man-made features.
Abbreviations

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AD    air defence
AFN   approved foreign national
AFP   Australian Federal Police
AN    Australian national
ANA   Afghan National Army
ANP   Afghan National Police
AO    area of operations
ARH   armed reconnaissance helicopter
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development
BG    battlegroup
BHO   battle handover
BOS   battlespace operating system
BZ    buffer zone
C3    command, control and communications
CCIR  commander’s critical information requirement
CF    coalition forces
CIED  counter improvised explosive device
CIMIC civil–military cooperation
COIN  counterinsurgency
DACC  Defence assistance to the civil community
DDR   disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
DFACA Defence Force aid to civilian authority
EAA   evacuation assembly area
EHC   evacuation handling centre
EOD   explosive ordnance disposal
EP    evacuation point
EWG   Elections Working Group
FE    force element
FOB   forward operating base
FUP   forming-up place
HA    humanitarian assistance
HN    host nation
HOM   head of mission
IA    information activity
IDP   internally displaced person
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IECI</td>
<td>Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFES</td>
<td>International Foundation of Electoral Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGUF</td>
<td>individual guidance for the use of force</td>
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<td>IHEC</td>
<td>Iraq Independent High Electoral Commission</td>
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<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force, East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPB</td>
<td>intelligence preparation of the battlespace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISTAR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIAF</td>
<td>joint interagency task force</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLE</td>
<td>key leader engagement</td>
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<td>KP</td>
<td>key point</td>
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<tr>
<td>KPP</td>
<td>key point protection</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOO</td>
<td>line of operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEAO</td>
<td>Middle East Area of Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNF-I</td>
<td>Multinational Force – Iraq</td>
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<td>MTT</td>
<td>military training team</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OE</td>
<td>operating environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFOF</td>
<td>orders for opening fire</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFUF</td>
<td>orders for the use of force</td>
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<tr>
<td>OMLT</td>
<td>operational mentoring and liaison team</td>
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<tr>
<td>OP</td>
<td>observation post</td>
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<tr>
<td>OS</td>
<td>offensive support</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-OMLT</td>
<td>Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>PI</td>
<td>public information</td>
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<td>PIR</td>
<td>priority information requirement</td>
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<td>QRF</td>
<td>quick reaction force</td>
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<td>RFSU</td>
<td>regional force surveillance unit</td>
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<td>TCL</td>
<td>tactical coordination line</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCP</td>
<td>traffic control post</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSR</td>
<td>transfer of security responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUAV</td>
<td>tactical unmanned aerial vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>unmanned aerial vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNIEAT</td>
<td>United Nations International Electoral Assistance Team</td>
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<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
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<td>VA</td>
<td>vital asset</td>
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<td>VAP</td>
<td>vital asset protection</td>
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<td>VCP</td>
<td>vehicle checkpoint</td>
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<tr>
<td>VNA</td>
<td>vital national asset</td>
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<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>vulnerable point</td>
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</table>

The following abbreviations appear in tables and figures within the publication.

AUSBATT  | Australian Battalion in the International Force for East Timor
CAPASSYPT | captured personnel assembly point
CD: criminal detainee
COMPINT: compassionate internee
CPERS: captured person
En: enemy
EPW: enemy prisoner of war
ICPC: initial collection and processing centre
ICRC: International Committee for the Red Cross
IO: international organisation
LD: line of departure
POC: point of capture
PSYOPS: psychological operations
REPAT: repatriation
RV: rendezvous
SI: security internee
SIG: signaller

The following are common shortened forms or symbols for names of measurements used throughout this publication.

t: tonne
Amendment certificate

Land Doctrine, Army Knowledge Centre is responsible for the management of this publication. The sponsor of this publication is Director General Training and Doctrine Headquarters Forces Command. The doctrine contained herein was approved on 27 November 2018.

Proposals for amendments or additions to the text of this publication should be made through normal channels to the sponsor. To facilitate this go to the Doctrine Online intranet website and select the ‘Feedback’ icon.

It is certified that the amendments promulgated in the undermentioned amendment lists have been made in this publication.

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All superseded Amendment Certificates should be retained at the rear of the publication for audit purposes.