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Editorial

The challenges of operating in different environments against a multitude of threats with a small but highly skilled force, are never ending. Preparing for likely scenarios is demanding enough, but mitigating against short notice emergencies and sustaining concurrent operations on multiple fronts is the future planning challenge. These challenges are made more complex by the need to integrate with other security organisations, industry, legislation and the demands of the community. This edition of the Australian Australian Army Journal features a collection of articles which highlight some of the current debates within this forum. The articles cover a broad spectrum of subjects from civic responsibility to counter-terrorism, and from urban warfare to amphibious operations.

In our lead article, Director of the Australian Army History Unit, Tim Gellel, draws on ideas from Army’s futures statement, *Accelerated Warfare*, to describe how the future operating themes of ‘cooperation, competition and conflict’ were also evident in Australia’s relationship with Imperial Japan at the beginning of Federation. This article sets the scene for the subsequent pieces which highlight some of the many complexities of the region. Next, Lieutenant Colonel Duncan Foster examines the idea of national service against the functional and societal imperatives of the Australian Defence Force and looks to the Swiss model for a successful example. His argument of how to balance structure and function in a rapidly changing threat environment is topical, and offers a societal perspective to a debate that is often dominated by technological solutions.

Continuing the discussion about future force structure and external support, Captain Nicholas Allen introduces a critical analysis of contracting methods.
His article looks at causes of contract failure, differences in organisational culture between ADF and private industry, and the impact of contracting on readiness and short notice tasks. Major Marshall Lawrence brings new ideas to the important requirement for cross-cultural expertise, through the efficiency of selective language training. Lawrence argues that psychological measures such as personality type and cultural intelligence may identify those best suited to language training and thus increase the effectiveness of the investment.

Patrick McMillan gives us a useful external perspective on the challenges of operating in the archipelagic environment of the Indo-Pacific. McMillan, a graduate student at ANU’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, examines Army’s current amphibious capability against coastal, littoral, estuarine and riverine environments and proposes new watercraft to fill the operational gaps. Contemporary operational challenges are also the subject of Nicolas Johnston’s article on Australia’s counter terrorism response. Johnston, another author who is external to Defence, keeps civil primacy as the focus of his case study on the Lindt Café siege, in which he evaluates different models of interagency cooperation in domestic security response. Finally, Major Dale Morely-Turnbull, a member of the military police, uses her experience in investigative services to ask whether the ADF’s ‘zero tolerance’ policy on substance abuse is still relevant in today’s social climate. Major Morely-Turnbull evaluates ethical and disciplinary reasons behind the policy and considers convergence of civil and military sectors as a rationale.

In this edition, we also present six book reviews on topics that range from 21st Century urban warfare to Commonwealth armies in the Second World War; and new disciplines and approaches to military research in books about criminology and reflexivity. We are also pleased to bring back our section ‘Letters to the Editor’, and invite further responses from readers.

The Australian Army Journal continues to play an important role in the ‘contest of ideas’ that is the fuel for an Army in Motion. I am continually encouraged by the breadth of interest in Australian Army Research Centre publications, both in Australia and in the international military research community; and in this spirit, I commend this edition of the Australian Army Journal to you.
From Cooperation to Conflict: How Australia Lost Control of its Northern Approaches, 1901–1941

Mr Tim Gellel

Abstract

Accelerated Warfare describes how Australia’s region is increasingly defined by a changing geopolitical order and operating spectrum of cooperation, competition and conflict. While Accelerated Warfare is the title of Army’s futures statement, that operating spectrum nonetheless reflects Army’s first 40 years. This paper examines how Army confronted those challenges as Australia’s relationship with Imperial Japan transitioned from one of security cooperation, through competition and confrontation to conflict.

Cooperation

On 30 January 1902, the British and Japanese government representatives signed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, ending Great Britain’s era of ‘splendid isolation’. Coming just over a year after Australian Federation, the alliance:

was, on the whole, received in Australian political and commercial circles ‘with marked expressions of approval.’ The Alliance was seen
as a check against a Russian fleet from Vladivostok or a German fleet from the Chinese Sea, and as a guarantee to the trading interests of Australia in the Far East.\(^2\)

The fledgling Australian Government’s relief proved short-lived. The 1904–05 Russo-Japanese War coincided with the withdrawal of Britain’s five China Station battleships to the North Sea to redress the balance against Germany, presenting Australia with a greatly changed security environment. Three weeks after the decisive Japanese naval victory over Imperial Russia at the Battle of Tsushima, Australia’s Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, ‘chief architect of her defence and foreign policy’, identified Japan as a ‘defence threat’ for the first time.\(^3\)

Those concerns did not prevent London from renewing and expanding the alliance’s scope in mid-1905 and 1911. But as war with Germany loomed, the Australian Government did not embrace the prospect of Anglo-Japanese naval cooperation with enthusiasm:

*When in an important speech on 17 March 1914 [then First Lord of the Admiralty] Winston Churchill asked for Australian and New Zealand Dreadnoughts to strengthen the decisive theatre in Europe, he based himself on the premise that Australia was adequately protected by the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Australian leaders, however, were flabbergasted by Churchill’s implication that the Pacific was to be made safe by the treaty with a nation whose people they did not admit to their shores.*\(^4\)

When the Great War broke out, ‘Australian apprehension that Japan would seize the opportunity to extend her empire further southward’ made London initially reluctant to call upon Japanese assistance.\(^5\) But the Royal Navy’s commitments to defeating the German High Seas Fleet in the North Sea, securing the Mediterranean and countering the U-Boat war in the northern Atlantic left little capacity for operations in the Pacific. Necessity won out, and the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was asked to reduce the German fleet base at Tsingtao, in north-eastern China, and to hunt down the cruisers based there.

This period saw unprecedented levels of Japanese-Australian naval cooperation, an often cited example of which was the cruiser HIJMS *Ibuki*’s role escorting the first ANZAC troop convoy through the Indian Ocean in
November 1914. Around the same time, the pre-dreadnought *Hizen* and the cruisers *Asama* and *Izumo* joined the battlecruiser HMAS *Australia* and the light cruiser HMS *Newcastle* off Mexico’s Pacific coast and headed south to search the Galapagos archipelago for the German Pacific Squadron cruisers. Beyond those examples, the IJN committed 12 cruiser sorties to southern patrols in Australian throughout the war’s duration, for which the Australian Government has been described as ‘less than enthusiastically grateful’.

**Competition**

The limits of that cooperation quickly emerged, however, when it came to the occupation of Germany’s Pacific Ocean territories. By 24 September 1914, the hastily assembled Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force (AN&MEF) had secured most of German New Guinea, while a New Zealand force occupied German Samoa at the end of August. On 6 November, a half-company-sized force from the AN&MEF had occupied Nauru. At relatively low cost, these antipodean forces had secured the German territories south of the equator. But the AN&MEF expedition had been at the limits of Australia’s military and naval capabilities. Shortcomings in logistics, training and preparedness were masked by the light opposition put up by the small local paramilitary Polizeitruppe.

When the British Admiralty enquired whether Australian forces could occupy the more distant German North Pacific territories, the Army raised a third AN&MEF battalion-sized force, dubbed the ‘Tropical Force’, in November. The commitment of the available naval escorts, troopships and coal to the first ANZAC convoy from Australia delayed the Tropical Force’s availability.

While the Australians tarried, the Japanese did not. Prompted by a request from the British Admiralty, but acting virtually independently of the Japanese Government, IJN landing parties seized the Mariana Islands (Saipan), Caroline Islands (Truk, Yap, Kusaie [now Kosrae], Ponape, Palau, Angaur) and Marshall Islands (Jaluit) in October 1914. Although the IJN proposed ‘permanent retention of all occupied islands’, the Japanese Government was not initially committed to their long-term possession. When Tokyo offered to hand Yap over, the Australian authorities were unable to find the necessary escorts for such a convoy, and cheekily enquired whether the IJN could provide that support. Tokyo’s position soon changed when domestic Japanese sentiment was aroused, and:
Riots emerged in Tokyo when it was learned that the government was prepared to hand over the Micronesian islands to their allies. The commotion caused the Japanese Government to retract its offer, and on 23 November, Britain asked Australia not to proceed to any islands north of the Equator.\textsuperscript{16}

Anglo-Japanese cooperation was now transforming to become Japanese-Australian competition in the Pacific:

\begin{quote}
In these embarrassing circumstances the Commonwealth Government perceived a divided duty. On the one hand it did not wish to adopt a policy which would cause difficulties to the Imperial Government; on the other hand it considered that Australia had geographical and strategic claims to the occupancy of these islands, possession of which by any Power other than Great Britain would profoundly affect the trend of Australia’s naval defence policy in the future.\textsuperscript{17}
\end{quote}

A 3 December telegram from the British Government was even more conclusive:

\begin{quote}
... as Pelew, Mariana, Caroline Islands, and Marshall Islands are at present in military occupation by Japanese who are at our request engaged in policing waters Northern Pacific, we consider it most convenient for strategic reasons to allow them to remain in occupation for the present, leaving whole question of future to be settled at the end of war. We should be glad therefore if the Australian expedition would confine itself to occupation of German islands south of the equator.\textsuperscript{18}
\end{quote}

Thus the AN&MEF Tropical Force expedition, ‘which had been so completely fitted out that it even carried with it postage-stamps overprinted “N.W. Pacific,” came to an end before it sailed’.\textsuperscript{19}

### Confrontation

The end of the First World War and the peace initiatives that followed inadvertently increased Australian-Japanese cooperation. In 1919, Australia stridently opposed Japan’s Racial Equality Proposal at the Paris Peace Conference. Then in 1922 Japan was forced to return Tsingtao to the Republic of China, while the conclusion of the Washington Naval Treaty
saw Britain annul the Anglo-Japanese treaty and decline to support Japan’s demand for closer naval parity with the Royal Navy and the US Navy.

The League of Nations—the forerunner to the modern United Nations—awarded Australia and Japan mandates over the former German Pacific territories. But that mandate required that these territories were not militarised, forbidding their fortification or the establishment of armed forces there. So in 1922 the Australian Army decommissioned the 6-inch coastal defence battery it had installed at Rabaul four years earlier, and avoided raising local militia forces when the garrison was withdrawn.20

From the early 1930s Japan was increasingly seen as an aggressor state. The League of Nations determined that Imperial Japanese Army officers had staged the 1931 Mukden Incident as a pretext for the invasion of north-eastern China, known as Manchuria. After the League of Nations General Assembly prepared to condemn Japan as an aggressor in February 1933, Tokyo gave formal notice of its withdrawal from the League. Similar incidents in Shanghai (1932) and later the 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident led to the Second Sino-Japanese War. Japan occupied Hainan in 1939 and then French Indochina in September 1940. In 1936, Japan also withdrew from the negotiations for a successor to the Washington Naval Treaty.
While successive Australian governments recognised the increasing Japanese threat, they did not invest in the capabilities needed for the Army to defend Australia's northern approaches. That growing threat coincided with the Royal Navy's further withdrawal from East Asia, starting with the closure of its forward naval base from Weihaiwei (near Tsingtao) in 1930. Under the emerging Singapore strategy, the Singapore ‘fortress’ would be defended until a Royal Navy fleet arrived to sally north to relieve or recapture Hong Kong and then blockade Japan to force Tokyo to accept terms.

Despite that strategy, the Australian Army focused its force planning on the establishment of a Second Australian Imperial Force (AIF) which, like the AIF of the First World War, would comprise infantry and light horse formations equipped to fight in Europe or the Middle East. At the same time, the Army confronted the block obsolescence of its artillery and small arms, a by-product of having relied for two decades on the surplus remaining from the First World War.

Scant regard was given to the emerging demands of modern warfare, let alone any requirement to fight in the South-East Asian or South-West Pacific littoral. Nowhere was this more evident than in the shortfalls of the weapons systems needed to defend against enemy air and naval forces. Nor did the Australian Army seek to exercise in the region to determine how and where best to deploy forces and sustain them in the unfamiliar South-East Asian and South-West Pacific regions. There was no meaningful engagement, let alone training, with regional US, French, Dutch or Portuguese forces. Nor did the Army realise the potential of indigenous forces such as those later raised in Papua and New Guinea.

Anti-aircraft guns were in especially short supply. By the end of 1940, only 40 3.7-inch anti-aircraft guns had been produced; by November 1941, that figure had reached 165 guns, ‘but without predictors’, which were not manufactured in Australia, ‘they were of limited value’.21 Modern 40 mm Bofors guns were requested from Great Britain, but production there could not meet British demands, let alone those of the rest of the Empire.

From 1934, Australia’s coastal defences were reinforced,22 including by the acquisition of 9.2-inch guns, which could outrange and outgun Japanese heavy cruisers that might raid key Australian ports. Those heavier weapons could not be spared for the northern approaches, however, and it was not until July 1939 that a 6-inch battery was installed at Port Moresby.23
Similarly, it was not until an infantry company from the 15th Battalion arrived in July 1940 that Papua New Guinea could claim to have even the most rudimentary garrison. A key factor that delayed the dispatch of these forces was the absence of the infrastructure needed to accommodate even a modest force.

To remediate these shortages, in October 1941 the Australian Government requested that the US Government provide, under the Lend-Lease program, weapons and equipment to thicken Australia’s coastal defences in the South-West Pacific. For example, the Australian Government planned to turn Base F—as Washington referred to Rabaul—into a forward base for a counter-offensive against the Japanese base at Truk. In October 1941, the US Government was requested to provide six 7-inch guns, eight 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, an anti-submarine harbour boom defence net and radio direction-finding equipment (i.e. radar). But, as events proved, these would not be ready in time for the Japanese attack. Even if they had been, more time would have been needed to train crews in their use.

Wartime conscription and a manpower shortage meant the potential of indigenous troops also received belated attention. Infantry battalions were gradually raised in Papua (from June 1940), the Torres Strait Islands (from May 1941), the Northern Territory (February 1942) and New Guinea (from March 1944). While these units proved effective, much time was needed for their establishment and training. It was not until mid-1942 that the Papuan Infantry Battalion participated in significant combat operations (whereas the Torres Strait Light Infantry Battalion, the 2/1st North Australia Observer Unit and the Northern Territory Special Reconnaissance Unit did not see significant combat). Had these units been raised earlier, their contribution to the war might have been even greater.

**Conflict**

War with Germany highlighted the inadequacy of the Australian Army’s inter-war preparations. As in the First World War, Royal Australian Navy (RAN) ships, Army’s Second AIF divisions, and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) combat squadrons were spread across the globe in defence of the Atlantic and the UK, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.
This left few resources for the Pacific where, aside from the looming Japanese threat, German commerce raiders were active. In December 1940, the German armed merchant ships *Komet* and *Orion* sank five merchant ships around the Australian-administered island of Nauru and damaged the island’s phosphate-loading facilities. The most resistance shown was when Nauru’s Administrator, Frederick Chalmers, who had commanded the 27th Battalion in the First World War, ‘stormed along the sea-front shouting at the enemy’.26 Those raids demonstrated the vulnerability of Nauru and the nearby British-controlled, and similarly phosphate-rich, Ocean Island, both of which were important to the British Empire’s war economy.

Even had the British Empire’s navies and air forces not been heavily committed to operations across all theatres, land-based coastal defences represented an economical and effective way of defending these outer islands. But the decades of under-investment left the Army without adequate resources to protect Australian interests in the region. The Army planned to install a pair of 6-inch coastal defence guns on Nauru and a second pair on Ocean Island to deter further raids.27 All that could be spared, however, were two detachments (known as Wren Force and Heron Force) equipped with a pair of obsolete 18-pounder field guns each.28

As its strategic circumstances worsened, the Australia Government attempted its own last-minute diplomacy and reconsidered cooperation with—or at least appeasement of—Japan. Following what has been described as the ‘tiptoe policy’, the Menzies Government urged London to temporarily close the Burma Road in the summer of 1940 to appease Tokyo, while continuing exports of iron ore and other ‘war material’ to Japan.29 Australia’s first ambassador to Tokyo, Sir John Latham, even suggested that Australia offer to buy Japanese military aircraft, and ‘for a few months promising negotiations with Mitsubishi proceeded’.30

The die was cast in December 1941 when Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and US bases in the Philippines. At the same time Japanese forces raided Singapore, invaded Malaya and sank the Royal Navy battleship *Prince of Wales* and battlecruiser *Repulse*, which had been deployed to Malaya to underpin the Singapore strategy. Those strikes were made possible by Japan’s possession of the former German Pacific territories. IJN bases in the Marshall Islands supported the attacks on Pearl Harbor, Wake Island, and later Nauru and Ocean Island; Palau supported the invasion of the Philippines; Saipan in the Marianas supported the invasion of Guam; and
Truk—the IJN 4th Fleet’s home port since 1939—was the base for IJN amphibious landings at Rabaul and Kavieng in New Guinea.

The Australian Army too had deployed forces across the northern approaches. The AIF 8th Division—only one of four AIF divisions—and other AIF and militia units spanned a 7,500 km arc from Malaya, Singapore, Timor (Sparrow Force), Ambon (Gull Force), Port Moresby (30th Brigade), New Britain and New Ireland (Lark Force), Nauru (Wren Force) and Ocean Island (Heron Force).31 These latter forces constituted what was soon called an ‘advanced observation line’—a picket line that would maintain forward air bases for aerial reconnaissance.32

Sparrow, Gull and Lark forces were each based around an AIF infantry battalion, but they were not combined arms teams. Lark Force was the best equipped, with a coastal defence battery of two 6-inch guns and a pair of obsolete 3-inch anti-aircraft guns and an independent company— the Army’s first deployment of commandos. But even this force had been designed:

… to deal with the situation as prevailing in 1940–41, viz. fleeting bombardment raid by, at most, one or two armed merchantmen. The problem of air attack or sea bombardment on a Pacific War scale was not budgeted for since sufficient coast guns and anti-aircraft guns were not available for the more important main-land ports let alone Rabaul.33
Thus, Lark Force—indeed all the ‘Bird Forces’—lacked field artillery and, even though there was a battery minus of anti-tank guns, the battalion’s Bren Gun Carriers constituted Lark Force’s only armoured vehicles.

The speed of Japan’s advance into South-East Asia and across the Pacific forced reconsideration of Army’s forward deployments. The Australian Government agreed to further reinforce the strategically vital Singapore ‘fortress’, but conceded that Wren and Heron forces were too weak to deter the IJN. They were withdrawn to Australia in February 1942, ceding Nauru and Ocean Island to uncontested Japanese occupation in August and allowing the IJN to extend its reach into the South Pacific and towards the vital US–Australia sea lanes.

In considering the fate of the remaining three Bird Forces, the Australian Government and Army hedged their bets. They agreed that US aid would not arrive in time but felt that, even if the Government was unable to reinforce these forces, they could not be abandoned. To have done so would have been to cede to the Japanese the harbours and airfields that lay across Australia’s northern approaches. These were needed both to protect Singapore’s eastern flank and for a future Allied counter-offensive into the North Pacific. Moreover, the Government was concerned lest the Bird Forces’ withdrawal discourage the Dutch from defending the Netherlands East Indies.34

This left the third option: for the garrisons to remain with only such reinforcements as could be spared in the time available. Not only were combat-ready troops unavailable but also the RAN’s commitments to other theatres meant that neither warships nor transports were available. In their stead, the Australian authorities despatched the meagre RAAF assets that could be found and deployed quickly. Unable to reinforce, and both unable and unwilling to withdraw, the three Bird Forces remained where they were. As the Chief of Naval Staff noted in a dispatch to the Australian Ambassador in Washington about Lark Force, ‘It is considered better to maintain Rabaul as an advanced air operational base, its present small garrison being regarded as hostages to fortune.’35

Isolated and incapable of supporting each other with the weapons available to them, the three garrisons suffered the same fate. Lark Force ceased to be a fighting force within hours of the Japanese landing at Rabaul on 23 January 1942. Gull Force surrendered on 3 February, and then Sparrow Force on 23 February.
Only the commandos were able to continue fighting. On East Timor, the 2/2nd Independent Company withdrew towards East Timor’s south coast and pursued a guerrilla campaign until the end of the year. Lark Force’s 1st Independent Company also performed its stay-behind role admirably, even after the loss of its headquarters at Kavieng, New Ireland, on 23 January. That company’s remaining detachments—fewer than three platoons—maintained their surveillance outposts at key points along a nearly 3,000 km arc extending from Seeadler Harbour on Manus Island through Namatanai in central New Ireland, Buka Passage in Bougainville, Tulagi in the Central Solomons, and Port Vila in Vanuatu. From those outposts, the commandos undertook presence and reconnaissance patrols, established observation posts, and supported the RAN Coastwatchers network, laying the foundations for their M Special Unit successors. Last to withdraw were the commandos at Tulagi, who supported the RAAF seaplane and wireless base there until the eve of the IJN’s 3 May 1942 invasion which triggered the Guadalcanal campaign.

More than 2,000 Lark, Sparrow and Gull Force soldiers were killed or died in Japanese captivity. In the counter-offensives that followed, US forces bypassed Timor, Ambon and Rabaul as they took the shortest road to Tokyo, but other locations such as Tulagi, Saipan, Palau and Kwajalein had to be retaken from the Japanese at great cost. Moreover, had the German Pacific territories not been ceded to Japan in 1914, the IJN’s opening offensives of the Pacific War would have necessarily been changed in scope and reach.

Conclusion

In the first two decades that followed Federation, Australia’s security relationship with Japan transitioned from awkward cooperation to an emerging competition. Upon the First World War’s outbreak, Australia found itself reliant on maritime security from the country it identified as the most direct threat to national security. That reliance both underscored and masked the limits of protection the Royal Navy could provide Australia in the event of a major conflict. In 1914, it was the limits of that indigenous naval force that forced the Australian Government to cede control of the central Pacific to Japan. Australia had the troops, but not the naval transports and escorts needed to occupy Imperial Germany’s North Pacific territories north of the equator.
The First World War’s ashes had barely settled before Australia’s cooperative security relationship with Japan further transitioned through competition into confrontation. But Australia did not use the inter-war period to prepare for littoral warfare in South-East Asia and the Pacific. Saddled with war debt and in the face of the Great Depression, successive governments under¬invested in defence, including the land-based air and sea defences that could have added substance to the advanced observation line established across South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific. Nor did the Army engage with prospective regional partners to offset its weaknesses, instead trusting that its traditional place in the British Empire provided the security guarantees needed. And, adhering to the conditions of the League of Nations mandate until the mid-1940s, nor did Australia raise local militia forces in the former German New Guinea, let alone indigenous ones.

As Washington had recognised, the advanced observation line included naval and air bases needed for a future counter-offensive against Japan. Properly defended, bases like Rabaul threatened the IJN’s forward bases in the former German Pacific territories, but in their largely indefensible state the Australian bases were vulnerable to attacks from those Japanese...
bases. Land-based forces were needed to provide the persistent defence of these bases to allow naval and air forces to concentrate where they were most needed. Those land forces needed to be composed of combined arms, equipped with anti-aircraft and coastal defence artillery to contest the airspace and waters around them. When the Government belatedly recognised those needs, the required weapons were in short supply and not available in the time frames needed. Without them, the fates of the Army units deployed to cover Australia’s northern approaches were left to fortune.

The Australian Army faces many of these challenges today. Advances in transportation, weapons and communications technologies have eroded the security buffer once provided by the Pacific Ocean’s vastness. Regional powers vie for and fortify contested reefs and islands as naval powers compete for control of the Western Pacific.

*Accelerated Warfare* describes these challenges and the need for partnering, cooperation and jointness to mitigate these security challenges. Increasingly the Australian Defence Force has the joint capabilities needed to transport, protect and sustain land-based task groups at such remote locations, and to contest control of the air and sea around them. Moreover Army, as part of that joint force, has strengthened engagement with regional and non-traditional partners. In addition to building partner force capacity across the region, Army has invested in indigenous and special forces for the domestic and overseas regional surveillance and reconnaissance roles.

At the same time, Army is replacing or upgrading the armoured component of its combined-arms capability, and has announced surface-to-air missile upgrades that now extend engagement ranges beyond those attained in the pre-missile era. Army is also examining long-range fire options that could replace the coastal defence capability disbanded in 1962. Such changes provide Australia with the capability not only to contest its northern approaches before cooperation, competition and confrontation transition into conflict but also to deter such an escalation in the first place.

**About the Author**

Prior to taking up the position as Head of the Australian Army History Unit, Tim Gellel served as a Colonel in the Australian Army, with experience as an intelligence officer from postings at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.
Endnotes


2 HP Frei, 1991, Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia, (Carlton, VIC: Melbourne University Press), 83.

3 Frei, 1991, 84.

4 Frei, 1991, 89.

5 Royal Navy Naval Staff, 1922, Naval Staff Monographs (Historical), Volume V: The Eastern Squadrions, 1914 (London), 46.

6 Royal Navy Naval Staff, 1922, 121, 166.

7 In addition to Ibuki, the light cruisers Chikuma and Yahagi cruised off Northern Queensland between December 1914 and January 1915. In April 1915 the cruiser Nisshin visited Rabaul and Madang, while between May and July the training ships Aso and Soya visited Australian ports between Fremantle and Rabaul. In May–July 1916 the Azuma and Iwate did the same between Fremantle and Brisbane. In March 1917 three IJN cruisers and eight destroyers escorted troopships (none Australian) through the Indian Ocean. Between May and June 1917 the cruisers Izumo, Nisshin, and Kasuga escorted cargo vessels between Fremantle and Colombo. For most of 1917 the light cruiser Hirado and her sister-ship Chikuma were in or near Australian waters until November and December respectively. The cruisers Nisshin, Kasuga and Yahagi also patrolled the Western Australian coast at intervals during 1917. The light cruiser Yahagi visited Fremantle in March 1917, and in May–October assisted Australian ships in patrolling the north-eastern coasts of the continent and the islands northwards. Also from mid-August to the beginning of October the cruiser Nisshin patrolled off Fremantle. AW Jose, 1941, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918, Volume IX—The Royal Australian Navy: 1914–1918 (Sydney: Angus and Robertson), 340–341.


9 SS Mackenzie, 1941, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918, Volume X—The Australians at Rabaul: The Capture and Administration of the German Possessions in the Southern Pacific (Canberra: Australian War Memorial), 143–144. In August, New Zealand’s Samoa Expeditionary Force—escorted by the RAN squadron —had captured German Samoa unopposed.

10 Mackenzie, 1941, 153.

11 Mackenzie, 1941, 153; Jose, 1941, 133–134.


13 Kaigun Hōjutsushi Kankōkai, 1975, Kaigun Hōjutsushi (Navy Gunnery Branch History), (Tokyo: Kaigun Hōjutsushi Kankōkai), 495.


17 Mackenzie, 1941, 159.

18 Mackenzie, 1941, 160.

19 Jose, 1941, 136–137.

20 National Archives of Australia, MP1049/1, 1919/0137, Maintenance of Rabaul as a Defended Port, folio 26, Cablegram from Secretary, Department of Defence, to Administrator Rabaul, dated 28 September 1918. Article XIX of the Washington Naval Treaty also prohibited Britain (and therefore Australia), Japan, and the United States from constructing fortifications or naval bases in the Pacific Ocean.


24 F Cranston, 1983, Always Faithful: The History of the 49th Battalion (Brisbane: Boolarong Publications), 100. By October, this force of one Vickers machine gun platoon and three rifle platoons had been re-designated as the, in anticipation of being joined by soldiers from that battalion.

25 National Archives of Australia, A1196, Chief of Air Staff 15/501/207 File, Rabaul—Local defences, Record of Discussion in Naval Boardroom on Tuesday 28 October 1941 between the Chief of Naval Staff, Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, Director Plans, Lieutenant Colonel Nurse, and the Assistant Director Plans.


28 Initially known as Wren Force and Heron Force, these detachments from the 2/13th Army Field Artillery Regiment were later renamed (in August 1941) as Nauru Force and Ocean Island Force respectively. Australian War Memorial, AWM52, 1/5/60, Wren Force Nauru; AWM52, 1/5/47, H Force and Ocean Island Force.


31 Blackforce—built around the Australian 2/3rd Machine Gun Battalion and the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion—was sent to Java in February 1942.


34 Wigmore, 1968, 396.

35 National Archives of Australia, A1196, Chief of Air Staff 15/501/207, Cablegram No. 152 from Chief of Naval Staff to to Australian Minister (Ambassador) Washington, dated 12 December 1941.
A Larger Australian Defence Force—More than Just Mass

Lieutenant Colonel Duncan Foster

Abstract

There are many advantages of increasing the commitment of Australia’s citizens to national institutions such as the ADF. Larger reserve organisations (for all services) provide a large base level of capability that serves as the nation’s ultimate insurance policy—to provide the basis for mobilisation in the event of major interstate conflict. This traditional view, while still important, neglects the many other advantages, such as the effect of having a larger proportion of society serve, thereby contributing to the integration of all elements of the nation. Australia is made up of many diverse cultures, and service to the nation is one of the best approaches to integrate all of those cultures to national advantage. Regardless of background, shared common experience among young individuals will influence their actions, potentially for the rest of their lives. Part-time service in the ADF can provide that experience. This essay considers the Swiss experience of over 150 years of reservist conscription and its positive effects on society, and suggests its application in Australia. The limiting factors are funding, the political commitment and acceptance by the population. Service to the nation, no matter how long or short, is remembered by individuals and influences their actions long past their service.
Introduction

In 1906, Colonel William Bridges,¹ in his role as the Australian Chief of Intelligence, visited Switzerland to gain an understanding of their model of force design and how it could benefit Australia. The first paragraph of Bridges’s report contains the bottom-line statement:

_In most, if not all, Anglo-Saxon countries, the army only affects the majority of people indirectly; but in Switzerland every man either serves in the army or pays a direct tax towards its maintenance._²

Switzerland introduced national service in 1848 and identifies itself, in both past and present, as an armed neutral. This means it was, and still is, fully prepared to use force to defend its sovereignty but considers itself neutral in affairs outside its borders.³ This neatly captures Bridges’s findings:

_Switzerland’s great defence advantage is that its military, people, industry and politics are virtually indistinguishable. Every aspect of the nation understands and is involved in its defence._

There is strength in this relationship, and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) should seek advantage in this area. However, the difference between our two nations is the size of the military compared to the size of the population.⁴ Switzerland’s key advantage is that a larger proportion of its population is involved in its defence. For the ADF, increasing its size, or mass, has distinct advantages beyond the purely military ones.

For the ADF to increase in size, the Australian Government must see advantage in the first, second and third-order effects that this increase in mass will generate, balanced against the cost incurred. These advantages can largely be achieved through increasing the size of the part-time elements of the force. An increase in the number of part-time service men and women provides a base to expand the full-time force in times of need, strengthens the relationship between the ADF and Australian society, develops the social and occupational potential of young Australians and acts as an integration function for society. Part-time members do not incur the same cost as full-time members, based on the temporary nature of their service; however, there is still a cost. Therefore a careful balance will need to occur between cost and benefit. This balance will shift based on the threat that the Government is prepared to accept; otherwise the additional funding required will not be forthcoming.
Expansion in Times of Need

When a government increases the size of its military, it is generally to meet a threat it perceives, either internationally or domestically. The current international order is a result of recent changes. To quote Allan Gyngell, ‘the order we have known for the past seventy years has ended. It’s not being challenged. It’s not changing. It’s over’. Terrorism is still a global scourge. Russia is seeking a return to its former glory, and the balance in East Asia has changed. Indeed, military power across East Asia continues to grow, with a number of nations possessing significant military capabilities. As the recent US Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress assessed:

The PLA [People’s Liberation Army] also continues to implement the most comprehensive restructure in its history to become a force capable of conducting complex joint operations. The PLA strives to be capable of fighting and winning ‘informatized local wars’—regional conflicts defined by real-time, data-networked command and control (C2), and precision strike.6

The ADF has recently experienced this disconnection between the number of full time personnel available and the type of operations it planned to conduct, during operations in East Timor.

(Image courtesy Defence)
The same report highlighted that the PLA Marine Corps has six brigades forming a core expeditionary force.7

China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative looks to support its domestic development as much as to expand its international influence. It leverages economic, diplomatic and military capabilities to pursue this aim.8 The OBOR initiative is likely to continue to drive overseas basing of military capabilities such as the PLA Navy support base in Djibouti (on the horn of Africa) and construction of islands in the South China Sea. Its use of all elements of its national power to pursue a national strategy is to be expected, although the end point may challenge the current international order. Therefore, as Stephan Frühling says, ‘Australia’s security, its perceptions of security, and its ability to defend itself will increasingly depend directly on the contemporary state of political relationships in Asia’ and the military forces they control.9

Numerous Australian Defence White Papers assert that Australia has time to identify a threat and appropriately prepare for it. Some have even stated that there will be up to 10 years’ warning; however, this view has been challenged by many commentators, including Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith.10 Furthermore, old rivalries continue, such as those between Pakistan and India or Iran and the US, and competition between states will always have the potential to escalate to war. It would be easy to suggest that we have enough evidence now—so why should we not prepare? This alone could justify an increase in the size of the ADF. To expand the size of the ADF takes time. It is not a simple undertaking and, depending on the size of the increase, it could be measured in years. To be able to increase the size of a defence force quickly and with the appropriate capabilities matched to the character of the conflict or challenge faced is a very difficult activity for any nation.

Australia has made mistakes in the recognition of the threat and the timeliness of the response. The 1920s and 1930s provided enough indicators and warnings that war was coming. However, when war did come in 1939 with Germany and in 1941 with Japan, the Australian military was unprepared.11 A report on the military defence of Australia noted in 1920, ‘The Empire of Japan remains, therefore, in the immediate future, as the only potential and probable enemy.’12 As Jeffery Grey notes:
… in March 1939 Cabinet approved in principle the raising of a permanent field force, but when [Prime Minister] Lyons died in office a month later he was succeeded as prime minister by R.G. Menzies, who reversed the decision—allegedly for financial reasons.\textsuperscript{13}

To expand the Army took time and was never as simple as training private soldiers; it also required the training and development of every rank level above them. This was a significant challenge with an estimated 726,000 Australians serving in the Army between 1939 and 1945.\textsuperscript{14} However, if the Government had acknowledged the threat in the mid-1930s, more appropriate resources could have been allocated, the scale of the subsequent expansion could have been better managed, and the time needed could have been reduced. This additional investment would be of most value in the development of leaders, who take time to learn and develop their skills that can then be leveraged during expansion and when conducting operations—particularly when rapid promotion occurs. Any additional investment in this area now will be of value to any operation in the future.

Australia will always have a small defence force in comparison to other nations, but the idea of Australia needing to fight any future conflict alone is false. Australia has always gone to war in cooperation with other nations and is likely to continue to do so in the future. Therefore, the ADF may provide the tipping point by contributing mass and capability for any future multilateral force to win. Any future conflict will see the permanent force elements from the ADF deploy first, simply because of their readiness for conflict. This has been the experience of the last 20 years. However, in any future large-scale interstate conflict there will be a requirement for the ADF to deploy as much as it can, to try to end the war quickly. History, unfortunately, tells us that wars do not end quickly; therefore new forces will be required, and that means mobilisation depending on the scale of the conflict. The intricacies of mobilisation are beyond the scope of this discussion; however, more trained people and leaders will be required when the time to train and prepare them is at a premium.

The ADF has experienced this disconnection between the number of full-time personnel available and the types of operations it planned to conduct during operations in East Timor. Due to the limited number of regular, full-strength infantry battalions, a large number of reservists accepted full-time service. This was the case for the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment,
in 2003 when it incorporated 200 reservists to bring it up to full strength prior to its deployment.\textsuperscript{15}

A part-time member, due to the nature of their service, costs less than a full-time member and requires less time to make battle-ready than an untrained citizen. Consequently, a larger ADF in the form of a larger reserve will require additional funding, although not as much as a similar increase of trained full-time members. A reservist, (depending on their background) will in general not be as fully trained or prepared as a full-time member; however, they will be better trained than someone with no military experience. The clear exception is in areas that directly require a professional qualification or experience (such as medical professions) matched to a military need. The general assumption is that the lead time to prepare a reservist is less than that required to train an inexperienced volunteer from the start. The capabilities used by reserve forces (for example, additional vehicles) would also need to be considered against the cost of those additional items and the overall capability and training standards they should achieve. The standard a reservist is trained to will in general (there are always exceptions) be lower than that required for operations. This gap in training standards should be considered as a risk that can be reduced with increases in preparation time prior to a deployment. A careful balance will need to be managed between the cost of increase and the benefits of an increased force size. This scale extends from a small number of reservists called up for a specific operation (described above) to national service.

In contrast, the Swiss have consistently maintained a large military organisation with conventional capabilities (infantry, tank, armoured personnel carrier, artillery, air defence, etc.) based on a part-time conscription model. They have enabled this capability by training their force through a period of initial full-time service and then a continuing part-time commitment. They have committed only small numbers of troops to various peacekeeping operations, with the main force focused on the defence of Switzerland. The Swiss armed forces have fluctuated in size over time, depending on the circumstances they face. With a current population of 8 million (one-third of Australia’s), Switzerland has a military of 240,000 members (compared to Australia’s ADF of approximately 80,000 active full-time and part-time members).\textsuperscript{16} Switzerland’s military commitment therefore represents approximately 3 per cent of its population, compared to an Australian figure of approximately 0.32 per cent. If Australia were to match
the Swiss 3 per cent, we would expect an ADF of approximately 750,000 people. During the Second World War, 'at the peak of its mobilisation Switzerland had 850,000 men under arms or standing in reserve, which represented a fifth of the total population'. One of the reasons why Switzerland has never been invaded is the deterrence effect produced by such a large and capable military, combined with the mountainous geography it defends. During the Cold War, the Swiss maintained large conventional forces. This has continued since 1989. For example, the Swiss military has acquired 380 Leopard 2A4 Main Battle Tanks, 581 M109 155 mm self-propelled guns and 310 Piranha I 6x6 vehicles armed with TOW-2. These systems are suited for a military force designed to deter a conventional state-based threat, which would be assumed to have large numbers of armoured vehicles and artillery. They are employed by a force that (for soldiers) conducts 18 weeks of initial training followed by a single three – to four-week training block every year until the required number of days have been served.

Conventional deterrence is one advantage of a large military, but another is its integration effect on the society from which it comes.

Although part-time elements require additional training and equipment and are therefore less ready, they do have advantages especially the close ties they have to their communities. (Image courtesy Defence)
Relationship Between the ADF and Society

Switzerland’s continuing commitment to national service seems odd given that the last time it faced a credible conventional state-based threat was in 1989 from the then Warsaw Pact. Many other European nations used national service as a foundation for their defence during the Cold War but ceased it when the threat disappeared. Switzerland clearly sees value in continuing national service, not just because of the deterrence effect a large military has against any state-based adversary but also for the cohesive effect service has on Swiss society. Perhaps the military’s effect on Swiss society is seen as more valuable than a traditional role of deterrence against other states. Former Chief of the Defence Force Admiral (Rtd) Chris Barrie experienced this first hand during the Sydney Olympics, at a breakfast held with the then president of the Swiss federation.

In conversation, he told me he would return to Switzerland within two weeks to undertake his annual national service obligation. I wondered why the head of state would feel compelled to undertake his national service obligation, but he explained as a proud member of the Swiss community he accepted the obligation, and went on to say ‘our national service makes us Swiss’.  

The shared experience gained from serving the nation in your youth (the initial period of full-time training) and the ongoing commitment to its security (the annual, ongoing, part-time commitments) provides value to the nation and enhances the national identity of individuals with their nation. It trains and develops the nation’s youth at a time when they are commencing their working lives, thus providing them with a foundation of individual discipline they can leverage into the future. Australia is not a stranger to this experience, with periods of our military and societal history characterised by national service with both full-time and part-time forces. 

Australia has had several periods of national service in its history. Arguably the most important iteration occurred soon after the outbreak of the Second World War. This saw compulsory service with the militia in Australia only, which was in accordance with the Defence Act 1903 (Cth). In February 1943 the Government further defined Australia to include New Guinea and adjacent islands, thus enabling militia units to serve in the region. When the war ended, conscription also ended, until 1951 when the Menzies
Government introduced the National Service Scheme (NSS). The NSS was seen as a drain on regular Army manpower during a period of operational commitments to Korea and then Malaya. It lasted eight years, until 1959. Australia’s last experience of national service was from 1964 to 1972. This was different from other schemes in that it was selective, not universal, and that in 1965 the Government introduced new powers allowing national servicemen to deploy overseas, principally to Vietnam. Controversies surround Australia’s use of conscription—mainly over the question of whether the Government should have the power to force someone into service to fight. For most, this is logical in the context of the defence of mainland Australia against an existential threat, but less so for wars of choice such as Vietnam. Since 1972 the ADF has relied upon volunteer full-time and part-time forces.

Until 1995, the Army’s part-time force, the Army Reserve, was generally larger or the same size as the regular Army. Currently the regular Army is twice the size of the Army Reserve. This suits the Army, as there has been a need to provide trained land forces at short notice to a number of different operations since 1999. Although part-time elements require additional training and equipment to meet the standard Army deems suitable for current operations, and are therefore less ready, they do have advantages, especially the close ties they have with society. These ties have been enabled through long associations between units and communities. Many Army Reserve units can trace their lineage back to the First World War, when upon return they became part-time militia units that have remained in the community since.

The ADF currently has seven different service categories in which a person can render service. Only one of these categories is for those rendering full-time service; the rest have various levels of commitment and could be considered part time. Part-time members may be considered more integrated with society than full-time members, particularly those who have other jobs and fulfil their military service as a second career. With this in mind, a larger ADF—particularly a part-time one—would greatly enhance and strengthen the ADF’s relationship with society. This relationship could include providing shared common experiences to Australians in their youth and aid in the integration of society. A number of programs are available for this, including the ADF Gap Year program, but the real challenge is increasing the number of people participating in these programs. If Australia is to reconsider
the size of the ADF and the basis of its force structure, it should look to the advantages the Swiss have found in their national service: namely that a large part-time force is a valuable integration tool for a nation’s society.

Integration Function for Society

The Swiss military identifies four roles for itself: to defend Switzerland, to contribute leadership experience to society, to integrate new members into society and to maintain national cohesion. The first role has an outward focus, as expected of a national military force, but the other roles are all inwardly focused on Swiss society and are perhaps of the most relevance to the nation. Switzerland has four official languages: German, French, Italian and Romanic. These languages reflect the mix of cultures resident in Swiss society. National service is used to integrate all elements of Swiss society: the rich, the poor, new citizens and members of long-established Swiss families are all required to provide service alongside each other. National service is not purely military; civil service is also an option, with approximately 50,000 people providing service in healthcare, welfare, departments such as forestry, and non-profit organisations. John Blaxland from the Australian National University has highlighted some of the advantages such a scheme would have for Australian society. The inward focus of national service has value for the nation. Senior management in Swiss companies find value and status in their simultaneous part-time service within the military. The military provides them with leadership skills they then transfer into civil sector advantage.

Universal national service does not discriminate against the affluence, culture or religion of those participating; however, it may discriminate against age, criminal convictions, physical and intellectual capacity and gender. In Switzerland, only male citizens are required to serve; female citizens may volunteer (although there is a call for female conscription). Many factors affect the very low incidence of terrorism and radicalisation in Switzerland. A study conducted in 2013 identified one of these factors as Switzerland’s ability to provide a significant degree of social, economic and cultural integration to those living in the nation. France has experienced a number of terrorist incidents throughout its history and has recently reintroduced national service for all 16 year olds. Although not explicitly stated, this could be interpreted as a strategy to reduce the number of radicalised
French citizens. This service includes a month-long placement focusing on civil culture (work in charities, the police, fire service or the military) and is designed to promote social cohesion and foster and sustain a more active sense of citizenship.32

Over the last 40 years, Australia has experienced acts of terrorism and has seen an increase in the number of radicalised people. National service does not need to be purely focused on military service to be effective, as both Switzerland and France have identified. For France, service at a young age is seen as an advantage as well. Australia has a long history of training its youth, and currently Cadets from the three services number approximately 26,000, supported by 3,200 officers and instructors.33 Under the Australian Universal Training Scheme from 1911 to 1929, three levels of training were instituted: all boys aged 12 to 14 years were to enrol in the junior cadets; 14 – to 18-year-olds were to enrol in senior cadets; and 18 to 26-year-olds had to register with the home defence militia—the Commonwealth Military Forces.34 Dr Craig Stockings has identified this as a ‘significant social and military activity. Hundreds of thousands of cadets were placed in uniforms and graced the drill halls newly built in almost every city, town and village of the nation’.35 This had a significant effect on the nation at the time, and
‘from January to July 1911 alone, a total of 102,194 cadets were medically examined and of these only 3,725 were rejected as unfit for service with another 2,697 deemed temporarily unsuitable’. This widespread cadet service or military exposure is important to remember, as the vast majority would go on to serve with the first Australian Imperial Force (AIF). The influence this had on that generation of Australians is important to consider in terms of its integration effect on society for many years after and, for those who would then serve in the AIF, some military and leadership training and experience from which to draw.

For the ADF, increasing the numbers in the part-time Cadets and Reserves is likely to see the greatest benefit for society balanced against the funding required. The scale of the increase is the challenge. Compulsory military service for all would be very difficult to introduce. It would require a proclamation by the Governor-General and approval by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Such a proclamation by the Governor-General can only be issued in time of war, which the Defence Act defines as ‘any invasion or apprehended invasion of, or attack or apprehended attack on, Australia by an enemy or armed force’. Therefore, for Australia to introduce conscription in a time of peace, when it would have the greatest effect on Australian society, would require a change in the law. This would be politically unacceptable in current circumstances. Australia has had a chequered history of conscription—from the failed referendums during the First World War to selective conscription during Vietnam. Therefore, more traditional volunteer recruiting initiatives would be required. One option, which was trialled during the Ready Reserve scheme of the 1990s, could be focused on university students and apprentices with fees greatly subsidised if students complete military training during study breaks. Options for how much training is suitable should be balanced against university and apprenticeship study requirements. This would require a subtle change to how Reserves are viewed by the ADF. Reserves are currently viewed as part of a total force alongside the full-time components, because they generate capability required for the conduct of operations that are almost always dangerous and often at short notice. Instead, the Reserves would need to be viewed as an instructor and leadership base for future mobilisation in the event of large-scale conflict (because the full-time ADF elements will have deployed and will not be of sufficient size to train and prepare a new force) and, perhaps more importantly, as an integration tool for Australian society. The size of the full-time ADF should remain the same or increase in
proportion to the part-time component to enable their training. Cadets could be a requirement for attendance at school. Some schools already have this, but if expansion of such a program were to occur, just as with other forms of increase, it would require funding as well as the right people to instruct and manage the increase. Although overseen by the ADF, Cadets are currently trained by members of the Australian community who act as officers or instructors of Cadets.

Military service is not the only option; service in other organisations could also assist in integrating society. Options could follow the Swiss and French model, with welfare, health, local government and emergency service organisations seeing increased participation. This idea has been advocated by others. The challenge will remain getting the required numbers for it to be significant and have an effect. This ultimately requires money. The investment would need to be scalable; the benefits will take time to be seen and may not be of a tangible or measurable nature. The Swiss have had uninterrupted military conscription for over 150 years but only recently enabled a civil service option, in 1996, so this case study is primarily founded on the example of military conscription.39

Military service has other advantages in terms of the actual training that all members undertake. Two simple examples are physical training and medical training. Physical training can be simple, effective and set the conditions for Australians to be more active even after their service ends. Medical training is always advantageous for a wide variety of domestic emergencies. Military service is also a challenging experience and therefore builds confidence and motivates individuals not only during service but for the rest of their lives. Military service also develops leaders. This skill is readily transferable to a professional workplace and can provide a strong foundation to be built upon.

There are many advantages of increasing the commitment of Australia’s citizens to national institutions such as the ADF. The limiting factors are funding, the political commitment to do so and acceptance by the population. For the ADF specifically, larger reserve organisations (for all services) provide a high base level of capability that serves as the nation’s ultimate insurance policy—to provide the basis for mobilisation in the event of major interstate conflict. This event or strategic shock could occur at short notice, and flexibility is required now because the specifics of the event and the required response are unknowable. However, it is almost certain that people—soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen—will be required. A large part-time force
balances the cost of more people now and the requirement to be prepared for the future. Perhaps the more significant advantage is the effect of having a larger proportion of society serve, thereby contributing to the integration of all elements of Australia. Our country is made up of many diverse cultures, and service to the nation is one of the best approaches to integrate all of those cultures for the benefit of the nation. Regardless of an Australian's background, shared common experience among young individuals will influence their actions, potentially for the rest of their lives. The effectiveness of this will be difficult to measure and is a long-term commitment. Service to your nation, no matter how long or short, is remembered by individuals and influences their actions long past their service.

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Duncan Foster is an infantry officer currently appointed as the Director of the Australian Army Research Centre in Army Headquarters.
**Endnotes**

1 Colonel Bridges would go on to be the first commandant of the Royal Military College Duntroon and command the 1st Australian Division at Gallipoli, where he was fatally wounded in 1915.


7 Department of Defense, 2019, 60–61.

8 Department of Defense, 2019, i.


16 CIA Factbook and Global Firepower.

18 ‘Swiss Army Equipment’, GlobalSecurity.org, at: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/ch-army-equipment.htm

19 245 days for soldiers, 550 days for NCOs and 680 days for junior officers.


21 Many other nations have had similar experiences, particularly European nations during the Cold War (Sweden, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark etc.).

22 The Act allowed for a government to introduce conscription for the defence of Australia only and not for service overseas.


28 Interview by Lieutenant Colonel Duncan Foster with Colonel Romeo Fritz, Swiss Army, 1 June 2018.


31 Lorenzo Vidino, 2013, Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland (Zurich: Center for Security Studies), 4.


36 Stockings, 2005.


38 Brown, 1999.

39 Mannitz, 2007
Contracting is Not the Enemy: The Readiness Impact of Policy, Money and Commercial Model

Captain Nicholas Allen

Abstract

The modern Australian Defence Force (ADF) is leaner and more lethal than ever, but it encounters more complexity per person and per item than ever before. From catering support to forces deployed to East Timor and Chinooks deployed to Afghanistan through to domestic transportation of ammunition, Defence has seen variability in the level of responsiveness available to government based on the effectiveness (or not) of contracting methods. The best examples show an integrated ADF/contracted workforce developed for and capable of the strategic tasks required of it. In the worst case, we see recognised deficits in capability, such as the insufficiency of transport to resupply artillery for national defence. This article presents three themes critical to the strategic enabling or impairing of contracted capability. It seeks to show that reliance on contractors need not erode Defence’s responsiveness to deal with unforeseen operations and recommends a more holistic and inclusive consideration of what Defence needs from its contracts.
Introduction

From the dawn of corporate enterprise in the British Empire to the drone-filled skies of Syria, whenever private capabilities have existed, governments and combatants have exploited them during conflicts. Reliance on contracting for logistics has been a staple of capability for hundreds of years, which is testimony to the fact that contracting need not cripple the ability to respond to unforeseen operations. Despite the history of contracting support to logistics force structures, there remains a persistent, if anecdotal, feeling of distrust of contractors and a sense that the very act of contracting undermines Army capability and readiness to respond to unforeseen operations. Indeed, through trade specialist forums and during the move to the Plan Beersheba configuration of Army, there has been a stated acknowledgement that Army’s readiness has been eroded.¹

The aim of this article is to argue that erosion in Army’s responsiveness to unforeseen operations, attributed broadly to contracting, is more accurately due to several factors to do with past contracting behaviour. These factors are bad policies, incorrect funding and poor contract formulation. This article will also address the counter-proposition that the contracting of elements of Army capability comes at an inherent cost to capability. Drawing on these interlinked themes, it will show that the counter-proposition is premised on less than ideal approaches to contracting and wrongly attributes current readiness issues to contracting in total, rather than to the policies and models of the current environment.

The scope of this article is limited and, while it is acknowledged there is much more depth behind the matter, the focus will be on three themes—policy, funding and competition, and contract formulation—using one or two examples for each. A counterargument to the thesis based on the current state of Army contracting and on a key risk drawn from contemporary conflicts that could undermine the thesis will also be discussed. It is the author’s intention to stimulate reflection by readers on how Defence conducts contracting, and to ask all logistics practitioners how to harness contracted capability most effectively as another tool to enable combat forces to achieve the mission.

For this article, the term ‘a reliance on contractors’ will be used to indicate an intentional or unintentional decision by the State to source some or all of
its capability from private service/equipment providers. It does not include State ownership, so quasi-State-owned vendors will not be considered.²

The terms ‘readiness’, ‘preparedness’ and ‘responsiveness’ will be used to mean ‘responsiveness to unforeseen operations’ at tactical, operational and strategic levels. The transition of existing military units through the Force Generation Cycle to ‘Ready’ is not considered within the scope of this article; however, where ‘Ready’ forces rely on a contracted support mechanism, that mechanism can be considered within the scope.

Policy

Government Policy
Governments are famously poor at contracting, so much so that there are movies³ made about it. Reports note that even highly commercially conscious countries such as the United States (US) lose vast sums of money in waste, internal competition and paying for unsustainable commitments. Equally, it is the government’s policy setting that directs
the size of the uniformed military organisation and the government that commits forces to operations. As recognised by the 2011 American review of wartime contracting, the military’s core business and focus is on kinetic capability, leading to a deficit in logistics support that is risk managed with contractors. However, when a government commits forces to theatres of choice, deploying organic military logistics and supporting the remaining intra-Australian capabilities through contracted logistics capabilities, the inherent risk is that those organic capabilities are then no longer available to support unforeseen operations. If an additional operation is launched, either new capability at the National Support Base (NSB) must be generated or capability in another theatre must be stripped. The ‘coalition of the willing’ experienced this when the Second Gulf War was launched. Frank Ledwidge criticised the British Armed Forces’ state of strategic and logistics torpor, resulting from lack of funding, protection and government focus, when they deployed again into Helmand Province in Afghanistan.

It is not the reliance on contracting that has eroded responsiveness but, rather, the strategic risk analysis conducted by successive governments over what the military should look like and how much of it should be committed to wars of choice at any one time. This includes the proportion of uniformed logistics and support to combat forces, as well as the proportion of capability held in-house or contracted out—and what the government expects it to be able to achieve. In Australia, this expression of strategic requirement should be voiced, after advice to the Government from the strategic-level committees, in the Defence White Paper. It is critical for Defence, as the adviser, to accurately represent both the capability absorption that ongoing conflicts cause and what remains in a ready reserve to respond to unforeseen operations that may arise from the risk environment. Unlike a firm in the commercial world, the military does not define its limits by a cost of transaction versus income from production model as Coase’s ‘The Nature of the Firm’ defines limits. Military force is generated not only within allocated budgets in the short term but also to meet strategic requirements. Efficiency is still important but not as fundamental as generating, projecting and sustaining forces capable of achieving the mission and ensuring Australia’s interests. In a recent article, economist Nitin Gupta outlined the economic drivers for conflict, but these factors of scarcity and uncertainty apply equally to the uniformed force structure desired and funded by government. Where strategic priorities and force alignment are considered side by side and contingencies or shortfalls
in projection and sustainment capability are identified, opportunities for integrated contracted elements from industry will be visible. Capability and resource scarcity will be defined in the process of addressing strategic uncertainty, and governmental or departmental tolerance and limits can be drawn from this for contracted capability supporting the ADF. By ensuring that strategic requirements such as force projection and sustainment are considered, contracting can support force logistic structures without erosion of readiness.

**Commercial and Corporate Environment**

Just as the government’s policies shape and direct how Army logistics force structures look, corporate commercial policy and culture affect how contractors seek to market their support to Defence. Corporate commercial protection around intellectual property (IP) has resulted in a reluctance by some original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to allow Australian-based maintenance of key equipment. This can be seen with both the Harris Radio and the M1A1 Abrams tank (albeit US Government IP policy rather than commercial policy for the Abrams).\(^{12}\) In circumstances like this, the erosion of readiness comes from a fundamental problem for modern complex technology and logistics: the risk acceptance of foreign manufacturers and the readiness variability\(^{13}\) of equipment that must travel internationally to be repaired. Even when vendor policy allows for the Army to address these risks and IP issues within Australia, the costs of doing so may well be prohibitive. Similarly, contracted capability can run into problems caused by lack of commercial/political insight. In December 2016, a contracted sea transport company caused diplomatic and military readiness challenges for Singapore by illegally docking in two Chinese ports, leading to nine Terrex APCs being held for two months.\(^{14}\) While insignificant in terms of the total force readiness of the Republic of Singapore Armed Forces (RSAF), the case demonstrates a clear issue with the corporate world’s understanding of the political environment. This issue is not a failure of contracting as a force projection option; it is a failure to communicate the requirement to behave differently from the way a commercial carrier would normally behave as part of the contract formulation.

These problematic corporate policies are not evidence that all contracting of logistics force structures is doomed to erode preparedness. As discussed further, the Royal Corps of Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (RAEME) is addressing the issue outlined above with better relationships with
OEMs and service vendors and through better contract formulation and sustained through-life contract administration. Although it is not reported, it is likely that an event such as the one described above would trigger a performance management review of the contractor by the RSAF. This mechanism would leverage commercial competitive pressure and the risk of contract termination due to any demonstrable negligence by the contractor, to ensure that the contractor does not erode the RSAF’s readiness by such actions again. Australia has also employed performance-based contracting—a contract formulation step that also seeks to manage expectations of commercial providers and influence external policymakers. With mature contract management processes (like performance-based contracting) driving contractors to better corporate policy and performance, contracting elements of the logistics force structure need not erode readiness.

There is scope to build the skills of Army logisticians and leaders in wielding industry integrated teams as deftly as conventional capabilities. (Image courtesy Defence)
Different Kinds of Reliance

What is seen in these examples of contracts undermining readiness is an example not of reliance on force support capability contracting as a general concept but, rather, of reliance on specific kinds of contracts, such as non-performance-based, non-integrated or poorly integrated. With local labour contracts in the Afghan theatre, the quality of work, reliability of staff and assurance about where the profits were being directed were arguably poor, so it is little wonder that American reliance on the initially poorly structured commercial/contract system led to significant waste, internal competition and financing the enemy. To use a ‘systems warfare’ analogy, reliance on local infantry in fighting a foreign insurgency has introduced threats from corruption, exploitation by the enemy and ‘green on blue’ hostile action at friction points within the coalition system. Contracting is a system similarly seeking to draw capability from a culture foreign to Defence, with its own stakeholders, motivations and competing objectives. Just as in the foreign counter-insurgency case, points of contact between the foreign cultures introduce friction and uncertainty to the system. Threading the needle to get the right requirements, the right management and the right contractor is financially and labour expensive. But, when it is done properly, Defence can rely upon these capabilities. An example can be seen in the Australian experience of deploying the CH-47 Rotary Wing Group to Afghanistan. This group integrated contractors closely, with OEMs and Australian contracted personnel physically present in Kandahar undertaking maintenance and deeper level supporting services. The mission parameters allowed for substantial deeper level maintenance periods (as helicopters cannot be operationally ready at all times). The ADF and contractor personnel were trained to work together and both understood the industry regulations. As a result, reliance was rewarded and the contracted logistics and enabling force structure functioned as a highly effective tool, ensuring that no erosion of responsiveness of the unit occurred. Australia deployed a uniformed quality assurance team to work with CHI Aviation contractors, linked in with the coalition’s contracted support. This allowed reliance on CHI to deliver the service effect, and reliable information about the unit’s operational readiness requirements. The coalition’s integrated logistics support enhanced CHI’s ability to support the Australian requirements. The coalition, through the US Forces Command, had negotiated a balance between uniformed and contracted aviation support staff that enhanced readiness of both aviation units (through pooled resourcing and integrated support across the fleet).
and fighting elements (through provision of greater aviation support than would have been allowed within deployed troop caps set by government).

Another kind of reliance is the inter-reliance of integrated teams with a shared mandate and mission. The Chief of Army Commander’s Statement: Army in Motion and Futures Statement: Accelerated Warfare outline the complexity of the contemporary environment that the ADF faces. In these statements, the Chief of Army speaks of the need to master the integration of industry and other supporting organisations into task forces. In its current state, the Army already has integrated joint and industry representatives within its exercise and training continuums. These include the joint support to the Exercise Hamel series, Army participation in ADF joint courses, and invitations to industry and coalition partners to support Army courses. However, there remains work to be done to meet the intent of the Army in Motion statement. There is scope to build the skills of Army logisticians and leaders in wielding industry-integrated teams as deftly as conventional capabilities. The all-corps training continuums for officers and non-commissioned officers currently develop tactical skills in an industry vacuum. Promisingly, the introduction of the Decisive Action Training Environment to the ADF provides an opportunity to train using mission-tailored, industry-integrated capabilities.

Funding and Competition

Funding
The ADF is a logistically lean organisation and, equally, has a lean funding line for supplementation of its organic logistic capabilities, compared with gargantuan organisations such as the US military. Done poorly, contracting can be a black hole of value, as was seen by the US in the first decade of their deployment into Iraq and Afghanistan. While ADF logistics force structures do not face all the same problems as were reviewed in the 2011 US report to Congress on wartime contracting, we do see some related issues. These are our difficulty generating economies of scale; relatively poor buying power in the open market; and a small acquisition, contracting and management team that provides a limited contracting capability. As Coase articulates, outsourcing should be used for functions that are cheaper to transact for than to develop in-house; however, as he notes, those transactions are expensive. Contract creation and management are
activities with distinct skill sets that come with costs to the organisation that increase with the complexity of the environment. Developing contracts that supplement the logistics force structure and can be relied upon to enhance Army’s readiness is a strategic activity. It is the responsibility of the Army’s leadership to impress upon the ministers for Defence and related portfolios how serious the consequences are of undercooking our fundamental logistics capability, particularly when contracted.

If contracting could deliver better capability, align better to readiness requirements and broadly cost the Army less, how much more capable a force could Army be? Lieutenant Colonel Kane Wright recently wrote an article concerning the scale of financial liability that comes with the high-readiness, technologically sophisticated ‘Army in Motion’. He concluded that, in order for Army to sustain itself in a strategically viable way, hard decisions would have to be made on the procurement of equipment. These decisions include judiciously limiting the equipment delivery to areas of greatest effect and also identifying where a less complex and expensive type of equipment still meets our capability requirement and where Army’s priorities simply do not justify development of a new capability. Contracting, despite being more complex than simply an extension of in-house Army logistics, could benefit from similar hard choices. To effectively make these choices, the Army will require a detailed understanding of where the contracted service or product sits in the Fundamental Inputs to Capability framework, as failures to correctly identify the requirements and supporting ‘architecture’ from the organisation will lead to wasted effort, sub-optimal service and wasted money.

The Competitive Environment
The Australian Army competes in both domestic and international markets for scarce resources. These resources are largely suitable personnel, supplies and equipment. In the context of developing a contracted component of a logistics force structure that supports preparedness, ‘competition’ means the forces and factors competing for the resources of the civilian industrial logistics sector. Army has a range of competitors in the Australian domestic and foreign procurement space. Competitors can be allied organisations such as the US Army, which can absorb the logistic capability of, for example, Javelin missile producers such that the Australian Army may not be able to replenish stock over a tactically viable period. Army also competes with the civil sector, particularly the Australian mining
sector and specialist industries such as the medical sector. Here the ADF struggles to convey how it represents a compelling return on investment. The civil sector competition within Australia means that the major logistics providers analyse contracts with the Army in the context of high-earning, shorter-term contracts in support of the major civilian players. The limited resources of each provider in the market may be allocated against a higher bidder at the expense of Army capability.

Insidiously, the presence of ‘bigger fish’ militaries and civilian outsourcing competition generates another element of competition for the Australian Army in the domain of intellectual capital in contract formation and negotiation. The Australian Army does not have a large pool of trained and experienced contract drafters and managers to turn to, this largely being limited to 17 Sustainment Brigade’s contract cell, uniformed staff with postings to a few relevant roles and departmental staff such as Estate and Infrastructure Group base support management staff. The absence of a body of professional contracting staff limits the intellectual capital put towards the concepts of industry integration from the Army perspective.

The resource-limited Army contracting staff turn to templates published by external organisations such as the Department of Finance. These templates—for example, the ‘Commonwealth Contracting Suite’—are based on imperfect matches to the preparedness requirements of the ADF. By the same token, the structure of logistics service providers (with the exception of specialist providers of services such as deployable medical care) are geared towards a less preparedness-driven model of logistic support, as the domestic environment sees little deployable or conflict-ready contracting.

Defence must be cognisant of this environment in its contracting. The Capability Acquisition and Sustainment Group (CASG) ASDEFCON templates and notes seek to take away much of the legwork required by publishing templates that address many of Defence’s contracting requirements. The push towards CASG ‘contracting centres of excellence’ in the Performance Based Contracting Team is a positive step that has the potential to ensure that contracting templates are suitable for Defence and cognisant of the need to support readiness in the force structure. Defence, and by extension the Army, are currently outcompeted for scarce resources in this environment, with long and costly tender processes and short contract periods. If Army wants to represent its particular requirements and preserve readiness, it needs to both engage these broader Defence
organisations and ensure that staff, from end user to contracting representative, understand how to articulate what is required. Although shaping the commercial environment’s domestic capability to support Army’s requirement for deployable support is both a big task and beyond the scope of this article, articulating that requirement to industry is surely the first step.

The Best We Can and the Recently Highlighted Risk

There is a salient counterargument to the thesis of this article, and there are clear examples of risks in seeking to build systems that outsource capability from logistics force structures. First, the counterargument is that the contracting teams within Defence have historically been composed of competent, pragmatic Defence members working with the best of the tools and money available, and that this represents Defence’s best efforts in this space. Any erosion to capability is a natural consequence of the limited contracting capability held in Defence. The move to contract fourth-line logistics demonstrates a positive political and budgetary outcome, albeit at the cost of capability. The decision to contract this capability was a policy made due to parliamentary and ministerial level decisions to downsize Army and outsource suitable functions. Consequently the policy itself (an argument could be made) was good policy given the strategic direction from Parliament.

With mature contract management processes deployable support, such as to Timor-Leste, becomes second nature. (Image courtesy Defence)
This article proposes that Army should have its own awareness and ability to articulate its requirements, both in advising on policy and in contract formation. It is possible to judge whether the contract formation was good in this endeavour by the results that can be seen today. RAEME Corps Conference 2018 Topic 3, RAEME Aviation’s Plan Pelican and RAEME’s Plan Centaur, all identify erosion in the readiness of our maintenance capabilities. This runs at the individual trade skills level and in engineering and trade knowledge within the corps and is attributed to the decision to remove fourth-line maintenance experience from Army’s uniformed members. Reinforcing the thesis of this article, trade skilling in deeper level maintenance as part of the contracted solution has been implemented for RAEME aviation trades, and the corps conference has raised the issue as articulated above. To address the argument on the quality of the policy, we can look to recent history. The aims of Plan Beersheba provided a clear message that the Army left standing as a consequence of this reduction had clear issues of eroded readiness. It was not the move towards generating contracted fourth-line logistics capability that was responsible for the erosion of readiness; rather, it was the policy directing the reduction and setting the scope, scale and timeline for this to occur.

The Risk and Answer
Another counterargument is the attitude that there will always be vulnerability inherent in contracting with the private sector. This vulnerability is the loss of sovereign control of the capability vendor and potential for foreign and potentially hostile influence. The implications for readiness should this occur do not need to be spelled out. An example of the loss of control of a supply chain occurred in recent history with the formerly allied states of Russia and Ukraine. It is speculated that security of the supply chain for Russian military vendors was a key cause of conflict once Russia lost faith in the reliability of their ally with the fall of the Russian-aligned Yanukovych government; and the conflict has seen still more supply chain problems. Australia also has moments of concern over the strategic supply chain, as seen in 2018 during parliamentary and media focus on the robustness of Australia’s strategic fuel reserves, which are primarily sourced from beyond our sovereign territory.

The risk of an unexpected operation involving a state that is a chief ADF equipment provider is not contemplated often. Australia maintains very close strategic relationships with these countries. Additionally, a review of later articles from that area yields interesting results. Although military equipment, spare parts and ‘dual use’ equipment trading has been suspended, it is interesting to observe that trade between Russia and Ukraine has increased,
including for food and power—commodities high on the agenda for any logistician.\textsuperscript{42} Although this risk could be catastrophic to the readiness of the ADF (and to the ADF), it is also highly unlikely based on the 2016 Defence White Paper and the depth of Australia’s alliance with its strategic partners.

**How Contract Formulation Can Erode or Not Erode Readiness**

**The Commercial Model**

Contract formulation, the third theme to be considered, relates to decisions on the scope and coverage of contracts and the effectiveness of the contract terms to meet Defence requirements. These decisions, and the model used, derive the terms that give the contract shape and affect its operation on the ground. Defence commonly uses models such as simple purchase arrangements for consumable supplies and agency arrangements for overseas translators.\textsuperscript{43} The commercial model used in shifting uniformed personnel numbers from administrative and logistics roles so that Defence could afford a more capable fighting element resulted in whole levels of logistics activity being outsourced. The contracting of all deeper level maintenance functions mentioned above has seen maintenance of some materiel and higher level ‘rebuild’ tasks removed from RAEME, resulting in loss of technical proficiency and experience.\textsuperscript{44} This detriment undermines Army’s readiness by reducing both the pool of qualified and experienced craftsmen available for Army to deploy and the pool of equipment available to deployed or readied forces when it must be dispatched for repair to a remote or overseas OEM.

Recognising this, RAEME Aviation, as part of Plan Pelican, and ground RAEME, as part of the corps conference, have identified how to retain ready forces while employing contracted capability.\textsuperscript{45} This model is a more integrated design, achieving a skilled and experienced workforce of both contracted and uniformed staff by building terms into contracts and agreements with contracted service and equipment providers. This builds trust between agencies and provides experience opportunities and allows overseas maintenance through embedding craftsmen with contracted maintainers to share deeper level maintenance work and bringing contractors into integrated close maintenance teams. In this way, the Army gains the benefits of contracting elements of the logistics force structure while offsetting cost to readiness by having the workforce skills and experience maintained.
Recommendations

There are three recommendations for improving the ADF’s relationship with contracting under these themes.

First, regarding policy, the success of ventures such as the integration of Boeing and other service providers on the Rotary Wing Group deployments to Kandahar, Afghanistan, demonstrates good alignment of Australian policy, commercial policy and contracting policy and should be identified as good case studies of capability-supportive contracting. The preparation, cultural factors and negotiation points that enabled these successes should be researched further and captured in Defence’s contracting training.

Second, regarding funding and competition, the ADF’s steps towards establishing joint ‘centre of excellence’ organisations to centralise costs and expertise is an excellent move to make the most of funding to professionalise contracting capability; however, it risks dislocating the capability from the requirements of the end users, such as the Army. It is recommended that Army mitigate this by taking steps such as routine liaison and training course and exercise integration to maintain the understanding between our strategic requirements through Forces Command and DGLAND and our capability generators in CASG and Joint Logistics Command.

Finally, regarding contract formulation, the success of performance-based contracts when adequately resourced provides an example of the way ahead. The Middle East Logistics and Base Services contract (MELABS) and many other contracts have since been created, and the performance-based contracting cell in CASG conduct some training within Defence.46 However, this training is limited and not integrated with logistics training as recommended above. With better articulation and reward of contractor performance, perhaps the second-order costs to readiness will be foreseen and mitigated. The Army would avoid another situation like RAEME’s generational skills gap, which was caused by removing uniformed craftsmen from rebuild and other deeper level maintenance tasks, as some internal expertise must be maintained to hold the contractor accountable for their performance. It is recommended that Future Land Warfare Branch engage at capability, force generation and sustainment levels to integrate these lessons learned into Army’s strategic direction and future force concepts.
Conclusion

The Australian Army has undoubtedly experienced erosion in preparedness to address unforeseen operations over the last 30 years through the outsourcing of elements of the logistics force structures, as have other nations around the world. This experience should not be used to link correlation to causation. Contracting conducted by the Australian, Ukrainian, Singaporean and US militaries have shown the way to create strategic problems for preparedness and also how to do things differently in the pursuit of an effective integrated contracted logistics compatible with responsive national defence. It behoves all logisticians and warfighters alike to learn these lessons and steer both strategic decision-makers and procurement agencies towards smarter Defence contracts.

About the Author

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Endnotes

1 Department of Defence, 2015, PLAN Beersheba OPORD/SPTORD. Accessed via Defence Protected Network (DPN), not publicly accessible.


3 War Dogs, 2016, motion picture, Warner Brothers.


6 ‘Organic’ meaning held within the organisation.

7 ADF logisticians refer to Australia as the National Support Base to describe its role in operational logistics support as the source of personnel, supplies and equipment owned by the ADF.

8 F Ledwidge, 2011, Losing Small Wars (New Haven and London: Yale University Press), Ch. 3.

9 Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, 1.11–1.28, 2.98–2.100.


13 ‘Readiness variability’ is the difference over time of equipment being available for deployment on operations against not being deployable due to being under repair.


15 Department of Defence, 2018, Joint Doctrine Note 1-18, para 2.7.


17 Department of Defence, 2016.


19 Teleconference between the author and Brigadier J Shanahan, Director General and Acting Commander TAAC-South, 6 September 2019.

21 Chief of Army, 2018, Commander’s Statement: Army In Motion, 2018 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia).


24 Above 3, Ch. 8.

25 Department of Defence, 2015, 6.1–6.7.

26 Coase, 1937.


28 This example is for illustration purposes only; no real data has been examined regarding supply of Javelin missiles to the ADF during warlike periods.

29 Roles such as the Joint Logistics Command Supply Chain Branch; FORCOMD Contracting Cell; and training conducted only through the ADFWTC Operational Contract Management Course and outsourced ‘Contract Risk Management’ training.


31 ASDEFCON Shortform Services Contract Template.

32 Department of Defence, 2017, CASG, Performance Based Contracting.

33 The experience of other public logistics is instructive—for example, public transport.


36 It has been beyond the time constraints of this article to find evidence about the capability of the team arranging the downsizing and the appropriateness of their funding, which, as outlined above, would have been compelling factors in the resourcing of this project and its capability to express Army’s requirements.

37 Department of Defence, Plan Pelican—Embedding of Aviation Technicians into OEM Workshops.

38 Department of Defence, 2015, PLAN Beersheba OPORD/SPTORD.


41 Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, 68–76.


43 See the Department of Defence office stationery contract and contract with World Wide Languages for provision of translator services for JTF633.

44 Department of Defence, RAEME Plan Pelican Problem Statement.


46 Department of Defence, CASG, 2019, Performance Based Contracting Fact Sheet, at: https://objective/id:AB33927872
A Second Soul? Language, Personality, and the Development of Cross-Cultural Expertise

Major Marshall Lawrence

To have another language is to possess a second soul.
Charlemagne

Abstract

The Defence White Paper 2016 and Army’s Professional Military Education Strategy of 2017 make clear that the development of cross-cultural expertise needs to become a key component of how Army trains and educates its personnel. This article examines the use of language training in the Australian Army in light of the challenges identified and goals set in these documents. It argues that language training should be viewed as an important but resource-intensive part of a larger program to develop deeper cross-cultural expertise in selected personnel. Selecting the right people for language training therefore becomes an increasingly important aspect of achieving the stated goal of higher levels of cross-cultural expertise. This article explores one method by which this might be achieved: the use of psychological measures, including personality and cultural intelligence, as a means to identify those likely to generate the greatest effect from the receipt of language training.
Introduction

Although the spiritual benefits of language learning might be disputed, there is little question that languages are often able to expand horizons much further than the simple act of being able to communicate with another group of people. Despite the potential benefits, it remains a significant investment for both individuals and organisations and requires some careful thought in its application.

The Defence White Paper 2016 (DWP 2016), Army’s Professional Military Education (PME) Strategy of 2017, and the Australian Joint PME (JPME) Continuum of 2018 make clear that the development of cross-cultural expertise needs to become a key component of how Army trains and educates its personnel. At a practical level, the release last year of Land Warfare Doctrine LWD 3.0.5 Security Force Capacity Building (SFCB) provides more specific guidance on what Army’s requirements are, and how language capability fits into current and likely future operational scenarios.

While the need for cross-cultural expertise and the associated language skills extends well beyond SFCB, this article focuses on SFCB and the most recent Australian Defence Force (ADF) ‘Train, Advise, Assist’ missions as the most prominent examples of where Army’s expertise, or lack of it, has come under scrutiny. One senior Australian advisor working in southern Afghanistan in 2014 concluded that ‘Australia and its Coalition partners were largely clueless about building partner capacity in conflict’ and partially attributed this to a lack of adequate preparation of the personnel required to carry out the mission.2 The link between success in such missions and the use of language training is nuanced and is explored throughout this article.

Recent research points to language skills being desirable in SFCB-type missions, but not a conclusive predictor of success.3 Despite Charlemagne’s aphorism, it follows that languages cannot be an end in themselves, but merely one component of Army’s efforts to imbue its personnel with greater cross-cultural expertise. If language by itself is not enough, and yet the investment required for language competence is so significant, the question becomes how to use languages as part of a broader effort to develop cross-cultural expertise.

This article examines the use of language training in the Australian Army, in light of Army’s SFCB experiences over the last two decades, and the goals set in DWP 2016 and the two foundation PME documents. It argues that language training should be viewed as an important but resource-intensive
part of a larger program to develop deeper cross-cultural expertise in selected personnel. Selecting the right personnel therefore becomes a critically important aspect of Army’s language training. Finally, this article explores one method by which this might be achieved: the use of psychological measures including personality and cultural intelligence (CQ) as a means to identify those likely to generate the greatest effect from language training.

Recent research points to language skills being desirable in Security Force Capacity Building-type missions, but not a conclusive predictor of success. (Image courtesy Defence)

What Is the Requirement?

DWP 2016 identifies the requirement for better training and development of personnel who need to operate across cultures, stating:

Defence will expand cultural and language capabilities to increase its effectiveness in operating in the region and collaborating with international partners. Defence will develop higher levels of cultural understanding of our region, including more intensive training for those who work routinely with regional partners. Defence will increase the number of personnel with intermediate and advanced language skills to support our enhanced international engagement, with a focus on languages in the Indo-Pacific region.4
Specific to Army, the PME Strategy of 2017 asserts that ‘a deepened foundation of socio-cultural skills and emotional intelligence will be required’. Laying out Army’s approach to partnering, the (then) Deputy Chief of Joint Operations, Major General Greg Bilton, argued at the Chief of Army Land Forces Seminar last year that ‘the success of our efforts will be underpinned by our approach, where we respect sovereignty, respect and understand culture and understand the needs and wants of our partners’.

LWD 3.0.5 provides more specific guidance on what Army’s requirements are, and how language proficiency fits into current and likely future operational scenarios. Given the challenges confronted on operations and in international engagement tasks over the last two decades, and the likely continuation of this trend, the requirements outlined in LWD 3.0.5 suggest the need for a more holistic approach to the development of cross-cultural expertise. In turn this requires a closer examination as to what Army’s PME Strategy and LWD 3.0.5 mean for Army’s approach to the development of linguists.

LWD 3.0.5 nominates language as one of 12 skills required in evaluating and selecting potential personnel needing to interact with host nation forces during SFCB, stating that ‘the approach and attitude to learning the host nation’s language(s) are as important as the knowledge of the language itself’. This statement affirms the idea that selecting who is given language training is important in ultimately achieving this ‘deepened foundation of socio-cultural skills and emotional intelligence’. This article does not claim that language ability is required to operate effectively cross-culturally. It is no shortcut to a second soul. This article does, however, argue that, given the investment required, Army’s linguists should be expected to also possess the traits and qualities necessary to wield their language skills to the greatest effect.

**The Role of Language Training**

First we need to ask how language training should fit into Army’s development of deeper cross-cultural expertise. First, a point that needs to be acknowledged up front is that the Defence Force School of Languages (DFSL) is a joint organisation that exists to meet the disparate needs of all three services. The requirements articulated in the Army’s PME Strategy and the single-service doctrine of LWD 3.0.5 are specific to Army. A RAAF signals intelligence analyst needs pure language skill, not the ability to advise
a foreign counterpart in a combat zone. Each service’s needs differ and there must be a suitable compromise. DFSL therefore rightly focuses almost entirely on the delivery of language skills. For this reason, this article makes no recommendations about the actual delivery of language training.

The resource-intensive nature of language training and the development of true regional expertise has led some to conclude that specialisation in the officer corps, along the lines of the United States Foreign Area Officer program, is the answer. This has a certain appeal in allowing specialists to develop very high levels of regional expertise and associated language proficiency. In a force the size of the Australian Army, however, this would become difficult to sustain. Opportunities for specialists to progress at middle to senior levels are likely to be limited. The resulting lack of opportunity may end up repelling talented personnel from taking up the training opportunities on offer in the first place—including language training. This dichotomy between career opportunities and specialisation is explored by Cate Carter in her examination of the Foreign Area Officer system and its applicability to the Australian Army.

Discounting specialisation as a viable option, what remains is a version of the current system in which language proficiency, outside certain trades in intelligence and signals corps, is treated as an additional qualification alongside someone’s existing role, trade or career stream. The addition of an improved selection model based on psychological measures, as described below, however, would see the establishment of a more substantial link between language training and the development of ‘a deepened foundation of socio-cultural skills and emotional intelligence’.

The next question that arises is how widely to cast the languages net. In attempting to achieve ‘higher levels of cultural understanding of our region, including more intensive training for those who work routinely with regional partners’, it becomes attractive to use greater numbers of language qualifications as a means of doing so. Major General Jim Molan, a linguist himself, cautioned on the impracticality of attempting to achieve ‘widespread … language skills in any military in anticipation of a conflict’ but also acknowledged that ‘languages are indeed the key to cultural understanding’. Molan’s seemingly contradictory statements in fact make the argument that true cross-cultural expertise for a specific country or region is an expensive capability to acquire and maintain, and so the application of language training towards this end must be applied very selectively. An improved selection model would go some way towards ensuring this.
This problem of selection is not unique to language training. By necessity Army has in the past had to select people for deployments with no objective assessment of the likely character traits required and no appreciation of the level of preparation required. This is not unique to the Australian Army and has been especially common when large, short-notice missions arise. In examining the use of military advisors to foreign forces during the 20th and 21st centuries, a consistent theme is that forces rarely have the luxury of carefully selecting and training people for foreign advisor duties, and some of those who find themselves in such a role neither are well suited to it nor feel well prepared. Australia’s most senior advisor to the Afghan National Army in Afghanistan during 2014 later lamented that ‘we weren’t selected or trained to be advisors … I would argue we were not set up for success’.

Why Personality Matters

Training can heighten motivation and sharpen skills, but only if the motivation and skills are there to begin with … the most successful advisors tend to be those whom life experience and personality have qualified for the role.

In psychology, personality has no single agreed definition, but for the purposes of this article it is best defined as a person’s set of traits, behaviours, cognition and emotions that explain job performance and task success over and above traditional measures of intelligence (intelligence quotient, or IQ). Language training has a significant effect on those who are, in terms of personality, well suited to operating in foreign environments. This is because learning a language, even at a basic level, signals to foreign counterparts a great deal about a willingness to engage and the lengths to which we will go to understand their point of view. This effect can be maximised by the right individuals. At the other end of the spectrum, Army risks wasting a great deal of time and resources if it delivers language training to those who are not suited to such endeavours.

Whatever our views of colonialism, over the course of 200 years in India, the British produced many highly effective cross-cultural operators. Senior Pakistan Army officers posting to the tribal areas on the Pakistan–Afghan border are still advised to read the books of those British hands of the 19th century in order to understand the area and its people, rather than rely on any contemporary works. Those hands, military and civilian alike, were
effective not because of their intellect or some training they had received but because they possessed the personality that gave them the ability and willingness to engage deeply with the language, culture and history of the people with whom they worked.21

Not all Army personnel who are high performing in traditional roles make good cross-cultural operators. Anecdotally, this has been obvious to many who have served in SFCB roles where it has been observed that otherwise very capable personnel were unable to deal with the peculiar demands of mentoring, partnering and advising.22 Writing in his senior officer debriefing report after commanding a regional assistance command in Vietnam in 1972, Major General John H Cushman argued that ‘a marked empathy with others, an ability to accommodate, a certain unmilitary philosophical or reflective bent, a kind of waywardness or independence … these are often found in outstanding advisors’ (emphasis added).23

Matthew Carr argues that the positive effects of delivering specific cross-cultural skills (such as languages) are influenced to a large degree by the foundation of generic cultural expertise (such as self-awareness) that
How then to find the right people and put them on the right development path towards wielding language skills most effectively? The challenge is: what exactly are we measuring, and how do we measure it ahead of time in a reliable and scientific manner? The science of personality is becoming increasingly sophisticated and offers some answers to this question.

**Measuring Personality**

The measurement of personality traits by psychologists is well documented, although subject to ongoing academic debate over how well certain measurements predict future behaviour and performance. Nevertheless, the measurement of traits such as extroversion, conscientiousness, agreeableness, openness to experience and neuroticism provides valuable information to inform the selection of candidates for certain roles. Research points towards certain combinations of personality traits and emotional profiles being predictably more effective in particular situations. Personality testing can therefore be used to inform a more nuanced and subjective assessment by a selection board or panel.

In the case of language candidates, these personality traits, along with other attributes such as empathy and motivation, will largely determine a person’s ability to adjust to foreign environments and their eventual job performance in such roles. That is, a person’s ability to apply the skills they possess, such as a language, towards task success in a foreign environment is dependent on their particular combination of traits and attributes—their personality.

The United States Peace Corps has employed personality testing extensively as part of selection for overseas service since its inception in 1961, with a high degree of success. In adopting a deliberately amateur or ‘ordinary everyman’ approach to overseas service, the Peace Corps needed to identify and train people who not only could withstand the psychological rigours of such service but also had the necessary personalities to embrace the inevitable ‘culture shock’ as a growth opportunity, and eventually thrive and succeed in such environments. In doing so, the Peace Corps turned to observable attributes such as self-mastery and self-awareness as predictors of success and monitored candidates for such attributes throughout selection and training.
The concept of cultural intelligence (CQ) has gained increasing acceptance in the field of psychology and is now found in Australian Army doctrine.\textsuperscript{30} It appears throughout LWD 3.0.5, which defines it as ‘the ability to effectively operate across a wide variety of cultural environments’.\textsuperscript{31} Research has further investigated the relationships between the ‘big five’ personality traits listed above and high levels of demonstrated CQ. In particular, there is evidence that the trait of ‘openness to experience’ is correlated with higher levels of all forms of cultural intelligence.\textsuperscript{32}

LWD 3.0.5 elaborates on CQ, stating:

\begin{quote}
ADF personnel can prepare … by building their understanding of how the culture operates in general and practicing strategies for more effective cross-cultural engagement. This rests on assessing one’s current level of CQ and committing to building their levels of CQ over time.\textsuperscript{33}
\end{quote}

This implies that CQ is not static but can be deliberately developed. However, it also implies that CQ development is dependent on one’s motivation to do so. This has been characterised by researchers as ‘CQ drive’ and is likely to be the single most important factor in the development of cross-cultural expertise:

\begin{quote}
Over the last decade, we have surveyed nearly 100,000 professionals from over 100 countries and there’s only one consistent characteristic among every culturally intelligent individual. It’s not where you grew up, how many languages you speak, whether you’re part of an under-represented group or how far you’ve travelled. It’s your curiosity, or something we call your CQ Drive. This is your interest and openness to other ways of doing things. And it’s your confidence and ability to persevere in the midst of intercultural challenges.\textsuperscript{34}
\end{quote}

Under the present system of selection, Army has no formal means of assessing the level of CQ or CQ drive among its potential linguists or assessing whether they are intrinsically motivated towards developing the skills demanded by cross-cultural roles. This is a significant vulnerability when seeking to fulfil the goals of DWP 2016 and Army’s PME Strategy. In order to address this deficiency, a comprehensive screening process to inform selection decisions would be beneficial. Such a test, tailored for military use, already exists but, being a proprietary assessment, comes at a financial cost.\textsuperscript{35} Additional costs include the need for military psychologists
to administer and interpret results. The assessment itself could easily be applied alongside the present screening process—language aptitude testing—that occurs routinely throughout Australia on an annual basis.

Critics of structured psychological screening practices may argue that self-selection for language training is good enough. That is, those who volunteer for and pursue language training can be expected to have sufficient CQ Drive. It is logical that people who are not interested in working in cross-cultural environments are hardly likely to want to learn a second language. This, however, ignores two factors. Firstly, people seek courses at DFSL for reasons other than the training or development offered. Courses at DFSL, both short and long, are highly sought after due to its attractive location in Melbourne and regular, predictable work hours. Remuneration in the form of language proficiency allowance is also a potentially distorting incentive. Secondly, most students tend to undergo language training early in their career. This will commonly mean pursuing a language course with their career advisor or chain of command before they have learned their own strengths and weaknesses and come to understand their own particular personality and emotional profile. It does not require blind faith in the science of personality assessment to nevertheless accept that psychology may be able to provide a useful framework for assessing someone’s present and potential CQ.

Conclusion

DWP 2016, the Army PME Strategy of 2017 and the JPME Continuum of 2018 set carefully articulated goals for Army and the joint force in the training and education of personnel that is needed to meet the future demands of service. In particular, a focus on developing improved abilities to operate cross-culturally features in all three documents. The application of language training towards meeting these goals is an important but resource-intensive component that requires careful calibration to ensure the greatest return on investment.

The means of developing improved cross-cultural expertise has been debated extensively, but almost always from a position of what and how much training to provide, rather than to whom to provide it. For establishing an organisational base level of competence this may be appropriate, but for the delivery of specialised training and education such an approach is problematic. When linked with understanding of the role that personality and CQ plays in determining the development of cross-cultural expertise, it becomes evident that selecting the right personnel for such
an investment becomes of increased importance. Simply put: personality matters, and should be used to inform selection decisions.

This article has explored one method by which such a model might be achieved. The use of personality and CQ measures has gained increasing acceptance in psychology and has now entered the lexicon of Army’s doctrine and policy. A personality and CQ screening model for potential linguists would allow Army to target such a considerable investment in the manner most likely to achieve its stated goal of ‘a deepened foundation of socio-cultural skills and emotional intelligence’.

About the Author

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Endnotes

1 Although this quotation is widely credited to Charlemagne, there is actually no historical record to definitively attribute it as such.


8 Australian Army, 2018, Land Warfare Doctrine LWD 3.0.5: Security Force Capacity Building, (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia), 31. The 12 skills identified in LWD 3.0.5 are the result of research by the Australian National University’s Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. See Jeppesen, ‘Are We Influential?’.


18 Hickey, 1965, 78.


21 Montgomery McFate, 2018, Military Anthropology: Soldiers, Scholars and Subjects at the Margins of Empire, Kindle edition (Oxford University Press).


23 Quoted in Ramsey, 2006, 65.


29 Schein, 2015: 1119.


35 The Cultural Intelligence Scale assessment developed by the Cultural Intelligence Center is presently the only such test specifically tailored for a military population and costs US$70 per individual.

36 Carr, 2013
Army Capability Issues: As CLEAR as Daylight

Mr Patrick McMillan

Abstract

This piece investigates the relationship between coastal, littoral, estuarine and riverine (CLEAR) environments and the conduct of Australian Army operations. Exploring the operational importance of these environments within the Indo-Pacific, it demonstrates the need for Army to fight and sustain itself in these areas to achieve Australia’s strategic defence objectives. Using historical examples to demonstrate the integral role played by watercraft in facilitating the manoeuvre and resupply of land forces, it prompts an analysis of Army’s existing waterborne capability. This capability is rapidly ageing, presenting gaps in Australia’s ability to operate within our region. As the Indo-Pacific becomes increasingly militarised, the limited number and quality of our existing waterborne capabilities may inhibit the ability of Army—and the wider Australian Defence Force—to respond to threats. Serious thought must therefore be devoted to how Army will sustain itself in the CLEAR environment. The acquisition of new watercraft provides one solution.
Introduction

The Australian Army (Army), alongside the wider Australian Defence Force (ADF) is currently undergoing a major revitalisation of its military capabilities and force structure. However, an area that has received little attention until now is Army’s coastal, littoral, estuarine and riverine (CLEAR) capability. Thus, this paper seeks to explore whether Army needs to update its CLEAR capability and what that capability might look like. To do this, an understanding of CLEAR environments is essential. In considering Army’s CLEAR capability it is important to understand the meaning of the acronym and the importance of this space to our region. A key feature of the Indo-Pacific is that the archipelagic chain of South-East Asia and the islands of the South-West Pacific form a ring around the Australian continent. This geography needs to be carefully considered when determining the future of Army’s, and the ADF’s, force structure. Any form of military engagement in the Indo-Pacific will require traversing at least some elements of the CLEAR space. CLEAR environments are highly complex, providing sustenance to populations, facilitating their trade and communication and serving as their home, resulting in a concentration of wealth in key coastal centres. Thus, these environments hold an immense amount of strategic weight due to the key role they play in Indo-Pacific countries. The region has become a centre of strategic gravity. Rapidly developing local powers compete over resources and political leverage, while Asia itself becomes a locus of global competition. Acknowledging this, the Australian Government has highlighted a shift in its policy towards deeper engagement with the region, as seen in the 2016 Defence White Paper and 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper.1 If Australia seeks to engage with the region and to operate within it, then Army and the wider ADF must be able to operate throughout the CLEAR space and efforts should be made to enhance this capability.

Army is responsible for coastal and riverine manoeuvre; however, its existing capability is small and antiquated. The threat of land-based anti-access, area denial (A2/AD) systems means that Royal Australian Navy (RAN) vessels are unlikely to spend extended periods of time near hostile coastlines. As a result, Army cannot rely solely on the Australian Amphibious Force (AAF) to provide its logistics and manoeuvre support. It must have the ability to conduct its own sustainment and movement of assets if required. This ability is currently based on antiquated platforms, primarily the Landing Craft
Mechanised Mark 8 (LCM-8), the Lighter Amphibious Resupply Cargo 5-Ton (LARC-V), and Rigid-Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs).

Historical examples drawn from Australia’s experience in the Second World War and the efforts of the United States (US) in Vietnam provide useful insights into the roles of and requirements for small watercraft when operating in the Indo-Pacific. These insights, combined with existing acquisition programs, can be used to develop a more effective and capable force for operating in CLEAR environments. This force can be further enhanced by considering the option of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems.

This paper explores the value of small craft within the ADF’s force structure and Army’s ability to conduct sustainment, manoeuvre, interdiction and fire support operations. Although relevant to the littoral space, it does not seek to provide an in-depth analysis of the AAF or the conduct of amphibious operations, or to focus on the utility of rotor-wing solutions in this environment. While versatile in their own way, helicopters are limited in terms of payload and duration, incurring greater operational costs due to maintenance and fuel usage than a relatively simple diesel-fuelled watercraft. Although perhaps the most prominent, amphibious operations are but one of the many jobs undertaken by militaries in the CLEAR space. While Army watercraft can be used to enhance Australia’s amphibious capability, they also fulfil additional roles in supporting the continued presence and effectiveness of the land force. This capability is essential for a small force that may not always be able to rely on the presence of major support vessels, while also allowing for the deployment of a scalable and self-sufficient force.²

Coastal, Littoral, Estuarine and Riverine

A sound understanding of the CLEAR environments is required to operate in the Indo-Pacific. Coastal, littoral, estuarine and riverine environments are operationally complex areas in which land and naval power meet. The broadest of these terms, the littoral zone, is described by the RAN as:

*The areas seaward of the coast which are susceptible to influence or support from the land and the areas inland from the coast which are susceptible to influence or support from the sea.*³
As the range of both sea and land based weapons systems increases, so does the littoral; however, for the purpose of this paper the littoral is most relevant when considering the ability to transfer assets from a ship to the shore or to move forces through an island chain. The littoral is made up of a combination of what might be called blue (open ocean) and green (coastal) waters. The coastal zone is integral to this space and marks the boundary between the sea or ocean and the land. Estuaries and river networks (brown water) mark a natural extension of the littoral and allow for the penetration of waterborne forces inland. The riverine environment is usually characterised by limited land lines of communication and made up of substantial inland waterways that allow for the transportation and manoeuvre of land forces. Warfare in the littoral, and by extension rivers and estuaries, has more similarities to combat on land than to combat in blue water. These environments present complex ‘surface and subsurface physical environmental conditions’ in which geography plays a major role. Coastal features, reefs, sandbars, man-made obstacles (for example, bridges or dams) and tides all work to constrain or dictate the movement of waterborne craft, while the close proximity of land and potential targets reduces the time available to respond to threats. As a result, substantial challenges await those seeking to operate in the CLEAR space. This space is extremely important and cannot be ignored.
CLEAR environments are strategically valuable and are present throughout the Indo-Pacific. This makes them strategically valuable. The Indo-Pacific is primarily maritime in nature, with the archipelago to the north playing a predominant role in Australia’s strategic geography. Regional tensions in the East China Sea and South China Sea further highlight the importance of the CLEAR space. Thus it is essential that Army understand, and be able to operate in, these environments. Littoral and coastal zones are confined and congested spaces occupied by all manner of people, craft and technologies—allied, opposed and neutral. To access land from the sea, forces must transition these zones. This is not a simple feat. Island chains can work to ‘canalise’ the movements of vessels, can be used to extend the depth of defensive networks and, in combination with bays and rugged coastlines, can provide havens for, or obscure the movement of, vessels while also working to limit the access of larger craft.6 Thus, during hostilities, coastlines, estuaries and the littoral zone are of extreme strategic importance. They must be defended to prevent enemy use or interdiction or, alternatively, traversed in order to project power onto the land. As noted by former Army officer and strategic consultant Dayton McCarthy, ‘the sea serves as both the barrier and the pathway between the coastlines’.7 Yet CLEAR environments are not only important due to their tactical value. They are also the source of much of the region’s wealth and the home of most of its population.

Throughout South-East Asia and the South Pacific, population and, in turn, economic wealth are concentrated in the CLEAR space. The region is characterised by large, densely populated coastal port cities, interspersed with natural beaches, jungle and sparsely populated island chains. Just as military craft must transition the littoral and coastal zones to project power onto the land, so too must commercial vessels pass through this space to conduct trade. Therefore it is not surprising to find that, as in Australia, throughout the region people, infrastructure and wealth are concentrated along the coast. Seventy-five per cent of the world’s population and 80 per cent of capital cities reside in the littoral space.8 As highlighted by strategists Ken Gleiman and Peter J Dean, across the Indo-Pacific, 80 per cent of cities, and therefore most essential infrastructure, trade and industry hubs, and military power, are found within 200 kilometres of the coast.9 Narrowing the scope even further, across South-East Asia, 65 per cent of people live within 50 kilometres of the coast, while 75 per cent of cities are situated in low-lying coastal areas.10 These figures would be higher if populations
situated on major inland waterways were also included. Rivers play essential roles in the lives of populations throughout South-East Asia and the Pacific, providing fresh water, food and transportation. The Mekong Delta is perhaps the best example of this, flowing through six countries and with more than sixty million people living and sustaining themselves on its lower basin.\textsuperscript{11} Given the importance of these areas to people’s lives, it makes sense for Australia to develop capabilities that enable it to act more effectively within them. This will enable Australia to better pursue its strategic objectives.

**Strategic Guidance**

The Indo-Pacific’s growing prosperity has transformed it into a centre of strategic gravity, increasing the importance of the region to Australia. Due to its rapid economic development, global strategic weight is shifting to the Indo-Pacific. As highlighted by Army, Australia’s region is becoming ‘increasingly defined by a changing geopolitical order’ while ‘the pace of urbanisation and regional competition in littoral environments [brings additional] complexity.’\textsuperscript{12} This rapid change is driven by unprecedented economic growth throughout the region. PricewaterhouseCoopers identifies that, if current trends continue, between now and 2050, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam will all fall within the world’s top 10 countries for average real gross domestic product (GDP) growth.\textsuperscript{13} Increased economic prosperity has been coupled with rising military spending throughout the region.\textsuperscript{14} While this spending is not necessarily directed at Australia, it will result in the region playing host to a series of much more capable militaries. The combination of this rapid change with the presence of numerous territorial disputes, historic rivalries and great power competition has the potential to drive conflict, or even war, in the region.\textsuperscript{15} If that were not already enough, threats posed by natural disasters and climate-induced instability, such as food insecurity and flooding, further amplify the importance of the region to Australia. The conduct of humanitarian aid and disaster relief, stabilisation and non-combatant evacuation operations is an important component of the ADF’s function. A large portion of Australia’s official responses to major natural disasters have taken the form of financial grants, technical assistance or the provision of relief supplies via commercial means.\textsuperscript{16} However, as the prevalence of these events increases and regional competition grows, it will be in Australia’s interest to ensure it has a clear, decisive and visible presence when conducting these operations.
The strategic interests and objectives of the Australian Government highlight the need for an effective CLEAR capability. Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper sets out the country’s defence priorities and reinforces a swing in Australia’s focus away from the Middle East and back to our near region and the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s stated strategic interests—a secure Australia with secure northern approaches, a secure South-East Asia and South Pacific, and a stable Indo-Pacific—are all maritime in nature. These are supported by three objectives, taking the form of ‘activities the Government expects Defence to be able to conduct if it decides to use military power’ in order to pursue its stated strategic interests. These objectives consist of deterring, denying or defeating attacks on or threats to Australia, its national interests and its northern approaches; making effective military contributions to the security of South-East Asia and supporting the governments of Papua New Guinea, Timor-Leste and Pacific Islands countries; and contributing military capabilities to support coalition operations. To achieve these objectives successfully, Army must be able to operate effectively in CLEAR environments. As highlighted earlier, the littoral and riverine environments constitute a major portion of the operating environment identified by the 2016 Defence White Paper. Thus, if Australia seeks to actively pursue its strategic aims in the Indo-Pacific, it must consider the value of CLEAR capabilities.

The ability to conduct and sustain independent military operations will enhance Australia’s ability to pursue its strategic defence objectives. The Department of Defence (Defence) has stated that it seeks a force that is ‘more capable of conducting independent combat operations’. However, Australia is severely limited in its ability to sustain independent combat operations in the maritime domain. Its limited access to amphibious shipping and watercraft restricts its ability to sustain concurrent operations. However, CLEAR capabilities can enhance the flexibility of land forces and facilitate their movement and sustainment. This would bring substantial advantages in a region defined by its maritime nature, and would help Army contribute to ‘a more capable, agile and potent force’. Army is right in stating that its ability to ‘[apply] lethality on the land, from the land and onto the land for potency and influence across all domains’ must remain a central focus. Throughout history, the ability of militaries to actively achieve this has been essential in enabling them to fight and win.
Operations from the Past and Lessons for the Future

A wealth of insights into the role of and need for capabilities that operate in the CLEAR environment can be drawn from historic operations conducted in the Indo-Pacific. These examples highlight the limitations placed upon military forces trying to operate in this region and the types of operations that may need to be conducted in the future. As highlighted by geographers Michael Lindberg and Daniel Todd in their study of the influence of geography on naval warfare, throughout history ‘navies and warships have changed, but their missions and operational environments have not’.23 The basic tasks and ‘utility’ of naval and waterborne forces, of which the strategic and tactical movement of ground forces, the provision of support to troops that are ashore and the general projection of military power are most relevant to this paper, have not changed over the last century.24 With this in mind, it is worth considering a number of examples to see what we can learn from past operations in the Indo-Pacific. The conduct of Australian forces during the Second World War provides a perfect starting point.

Bougainville provides a perfect example of the value of Army watercraft and the limitations that geography imposes on those attempting to operate in the littoral space. Positioned within the Royal Australian Engineers, the 41st Australian Landing Craft Company (41st ALC Company) was used to run men and supplies between Jacquinot Bay and Wide Bay and from Torokina to the front, and to contribute to fresh landings undertaken by the Army.25 This ferry service was essential to Australian operations. Mountainous terrain combined with large amounts of rainfall resulted in numerous creeks and rivers snaking through the jungles to the beaches, making it extremely difficult to move trucks or jeeps down the coast. Thus, landing craft played a major role in moving forces around the island. Corporal Wallis William Rice noted that landing craft were used to move artillery up the coast every few days as the infantry advanced.26 Craft were also used to deploy fighting and reconnaissance patrols consisting of 10 to 30 men, as well as stretcher parties to extract the wounded.27 One of the most famous of these landings was the battle for Porton Plantation. On 8 June 1945, the 42nd ALC Company was ordered to land a company group from the 31/51st Battalion on the beaches of the Porton Plantation at first light.28 The mission was designed to put pressure on Japanese positions that had been holding up the 26th Battalion in its northward advance along the island. The landing would be ‘the only [action] of World War Two in which Australian forces landed on and attacked an enemy-held beach, using landing craft
manned by Australians, and suffered casualties in the process.29 Although the landing ended in failure, with some craft running aground on reefs and additional craft having to be sent to extract infantry the following day, the battle shows the utility of small boats in this domain and what could be achieved by a dedicated and properly equipped force.30 Similar lessons can be drawn from the experiences of Australian forces during Operation Oboe.

The actions of Australian forces during Operation Oboe highlight the difficulties imposed by limited infrastructure and the utility of landing craft to manoeuvre forces. Operation Oboe was the name given to the Allied invasion of Borneo, conducted by the 7th and 9th Australian Divisions, Second Australian Imperial Force, with a range of supporting elements. From 1 May 1945, Australian forces struggled through the swampy coastal plains, mangroves, dense rainforest and jungle that inhibited the movement of vehicles to existing roads and tracks.31 Throughout each phase of Operation Oboe, armour and support elements were held back by poor infrastructure and the pervasive threat of Japanese mines and improvised explosive devices.32 During Oboe Six, the capture of Brunei Bay, the 20th Australian Infantry Brigade captured Brunei without the majority of its supporting armour.33 The armour had been left behind, the limited existing bridges unable to bear their weight, and swampland slowing their progress. An important lesson was to be drawn from this. Despite limited existing road and communication networks, the rivers of the Klias Peninsula and Brunei were negotiable for manoeuvre.34 LCMs (Landing Craft Mechanised) were brought in to move tanks up the Brunei River and secure the Clifford Bridge, while also being used to carry 4 Troop, A Squadron, 2/9th Australian Armoured Regiment to support the 2/15th infantry battalion at Brooketon.35 Operations in Brunei Bay demonstrated the severe limitations that the geographical environment can place on units operating in the Indo-Pacific. However, in attempts to resolve these issues, waterborne craft provided a solution, enabling Australian forces to advance. Landing craft would also be used in attempts to solve similar issues during Oboe Two.

The use of landing craft to conduct shore-to-shore manoeuvre during Oboe Two depicts an essential capability for the Australian Army. During Oboe Two, the Battle of Balikpapan beginning on 1 July 1945, Australian forces met stiff resistance from dug-in Japanese positions. Japanese forces had mined the major roadways, making it difficult for Australian infantry units to receive vehicular support. To alleviate this issue, Australian forces decided to advance their armoured units directly on their objective. On 5 July, 3 Troop of A Squadron, 1st Australian Armoured Regiment was embarked
onto landing craft and landed at Manggar airfield at 1 pm, under the cover of smoke, to engage Japanese positions which had halted the infantry.\textsuperscript{36} Unfortunately, as the troop stopped to remove its waterproofing, it was engaged by a Japanese 120 mm gun and mortar fire from a position that had been reported as destroyed after an earlier bombardment.\textsuperscript{37} After further bombardment, a second landing was undertaken by 4 Troop on 9 July, which advanced up the beach and successfully supported a push to capture Manggar airfield. Landing craft would also be used on 5 July to ferry forces to Penadjam on the other side of Balikpapan Bay.\textsuperscript{38} Without water transport, Australian forces would have been forced to fight well inland in order to secure a position up river where they could cross to the other side of the bay. Despite the sinking of two tanks upon landing, water transport facilitated the capture of Penadjam, allowing allied force to secure the bay.

Although both operations ended in disaster for the armoured units involved, these efforts show the utility of small craft in the littoral space. Moving assets along the coast allows forces to bypass obstacles imposed by both terrain and the enemy. It reduces the amount of attrition suffered by allied forces, minimises wear and tear on equipment and provides the opportunity to advance quickly and act with surprise. This is an important lesson for our contemporary forces. If the ADF seeks to follow its concept of ‘manoeuvre warfare’ then Army will need to ensure that it maintains its ability to move assets around the battlefield rapidly.

The experiences of US forces during Vietnam are extremely useful for understanding combat in the CLEAR space. The River Patrol Force (RPF) and Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) saw substantial combat during the Vietnam War and provide perfect examples of how Army could go about conducting operations in the CLEAR space. The value of these forces was drawn from their flexibility, rapid manoeuvrability, offensive power, and ability to move allied forces and disrupt enemy activity. The Mekong Delta consists of some 2,400 kilometres of natural navigable waterways and an additional 4,000 kilometres of man-made canals and other waterways that sprout from the 4,184 kilometre Song Mekong river.\textsuperscript{39} With poor infrastructure and few roads, waterways served as the primary mode of transportation within the Delta. The RPF was responsible for patrolling this vast network. Through Operation Game Warden (Task Force 116) the RPF quickly developed into a mobile strike force used to attack Viet Cong (VC) positions, disrupt river crossings and VC troop movement, and secure major rivers for commerce.\textsuperscript{40}

During the 1968 Tet Offensive, the RPF was used as ‘roving cavalry’, providing besieged American and South Vietnamese positions with fire
support and supplies. This fire support usually came from 81 mm Mark II mortar and .50-calibre machine guns mounted on Patrol Craft Fast (the famous Swift Boats) or Coast Guard Patrol Boats. The MRF was used as an ‘amphibious riverine strike force’, working in combination with the US Army’s 9th Infantry Division to hunt down large bands of VC forces operating in the Mekong Delta. Armoured landing craft, in combination with minesweepers and patrol craft, were used to fulfil this task. While the MRF was successful in locating and eliminating large elements of the VC force, the armoured landing craft did prove vulnerable to anti-tank weaponry and ambush, resulting in substantial casualties. The conduct of the RPF and MRF highlight the value of a dedicated CLEAR capability in enhancing the effectiveness of land forces by providing tactical manoeuvre and naval gunfire support, in addition to an ability to engage the enemy directly. These lessons should be considered carefully when considering Australia’s own development of a CLEAR capability.

Small boats, landing craft and amphibious vehicles are an essential enabling capability in the CLEAR environment. They allow for the completion of a range of support tasks in both stable and contested environments that are essential to the continued operation of forces in the CLEAR space. The previous historical examples highlighted a number of roles undertaken by CLEAR watercraft, including the ability to conduct quicker manoeuvre, logistics over the shore, resupply and rapid reinforcement, naval gunfire support, and interdiction, all of which boost the effectiveness of the land

*The Indo-Pacific’s growing prosperity has transformed it into a centre of strategic gravity, increasing the importance of the region to Australia. (Image courtesy Defence)*
force. Thus, an effective CLEAR capability will enhance Army’s ability to contribute to Defence’s goal of establishing ‘a more capable, agile and potent future force’. It will also work towards increasing the ADF’s preparedness level by ensuring it is capable of operating in the CLEAR environment and enhancing its sustainability. As admitted by the 2016 Defence White Paper, ‘Defence’s capability plans have become disconnected from defence strategy and resources, delaying important investments in Australia’s security’. Australia’s focus on warfighting in the Middle East has seen substantial investment in armoured vehicles and increasing the survivability of our forces against improvised explosive devices. However, this focus has come at the detriment of the development of watercraft and led to the establishment of a heavier force, putting additional strain on our existing water transport systems. Similarly, despite the proliferation of A2/AD technologies and increased defence spending throughout the region, there has been little development of more resilient and adept watercraft. Army must carefully consider the role played by its existing watercraft to determine whether they meet the requirements of our contemporary operating environment.

Australia’s Existing CLEAR Capabilities

Army’s ability to operate in CLEAR environments is limited by its reliance on a small number of antiquated platforms. Army watercraft expand the options available to defence planners and military commanders when considering the movement and manoeuvre of forces and supplies in support of land operations. They allow for the independent deployment, sustainment and extraction of land forces, in addition to a range of auxiliary roles like reconnaissance and fire support, facilitating the projection of land power. The LCM-8 is the backbone of the Australian Army’s waterborne capability. As highlighted by the United States Army, landing craft provide:

\[\text{inter – and intra-theatre transportation of personnel and material, delivering cargo from advanced bases and deep-draft strategic sealift ships to harbours, inland waterways, remote and unimproved beaches and coastlines, and denied or degraded ports.}^{49}\]

This capability will be essential when operating in the Indo-Pacific. Introduced in 1965, the LCM-8 can carry up to 54 tonnes of cargo and has a maximum speed of 9.5 knots when fully loaded. With a draft of
1.5 metres it can access most waterways, while mounted machine guns provide a limited defensive capability. However, the LCM-8 is an extremely dated platform and is limited in its ability to support the Army’s future needs. It is unable to transport Army’s M1 Abrams main battle tank and, though it is capable of transporting Army’s new LAND 121 Phase 3B trucks and the oncoming Rheinmetall Boxer, the increased weight of contemporary combat systems will put additional strain on this legacy platform.51 The relatively small number of these craft is also of concern, restricting Army’s ability to sustain concurrent efforts and move force elements.52 The craft’s relatively slow speed and open-topped design also leave it ill-suited to conducting riverine operations, with its steel hull providing only limited protection to the boat’s occupants. Thus, Army’s existing LCM-8 capability is not sufficient to meet the challenges of operating in the Indo-Pacific. This is also true of Army’s other watercraft.

Army’s additional waterborne craft fail to fully fill the gaps left by the LCM-8 in Australia’s CLEAR capability. The LARC-V provides an additional logistical service, functioning as a ship-to-shore connector and transport craft. Like the LCM-8, the LARC-V is a legacy platform that was acquired during the 1960s. Capable of carrying roughly 4 tonnes of cargo at a speed of around 48 kilometres/hour on land or 8.5 knots on water, the LARC-V is a useful amphibious vehicle.53 It provides a unique logistics over the shore capability, able to move supplies inland from waiting ships rather than solely depositing them onto a beach or river bank. However, just like the LCM-8, its downfall comes from a slow speed when waterborne, a lack of protection for troops using the craft for transportation, and the limited number of craft available for use. Counter to the LARC-V, RHIBs do provide Army with a rapid response, interdiction and tactical insertion capability. The Zodiac FC-470 can take 10 combatants, holding a maximum weight of 1,250 kilograms, and provides a nimble alternative for negotiating waterways.54 Its low profile, speed and relatively small size make it ideal for manoeuvring up rivers, conducting reconnaissance and inserting special forces or raiding parties. However, the craft’s simple design offers little additional protection or offensive capability to the crew. As a result, Army lacks any form of offensive watercraft for operations in the CLEAR environment and, while it does maintain some capacity to conduct logistics over the shore and move and sustain land forces, its small number of antiquated platforms are unlikely to meet the operating challenges of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific.
Despite enhancing the ADF’s ability to operate through the littoral space, the AAF plays only a minor role in boosting Army’s tactical manoeuvre and resupply capability over a prolonged period. With the commissioning of two Landing Helicopter Docks (LHDs), HMAS Canberra and HMAS Adelaide, on 28 November 2014 and 4 December 2015 respectively, Australia has developed a respectable amphibious capability. Each LHD has the ability to land a force of over 1,000 personnel with their equipment and supporting vehicles by a combination of helicopter and watercraft. These watercraft comprise four LHD Landing Craft LCM-1E, with additional space for four RHIBs. In combination with the Landing Ship Dock HMAS Choules, the ADF has the potential to deploy a number of force packages ranging from an Amphibious Ready Element consisting of one amphibious ship, a combat team and supporting helicopters, to an Amphibious Ready Group capable of conducting a full spectrum of amphibious operations with extensive helicopter support and a number of combat teams. However, the AAF does not provide Army with a permanent and flexible capability. The eight LCM-1E landing craft are tied to the LHDs, extremely valuable platforms whose exposure to risk should be kept to a minimum. The option of an additional LCM-8 or two LCVP (Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel) courtesy of HMAS Choules does little to alleviate this issue. In light of the threat posed by hostile A2/AD capabilities, it is unlikely that either of these vessels would be kept close at hand after the completion of an amphibious operation. Once the major vessels of the RAN have withdrawn to blue water, taking the LCM-1E with them, Army has little capacity to manoeuvre any serious force up and through major waterways or around coastal features. Despite this, efforts to restore Army’s CLEAR capability have been limited.

A Future CLEAR Capability

CLEAR capability projects have had a poor history over the last decade, demonstrating a lack of priority. Defence has failed to deliver some of the capabilities highlighted in its Defence Capability Plan 2006–2016. JP 2048 Phase 1a was established for the provisioning of six Amphibious Watercraft Systems in the form of the LCM-2000. However, this project was abandoned due to structural issues with the craft. JP 2048 Phase 3, Amphibious Watercraft Replacement, was intended to replace the entirety of the ADF’s landing craft; however, this project was also cut back and, in the end, only resulted in the development of the LHD Landing Craft. JP 2048
Phase 5, the project to replace Navy’s Landing Craft Heavy (LCH) to provide landing craft with enhanced ocean-going capabilities and the capability to transport large armoured ocean-going vehicles, trucks, personnel and stores for intra-theatre sealift or the conduct of independent small-scale amphibious operations, lost its priority. The decommissioning of the last Balikpapan Class LCH in November 2014 has seen the removal of this capability from the ADF. However, if it seeks to remain an influential actor in the Indo-Pacific, Australia cannot afford to continue scrapping projects linked to its CLEAR capability.

Existing Army projects designed to enhance its CLEAR capability must be given priority. Despite constant failures over the last decade to replace Army’s existing watercraft, two projects remain. Highlighting an increased awareness of the importance of the CLEAR space, LAND 8710 and LAND 8702 are projects for ‘Army Water Transports’ and ‘Army Riverine Craft’ respectively. Recognising the importance of landing craft and amphibious vehicles to the ADF’s battlefield logistic support, tactical resupply and force manoeuvre, LAND 8710 seeks to replace Army’s antiquated water transport fleet (LCM-8 and LARC-V). With an indicative cost of $400 million to $500 million, the project has been approved to move towards Gate 1 (the risk mitigation and requirement-setting phase) of the acquisition process; however, there is still a long way to go. LAND 8702 seeks to ‘re-establish’ a fleet of lightly armed small patrol boats capable of carrying small force elements to increase manoeuvrability. Defence’s stated intention for this capability to be delivered from around 2022, with a program time frame of 2018 to 2028, is extremely ambitious, as the project remains in Phase 1. However, both of these projects hold a substantial advantage. With LAND 8710 projected to cost $400 million to $500 million and LAND 8702 estimated at $200 million to $300 million, existing CLEAR projects are far cheaper than many of Defence’s other acquisition projects in the Land Combat and Amphibious Warfare stream, whose costs range from $100 million to $200 million for barracks redevelopment all the way to $10 billion to $15 billion for Army’s new infantry fighting vehicles. In this context, an updated CLEAR capability is an extremely affordable endeavour. Considering the advantages an updated CLEAR capability will bring in enhancing the effectiveness of Australia’s armed forces throughout the Indo-Pacific, it makes sense to prioritise these projects. These capabilities could be further enhanced through the exploration of autonomous systems.
Autonomous Vehicles

Autonomous and semi-autonomous systems provide a way to circumvent the dangers of operating in the CLEAR environment. Over the last decade there has been substantial experimentation with investment in autonomous and semi-autonomous systems, ranging from specialised land systems to unmanned aerial vehicles, watercraft and unmanned underwater vehicles. The use of autonomous or semi-autonomous systems in specialised roles allows for the removal of risk to human operators. The use of these platforms to conduct mine and barricade clearance, forward reconnaissance and hydrographical mapping has the potential to both reduce the threats faced by and increase the situational awareness of friendly forces. As stated by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Director for Defence & Strategy, Michael Shoebridge, autonomous systems ‘will, at the very least, be essential “complementary capabilities” to the big, complex manned platforms’ of the future ADF. Army is already aware of the advantages autonomous systems can bring, highlighting the use of artificial intelligence, autonomy and robotics as a way of obtaining ‘asymmetric advantages’ in its 2018 Robotic & Autonomous Systems Strategy. The ability for autonomous systems to come in almost any shape or size allows them to fill a multitude of roles. The potential use of small underwater craft to map and explore beaches, harbours and inland waterways provides a solution to the challenges A2/AD capabilities pose to forces conducting pre-landing operations. Alternatively, a larger surface vessel, taking the form of a landing craft or small barge, could be used to transport equipment, supplies, vehicles and munitions from waiting ships to the shore, or from established logistics hubs to advance bases or forward deployed troops. Thus, the development of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems has the potential to bring a range of advantages to Army’s CLEAR capability.

Conclusion

The Australian Army needs a more advanced CLEAR capability. Situated in a maritime region with extensive CLEAR environments, Army must be able to project power across the water. The CLEAR space is home to the majority of the region’s wealth, and population centres are concentrated within it, making it essential for Army to be able to wield influence in this domain. Given rising regional tensions and the potential for conflict, Australia must be
Autonomous and semi-autonomous systems provide a way to circumvent the dangers of operating in the CLEAR environment. Over the last decade there has been substantial experimentation with investment in autonomous and semi-autonomous systems, ranging from specialised land systems to unmanned aerial vehicles, watercraft and unmanned underwater vehicles. The use of autonomous or semi-autonomous systems in specialised roles allows for the removal of risk to human operators. The use of these platforms to conduct mine and barricade clearance, forward reconnaissance and hydrographical mapping has the potential to both reduce the threats faced by and increase the situational awareness of friendly forces. As stated by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Director for Defence & Strategy, Michael Shoebridge, autonomous systems ‘will, at the very least, be essential “complementary capabilities” to the big, complex manned platforms’ of the future ADF.70 Army is already aware of the advantages autonomous systems can bring, highlighting the use of artificial intelligence, autonomy and robotics as a way of obtaining ‘asymmetric advantages’ in its 2018 Robotic & Autonomous Systems Strategy.71 The ability for autonomous systems to come in almost any shape or size allows them to fill a multitude of roles. The potential use of small underwater craft to map and explore beaches, harbours and inland waterways provides a solution to the challenges A2/AD capabilities pose to forces conducting pre-landing operations.72 Alternatively, a larger surface vessel, taking the form of a landing craft or small barge, could be used to transport equipment, supplies, vehicles and munitions from waiting ships to the shore, or from established logistics hubs to advance bases or forward deployed troops. Thus, the development of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems has the potential to bring a range of advantages to Army’s CLEAR capability.

Conclusion

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further in its CLEAR capabilities. Although this capability could take many forms, Army’s existing programs and past experience suggest that the development of a robust fleet of manned craft capable of moving troops, supplies and equipment is essential. This will strengthen Army’s ability to sustain its efforts on land, while also enabling it to contribute to the AAF. Combined with autonomous or remotely operated systems capable of enhancing the precision and situational awareness of the force, and a fleet of small, fast and offensively capable craft, Army could have a significantly enhanced CLEAR capability that would bolster its capacity to project force in the Indo-Pacific.

About the Author

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Endnotes


2 Scalable force refers to the ability to provide force packages of varying sizes relative to the magnitude of the assigned objective. This prevents wasting resources that could be used elsewhere.


4 An estuary is the tidal mouth of a large river, marking the transition zone between the river and maritime environments.


7 McCarthy, 2018, 12.


11 International Rivers, 2019, ‘Southeast Asia’, at: https://www.internationalrivers.org/programs/southeast-asia

12 Australian Army, 2019, ‘Accelerated Warfare: Futures Statement for an Army in Motion’, at: https://www.army.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/futures_statement_accelerated_warfare_a4_u.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3h_Hk9eQRgsQ9aTtkc0SJVrsrUAnu0aX6yrwm1NQBHm9siSPdfzbqY


14 See the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s Military Expenditure Database, at: www.sipri.org/databases/milex

15 For an exception analysis of the key strategic flashpoints in Asia, see Brendan Taylor, 2018, The Four Flashpoints: How Asia Goes to War (Carlton, VIC: La Trobe University Press).


17 Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, 16.

19 Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, 12.
22 Australian Army, 2019, ‘Accelerated Warfare’.
30 The ALC companies lacked any form of specialised equipment. The ALCs were mass-produced and simple, their flat bottoms susceptible to catching on reefs and shores. Additionally, most crews lacked any form of charts or hydrographical data, few were equipped with radios for communication, and most had limited seafaring/maritime experience.
32 The Glenelg, Collins and ANZAC highways in Tarakan were all heavily mined. Mining halted the advances of two troops on Labuan, and forces in Balikpapan were constantly held up by buried depth charges and explosives as they attempted to advance inland. For an exceptional account of Australian armour on Borneo, see Peter Donovan, 1988, Waltzing Matildas (Blackwood, SA: Donovan and Associates), 119–122, 156.
33 Australian War Memorial, 2/9 Australian Armoured Regiment AIF, July 1945, in Unit War Diaries, 1939–45 War, AWM52, 3/1/15.
35 Donovan, 1988, 164.
36 AWM52, 3/1/15.
37 Australian War Memorial, 1 AUST ARMD REGT (AIF) NARRATIVE FOR JULY 45, 2, Jan–May 1945, in Unit War Diaries, 1939–45 War, 1 Australian Armoured Regiment AIF, AWM52, 3/1/17.
38 AWM52, 3/1/17.
40 John Darrel Sherwood, 2015, War in the Shallows (Washington, DC: Naval History and Heritage Command, Department of the Navy), xi.

41 Sherwood, 2015, xii.

42 Sherwood, 2015, 233–234.

43 Sherwood, 2015, xi–xii.

44 Sherwood, 2015, xi–xii.


46 Department of Defence, 2016 Defence White Paper, 22.


48 See the LAND 400 projects, as well as enhanced soldier systems.


50 Hydrographic Systems Program Office, Electrical & Mechanical Engineering Instruction, Marine L 136-8, Landing Craft, Mechanised, 8 (LCM8), Series 1 and 2 (Canberra: Department of Defence), 3.

51 The new Boxer weighs in at 38.5 tonnes. A list of Project LAND 121 acquisitions can be found at: https://www.army.gov.au/our-future/modernisation-projects/project-land-121

52 The quantities of craft remain classified.


58 Department of Defence, 2019, Amphibious Operations, Australian Defence Doctrine Publication 3.2 (Canberra: Department of Defence), section 2, 6.


64 Program Management Office, Australian Army, 2019, Introduction to Land Capability (Canberra: Australian Army).

65 Department of Defence, 2016, 2016 Integrated Investment Program (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia), 117–118.


67 Department of Defence, 2016 Integrated Investment Program, 119.

68 For information on capability acquisition and its relevant phases, see Department of Defence, 2014, Defence Capability Development Handbook 2014 (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia).

69 Department of Defence, 2016 Integrated Investment Program, 119–120.


71 Australian Army, 2018, Robotic & Autonomous Systems Strategy (Canberra: Australian Army Research Centre), 1.

72 For a discussion of the contemporary difficulties in conducting pre-landing operations, see Albert Palazzo, 2019, Pre-Landing Operations: Getting Old Tasks Done in an Age of Transparency (Canberra: Australian Army Research Centre).
Considering Military Involvement in Australia’s Domestic Counter-Terrorism Apparatus

Mr Nicolas Johnston

Abstract

Terrorist threats are evolving globally, and nations are grappling with the traditional division between civil and military affairs in their responses to what have essentially become paramilitary actors. Although Australia has largely been spared the extremes of domestic terror, such as events in Mumbai (2008), Paris (2015) and Nairobi (2019), the 2014 Lindt Café siege in Sydney highlighted the challenges Australian forces face in dealing with this developing dichotomy. This article draws on the lessons of the Lindt Café siege to explore and evaluate a number of models by which state and Commonwealth authorities might most effectively respond to future threats of domestic violence without supplanting civil primacy. It finds that ‘outsourcing’ military-level lethal capacities to civil forces is preferable in terms of both cost-effectiveness and preventing the militarisation of civil forces, and reviews the Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Act 2018 against this standard. It makes a number of recommendations to address what is perceived as the politicisation of the military call-out procedure such that Australia might optimally respond to threats of domestic violence without undermining the long-established distinction between civil and military actors.
Introduction

The changing pattern of domestic terrorist attacks is creating a new challenge for Western nations in managing national security. Modern democratic ideals dictate that civil authorities ought to be primarily responsible for responding to domestic threats, including terrorist threats, but the modus operandi of many terrorist actors has evolved to the point where civil authorities are often neither trained nor equipped to address them.¹ Thus, while civil security services are capable of handling relatively small-scale events, more severe attacks, such as those in Mumbai, Nairobi and Paris, often exceed the capacities of those civil services and challenge the traditional division between civil and military affairs.²

The 2014 Lindt Café siege in Sydney highlighted the legislative and procedural challenges facing Australian authorities in responding even to a lone-actor terrorist attack. In that incident, the New South Wales (NSW) Police Force (the civil security) responded to the terrorist threat without formally involving the Australian Defence Force (ADF) (the military). This decision was not directly criticised by the Coroner’s report on the Lindt Cafe Siege,³ but perceived shortcomings in the actions of the NSW Police Force led the Coroner to recommend that civil and military forces review the criteria governing applications for the military to be ‘called out’ in comparable civil incidents.⁴ These criteria were subsequently updated in the Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Act 2018⁵ (the 2018 Act), which was passed in November 2018 to address a number of legislative barriers to effective civil–military cooperation in similar incidents.

This article first reviews the foundational legislative distinctions between national military and domestic (state) civil security services in Australia. It then explores the shortfalls in legislative arrangements regarding military involvement in Australia’s domestic counter-terrorism apparatus as highlighted by the events and outcomes of the 2014 Lindt Café siege. Drawing on the findings of the 2016 coronial inquiry into the Lindt Café siege, it then presents and assesses three possible models to address these shortcomings and compares the benefits of these conceptual models to key elements introduced in the 2018 Act. The article concludes by offering a number of recommendations to limit perceived issues of Commonwealth overreach and military politicisation while still maximising the effectiveness of domestic responses by both civil and military forces to acts of domestic violence.
Australia’s Legislative Architecture

The distinction between the roles of military and civil security agencies in Australia is entrenched in sections 51(vi), 114 and 119 of the Constitution. Military primacy—power over ‘the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States and the control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth’—is exclusively held by the Commonwealth under section 51(vi). Section 114 supports this by prohibiting states from raising or maintaining any autonomous naval or military force without the Commonwealth’s consent, although section 119 then obliges the Commonwealth to ‘protect every State against invasion and, on the application of the Executive Government of the State, against domestic violence’.

The process for enabling Commonwealth military intervention in state matters at the time of the Lindt Café siege was established some 20 years earlier, in the lead-up to the 2000 Sydney Olympics. Until amended by the 2018 Act, Part IIIAAA of the Defence Act 1903 specified that a state government could only request Commonwealth military intervention in the case of likely or actual domestic violence and with all other available options exhausted (section 51B). Section 51A(3), however, provided for unilateral Commonwealth involvement if a state was not able to defend Commonwealth interests, for example against a nuclear or chemical threat. Section 51A(3)(a) also specified that, if it is impractical to request a state’s permission to deploy under Section 51A(3), such a requirement does not apply.

Part IIIAAA was amended in 2006 by a new section 51CA, which enabled the Prime Minister and various Commonwealth ministers to direct ADF intervention in state matters in specific circumstances without needing state agreement, provided one or more Commonwealth officials had determined specifically that ‘the State is not, or is unlikely to be, able to protect itself against the domestic violence’, although there was some debate about the scope of the phrase ‘domestic violence’. In essence, at the time of the Lindt Café siege, the ADF could become involved in a domestic terrorism incident if a Commonwealth politician determined that a state was incapable of protecting or unwilling to protect its people. This may seem expeditious, but the political fallout from such a decision and the implicitly unwelcome intrusion on state rights meant that the expedited call-out process could be used in only the most extreme circumstances.
Lessons from the Lindt Café siege

The Coroner’s report on the Lindt Café siege judged that the requirements for responding to the threat posed by the assailant were ‘at all times within the capacity of the [NSW Police Force]’. There were indications, however, that the NSW Police Force was at the limits of its operational capabilities during the siege. For example, 11 individual ‘flashbang’ devices were used and 22 bullets were fired by the assaulting officers to eliminate a single target. The assailant was shot 13 times, whereas military experts contend that only two shots should ever be necessary. Furthermore, the small-calibre, high-velocity rounds used by the police fragmented on impact, causing the death of one of the hostages and wounding an additional three, as well as an officer.

Although each state’s designated counter-terrorism forces spend two weeks each year at the ADF’s counter-terrorism training facility in Perth and occasionally conduct joint training exercises with ADF Special Forces Tactical Assault Group (TAG) teams, as civil forces they necessarily lack the level of preparation and operational experience of TAG team members. ADF Special Forces members on TAG rotation devote 52 weeks a year to counter-terrorism exercises, firing thousands of rounds per week. In contrast, State Protective Groups (SPGs)—civil security units with a regular mandate to police rather than neutralise—are broadly operational, being deployed in situations from suicide intervention to high-risk warrant executions. Between January 2008 and August 2015, for example, the NSW SPG was deployed to 1,345 separate incidents, only one of which (the Lindt Café siege) was of a terrorist nature.

A number of authors have questioned whether collateral casualties may have been avoided in the Lindt Café siege if the more practised military professionals, rather than less-drilled civilian actors, had conducted the critical raid. According to the Coroner’s report, TAG East (stationed at Holsworthy Barracks) understood the Lindt Café siege’s operational environment at least as well as the NSW Tactical Operating Unit (TOU), but its expertise was not used. Indeed, it appears that no serious consideration was given to the ADF entering the café, even if the possibility was canvassed, albeit non-specifically, in the Coroner’s report.
Options for Optimising Domestic Responses to ‘New’ Threats

By global standards, the Lindt Café siege was relatively small in scope, but Australia cannot always expect to be spared attacks of the dimensions seen in Mumbai, Paris or Nairobi. Public policy should, therefore, allow the best response to terrorism threats of any magnitude. Policy settings enabling the ADF’s involvement, however, must be inherently balanced with considerations for state primacy and constitutional limitations.

There are three possible models by which the Australian Government might achieve this, based on the lessons from the Lindt Café siege and the Coroner’s recommendations:

- Broadly militarising the police SPGs (particularly the various TOUs) so that they are as well trained as the ADF Special Forces TAG teams
- Streamlining current call-out procedures to remove theoretical and practical hurdles to appropriate military involvement whenever necessary
• Establishing a pre-emptive agreement under which states must request (or be deemed to have requested) military involvement based on the recommendation of a legislated non-state actor, such as an independent and expert group, subject to such consultation as is practicable.

Model 1: Militarising Police Units
A major hurdle for militarising police forces (the first model) is that section 114 of the Constitution prevents state forces from exercising paramilitary capabilities. The present capabilities of the SPGs, including state and territory forces’ standing access to ADF training facilities,22 arguably already breach this provision.23 Concerns of this nature would undoubtedly escalate if SPGs were required to develop further military capabilities. In addition, it would require considerable expenditure by each state to ensure its dedicated counter-terrorism units were trained to par with ADF Special Forces and to maintain what are largely duplicate capabilities. The magnitude of this expenditure is suggested in the Department of Defence Annual Report 2001–02, which noted that establishing TAG East alone cost almost $220 million over its first four years of operation, even when drawing from extant personnel and equipment pools.24 Thus, even beyond concerns of legality or practicability, cost alone is likely to deny public support for each state to militarise parts of its forces to meet this standard.

That states are not capable of deploying potentially necessary military-level lethal capabilities means that ADF involvement must be, in some situations, unavoidable. Deploying ADF elements parallel to their state counterparts will inevitably draw criticism based on understandings that the role of the armed forces is to provide for the external defence of the nation rather than internal law enforcement, and that a soldier trained to use maximum force is not well equipped to handle the individual minimum force demands of policing.25 However, these contentions must be approached from the perspective that the ADF’s involvement in this regard is, rather, a temporary ‘outsourcing’ of these lethal capabilities and that this outsourcing prevents their development and standing deployment in regular police units.

Model 2: Streamlining State-Based Call-Out Procedures
The second model—streamlining state-based call-out procedures—would increase the efficiency with which states could access and use ADF personnel and expertise. Streamlining is clearly possible: Jacinta Carroll notes that a major failing of the NSW Police Force TOU team assigned to
respond to the Lindt Café siege was that its leadership was unaware of how to call upon TAG East’s support in the raid.26 ‘Decision-making exercises’ have been proposed to optimise this process so that the ADF can be better involved in comparable future situations,27 although the frequency, consistency and rigour of the training exercises undertaken by any single state are highly unlikely to guarantee it can always meet the standard of decision-making required in the immediacy of a ‘live’ terrorist act.

While likely to be an important component of any holistic policy response to the Lindt Café siege, this model is, by itself, thus not sufficient to ensure that the ADF is called upon in all situations where its expertise might assist state police forces. It accordingly cannot be seen as a practicable standalone option.

Model 3: Pre-emptive Call-Out Agreement with States

The third model—a pre-emptive executive agreement with states—could resolve the legislative and executive hurdles that prevent the ADF from providing immediate assistance to state forces, as in the case of the Lindt Café siege. In essence, each state would sacrifice a degree of autonomy in decision-making and agree to be bound immediately by the decisions of
Considering Military Involvement in Australia’s Domestic Counter-Terrorism Apparatus

An external decision-maker it does not control that is not beholden to any state’s broader interests. This model could operate with already available resources and would fall within the current law, but would not affect parallel civil call-out procedures, allowing SPG teams to still execute action plans as required. It would, however, mark a structural change in a state’s direct control over the involvement of national forces in civil matters.

Rather than delegating these powers to political officers, this model would benefit most from the input of a non-partisan committee of experts which would be tasked with objectively determining whether military call out was appropriate and proper in response to a particular terrorism threat. Such a committee might resemble, for example, the Australia-New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC), which includes civil state and federal representatives and senior officials from a number of Home Affairs and intelligence agencies, and is currently tasked with ‘providing expert strategic and police advice to heads of government’.28

Importantly, it may be possible for the second and third options to coexist and even be mutually reinforcing. Not only would police SPG teams be better positioned to directly call on ADF expertise and personnel when they deem it operationally necessary (Model 2) but also a parallel call-out procedure determined by an external authority would ensure that the ADF is present in circumstances deemed appropriate by experts (Model 3). In this way, Model 3 acts as a form of safeguard in case state authorities fail to call on the ADF even in situations where the military may be of use.

Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Act 2018

The 2018 Act was introduced to enable more ‘flexible’29 calling out of the ADF—not as a ‘last resort’ option but rather, per section 33(2)(a)(ii), in any situation in which the ADF might ‘enhance the ability of each of those States and Territories to protect Commonwealth interests against domestic violence’.30 It implements a number of practical measures to address concerns raised in the Lindt Café siege Coroner’s report as well as the Commonwealth’s 2016 Review of Defence Support to National Counter-Terrorism Arrangements.31
Above all else, the 2018 Act lowers the threshold for military call out at the request of states and territories and expands the potential for pre-authorised or contingent call outs involving states and territories. The 2018 Act also clarifies and expands ADF powers in the case of call out, including powers to search and seize and control movement during an incident, and eliminates some causes of operational complexity (as categorised broadly in the Minister’s second reading speech). In practice, this ought to allow for the earlier deployment of ADF elements so that civil security units can more readily call upon their expertise to achieve specific tasks beyond civil security units’ level of competency.

Although the legislative arrangements in the 2018 Act broadly align with Model 3 above, the key difference (and likely cause of the Act’s longer term public policy weakness) is that, per section 51V(6), the dominant power to determine if and when the ADF should be involved in matters specifically affecting states’ security ultimately lies in the hands of Commonwealth politicians filling nominated party-political offices, rather than a non-partisan expert entity. These actors are empowered by section 38(3) to make decisions without the need to involve their state-based counterparts only when matters are urgent or expedited, but this is likely to include a large percentage of terrorism threats and incidents of domestic violence, which by their very nature cause fear and disruption because they are immediate and unanticipated.

Two particular issues arise from the 2018 Act.

**Issue 1: Politicising the Military**

Although the 2018 Act emphasises that ADF elements are under the command of the relevant state police force ‘as far as reasonably practicable’, section 36(1)(b) states that the Commonwealth may, when necessary, unilaterally call out the military without consulting state authorities. Even if a call out by one or more ministers is a practical necessity when a threat is imminent, it is conceivable that a series of call outs by officials holding office by virtue of a political process (rather than through security or counter-terrorism expertise) may lead to the military’s involvement being seen as a function of party-political agitation, particularly if the domestic violence in question is political in nature. Furthermore, the ministers authorising ADF involvement will, as Commonwealth ministers, have ultimate responsibility for the operation. This creates an inherent conflict of interest because of the high likelihood of extensive media coverage, especially when
it is acknowledged that officials who are seen to handle emergencies well can often gain considerable elector recognition,\textsuperscript{35} which can translate to party-political and personal gain.

The greatest concern is the wide range of circumstances in which the ADF might be called out, and the risk that legislated process normalises the deployment of the ADF against domestic political actors.\textsuperscript{36} This potential is hinted at implicitly by section 39(3)(b), for example, which prevents the military being called out in relation to industrial disputes. While the Lindt Café siege is—quite reasonably—the prime model against which to measure the efficacy of such legislation, reasonable concerns have been raised that such an approach might, in time, be politicised and abused.\textsuperscript{37} One might consider, for example, the concerns of party-political agitation arising from the involvement of France’s military in that country’s response to its civil protests in March 2019.\textsuperscript{38} The likelihood of those circumstances occurring in Australia may be low, but their impact would be extreme, and one weakness of the 2018 Act appears to be that it has created a pathway for the potential establishment of a form of ‘Praetorian Guard’\textsuperscript{39} model of military involvement in civil affairs.

**Issue 2: Deploying ADF Expertise in Non-Call-Out Situations**

Even though the Lindt Café siege response fell within the capacities and jurisdiction of state services\textsuperscript{40} and therefore would probably not have justified national-level ADF call out, the simple integration of military experts in NSW TOU planning (including issues such as appropriate bullet calibre) could well have led to a better outcome. This issue is not entirely addressed in the 2018 Act, which continues to rely on the ADF having been formally called out for it to be positioned to offer its expertise. Although the Act’s parallel call-out procedures ought to increase the likelihood that expert input and risk assessment is available to advise state decision-making or execution, the issue remains that non-experts are often not aware of the potential for, and value of, expert advice. This issue is reinforced by section 40(1)(b), which ensures that ADF personnel and expertise cannot be used by the police unless a member of the civil (police) force specifically requests so. The 2018 Act may therefore not yet have overcome a critical issue observed in the events of the Lindt Café siege: while ADF advisors were present and available, NSW Police TOU commanders were unaware of how to call upon their expertise or support.\textsuperscript{41}
Conclusion and Recommendations

Domestic terrorism threats are evolving worldwide such that civil security forces are regularly facing what have essentially become paramilitary actors. The 2014 Lindt Café siege was Australia’s first encounter with this phenomenon and it is unlikely to be the last. In the wake of the Lindt Café siege, the Coroner’s report affirmed that legislation had to be revised in order to address this new threat, and public debate has increasingly broached the possibility of increasing the role of the ADF in domestic counter-terrorism arrangements, despite the clear challenges this poses to the traditional division of civil and military responsibilities.

The 2018 Act has made important legislative provisions towards expediting the ADF’s involvement in situations where its expertise would be invaluable. However, despite seeking to support the ‘outsourcing’ of military-level lethal capacities of military forces by their civil counterparts, the 2018 Act does not provide optimal policy settings to ensure both that the best respondents are called upon to respond to a nascent terrorist threat and that the foundational legal divide between state and Commonwealth is maintained. It is unlikely that the 2018 Act will be amended in the short term. Its shortcomings could, however, be largely addressed by practical rather than legislative arrangements.
Recommendation 1: Delegating to Experts

The Commonwealth should consider involving all states and territories in a scheme by which the states and territories delegate relevant powers to a standing independent and expert committee, such as the ANZCTC as proposed in Model 3 above, which would be tasked with determining whether military call out was appropriate and proper in response to a particular threat. This delegation would merely be an advisory role, as ministers are not required to consider any external advice when agreement with a state or territory is impracticable. However, the role of such a committee could eventually be codified, particularly if there were adverse public responses to decisions made by ministers without broader consultation.

The practical benefits of this separate group are not only the ready availability of expert advice but also the potential to overcome the perception of any conflict of interest for the ministers involved and the clear statement that the involvement of the military in a state’s or territory’s affairs was guided by expert rather than political considerations. There is no reason to suspect that any minister acting under section 51V(6) would ever do so for an improper motive, but the perception of conflict ought to be avoided. It is arguable that this would be better achieved if there were mechanisms to require independent and expert views to be involved if at all practicable.

Recommendation 2: Improving State Actor Decision-Making

The Commonwealth should consider allocating funding and providing expert training to ensure state forces and decision-makers are aware of the situations in which they may benefit from ADF expertise when threats of terrorism or domestic violence arise. The objective would be to ensure that call-out decisions involving agreement with the states or territories are made by fully informed state (and Commonwealth) officials based on a real-time current awareness of ADF and state capabilities. Empowering state officials in particular would limit the possibility that the Commonwealth would override state primacy by unilaterally determining that its interests are beyond the capacity of state protection.

In this regard, consideration might even be given to embedding ADF advisors within state and territory police command units, so that those units are more aware of the tactical advantages ADF involvement may offer in particular situations. In practice, however, the financial and organisational
costs (as well as the potential for perceived military domination of civil security) are likely to make this model less favourable than an approach more simply requiring frequent liaison and exchange of situational expertise.

About the Author

Nicolas Johnston has a master’s degree from the Australian Defence Force Academy (UNSW Canberra). He received his BA in Political Science and International Comparative Studies from Duke University, North Carolina.
Endnotes


4 State Coroner of New South Wales, 2017, 35.


9 State Coroner of New South Wales, 2017, 384.

10 State Coroner of New South Wales, 2017, 195.


12 Correspondence between author and senior Special Forces officer, 4 November 2017.


14 State Coroner of New South Wales, 2017, 118; and correspondence between author and senior Special Forces officer.

15 Correspondence between author and senior Special Forces officer.


17 State Coroner of New South Wales, 2017, 117.

Considering Military Involvement in Australia's Domestic Counter-Terrorism Apparatus

19 State Coroner of New South Wales, 2017, 387.


21 State Coroner of New South Wales, 2017, 384.


28 State Coroner of New South Wales, 2017, 106.


30 Defence Amendment (Call Out of the Australian Defence Force) Act 2018 (Cth).


35 One might note, for example, Premier Anna Bligh in the 2010–2011 Queensland floods and Rural Fire Service Commissioner Phil Koperberg in the 2001 New South Wales bushfires.


39 Historically the only military force allowed within the city of Rome.

40 State Coroner of New South Wales, 2017, 384.

41 Carroll, 2017.
Zero Tolerance: Questioning the Ongoing Need for Strict Substance Abuse Policy in the ADF

Major Dale Morley-Turnbull

Abstract

On the surface, the ‘zero tolerance’ policy of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) on substance abuse appears to be overbearing and paternalistic—out of step and out of touch in an age when individuals feel that they should be able to make informed decisions about what they do and what substances they put in their bodies. Examination of media releases, official statements, policies and freedom of information documents available through Defence or in open media in relation to drug use in the military reveals one clear statement:

_Defence does not condone the use of prohibited substances or the misuse of alcohol as it is incompatible with an effective and efficient Defence Force and can undermine health, safety, discipline, morale, security and reputation._

Is zero tolerance of substance abuse in a modern military still necessary, or is it a legacy of a moralistic, paternalistic, risk-averse past? This article will examine Army’s stance on substance abuse, and the underlying ethical,
moral and disciplinary reasons for maintaining the status quo, against the backdrop of harm reduction or minimisation arguments which pervade civil society. The author concludes that the ADF should not reduce or relax its current policy of zero tolerance of substance abuse, regardless of changing societal norms now or in the future.

Introduction

The negative effects of drug use on the health and wellbeing of an individual are well documented. The purpose of this article is not to reiterate the effects of drugs on a person’s health but to ask leaders of all ranks in the ADF to examine the cost to the organisation and the effect on the Defence community.

On 23 January 2019 the Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Rick Burr, released his Army in Motion strategic guidance. This document articulates his command philosophy, in particular, that:

The Australian Army is a national institution; a professional fighting force, a force for good, earning and sustaining trust of the society we serve. Army understands the unique responsibility to apply lethal force when required to do so. This demands physical, moral and intellectual standards of the highest order and continuous professional development.¹

The majority of modern militaries strive to maintain an ethical and professional mastery of arms. The Australian Army is no different. The desire to produce and maintain a world-class professional modern military is as much about modern weapons systems as it is about recruiting, training and retaining people of the highest physical, moral and ethical standards. Countless books have been written about ethics, and in particular military ethics. However, what is considered to be moral and ethical can, and does, change. Morality and ethics move with the prevailing societal norms of the nation from which a military is recruited. As such, modern militaries must be prepared to examine changes in society, question the effects they may have on military effectiveness and, if appropriate, move with the changes.

As the Army continues to modernise, we should question whether the current zero tolerance policy on drugs is necessary, whether it is effective,
and what would realistically change if Army were more in line with civilian jurisdictions. Before we tackle the question of drug use, it is necessary to explore a number of embedded concepts within Army which would be affected by the change, and concepts in Australian society which contribute to our desire for discussion around drug use.

**When Defence Says ‘Drugs, What Does It Mean?’**

A drug by definition is any substance which, when introduced into the body, has a physiological effect. This includes legal substances such as tobacco, alcohol, caffeine, over-the-counter medications, herbal remedies and legally prescribed substances. It also includes illicit substances such as cocaine, heroin and LSD. Rather than ‘drugs’, Defence prefers to use the term ‘prohibited substances’. This is defined by the Defence Determination *(Prohibited Substances) 2019,* which allows the ADF to maintain a higher standard of fidelity when dealing with the issue of drug identification and to prohibit the use of substances it does not consider to be in its best interests. It draws on defined lists from the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and the Poisons Standard 2019. By using lists from the Commonwealth and WADA, Defence can stay abreast of the increasing number of substances that can be defined as prohibited in a constantly evolving societal context. This allows the ADF to remain current with state and federal law enforcement agencies and not be completely reliant on the *Defence Force Discipline Act 1982,* which is historically slow to adapt to required changes and the expectations of society.

The characterisation of what the ADF considers prohibited includes not just illicit or banned substances but any substance which has not been prescribed by the military health system, is suspected of being abused by an individual, or is suspected of being used to mask other suspected drug use.

**Where Does the Military Member Stand When it Comes to Using Prohibited Substances?**

Service in Defence is a matter of choice. A person can choose to serve as a uniformed member. Conversely, the ADF is selective in who it permits to serve. The result is an accord between ADF and the individual service member. Those who choose to serve in the ADF agree to follow the rules and policies that the ADF dictates. Members are not forced into service;
nor are they conscripted. The ADF also has choices. It has decided that the individuals who are recruited to the ADF are to be volunteers; what the required standard of education for enlistment will be; that recruits are to be free of criminal convictions; that recruits are to be in good health; and that recruits are to be capable of willingly following policies, orders and directions which are given lawfully. Individuals who are being recruited into the ADF are thoroughly briefed on ADF policy in relation to prohibited substances, and each potential recruit signs an acknowledgement on the requirements of service before enlistment or appointment.6

In order to carry out its own remit, the ADF needs to ensure that its members are physically and mentally able to carry out its mission at any time. To support this level of readiness, the ADF not only chooses to select

Maintaining physical agility and fitness is an essential part of service in the Army, additionally training activities and operational duties carry an inherent risk of injury, which when serious enough, limit an individuals ability to serve. (Image courtesy Defence)
individuals who meet its requirements at recruitment but also ensures that this required level of readiness is continued by providing its members with continuous support in the form of medical and dental services, psychological support, chaplaincy, policing, training and education. It facilitates the maintenance of a healthy lifestyle through access to gyms, trainers and sports facilities in its members’ places of work.

Work in the ADF is inherently dangerous for members, both physically and morally.7 The ADF is in the business of defending the nation, which includes actions up to and including the prescribed use of force to pursue, prosecute and neutralise a threat. Furthermore, it is called upon to assist in times of need through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Both are complex activities requiring sound judgement and physical and mental stamina. In order to achieve this, ADF members need to maintain both physical and mental fitness. Involvement with prohibited substances is considered counterproductive to these requirements.

Balancing Change

Patterns of drug use and social attitudes to drug use have changed dramatically over time. The notion of making drug use illegal did not really emerge in Western societies until the late nineteenth century. Before that, in Australia, Britain, Europe and the United States, whether people used drugs was considered a personal decision—subject to social disapproval, but not illegal. Alcohol was of course the most widely used psychoactive substance.8

History suggests that changes in societal norms and ethics are to be expected and, to a large extent, are reflected in institutions such as the military. There is also, however, the expectation that such an organisation will uphold the highest standards of the society which it represents and serves, and that it will provide a solid and achievable framework in order to achieve this.

Attitudes, ethics and morals which exist in civilian society can vary markedly across the spectrum of that society. Morality and the sense of what is acceptable range right across the spectrum and are significantly shaped by our upbringing, culture and religious beliefs. As Australian society changes its attitudes towards moral law and policy and as it questions long-held
beliefs and laws, institutions such as Defence are obliged to examine these changes and adopt those which may have a neutral or positive effect on the organisation, by eliminating unfounded, emotional, paternalistic or overly moralistic arguments and focusing on realistic arguments based on established facts. Significant changes in policy or legislation within the military are not made in isolation or without consideration of subsequent effects. While civilian populations’ attitudes towards drugs change, the military must be prepared to examine the arguments for change and decide whether that change will support its mission and possibly enhance it, or whether it will ultimately undermine it.

**Normalisation of Drug Use, Decriminalisation and Harm Minimisation in Civilian Society**

It is unfortunate that popular media over the last four decades has helped to normalise drug use. As a result, the perceived risks associated with drugs may be minimised in the minds of the public. At the same time, active policing of drug use within the civilian population has reduced. There is a greater push for legalisation and decriminalisation of drug use, and for harm minimisation or reduction strategies rather than strict policing and enforcement, with a greater focus on policing the supply of drugs rather than targeting users.9

In 1985 harm minimisation began to be introduced into Australia as part of the National Drug Strategy. This was a ‘pragmatic mixture of prohibition and stated objective harm reduction’.10 Harm reduction or harm minimisation is defined by Harm Reduction International as ‘policies, programmes and practices that aim to reduce the harms associated with the use of psychoactive drugs in people unable or unwilling to stop’.11 Its defining feature is that it focuses on harm reduction in using drugs and not on preventing individual drug use.

Whilst civilian jurisdictions in Australia support harm minimisation practices, the real trade-off for Australian states is the savings made in policing, detection, investigation and prosecution of drug users. Harm Reduction Australia claims that for every dollar spent on harm minimisation strategies, $27 is saved by not investigating, prosecuting and incarcerating drug users.12 According to the National Drug Strategy Household Survey 2016, 12.6 per cent of Australians over the age of 14 have used illicit drugs and
4.8 per cent have misused pharmaceuticals. In comparison, the ADF’s positive test result rates have remained under 0.0654 per cent since 2009.\textsuperscript{13}

There is no doubt that harm minimisation reduces the number of drug users facing the judicial system and reduces the amount of time spent by police in dealing with small-time users. What is often overlooked by some advocates of harm minimisation is the cost to families, the community and individual users. In 2007 the United Nations reviewed Sweden’s restrictive drug policy and came to the conclusion that Sweden’s ‘ambitious vision’\textsuperscript{14} may have been realised, noting that while drug use had increased in other European countries it had fallen in Sweden.\textsuperscript{15} Sweden has pursued restrictive zero tolerance not just of drug possession but of drug use as well. Harm minimisation strategies in use in the country are small in number, in favour of education programs and treatments which support abstinence. The downside of this approach is that over the last 20 years, Sweden has seen a rise in hepatitis C and overdose deaths amongst substance users.\textsuperscript{16} In comparison, the government of the UK ‘spends more than a quarter of a billion dollars each year on drug treatment … despite there being little evidence of any reduction in the number of addicts’.\textsuperscript{17}

The debate within civil society on substance abuse demonstrates the depth and complexity of the issue. While the incidence of substance abuse in the military is significantly lower, the risks to the organisation and members is exponentially higher, given the nature of the work which members are required to carry out. The reported cost of harm minimisation strategies in the community, such as needle exchanges, pill testing and safe injection rooms is, on the surface, considerably less than the strict enforcement of zero tolerance, freeing up police time and caseloads in courts. What is harder to quantify is the long-term cost to the community not only of illicit drug use but also of the misuse of prescription drugs, alcohol and tobacco. The cost of substance abuse is paid not only by the individual but also by his or her colleagues, family and friends, and ultimately the community.\textsuperscript{18}

**ADF Strategies**

The ADF does not condone the use of or involvement with prohibited substances by Defence members. This is clearly articulated to every individual before enlistment and reiterated throughout service by various means, including mandatory training, education campaigns, official policies
and testing regimes. For civilians, substance abuse is, at its very basic level, an issue for the individual. It may be a symptom of other issues, perhaps poor education, personal loss, mental health issues, boredom, peer pressure, addiction, physical pain or emotional pain. In relation to members of the military, issues which become causal factors in drug use can be addressed and managed without turning to substance abuse, by using the large number of resources available to members of the ADF at no cost to the member. These are resources which many people in the wider civilian community may not have access to.\textsuperscript{19}

Members of the Australian Army and the ADF are drawn from the wider Australian society and, as such, arguably have attitudes and ethics drawn from and at times reflective of the wider community. What sets ADF members apart, however, is the concept of service. Members of the ADF volunteer to serve and are selected from a large pool of volunteers based on education, abilities, morals and ethics. It could be said that they are not average people and are held to higher standards by the country and by the ADF. It is this author’s opinion that we should strive to exceed that standard.

Despite the current zero tolerance policy, the ADF recognises that because its members are drawn from the wider Australian community, some members may be tempted to become involved in the use of prohibited substances. This has resulted in a number of strategies designed to support the policy being adopted by the ADF. These include annual mandatory prohibited substance education, the Alcohol, Tobacco and Other Drugs Program, random and targeted prohibited substance testing, and voluntary self-referral for prohibited substance user intervention. These strategies are designed to prevent the uptake of prohibited substance use and assist members who are at risk or who voluntarily admit using prohibited substances. In addition to these strategies, which are specifically designed to target prohibited substance use, the ADF provides clear guidance on ambiguous areas such as nutritional and dietary supplements, though policy and informed advice and support from ADF medical staff and physical training instructors (PTIs).
Morale, Discipline, Leadership—Sustaining Professionalisation

It is ironic that the freedoms and security that Australian society enjoys today are not always extended in the same way to the men and women who serve in the military. Military members are subject to a greater number of laws than any other group in society—civil law, military law and international law. They are not free to make the same types of choices about their bodies, their associates, where they live and where they travel, and at times they are restricted in what they may be allowed to say. This is, however, one of the costs of serving in a professional military organisation.

The task of maintaining a professional and modern defence force involves a wide and varied cross-section of activities, not all of them directly involved with the prosecution of a threat but all of them impacting on the force’s biggest resource: its personnel. Unfortunately it is a fact of life that any professional military needs a strong disciplinary framework. This includes suitable, effective legislation and policy with appropriate punishments as deterrents. This disciplinary framework is predicated on a long list of laws, policies, rules, offences and charges, which are designed to ensure that men and women whom the military arms and entrusts with the safety and security of the nation have the capability, willingness and motivation to conduct disciplined and legal military operations against the enemy. This disciplinary framework is an essential element of command and, when properly implemented, will support morale and ensure discipline within the ranks. The disciplinary framework will at times be skewed in favour of the collective need rather than supportive of individual freedoms or rights, but will always remain reasonable, necessary and proportionate.

The Path to Professionalisation

From the earliest days of the Australian Army, military leaders such as John Monash, William Bridges and Harry Chauvel tackled the same issues in the profession of arms as modern leaders do today. They too lamented the effects of poor leaders and at times their ineptness, laissez-faire attitudes and autocratic or dictatorial styles, and how some less effective commanders affected the morale and discipline of the soldiers and the outcomes on battlefields.
As a result of this, Australian leadership determined that the process of disciplining Australian troops should reflect the ‘outlook in Australia’ and that punishments should not undermine ‘a man’s dignity’. Changes in 1917 resulted in Australian commanders maintaining greater control over the discipline of their men, and resulted in the removal of the death penalty and ‘Field Punishment No. 1’. The reforms made to the military justice system in 1917 and in the decades since are a result not so much of the Australian military’s soft approach to discipline as of pragmatism. The Australian military is a small, dynamic force. The discipline system is designed to ensure that its members are still capable of deployment and employment, both physically and morally, and that they are willing to execute orders which may place them or others in danger.

The delicate balance which exists between leadership, morale and discipline can be influenced not just by positive and negative changes in each area but additionally by numerous external factors that, if leaders are unable to identify and combat, can become extreme and affect the fighting effectiveness of a unit. This is illustrated in the following example:

During Vietnam, the US was struggling with an increase in drug use and experimentation in their ranks, the number of men who had used drugs prior to enlistment was rising, the comparative cheapness of the drugs, the purity and the ease at which they could be obtained in Vietnam contributed to the decreasing morale and discipline in the US ranks. By 1967 the challenges faced by US and Australian militaries trying to maintain discipline and morale was reaching a boiling point. Increasing numbers of men were refusing to patrol, insubordination and even fragging was on the increase. Morale within the US ranks was being hampered by the war being waged at home, the anti-war campaigners who derided not just the war but the men who fought, added to the malaise which was felt by servicemen and contributing to the reduction in morale and declining levels of discipline.

By comparison Australian combat units had very low levels of detected or reported illicit drug use, but the use and misuse of alcohol was widespread and this was a contributing factor in much of the ill-discipline and violence which occurred away from combat, including four murders. Alcohol was legal and socially acceptable, and easily obtainable both on and off base. It is not clear why Australian and New Zealand troops had fewer significant issues with drugs than their American allies; this is still a subject of speculation for veterans and historians. What is clear is that the
soldiers’ own determination to behave professionally when patrolling and their apparent esprit de corps contributed to the maintenance of morale and discipline. In many ways this has not changed; alcohol has always been, and remains, one of the most common factors in discipline issues in the Australian military.

The Continued Professionalisation of the Australian Military

During the 1970s and 1980s, Australian society continued to change and mature and so did the military. It was a tumultuous period. With the newly formed ADF returning from what the public saw as a disastrous Vietnam campaign, the military moved into a long period of peace which saw reductions in personnel numbers and resources across the whole of the ADF. This period heralded a new era of professionalisation, accountability and modernisation that would begin changing the face of the military in general and the Australian Army in particular. Some of the most significant social changes for Army personnel over the next three decades were:

- the start of the modernisation of the military justice system, including the introduction of the Defence Force Discipline Act 1982
- removal of administrative and military law sanctions against homosexual members
- integration of women into the wider Army and the eventual inclusion of female members in all trades, including combat roles
- recognition of single-sex relationships
- introduction of prohibited substance testing
- establishment of the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce.

While many will point out that some changes are forced upon the military, sometimes as a result of incidents within the ranks, the military’s ability to adapt and change in response to the demands and expectations of Australian society demonstrates the Australian Army’s, and the wider ADF’s, respect not just for the society they serve but also for the people who serve in their ranks, regardless of gender, education, position, rank or trade. This new age of professionalisation of the Australian Army has continued to the present day and will endure. The desire remains strong for the ADF to move beyond the Anzac legend and the perception of Australian larrikinism and to continue to develop an armed force that will carry on providing government with appropriate options, domestically and internationally.
It can be argued that the use of prohibited substances by individuals is a minor problem in the Australian military and that one of the more significant contributing factors to discipline issues has always been, and still is, alcohol. From the days of the ‘Rum Corps’ in colonial New South Wales to the present day, this has continued to vex commanders dealing with discipline, for alcohol is not only legal but also socially acceptable. Even when a substance is legal, the misuse or abuse of substances that affect the performance or health of an individual is undesirable.

How Are Prohibited Substances Used in the Military?

Patterns of abuse and misuse of drugs and prohibited substances within the military fall into three broad categories:

- **recreational/experimental drug use** (where users are seeking an altered state of consciousness for pleasure or thrill)
- **self-medicating** (where users may be seeking an altered state to alleviate pain or stress, or to reduce symptoms of trauma or mental illness)
- **attempts to address negative body image or performance fears** (where users attempt to aid recovery from injury, improve perceived body image or enhance performance).

In some cases, drug use can cross all three categories. Additionally, an extremely small number of personnel in the military are victims of drink or food spiking or other types of unintentional drug use.

Detection of Prohibited Substance Use in the ADF

The use of prohibited substances in the ADF is not prevalent but is still problematic. Between 16 June 2005—when administrative drug testing was introduced—and 30 November 2018, over 231,000 drug tests for prohibited substances were administered in the ADF. Of these, 1,593 returned positive results and 1,189 resulted in the expulsion of ADF members.

According to statistics obtained from the Military Police Central Records Office, the illicit drugs most commonly detected by Military Police in the ADF are those which fall into the category of amphetamine-type substances.
Based on past interviews conducted with military drug users, these types of drugs are considered cheap and easily obtainable. Many are metabolised quickly, making many users believe that this reduces their chance of being detected in random urinalysis.

Since its introduction in 2005, the Prohibited Substance Testing Program (PSTP) within the military has been a huge success. It has allowed Defence to reinforce its zero tolerance message through a program of random and targeted testing at unit level. It has permitted the removal of individuals who test positive, sending a firm message to users. The recent introduction of hair follicle testing and the introduction soon of saliva testing in the PSTP should increase detection of prohibited substances and reduce the chance of false positives in test results, as well as reducing the opportunity for members to employ deception methods such as synthetic urine kits to avoid detection.

**Unseen Costs of Prohibited Substance Use in the Military**

Whilst PSTP is undoubtedly a success in its ability to swiftly remove drug users from the military organisation, it fails to uncover the unseen costs to the military. Just as in civilian society, the costs of substance abuse are borne not just by the individual user but also by those with whom the user works or associates. Effects include absenteeism, underperformance at work, workplace accidents, self-neglect, domestic violence, and child abuse and neglect. Not only does PSTP not target the criminal elements involved in the supply of prohibited substances to military members; it also fails to address the underlying reasons why an ADF member has been using drugs.

As prohibited substance use in the ADF is an offence, it usually occurs in private and involves the use of deception to hide the activity from the chain of command and other members. This creates the perfect opportunity for members to be exploited and manipulated by others, due to the inherent illegality of the activity and the impact it could have on the member and his or her career if detected.

Simply to obtain many of the prohibited substances requires a level of deception. It also requires participation in illegal activities or socialising in groups or with individuals who may be classified as undesirable. These activities create increasing levels of risk to an individual and to the ADF as an organisation.
The Risks of Self-medication or Unsanctioned Performance Enhancement by Members

Part of winning the land battle must be the ability to field the best group of combatants possible. That means more than just strong, well-equipped soldiers. The Australian Army is serious about optimising the performance of its members, through superior training, education and medical support.39

Occasionally members are caught using prohibited substances, self-medicating to deal with stress or injury or in some cases to attempt faster recovery from injury, improve performance or endurance. Some members feel under pressure to maintain their fitness, and struggle to keep up with the physical demands as their body ages or their lifestyle changes. A number are looking for a shortcut to obtain higher levels of strength and fitness or improve their body image. As a result, some may turn to supplements,40 diet pills, steroids, hormones, diuretics, stimulants and other substances. Some of these substances may be legal (dietary supplements, herbal remedies and nutritional supplements). Others may be prohibited substances. In relation to enhancing performance, any authorised use of supplements or pharmaceutical enhancements needs to be conducted through informed and thorough research on the immediate and long-term risks both to the individual and to the organisation.

Not all drug use or prohibited substance use in the military is recreational or experimental. In many cases use is linked attempts to address negative body image and performance fears and to self-medicate. (Image courtesy Pixabay by Ivabank)
Conclusion

The Australian military organisation is a small, dynamic volunteer force which needs to maintain a strong and mentally and physically healthy fighting force—a force that is able to perform a wide variety of complex and demanding tasks across the spectrum of conflict and national defence. In order to support a viable professional fighting force, I suggest, the ADF should not reduce or relax its current policy of zero tolerance for substance abuse, regardless of changing societal norms now or in the future. Rather, the Australian Army should continue to pursue individuals who choose to risk not only their own wellbeing but also the wellbeing of others by abusing drugs and alcohol and by those actions expose the organisation to damage to its reputation at best and damage to its security and the trust of Australian society at worst.

Leaders at all rank levels need to understand the underlying reasons why individuals may get involved with prohibited substances and to ensure that their peers and subordinates have the time and feel able to access the support they need to maintain both their physical and their mental wellbeing. This includes ensuring that the message of ethical and informed performance enhancement of our members is understood, by both commanders and members. Conversely, we cannot turn a blind eye to substance abuse in the military. Substance abuse affects more than just the individual user. As leaders in the military we have a responsibility to the organisation, the Defence community and the individuals with whom we serve. Service in the Australian military is completely voluntary, but the standard and quality of that service is neither voluntary nor negotiable. Individuals who cannot maintain the expected standard should expect to have their service terminated.

About the Author

Major Dale Morley-Turnbull is a member of the Royal Australian Corps of Military Police and has served in a variety of policing and investigation roles in her 30-year career, including Army Special Investigations Branch and ADF Investigative Service. She is currently posted to the Australian Army Research Centre.
Endnotes

1 Australian Army, 2019, *Army in Motion: Chief of Army’s Strategic Guidance 2019* (Canberra: Australian Army).

2 Department of Defence, 2019, *Defence Determination (Prohibited Substances) 2019* (Canberra: Department of Defence).


4 Full-time members of the ADF can only take medications/substances which have been prescribed by an ADF health practitioner, including health practitioners who are contracted by ADF health services. Substance abuse includes legal or prescribed substances which are misused—which could lead to addiction, cause additional medical complications, be used to mask other illicit drug use, or lead to impaired performance or judgement.

5 It should be noted that service in the military is not employment. Employment suggests a form of civil contract, were as service is conducted at the pleasure of the crown. Section 27 of the Defence Act 1903, states “service is not a civil contract”. This distinction, is important, and has in fact been tested in litigation, in the NSW Supreme Court (*Searle v Commonwealth of Australia*) The restrictions and responsibilities of military service being traditionally greater than those of normal employment. As such, those of us who serve the nation or public are held to a much higher standard, and not just during normal working hours.

6 AD304 Acknowledgement of the Requirements of Service in the RAN, Australian Army or RAAF.

7 While unstated directly in this article, the ADF is still required to maintain a safe working environment within the bounds of the activities which it carries out; this requires significant risk management. The working environment may be inherently dangerous, but this does not excuse the ADF from its responsibilities.


17 Shane Varcoe, 2011, “‘Normalising” Drug Use?’ (Doncaster: Dalgarni Institute).


19 The author acknowledges that the ADF health system and military policing capability could both be more responsive to individual and unit needs, in real time, in dealing with substance abuse.

20 Peter Pedersen, 2018, Monash as a Military Commander (Newport, NSW: Big Sky Publishing).

21 Glenn Wahlert, 1999, The Other Enemy? (Melbourne: Oxford University Press). Wahlert discusses the brutal and punitive punishments handed out under the British military, including the conditions at detention centres and the hated field punishments.


24 Max Hastings, 2019, Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy (London: Harper Collins Publishing). Hastings reports that a 1967 study estimated that one in five US servicemen had already used prior to enlistment and that by 1970 that figure rose to 50 per cent. In-country use was estimated to be two-thirds by 1971.


26 Fragging was a term coined by US servicemen to describe using a fragmentation grenade to kill or injure members of their own force.


28 Bruce Oswald and Jim Waddell (eds), Australian Army Legal Corps, 2014, Justice in Arms: Lawyers in the Australian Army’s First Hundred Years (Newport, NSW: Big Sky Publishing). Oswald and Waddell state that during 1962–1972 the Australian Army Legal Corps only heard three courts martial for drug offences; most drug cases were dealt with at unit level, but the instances were still extremely small in number. This is confirmed by discussion with veterans.
29 Bruce Oswald and Jim Waddell (eds), Australian Army Legal Corps, 2014, *Justice in Arms: Lawyers in the Australian Army’s First Hundred Years* (Newport, NSW: Big Sky Publishing).

30 Abuse of substances in order to cope with life stressors, including mental health issues; to relieve physical pain; and to aid recovery or attempt to enhance performance at work or enhance body image.

31 Use of over-the-counter sports supplements, herbal remedies and dieting supplements which can contain banned substances but are not taken intentionally by the member, as opposed to knowingly taking a substance to elicit an effect.


36 In comparison to Military Police investigations and subsequent legal proceedings.

37 Under the *Defence Force Discipline Act 1982* and in many cases under civilian law as well, the user also risks termination of service.

38 A joint drug operation conducted by the New South Wales Police Force, the Australian Federal Police and Army’s Special Investigation Branch in 2006 uncovered an Army member who, in addition to using a number of prohibited substances to self-medicate, had started not only dealing drugs to civilians but also supplying drugs to other military members. He funded his drug use by stealing controlled items from the unit of which he was a member. He then sold these items to the criminal group who supplied him with drugs.

39 Directorate of Human Performance—Army, 2019, ‘Directorate of Human Performance: Army’ (Army Intranet) In order to do this the ADF and Army have invested in ethical and innovative programs and initiatives. Defence will continue to partner with other modern and forward-thinking organisations and explore, develop and implement human performance optimisation initiatives. The programs and initiatives are based on scientific research and ethical programs, and are managed and overseen by the Directorate of Human Performance—Army.

40 Defence Science and Technology, 2019, ‘Australian Defence Force (ADF) Supplement Use: Views of Health and Physical Activity Professionals. Research Paper’ (Scottsdale: Commonwealth of Australia); Department of Defence, 2016, ‘Use of Dietary Supplements and Complementary Medicines by Australian Defence Personnel’, in *Defence Health Manual, Volume 2, Chapter 2: 2-0 to 2-3* (Canberra: Department of Defence). It is important to note that supplements are not regulated: there is no control over how they are produced or what they contain. Because of this, advice should be sought through ADF medical practitioners or PTI staff before using supplements.
Letter to the Editor of the Australian Army Journal

Dear Editor,

I am writing to comment on the article by Dr Jason Mazanov regarding how to deal with the aftermath of toxic leadership which appeared in the autumn edition of the Australian Army Journal (vol. XV, no. 1). Whilst it is disturbing to discover that toxic leaders / workplace psychopaths have migrated from Australian corporate and government workplaces to the Australian Army, it is encouraging to see that this issue is recognised and debated.

It is to be hoped that the Australian Army will investigate allegations of toxic leadership and re-educate toxic leaders, rather than covering up misdeeds. If the Australian Army fails to deal with toxic leaders and their aftermath, then it will be to its detriment. Those interested in toxic leadership should consult Dr John Clarke’s book Working with Monsters: How to Identify and Protect Yourself from the Workplace Psychopath.

It is my long-held belief that toxic leadership is one of the manifestations of the vestiges of the feudal system which exist in the Australian Army, and probably in all armies which have their roots in Western European culture. The existence of vestigial feudalism within Western armies should not be surprising, as the feudal system was designed to deliver military capability. Within the Australian Army, I believe, vestigial feudalism can be seen in both the officer promotion system and unit command. In the case of the officer promotion system, promotion to Lieutenant Colonel and above requires senior officers to ‘speak up’ for those displaying the potential for higher command. This system encourages those seeking promotion to
seek a sponsor or mentor. In return for sponsorship, the candidate pledges allegiance to the sponsor, supporting him or her in their struggles with the higher levels of Army bureaucracy.

Unit command provides an officer with the opportunity to exercise his or her command presence within their unit. Good commanders encourage and train their units and leave the unit in better shape than they found it in. Unfortunately, in an Army where results count, toxic leaders manage up. They deliver for their formation commander, but often at high cost to their unit. The power available to unit commanders allows them to reward followers and punish those who do not share their vision/methods.

Rewards may include deployments, course nominations, plum postings etc. Punishments may include over-tasking, denial of opportunities to deploy, denial of opportunities to undertake courses, and unfavourable postings. Some toxic leaders go to great lengths to ensure that their opponents cannot get a hearing outside the unit.

The adverse impact of toxic leadership can be immense. High morale is a combat multiplier. Poor morale reduces unit efficiency and effectiveness. I believe that formation personnel staff can play a critical role in identifying toxic leadership. Indications of poor morale in a peacetime setting may include high levels of illness, low rates of Army Individual Readiness Notice (AIRN) compliance, high numbers of requests for transfer, and a high level of applications for discharge. When formation personnel staff see a unit displaying higher than normal levels of illness, AIRN noncompliance, requests for transfer and requests for discharge, they should investigate. Data like this is not merely collected for reporting purposes! Once toxic leadership is identified, the toxic leader should, if possible, be re-educated and the unit repaired/rebuilt along the lines suggested by Dr Mazanov.

I congratulate you on publishing Dr Mazanov’s article, which I hope will contribute to a debate on how to deal with toxic leadership in the Australian Army.

Yours sincerely,

Jim Sinclair
Lieutenant Colonel
Book Review

Researching the Military

Edited by Helena Carreiras, Celso Castro and Sabina Frederic

Routledge, 2016, ISBN 1138309249, 221pp

Reviewed by Major Cate Carter

Conducting social research on the military is a complex endeavour. It involves theoretical traditions from a multitude of disciplines and a variety of methodological approaches. There are unique challenges to studying an organisation which has restricted access and often hazardous working conditions, and researchers need to approach their projects in innovative and flexible ways. *Researching the Military* is a welcome addition to Routledge’s Cass Military Studies series and features such innovation and flexibility by presenting the ‘historical, social, institutional and personal factors’ which contribute to the military researcher’s experience.

The central theme of the book is ‘reflexivity’ which the editors describe through examinations of the role of the researcher, the relationship of the researcher to the object of study, the positioning of the researcher in their institution, the impact of findings on policy, and the researcher’s own military experience. This edited edition consists of 15 essays written by
military researchers from European, Middle Eastern, South American and African universities, each studying their own national armed force. Each chapter offers a personal account of the author’s research process and their perception of the relative success of different fieldwork methods.

The editors themselves begin the volume with a defence of reflexivity as a necessary surveillance tool but observe its relative immaturity in the field of armed forces and society. Eyal Ben-Ari offers a possible reason for this when he notes the divergence in military sociological topics studied by researchers in the United States and those in Western Europe, and suggests that this might be due to the latter being better ‘boundary spanners’ with ‘roles that actively mediate information and knowledge between two organizations’.

The question of insider/outsider identity when dealing with the military is also examined by Lindy Heinecken in her chapter on research conducted by non-government organisations and think tanks in South Africa. A study from Slovenian academics Ljubica Jelusic, Janja Vuga Bersnak and Julija Jelusic Juznic, on the gap between academic findings and operational needs, offers one of the most useful chapters for Australian Defence Force researchers. The authors note that dissemination of findings to those who have the ability to make change is often missed because of the priority of effort put on the commissioning of the research rather than its application. These researchers also find that academic and scientific language is often a barrier to understanding the findings, and that researchers often do not get opportunities to interpret that language for the military community.

Rachel Woodward provides a much-appreciated chapter defining military geographies. Traditional military geography (applying geographical tools and techniques to solving military problems) has, she says, been influenced by a critical approach which investigates:

… ways in which militarism, militarization and military activities are constituted though space and expressed across space, with the understanding that these processes and outcomes operate at a range of scales from the personal to the international.

The author sees personal interactions with military landscapes as a vital tool in the researcher’s kit to understand space and environment and expression of military power.
The studies from South American scholars include Piero C Leirner’s fascinating exploration of the relationship between anthropology and the state, and the ways anthropological ideas such as ‘culture’ have been politicised and even weaponised through military adoption. Rosana Guber and Sabina Frederic provide chapters on ethnographic research in Argentina. Editor Celso Castro’s reflection on interviewing members of the Brazilian armed forces discusses access and identity as it relates to the insider/outsider perception. Immersion in the military environment is also discussed by Claude Weber and Alicia Payor y Pastor, who both studied the French armies from a variety of perspectives including civilian, veteran, reservist, soldier, officer and PhD student. Both pose the question ‘Is the researcher a participating observer or an observing participant?’

A gender perspective is provided by Cristina Rodrigues da Silva in a report of her research on military families on the Brazilian Amazon border; in an account of collecting women’s narratives of their military service in Israel by Edna Lomsky-Feder and Orna Sasson-Levy; and in an account of experiences researching in the NATO environment in Bosnia Herzegovina and Italy by Teresa Ammendola, Fatima Farina and Maria Grazia Galentino. Finally, David Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal write an engaging reflection on their professional and personal partnership, their research and teaching experience and their influence on security policy, all against the evolution of military sociology in the United States over the last 50 years.

*Researching the Military* is a valuable handbook for civilian and military researchers alike and for those who craft policy in the defence sector. Its editors have brought together a contemporary collection of research experiences and challenges in the dynamic environment of modern militaries. Through these experiences of reflexive practice, we can learn not only how we might improve our own research methods but also what obstacles we as a military organisation must dismantle. As the editors claim, ‘The type of ties between the military and the academic world is one of the factors that condition the possibility of successful engagement.’
Book Review

Myanmar’s ‘Rohingya’ Conflict

By Anthony Ware and Costas Laoutides

Hurst & Company, 2018, ISBN 9781849049047, 276pp

Reviewed by Chaplain Darren Cronshaw

Suggesting simple solutions is not helpful for a crisis as complex as that involving the Rohingya people in Myanmar, which is why *Myanmar’s ‘Rohingya’ Conflict* by Anthony Ware and Costas Laoutides is a welcome analysis pointing in constructive directions. The conflict and resulting refugee crisis of Myanmar’s Rohingya people has involved repeated and long-lasting violence, including claims of state-sponsored genocide and crimes against humanity. It is a massive humanitarian crisis with different groups contesting the causes and potential solutions of the troubles. There are over 1 million Muslims from northern Rakhine in Bangladesh, including the world’s largest refugee camp. Nobel Peace Prize winning leader Aung San Suu Kyi for decades claimed that her leadership would champion human rights, but now appears silent on this issue. She leads a multi-ethnic country but the Buddhist majority have little sympathy for the Muslim Rohingya. The challenges and dilemmas are huge for political leaders, aid and development workers and peacemakers.
Anthony Ware is Senior Lecturer in Development Studies at Deakin University and Director of the Australia Myanmar Institute. He has had many years of personal involvement in community development training in Myanmar. Costas Laoutides is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University. His background research expertise is separatist conflicts and he first visited Myanmar with Ware to contribute to a human rights training workshop. As they observed local conflict dynamics, they developed their combined interest in research and advocacy for getting beyond the multilayered hidden agendas to identify the real causes of the conflict and point towards peace-building possibilities.

The ‘Rohingya’ conflict is a complex, intractable situation. The conflict is multi-polarised against Rohingya Muslims, by Rohingya against the Tatmadaw Burman-dominated military and the local Rakhine Buddhists, and among the Burman and Rakhine. The government is in a power struggle with the military, who control defence, police and border regions without government oversight. Furthermore, the international community joins the conflict with public shaming and humanitarian action, not always with nonpartisan awareness.

Ware and Laoutides refuse to accept popular expedient explanations of the origins of or solutions to the problems. They unpack the four different (all often distorted) historical narratives presented by the different actors. This underlines why detailed historical background study is important, but also shows how actors adopt speculative history when faced with a struggle for survival. Basically the Rohingya ‘origin’ narrative emphasises their deep historical pre-Burman and pre-British roots, thus seeking to establish their right to be called taing-yin-tha or ‘indigenous national race’. The Rakhine-Burman ‘independence’ narrative asserts their antiquity in the land while ignoring the Muslim presence. The Burman ‘unity’ narrative suggests that Myanmar has historically been a family of races living in harmony; this is then used to marginalise other groups. Finally, the Rakhine-Burman ‘infiltration’ narrative suggests that Bengali Muslims have been illegally ‘infiltrating’ Myanmar over the last 100 to 200 years and furthermore became allied with the British colonial administration.

After explaining (and critiquing) this competing ‘stalemate of stories’, the writers offer different lenses to analyse the conflict—security dilemma, minority complex, greed or political economy, identity and territory grievances. These frameworks help unravel the causes and pathways of any
intractable conflict that may seem to be based on religious and/or ethnic difference. For Myanmar, the authors conclude, the key issue for explaining the conflict is contested political inclusion and control over governance. They suggest that a territorial (rather than ethnic) definition of citizenship is needed to validate the Rohingya (and the Rakhine). They applaud the various recommendations of the Kofi Annan led Advisory Commission on Rakhine State but acknowledge the need for courageous leadership to implement them—for example, to create new citizenship pathways and open an inquiry into atrocities. Furthermore, they suggest, the situation needs more action, including protecting economic interests of returning refugees, advocating for justice for all groups, making the Tatmadaw accountable, and providing avenues for dialogue and reconciliation. They thus appeal for a negotiated solution to avoid more loss of life, but point in constructive directions for the kind of courageous leadership this will take—and for more than confrontational international public shaming.

The book helped me learn much about Myanmar, as well as principles and frameworks that apply in other intractable conflicts. It also modelled for me the potential of well-grounded research to look carefully at history and point productively forward into the future with constructive recommendations and conclusions. One of the challenges for military leaders is understanding the context in which they are deployed, including a region's cultural values, history and religion and the part those factors play in a conflict. *Myanmar’s ‘Rohingya’ Conflict* is invaluable reading for anyone wanting to understand what is beneath the surface of the conflict, politics and refugee crisis of Myanmar, or indeed to consider implications for other similarly complex situations.
Book Review

Blood and Concrete: 21st Century Conflict in Urban Centers and Megacities

Edited by Dave Dilegge, Robert J Bunker, John P Sullivan and Alma Keshavarz

Small Wars Foundation, 2019, ISBN 9781984573759, 705pp

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Dayton McCarthy

Positioning itself to capture the burgeoning interest in cities and how armies might interact with and within them, Blood and Concrete is a compendium of over 50 short articles on various aspects of urban warfare that have appeared on the Small Wars Journal website. And some of these articles are very short: a handful are one to two pages long. Herein lies a major problem with many of the articles in the book. Their length, while digestible, results often in a superficial treatment of the subject matter. Moreover, many of the articles suffer from the problem common to some blogs and online articles: a lack of depth and academic objectivity, replaced instead by a superficial treatment of the subject matter coupled with urgent recommendations (‘the Army must buy/do/train for …’) that are often devoid of context or other aspects of the connected ‘big picture’.
The four editors of *Blood and Concrete* could have been more selective: a number of articles say much the same thing in much the same way. The book also illustrates the dangers of simply compiling a series of independently written articles without overarching editorial guidance. The reader will quickly tire of reading the same facts in successive articles about rates of urbanisation, growth of megacities and other relatively well-known tropes; surely these did not need to be repeated in every article.

These gripes aside, *Blood and Concrete* contains some great pieces of work that cover such wide-ranging topics as the Mumbai siege and London riots, the distorted visions of ‘narco-cities’ in Mexico and microclimates in dense urban terrain. A number of articles cover the intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) as it relates to cities and urban terrain. In ‘A Proposed Framework for Appreciating Megacities’ the authors argue that each city must be understood through the components of context, scale, density (physical, demographic and informational), connectedness and flow (that is, the movement of people, resources or things in and out of a city). Another article, ‘City as a System Analytical Framework’, spruiks a private consultancy’s proprietary analytical tool to understand the connections between—and thus ramifications of—the elements of the ‘urban triad’ of population, infrastructure and physical environment of a city.

In my opinion, the last half-dozen articles stand out, as if the editors left the best for last. ‘Complex Cyber Terrain in Hyper-Connected Urban Areas’ and ‘Cyber Operational Considerations in Dense Urban Terrain’ make for a sobering primer on the all-pervasive informational/cyber domain within dense urban areas. Even the poorest of cities will be hyper-connected, generating not only an Internet of Things but also an Internet of People that seamlessly exchanges information about individuals, their social context and their environment.

Household names such Robert Muggah and Russell W Glenn conclude the book with insights that bring many of the themes together, weaving in nascent concepts such as multi-domain battle (MDB) for good measure. Glenn argues that urban operations and MDB emphasise the need for distributed, mission command oriented forces. As an MDB agnostic, I am not so sure; in fact many of the preceding articles suggest that to operate successfully in cities a panoply of enablers will be required that are more likely to be held at a higher, centralised level of command than allocated out to subordinate units.

The editors intended *Blood and Concrete* to be a ‘foundation for understanding urban operations and sustaining urban warfare research’. This hefty tome achieves this—but with more rigorous and robust editing, it might have done so in a volume half the size.
Book Review

Criminologies of the Military: Militarism, National Security and Justice

Edited by Ben Wadham and Andrew Goldsmith


Reviewed by Dr David Mount

In *Criminologies of the Military*, Wadham and Goldsmith have set themselves a formidable task: to encapsulate the concept of crime committed by, within and against military (and military-like) entities in order to better understand the sources and natures of those crimes and the various responses to them. As a volume of the Onati International Series in Law and Society, this publication has been compiled for a broad global readership and, as such, its contributing authors are drawn from a cross-section of academic/professional disciplines and countries. In this reviewer’s opinion, the editors have generally achieved an appropriate balance between discussions of criminological theory and case study applications.

The chapters of the publication have largely been derived from papers presented at an International Institute for the Sociology of Law workshop.
convened in 2014. As a result, the chapters are authored by scholars from Britain, Germany, Canada and Australia, with each giving a particular national perspective on issues raised and discussed. For Australian readers, the criminology, criminal justice and law scholarship of Ben Wadham, Willem de Lint, Andrew Goldsmith, Mark Halsey, Grant Niemann, Yorick Smaal and Graham Willett may be familiar.

The Australian contributors to the volume provide unique perspectives on the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and a number of particular criminological issues associated with militaries operating in an increasingly complex 21st century global construct. For example, Australian Army Journal readers are likely to be engaged by Grant Niemann’s examination of the intersection of international criminal law and national military law, and particularly his supporting use of an ADF case study. Equally, Ben Wadham’s examination of the Australian Defence Force Academy Skype affair and issues associated with perceptions of dominant masculine cultures and criminological theories is likely to incite thought and debate amongst a military readership.

If this reviewer has one criticism of the publication, it is the relative emphasis that is placed on attempting to reinforce the merits of considering military institutions and their intra-relations and external associations from a criminological perspective. While it is accepted that consideration of militaries from this perspective is relatively new (in comparison to more traditional sociological or psychological viewpoints), the argument becomes somewhat laboured. It is unlikely, for example, that a general military readership will be engaged by the nuanced theoretical/methodological discussions that dominate several of the chapters. It is more likely that the chapters dedicated to an exploration of a specific aspect of criminal conduct in a military context or systemic responses to such conduct will garner more interest amongst a general military readership.

In overview, Criminologies of the Military provides a broad introduction to an emerging scholarly construct: the consideration of military (and quasi-military) organisations and the actions of their members from a criminological perspective. This publication is likely to appeal to readers with an interest in the relationships between the military and the society it serves, and between the individual’s rights/freedoms and the degree to which such concepts are subordinated when wearing a uniform. This publication is a worthy addition to the scholarly consideration of the roles and relationships of the military in an increasingly complex global and social construct.
Book Review

How to Defend Australia

By Hugh White

La Trobe University Press, 2019, ISBN 9781760640996, 336pp

Reviewed by Dr Albert Palazzo

There are occasions when the sum of a book’s parts is more profound than its individual thoughts. Hugh White, an emeritus professor at the Australian National University and one of Australia’s premier strategic thinkers, has done the nation a service in writing this book. If anyone can move the Australian Government and people to seriously rethink the fundamentals of the nation’s security, it is White. In How to Defend Australia, he outlines with clarity and matter-of-factness the challenge the changing strategic environment is creating for Australian security. Hopefully, those in positions of power to effect change will read and act on his book.

White’s thesis is simple. The growing power of China relative to the United States is calling into question the ability of the US to maintain its influence in Asia. As a result, the US security guarantee that Australia has enjoyed since the Second World War may not be as reliable as it has been in the past. White believes that if a crisis comes, Australia will find itself without its protector: a repeat of the flawed Singapore strategy of nearly 80 years ago.
White has made this argument before in a series of publications dating from
the release of Power Shift in 2010, and his logic is unassailable. Short of
something truly catastrophic intervening, the Chinese economy will dwarf
America’s and, as military power follows economic power, the ability of the
US to intervene in the western Pacific will only become more difficult, costly
and risky. At what point will the American people decide that ‘the juice is
not worth the squeeze’ and cede dominance in east Asia to the traditional
power of east Asia? America’s tipping point is not known, but as long as
trends continue on current trajectories it seems likely that it will be reached.

As perceptive as White’s thinking might be, he shows little desire to go
beyond the ideas that first formed his thoughts during the era of the Defence
of Australia Policy. White’s proposed solution is based on the maritime
defence of the continent, with a focus on air and sea assets and a minimal
role for land forces. The trivialisation of the land power denies not just the
history of Australia but also the history of war. His willingness to discuss
nuclear weapons is also troubling because, like most security thinkers, he
treats these weapons in the abstract, whereas their acquisition must come
with the acceptance that any use means accepting the potential for not just
the end of Australia but also the end of humanity.

Another shortcoming of the book is its sole reliance on traditional ‘realpolitik’
thinking. Anything outside a state-versus-state dynamic is ignored. In an era
of heightened climate threat, the lack of any awareness that the interaction
between states is also affected by human dependence on the natural world
makes White’s thinking seem tired. Is it still possible to avoid considering
climate change in any discussion of Australia’s future national security needs?
Apparently so, but the result will be a failure to consider a host of other
possible security threats to Australia against which the nation must prepare.

How to Defend Australia is an important book, if not without flaws.
Soldiers, defence thinkers and policymakers must read it and debate its
recommendations. Australia is facing an era of significant change; most
importantly it will have to manage the reality that a fortunate period of
cheap security is at an end. As White insists, Australia must embrace a new
philosophy on how it provides for its defence if its people are to continue to
enjoy the fruits of a sovereign nation. Much is at stake, and How to Defend
Australia provides a critical starting point for setting a path for what promises
to be a tumultuous age.
Book Review

Fighting the People’s War: The British and Commonwealth Armies and the Second World War

By Jonathan Fennell

Cambridge University Press, 2019, ISBN 9781139380881, 966pp

Reviewed by Dr William Westerman

There is an unfortunate tendency with some writers of popular-level military history to produce big books that say very little—at least, very little that is original or insightful. Jonathan Fennell’s Fighting the People’s War is a towering example of what can and should be done with a well-worn topic such as the Second World War. Fennell, Senior Lecturer in Defence Studies at King’s College, London, has written the first single-volume history of the British and Commonwealth armies in the war. In doing so, he has produced a significant book, both in its scope and in its themes—and those seeking a fresh, complex and mature history of the conflict are the richer for it.

Fighting the People’s War is no mere retelling of the Second World War from the British perspective. For one thing, the narrative includes the Dominions (Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa) as well as British India,
correctly treating them as vital components of Britain’s war effort. Fennell tells a truly expansive story about the British Commonwealth at war—a good corrective to narrow nationalist histories. The interconnections among and similarities between the elements of the ‘British world’ are an important part of understanding the problems that beset the armies of the British Commonwealth and the manner in which solutions were found.

A second distinctive aspect of the book (and perhaps its most intriguing) is the way Fennell explores soldiers’ political and social engagement and the subsequent effect on morale. He writes about the citizen armies of Britain and the Commonwealth as armies of citizens, diving into troves of underused censorship material and morale reports to present a picture of citizen soldiers who were concerned about the nature of the society and the political state for which they fought. For Britain and the Commonwealth, the Second World War was a ‘people’s war’, in that the people who participated in it had expectations about what their sacrifices meant to civil society, both in the present and in the future. This emerges most strikingly with India, a nation expected to provide manpower to Britain’s war effort while it was demanding greater autonomy from London. The friction of Quit India in 1942 demonstrated how the British Government’s intransigence failed to fully mobilise the Indian people and how these political tensions undermined morale in the Indian Army at a crucial time in the war.

_Fighting the People’s War_ follows the familiar narrative contours of the war. After setting the scene, the book focuses on the campaigns and areas of operations where British Commonwealth armies fought, dividing itself neatly between the West (Western Europe, the Mediterranean and North Africa) and the East (Burma and the South-West Pacific Area). Even at just under 700 pages (not including almost 200 pages of endnotes and bibliography), the size and scope of the task Fennell has set himself limits how deeply he can dive into the war (a problem for any single-volume history of such an immense conflagration). Accordingly, Fennell literally chooses his battles: Italy and Normandy, for instance, are more prominent than Burma and New Guinea. From an Australian perspective, no major operation involving Australians is missing, although the Syrian campaign of 1941 is only mentioned briefly, as are the final South-West Pacific Area campaigns of 1944–45. Massive operations such as the Australian involvement in Operation Cartwheel are treated well, but in the scope of the book only occupy a few pages. This is not a criticism of the work—it is entirely
necessary and appropriate given the aim of Fennell’s project—but readers need to be aware that not all British and Commonwealth campaigns are covered equally.

In his final section, Fennell goes beyond VE (Victory in Europe) Day and VJ (Victory over Japan) Day to see how the soldiers’ experience of the war shaped the societies to which they returned. It is an important coda to the British and Commonwealth war effort, and makes sense of some of the dramatic political events in the war’s aftermath, such as the 1945 British general election result. This is just one example of where Fighting the People’s War is as much about the societies that created citizen armies as it is about tactics, operational art and strategy directing the way they fought. The book bridges the divide between operational military historians and social historians of war in a way that should be illuminating for those who work in both fields. Crucially, he gives agency back to citizen soldiers, who are treated not just as cogs in a great military machine but as important in shaping their civil societies.

Overall, Fennell has written a fascinating book that blends narrative with analysis to produce an integrated assessment of mobilisation, battle, campaign and strategy, and also considers the geopolitical and socioeconomic preludes to and consequences of the war. Fighting the People’s War provides much food for thought for those interested in a deeper understanding of the Second World War and the citizen armies that fought it. It asks important questions about the obligations the state owes to its soldiers and it speaks to the challenges of having a cause worth fighting for, an issue no less relevant for professional armies fighting modern wars of choice.
Call for submissions for the Autumn edition of the Australian Army Journal

Are you studying towards a post graduate degree? Have you written an essay which may be of interest to the wider Army community? The Australian Army Research Centre (AARC) is looking for well written, scholarly articles on topics related to Army, particularly the future of Army, for publishing in the Australian Army Journal.

The next edition of the Australian Army Journal will be published in the Autumn of 2020. We welcome submissions which have well structured arguments, are in a readable style without too much military jargon, and which lead to logical conclusions or recommendations.

All submissions are initially assessed for suitability by the Managing Editor, then professionally reviewed with the reviewer’s comments returned to the author for amendment. The articles are then recommended for publication by the Editorial Advisory Board and edited for publication. We cannot accept articles which have been published elsewhere or are currently under consideration for publication with another journal.

We welcome submissions at any time, and currently publish two themed and two general editions per year.
Word length

- Journal articles should be between 4000 and 6000 words
- Book reviews can be any length up to 1000 words
- Opinion Pieces can be any length up to 2000 words
- Letters to the Editor are welcome

Format/style guide

Formatting and style of submissions should be in accordance with the Australian Style Manual and the ADF Writing Manual, Chapter 22, Academic Writing. Articles must be presented as a Microsoft Word document using 1.5 line spacing, no paragraph numbers; and all references are to be automated in endnotes (Chicago style 17A) rather than in-text referencing. An additional bibliography or references list is not required. Read previous editions to become familiar with the style, and use our style guide here: https://www.army.gov.au/our-future/aarc/advice-to-authors.

Article abstract

Please include an article abstract. The function of an abstract is to summarise the major aspects of a paper, but a good abstract should also encourage a reader to read the entire article! For this reason, it should be an engagingly written piece of prose and not simply a rewrite of the introduction in shorter form. It should be no longer than 200 words.

Author biography

Your biography should be approximately 100 words and include a summary of your service and educational history.

Please send submissions to: dflw.publications@defence.gov.au
Call for submissions for the Australian Army Journal Occassional Paper Series

Are you studying towards a post graduate degree or doctorate and are writing a thesis? Would your thesis be of interest to the wider Army and former Defence personnel who read treatises on military topics? The Australian Army Research Centre (AARC) is looking for well written, scholarly papers on topics related to Army, for publishing in the Army Occasional Paper series.

If you have written an article of original research, on a topic of military interest which would fit in one of the seven themes below, then AARC may be interested in publishing your work as an Army Occasional Paper.

a. Future of Army Series

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d. Human Performance Series

e. Operational Development Series

f. Technical Development Series

g. Ethics Series.
All submissions are peer reviewed by subject matter experts, then assessed for publishable quality by the Army Occasional Paper editorial team, before being substantially edited for publication. The AARC cannot accept articles which have been published elsewhere or are currently under consideration for publication in other formats.

Format/style guide

Formatting and style of submissions should be in accordance with the Australian Style Manual and the ADF Writing Manual, Chapter 22, Academic Writing. Articles must be presented as a Microsoft Word document using 1.5 line spacing, no paragraph numbers, and all references are to be automated as Oxford style endnotes, rather than Harvard style in-text referencing. A bibliography is required. Occasional Papers are expected to be in depth studies of the subject being researched and therefore should be between 8000 and 40,000 words.

Paper abstract

A paper abstract should be included. The most immediate function of an abstract is to summarise the major aspects of a paper, but a good abstract should also encourage a reader to read the entire piece. For this reason, it should be an engagingly written piece of prose between 200 and 500 words and not simply a rewrite of the introduction in shorter form.

Author biography

The biography should be approximately 100 words and include a summary of the author’s service and educational history.

Please send submissions to: dflw.publications@defence.gov.au