THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY COUNTERINSURGENCY AND SMALL WARS READING GUIDE

edited by Jeffrey Grey

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The Australian Army established the LWSC in July 1997 through the amalgamation of several existing staffs and research elements.

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CHIEF OF ARMY FOREWORD
2009 AUSTRALIAN ARMY COIN READING LIST

Since 1999 the Australian Army has been engaged in continuous operations overseas. All of these operations, embracing theatres as diverse as East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Solomon Islands, have been characterised by irregular warfare. Apart from the initial phase of operations in Iraq in 2003, our adversaries have been non-state actors.

Our military history contains a rich lode of lessons about irregular warfare and counter-insurgency. History is a useful tool for analysing military problems. This is especially the case with counter-insurgency. As the author of this guide professor Jeff Grey points out:

*Insurgency is a form of warfare as old as warfare itself, and it has gone by many names in the past: guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, revolutionary warfare, insurrectionary warfare, irregular warfare, peoples’ warfare and terrorism. All have the been-and are-used to describe the same broad phenomenon, though they do not all have the exact same meaning and have not necessarily been used simultaneously.*

Although the past offers many useful lessons to the military professional, the key to the effective application of military history is an adaptive culture and mind-set within the Army. Since 1999 the Army has been attempting to adapt to a dynamic, complex environment. Our concepts and doctrine have been adapted very effectively to posture Army for success in this environment. The more recent *Adaptive Army* initiative brings together this earlier work, with historical lessons and our research into adaptation, to ensure a systemic approach to the inculcation of this adaptive culture in Army.

But we can never become complacent. Every officer and soldier in our Army has a professional obligation to commit to constant learning and up-skilling to meet new circumstances. Reading guides such as this are but the start. Every one of us must constantly evaluate our experiences against history and doctrine and be prepared to challenge conventional wisdom.

My aspiration for the Australian Army is that we are the ‘Best Small Army in the World.’ A large part of our claim to that mantle has been based on consistent excellence at the art of counter-insurgency and the conduct of small wars. I commend this study of the history and theory of counter-insurgency to you—and urge you to think about its lessons and carefully consider ways to adapt them to our current challenges, and to share your ideas widely within the Army. I wish you good reading!

K.J. GILLESPIE
Lieutenant General
Chief of Army

August 2009
Introduction

In counter-insurgency, the population is not only the field of battle but also the prize.

— David C Gompert

Insurgency is a form of warfare as old as warfare itself, and it has gone by many names in the past: guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, revolutionary warfare, insurrectionary warfare, irregular warfare, unconventional warfare, peoples’ war and terrorism. All have been—and are—used to describe the same broad phenomenon, though they do not all have the exact same meaning and have not necessarily been used simultaneously. Modern insurgency, closely identified in the second half of the twentieth century with national liberation struggles and revolutionary Marxism derived from the writings—and practice—of Mao (among others), has a well defined theoretical literature. So, too, does counterinsurgency. There is, likewise, a sizeable historical literature that provides numerous case studies in the field. To borrow an observation of T E Lawrence, himself an insurgent leader: ‘With 2000 years of examples behind us, we have no excuse when fighting for not fighting well’.

Virtually all of this literature affirms the proposition that the struggle against insurgency is inherently political in nature, and further, that the traditionally military component of successful counterinsurgency represents only a proportion of the total counterinsurgent effort. Notwithstanding this fundamental—if elementary—observation, Edward Luttwak has noted that modern militaries and the governments they serve too often find it hard, ‘amidst the frustrations of fighting an almost invisible enemy ... to resist the tempting delusion that some clever new tactics, or even some clever new technology, can defeat the insurgents’.

This reading list is intended to counter such tempting delusions, or at least to subject them to rigorous scrutiny. It makes no attempt, and no claim, to be exhaustive or definitive: such a list would run to many thousands of entries and quickly prove self-defeating. The list is divided into two parts: a strongly historical section, and a contemporary one. Arguments about insurgency in the present are frequently couched in historical terms, or by appeal to historical precedent. The quality of the argument is
often determined by the quality of the history and depth of historical understanding conscripted to support it.

The readings offered here are a mix of books and articles; the books are mostly classics, key texts or works of insurgent or counterinsurgent theory, while the articles reflect recent (sometimes very recent) scholarship dealing with contemporary insurgencies associated with the Global War on Terror, or ask new questions of older case studies prompted by recent operational experience. Recognising that many of those to whom this list is directed are either ‘time poor’, or else already well versed in the basics of insurgent and counterinsurgent theory and history, articles have been preferred over books where possible.

As an academic, scholarly and professional specialisation, insurgency and counter-insurgency are newly ‘hot properties’, once again. Readers wishing to keep abreast of new work in the field might find it useful to monitor subsequent editions of the journals cited in these pages, but especially *Small Wars & Insurgencies, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, and the online journal-cum-blog, *Small Wars Journal*, available at the time of publication at http://www.smallwarsjournal.com. It is also worth keeping a regular check on the publications of the US Army’s Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil
Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Theory and Doctrine

The following represent classic texts in the twentieth century history of insurgency and revolutionary warfare. Mao and Giap are the key proponents of ‘people’s war’ of the kind that prevailed successfully in the Chinese Civil War and Vietnam. Note that on both occasions conventional armies conducting mobile, mid-intensity operations secured final victory for the insurgent side. Nasution, on the other hand, offers the interesting example of a theory of popular guerrilla struggle that is avowedly non-Marxist in its practice and inspiration; Nasution, like Giap, occupies a central place in the history of his country’s independence struggles and in the formation of the national army that emerged from them. Guevara’s totemic place in the popular culture of the 1960s and 1970s (and, arguably, beyond) is not supported by his practice as an insurgent. Drawing on the singular example of the Cuban revolution in which he took part, his attempt to elaborate a new theory of insurgency (‘focoism’) that emphasised the revolutionary potential of a small, highly-motivated leadership group led to his early death in Bolivia at the hands of the National Police in 1967. Debray, a former comrade of Guevarra’s in Bolivia, was a left-wing French intellectual whose writings reflected the activities of various revolutionary guerrilla movements in Latin America, at one time seen as the ‘cutting edge’ of revolutionary and guerrilla theory and practice. Finally, the closest thing we have in a coherent and publicly available form to an insurgent doctrine for al-Qaeda is presented with an informed analysis and commentary.


Vo Nguyen Giap, People’s War, People’s Army, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Hanoi, 1961


Jose Antonio Moreno, Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare: Doctrine, Practice and Evaluation, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, 1970


Before there were ‘insurgencies’ there were ‘small wars’, usually involving the extension or enforcement of empire. Neither Callwell nor Gwynn, experienced colonial soldiers, would be especially surprised by the operational problems that confront counterinsurgents in the early twenty-first century—both recognised, explicitly, that low-intensity conflict posed a problem different in kind, and not merely in scale, from conventional warfighting. Trinquier and Galula endured the bitter and ultimately unsuccessful wars of France’s retreat from empire after the Second World War, though they came to some very different conclusions about the correct response to the political dimensions of revolutionary insurgency. Although many Americans would have rejected the notion of an American imperium, the Marine Corps manual published at the beginning of the Second World War codified practices and approaches developed from the Philippines War through the deployments in Central America in the 1920s and 1930s. The recent manual *FM 3-24* produced under the direction of senior US Army and Marine officers is but its lineal descendant.

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(Sir) Charles [C E] Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1996 [originally 1906]


The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have again focused Western militaries and scholars on the problems of insurgency and its countering, and the following provide perspectives on the issues in a broad context. Colin Gray, one of the most important Anglo-American strategic thinkers writing today, places thinking about insurgency in the context of war as a whole. Kilcullen’s well known article draws its inspiration from a similar piece written by T E Lawrence in 1917, and both of which range widely over their subjects. The questions of ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ against an insurgency, and of understanding the nature of the conflict engaged in, are addressed by Marks, by Coons and Harned, and by Junio, respectively.


General histories of insurgency and counterinsurgency

The following provides a general guide to histories of insurgency and counterinsurgency for both the general reader and the specialist. The edited collections by Haycock, Davis, and Dennis and Grey offer individual chapters dealing with lesser known colonial counterinsurgent experiences such as those of the Dutch and Portuguese.


Historical case studies

Insurgent or irregular warfare played a role in the wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, though it was never the decisive element in its own right. During the American War of Independence, the Civil War, and Napoleon’s war in Spain, guerrilla or irregular forces were an important—even vital—adjunct to the operations of regular armies, and their contributions need to be understood in that context. The international anarchist movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the al-Qaeda of its time, given to spectacular acts of terrorism usually involving the assassination of crowned heads and other leading political figures of the established order. It provides a useful comparison for terrorist activities more recently.

Pre-20th Century


Don W Alexander, Rod of Iron: French Counterinsurgency Policy in Aragon during the Peninsular War, Scholarly Resources Inc, Wilmington, 1985


20th Century

The following provides a wide-ranging and valuable collection of essays dealing with the main counterinsurgencies of the twentieth century with emphasis on experience since 1945. Both editors have operated as consultant advisors to the coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (eds), *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare*, Osprey, Oxford, 2008

US Experience before 1941

The notion that the US armed forces do not understand counterinsurgency or have failed in applying it in the past is untrue, and belied both by experience in the Philippines following the short and successful war with Spain in 1898 and by the evolution of Marine Corps doctrine before the Second World War.


Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899–1902*, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2000


The Second World War

As in the nineteenth century, resistance and guerrilla movements operated largely as adjuncts to conventional forces and were nowhere decisive in their own right—with the possible exception of the partisans in Yugoslavia under Tito. The Soviet partisan movement on the Eastern Front has aroused considerable scholarly investigation, and
was the subject of extended professional scrutiny by the US military early in the Cold War, as were German counter-guerrilla tactics and policy. Early post-war US Special Forces doctrine emphasised operations in the rear of enemy formations to disrupt command and control, logistics and communications very much along the lines of the Soviet effort on the Eastern Front.


**Soviet counterinsurgency**

Soviet efforts to suppress and eradicate nationalist and anti-Soviet insurgencies in areas formerly occupied by the Germans during the war continued past 1945, and illustrate much about the Soviet approach to governance. Their lengthy and ill-fated excursion in Afghanistan in the 1980s is well known in outline in the West, but has not received much sustained scholarly examination. The volume by Grau and Gress presents the
Soviet General Staff study of the campaign, with interesting insights into the nature of the conflict and the mujahideen enemy.


US counterinsurgency and the war in Vietnam

The literature on the US war in Vietnam is enormous, and much of it deals with the ‘big unit’ war fought by conventional US formations after 1965. Of the works listed below, Nagl’s is particularly interesting since it is written by a young US Army officer who subsequently worked for General David Petraeus during the ‘surge’ in Iraq. Much of the writing on Vietnam is concerned with ‘lessons’ from that conflict; the articles by Gentile and Andrade engage directly with this issue of ‘received wisdom’ on the rights and wrongs of US conduct of the war.

British counterinsurgency

In some quarters it is assumed that the British possessed some particular gift for counterinsurgency; this is certainly a view entertained in parts of the US armed forces, but it is generally belied by history. The British worked hard for such successes as they enjoyed in places like Malaya, and their experiences in Kenya at the same time demonstrated that there was no ‘school solution’ or template to be applied to insurgency in colonial or Third World environments. Victories in Kenya or Malaya were tempered by defeats and forced withdrawals in Ireland in the 1920s, or in Palestine,
Greece and Aden in the 1940s and 1970s. British conduct of operations against the Mau Mau has been the subject of very bitter revisionist scholarship over the last decade with important questions raised about the approach adopted towards population control and security in Kenya.


Ireland

The renewed violence in Ulster from 1969 (‘The Troubles’) and the struggle with the Provisional IRA that ensued is well known, but its antecedents in the Anglo-Irish War and the subsequent civil war are generally not well understood outside Ireland. Hart’s work addresses these issues centrally, from both sides of the divide. Nor do many people recognise the counterinsurgent and counter-terrorist role played by the Irish Government against rogue elements of the IRA within the Republic itself, a primary concern of O’Halpin’s work.


Australian experience

Australian counterinsurgent practice and experience has received little serious analysis in published form. There is some discussion, *inter alia*, in the official histories of post-war South-East Asian conflicts. Welburn and Bushby, both serving Army officers, discuss the evolution of Army doctrine in the 1950s and 1960s and its interaction with operational experience in Malaya and South Vietnam.


French experiences

France fought protracted and bitter wars in Indochina and Algeria between 1946–1962 during which the French empire was conceded and the supremacy of civil control within France was challenged directly. French experience in Indochina led to the formulation of a doctrine of ‘revolutionary warfare’ practiced in Algeria that led, at times, to systematic use of torture on detainees and other abuses of the laws of armed conflict. The theoretical writing thrown up by these experiences deals in sometimes contradictory messages, and the population-centric approach advocated by David Galula (based on his own experiences in Algeria) has found renewed favour in the US Army largely through the advocacy of General David Petraeus, amongst others. The French made widespread use of indigenous personnel in both theatres, and several of the articles listed here address this experience.

Peter Paret, *French Revolutionary Warfare from Indochina to Algeria*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1964


Sub-Saharan Africa

Minority white governments in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe and South Africa fought protracted wars with African liberation movements across almost thirty years. Both resulted in black majority rule and hence defeat for the original aims of their white protagonists, but the outcomes were achieved through very different processes and the success of the insurgent strategies must be judged as qualified.


Philippines

The struggle with the Huks (Hukbalahap or People’s Army against the Japanese, formed in 1942) is now largely forgotten, but in the 1960s suggested an approach to countering popular revolutionary insurgency in South-East Asia through a mix of targeted reforms, military actions and psychological operations. Valeriano exercised a sometimes controversial command of counter-Huk units on operations in 1950–54.

Contemporary counterinsurgency

The war against the Taliban and the insurgency that emerged in Iraq after the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003 have given renewed focus to insurgency and counterinsurgency as topics of military professional concern and historical and scholarly enquiry. The readings listed here deal with a variety of issues principally to do with doctrine, education and training for counterinsurgency; understanding the relationship between counterinsurgency and other roles and missions; and the connections between the military and political dimensions of successful counterinsurgent practice.

Generic issues


**Afghanistan**

The war in Afghanistan has received substantially less attention than that in Iraq, both from policy and decision-makers in Washington during the Bush administration and from scholars and commentators. This has changed recently, but most commentators and observers imperfectly understand the complexities of Afghan society and politics.


**Iraq**

The war in Iraq has received enormous attention, at least until recently when the apparent success of the ‘surge’ under Petraeus and the departure of George W. Bush from the White House, together with the renewed emphasis on the fight against the Taliban in Afghanistan announced by President Obama, has moved it from the centre of collective attention. More than any other event, the war in Iraq placed insurgency
and counterinsurgency back on the agenda for Western militaries and civilian analysts, and the range of issues and concerns it excited is well represented in the readings listed here.


Major General Jim Molan, *Running the war in Iraq: An Australian general, 300,000 troops, the bloodiest conflict of our time*, HarperCollins, Pymble, 2008


Edward Luttwak, ‘Dead End: Counterinsurgency warfare as military malpractice’, *Harpers Magazine*, April 2007
Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa

The global insurgency allegedly sparked by the attack on the Twin Towers in September 2001 is not confined to Iraq and Afghanistan, nor is it being fought solely against Islamist extremists; it involves the security forces of nations other than the United States and its immediate allies. The Indian Army has a lengthy history of counterinsurgency, principally but not exclusively in Kashmir, while the protracted struggle in Nepal reminds us that ‘old fashioned’ Maoist peoples war is still a viable model in some parts of the world. The literature of Israel’s long-running fight with Hezbollah and Hamas deserves an extensive analysis in its own right, but much of this is published in Hebrew and is not accessible to an English-speaking audience.


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122 Evans, Michael and Alan Ryan (eds), *From Breitenfeld to Baghdad: Perspectives on Combined Arms Warfare*, January 2003.


**Books**


Dennis, Peter and Jeffrey Grey (eds), *From Past to Future: The Australian Experience of Land/Air Operations*, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1995.

Dennis, Peter and Jeffrey Grey (eds), *Serving Vital Interests: Australia’s Strategic Planning in Peace and War*, University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1996.


