Army

ARMY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2016
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INTRODUCTION

This is the Australian Army’s second Research and Development (R&D) Plan. The Army’s first plan was released in 2014 with a focus on science and technology. Army always recognised that there was a need for a broader research agenda and work soon commenced on a R&D plan for the arts and humanities. With the release of this plan all disciplines of human inquiry are now represented in the Army’s research requirements. Both plans support each other and together they sit firmly in the Army’s modernisation process. Furthermore, both plans are dedicated to seeking ways to make the nation’s land force more capable at waging war and more effective at meeting the nation’s military requirements.

In our modern society it is often taken for granted that the military is naturally drawn to technology, both the improvements in existing devices and the opportunity to take advantage of completely new ones. There is much truth in this assumption.

Yet it would be wrong to conclude that soldiers are technological determinists who seek to solve the challenges of waging modern war by applying the latest technological silver bullet. War is among humanity’s most complex endeavours and it is not amenable to quick fixes.

Rather, soldiers know that war has and forever will be a contest between humans and conducted among humans. It is a struggle between two combatants who seek to exert dominance over their opponent. At its most fundamental, war is about the same traits that defined us as humans – emotion, courage and sacrifice, and the victor is the one who forces the enemy to accept their will. War, in brief, is about human interaction. Therefore, its examination by humanists is welcome.

The Australian Army understands the important role the humanities play in the examination of war. It was, therefore, only natural to develop an Arts and Humanities R&D Plan that draws upon humanists to inform Army modernisation in order to meet the present and future challenges of war.

The Arts and Humanities R&D Plan is divided into seven sections:

1. Strategy
2. Leadership
3. Logistics
4. Operational Art
5. Professional Military Education
6. Army and Society
7. The Changing Character of War

It was possible to identify additional subject areas and some may be included in a future edition. The Arts and Humanities R&D Plan is meant to be a living document that will evolve changes in the challenges and opportunities war presents, as well of changes in Australian defence requirements. New questions will be added and existing ones will be deleted. Suggestions are welcome for its improvement.

Enquires and suggestions should be directed to:

army.research@defence.gov.au
OBJECTIVE

The objective of the Arts and Humanities R&D plan is to inform Army modernisation in order to build a more capable force. The questions listed here do not necessarily have a single answer and may even need to be reinterpreted as the character of war and the context of Australian society change. The Arts and Humanities R&D plan is aimed at a wide audience, both internal and external to the Australian Defence Community. For example, the questions in this plan can be used by:

- students at the Australian Staff Colleges for research thesis topics
- unit commanders to shape professional development workshops
- academics and independent scholars to develop research proposals for funding through the Army Research Scheme
- organisations and individuals who wish to contribute to the Army’s improvement.

While a more capable force is the objective of the R&D Plan, there is no prescribed pathway to its achievement. Researchers can shape their potential contributions to force modernisation as they see fit and Army will consider contributions ranging in size from a short blog post to a major book. For more information, possible funding and publishing options see the Army’s modernisation website at: www.army.gov.au/Our-Future/Research
STRATEGY

Strategy is the 'way' to achieve a military/political 'end.' It requires thinking about war, interpreting the military implications of political goals, understanding trade-offs and ensuring all efforts are directed to, and consistent with, achieving the 'end'. It also means accepting that the desired 'end' may not be achievable, at an acceptable cost or at all.

Nesting strategy with policy

1. How may Army assist policy makers (politicians and advisers) to understand the theory and practice of strategy?
2. What skill-sets do Army strategists need, to be equipped to give politically aware and politically sound advice?
3. How does the Army ensure that policy ends are nested with realistic and achievable strategic ways and means?
4. What are the obligations of the strategist in the Western model of civil-military relations?

Nesting tactics with strategy

5. How can the Army ensure that tactics and strategy are understood as a Clausewitzian whole?
6. Should Army’s tactics and strategy be considered as a Clausewitzian whole?

Interoperability with OGAs and NGOs

7. How might Army collaborate better with OGAs and NGOs in an inter-agency environment?

Strategy in the Australian context

8. Does Australian strategy exist?
9. Can Australian strategy exist?
10. Should Australian strategy exist?
11. Can a middle power practise strategy?
12. If a middle power cannot practise strategy, what are the implications for the art of war?
13. What is the Army’s role in an Australian maritime strategy?
14. How can the Army contribute to, and/or develop, a long-term strategy for the Indo-Pacific region?
15. How does Australia’s changing societal composition and cultural outlook impact on capability?
16. How might future strategists reduce or remove the 'tyranny of dissonance' from strategy and defence policy?

**Professional Military Education (PME)**

17. How might PME prepare officers for the transition from tactical 'doers' to strategic 'thinkers'?

18. What are the traits of a strategist?

19. How might strategists be identified, nurtured and practiced?

20. How might Army's career progression and promotion system recognise and nurture junior officers with strategic thinking skills?

21. Can the Army learn from the teaching of strategy in Western and/or Asian business schools?

22. Are the current means by which Army strategists are developed in Western military philosophy sufficient?

23. If current development means are not sufficient, how can better means be developed?

**Cultural Interpretations of Strategy**

24. Do other cultural or non-Western texts need to be studied to enhance the Army's understanding of strategy?

25. What authors should be included in the strategic canon?

26. What can the Australian Army learn from other military philosophies?

**Decision Support Tools**

27. What methods and technologies exist to enhance/assist the practice of strategy and/or strategic thinking?

28. What feedback mechanisms exist and how do they provide input into the development and improvement of strategy?

29. What qualitative and quantitative operations analysis techniques should be included in PME and/or provided to strategists?

30. If decision support tools are used, how are they used, who makes the decision and how is the decision made?
LEADERSHIP

Leadership is the act of organising and motivating a group of people to achieve a common goal. In the Army context, this also involves the associated concepts of command (legal authority) and management (best use of resources). Leadership is practised both tactically and strategically and encompasses decision-making and personal influence through to organisational and cultural change.

Generational Expectations of Leadership

31. Should Army identify and adapt to the next generation’s expectations of leaders and leadership?

32. Should Army evolve with the younger generations' desire for a less authoritarian and more collaborative workplaces?

33. Should Army evolve with societal trends for flatter organisational hierarchies?

34. Are there cultural leadership styles that need to be adapted to reflect a future multicultural army?

35. Has Army become less of a vocation and more of a job? Have the resulting changed conditions of service favoured the use of transactional leadership rather than transformational leadership?

36. How do Army leadership styles and organisational culture affect job satisfaction and retention?

Strategic Leadership

37. What is the efficacy of organisational mission and vision statements?

38. What is the appropriateness and efficacy of the 'I am an Australian soldier' creed?

39. How can strategic leaders implement organisational change but remain true to bedrock organisational values?

40. What is the role of the Australian Army Journal and other service publications in promulgating strategic messages?

41. Are the Army's strategic managers disconnected from the middle and junior leaders?

Pastoral Care

42. What is the future role of Chaplains? Can their existence be justified in an increasing secular Australia?

43. Are junior officers sufficiently equipped to provide pastoral care? If not, how may they be?
44. How might the Army recognise the expected holistic leadership responsibilities of junior leaders and better train and equip junior leaders?

**Personality and Leadership**

45. Does the current PME provide the means for individual leaders to discover their own leadership style?

46. Are there 'corps specific' leadership styles that are better suited to certain roles? If so, how might corps allocations/posting better reflect leadership strengths?

**Management and Leadership**

47. Is the balance of managerial skills versus war fighting skills in the ACOTC/ACSTC correct?

48. Is 'transformational leadership' taught but transactional leadership' practised?

49. How might knowledge management (KM) practices and systems assist in the development of leadership?

**Army Leadership Model**

50. Is the Army Leadership Model still workable and/or relevant?

51. Are leadership case studies the best means to teach leadership?

52. Does the Army place too much emphasis on results based leadership and not enough on the development of teams and individuals?

**Emotional Intelligence**

53. How might Army identify officer candidates with high emotional intelligence during the recruiting process?

54. Is emotional intelligence a desirable trait?

55. If emotional intelligence is desirable, how might it be taught?

**Ethical Decision-Making**

56. How might 'soft skills' of such as listening, counselling and providing feedback be taught or improved within leaders?

57. Does the ethical decision-making curriculum in the ACOTC/ACSTC equip officers and soldiers for the new operational environment and ubiquitous media presence?

58. Does an adherence to ethics undermine the will to win?

**Improving Leadership**

59. Does Army value task achievement to the detriment of team and individual needs?
60. How is the current ACOTC/ACSTC positioned to develop leaders for the new operational environment?

61. How might 360 degree reporting be implemented within the Army to improve leadership?

62. How might the Army establish a formal 'mentoring' programme to assist junior leaders discover their own leadership style?
LOGISTICS

Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement, sustainment and maintenance of manpower and equipment. Logistics plays a pivotal role in operations. Planners must take into account logistical requirements and limits. Logisticians must ensure they can support plans and operations. Logistical support must be timely and, in the case of power projection overseas, be so structured to operate over large distances away from the national base. Logistics set the parameters for what is possible in war.

Sustainment and Distribution

63. How might Army reduce its dependency upon its lines of communication?
64. How can Army increase its operational viability in logistically austere environments?
65. What are the resource alternatives that may reduce sustainment requirements in the deployed environment?
66. Should Army's procurement policies aim to reduce the consumption of plastics and disposable items both at home and on operations?
67. What are the possible impacts of the telecommuting 'knowledge worker' on Army's holdings of office space and buildings?
68. What might emerging collaborative Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems offer Army in terms of logistical and resourcing innovations?
69. Is there an imperative for Army to 'go green', or reduce its carbon footprint?

Medical Issues

70. How will the health capability operate in the future operating environment?
71. What are the ramifications of the civilianisation of medical services for the expeditionary strategy/amphibious capability?

Organisational Issues

72. Are Army's logistics issues adequately represented at the political-strategic, military strategic and operational levels? Is there an undue influence/concern on 'tactical' Combat Service Support (CSS) issues?
73. Is Army's relationship with joint agencies effective in the provision of land logistics? Should Army have a much closer relationship to JLC?
74. How can Army better employ / share capabilities that exist in other Services?
75. How can Army better manage its specialist capabilities and personnel?
76. How can Army better coordinate its logistic requirements with coalition partners?
77. Does Army have the force structure balance between Combat, Combat Support and CSS correct?

78. What have been the effects of the centralisation of logistic capability undertaken in Army over the last two decades? Should there be more or less?

79. What logistics compromises and risks are introduced by designing Army to be more expeditionary or amphibious?

80. How can Army improve in its logistics exercising and experimentation?

81. What is the correct balance between contracting and 'in house'? Does this balance change at the force level?

Repair and Recovery

82. How can the traditional back loading of vehicles, for repair and recovery, work in a non-linear battle space?

83. How can Army reduce, or better manage, its repair parts requirements while increasing its level of mechanisation?

84. How vulnerable is Army's maintenance because of its global supply chain dependency?

85. Is there an appropriate level of original equipment manufacturer involvement within Army's maintenance capabilities?

Military Policing

86. How will the traditional military police roles of route control and prisoner of war back loading be conducted in future?

Force Protection

87. Can logistics units protect themselves in a non-linear battle space?

Logistics in the future battle space

88. How might Army better predict its future logistics requirements?

89. How can Army develop more resilient supply chain networks to support land operations?

90. What logistic capabilities should be developed to improve the flexibility of Army's combat elements?

91. Can Army and the ADF better employ third-party logistic providers?

92. Can Army reconcile the requirement to maintain adequate logistic support in a deployed environment, with the desire to keep the logistic footprint light?

93. Are contemporary technological achievements an effective substitute for logistics?
94. What is the role of basing in the projection of strategic land power?
95. What is the relationship between increased combat power and sustainment?
96. How will the cost and increasing complexity of weapons systems affect military logistics systems?
97. How could Army's logistics force elements be structured or designed to support HADR tasks? Should they?
98. How might Army generate, lead or harness future change in military logistics?
99. What is the effect of the Internet of Things (IoT), embedded and wearable computers on military logistics?
100. What lessons from business can Army learn with regards to efficiency within supply chains?
101. What capabilities does Army require from a national mobilisation plan, if one is required at all?
102. What are the logistics requirements for maritime strategy or the 'Maritime Strategy' from Defence White Paper 2016?
103. What are the implications of any disruption to globalised supply chains on Army's logistics systems and preparedness?
104. Are Army's and the ADF's IT systems postured or future requirements?
105. Is the distinction between Combat, Combat Support and CSS relevant?
106. Is Army overly dependent on contractors or coalition support in the provision of land logistics? Is there an appropriate balance, and if so, what is it?
107. Does the logistics PME require more emphasis on working in a deployed, joint, coalition environment?
108. If so, what needs to be done? How else might we improve interoperability with joint and coalition capabilities?
109. How may UAVs be integrated into Army logistics system?
110. Under what circumstances will additive manufacturing be practically useful for units at the tactical level?
111. How can Army's CSS force elements better support dispersed combat force elements? Are they a limiting factor in the level of dispersal?
112. Are 'lines of supply / support' applicable in the contemporary battle space?
OPERATIONAL ART

Operational Art is the process to achieve strategic aims with structured and skilful use of the available military forces. It is the level of war which links strategic ends with tactical means. Operational art crafts ‘ways’-campaigns and major operations that sequence tactical actions to synchronise effects.

The Australian Way of War

113. Do we understand our national capacity for war?
114. Is there an Australian Way of War?
115. What is the role of risk in future operations?
116. Should the Australian Army prepare for war in a general sense, or for a particular type of war?

Cognitive Skills

117. What are the characteristics/qualities of the operational level commander?

Defining the Operational Level of War

118. How might the Army build up its body of knowledge on the operational level of war?
119. If tactical actions have strategic consequences, is there an operational level of war?
120. Has the operational level of war created unnecessarily large headquarters disproportionate to the size of forces under command?
121. Has the creation of the operational level distanced political guidance from the running of the war?
122. How can the operational level of war seek, control and coordinate other agencies or strategic assets?
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

Professional Military Education (PME) comprises the fundamental study of war and warfare – it is the 'why' of the Australian profession of arms. PME should therefore be based on a deep, thorough and systematic study of military history, coupled with the more technical 'how', that is the way the military operates in war and peace. PME should be continual and supported by an organisational culture that craves learning. PME should be deep, prolonged and challenging and therefore differs to training which is routine and functional.

The prerequisites of PME

123. What does Army want and/or need from PME?

124. Is the Australian Army anti-intellectual?

125. How can the Army attract and retain thinkers to develop and enhance PME?

126. Should the ACOTC/ACSTC be reprioritised? Is there enough time to conduct PME?

127. How might PME transition from functional instruction to deeper learning?

128. Are Army officers educated enough in the right areas to lead and conduct PME?

129. Is the Army too focussed on technology when discussing modernisation? Could the enhancement of PME achieve better results?

The centrality of military history in PME

130. What is the point and purpose of military history in PME?

131. Does the culture of the Army appreciate history as a war fighting enabler? If not how might this be changed?

132. How can the deep and thorough study of military history be made the cornerstone of PME?

133. Without a thorough grounding in military history in PME, what have been the ramifications for doctrinal development in the Australian Army?

134. What are the ramifications for the Australian profession of arms if it is unanchored in an understanding of the past?

135. How can the Army implement the teaching and deep study of military history across all rank levels?

Delivery Mechanisms

136. What is the appropriate balance between education and training?
137. How might Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) be a means to develop and transmit PME?

138. How might the Army's online CAMPUS be used to develop and transmit PME?

139. What are the cost benefits for PME to be delivered online?

140. What shortcomings/detriments are there for delivering PME online?

141. How might simulations and technology assist in the delivery of PME?

Knowledge Management (KM)

142. What KM policies need to be in place to assist the delivery of PME?

PME and Academia

143. Should a university degree be a prerequisite for being an officer?

144. Is the West Point model with uniformed, PhD qualified officers as lecturers at ADFA/RMC suitable for the Australian Army? Is it possible or achievable? What are the strengths/weaknesses of such a system?

145. Does a PME regulatory/advisory body need to be created? If so, what would be its composition?

146. Should the Army consider sponsoring chairs of military history/post doctoral scholarships/PhDs in Australian universities? Can the Army follow industry/university collaboration models for the delivery of targeted PME?

147. Has ADFA provided sufficient military historical teaching and researching support to deliver PME?

148. Does the ROTC/US college model have any utility in an Australian context?

149. Do non-ADFA staff cadets receive enough PME at RMC?
ARMY AND SOCIETY

Army and Society covers all aspects of the Army's interaction with society, including the polity, community and private industry. This interaction and relationship is two-way and this line of effort will study the influences one has on the other.

The Army and Diversity

150. Are there other opportunity costs in mandating diversity in Army?
151. Can Army ever take an unpopular stand on diversity issues in the age of social media?

Army Culture and Symbolism

152. Has Army's culture been 'Americanised'?
153. If so, what is the effect of the Americanisation of Army culture?
154. How can Army balance its British traditions with the Americanisation of its culture and doctrine? Should it do so?
155. What are the ramifications of a modern professional army basing its culture and traditions on part-time and/or wartime volunteer history?
156. Has the ANZAC tradition outlived its usefulness?
157. Should more Army commemorations be based on post 1947 actions undertaken by the ARA?
158. Should the symbol of Army remain the infantryman? Or is a different symbol more appropriate for future war?

The Army and Family

159. Can the profession of arms realistically provide work life balance?
160. Can Army realistically provide flexible work arrangements (FWA)? Are FWA the preserve of a small part of the Army and thus a fairness issue?
161. Does Army need to provide childcare on bases as a condition of service?
162. Does the location of Army's bases undermine the ability of professional spouses to find work? If yes, what is the effect on retention, if any?
163. Does the Army posting cycle undermine the ability of professional spouses to build careers? If yes, what is the effect on retention, if any?

The Army and the changing nature of Australian society

164. How might Army's idea of esprit de corps and community evolve to meet the idea of a virtual community and connectedness?
165. Can Army positively influence diets, exercise, sleeping patterns and lifestyles in general to create a healthier workforce?

166. What is the impact of Australia’s declining birth rate and aging population on Army?

167. Has Army retreated to garrison towns? Is Army at risk of becoming disconnected from Australian society?

168. Should Army's ethos and values be better than or reflect contemporary society?

169. Is there a 'tipping point' where it is no longer economically feasible for desirable for Army to recruit from and reflect all of society?

170. Is the current generation’s preference for individualism contrary to military values? How might this be changed?

171. What is the effect of the secularisation of Australian society? Does a lack of religious grounding result in ethical decision-making issues?

172. Is serving in Army, in any capacity, a right?

173. Are the Reserves being used efficiently? Is the existence of Reserves contrary to the notion of military professionalism?

174. Can the Reserves be used more creatively to bring in subject matter experts? Can the SSO construct be used to commission 'captains of industry' and so forth?

175. Does the Army benefit from the Australian Army Cadets? If not, how may it do so?

The Army and the Military Contract

176. Will social and political imperatives place an undue strain on medical resources to ensure a near zero loss of life from battlefield casualties?

177. Can the British Army's long experience with ethnic regiments be a template for the Army to recruit from newer demographics in Australian society?

178. Has the civilianisation of support roles decreased the number of military jobs with a direct civilian counterpart? What effect does this have in recruiting/retention?

179. What is the second order effects of using the term 'warrior' in lieu of 'soldier'?

180. Have changes in conditions of service affected the attractiveness of military service?

Civil-Military Relations

181. What is the nature of the Australian civil-military relationship? Is it effective? Does it exist?
182. Should soldiers/officers be publically active in politics?

183. What has been/is the consequence of limited numbers of parliamentarians with military experience?

184. Should soldiers/officers voice opinions on social media or publically? What effect does this have on the perception of an objective, apolitical military?

**The Army and Veterans’ Issues**

185. At what point does the Army's duty of care end?

186. What should the Army's relationship with veterans' organisations be?

187. Is there any relationship between military service and success/failure in finding civilian employment?

188. What is the workplace's perception of ex-military personnel?

189. Has Army culture allowed for the rise of an entitled veterans' culture?

**Australian society's perceptions of war**

190. Does the Australian public see the waging of war as a legitimate act?

191. Would Australian society accept war by proxies as a means to counter casualty aversion?

192. Does Australian society understand jus ad bello?

193. How might Australian society be prepared for the realities of war?

194. How might Army reconcile its preference for expeditionary warfare with public perceptions?

195. What preparatory opinion shaping must Army conduct to make this acceptable to the Australian public?

196. Does unfettered access by the news media on operations create opportunities for exploitation by weaker opponents?

197. How might Army better use social media and the 24-hour news cycle to influence public opinion?

**Recruiting and retention**

198. What is the effect of a reduced Army presence in Sydney and Melbourne on drawing from the two largest recruiting catchments?

199. Would a 'GI Bill' re-establish greater links with wider society and be a tool for recruitment?

200. Is the Army's fundamental recruiting message correct?
Domestic Operations/DACC/ DACP

201. How does Army ensure it has the operational resilience necessary to conduct the full range of military operations after domestic disasters or attacks?

202. Do future Army installations need to integrate support for domestic operations into their core missions and capabilities?

203. How do Army forces support civil authorities in response to complex catastrophes and disasters in complex urban environments?

204. How does Army respond to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) events within Australia?
THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WAR

The changing character of war recognises that while war's nature is fixed, its character changes and evolves based on context, technology, organisation and other external factors. This line of enquiry seeks to discover the ramifications of the future character of war.

Future Doctrine

205. Are Army's learning loops and Knowledge Management procedures robust enough to inform future doctrine?

206. Is doctrine overly influenced by Counter Insurgency (COIN) theory?

207. How does Army contribute to and positively influence the creation of joint doctrine?

208. How might Army adopt a realistic urban warfare doctrine noting that it will never be able to generate the force ratios to operate in a heavily urbanised area?

209. Is Army serious about 'mission command?' How will it ensure the primacy of mission command within its doctrine amid the culture of strategic reach down and risk avoidance?

210. Is Army supported by a cogent joint fires doctrine that allows dispersed formations within the battle space?

211. Does the content, format and manner in which orders are crafted and delivered need to change to facilitate operations in the future battle space?

212. Should the fundamental precepts of tactics and its teaching be revised to recognise the likelihood of fighting in urban terrain rather than the open?

213. What is the optimum balance of force protection and mobility for infantry soldiers? Has Army's culture of casualty aversion meant that its soldiers are 'too armoured'? Is there ever a scenario where heavily armoured 'heavy infantry' would be preferable to mobile 'light infantry'?

214. How far is the Army prepared to engage the littoral battle space? Does this include riverine inlets? If so what doctrinal, force structure, equipment ramifications does this have?

The future battle space

215. Is cyberwar, war?

216. Can Army, in conjunction with other government agencies, predict the likelihood of failed states?

217. What would Army's role be if deployed to a failed state?

218. Is public opinion part of the battle space or an adjunct to it? How may Army conduct its core roles without alienating public opinion? Does this have an
impact on planning at all levels? What role does Army have in educating/changing/consolidating public opinion? Can Army ever have the policies, procedures or training in place that minimise the chance of its members engaging in strategically damaging activities?

219. What scenarios could see Army used on Australian soil beyond aid to the community? Is there a debate to be had in the context of the wider understanding of security?

220. If climate change is real, what is the impact on the future battle space? Will weather affect radio spectrums? Do soldiers need more sun protection? Does increased water consumption effect tactical options due to logistical considerations?

221. How has the 'fallacy of the precise engagement' influenced TTPs, R and D and even the Western Way of War?

222. How does the Army strike the same balance with its armoured vehicles balancing deployability with survivability? Is a medium weight army possible in the age of increasingly lethal and cheap anti-armour weapons?

223. Would/should the Army consider pharmaceutical or technological enhancements to soldiers?

224. Would/should the Army accept fully autonomous drones or combat robots? What moral guidance and decision-making programming would they need?

225. Would the use of combat robots further disconnect society from the realities and ramifications of war?

Future Organisations

226. Are Western militaries too bureaucratic to adapt faster than their enemies?

227. What is the future of SOCOMD? Will SOCOMD forces continue to be the operational choice for the government?

228. What has been the long-term retarding effect on conventional forces by the use of SOCOMD forces in operations traditionally assigned to conventional forces?

229. Has the capability of modern Command and Control (C²) created strategic corporals and tactical generals?

230. Is it possible for the modern military organisation to adopt a horizontal C² structure in lieu of the current vertical one?

231. The technological preconditions for swarming and dispersed operations are present but how far is the Army prepared to overhaul its C² and organisations to facilitate swarming?

232. Is the MCB Brigade the correct formation for the repository of enablers such as fires, protected mobility and armour? Should these enablers be grouped at lower level of command such as company, platoon or even section?
233. How might the doctrine and processes for the planning and executing of ISR at Combat Bde HQ be achieved? How might a Combat Brigade harness all the ISR capabilities available to it?

234. Has the reduction in combat-power autonomy of the Combat Brigade placed too great a C² and CSS coordination point of failure at Brigade HQ, and what is the appropriate response to this unintended growth of these additional coordination and synchronisation burdens?

235. How will the Army ensure that 'big data' C² systems enhance the tactical level and not produce strategic reach down? Is there a cultural/doctrinal/technological solution?

236. Will combined-arms organisations ever be maintained other than as ad hoc responses to current operations?

237. What is the next evolution of Infantry? Should Infantry Battalions be dismounted with access to mobility or be specialised eg light, mechanised, motorised?

238. Is an infantry battalion the best organisation for the basis of the amphibious task group? Should this evolve into something else?

239. Is the balance of enablers to combat units correct?

240. Can the enabling capabilities deploy constantly in the case of a long war?

241. Are ad hoc liaison officers still suitable for increased inter-agency operations in the future? If not, what specialisations or embedded personnel are required for these future operations?

242. How can the trend for ever-increasing size of headquarters be remedied?

243. Can headquarters operate in a different manner (ie dispersed nodes) in order to minimise their size and signature?

244. In the age of joint operations, can Army influence the force structure of the other services to ensure they have they necessary redundancy for prolonged operations?

245. Does the Army have enough organic firepower-or access to naval/air support to facilitate dispersed manoeuvre/swarming?

Wars of Religion

246. Is the West encountering a 'long war' with radical Islam? If so, what must the Army do to prepare for it?

247. How might Army recruit and appeal to Muslims if its raison d'etre is to fight radical Islam?

248. Is the West's understanding and use of COIN suitable for engaging with Islam and countering Islamist threats?
Wars for Resources

249. What are the nature of conflicts that are exacerbated by resource depletion (eg lack of resources as stress multiplier)?

250. What role does Army have in protecting our off-and onshore resources that may be desirable to foreign powers?

Convergence of FLWR Meta-Trends

251. How might Army focus on the FLWR meta-trends and the changing character of war while understanding that the nature of war remains unchanged?

252. Has research and development and/or military theory and writing generally been too focussed on the changing character of war and neglected a deep, broad and consistent understanding of the nature of war?

253. What are the ramifications of mixing different belief systems with the future operating environment trend convergence? Can the post-modern secular West understand it? What effects does cultural relativism have in hindering the West's responses?

Nations' abilities to wage war

254. Can Australia's taxation base support high technology defence expenditure?

255. Will wars of choice be too expensive? What is the ramification for alliance maintenance?

256. Have the Western nations' pursuit of 'equality' fundamentally misunderstood the nature of war?

257. Should Army undertake more 'self-advocacy' on its core functions to counter popular notions of R2P and HADR?

Mentoring, Advising and Indigenous Capacity Building

258. How does the Army conduct such mission planning that enables Whole of Government objectives?

259. What changes in training and PME need to be made to ensure that the Army and its soldiers deliver the best results for host nation forces being trained/mentored/advised?

Expeditionary Forces

260. How can Australian amphibious-based manoeuvre elements leverage sea basing and the sea as manoeuvre space to overcome enemy anti-access capabilities? What capabilities must be developed to make this functional?

261. What capabilities are required to protect early entry forces from enemy anti-access weapons and technologies?